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An Efficient Mutual Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things
An Efficient Mutual Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things
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An Efficient Mutual Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things ´ s Pitner Bacem Mbarek, Mouzhi Ge, Tomaˇ PII: DOI: Reference:
S2542-6605(20)30003-2 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2020.100160 IOT 100160
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Internet of Things
Received date: Revised date: Accepted date:
15 December 2019 29 December 2019 29 December 2019
´ s Pitner, An Efficient Mutual Authentication Please cite this article as: Bacem Mbarek, Mouzhi Ge, Tomaˇ Scheme for Internet of Things, Internet of Things (2020), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2020.100160
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An Efficient Mutual Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things Bacem Mbareka,∗, Mouzhi Gea , Tom Pitnera a Faculty
of Informatics, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
Abstract The Internet of Things (IoT) is developed to facilitate the connections and data sharing among people, devices, and systems. Among the infrastructural IoT techniques, Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) has been used to enable the proliferation and communication in IoT networks. However, the RFID techniques usually suffer from security issues due to the inherent weaknesses of underlying wireless radio communications. One of the main security issues is the authentication vulnerability from the jamming attack. In order to tackle the vulnerabilities of key updating algorithms, this paper therefore proposes an efficient authentication scheme based on the self-adaptive and mutual key updating. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance and applicability of our solution with a thorough simulation by taking into account the energy consumption, authentication failure rate and authentication delay. The feasibility and applicability are demonstrated by implementing the proposed authentication scheme in smart home IoT systems. Keywords: Internet of Things, RFID, authentication, jamming attack, IoT security
∗I
am corresponding author Email addresses: [email protected] (Bacem Mbarek), [email protected] (Mouzhi Ge), [email protected] (Tom Pitner)
Preprint submitted to Internet of Things
January 7, 2020
1. Introduction Nowadays, the Internet of Things (IoT) are developed to interconnect a wide variety of objects via wireless sensors, mobile phones, and other devices [1][2]. IoT has significantly influenced our daily lives [3][4], for example, smart home IoT systems usually use a mobile application to connect and control different home devices such as power plugins, lights, cooking devices, temperature and humidity sensors as well as security systems [5] [6]. One of the enabling technologies for IoT is Radio Frequency IDentification(RFID) system. A typical RFID system consists of tags as well as readers [7]. A tag, which is typically a microchip connected to an antenna and then attached to a household object as its identifier, communicates with a RFID reader using radio waves. Because of the their low cost, RFID technologies are widely used to increase efficiency through accurate object identification and data collection with non-line-of-sight [8]. Due to the advantages of RFID, RFID technologies become a prevalent infrastructural component of IoT applications [8]. However, there exists several security concerns when preventing illegitimate users and devices from unauthorized usage of IoT resources [9]. For example in a smart home IoT system, IoT security breach can result in privacy disclosure and economic loss [10]. The IoT security breach is usually because of the authentication vulnerability [11] [12]. A variety of authentication schemes have been proposed to tackle the authentication vulnerability in IoT [13], among others, most used authentication scheme in RFID is that the RFID reader gets the encrypted message from the tag, identifies the tag with the disclosed key that will be updated after each successful authentication. However, if a jamming attack occurs during key updates, it may disturb the operation from transceivers, so that the tag cannot receive the message from the reader and does not update its secret information while the reader updates the tag’s secret information. After this attack, the secret information will be inconsistent between the reader and the tag. Therefore, the further authentication will fail. In order to address the jamming attacks in RFID systems, this paper is
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extending our work of [14] and propose a new authentication protocol with a robust key updating scheme. Our solution consists of enhancing the authentication process against jamming attacks by using previous keys as a trust-based parameters for additional transparency and traceability during transactions between RFID tags and readers. To this end, the tag appends MAC address as message authentication codes with different keys, which includes the updated key and the previous keys. Thus, a reader can verify the received MAC authenticity with the updating key or with the N previous keys. If the reader fails to authenticate with the updated key, the reader still can use the previous keys for authentication. This will in turn increase the robustness and tolerance of the authentication scheme. In the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes and revisits a typical RFID protocol and its security concerns. Section 3 discusses the state-of-the-art solutions that have been proposed to solve the RFID security breach. Based on the related work, Section 4 proposes a new solution that can dynamically authenticate the RFID keys. In order to evaluate the proposed solution, Section 5 conducts a security analysis simulation by considering authentication failure rate, energy consumption and authentication delay. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines future works for this paper.
2. RFID Protocol and Security Concerns RFID device is an essential infrastructure in an IoT network to remotely identify wireless objects without physical or visual contact. A RFID system typically consists of two electronic chips, a reader and a tag [15]. RFID tags support the reception within a range of a few meters and high-speed communication. The tags are usually constructed as a network to work collaboratively. A typical communication between a reader and a tag is described as follows. A reader queries a tag to obtain the tag’s contents though RF (Radio frequency) interface. Moreover, by authenticating a tag to a reader, a tag should be ready to open its information to a reader.
