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An Enhanced Secure Mobility Management Scheme for Building IoT Applications
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect Procedia Computer Science 56 (2015) 586 – 591
International Workshop on Networking Algorithms and Technologies for IoT (NAT-IoT 2015)
An Enhanced Secure Mobility Management Scheme for Building IoT Applications Hyun-Suk Chaia, Jae-Young Choib, Jongpil Jeongb,* b
a Security Team of R&D Division, SK Corporation, Seoul, Republic of Korea College of Information and Communications, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon, Republic of Korea
Abstract In this paper, we analyze the Kang-Park and ESS-FH scheme, and propose an Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for FPMIPv6 (ESS-FP). Based on the CGA method and public key Cryptography, ESS-FP provides a strong key exchange and key independence, in addition to improving the weaknesses of Fast Handover for Proxy Mobile IPv6 (FPMIPv6). We formally verify the proposed scheme based on BAN (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham) Logic, and analyze and compare its handover latency with those of the Kang-Park scheme and ESS-FH. In addition, we propose an inter-domain fast handover scheme for PMIPv6, using the proxy-based FPMIPv6. Furthermore, we apply an Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for FPMIPv6 in the Internet of Things (IoT) environments. © 2015 2015 The byby Elsevier B.V.B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license © TheAuthors. Authors.Published Published Elsevier (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs. Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs
Keywords: Data Management; FPMIPv6; CGA; BAN-Logic; IoT.
1. Introduction In recent years, broadband wireless networks have rapidly evolved towards all-IP networks. Due to the quick growth in the number of Internet users in the wireless environment, the issue of IP mobility management technology has become more and more important. For this reason, research is being carried out to enhance flow mobility
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +82-31-299-4260; fax: +82-31-290-5569. E-mail address: [email protected] 1877-0509 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
1877-0509 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs doi:10.1016/j.procs.2015.07.258
Hyun-Suk Chai et al. / Procedia Computer Science 56 (2015) 586 – 591
management. Mobility management enables the serving networks to locate a point of attachment of a Mobile Node (MN) for delivering data packets, and to maintain an MN’s connection, as it continues to change its point of attachment. After many papers and much research, the IETF NETLMM working group has proposed Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) as a local mobility management protocol1. PMIPv6 introduces a new entity, called a Mobility Access Gateway (MAG), which acts as a relay node between an MN and a Local Mobility Agent (LMA). The MAG performs the mobilityrelated signaling with the LMA on behalf of the MN. Although the signaling between the MN and the network can be saved, PMIPv6 still has the same drawback as MIPv6. That is, during the PMIPv6 handover execution, there is a period when the MN experiences a service break, due to the PMIPv6 protocol operations. To reduce the handover latency, it has been suggested that the Fast MIPv6 (FMIPv6) solution specified in be applied to PMIPv62. However, Fast Handover for PMIPv6 (FPMIPv6) suffers from the problem of false handover initiation, since in fast handovers, the serving MAG predicts which MAG the MN will move to, with the help of Layer 2 (L2) triggers3. Despite the best efficiency, without being secure for signaling messages, PMIPv6/FPMIPv6 is vulnerable to various security threats, such as Denial of Service (DoS) or redirect attacks, and it does not support global mobility between PMIPv6. Recently, Kang and Park, and You, Lee, Sakurai and Hori proposed the Kang-Park Scheme and ESS-FH (Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for Fast Handover)4,5, to secure the signaling message in the FH-HMIPv6 environment. In this paper, we analyze its method, and then propose an Enhanced Security and InterDomain Scheme for FPMIPv6 (ESS-FP)6. Based on the Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) method7 and the public key cryptography, ESS-FP provides strong key exchange and key independence, in addition to improving the weaknesses of FPMIPv6. Furthermore, in order to improve the security and efficiency of communication in the Internet of things, we apply an Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for