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An inquiry into the causes of shipwrecks: Its implications for the prevention of pollution
~ ] EU T T E R w O R T H IN E M A N N
Marine Poficy, Vol. 19, No. 6, pp. 469-475, 1995 Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0308-597X/95 $10.00 + 0.00
0308-597X(95)00029-1
An Inquiry into the causes of shipwrecks: its implications for
the prevention of pollution John King Department of Maritime Studies and International Transport, University of Wales College of Cardiff, PO Box 907, Colum Drive, Cardiff CF1 3YP, UK Lord Donaldson's is the latest in a long line of reports that have dealt with the operation of ships and the prevention of casualties. A classic example is the 1836 report of the select committee that inquired into the Causes of Shipwrecks. Despite its brevity, this Report managed to encapsulate many of the issues which still concern us today. The symptoms of current shipping ills are considered at great length in the Donaldson Report. However, in this paper, it is argued that the underlying causes remain much as they have ever been.
The problem of making a ship is one of doing something very like what has been done before. To understand fully how to make a new ship, it is necessary to study the qualities and history of creation of existing ships.1
exaggerated, or that such criticisms are based on emotional reactions to events and are therefore unjustified, we should do well not to disregard them completely. For the complaints that we hear today have been heard before. Ships have been lost; committees have inquired. Enough has been done to satisfy those who demand that something be done, and the cycle has repeated itself. Shipping is an old industry. It is ballasted by its history to the point of overloading. Lord D o n a l d s o n ' s R e p o r t 2 stands at the mid-point of the latest cycle. We have had the shipwreck and the Inquiry; we wait to see which if any of its 103 recommendations will be translated into action.-3 A realist might expect their n u m b e r to be small and their effects minimal. This is not because they are wrong or irrational when placed in their correct historical context; nor is it because they are directed at knaves to be i m p l e m e n t e d by fools. Rather it is our traditional models of shipping and maritime enterprise that are becoming increasingly inadequate. Lord Donaldson was primarily concerned with the prevention of pollution from ships but his inquiry necessarily ranged over the well trodden ground that
In the eyes of m a n y today the international shipping industry is once again in danger of falling into disrepute. If this observation is accurate it reflects a situation that we cannot afford to ignore, for the efficient and u n h a m p e r e d m o v e m e n t of goods that underpins the World's e c o n o m y is at risk. Self interest, if no other reason, demands that we give it our attention. A r e things really so bad? The concerns of those who see disasters looming are based on evidence that is real enough. The case of the Estonia has r e a w a k e n e d memories in Britain of the Herald of Free Enterprise and fuelled suspicions that ship operators will always rank profit above people; the case of the Braer has demonstrated that we can all be victims. The word is also abroad that seamen are incompetent, that shipping companies can never be called to account and that maritime institutions are no longer a byword for rectitude. On such grounds are reputations lost and confidence undermined. While those of us who are slightly closer to the facts might argue that such conclusions are false or
2Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas, Report of Lord Donaldson's Inquiry
1j H Biles, The Design and Construction of Ships, Charles Griffin & Co, London, 1919.
into the Prevention of Pollution from Merchant Shipping, Cm 2560 HMSO, London, 1994. 3The response of Her Majesty's Government was published in February 1995.
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A n Inquiry into the causes o f shipwrecks: J King
is occupied by the wider failings of merchant shipping; ground, m o r e o v e r , which has been explored on n u m e r o u s occasions in the past. For this is not the first time that shipping has been the subject of public criticism. It is often said that a high proportion of all accidents at sea have a h u m a n cause. To say this is to say nothing. Ultimately all accidents can be attributed either to the hand of man or the hand of God. Since shipping is a h u m a n activity the former, whether applied directly on board ship or indirectly ashore, is much more likely to be culpable than the latter. M o r e o v e r , to look for someone to blame and to d e m a n d action are natural h u m a n reactions when an accident occurs. It follows, therefore, that concern bred of catastrophe has been a frequent and m a j o r force for change throughout much of maritime history. In 1836, following three years during which 1702 British vessels were lost, 1714 people drowned and p r o p e r t y valued at £8 510 000 was destroyed, the Select C o m m i t t e e set up to inquire into the causes of shipwrecks, 4 concluded: That among the various causes of Shipwreck, which appear susceptible of removal or diminution, the following appear to be the most frequent and the most generally admitted: • • • • • • • • • •
defective construction of ships; inadequacy of equipment; imperfect state of repair; improper or excessive loading; inappropriateness of form; incompetence of masters and officers; drunkenness of officers and men; operation of marine insurance; want of harbours of refuge; and imperfection of charts.
