An evaluation of “the everyday accountant and researching his reality”

Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 375-384, 1983.

Printed in Great Britain.

0361-3682183 $3.00 + .OO @ 1983 Pergamon Press Ltd.

AN EVALUATION

OF “THE EVERYDAY ACCOUNTANT AND RESEARCHING HIS REALITY”

A. RASHAD ABDEL-KHALIK and BIPIN B. AJINKYA University

of Florida,

In a paper with a title that at best reveals a poor ontological assumption (and at worst, “male chauvinism”), Tomkins & Groves (1983) make three main points. of the “social” world can be classified along a continuum consisting of six main classes, each with its own unique and different set of assumptions about reality. The continuum has at one end a most objective and concrete structure, at the other a most subjective phenomenology (projection of human imagination). Tomkins and Groves advance the proposition that much of the research that would be relevant to the “everyday accountant” falls more toward the subjective end of the classification. Yet, much of the research undertaken in accounting, they claim, is concentrated more towards the objective end of the spectrum. Hence, in undertaking accounting research, academicians typically make inappropriate ontological assumptions about the everyday accountant’s reality. Point

1. The nature

Point 2. There is an appropriate research approach for each class or category of the social world. Hence, specification of the correct ontological assumption is necessary before one can choose an appropriate research style. Furthermore, they assert that the existing “dominating ‘scientific’ paradigm (of research) has left academic accounting literature adrift from practice and so some shift in paradigm seems required now to

U.S.A.

redress the balance.” (Tomkins & Groves, p. 31). They clearly would like to see a tilt towards the “naturalistic” paradigm. Point 3. Although Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya (1979) appear to be aware of the “scientific” versus “naturalistic” debate in sociology, they “left aside any consideration of the underlying objectives of each research style, the ontological assumptions which underpin it and the appropriate epistemological and methodological implications.” (Tomkins & Groves, p. 30). Also, there appears to be some confusion as to the meaning of “triangulation” in research.

We address these points in the following sequence. First, we note that even though there are several differences in perspective between the scientific and the naturalistic approaches, their ultimate objectives are essentially the same. Second, we evaluate the contention that research approaches and ontological assumptions should have a one-to-one correspondence and demonstrate a certain degree of circularity in Tomkins & Groves’ definitions. Next, we contrast our view of triangulation with that of Tomkins & Groves and conclude that our broader view is the empirically more useful one. Finally, we indicate that a philosophical debate such as this (on the merits and demerits of research approaches) is unlikely to achieve their implied objective of bridging the gap between research and practice. 375

376

A. BASHAD ABDEL-KHALIK

Even though Tomkins and Groves make an academic contribution by extending the philosophy of research debate in accounting literature, it is indeed unfortunate that they have chosen to beat a “straw-man” to push their viewpoint. We have no quarrel with the ends they seek to achieve - making accounting research more relevant to practitioners’ needs - but we question their suggested means and justifications.

SCIENTIFIC AND NATURALISTIC APPROACHES CONTRASTED Before delving into the specifics of the Ton&ins and Groves paper, we begin by defining research and specifying its objectives. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines research as “a diligent and systematic inquiry or investigation into a subject in order to discover or revise facts, theories, applications, etc.” The universally accepted objectives of any and all research are to (i) describe, (ii) explain and (iii) predict phenomena. Superficial description is possible at the level of the phenomenon (“dependent” variable) itself, without invoking causal (independent) variables. But objectives (ii) and (iii) require the establishment of causality between so-called dependent and independent variables. Causality loosely implies the acceptance of one relationship or hypothesis to the exclusion of all rival hypotheses. Other terms that describe this process are “verification” and the establishment of “internal validity”. As we quoted Asher (1976) in our monograph (1979, p. 27), the attribution of causality requires: (a) a temporal sequence of observations; (b) covariability; and (c) negation of rival hypotheses. To be sure, these exact three conditions are explicitly stated by Denzin in his discussion of the naturalistic approach to research: “Explanation assumes resolution of the causality problem. That is, time order, covariance and the exclusion of rival causal factors must be demonstated” (1978, p. 3 I). It is quite possible, of course, that some naturalistic stances (symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology) may have limited research objectives that may not encompass the demonstra-