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RFID tags are usually largely deployed in IoT and thus, an adversary could inject misleading information in the network and even fool other nodes, making them believe it is an authentic device. Therefore, it is important to protect RFID tags against all types of attacks. In RFID systems, an adversary may monitor all the messages transmitted between a reader and a tag. The adversary can also infringe upon a user’s privacy using various methods. Therefore, RFID systems must be designed to be protected from attacks such as eavesdropping and impersonation. We have summarized three typical RFID security concerns in IoT applications as follows. Confidentiality: An attacker may try to access the information to IoT devices without authorizations. Confidentiality should be ensured by using encryption algorithms. Cryptography encrypts message to generate an illegible text [16]. Key confidentiality is to protect the key so that it can only be recovered by authorized tags. Authentication: Key authentication is to provide assurance to authorized tags that the key is distributed by certain reader but not from an attacker. Jamming attack can be a critical problem for authentication procedure between the reader and the tag [17]. Jamming is one of many exploits to compromise the wireless environment. It works by denying service to authorized users as legitimate traffic, which is jammed by the overwhelming frequencies of illegitimate traffic. Data integrity: Physical attack is a viable method of compromising the integrity of a device, hence an attacker upon compromising a tag may be able to read its secret values like keys and link this tag with past actions performed on the tag. A key freshness should be ensured by tags and a compromised key cannot be reused for authentication request [18]. Forward privacy ensures that messages transmitted now will still be secure in the future, even after compromising the tag. RFID tags encrypt authentication messages to RFID reader, and the reader searches the key space to locate the tags. Due to the lack of efficient key updating algorithms, previous schemes are vulnerable to jamming attacks. For 4
example, an attacker generates a jamming signal, so that the tag cannot receive the message from the reader and does not update its secret information while the reader updates the tag’s secret information. After this attack, the secret information will be inconsistent between the reader and the tag. Therefore, the authentication will fail. Hence, the individual keys will be updated dynamically, with respect to the defense against jamming attacks. Suppose the reader keeps only the current keys per tag. Then, the authentication will be failed. In Figure 1, we present an example of jamming attack which can be seen by the update of RFID keys.
Figure 1: RFID protocols with a key update phase that suffer from jamming attack
3. Related Works Different research threads focus on security and privacy concerns of RFID technologies. Thus, the primary focus is on the protection of tags and readers against several well-known kinds of jamming attacks that can have a large ef-
5
fect on data quality and network resources. The practical most used solution is to update keys for a tag after each authentication so that the attacker cannot make use of keys obtained from compromised tags to attack uncompromised ones. Jamming attack is one of the main issues for RFID systems [19]. In this attack, electromagnetic jamming is carried out to prevent tags from communicating with readers [20]. However, many updating key architectures are still not capable of efficiently updating the key in the presence of the jamming attacks. This problem motivates us to propose a new authentication scheme to secure RFID against the jamming attacks. Mostly used authentication scheme in RFID is that the RFID reader gets the encrypted message from the tag, identifies the tag with the disclosed key that will be updated after each successful authentication. However, previous update keys schemes suffer from both jamming and cloning attacks [14][21]. For example, an attacker can lunch a jamming signal in order to disturb the transceivers’ operation, so that the tag cannot receive the message from the reader and does not update its secret information while the reader updates the tag’s secret information. After this attack, the secret information will be inconsistent between the reader and the tag. Therefore, the authentication will fail. Furthermore, several studies have proposed solutions to related problems, including access control (e.g., [22, 23] ), key agreement (e.g., [14, 24, 25]), and data upload (e.g.,[26, 27]). In [28], the authors have proposed a Triangle Based Security Algorithm (TBSA) for data encryption based on an efficient key generation mechanism. The author have claimed that the algorithm can provide secure data transmission over a long converge range. In [24], the authors have presented an enhanced secure network architecture to diagnose security threats in a smart home. In [22], the authors have explored how permission models can prevent overrides in smart networks. They have concluded that smarthome apps are automatically overprivileged, which can leave users vulnerable to various remote attacks. In [25], the authors have proposed a secure remote user authentication scheme for limited resource devices in smart home systems. 6
In [27], the authors have introduced a lightweight and secure session key establishment scheme to meet the requirement of smart home systems. The authors have improved this scheme into an anonymous secure framework. In [29], the authors have proposed a real-time passive RFID localization protocol to locate users locations in smart homes. The entire system relies on an innovative model of elliptical trilateration with several filters, as well as on an ingenious representation of activities with spatial zones. In [15], the authors have described an enhancement of an existing mutual authentication protocol called TAP protocol (Tuan Anh Plan mutual authentication protocol) by deploying a key update strategy. The proposed enhancement has, however, some deficiencies when jamming attacks occur. For example, an attacker can lunch a jamming signal in order to disturb the transceivers’ operation, so that the reader cannot receive the message from the tag and does not update its secret information while the tag updates its information. Another variation of the previous scheme is proposed in [30], in which a hash-chain mechanism is used to protect against tracking and ensure forward security in tag transactions. Again, the tag replies back with different values, but its secret ID changes with every response through the application of a hash function. However, just as in the previous scheme scalability is problematic as it requires exhaustive search in the back-end database to locate the ID of the tag. Although in [31] authors propose a challenge-response scheme that allows for more efficient identification. The protocol involves three messages per round and allows for mutual authentication of both the tag and the reader. However, this protocol uses O(log N) communication rounds, where N is the number of possible tags in the system. Hence, one drawback of this scheme is that it cannot be applied to legacy systems in which a reader makes only one request and the tag responds with a simple value. A performance enhancement of randomization-based authentication is proposed in recent work [32], a simple protocol has been presented in which the both the tag and the reader use a random number generation and only a bitwise operations, i.e., bitwise XOR and rotation operations which makes it an ultra-lightweight solution for mutual 7
authentication between reader and the RFID tag. More recently, authors in [40] proposed an effective approaches to providing a certificateless authentication protocol which is rooted in a novel ECC-based pairing free certificateless signature scheme. However, ECC protocol is vulnerable to jamming attacks and DoS attacks. However, due to the fact that limited resources can be used to protect the transmitted data at tag side, the wireless channel between the reader and the tag may be attacked by different kinds of existing and potential methods. Based on our literature review, we found that the RFID authentication schemes in IoT networks can be classified into three categories, which are tree based authentication, randomized access control, and third-party authentication. For each category, in Table 1, we have summarized the advantages as well as limitations of the very scheme. It can be seen that one fundamental issue of the previously proposed authentication approaches appear to be vulnerable with jamming attacks. Therefore this paper tackles RFID authentication by considering the jamming attack, which is a critical security problem in IoT research.
