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An entry into the debate on generalized complementarity
J. them. Bid. (1972) 37, 193-195
LITITERS TO THE EDITOR
An Entry into the Debate on Generalized Complementarity Since no response has appeared yet in this journal and in the hope that the interaction viewpoint might clarify some of the points which Markowitz (Markowitz, 1971) has raised about generalized complementarity, I should like to add to the present manuscript (Jakobsson, 1972) this direct response to Markowitz’s letter. I will deal briefly with each of the three aspects of generalized complementarity to which Markowitz specifically objects. In each case the argument will be made in terms of the interaction viewpoint, i.e. by considering the results of experiments on systems rather than the systems themselves. Firstly, Markowitz deals with the statement of generalized complementarity that biology treats individuals and not, as physics does, classes. He counters with the example of solid state physics, pointing out that no two systems larger than a molecule are microscopically identical. But the important point is that it is the province of the solid state physicist to ask just those questions about a solid which will permit an answer in terms of classes, i.e. what is the conductivity or what kind of X-ray diffraction pattern does one get from a sample of material. Those aspects in which samples of the same material might be different from each other, such as size, shape, or precise (as opposed to statistical) distribution of impurities are not of interest to the physicist. On the other hand, the biologist (especially if one categorizes psychologists as biologists) often asks of his material questions from which he gets different answers from different samples of the same class, and he is often interested in the difference. This brings us directly to the second point which Markowitz criticizes, namely the dualism in generalized complementarity between the biochemical or biophysical description of a system on the one hand and the description of a system as having probabilistic or autonomous behavior on the other hand. Markowitz says that these two modes of description are not complementary but merely different, in the sense that physics and engineering descriptions of a machine are different. Again, I will invoke hypothetical experimental results to clarify this point. A key element in the definition of complementarity is that the two complementary modes of description are never appropriate for describing the results of the same experiment. For example, in some experimental situations light may be described as a classical r.a 193 13
194
E.
JAKOBSSON
wave, and in other experiments as a classical particle, but in no single observation can it be described simultaneously as a classical wave and a classical particle. The two modes of description of biological systems are complementary in just this way. To the extent that the experimenter in biology achieves the same results from different specimens of the same class, the biochemical or biophysical description is appropriate; to the extent that he gets different results the probabilistic or autonomous description applies. For example, if Markowitz and I and any number of other physicists are given identical fairly large injections of sodium pentathol, we will all fall asleep. In this experiment, biochemistry provides quite an adequate description of physicists. On the other hand, if this same goup of specimens is placed in separate identical rooms, given identical writing materials and access to identical references, and instructed to write on the philosophy of science, I submit we will produce results not only quite different from each other but also only probabilistically (if at all) predictable to the experimenter. The simplest accurate description of our behavior would be in terms of autonomy, i.e. the choices we had made. These two modes of description are derivable from two “incompatible” views of man: (i) as responding to stimuli in a totally determined, predictable way; (ii) as capable of making choices. As Markowitz points out, engineering and physics descriptions of a machine are not dual in this way, since they may both apply to the same machine simultaneously. The third and last point to which Markowitz speaks is the sparseness of attainable points in the multidimensional phase space in which complex systems reside. He points out that in superconducting materials only a tiny fraction of the excited states in the system are in the uniformly comoving pairs which give rise to the most interesting behavior of the specimen, and yet superconductivity is entirely a predictable phenomenon. But if we again think of possible experiments on the system, we see that in the case of the superconductor the experiment is easily made large enough to permit simultaneous observation of an effectively infinite number of comoving pairs, i.e. the comoving pairs are densely enough packed for an effectively infinite number to fit in the experimental apparatus. Identical physicists (of which there are one) on the other hand, while much more common as a fraction of the human race than comoving pairs in a superconductor, #Identical Physicists 1 EzoLp #Persons
#comoving pairs #broken pairs >
are more sparse when one tries to gather an infinite experiment on.
sample of them to
LETTERS
TO
THE
Department of Physiology and Biophysics, University of Illinois, Urbana,Illinois 61801,U.S.A. (Received3 November1971) REFERENCES JAKOBSSON, MARKOWITZ,
E. (1972). J. D. (1971).
theor. Biol. 37, 93. J. them-. Bioi. 30,211.