FPMIPv6 in the IoT environment. Specially, the mobile nodes may move together with human or vehicles in Internet of Thing (IoT)8. As a result, the mobile nodes have limited resources such as battery power, computing capability and memory9. Also, the current state of Internet of Things security seems to take all the vulnerabilities from existing spaces, e.g. network security, application security, mobile security, and Internet-connected devices. Specifically, identify three key research challenges in detecting Sybil attacks in the IoT. A Sybil attack is a security threat where an attacker employs a false/forged identity to gain unauthorized access to a secure system 10. We formally verify the proposed scheme based on BAN (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham) Logic, and analyze and compare its handover latency with that of the KangPark scheme and ESS-FH. In addition, this paper proposes an inter-domain fast handover scheme for PMIPv6, using proxy-based FMIPv6 (FPMIPv6). In conclusion, we believe that the security scheme properly harmonizes, and advances the inter-domain handover with PMIPv6/FPMIPv6, which are important goals. 2. Enhanced Security Mobility Management In this section, the proposed ESS-FP is introduced. This is the Enhanced Security and Inter-Domain Scheme for Fast Handovers for Proxy Mobile IPv6, called ESS-FP. For security purposes, ESS-FP makes use of the CGA method and public key cryptography to provide a strong key exchange, as well as key independence. Furthermore, we apply an ESS-FP scheme for the Internet of things based on the CGA method and public key Cryptography. With its superiority in efficiency and security, ESS-FP proves to be more suitable for resource-restricted environment in IOT and better satisfies the requirement of secure scheme in IoT. i.e. MAG negotiates a secret key ‘Kbm’ with the LMA, whenever moving to the LMA domain. For this ‘Kbm’ negotiation, the public-key cryptography is applied in conjunction with the CGA method7. Based on the ‘Kbm’, ESS-FP achieves a seamless integration between fast handover and local binding update. Moreover, it allows the MN to continually execute a fast handover, even between different LMA domains. We also proposed an inter-domain handover scheme for Proxy Mobile IPv6, and when the mobile node leaves this domain, the mobility support breaks. In addition, when a MN detects that it is entering a new sensor and communicate from a sensor to MN using Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). CoAP is being standardized as an application layer protocol for the IoT. CoAP proposes to use DTLS to provide end-to-end security to protect the IoT11. Signaling message must be included with the security mechanism, during the handover process within a PMIPv6 domain. If not, it is vulnerable to various attacks, such as Session Hijacking (SSH), Malicious Mobile Node Flooding (MMF), Man-In-The-Middle (MITM), and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks4,5. For security reasons, the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server was used, as well as the security protocol in PMIPv6. But it was
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primarily directed at mobile node certification to secure support. We will also discuss some problems in previous authentication mechanisms associated with PMIPv6, and propose a new security mechanism through secret keys between MN and MAG. MAG and LMA are used to perform a secure handover with a security association (SA). Additionally, ESS-FP can support a global mobility management in PMIPv6. ju
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tu Fig. 1. Initial Architecture of the proposed scheme
The initial access authentication process is initiated as shown in Fig. 1. ESS-FP is composed of four phases: the initialization, predictive and reactive mode of intra-handover, and inter-handover phases. The initialization phase is only executed once by an MN during its bootstrapping stage, or during its movement from the home network. In this phase, the MN negotiates a secret key with its current LMA, while performing the local binding update. After this phase, if the MN moves to a new network, the predictive and reactive mode of the intra-handover phase or the interhandover phase is performed, depending on the type of handover. This paper proposes a security scheme to protect PMIPv6 and FPMIPv6. In this scheme, AAA infrastructure is used to authenticate an MN, while exchanging a session key with it. Also, the LMA uses the group key and the ticket, to distribute the session key to its MAGs. In addition, each