This list looks familiar, and so it should since it includes most of the causes which are usually given today for marine accidents. While the C o m m i t t e e naturally directed their attention towards contemporary issues whose details are no longer of concern to us, their classification would serve us perfectly well as a basis for analysing the ills that continue to plague shipping. It is not difficult to see the correspondence between each item in this list and the topics addressed in Lord Donaldson's chapters. That this should be so is in one sense unremarkable; the perils of the sea do not change. Nevertheless one might have expected that some of the listed items would have been capable of remedy during a century or m o r e of unprecedented technological progress. Just as in 1836, we can still recognise defective construction (which includes design, fabrication and
"Report from the Select Committee appointed to inquire into The Causes of Shipwrecks, House of Commons, 19 August 1836.
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all other aspects of the creation and maintenance of a ship) as a potential source of failure. In recent years a n u m b e r of large bulk carriers have been lost in circumstances which might be attributed to some form of constructional fault, despite the fact that they were apparently built and maintained to standards which were in accord with the customary practices of the maritime industry. Similarly, several roll-on roll-off vessels have also been lost in circumstances which have given cause to question their stability, despite the fact that they too were no doubt constructed according to accepted standards. We have to ask ourselves why such events continue to occur today. In 1836 it might have been argued that many constructional failures were due to lack of knowledge. But it is difficult to argue that ignorance lies at the root of today's failures. While specialists will always point to interesting problems that have yet to be solved, there is now no shortage of technical knowledge. Rather it might be argued that the maritime industry fails to apply effectively what is already known. Throughout maritime history experience has invariably taken precedence over theoretical knowledge. The construction of ships has always depended upon the skill and practical knowledge of craftsmen. Even in the first half of the nineteenth century the application of scientific principles to the design, construction and operation of ships was minimal. In 1836, while the C o m m i t t e e were sitting, experiments with screw propulsion were going on, unsupported by a rational theory of propeller action or ship resistance; 5 iron was becoming established as a shipbuilding material, unsupported by any rational theory of structures; 6 and ships were being launched and sent to sea without any certainty that they would float the right way up. 7 Such theoretical knowledge as was available was often ignored. The principles of ship stability were certainly known in France in the early eighteenth century when Bouger invented the metacentre, and in Spain when Santacilla devised a practical inclining experiment. But their work was
5Notwithstanding that proposals for using windmills in ships were made in England by Hooke, 1681 and in France by Duquet, 1699; Dubost, 1743; Bernouilli, 1752; and in America by Bushnell, 1776; nor that patents for screw propulsion were awarded to Bramah, 1784; Lyttleton, 1794; Shorter, 1799; Dallery, 1803; Bourdon, 1824 and Sauvage, 1832; or that the report of the Nautical and Hydraulic Experiments conducted between 1796 and 1798 by Beaufoy and the Society for the Improvement of Naval Architecture were published posthumously in 1834. 6The method still employed for estimating shear forces and bending moments was first described by Edward Reed, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 1871, although earlier insights had been provided by inter alia Thomas Young, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 1814. 7Notwithstanding that the principles of ship hydrostatics had been explored by inter alia Hoste, 1697; Bouguer, 1746; Euler, 1749, 1773; Santacilla, 1771; Watson, 1776; Atwood, 1798; Dupin, 1822; the first recorded inclining experiment conducted in Britain took place aboard HMS Scylla in 1830.