and BIPIN B. AJINKYA

tion of causality. Thus if the social world is viewed as a collection of idiosyncratic and highly situation-specific impressions, then the symbolic interactionist will not be looking for generalizable conclusions and the ethnomethodologist will be concerned with only the “subjective perspective of the actor” in every individual and separate encounter. (It is unclear what tools/instruments Tomkins & Groves envision in order to tap such ephemeral and fleeting reality and what procedures are available to objectively judge the validity of such descriptions.) Even though the possibility of a world with completely idiosyncratic meanings exists, even Ton&ins & Groves appear somewhat reluctant to limit research objectives to the mere cataloguing of impressions: If individual definitions of situations and responses do prove to be widespread across locations and time, then general formal theories may be formulated

(Glasser &

Strauss, 1967, Ch. IV). (Tomkins &Groves, p. 22) Further: It should be stressed that such research is not just destipziwe. It commences with a description based to a large extent upon the reported perceptions of persons in their everyday work setting, but that does not mean that one does not question whether these perceptions based themselves upon misconceptions.

are valid

or

One must raise

the level of analysis in an attempt to identify concepts and

the

establishment

of at least substantive

theories

(emphasis added). (Tomkins & Groves, p. 23)

From

the above quotations it is clear that the research approach are the same as those of the scientific approach, although sometimes there may be differences in focus and degree. What then are the essential differences between the two approaches? The two essential differences pertain to: objectives of the naturalistic

1. the location of theory generation (as opposed to verification) in relation to other segments of the research process; and

AN EVALUATION OF “THE EVERYDAY ACCOUNTANT AND RESEARCHING HIS REALITY” 2. the nature of the environment in which the research is conducted, as shown below (Scheme 1). Scheme 1 Scientific approach

(a) Theory and variable specification done prior to conducting the empirical portion of the study (b) Research conducted in artificial or controlled environment Naturalistic approach (a) No (or minimal) prior theory and variable apecification (b) Research conducted in resl (undisturbed, natural) en-

vlronment

Hence, given the above differences in perspective concerning theory generation and type of environment in which phenomena are studied, the common objective of establishing causality (negation of rival hypotheses) leads to differences in data collection methods (Scheme 2). Scheme 2 Scientific approach (a) Data collection methods may be (and usually arc) explicit and obtrusive; measurement scale may be quantitative or qualitative (b) Causal (independent) variables explicitly manipulated and extraneous variables tighdy controlled (c) Verification by statistical analysis of data collected from current study only Naturalistic approach

Tomkins and Groves paraphrase Blumer (1978) as arguing that “conventional research of the ‘scientific variety’ enables the scholar to remain unconcerned that he has little direct familiarity with the sphere of life being studied. The research model becomes a substitute for intimate knowledge of the field being studied.” We made essentially the same point [using a quote from Denzin (1978)], that researchers in sociology may have gone to extremes in emphasizing the elegance of the research method over the relevance of the research problem, and as a consequence, the pendulum has swung towards the naturalistic mode of inquiry. We further cautioned that when identifying research topics and problem areas one should endeavor to have them more in accounting than in methodology [Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya, (1979), p. 201. However, these exhortations to switch to the naturalistic mode cannot be construed as an indictment of the scientific method per se, but rather demonstrate the inadequacy of researchers’ ability to identify “relevant” problems and select the appropriate data collection methods. The scientific method presumes the availability of a theoretical structure for the phenomena under study, and the focus is therefore primarily on verification (hence the need for explicit control and manipulation of variables, assuming that the phenomena under study will not be affected by the protocol followed). If on the other hand, the phenomena under study would be affected (biased) by any attempt at overt manipulation or then the researcher obtrusive measurement, obviously needs to use naturalistic modes of data collection. Also, if the researcher is looking to generate theory grounded in data, rather than just theories, then naturalistic verify “great-man” procedures

(a) Data collection methods must be relatively unobtrusive ao aa not to “disturb” the environment; meaaurement may be quantitative or qualitative, although typically ia qualitative (b)Cauaal and extraneous variabla only observed, not manipulated (c)Simultaneous theory generation and verification by comparison with data from other properly selected sources