involved entity (i.e., MN or MAG or LMA) uses a CGA as its source address, and signs signaling messages with the private key corresponding to this CGA. In this way, ESS-FP verifies each entity’s address ownership and public key, while using public key cryptography for both the handover key exchange, and the message protection, without any security infrastructure. More importantly, the scheme achieves seamless harmony with PMIPv6 and FPMIPv6. This paper discusses the use of CoAP11 over DTLS12 for sensor to MN (S2M) communication in IoT for supervision of the environmental conditions during transport. The MN sends to sensor for initial request message and creates a secure tunnel with the CoAP over DTLS. If the secure channel is successfully created, then the MN sends next message to the MAG. 3. Performance Evaluation This chapter compares and analyzes the handover latency for the proposed scheme, existing Kang-Park scheme, and ESS-FH scheme. Proposed scheme models the mobility of MN using the 2-dimensional Markov Chain model of the Random-Walk mobility model14. In this model, the next location becomes an arbitrary value to the earlier location. This arbitrary value is a value independently selected from the distribution. In addition, when the probability that the
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Hyun-Suk Chai et al. / Procedia Computer Science 56 (2015) 586 – 591
MN stays in the network is P, the probability to move to another network is 1-P. Table 1 represents the parameter values for performance evaluation. Table 1. Parameter values Parameter
tMN pMAG ( pAR ) tMN nMAG ( nAR )
t pMAG ( pAR )nMAG ( nAR ) t pMAG ( pAR )nLMA(nMAP ) tnMAG ( nAR )nLMA( nMAP )
tnLMA( nMAP ) HA t pLMA( pMAP)nLMA( nMAP)
tMN AAA tMAG ( AR ) AAA
tLMA( MAP ) AAA
Description
Values
Transmission time between MN and pMAG(pAR)
12
Transmission time between MN and nMAG(nAR)
12
Transmission time between pMAG(pAR) and nMAG(nAR)
20
Transmission time between pMAG(pAR) and nLMA(pMAP or HA)
20
Transmission time between nMAG(nAR) and nLMA(nMAP)
20
Transmission time between nLMA(nMAP) and HA
40
Transmission time between pLMA(pMAP) and nLMA(nMAP)
40
Transmission time between NM and AAA for authentication
40
Transmission time between MAG(AR) and AAA for authentication
40
Transmission time between LMA (MAP) and AAA for authentication
40
MinInt
Minimum time allowed between sending unsolicited MN messages
30
MaxInt
Maximum time allowed between sending unsolicited MN messages
70
ReTranceT
Neighbor Solicitation (NS) retransmission time
1000
DADTrance
Duplicate address detection time
1
Handover latency represents the registration process and authentication process, where MN delivers the Report message to Access Router (AR), and receives the Reply message back from MAG. For handover analysis, the handover latency in the initial access authentication process and the handover latency in the handover authentication process can be obtained. First, we notate the handover latency of the existing studies in the initial access authentication ( KP ) ( ESS FH ) process as LInitial HO , LInitial HO , and equations (1) and (2), and notate the initial access latency of the proposed scheme as ( SA FP ) LInitial HO and equation (3). KP ) L(Initial HO
ESS FH ) L(Initial HO
ESS FP ) L(Initial HO
( MinInt MaxInt ) Re transTimer u DADTransmits 3tMN AR 2(t AR MAP tMAP HA ) 4
(1)
( MinInt MaxInt ) Re transTimer u DADTransmits 3tMN AR 2(t AR MAP tMAP HA ) 4
(2)
( MinInt MaxInt ) 2tMAG LMA tMN AAA 4
(3)
Equation (3) is the initial access and handover latency of general PMIPv6, which is divided into the latency when MN is recognized, and the time to register MN to the local network ( 2tMAG LMA ). Next, we notate the handover latency within the domain with equations (4) and (5). KP ) L(Intra HO
2tMN AR
ESS FH ) L(Intra HO
KP ) L(Intra HO
(4) (5)
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Hyun-Suk Chai et al. / Procedia Computer Science 56 (2015) 586 – 591
There is latency in the interval NMAG, which is recognized by MN, and latency for the binding update between NMAG and LMA. KP ) L(Inter HO
ESS FH ) L(Inter HO
KP ) L(Initial HO
ESS FH ) L(Intra HO
(6) (7)
We evaluated the performance using a graph, based on the mathematically analyzed equation and except that connectivity using phase of CoAP evaluated because performance suffered in the common process case. We based the value of the mediator set up in the simulation on the assumptions made in relevant studies by Kong and Han 14,15,16.
Fig. 2. Comparison in Handover Latency (left) and Comparison of Handover Latencies According to Increase of Frequency in Inter-Domain Movement (right).