4. SAM: Self-adaptive RFID Authentication Scheme This section provides a detailed description of our proposed authentication solution, which includes the self-adaptive authentication mechanism as well as the authentication algorithms for the reader and tag. We propose a Self-adaptive Authentication Mechanism (SAM) capable of authenticating entities in IoT network through an RFID tags technology, that aims to resolve the problem of jamming attack. Then, the reader only needs to store the previous commitment keys for each tag. If the reader fails to authenticate with the updated key, the reader can use the previous keys. Since N previous tags-keys are stored in the reader. For each authentication, the reader generates a MAC (message authentication code) encrypted with the updated key ad generates N MACs encrypted with N previous keys. The format of each send query is as follows.
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Table 1: RFID authentication protocols
Scheme
Paper
Description
The tree based au-
[33][31]
Dynamic
thentication
[34]
Updating
using the
a
based
key-tree
Advantages key- Defend
scheme.
Limitations against vulnerable
compromise
with
jam-
attacks and resolve ming
at-
the problem.
scalability tacks,
DoS
attacks, cloning attacks
Randomized Access
[15][35]
The reader gener-
Defend against the vulnerable
control
[36]
ates a random num-
compromise attacks with
jam-
[30][32]
ber R and uses it to
ming
at-
updates the shared
tacks,
key with the tag.
cloning attacks, DoS attacks. Defend against the vulnerable
Third-party
au- [37][38][39] A third part al-
thentication
lows the RFID-tag
compromise attacks with
jam-
to verify a valid au-
ming
at-
thentication.
tacks, Cloning attacks, DoS attacks.
9
S = M AC(kupdated , M )||M AC(ki , M ), M AC(ki−1 , M ), ..., M AC(ki−N +1 , M ) 4.1. Authentication Algorithm Algorithm 1 Authentication Procedure on the Reader The reader generates a random value R and computes k = k ⊕ R if k ⊕ R is not unique then the reader regenerates R until k ⊕ R becomes unique. else if k ⊕ R is unique then Server encrypts the updated key with the previous key Ki (kupdated ) and sends it to the tag. if update keys are lost due to packet loss or jamming attacks. then The reader can communicate with the tag using N previous keys. The reader creates and sends the following structure to the tag. S =< kupdated (M )||ki (M ), ki−1 (M ), ...., ki−N +1 (M ) > end if end if At the beginning, the reader and the tag have the same shared key k. The ID of each tag is stored on the reader and on the memory of tag. The reader generates a code MAC M encrypted with the updated key kupdated (M ) and generates N M ACs encrypted with N previous keys ki (M ), ki−1 (M ), ...., ki−N +1 (M ). Algorithms 1 and 2 describe the proposed authentication procedure between the reader and the tag. In the following algorithms, the authentication is conducted in mutual ways. By authenticating a reader to a tag and by authenticating a tag to a reader. The first algorithm describes the different authentication steps by the reader. The reader updates the sharing common secret key by xored the current key Ki with a random value R, and checks whether the new key is unique. If it is not unique, the reader regenerates R until it becomes unique. Then, after updating and sending the key. The reader will communicate with the tag with the new updated key and N previous keys. The readers have the property that if the 10
updated keys are lost, they can be recomputed using previous keys. Therefore, even if some disclosed keys are lost due to packet loss or jamming attacks, the tag still can recover the key from the previous keys and check the authenticity of messages. The second algorithm describes the authentication procedure in the tag after updating the key, whereby the tag can verify the reader with the updated key or with the N previous sharing common keys. Algorithm 2 Authentication Procedure on the Tag The Tag checks Kupdated (M ) if it is correct then The reader is authenticated. else if it is not correct then Tag checks ki (M ), ki−1 (M ), ...., ki−N +1 (M ). if the previous keys are authenticated then The reader is authenticated else if failed then The message will be considered forged and the authentication will failed. The tag would need to inform the reader and the reader would need to retransmit the updated key. end if end if In the most IoT RFID systems, the communication complexity refers to the amount of data transmitted between the reader and the tag in the RFID authentication algorithm [41]. Let C(n) be the communication complexity of RFID-algorithm, CR(n) is the reader-side communication complexity, CT (n) is the tag-side communication complexity, and they satisfy the following relationship: C(n) = CR(n) + CT (n). Our authentication algorithm reduces the effect of jamming attacks as soon as possible using two manners for providing authentication (current and previous keys). This later method reduces the communication overhead in the presence of jamming attacks compared to the other typical RFID-algorithms. 11
4.2. Security Analysis The key-updating is employed after a tag successfully performs its identification with the reader. The main drawback of previous dynamic key-updating algorithms for private authentication in RFID systems is the vulnerability to jamming attacks. An attacker can disrupt network operation by launching a jamming signal, so that the tag updates its key while the reader cannot update its key at the cause or the consequences of jamming attack. Then, the secret information will be inconsistent between the tag and the RFID reader and the authentication will be failed. The security rationale behind the our RFID authentication scheme is that it particularly provides any given RFID reader with alternatives when the security key of a tag is not updated correctly due to some attacks. To this end, our scheme relies on previous keys as a trust-based parameters derived from historical transactions between the reader and the tag.
5. Evaluations In order to evaluate the self-adaptive authentication protocol, we used the NS-2.35 simulator [42] to analyze the performance of the SAM scheme in terms of energy consumption and percentage of authentication failure. We run our simulations 50 times on a large scale network with 800 tags and one reader that initiates the communication in every iteration with all the settings provided in the Table 2. We assume that all tags have a fixed position throughout the period of simulation. 5.1. The average of authentication failure rate We evaluate the average of authentication failure rate between the reader and the tag, with varying the number of jamming attacks. Figure 2 shows the percentage of authentication failure versus the number of jamming attacks. We found that SAM have a significantly low percentage than the TAP protocol. The main reason is that SAM protocol uses the two authentication ways (with
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Table 2: Simulation parameters
Parameter
Value
Simulation time
100 s
Run times
50 times
Number of tags
800
Number of reader
1
Mobility
None
current updated key and the with previous keys), while with TAP protocol the reader keeps only the current keys per tag. When a jamming attacks occurs, the tag will not receive the updated key and the authentication will fail.