An Inquiry into the causes of shipwrecks: J King disregarded in Britain by practical shipbuilders. Only two inclining experiments are known to have been conducted in Britain before the capsizing of the Perseverance in 1855. In 1850, 100 years after Bouger published his classic work 8, Moseley 9 explained the concept of dynamical stability. Yet the significance of calculating even statical stability curves was not recognised in Britain by any practical shipbuilder before the loss of H M S Captain w in 1871. Even as late as 1897 Martell, Chief Surveyor of Lloyd's Register, was still able to say: to require the captain of a ship to go into the study of and understand the elements of calculating the stability of a ship is perfectly monstrous H and only in 1948 did the provision of stability information to the masters of both passenger ships and cargo ships b e c o m e mandatory, under the Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea. Dynamical stability criteria were not introduced as a formal requirement for merchant ships until 1966, and a practical resolution of the instability of roll-on rolloff ships arising from the flooding of the vehicle deck has still not been implemented. The conclusion is unavoidable that things move slowly in the maritime world. Problems persist from one generation to the next. Solutions are rarely acted upon when they are first devised. Rules which define actual practice reflect what is acceptable rather than what is possible and so continue to lag far behind the growth of knowledge. This is not a new state of affairs: • . . the defective construction of ships appears to have been greatly encouraged by the system of classification • . . followed at Lloyd's 12 So observed the Select C o m m i t t e e in 1836 referring to a system of classification that had in fact existed since 1708; so might we also observe, in equivalent terms today. Ships are still designed to rules. Classification Society Rules, I M O rules and the like provide a familiar if sometimes anachronistic f r a m e w o r k for ship construction and operation. Such rules are in large measure a relic of early maritime history. T h e y represent a codification of experience which, in a pre-scientific age, would have been held in the shipwright's head, as for example: Suppose a Ship of 300 Tunnes be 29 foot at the Beame. If
8Pierre Bouger, Traite du Navire, Paris, 1746. 9Rev H Moseley, 'On dynamical stability and the oscillations of floating bodies', Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 1850. ~°N Barnaby, 'The relative influence of breadth of beam and height of freeboard in lengthening out the curves of stability', Trans. Inst. Nav. Arch. 1871. ~lln J MacFarlane Gray, A Note on the Geometry of Stability, Trans. Inst. Nav. Arch. 1897. 121bid, para 12.
her main Mast be 24 inches diameter, the length of it must be 24 yards, for every inch in thicknesse is allowed a yard in length t3 Action stemming from the deliberations of Committees of Inquiry has often taken the form of new or modified rules which inevitably challenge the ingenuity of designers. They, in their turn, produce new forms of ships that may be extreme or otherwise defective, but which nevertheless possess the doubtful virtue of perverting the rules they are required to follow. The slender and unsafe forms of the late nineteenth century, for instance, which included the curious awning-deckers and spar-deckers, were the result of attempts to circumvent c o n t e m p o r a r y rules whose legacy to the twentieth century has been the tonnage hatch and other similar contrivances. In the same way, m o d e r n roll-on roll-off ferries now have low freeboards because their vast, unsubdivided vehicle deck spaces are ruled to be superstructures which allows them to enjoy benefits from rules that were never devised to a c c o m m o d a t e their special arrangements. We may also recall paragraph ships whose description blatantly advertises successful circumvention of the rules. Once there was a rule that restricted the length of an oil cargo tank to 30 feet. This rule was relaxed when supertankers began to be built because, so it was argued, it led to hull structures that were too heavy and penalised large vessels. Following the rule change, tankers were built with fewer bulkheads and hence with much larger cargo tanks, any one of which probably exceeded the capacity of an entire ship of an earlier generation. It is interesting to speculate on how much less oil would have spilled into the sea in subsequent years had this rule not been changed in this way. Rules provide a practical way to solve problems without having to start from first principles. They are particularly useful when the underlying principles are unknown, as was the case when John Smith's contemporaries built a mast. But the m o r e complicated the situation the less likely it is that a satisfactory general rule can be devised, as Smith also recognised. But to give a true Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportion of the building of all sorts of Ships, were they all built after one mould . . . a methodicall rule might be projected; but their lengths, bredths, depths, rakes and burthens are so variable and different, that nothing but experiences can possibly teach it. 14 There are still times when we might feel that the maritime industry has not yet come fully to terms with the scientific age. Brunel complained that shipbuilders left too much to the experience of
1aJohn Smith, A Sea Grammar, London, 1627• 14Ibid•
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An Inquiry into the causes o f shipwrecks: J King