Fig. 2 (left) shows a graphic comparison the handover latency of the proposed ESS-FP scheme and conventional schemes. The proposed scheme is shown to be better than the conventional schemes in the initial authentication process, and the inter-domain handover authentication process. Fig. 2 (right) shows the results using equations (8), (9), and (10), which mathematically analyzed the handover latencies for increases in the frequency of movement among domains. Since general PMIPv6 does not support inter-domain handover, the proposed inter-domain handover and conventional scheme for handover latencies are compared. Latencies increase rapidly, based on the increase in the KP-FHMIPv6 inter-domain handover. This occurs because FHMIPv6 has time for binding update to earlier HA, which is different from the proposed ESS-FPMIPv6 inter-domain handover. In addition, since the proposed ESSFPMIPv6 scheme is relatively less affected by wireless interval latency, when the inter-domain handover is applied, the handover latency is very small compared to conventional schemes; high speed handover is possible, even during long-distance movement. 4. Conclusion Various methods to improve the mobility performance in MIPv6 are currently being developed. Among them, PMIPv6 has been widely studied after the completion of RFC standards in 2008, in order to complement the shortcomings of wasting countless signaling that can take place in MIPv6, FMIPv6, and HMIPv6, which are hostbased mobility support technologies. Although PMIPv6 reduces the problem of interference between wireless signals by dramatically decreasing the number of signals by MN, and securing stable transfer speed by expanding the wire interval, it does not support inter-domain handover. In regard to security, many different schemes have been proposed to protect signaling messages; but to protect PMIPv6 signaling messages, most conventional schemes are based on an
Hyun-Suk Chai et al. / Procedia Computer Science 56 (2015) 586 – 591
AAA server. In this study, a new CGA scheme based on an AAA protocol and public key to protect PMIPv6/FPMIPv6 based signaling messages using security analysis of handover schemes for proxy mobile network in the IoT environment is developed, which improves the mobility and stability. In addition, a new inter-domain handover is proposed that conventional PMIPv6 cannot support. Here we also present its architecture and messages formats and evaluate its performance by analyzing handover latency. The authentication protocol is also evaluated through BANLogic, a logic tool17; and a higher security is achieved through a message security mechanism involving signaling, after a consistent transfer speed is secured based on PMIPv6 and network-based mobility support technology, by modeling mobility through a Markov chain model. Acknowledgements This research was supported by Next-Generation Information Computing Development Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning (NRF2014M3C4A7030503) and Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education (NRF-2010-0024695). Also, this research was supported by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), KOREA, through the Education Support program for Creative and Industrial Convergence (Grant Number N0000717). References 1. S. Gundavelli, K. Leung, V. Devarapalli, and K. Chowdhury, Proxy Mobile IPv6, IETF RFC 5213, 2008. 2. H. Yokota, K. Chowdhury and R. Koodli, Fast Handovers for Proxy Mobile IPv6, IETF RFC 5949, 2010. 3. D.H. Kim, J.P. Jeong, Analytical Approach of Cross-Layer-Based Handoff Scheme in Heterogeneous Mobile Networks, The Journal of the Institute of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication, Vol. 6, 2013, pp. 121-133. 4. H. S. Kang, C. S. Park, MIPv6 Binding Update Protocol Secure Against Both Redirect and DoS Attacks, CISC 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3822, 2005, pp. 407-418. 5. I. You, J. Lee, K. Sakurai and Y. Hori, ESS-FH: Enhanced Security for Fast Handover in Hierarchical Mobile IPv6, IEICE Transaction on Information and Systems E93-D, Vol.5, 2010, pp. 1096-1105. 6. H.S. Chai, J.P. Jeong, Secure and Fast Handover Scheme of Proxy Mobile IPv6 Networks, in ISAAC 2014 The 2nd International Sym posium on Advanced and Applied Convergence, 2014, pp. 36-45. 7. T. Aura, Cryptographically Generated Address, IETF RFC 3972, 2005. 8. L. Atzori, A. Iera, G. Morabito, The Internet of Things: A survey, in Elsevier Computer Networks 54, Vol. 15, 2010, pp. 2787-2805. 9. S. H. Jang, J. P. Jeong, Cost-Effective and Distributed Mobility Management Scheme in Sensor-Based PMIPv6 Networks with SPIG Support, The Journal of the Institute of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication 12, Vol. 4, 2013, pp.259-273. 10. K. Zhang, X. Liang, R. Lu, and X. Shen, Sybil Attacks and Their Defenses in the Internet of Things, IEEE Internet of Things Journal, Vol. 5, 2014, pp. 372-383. 11. Z. Shelby, K. Hartke, and C. Bormann, Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), IETF RFC 7252, 2014. 12. E. Rescorla, N. Modadugu, Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2, IETF RFC 6347, 2012. 13. I. F. Akyildiz and W. Wang, A dynamic location management scheme for next-generation multitier PCS systems, IEEE Transaction on Wireless Communication, Vol. 1, 2002, pp. 178-189. 14. K.S. Kong, Y.H. Han, M.K. Shin, H.R. Yoo, and W.J. Lee, Mobility management for all-IP mobile networks: mobile IPv6 vs. proxy mobile IPv6, IEEE Wireless Communications, Vol. 2, 2008, pp. 36-45. 15. Y. Han, J. Choi, and S. Hwang, Reactive Handover Optimization in IPv6 Based Mobile Networks, IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC), Vol. 9, 2006, pp. 1758-1772. 16. K. S. Kong, W. Lee, Y. H. Han, M. K. Shin, Handover Latency Analysis of a Network -based Localized Mobility Management Protocol, IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC’08), 2008, pp. 5838-5843. 17. M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham, A Logic of Authentication, ACM Transaction on Computer System, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1990, pp. 18-36.