377

allow

simultaneous

theory

construct-

and verification, as described in Glaser & Strauss (1967). Hence it is rather trivial to insist that the study of realistic human interactions and emotions/perceptions that occur in the actual work-place cannot be conducted in contrived laboratory situations using strict scientific methodology. To the extent that certain types of social reality cannot be simulated in the laboratory setting and to the extent that prior theory about a phenomenon is absent, the naturalistic orientation ion

378

A. BASHAD ABDEL-KHALIK

is necessary, advocates

which

“scientific”

a highly unstructured

subjective approach to

research which maintains the natural setting in which behavior

or phenomena

participant

observations,

and BIPIN B. AJINKYA

occur.

Unstructured

and unobstructive

interviews, (not notice-

able) approaches that do not disrupt the natural setting are apt to result in “discovered” theories which are closer to reality. (Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya, p. 17)

Often there may be hybrid situations where the researcher may have a prior theory and may wish to test it in the natural socio-economic setting with all its attendant complex relations and interactions. This would be a field study where the focus is on verification rather than theory generation and belongs to the quasi-experimental class of design for the attribution of causality. If simultaneous theory generation and verification

element.

We ought to address at this point Tomkins and Groves’ interpretation of our position on the naturalistic versus the scientific approach. Our objective in introducing the subject was threefold: (1) to introduce the terminology into the accounting literature; (2) to entice interested researchers such as Tomkins and Groves and others to continue debating and discussing the issues; and (3) providing our own viewpoint. We believe that Tomkins and Groves were not fair in presenting our position. First of all, the monograph is entitled “A Methodological Viewpoint”, and, in addition, we cautioned

the reader

that it is not a textbook.

Moreover, we clearly stated that “In principle, we prefer . . .” (p. 21), which is as clear a statement of personal preference as one can find. Nevertheless Tomkins and Groves write: Through dealing with the ‘naturalistic’ style so briefly,

in the natural setting were the focus - the pure naturalist stance - then the method of “com-

they (Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya) present conclusions that

parative Strauss

with ‘naturalistic’ modes of research. They seem to imply

Notice, whether

analysis”,

as advocated by Glaser and (1967) is the appropriate protocol. however, that the notion of verification, it be part of the so-called pure scientific

or pure naturalist approaches, is essentially based on deductive logic and in that sense is “scientific”.

may be misleading for readers not previous(ly) acquainted that their few pages have resolved the ‘naturalistic’ versus ‘scientific’ methodology

debate and in so doing tend to

close the debate down as of marginal significance to accountants whereas we believe that it should be opened up to reveal all (of) its ramifications.

minimize and maximize group differences relative to the original group studied - is clearly based on deductive principles and is hence “scientific”. Study of the comparison groups so selected enables the researcher to establish or verify the existence, range and variations in the theoretical category or relationship that was inferred from the original group. We view the term “scientific” more broadly, as being almost synonymous with “verification”. Thus grounded theory protocol may be

..

(Tomkins and Groves, p. 10)

The second stage of grounded theory - the careful selection of additional sampling units or groups to In addition

title,

to having

and the cautionary

ignored

statements

the purpose,

the

in the preface

structure and proceeds in spirit to a more typical quasi-experiment with its need for appropriately selected comparison or control groups. We view

of our monograph, Tomkins and Groves also divine that we “close the debate”, and that we believe that our fern pages have resolved it. Nothing we have written can or should be construed to lead to such an assessment. However, by writing on the issues involved, we appear to have provided Tomkins and Groves with a convenient “strawman”, since such issues were not previously addressed in the accounting literature. Will it be useful for us to continue forever debating the “naturalistic” versus the “scientific” approaches at the very broad level? Our answer to this question is: probably not.

the deliberate selection of comparison groups for the explicit purpose of increasing the internal validity of empirically derived theory as a

The above discussion illustrates that there are many elements (including objectives) that are similar in the scientific versus naturalistic approaches

viewed as that starts

a quasi-experimental with little or no

research design initial theoretical

AN EVALUATION

OF “TIb

EVERYDAY

ACCOUNTANT

and it is indeed unnecessary to take exclusivist positions for or against a particular approach or to maintain the primacy/superiority of the inductive versus deductive approaches to theory building. At a philosophical level, the various approaches can co-exist and the elements of each blur into the other depending upon the nature of problem under study, the extent of theory availability, the viewpoint and incentives of the researcher, etc. Figure 1 depicts our characterization of the scientific and naturalistic (grounded theory) processes.