craftsmen ~5 and in the first paper given to the newly formed Institution of Naval Architects on 1 March 1860, the Rev Joseph Woolley 16 argued for a more scientific approach to ship design and construction, comparing British practice unfavourably with that of the French because it lacked the theoretical basis of the latter. Today, we might note that the general tenor of such criticisms remains valid. While theoretical knowledge has increased substantially, practical ship design and operation are still heavily rule-based, especially in areas like safety which has always been uppermost in the maritime consciousness. Here the rules bear closer resemblance to those introduced 100 years ago by the Board of Trade than to the analytical procedures which today are more common in industries no less hazardous than shipping, such as chemicals or offshore oil. While offshore operators analyse safety cases and devise emergency plans, ship operators count fire extinguishers. Lord Donaldson stands at the end of a long, distinguished and largely ignored line of advocates of a more analytical, or safety case approach to marine safety. "Not invented here" is a phrase sometimes heard in respect of the attitude of the maritime world towards developments that take place beyond its boundaries. Shipbuilding may have pioneered the use of steam and iron technology in the nineteenth century, but maritime industry in Britain has lagged far behind in its use of the electronics and information technologies of the twentieth century. That is not to say they have had no impact. The management and operation of shipping was fundamentally changed by the introduction of radio communication which, more than anything else perhaps, was responsible for the decline in the powers, if not the responsibilities, of the shipmaster and transferred all strategic and many day-to-day decisions to desks ashore. All this began early in the present century and has crept up on us by stealth, unnoticed until fairly recently when it became obvious to everyone that many traditional practices could no longer be sustained. The managed introduction and use of such means to achieve specific aims has been alien to the maritime industries, however. Those who have pointed out the possible marine applications of non-maritime technological developments have often placed their own personal credibility at risk. Who, in the 1960s exactly 100 years after the first separation scheme for the English Channel was proposed, would have risked his professional reputation by daring to suggest that marine traffic control might learn something from aviation? Now Lord Donaldson proposes 151fyou look carefully at the structure of the Great Britain you can still see what he meant. ~6Rev Joseph Wooliey, 'The present state of the mathematical theory of Naval architecture', Trans. Inst. Nav. Arch. 1860.
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that shipping adopt transponders, first used by aircraft during the Second World War. Who, in the 1970s, could convince the shipping industry that it should take computers seriously, or was prepared to speculate openly on their potential in the face of the widespread belief that they would offer little benefit and probably would not work at sea? The idea that the sea is special has sustained maritime tradition through the centuries. It has justified much maritime practice and encouraged the historical isolation of shipping. For many practitioners, its truth remains self-evident. But is this view still valid; or is it part of the ballast that burdens the maritime world? Until the last few decades seafarers were the guardians of all maritime experience. They alone knew how to survive at sea and doubtless their unique status fostered the mystique which still surrounds their profession. But today their position is no longer unique; the sea is no longer remote in the way that it was. Offshore industry in all its many forms has broadened the scope of maritime endeavour. It has introduced to the sea many people with neither previous marine experience nor preconceptions about working in the marine environment• Yet it has barely called upon traditional maritime skills; seafarers and shipbuilders have played only a subsidiary role in these new developments. Traditional maritime skills are becoming more scarce, even within shipping. Processes at work today have increased labour productivity, reduced manning scales and dried up recruitment. They have also depleted the stock of experience upon which the operation of ships has traditionally relied• Thus, today just as in 1836, the competence of crews is in doubt• • . . the frequent incompetency of masters and officers appears to be admitted . . . arising from the want of skill and knowledge in seamanship, but more frequently from the want of an adequate knowledge of navigation; it being proved that some masters have been appointed to command after having been for a very short time at sea; that others have hardly known how to trace a ship's course on a c h a r t . . . 17 Seafaring is no longer a lifetime's career for many people. It is again possible to find masters who have accumulated little sea-time, officers who have little knowledge of navigation, engineers who are unfamiliar with basic watch-keeping procedures and crews who do not share a common language. The implications are obvious, both for the shipping industry itself now losing the pool of experience whence it has habitually drawn its superintendents and other senior operations staff, and also for those ancillary maritime occupations which once recruited seafarers. Nowadays, citizens of traditional maritime
171bid, para 18.