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ScienceDirect Procedia Computer Science 56 (2015) 586 – 591
International Workshop on Networking Algorithms and Technologies for IoT (NAT-IoT 2015)
An Enhanced Secure Mobility Management Scheme for Building IoT Applications Hyun-Suk Chaia, Jae-Young Choib, Jongpil Jeongb,* b
a Security Team of R&D Division, SK Corporation, Seoul, Republic of Korea College of Information and Communications, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon, Republic of Korea
Abstract In this paper, we analyze the Kang-Park and ESS-FH scheme, and propose an Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for FPMIPv6 (ESS-FP). Based on the CGA method and public key Cryptography, ESS-FP provides a strong key exchange and key independence, in addition to improving the weaknesses of Fast Handover for Proxy Mobile IPv6 (FPMIPv6). We formally verify the proposed scheme based on BAN (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham) Logic, and analyze and compare its handover latency with those of the Kang-Park scheme and ESS-FH. In addition, we propose an inter-domain fast handover scheme for PMIPv6, using the proxy-based FPMIPv6. Furthermore, we apply an Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for FPMIPv6 in the Internet of Things (IoT) environments. © 2015 2015 The byby Elsevier B.V.B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license © TheAuthors. Authors.Published Published Elsevier (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs. Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs
Keywords: Data Management; FPMIPv6; CGA; BAN-Logic; IoT.
1. Introduction In recent years, broadband wireless networks have rapidly evolved towards all-IP networks. Due to the quick growth in the number of Internet users in the wireless environment, the issue of IP mobility management technology has become more and more important. For this reason, research is being carried out to enhance flow mobility
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +82-31-299-4260; fax: +82-31-290-5569. E-mail address: [email protected] 1877-0509 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
1877-0509 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs doi:10.1016/j.procs.2015.07.258
Hyun-Suk Chai et al. / Procedia Computer Science 56 (2015) 586 – 591
management. Mobility management enables the serving networks to locate a point of attachment of a Mobile Node (MN) for delivering data packets, and to maintain an MN’s connection, as it continues to change its point of attachment. After many papers and much research, the IETF NETLMM working group has proposed Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) as a local mobility management protocol1. PMIPv6 introduces a new entity, called a Mobility Access Gateway (MAG), which acts as a relay node between an MN and a Local Mobility Agent (LMA). The MAG performs the mobilityrelated signaling with the LMA on behalf of the MN. Although the signaling between the MN and the network can be saved, PMIPv6 still has the same drawback as MIPv6. That is, during the PMIPv6 handover execution, there is a period when the MN experiences a service break, due to the PMIPv6 protocol operations. To reduce the handover latency, it has been suggested that the Fast MIPv6 (FMIPv6) solution specified in be applied to PMIPv62. However, Fast Handover for PMIPv6 (FPMIPv6) suffers from the problem of false handover initiation, since in fast handovers, the serving MAG predicts which MAG the MN will move to, with the help of Layer 2 (L2) triggers3. Despite the best efficiency, without being secure for signaling messages, PMIPv6/FPMIPv6 is vulnerable to various security threats, such as Denial of Service (DoS) or redirect attacks, and it does not support global mobility between PMIPv6. Recently, Kang and Park, and You, Lee, Sakurai and Hori proposed the Kang-Park Scheme and ESS-FH (Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for Fast Handover)4,5, to secure the signaling message in the FH-HMIPv6 environment. In this paper, we analyze its method, and then propose an Enhanced Security and InterDomain Scheme for FPMIPv6 (ESS-FP)6. Based on the Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) method7 and the public key cryptography, ESS-FP provides strong key exchange and key independence, in addition to improving the weaknesses of FPMIPv6. Furthermore, in order to improve the security and efficiency of communication in the Internet of things, we apply an Enhanced Secure-Mobility Data Management Scheme for FPMIPv6 in the IoT environment. Specially, the mobile nodes may move together with human or vehicles in Internet