Figure 2: Evaluation of authentication failure between the reader and the tags
Figure 2 depicts the results for the percentage of authentication failure between the SAM and TAP approaches. In particular, it shows that the percentage of of authentication failure is lower with SAM, especially when the number of jamming attack is high i.e., above 10. For instance, with TAP, we can de13
tect around 80% of the forged packets while only 60% are are failed with SAM because it uses two authentication ways which are current and N previous keys. 5.2. Energy consumption We also evaluate the energy consumption of SAM and TAP protocols by varying the number of jamming attacks. Figure 3 reports the impact of this attack on energy consumption. From this figure, we obtained three interesting outcomes. The first outcome is that by increasing the number of jamming attacks, the energy consumption increases for all the studied protocols. For instance, when the number of jamming attacks is equal to 6, SAM and TAP consume more than 30 J.
Figure 3: Evaluation of energy consumption
The second outcome is that SAM has a low energy consumption compared to TAP, when increasing the number of forged packets. One explanation to this phenomenon is that authentication in our solution will be done with the current and the previous keys in case of jamming attack, and the authentication process will continue by the decryption of N encrypted MACs with N previous keys; while for TAP the authentication will not succeed in the presence of jamming
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attack and the reader needs to repeat the procedure many times until the receiver gets the updated key. The third outcome is that without attack, SAM incurs higher communication overhead. This may be explained by the fact that in order to encrypt message, the SAM protocol needs to search N keys (previous keys) and use them to encrypt N MACs; while with TAP protocol the reader creates and sends only one MAC with the current key. 5.3. Authentication delay Figure 4 shows the evaluation result of the authentication delay of our proposed SAM protocol. The authentication delay is defined as a delay between the real reception and the authentication of packets [43, 43]. The packet loss rate refers to the number of sent packets minus the number of received packets in a portion of time [44, 45, 46]. By varying the packet loss rate, from figure 4, we can see two interesting outcomes. The first outcome is that with increasing the loss rate, the authentication delay increases. For instance, when the loss rate=20%, the authentication delay is about 0.51 seconds; while for loss rate=60%, the authentication delay is about 0.9 seconds. When there is a packet loss because of jamming attack, our proposed SAM protocol does not need to revisit the tag and open more communication channel. This will therefore result in more efficient authentication. The second outcome is that the authentication delay is between (5×100ms) and (10×100ms) which is a reasonable time. 5.4. Implementation of SAM in smart home IoT systems In order to demonstrate the feasibility and applicability for the proposed authentication scheme, the SAM scheme is implemented in the context of a smart home IoT systems, which controls household appliances remotely and realizes real-time monitoring of home security status through RFID technology. This system consists of RFID tags that are coupled with the household hardware to control the functions for these devices and collect important information from diagnosis, operation, and failures. In smart home IoT environment, we take into consideration that many tags are installed to formulate a sensorbased
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Figure 4: Authentication delay
network that will use SAM scheme to ensure the authentication between the RFID reader and the tags which are plugged into home appliances. As SAM is an authentication scheme, applying SAM in smart home requires limited efforts and changes in the existing smart home information systems. Thus, it can be easily integrated to the sensor network in smart home. In a smart home IoT system, the householder is equipped with a RFID reader and navigates from one room to another to control the different household appliances which are deployed in the smart space [10]. All the appliances that intend to communicate with the central mobile reader in the network should be authenticated using the SAM scheme attached to each connected home appliance. This is to prevent malicious modifications, and phishing information exchange. Each home appliance represented by its tag which appends MACs with different keys (with the updated key and the previous keys of each tag). The receiver home appliance will decrypt the received messages by using the update key and/or by using N previous keys against jamming and cloning attacks. It can be seen that not only in smart home, the SAM scheme can be generalized to other information systems as soon as organization structure and authentication methods are similar to smart home. As far as we found, the SAM scheme can be also used in smart building [47], smart grid [48], smart tourism [49], and smart cities [50]. 16
6. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have proposed a new RFID authentication protocol, named as SAM, to provide a secure and efficient transaction between tag and read in IoT applications. By using dynamic key-updating algorithms, our proposed solution enhances the key updating system based on enabling different ways to authenticate keys, which significantly reduces the impact of jamming attacks. One important advantage of our protocol is that it can be seamlessly deployed to existing systems for increasing the security of tag identification while at the same time maintaining the system efficiency. Our simulation results show that SAM protocol outperforms the TAP protocol in terms of energy consumption and authentication failure rate. For energy consumption compared to TAP, although SAM consumes slightly more energy in the absence of attacks, it consumes significantly less energy in the presence of attacks. This indicates that when the security is more prioritized in an IoT system, SAM can be used when the system is started. Furthermore, SAM can also be dynamically invoked in a reasonable time when certain jamming attack is detected. Finally, we have discussed the SAM application in the smart home Iot systems. It can be seen that our proposed solution can not only be applied in smart home IoT but also in other domains such as smart grid or smart tourism. As future work, we plan to deploy SAM for physical IoT network such as in ambient assisted living environment. We believe that The real-world deployment can help us further consolidate the performance of proposed authentication algorithms. Also, we intend to explore more application domains for our solution to facilitate tolerant and robust IoT communication.
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Dear Editor, We are submitting a manuscript for consideration of publication in Internet of Things Journal. The manuscript is entitled “An Efficient Mutual Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things”. It has not been published elsewhere and that it has not been submitted simultaneously for publication elsewhere. Our paper is an invited extension of AINA-2019 CONFERENCE, Matsue, Japan.