An Inquiry into the causes of shipwrecks: J King
countries are reluctant to go to sea; countries that began supplying seafarers' services in the 1960s and 1970s are now also finding their own citizens similarly reluctant. We should not be surprised, therefore, to hear today of ships in the charge of officers whose combined experience barely matches that of the apprentices in a medium-sized cargo vessel of 40 years ago. We ought not to be surprised when such ships get into difficulties. Sea-sense and ordinary practice o f seamen are phrases that are increasingly reminiscent of an age that is rapidly passing• The cost of marine accidents is high, often much higher than is implied by the sums recorded in the accounts of those directly involved in the actions which led to them. This is because external factors such as personal injury, loss of life or pollution are often ignored or greatly underestimated in practice. Shipping has been slow to adopt the procedures for calculating them used in other sectors of the transport industry, even though it has long been recognised that the costs of externalities are ultimately borne by the public. the system of Marine Insurance, though affording the means of protecting individuals from excessive loss, has nevertheless a tendency, by transferring the pecuniary responsibility for such losses from the owners of ships to the underwriters who insure them, to induce less care in the construction of ships, less efficiency in their equipment, and less security for their adequate management at sea; inasmuch as the risk of such loss to the shipowners can be covered by a fixed premium of insurance, which, being charged on the freight, and then re-charged on the goods conveyed, fixes the real responsibility and real loss ultimately on the public; as all the parties actually engaged in the transaction can secure themselves from any participation in such loss by the aid of Marine Insurance. )8 •
.
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Official drafting succinctly encapsulates a problem which remains with us today. The real cost of marine casualties falls ultimately on the public, either through real losses for which no compensation is available or through a general increase in the cost of sea transportation. Losses are often highly visible as in the case which Lord Donaldson addressed. But the rise in transportation costs, stemming from a widening of the scope of compensation in accordance with the polluter pays principle, is arguably m o r e significant. Thus, in accordance with the principles set out in G r e s h a m ' s Law, the upright ship o p e r a t o r carries the burden of increased insurance costs, while the unscrupulous one avoids his responsibilities in a variety of ways. A section of the public, the shippers, may be t e m p t e d to avoid paying higher freight required by the f o r m e r by accepting the services of the latter whose incompetence, should it result in a casualty, will mainly injure those who are remote ~81bid, para 22.
from the original transaction. A circular process is thereby established which disadvantages the upright o p e r a t o r further. Moreover, this process is accelerated by the unwillingness of insurers to recognise the efforts of the good operator to improve his operation by investing in safety measures. The operation of marine insurance appears to be as much a matter of concern as it was a century and a half ago. Inquiries are usually charged both with identifying causes and proposing remedies. This was so in 1836; Lord Donaldson has similarly made r e c o m m e n d a tions for action, many of which have been proposed in essence by earlier inquiries. The principal recommendations of the 1836 Inquiry covered inter alia the following points: (1) compilation and consolidation of a Code of Maritime Law 19 (2) promotion and encouragement of Nautical Improvement~° • perfection of a system of Classification of Ships 21 • collection of information as to the best methods of building, surveying, fitting out, equipping, loading and furnishing . . . all ships 22 (3) formation of certain standards of qualifications in seamanship and navigation to be obtained by officers and by masters 23 • appointment of examiners in seamanship and navigation for the public examination of all candidates for appointment as officers or commanders 24 (4) arrangement of a plan for the institution of Courts of Inquiry to examine the circumstances of every shipwreck 25 (5) opening (of) a negociation (sic) with all the maritime powers of the world . . . in order to effect a comprehensive treaty with each and all of them, to use their best endeavours for the preservation of the lives and property...26 •
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.