of Thing (IoT)8. As a result, the mobile nodes have limited resources such as battery power, computing capability and memory9. Also, the current state of Internet of Things security seems to take all the vulnerabilities from existing spaces, e.g. network security, application security, mobile security, and Internet-connected devices. Specifically, identify three key research challenges in detecting Sybil attacks in the IoT. A Sybil attack is a security threat where an attacker employs a false/forged identity to gain unauthorized access to a secure system 10. We formally verify the proposed scheme based on BAN (Burrows, Abadi, and Needham) Logic, and analyze and compare its handover latency with that of the KangPark scheme and ESS-FH. In addition, this paper proposes an inter-domain fast handover scheme for PMIPv6, using proxy-based FMIPv6 (FPMIPv6). In conclusion, we believe that the security scheme properly harmonizes, and advances the inter-domain handover with PMIPv6/FPMIPv6, which are important goals. 2. Enhanced Security Mobility Management In this section, the proposed ESS-FP is introduced. This is the Enhanced Security and Inter-Domain Scheme for Fast Handovers for Proxy Mobile IPv6, called ESS-FP. For security purposes, ESS-FP makes use of the CGA method and public key cryptography to provide a strong key exchange, as well as key independence. Furthermore, we apply an ESS-FP scheme for the Internet of things based on the CGA method and public key Cryptography. With its superiority in efficiency and security, ESS-FP proves to be more suitable for resource-restricted environment in IOT and better satisfies the requirement of secure scheme in IoT. i.e. MAG negotiates a secret key ‘Kbm’ with the LMA, whenever moving to the LMA domain. For this ‘Kbm’ negotiation, the public-key cryptography is applied in conjunction with the CGA method7. Based on the ‘Kbm’, ESS-FP achieves a seamless integration between fast handover and local binding update. Moreover, it allows the MN to continually execute a fast handover, even between different LMA domains. We also proposed an inter-domain handover scheme for Proxy Mobile IPv6, and when the mobile node leaves this domain, the mobility support breaks. In addition, when a MN detects that it is entering a new sensor and communicate from a sensor to MN using Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). CoAP is being standardized as an application layer protocol for the IoT. CoAP proposes to use DTLS to provide end-to-end security to protect the IoT11. Signaling message must be included with the security mechanism, during the handover process within a PMIPv6 domain. If not, it is vulnerable to various attacks, such as Session Hijacking (SSH), Malicious Mobile Node Flooding (MMF), Man-In-The-Middle (MITM), and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks4,5. For security reasons, the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server was used, as well as the security protocol in PMIPv6. But it was
587
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Hyun-Suk Chai et al. / Procedia Computer Science 56 (2015) 586 – 591
primarily directed at mobile node certification to secure support. We will also discuss some problems in previous authentication mechanisms associated with PMIPv6, and propose a new security mechanism through secret keys between MN and MAG. MAG and LMA are used to perform a secure handover with a security association (SA). Additionally, ESS-FP can support a global mobility management in PMIPv6. ju
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_UGnG ˄ r˅˅
hhhGz ZUGhhhG G
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[UGwi|GGtuTppk ¢z zSSjnhwthnSzpnwi|¤
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jhw
oG uG w
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z
z
tu Fig. 1. Initial Architecture of the proposed scheme
The initial access authentication process is initiated as shown in Fig. 1. ESS-FP is composed of four phases: the initialization, predictive and reactive mode of intra-handover, and inter-handover phases. The initialization phase is only executed once by an MN during its bootstrapping stage, or during its movement from the home network. In this phase, the MN negotiates a secret key with its current LMA, while performing the local binding update. After this phase, if the MN moves to a new network, the predictive and reactive mode of the intra-handover phase or the interhandover phase is performed, depending on the type of handover. This paper proposes a security scheme to protect PMIPv6 and FPMIPv6. In this scheme, AAA infrastructure is used to authenticate an MN, while exchanging a