The authors of the paper are order as below: Bacem Mbarek; Mouzhi Ge , Tomas Pitner
Best regards Authors
1
Journal Pre-proof
An Efficient Mutual Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things ´ s Pitner Bacem Mbarek, Mouzhi Ge, Tomaˇ PII: DOI: Reference:
S2542-6605(20)30003-2 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2020.100160 IOT 100160
To appear in:
Internet of Things
Received date: Revised date: Accepted date:
15 December 2019 29 December 2019 29 December 2019
´ s Pitner, An Efficient Mutual Authentication Please cite this article as: Bacem Mbarek, Mouzhi Ge, Tomaˇ Scheme for Internet of Things, Internet of Things (2020), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iot.2020.100160
This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. © 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V.
An Efficient Mutual Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things Bacem Mbareka,∗, Mouzhi Gea , Tom Pitnera a Faculty
of Informatics, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
Abstract The Internet of Things (IoT) is developed to facilitate the connections and data sharing among people, devices, and systems. Among the infrastructural IoT techniques, Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) has been used to enable the proliferation and communication in IoT networks. However, the RFID techniques usually suffer from security issues due to the inherent weaknesses of underlying wireless radio communications. One of the main security issues is the authentication vulnerability from the jamming attack. In order to tackle the vulnerabilities of key updating algorithms, this paper therefore proposes an efficient authentication scheme based on the self-adaptive and mutual key updating. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance and applicability of our solution with a thorough simulation by taking into account the energy consumption, authentication failure rate and authentication delay. The feasibility and applicability are demonstrated by implementing the proposed authentication scheme in smart home IoT systems. Keywords: Internet of Things, RFID, authentication, jamming attack, IoT security
∗I
am corresponding author Email addresses: [email protected] (Bacem Mbarek), [email protected] (Mouzhi Ge), [email protected] (Tom Pitner)
Preprint submitted to Internet of Things
January 7, 2020
1. Introduction Nowadays, the Internet of Things (IoT) are developed to interconnect a wide variety of objects via wireless sensors, mobile phones, and other devices [1][2]. IoT has significantly influenced our daily lives [3][4], for example, smart home IoT systems usually use a mobile application to connect and control different home devices such as power plugins, lights, cooking devices, temperature and humidity sensors as well as security systems [5] [6]. One of the enabling technologies for IoT is Radio Frequency IDentification(RFID) system. A typical RFID system consists of tags as well as readers [7]. A tag, which is typically a microchip connected to an antenna and then attached to a household object as its identifier, communicates with a RFID reader using radio waves. Because of the their low cost, RFID technologies are widely used to increase efficiency through accurate object identification and data collection with non-line-of-sight [8]. Due to the advantages of RFID, RFID technologies become a prevalent infrastructural component of IoT applications [8]. However, there exists several security concerns when preventing illegitimate users and devices from unauthorized usage of IoT resources [9]. For example in a smart home IoT system, IoT security breach can result in privacy disclosure and economic loss [10]. The IoT security breach is usually because of the authentication vulnerability [11] [12]. A variety of authentication schemes have been proposed to tackle the authentication vulnerability in IoT [13], among others, most used authentication scheme in RFID is that the RFID reader gets the encrypted message from the tag, identifies the tag with the disclosed key that will be updated after each successful authentication. However, if a jamming attack occurs during key updates, it may disturb the operation from transceivers, so that the tag cannot receive the message from the reader and does not update its secret information while the reader updates the tag’s secret information. After this attack, the secret information will be inconsistent between the reader and the tag. Therefore, the further authentication will fail. In order to address the jamming attacks in RFID systems, this paper is
2
extending our work of [14] and propose a new authentication protocol with a robust key updating scheme. Our solution consists of enhancing the authentication process against jamming attacks by using previous keys as a trust-based parameters for additional transparency and traceability during transactions between RFID tags and readers. To this end, the tag appends MAC address as message authentication codes with different keys, which includes the updated key and the previous keys. Thus, a reader can verify the received MAC authenticity with the updating key or with the N previous keys. If the reader fails to authenticate with the updated key, the reader still can use the previous keys for authentication. This will in turn increase the robustness and tolerance of the authentication scheme. In the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes and revisits a typical RFID protocol and its security concerns. Section 3 discusses the state-of-the-art solutions that have been proposed to solve the RFID security breach. Based on the related work, Section 4 proposes a new solution that can dynamically authenticate the RFID keys. In order to evaluate the proposed solution, Section 5 conducts a security analysis simulation by considering authentication failure rate, energy consumption and authentication delay. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines future works for this paper.
2. RFID Protocol and Security Concerns RFID device is an essential infrastructure in an IoT network to remotely identify wireless objects without physical or visual contact. A RFID system typically consists of two electronic chips, a reader and a tag [15]. RFID tags support the reception within a range of a few meters and high-speed communication. The tags are usually constructed as a network to work collaboratively. A typical communication between a reader and a tag is described as follows. A reader queries a tag to obtain the tag’s contents though RF (Radio frequency) interface. Moreover, by authenticating a tag to a reader, a tag should be ready to open its information to a reader.