-

-

-

--Theory

Source can be either (i 1 pati data based, ?iri) non-dato (assumption,

I

construction--

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Verrfrcatron-4

Induction Deduction

bosed analogy)

-

379

method

--4

1grounded

Naturalistic

k

HIS REALITY”

cation of social reality by Morgan & Smircich (1980) appears to be based upon combinations of two dimensions - objective (concrete) versus subjective meanings and stable versus unstable relationships. One end of the continuum depicts reality as objective-stable and the other end characterizes reality as completely subjective-unstable-idiosyncratic. In order to appreciate this viewpoint, we have resketched the six types of social reality and their related research paradigms as suggested by Tomkins & Groves (see Fig. 2, panel A). It appears that in their discussion of

Scientific

I--

AND RESEARCHING

Theory

Unobtrusive observation of -new data in real, uncontrolled environment . (Sample I)

construction Induct

ion

-

-

-

-

theory

+/

f

Theoretical

Verification If propositron “A” ” proposltion “6” then both propositions are consldered to be simultaneosly verified

Deductive choice of comparison samples to minimize/maximize sample differences

Unobtrusive observation of similar phenomena in carefully selected m instances I Samples 2,3, etc.)

I opprooch

Induction

Theoretical proposition ‘I B I(

Fig. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND RESEARCH APPROACHES We now turn to the principal thesis of Ton&ins and Groves, that the nature of reality (the ontological assumption) should determine the broad research approach (and presumably the ultimate data collection method). The six-category classifi-

_

1.

the one-to-one correspondence between classes of social reality and research approaches, Ton&ins & Groves use the term “naturalistic perspective” to refer to both ontological assumption and epistemological (research) approach. In fact, we were unable to find much discussion in their paper about the ultimate data collection tools or methods that uniquely characterize the three sub-sets of the naturalistic research approach (for reality

380

A. RASHAD ABDEL-KHALIK

categories 4-6). The following quotes are illustrative of this apparent confusion (the comments between square brackets following each quote are our own remarks): Symbolic interactionists see the world as one in which people form their own separate impressions through a process of human interaction and negotiation. The belief that.

..

and BIPIN B. AJINKYA

of receptionists in a public welfare agency (for Category 5 research). Category 6 type research would be too subjective and speculative to be useful in accounting, if it can be done at all. More importantly, we are not persuaded that the objective-subjective and stability-instability dimensions of reality usefully dictate the appropriateness of research methods. Rather, we believe

(Tomkins and Groves, p. 19)

that the principal determinants of the choice of research methods are the degree to which phenomena can or cannot be simulated in “artificial”

[Here it appears that symbolic interactionism is more a description of reality rather than a research method to determine that reality.]

settings, the degree to which overt control or observation can destroy or bias the relevant social reality and the degree to which prior theory is or

[Tl he “naturalistic”

is not available. Also, the latter characterization enables one to match the type of problem studied

Blumer who placed heavy stress on

the need for ‘feeling one’s way inside the experience of

with the appropriate Certain relationships,

data collection however, do exist

(Tomkiis and Groves, p. 20)

the

For

one’s

completely subjective and situation-specific, then almost certainly it cannot be artificially duplicated

the actor’ in order to gain an understanding

[How

does

particular use?]

one

“feel

methods

of

data

...

way”?

And

collection

what

does

one

two

in the laboratory. indicate

The focus now turns deeper into the subjective perspective of the actor and further from positivistic methods. For ethnomethodologists

(the advocates

of Category

5

research style) symbolic interactionism is an over-rational model of man which ignores the roles of emotion. ethnomethodologist

wants

to

understand

. . The

what

self-

images people hold, but more particularly what under lying assumptions person

performs

moreover,

viewpoints.

sustain that view in the way each hi

or her everyday

role. He is not,

interested in moving beyond the viewpoint of

the person studied.