session key with it. Also, the LMA uses the group key and the ticket, to distribute the session key to its MAGs. In addition, each involved entity (i.e., MN or MAG or LMA) uses a CGA as its source address, and signs signaling messages with the private key corresponding to this CGA. In this way, ESS-FP verifies each entity’s address ownership and public key, while using public key cryptography for both the handover key exchange, and the message protection, without any security infrastructure. More importantly, the scheme achieves seamless harmony with PMIPv6 and FPMIPv6. This paper discusses the use of CoAP11 over DTLS12 for sensor to MN (S2M) communication in IoT for supervision of the environmental conditions during transport. The MN sends to sensor for initial request message and creates a secure tunnel with the CoAP over DTLS. If the secure channel is successfully created, then the MN sends next message to the MAG. 3. Performance Evaluation This chapter compares and analyzes the handover latency for the proposed scheme, existing Kang-Park scheme, and ESS-FH scheme. Proposed scheme models the mobility of MN using the 2-dimensional Markov Chain model of the Random-Walk mobility model14. In this model, the next location becomes an arbitrary value to the earlier location. This arbitrary value is a value independently selected from the distribution. In addition, when the probability that the
589
Hyun-Suk Chai et al. / Procedia Computer Science 56 (2015) 586 – 591
MN stays in the network is P, the probability to move to another network is 1-P. Table 1 represents the parameter values for performance evaluation. Table 1. Parameter values Parameter
tMN pMAG ( pAR ) tMN nMAG ( nAR )
t pMAG ( pAR )nMAG ( nAR ) t pMAG ( pAR )nLMA(nMAP ) tnMAG ( nAR )nLMA( nMAP )
tnLMA( nMAP ) HA t pLMA( pMAP)nLMA( nMAP)
tMN AAA tMAG ( AR ) AAA
tLMA( MAP ) AAA
Description
Values
Transmission time between MN and pMAG(pAR)
12
Transmission time between MN and nMAG(nAR)
12
Transmission time between pMAG(pAR) and nMAG(nAR)
20
Transmission time between pMAG(pAR) and nLMA(pMAP or HA)
20
Transmission time between nMAG(nAR) and nLMA(nMAP)
20
Transmission time between nLMA(nMAP) and HA
40
Transmission time between pLMA(pMAP) and nLMA(nMAP)
40
Transmission time between NM and AAA for authentication
40
Transmission time between MAG(AR) and AAA for authentication
40
Transmission time between LMA (MAP) and AAA for authentication
40
MinInt
Minimum time allowed between sending unsolicited MN messages
30
MaxInt
Maximum time allowed between sending unsolicited MN messages
70
ReTranceT
Neighbor Solicitation (NS) retransmission time
1000
DADTrance
Duplicate address detection time
1
Handover latency represents the registration process and authentication process, where MN delivers the Report message to Access Router (AR), and receives the Reply message back from MAG. For handover analysis, the handover latency in the initial access authentication process and the handover latency in the handover authentication process can be obtained. First, we notate the handover latency of the existing studies in the initial access authentication ( KP ) ( ESS FH ) process as LInitial HO , LInitial HO , and equations (1) and (2), and notate the initial access latency of the proposed scheme as ( SA FP ) LInitial HO and equation (3). KP ) L(Initial HO
ESS FH ) L(Initial HO
ESS FP ) L(Initial HO
( MinInt MaxInt ) Re transTimer u DADTransmits 3tMN AR 2(t AR MAP tMAP HA ) 4
(1)
( MinInt MaxInt ) Re transTimer u DADTransmits 3tMN AR 2(t AR MAP tMAP HA ) 4
(2)
( MinInt MaxInt ) 2tMAG LMA tMN AAA 4
(3)
Equation (3) is the initial access and handover latency of general PMIPv6, which is divided into the latency when MN is recognized, and the time to register MN to the local network ( 2tMAG LMA ). Next, we notate the handover latency within the domain with equations (4) and (5). KP ) L(Intra HO
2tMN AR
ESS FH ) L(Intra HO
KP ) L(Intra HO
(4) (5)
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There is latency in the interval NMAG, which is recognized by MN, and latency for the binding update between NMAG and LMA. KP ) L(Inter HO
ESS FH ) L(Inter HO
KP ) L(Initial HO
ESS FH ) L(Intra HO
(6) (7)
We evaluated the performance using a graph, based on the mathematically analyzed equation and except that connectivity using phase of CoAP evaluated because performance suffered in the common process case. We based the value of the mediator set up in the simulation on the assumptions made in relevant studies by Kong and Han 14,15,16.
Fig. 2. Comparison in Handover Latency (left) and Comparison of Handover Latencies According to Increase of Frequency in Inter-Domain Movement (right).