3
RFID tags are usually largely deployed in IoT and thus, an adversary could inject misleading information in the network and even fool other nodes, making them believe it is an authentic device. Therefore, it is important to protect RFID tags against all types of attacks. In RFID systems, an adversary may monitor all the messages transmitted between a reader and a tag. The adversary can also infringe upon a user’s privacy using various methods. Therefore, RFID systems must be designed to be protected from attacks such as eavesdropping and impersonation. We have summarized three typical RFID security concerns in IoT applications as follows. Confidentiality: An attacker may try to access the information to IoT devices without authorizations. Confidentiality should be ensured by using encryption algorithms. Cryptography encrypts message to generate an illegible text [16]. Key confidentiality is to protect the key so that it can only be recovered by authorized tags. Authentication: Key authentication is to provide assurance to authorized tags that the key is distributed by certain reader but not from an attacker. Jamming attack can be a critical problem for authentication procedure between the reader and the tag [17]. Jamming is one of many exploits to compromise the wireless environment. It works by denying service to authorized users as legitimate traffic, which is jammed by the overwhelming frequencies of illegitimate traffic. Data integrity: Physical attack is a viable method of compromising the integrity of a device, hence an attacker upon compromising a tag may be able to read its secret values like keys and link this tag with past actions performed on the tag. A key freshness should be ensured by tags and a compromised key cannot be reused for authentication request [18]. Forward privacy ensures that messages transmitted now will still be secure in the future, even after compromising the tag. RFID tags encrypt authentication messages to RFID reader, and the reader searches the key space to locate the tags. Due to the lack of efficient key updating algorithms, previous schemes are vulnerable to jamming attacks. For 4
example, an attacker generates a jamming signal, so that the tag cannot receive the message from the reader and does not update its secret information while the reader updates the tag’s secret information. After this attack, the secret information will be inconsistent between the reader and the tag. Therefore, the authentication will fail. Hence, the individual keys will be updated dynamically, with respect to the defense against jamming attacks. Suppose the reader keeps only the current keys per tag. Then, the authentication will be failed. In Figure 1, we present an example of jamming attack which can be seen by the update of RFID keys.
Figure 1: RFID protocols with a key update phase that suffer from jamming attack
3. Related Works Different research threads focus on security and privacy concerns of RFID technologies. Thus, the primary focus is on the protection of tags and readers against several well-known kinds of jamming attacks that can have a large ef-
5
fect on data quality and network resources. The practical most used solution is to update keys for a tag after each authentication so that the attacker cannot make use of keys obtained from compromised tags to attack uncompromised ones. Jamming attack is one of the main issues for RFID systems [19]. In this attack, electromagnetic jamming is carried out to prevent tags from communicating with readers [20]. However, many updating key architectures are still not capable of efficiently updating the key in the presence of the jamming attacks. This problem motivates us to propose a new authentication scheme to secure RFID against the jamming attacks. Mostly used authentication scheme in RFID is that the RFID reader gets the encrypted message from the tag, identifies the tag with the disclosed key that will be updated after each successful authentication. However, previous update keys schemes suffer from both jamming and cloning attacks [14][21]. For example, an attacker can lunch a jamming signal in order to disturb the transceivers’ operation, so that the tag cannot receive the message from the reader and does not update its secret information while the reader updates the tag’s secret information. After this attack, the secret information will be inconsistent between the reader and the tag. Therefore, the authentication will fail. Furthermore, several studies have proposed solutions to related problems, including access control (e.g., [22, 23] ), key agreement (e.g., [14, 24, 25]), and data upload (e.g.,[26, 27]). In [28], the authors have proposed a Triangle Based Security Algorithm (TBSA) for data encryption based on an efficient key generation mechanism. The author have claimed that the algorithm can provide secure data transmission over a long converge range. In [24], the authors have presented an enhanced secure network architecture to diagnose security threats in a smart home. In [22], the authors have explored how permission models can prevent overrides in smart networks. They have concluded that smarthome apps are automatically overprivileged, which can leave users vulnerable to various remote attacks. In [25], the authors have proposed a secure remote user authentication scheme for limited resource devices in smart home systems. 6
In [27], the authors have introduced a lightweight and secure session key establishment scheme to meet the requirement of smart home systems. The authors have improved this scheme into an anonymous secure framework. In [29], the authors have proposed a real-time passive RFID localization protocol to locate users locations in smart homes. The entire system relies on an innovative model of elliptical trilateration with several filters, as well as on an ingenious representation of activities with spatial zones. In [15], the authors have described an enhancement of an existing mutual authentication protocol called TAP protocol (Tuan Anh Plan mutual authentication protocol) by deploying a key update strategy. The proposed enhancement has, however, some deficiencies when jamming attacks occur. For example, an attacker can lunch a jamming signal in order to disturb the transceivers’ operation, so that the reader cannot receive the message from the tag and does not update its secret information while the tag updates its information. Another variation of the previous scheme is proposed in [30], in which a hash-chain mechanism is used to protect against tracking and ensure forward security in tag transactions. Again, the tag replies back with different values, but its secret ID changes with every response through the application of a hash function. However, just as in the previous scheme scalability is problematic as it requires exhaustive search in the back-end database to locate the ID of the tag. Although in [31] authors propose a challenge-response scheme that allows for more efficient identification. The protocol involves three messages per round and allows for mutual authentication of both the tag and the reader. However, this protocol uses O(log N) communication rounds, where N is the number of possible tags in the system. Hence, one drawback of this scheme is that it cannot be applied to legacy systems in which a reader makes only one request and the tag responds with a simple value. A performance enhancement of randomization-based authentication is proposed in recent work [32], a simple protocol has been presented in which the both the tag and the reader use a random number generation and only a bitwise operations, i.e., bitwise XOR and rotation operations which makes it an ultra-lightweight solution for mutual 7
authentication between reader and the RFID tag. More recently, authors in [40] proposed an effective approaches to providing a certificateless authentication protocol which is rooted in a novel ECC-based pairing free certificateless signature scheme. However, ECC protocol is vulnerable to jamming attacks and DoS attacks. However, due to the fact that limited resources can be used to protect the transmitted data at tag side, the wireless channel between the reader and the tag may be attacked by different kinds of existing and potential methods. Based on our literature review, we found that the RFID authentication schemes in IoT networks can be classified into three categories, which are tree based authentication, randomized access control, and third-party authentication. For each category, in Table 1, we have summarized the advantages as well as limitations of the very scheme. It can be seen that one fundamental issue of the previously proposed authentication approaches appear to be vulnerable with jamming attacks. Therefore this paper tackles RFID authentication by considering the jamming attack, which is a critical security problem in IoT research.