(Tomkins and Groves, p. 24)

approach collection

that

Both

example,

viewpoints

a naturalistic

that

if reality

is

will therefore

(or quasi-experimental)

is appropriate and method will depend

of obtrusiveness other factors.

method. between

can

the ultimate data upon the amount

be

Let us take another hypothetical demonstrate our point. Assume

tolerated,

among

case to further that reality is

stable in the Sense that the same combination of environmental factors leads to the same perception (impression) and the same action on the part of the actor. Tomkins and Groves would say that such reality can and should be studied using the scientific approach. However, assume further that

of what type of reality he assumes rather than bow he goes about determining that reality.]

some of the causal factors cannot be made effective (realistic) in a synthetic environment and also that attempts at overt observation would bias the actions of the actor. Our framework would

The apparent jects confusion

lead to the conclusion that a quasi-experimental approach should be followed using some type of unobtrusive measurement (i.e. a naturalistic

[Again,

the ethnomethodologist

is defied

almost

in terms

circularity of these definitions inin trying to make sense of Tomkins

and Groves’ idea of one-to-one mapping. The only cases of specific data collection methods we could find are “actor reports” (for Category 4 research), analysis of and (presumably) documentary psychiatric hospital files and some type of unobtrusive observation in studying the behavior

approach).

Of course,

Tomkins

and Groves

may

retort that their (assumed) concrete reality is always such that it can be adequately reproduced in the laboratory and is never affected by the obtrusiveness of the setting or measurement, hence the combination of conditions in the

AN EVALUATION OF “THE EVERYDAY ACCOUNTANT AND RESEARCHING HIS REALITY”

- Panel

1

Type

Type3 Contextual fieLd of information

Symbolic discourse

Socia t construction

Prelection of human imagination

Scientific

Scientific

Cybernetic (simulation)

Symbolic interactionlsm

Ethno methodogy

Phenomenology

k

-

Scientif

-Pane\

Prior theory avai\abLe

Contrived or artificial environment

and Grove s’ framework

Concrete process

1

Related epistemological or research approaches (?I (Tomkins and Groves [IS83]1

Tomkins

Concrete structure

Type Social reality or ontological assumptions (Morgan and Smircich [I9801

A:

it

9:

approach

Type 4

---w/--

Alternative

Phenonomenon affected or biased by explicit control, manipulation, or observot

True experiment : Laboratory experiment; (and most observation

Quasi -experiment (?I: unobtrusive observatron, verbat protocol analysis

methods1

[Scientific

[Naturalistic

*Note:

Prior theory unavailable

G

-

-

ion

and naturalistic]*

methods)

[Naturalistic

and scientific]*

and scientific]*

Method of grounded theory (comparative analysis): fieLd and case study; (and most observation methods)

Method of grounded theory field ond case study; observation methods similar to above

[Naturalistic]

[Naturalistic]

These may be looked upon as hybrid naturalistic approaches.

approaches

y

Quasi-experiment: field and case study; document analysis, unstructured interview and self - report If phenomenon is subjective

/

\

approach

Phenomenon unaffected by explicit or overt control, manipuLation. or observation

Quasi-experiment: field experiment; (and most observation

\

Type

framework

/ Rea I environment

Type 5

---Naturalistic

[Scientific]

Prior theory available

381

that

combine

elements

of both

scientific

:

and

Fig. 2. foregoing counter-example

would never occur. Our

intention is not to belittle the thesis put fortb by Tomkins and Groves, but rather to suggest that the nature of reality and the means used to determine that nature may be visualized using several aternative and arbitrary frameworks (although some may be more “useful” than others). For an alternative framework, see Fig. 2, Panel B. We note that in their recent survey of behavioral decision theory, Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) cite that the processes of representation and framing - how the problem-task, or the reality behind the task, is seen by the actor - are important determinants

of the judgements

ALTERNATIVE

and choices

made by the actor.