Fig. 2 (left) shows a graphic comparison the handover latency of the proposed ESS-FP scheme and conventional schemes. The proposed scheme is shown to be better than the conventional schemes in the initial authentication process, and the inter-domain handover authentication process. Fig. 2 (right) shows the results using equations (8), (9), and (10), which mathematically analyzed the handover latencies for increases in the frequency of movement among domains. Since general PMIPv6 does not support inter-domain handover, the proposed inter-domain handover and conventional scheme for handover latencies are compared. Latencies increase rapidly, based on the increase in the KP-FHMIPv6 inter-domain handover. This occurs because FHMIPv6 has time for binding update to earlier HA, which is different from the proposed ESS-FPMIPv6 inter-domain handover. In addition, since the proposed ESSFPMIPv6 scheme is relatively less affected by wireless interval latency, when the inter-domain handover is applied, the handover latency is very small compared to conventional schemes; high speed handover is possible, even during long-distance movement. 4. Conclusion Various methods to improve the mobility performance in MIPv6 are currently being developed. Among them, PMIPv6 has been widely studied after the completion of RFC standards in 2008, in order to complement the shortcomings of wasting countless signaling that can take place in MIPv6, FMIPv6, and HMIPv6, which are hostbased mobility support technologies. Although PMIPv6 reduces the problem of interference between wireless signals by dramatically decreasing the number of signals by MN, and securing stable transfer speed by expanding the wire interval, it does not support inter-domain handover. In regard to security, many different schemes have been proposed to protect signaling messages; but to protect PMIPv6 signaling messages, most conventional schemes are based on an
Hyun-Suk Chai et al. / Procedia Computer Science 56 (2015) 586 – 591
AAA server. In this study, a new CGA scheme based on an AAA protocol and public key to protect PMIPv6/FPMIPv6 based signaling messages using security analysis of handover schemes for proxy mobile network in the IoT environment is developed, which improves the mobility and stability. In addition, a new inter-domain handover is proposed that conventional PMIPv6 cannot support. Here we also present its architecture and messages formats and evaluate its performance by analyzing handover latency. The authentication protocol is also evaluated through BANLogic, a logic tool17; and a higher security is achieved through a message security mechanism involving signaling, after a consistent transfer speed is secured based on PMIPv6 and network-based mobility support technology, by modeling mobility through a Markov chain model. Acknowledgements This research was supported by Next-Generation Information Computing Development Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning (NRF2014M3C4A7030503) and Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education (NRF-2010-0024695). Also, this research was supported by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), KOREA, through the Education Support program for Creative and Industrial Convergence (Grant Number N0000717). References 1. S. Gundavelli, K. Leung, V. Devarapalli, and K. Chowdhury, Proxy Mobile IPv6, IETF RFC 5213, 2008. 2. H. Yokota, K. Chowdhury and R. Koodli, Fast Handovers for Proxy Mobile IPv6, IETF RFC 5949, 2010. 3. D.H. Kim, J.P. Jeong, Analytical Approach of Cross-Layer-Based Handoff Scheme in Heterogeneous Mobile Networks, The Journal of the Institute of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication, Vol. 6, 2013, pp. 121-133. 4. H. S. Kang, C. S. Park, MIPv6 Binding Update Protocol Secure Against Both Redirect and DoS Attacks, CISC 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3822, 2005, pp. 407-418. 5. I. You, J. Lee, K. Sakurai and Y. Hori, ESS-FH: Enhanced Security for Fast Handover in Hierarchical Mobile IPv6, IEICE Transaction on Information and Systems E93-D, Vol.5, 2010, pp. 1096-1105. 6. H.S. Chai, J.P. Jeong, Secure and Fast Handover Scheme of Proxy Mobile IPv6 Networks, in ISAAC 2014 The 2nd International Sym posium on Advanced and Applied Convergence, 2014, pp. 36-45. 7. T. Aura, Cryptographically Generated Address, IETF RFC 3972, 2005. 8. L. Atzori, A. Iera, G. Morabito, The Internet of Things: A survey, in Elsevier Computer Networks 54, Vol. 15, 2010, pp. 2787-2805. 9. S. H. Jang, J. P. Jeong, Cost-Effective and Distributed Mobility Management Scheme in Sensor-Based PMIPv6 Networks with SPIG Support, The Journal of the Institute of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication 12, Vol. 4, 2013, pp.259-273. 10. K. Zhang, X. Liang, R. Lu, and X. Shen, Sybil Attacks and Their Defenses in the Internet of Things, IEEE Internet of Things Journal, Vol. 5, 2014, pp. 372-383. 11. Z. Shelby, K. Hartke, and C. Bormann, Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), IETF RFC 7252, 2014. 12. E. Rescorla, N. Modadugu, Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2, IETF RFC 6347, 2012. 13. I. F. Akyildiz and W. Wang, A dynamic location management scheme for next-generation multitier PCS systems, IEEE Transaction on Wireless Communication, Vol. 1, 2002, pp. 178-189. 14. K.S. Kong, Y.H. Han, M.K. Shin, H.R. Yoo, and W.J. Lee, Mobility management for all-IP mobile networks: mobile IPv6 vs. proxy mobile IPv6, IEEE Wireless Communications, Vol. 2, 2008, pp. 36-45. 15. Y. Han, J. Choi, and S. Hwang, Reactive Handover Optimization in IPv6 Based Mobile Networks, IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC), Vol. 9, 2006, pp. 1758-1772. 16. K. S. Kong, W. Lee, Y. H. Han, M. K. Shin, Handover Latency Analysis of a Network -based Localized Mobility Management Protocol, IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC’08), 2008, pp. 5838-5843. 17. M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham, A Logic of Authentication, ACM Transaction on Computer System, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1990, pp. 18-36.
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