4. SAM: Self-adaptive RFID Authentication Scheme This section provides a detailed description of our proposed authentication solution, which includes the self-adaptive authentication mechanism as well as the authentication algorithms for the reader and tag. We propose a Self-adaptive Authentication Mechanism (SAM) capable of authenticating entities in IoT network through an RFID tags technology, that aims to resolve the problem of jamming attack. Then, the reader only needs to store the previous commitment keys for each tag. If the reader fails to authenticate with the updated key, the reader can use the previous keys. Since N previous tags-keys are stored in the reader. For each authentication, the reader generates a MAC (message authentication code) encrypted with the updated key ad generates N MACs encrypted with N previous keys. The format of each send query is as follows.
8
Table 1: RFID authentication protocols
Scheme
Paper
Description
The tree based au-
[33][31]
Dynamic
thentication
[34]
Updating
using the
a
based
key-tree
Advantages key- Defend
scheme.
Limitations against vulnerable
compromise
with
jam-
attacks and resolve ming
at-
the problem.
scalability tacks,
DoS
attacks, cloning attacks
Randomized Access
[15][35]
The reader gener-
Defend against the vulnerable
control
[36]
ates a random num-
compromise attacks with
jam-
[30][32]
ber R and uses it to
ming
at-
updates the shared
tacks,
key with the tag.
cloning attacks, DoS attacks. Defend against the vulnerable
Third-party
au- [37][38][39] A third part al-
thentication
lows the RFID-tag
compromise attacks with
jam-
to verify a valid au-
ming
at-
thentication.
tacks, Cloning attacks, DoS attacks.
9
S = M AC(kupdated , M )||M AC(ki , M ), M AC(ki−1 , M ), ..., M AC(ki−N +1 , M ) 4.1. Authentication Algorithm Algorithm 1 Authentication Procedure on the Reader The reader generates a random value R and computes k = k ⊕ R if k ⊕ R is not unique then the reader regenerates R until k ⊕ R becomes unique. else if k ⊕ R is unique then Server encrypts the updated key with the previous key Ki (kupdated ) and sends it to the tag. if update keys are lost due to packet loss or jamming attacks. then The reader can communicate with the tag using N previous keys. The reader creates and sends the following structure to the tag. S =< kupdated (M )||ki (M ), ki−1 (M ), ...., ki−N +1 (M ) > end if end if At the beginning, the reader and the tag have the same shared key k. The ID of each tag is stored on the reader and on the memory of tag. The reader generates a code MAC M encrypted with the updated key kupdated (M ) and generates N M ACs encrypted with N previous keys ki (M ), ki−1 (M ), ...., ki−N +1 (M ). Algorithms 1 and 2 describe the proposed authentication procedure between the reader and the tag. In the following algorithms, the authentication is conducted in mutual ways. By authenticating a reader to a tag and by authenticating a tag to a reader. The first algorithm describes the different authentication steps by the reader. The reader updates the sharing common secret key by xored the current key Ki with a random value R, and checks whether the new key is unique. If it is not unique, the reader regenerates R until it becomes unique. Then, after updating and sending the key. The reader will communicate with the tag with the new updated key and N previous keys. The readers have the property that if the 10
updated keys are lost, they can be recomputed using previous keys. Therefore, even if some disclosed keys are lost due to packet loss or jamming attacks, the tag still can recover the key from the previous keys and check the authenticity of messages. The second algorithm describes the authentication procedure in the tag after updating the key, whereby the tag can verify the reader with the updated key or with the N previous sharing common keys. Algorithm 2 Authentication Procedure on the Tag The Tag checks Kupdated (M ) if it is correct then The reader is authenticated. else if it is not correct then Tag checks ki (M ), ki−1 (M ), ...., ki−N +1 (M ). if the previous keys are authenticated then The reader is authenticated else if failed then The message will be considered forged and the authentication will failed. The tag would need to inform the reader and the reader would need to retransmit the updated key. end if end if In the most IoT RFID systems, the communication complexity refers to the amount of data transmitted between the reader and the tag in the RFID authentication algorithm [41]. Let C(n) be the communication complexity of RFID-algorithm, CR(n) is the reader-side communication complexity, CT (n) is the tag-side communication complexity, and they satisfy the following relationship: C(n) = CR(n) + CT (n). Our authentication algorithm reduces the effect of jamming attacks as soon as possible using two manners for providing authentication (current and previous keys). This later method reduces the communication overhead in the presence of jamming attacks compared to the other typical RFID-algorithms. 11
4.2. Security Analysis The key-updating is employed after a tag successfully performs its identification with the reader. The main drawback of previous dynamic key-updating algorithms for private authentication in RFID systems is the vulnerability to jamming attacks. An attacker can disrupt network operation by launching a jamming signal, so that the tag updates its key while the reader cannot update its key at the cause or the consequences of jamming attack. Then, the secret information will be inconsistent between the tag and the RFID reader and the authentication will be failed. The security rationale behind the our RFID authentication scheme is that it particularly provides any given RFID reader with alternatives when the security key of a tag is not updated correctly due to some attacks. To this end, our scheme relies on previous keys as a trust-based parameters derived from historical transactions between the reader and the tag.
5. Evaluations In order to evaluate the self-adaptive authentication protocol, we used the NS-2.35 simulator [42] to analyze the performance of the SAM scheme in terms of energy consumption and percentage of authentication failure. We run our simulations 50 times on a large scale network with 800 tags and one reader that initiates the communication in every iteration with all the settings provided in the Table 2. We assume that all tags have a fixed position throughout the period of simulation. 5.1. The average of authentication failure rate We evaluate the average of authentication failure rate between the reader and the tag, with varying the number of jamming attacks. Figure 2 shows the percentage of authentication failure versus the number of jamming attacks. We found that SAM have a significantly low percentage than the TAP protocol. The main reason is that SAM protocol uses the two authentication ways (with
12
Table 2: Simulation parameters
Parameter
Value
Simulation time
100 s
Run times
50 times
Number of tags
800
Number of reader
1
Mobility
None
current updated key and the with previous keys), while with TAP protocol the reader keeps only the current keys per tag. When a jamming attacks occurs, the tag will not receive the updated key and the authentication will fail.