INTERPRETATIONS

OF

TRIANGULATION We turn next to the “appropriate” interpretation of the concept of triangulation in research. Our interpretation of triangulation is the broadest possible, that is, the researcher may triangulate both within and across research approaches, whereas Tomkins and Groves interpret the term to apply to the use of different data collection

382

A. FXASHAD ABDEL-KHALIK

methods search

and

samples

approach

within

(typically

a given the

overall

naturalistic

andBIPIN B. AJINKYA

re-

assumption.

ap-

triangulation

Finally,

the philosophical

is based

proach). Note that our discussion in this paper as well as Tomkins and Groves’ thesis of the correct

any single theory, empirical study, etc.

correspondence between type of problem (or reality) being studied and the appropriate research approach (including data collection method) presume that the researcher already knows the nature of reality and has made the correct onto-

divining ities.

logical assumption. In this case, he or she can proceed to the appropriate research tool and triangulation may be of a limited variety. However, the point of doing research is to discover the

nature of reality, that is, one does not know a priori which class the phenomenon belongs to. One, therefore,

has to make

ontological assumption and the method. What happens made is in fact erroneous?

an initial

guess at the

accordingly choose if the assumption The inferences and

conclusions made in this caSe would be fallacious and the circularity could only be resolved by employing

methods, Also, methods of

different

research

approaches

and

i.e. triangulation of research approaches. what are the implications for research if a particular phenomenon is composed

more

than one ontological assumption. Tompkins and Groves themselves quote Burrell and Morgan (1979) that “few researchers have been able to demonstrate that a pure ethnomethodological stance explains all of an individual’s behavior and that usually structural or organizational features enter the explanation to some extent” (p. 26). Another quotation from Silverman and Jones (1976) on the same page essentially points to the possibility of mixed ontological assumptions. Hence if we accept the one-to-one correspondence between ontological assumption and research case of mixed assumptions

approach then for the we are logically led to

triangulation across research approaches. Similarly, Reichardt and Cook (1980) support the use of mixed paradigms, particularly in the early stages of research in new areas, where features from both scientific and naturalistic modes may be combined. Our conclusion is that the level of triangulation should be dictated by the degree to (and the strength with) which accumulated prior evidence points to the existence of a particular ontological

the nature

support

for

on the tacit assumption that research method, particular is manifestly

of reality

RESOLUTION

incapable

of

in all of its complex-

OF THE “SCHISM”

The last point we wish to address is the contention of Ton&ins and Groves that by freeing the academic accounting researcher from the “yoke” of the scientific the awareness researcher will

method

and by simply

increasing

of naturalistic approaches, the automatically move on to study

problems and concerns that are close to the heart of the practicing accountant. The objective is laudable and we wholeheartedly support their plea for a “fair sprinkling of accounting research effort all along the continuum from Category 1 to 6 . . .” But we believe

that their linkage

and effect is quite simplistic. Research much an economic act as an academic governed

by the incentive

perceived

by the researcher.

(cost-benefit)

of cause

effort is as one and is structure

The net incentive

to

study a particular research problem or to change research effort is dependent upon (in addition to academic expertise and interest) the following factors. (i) Knowledge that the problem is of interest to the practitioner.

exists

and

(ii) The feasibility (cost and effort) of studying the problem in its natural setting, including the cooperation of the practitioner in making available opportunity, data, facilities, etc. (iii) Positive inducements (communication of problem areas and financial support) provided by practitioner groups to study problems of interest to the sponsor, and last but not least, (iv) The academic respectability of the problem studied and the scholarly procedures followed that determine the publishability of such endeavors

in quality

academic

journals.