Once again we find a f r a m e w o r k which could be useful today. It embraces (1) the legal basis for shipping, (2) the technology that renders it possible, (3) the h u m a n skills to conduct it competently, (4) the means for investigating whatever goes wrong and (5) a mechanism for gaining the consent of all who engage in it. W h a t m o r e is needed? Perhaps the most interesting of the foregoing recommendations is that concerned with the opening of negotiations with maritime powers. In 1836 the U K fleet greatly surpassed all others in size, with 20 388 vessels of 2.349 million net tons. The fleet was protected by the Navigation Act which was not to be ~91bid, para 2°lbid, para 2~Ibid, para =21bid, para
231bid, para 241bid, para 251bid, para 261bid, para
27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 36. 43.
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An Inquiry into the causes o f shipwrecks: J King
repealed for another 13 years. Yet the C o m m i t t e e still noted that: the British shipowner had also to meet the competition of foreigners . . . who, from the many advantages enjoyed by them in the superior cheapness of their materials for building, equipping and provisioning their vessels, and the lower rates of wages paid to their crews, were enabled to realise profits on terms of freight which would not even cover the expenses of British ships. 27 •
.
.
This observation has been repeated m a n y times since as in, for example, the R e p o r t of the Select C o m m i t t e e of 1860 which noted: the Merchant Shipping of the United Kingdom, which for many ages was deemed an important element in our national wealth and power, has been in a state of great depression; and in the struggle of competition to which British shipowners are now exposed with foreigners, they view with the greatest jealousy the restrictions still imposed by foreign nations zs •
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The practice of blaming foreigners for the ills of British shipping has continued to the present day. Blame is now cast from a position of much greater weakness than in 1836, however. On the one hand foreign flag vessels are still perceived as possessing unfair commercial advantages; on the other hand foreign flag vessels, by virtue of their numbers, are more likely than British flag vessels to come to grief on our coasts. While negotiations with maritime powers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries succeeded in aligning international maritime practice to British precedents, British maritime influence is much diminished today. Lord Donaldson's repeated and plaintive use of the formula "The U K G o v e r n m e n t should work through I M O [or] Paris M O U partners [or] EC Commission t o . . . " in his recommendations, serves only to underline the extent to which things have changed. The World no longer automatically follows a British lead and we should not forget this when we propose actions intended to preserve our own interests. The Conventions that today govern shipping are the successors to traditional maritime rules. They have been formulated by negotiation and therefore reflect what can be agreed rather than what m a n y might regard as best or even desirable practice. As the centre of gravity of the World's fleet has shifted away from the traditional maritime countries, the gap has widened between those states that have experience of ships but diminishing tonnage and those that have direct responsibility for ships but few resources. In consequence, the former have tended to b e c o m e frustrated by their own impotence and the latter have failed to introduce the new thinking 271bid, para 14. 28Repo~ from the Select Committee on Merchant Shipping, House of Commons, 7 August 1860.
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that might be expected from States unencumbered by years of maritime tradition. Maritime Conventions have become increasingly numerous since the 1970s. They are not implemented with uniform vigour, however; 29 nor do their provisions stray far from the established f r a m e w o r k of maritime and international law which the 1836 C o m m i t t e e was so keen to see strengthened. It could be argued that some of the tenets which underpin this f r a m e w o r k are now anachronistic or unhelpful. The Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS), for instance, is widely seen as a significant advance because it assigns to coastal States rights in respect of the seabed where none had previously been defined; but it also preserves the long-established right of innocent passage when nowadays it might be more appropriate to allow coastal States rights in respect of the benign control of passing traffic. Support for the active m a n a g e m e n t and control of the operation of ships has grown in recent years. There are, however, still many who cherish traditional maritime freedom, and who should perhaps ask themselves whether the exercise of such freedom hinders the i m p r o v e m e n t of operational standards. Port State Control (PSC), especially if it involves sharing intelligence and concerted action by coastal States, is one measure that might help to raise standards. But PSC deals in actions whose effects are always potential. D e m a n d s that defects be rectified may be met but they cannot guarantee safer operation when the ship sails. Once at sea no further action can be taken to ensure proper navigation. A n d regardless of the many secondary measures that have been proposed in the past, and are proposed again by Lord Donaldson, such as designated areas and routes, radar surveillance etc, no effective action in respect of vessels at sea is ever going to be possible until the obstacle to direct action by coastal States imposed by International Law is removed. 3° It was argued in 1836 that the Code of Maritime Law should be consolidated. This must surely be the objective of international negotiations today. The powers that States may take to protect themselves against the consequences stemming from ships failing to navigate properly in the vicinity of their coasts are very limited. Little will be achieved by applying them, however ingeniously, until the principles upon which they are necessarily based are modified. A ship that cannot sink cannot be built, any more than an aircraft that cannot crash cannot be built. Thus it is not reasonable to argue as some do that roll-on roll-off ships should never capsize or that tankers should never spill oil. But it is reasonable that, within the bounds of the current state of 29For example, reception facilities for wastes required under MARPOL 73/78 are still not generally available. 3°See for example the recommendations concerning radar surveillance or move along please legislation.