Figure 2: Evaluation of authentication failure between the reader and the tags
Figure 2 depicts the results for the percentage of authentication failure between the SAM and TAP approaches. In particular, it shows that the percentage of of authentication failure is lower with SAM, especially when the number of jamming attack is high i.e., above 10. For instance, with TAP, we can de13
tect around 80% of the forged packets while only 60% are are failed with SAM because it uses two authentication ways which are current and N previous keys. 5.2. Energy consumption We also evaluate the energy consumption of SAM and TAP protocols by varying the number of jamming attacks. Figure 3 reports the impact of this attack on energy consumption. From this figure, we obtained three interesting outcomes. The first outcome is that by increasing the number of jamming attacks, the energy consumption increases for all the studied protocols. For instance, when the number of jamming attacks is equal to 6, SAM and TAP consume more than 30 J.
Figure 3: Evaluation of energy consumption
The second outcome is that SAM has a low energy consumption compared to TAP, when increasing the number of forged packets. One explanation to this phenomenon is that authentication in our solution will be done with the current and the previous keys in case of jamming attack, and the authentication process will continue by the decryption of N encrypted MACs with N previous keys; while for TAP the authentication will not succeed in the presence of jamming
14
attack and the reader needs to repeat the procedure many times until the receiver gets the updated key. The third outcome is that without attack, SAM incurs higher communication overhead. This may be explained by the fact that in order to encrypt message, the SAM protocol needs to search N keys (previous keys) and use them to encrypt N MACs; while with TAP protocol the reader creates and sends only one MAC with the current key. 5.3. Authentication delay Figure 4 shows the evaluation result of the authentication delay of our proposed SAM protocol. The authentication delay is defined as a delay between the real reception and the authentication of packets [43, 43]. The packet loss rate refers to the number of sent packets minus the number of received packets in a portion of time [44, 45, 46]. By varying the packet loss rate, from figure 4, we can see two interesting outcomes. The first outcome is that with increasing the loss rate, the authentication delay increases. For instance, when the loss rate=20%, the authentication delay is about 0.51 seconds; while for loss rate=60%, the authentication delay is about 0.9 seconds. When there is a packet loss because of jamming attack, our proposed SAM protocol does not need to revisit the tag and open more communication channel. This will therefore result in more efficient authentication. The second outcome is that the authentication delay is between (5×100ms) and (10×100ms) which is a reasonable time. 5.4. Implementation of SAM in smart home IoT systems In order to demonstrate the feasibility and applicability for the proposed authentication scheme, the SAM scheme is implemented in the context of a smart home IoT systems, which controls household appliances remotely and realizes real-time monitoring of home security status through RFID technology. This system consists of RFID tags that are coupled with the household hardware to control the functions for these devices and collect important information from diagnosis, operation, and failures. In smart home IoT environment, we take into consideration that many tags are installed to formulate a sensorbased
15
Figure 4: Authentication delay
network that will use SAM scheme to ensure the authentication between the RFID reader and the tags which are plugged into home appliances. As SAM is an authentication scheme, applying SAM in smart home requires limited efforts and changes in the existing smart home information systems. Thus, it can be easily integrated to the sensor network in smart home. In a smart home IoT system, the householder is equipped with a RFID reader and navigates from one room to another to control the different household appliances which are deployed in the smart space [10]. All the appliances that intend to communicate with the central mobile reader in the network should be authenticated using the SAM scheme attached to each connected home appliance. This is to prevent malicious modifications, and phishing information exchange. Each home appliance represented by its tag which appends MACs with different keys (with the updated key and the previous keys of each tag). The receiver home appliance will decrypt the received messages by using the update key and/or by using N previous keys against jamming and cloning attacks. It can be seen that not only in smart home, the SAM scheme can be generalized to other information systems as soon as organization structure and authentication methods are similar to smart home. As far as we found, the SAM scheme can be also used in smart building [47], smart grid [48], smart tourism [49], and smart cities [50]. 16
6. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have proposed a new RFID authentication protocol, named as SAM, to provide a secure and efficient transaction between tag and read in IoT applications. By using dynamic key-updating algorithms, our proposed solution enhances the key updating system based on enabling different ways to authenticate keys, which significantly reduces the impact of jamming attacks. One important advantage of our protocol is that it can be seamlessly deployed to existing systems for increasing the security of tag identification while at the same time maintaining the system efficiency. Our simulation results show that SAM protocol outperforms the TAP protocol in terms of energy consumption and authentication failure rate. For energy consumption compared to TAP, although SAM consumes slightly more energy in the absence of attacks, it consumes significantly less energy in the presence of attacks. This indicates that when the security is more prioritized in an IoT system, SAM can be used when the system is started. Furthermore, SAM can also be dynamically invoked in a reasonable time when certain jamming attack is detected. Finally, we have discussed the SAM application in the smart home Iot systems. It can be seen that our proposed solution can not only be applied in smart home IoT but also in other domains such as smart grid or smart tourism. As future work, we plan to deploy SAM for physical IoT network such as in ambient assisted living environment. We believe that The real-world deployment can help us further consolidate the performance of proposed authentication algorithms. Also, we intend to explore more application domains for our solution to facilitate tolerant and robust IoT communication.
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Dear Editor, We are submitting a manuscript for consideration of publication in Internet of Things Journal. The manuscript is entitled “An Efficient Mutual Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things”. It has not been published elsewhere and that it has not been submitted simultaneously for publication elsewhere. Our paper is an invited extension of AINA-2019 CONFERENCE, Matsue, Japan.
The authors of the paper are order as below: Bacem Mbarek; Mouzhi Ge , Tomas Pitner
Best regards Authors
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