These incentives are the typical whether particular problem-areas

determinants get studied

of or

AN EVALUATION

OF “THE EVERYDAY

ACCOUNTANT

whether shifts in research effort materialize (notice that Peat, Marwick & Mitchell Co. provided the first three incentives above and witness the phenomenal shift towards auditing-practitioner oriented research). In this context, the reader is referred to an analysis of how to restructure research for impact on practice by Abdel-khalik (1981). If the above set of incentives is not made more congruent towards the types of particular problems that are presumably of interest to practitioners (as per Tomkins and Groves), then such problems will remain unexamined and lofty exhortations to change paradigms are unlikely to bear fruit, Thus our view is that to the degree that any “schism” exists, it was caused by the above factors and not by any misplaced adherence to the tenets of the scientific method. The methods of field studies and quasi-experimental designs have been known to accounting researchers probably almost as long as the scientific method and pure experimental designs, hence we remain unconvinced about Tomkins and Groves’ explanation of the cause for the “schism” as well as their plan for its resolution. CONCLUDING COMMENTS Our discussion of the paper by Ton&ins and Groves (1984) examined, among other things, two premises of particular importance. 1. There is a one-to-one mapping between different ontological assumptions and research methods. 2. If more academic research is directed at discovering the “impressions” held by and about the “everyday accountant”, the schism between accounting research and practice is likely to disappear. We argued that both premises, although provid-

AND RESEARCHING

HIS REALITY”

ing an interesting academic debate, were not adequately supported. We also expressed doubt that a misplaced preference for a research method or approach per se is the primary cause of the often-mentioned gap between accounting research and practice. By comparison to Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya (1979), Ton&ins and Groves elected to adopt a particular framework to characterize the “naturalistic” research approach, as well as a somewhat narrow interpretation of the concept of “triangulation”. We believe that both of these concepts should serve as general guides for conceptualizing and facilitating the research process; neither ought to be cast in concrete. It is also emphasized that the objectives of research - to describe, explain and predict - are common to both the scientific and naturalistic approaches and to any form of triangulation. Several comments were made to indicate that the necessary conditions for causal inference and attribution have a logical flavor and are essentially unaffected by the research approach, method or tool. We would like to reiterate that we fully support Tomkins and Groves’ ultimate goal of increasing the diversity of academic accounting research (in general), as well as making it more relevant to the immediate needs of practitioners (in particular). It is not clear what type of debate a philosophical paper on research methodology could generate. However, we feel that the paper by Ton&ins and Groves might entice others to consider and study two issues: (a) the desirability of developing a set of criteria for classifytig both the nature of problem areas and the choice of research methods; and (b) further evaluating the extent to which the schism between accounting research and practice is a function of the chosen research methods, rather than other incentive-type causal factors.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Abdel-khaiik, Accounting

A. R., How Academic Research

should be Restructured for Impact, in The Zmpacr of

Research on Policy and Practice, Buckley, J. W. ted.) (The Council of Arthur Young

Professors, 1981),

pp. 157-185.

383

384

A. RASHAD ABDEL-KHALIK

and BIPIN B. AJINKYA

Abdel-khsIik. A. R. & Ajinkya, B. B., Empirical Research in Accounting: a Methodologhxl Viewpoint, Accounting Education Series (American Accounting Associstion, 1979), Vol. 4. Asher, H., Causal Modeling (Sage Publications, 1976). Blumer, H., Methodological Principles of Empirical Sciences, in Sociological Methods: a Sourcebook. Denzin, N. K. (ed.) (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1978). pp. 29-43. Burrell, G. & Morgan, G., Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis (Heinemsnn, 1979). Denzin, N. K. (ed.), SociologicalMethods: a Sourcebook (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1978). Einhorn, H. J. & Hogsrth. R. M., Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of Judgment and Choice, Journal of Accounting Research (Spring, 1981), pp. 1-41. [Reprinted from Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 32 (1981).1 Glsser, B. N. & Strauss. A. L., The Discouey of Grounded Theory (Aldine Publishing, 1967). Morgsn, G. & Smircich, L., The Case for Qualitative Research, Academy of Management Review (1980). Reichsrdt, C. S. & Cook, T. D., Beyond Qusbtative Versus Quantitative Methods, in Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Evaluation Research, Cook and Reichsrdt (eds.) (Sage, 1979). Silverman, D. & Jones, J., Organizational Work (Collier Macmillan, 1976). Tomkins, C. & Groves, R., The Everyday Accountant and Researching His Reality, Accounting, Organizations and Society (1983), pp. 361-374.