An Inquiry into the causes o f shipwrecks: J King
knowledge, everything should be done to minimise the risk. In 1836, the Committee argued for the promotion of nautical improvement and better classification. Their intention was to encourage the development and adoption of marine technology and to provide the mechanisms by which to monitor best practice. Lord Donaldson has similarly argued for improved classification and the adoption of technological improvements in respect of, for example, anchoring systems, double hulls and stress monitoring. None of these embodies new ideas. The anchor is of such antiquity that is difficult to believe that anything new can be said about it; 3t Brunel's double hull pre-dates the oil tanker by 50 years, and a practical means for monitoring hull stresses was introduced 100 years ago. 32 Can we really have confidence that shipping is 31John King, 'Some practical aspects of anchoring large ships', Trans. R. Inst. Nav. Arch. 1984. 320 E Stromeyer, 'A strain indicator for use at sea', Trans. Inst. Nav. Arch. 1886.
using all the means at its disposal when it is still being urged to employ nineteenth century technologY? In 1836, the Committee also argued for international negotiations. These are still called for. Today, however, when an even greater proportion of the cost of marine accidents should be attributed to pollution and other externalities we have to recognise that it is always in the interests of those who create them to move slowly, to delay the implementation of new technologies, to procrastinate despite public disquiet. When Gresham's Law is firmly established, things can only get worse unless there is a fundamental change in the conditions which allow it to flourish. It may be that unilateral actions are the only means of breaking out of the historical rut in which the maritime world is trapped. The recent unilateral actions of the US and Australia hint at what might be done and provide models that could bring about the changes which are needed. We should do well to heed their example.
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Marine Poficy, Vol. 19, No. 6, pp. 469-475, 1995 Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0308-597X/95 $10.00 + 0.00
0308-597X(95)00029-1
An Inquiry into the causes of shipwrecks: its implications for
the prevention of pollution John King Department of Maritime Studies and International Transport, University of Wales College of Cardiff, PO Box 907, Colum Drive, Cardiff CF1 3YP, UK Lord Donaldson's is the latest in a long line of reports that have dealt with the operation of ships and the prevention of casualties. A classic example is the 1836 report of the select committee that inquired into the Causes of Shipwrecks. Despite its brevity, this Report managed to encapsulate many of the issues which still concern us today. The symptoms of current shipping ills are considered at great length in the Donaldson Report. However, in this paper, it is argued that the underlying causes remain much as they have ever been.