195
EDITOR
E.
JAICOBSWN
LITITERS TO THE EDITOR
An Entry into the Debate on Generalized Complementarity Since no response has appeared yet in this journal and in the hope that the interaction viewpoint might clarify some of the points which Markowitz (Markowitz, 1971) has raised about generalized complementarity, I should like to add to the present manuscript (Jakobsson, 1972) this direct response to Markowitz’s letter. I will deal briefly with each of the three aspects of generalized complementarity to which Markowitz specifically objects. In each case the argument will be made in terms of the interaction viewpoint, i.e. by considering the results of experiments on systems rather than the systems themselves. Firstly, Markowitz deals with the statement of generalized complementarity that biology treats individuals and not, as physics does, classes. He counters with the example of solid state physics, pointing out that no two systems larger than a molecule are microscopically identical. But the important point is that it is the province of the solid state physicist to ask just those questions about a solid which will permit an answer in terms of classes, i.e. what is the conductivity or what kind of X-ray diffraction pattern does one get from a sample of material. Those aspects in which samples of the same material might be different from each other, such as size, shape, or precise (as opposed to statistical) distribution of impurities are not of interest to the physicist. On the other hand, the biologist (especially if one categorizes psychologists as biologists) often asks of his material questions from which he gets different answers from different samples of the same class, and he is often interested in the difference. This brings us directly to the second point which Markowitz criticizes, namely the dualism in generalized complementarity between the biochemical or biophysical description of a system on the one hand and the description of a system as having probabilistic or autonomous behavior on the other hand. Markowitz says that these two modes of description are not complementary but merely different, in the sense that physics and engineering descriptions of a machine are different. Again, I will invoke hypothetical experimental results to clarify this point. A key element in the definition of complementarity is that the two complementary modes of description are never appropriate for describing the results of the same experiment. For example, in some experimental situations light may be described as a classical r.a 193 13
194
E.
JAKOBSSON
wave, and in other experiments as a classical particle, but in no single observation can it be described simultaneously as a classical wave and a classical particle. The two modes of description of biological systems are complementary in just this way. To the extent that the experimenter in biology achieves the same results from different specimens of the same class, the biochemical or biophysical description is appropriate; to the extent that he gets different results the probabilistic or autonomous description applies. For example, if Markowitz and I and any number of other physicists are given identical fairly large injections of sodium pentathol, we will all fall asleep. In this experiment, biochemistry provides quite an adequate description of physicists. On the other hand, if this same goup of specimens is placed in separate identical rooms, given identical writing materials and access to identical references, and instructed to write on the philosophy of science, I submit we will produce results not only quite different from each other but also only probabilistically (if at all) predictable to the experimenter. The simplest accurate description of our behavior would be in terms of autonomy, i.e. the choices we had made. These two modes of description are derivable from two “incompatible” views of man: (i) as responding to stimuli in a totally determined, predictable way; (ii) as capable of making choices. As Markowitz points out, engineering and physics descriptions of a machine are not dual in this way, since they may both apply to the same machine simultaneously. The third and last point to which Markowitz speaks is the sparseness of attainable points in the multidimensional phase space in which complex systems reside. He points out that in superconducting materials only a tiny fraction of the excited states in the system are in the uniformly comoving pairs which give rise to the most interesting behavior of the specimen, and yet superconductivity is entirely a predictable phenomenon. But if we again think of possible experiments on the system, we see that in the case of the superconductor the experiment is easily made large enough to permit simultaneous observation of an effectively infinite number of comoving pairs, i.e. the comoving pairs are densely enough packed for an effectively infinite number to fit in the experimental apparatus. Identical physicists (of which there are one) on the other hand, while much more common as a fraction of the human race than comoving pairs in a superconductor, #Identical Physicists 1 EzoLp #Persons
#comoving pairs #broken pairs >
are more sparse when one tries to gather an infinite experiment on.
sample of them to
LETTERS
TO
THE
Department of Physiology and Biophysics, University of Illinois, Urbana,Illinois 61801,U.S.A. (Received3 November1971) REFERENCES JAKOBSSON, MARKOWITZ,
E. (1972). J. D. (1971).
theor. Biol. 37, 93. J. them-. Bioi. 30,211.
195
EDITOR
E.
JAICOBSWN