The problem of making a ship is one of doing something very like what has been done before. To understand fully how to make a new ship, it is necessary to study the qualities and history of creation of existing ships.1
exaggerated, or that such criticisms are based on emotional reactions to events and are therefore unjustified, we should do well not to disregard them completely. For the complaints that we hear today have been heard before. Ships have been lost; committees have inquired. Enough has been done to satisfy those who demand that something be done, and the cycle has repeated itself. Shipping is an old industry. It is ballasted by its history to the point of overloading. Lord D o n a l d s o n ' s R e p o r t 2 stands at the mid-point of the latest cycle. We have had the shipwreck and the Inquiry; we wait to see which if any of its 103 recommendations will be translated into action.-3 A realist might expect their n u m b e r to be small and their effects minimal. This is not because they are wrong or irrational when placed in their correct historical context; nor is it because they are directed at knaves to be i m p l e m e n t e d by fools. Rather it is our traditional models of shipping and maritime enterprise that are becoming increasingly inadequate. Lord Donaldson was primarily concerned with the prevention of pollution from ships but his inquiry necessarily ranged over the well trodden ground that
In the eyes of m a n y today the international shipping industry is once again in danger of falling into disrepute. If this observation is accurate it reflects a situation that we cannot afford to ignore, for the efficient and u n h a m p e r e d m o v e m e n t of goods that underpins the World's e c o n o m y is at risk. Self interest, if no other reason, demands that we give it our attention. A r e things really so bad? The concerns of those who see disasters looming are based on evidence that is real enough. The case of the Estonia has r e a w a k e n e d memories in Britain of the Herald of Free Enterprise and fuelled suspicions that ship operators will always rank profit above people; the case of the Braer has demonstrated that we can all be victims. The word is also abroad that seamen are incompetent, that shipping companies can never be called to account and that maritime institutions are no longer a byword for rectitude. On such grounds are reputations lost and confidence undermined. While those of us who are slightly closer to the facts might argue that such conclusions are false or
2Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas, Report of Lord Donaldson's Inquiry
1j H Biles, The Design and Construction of Ships, Charles Griffin & Co, London, 1919.
into the Prevention of Pollution from Merchant Shipping, Cm 2560 HMSO, London, 1994. 3The response of Her Majesty's Government was published in February 1995.
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is occupied by the wider failings of merchant shipping; ground, m o r e o v e r , which has been explored on n u m e r o u s occasions in the past. For this is not the first time that shipping has been the subject of public criticism. It is often said that a high proportion of all accidents at sea have a h u m a n cause. To say this is to say nothing. Ultimately all accidents can be attributed either to the hand of man or the hand of God. Since shipping is a h u m a n activity the former, whether applied directly on board ship or indirectly ashore, is much more likely to be culpable than the latter. M o r e o v e r , to look for someone to blame and to d e m a n d action are natural h u m a n reactions when an accident occurs. It follows, therefore, that concern bred of catastrophe has been a frequent and m a j o r force for change throughout much of maritime history. In 1836, following three years during which 1702 British vessels were lost, 1714 people drowned and p r o p e r t y valued at £8 510 000 was destroyed, the Select C o m m i t t e e set up to inquire into the causes of shipwrecks, 4 concluded: That among the various causes of Shipwreck, which appear susceptible of removal or diminution, the following appear to be the most frequent and the most generally admitted: • • • • • • • • • •
defective construction of ships; inadequacy of equipment; imperfect state of repair; improper or excessive loading; inappropriateness of form; incompetence of masters and officers; drunkenness of officers and men; operation of marine insurance; want of harbours of refuge; and imperfection of charts.
This list looks familiar, and so it should since it includes most of the causes which are usually given today for marine accidents. While the C o m m i t t e e naturally directed their attention towards contemporary issues whose details are no longer of concern to us, their classification would serve us perfectly well as a basis for analysing the ills that continue to plague shipping. It is not difficult to see the correspondence between each item in this list and the topics addressed in Lord Donaldson's chapters. That this should be so is in one sense unremarkable; the perils of the sea do not change. Nevertheless one might have expected that some of the listed items would have been capable of remedy during a century or m o r e of unprecedented technological progress. Just as in 1836, we can still recognise defective construction (which includes design, fabrication and
"Report from the Select Committee appointed to inquire into The Causes of Shipwrecks, House of Commons, 19 August 1836.
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all other aspects of the creation and maintenance of a ship) as a potential source of failure. In recent years a n u m b e r of large bulk carriers have been lost in circumstances which might be attributed to some form of constructional fault, despite the fact that they were apparently built and maintained to standards which were in accord with the customary practices of the maritime industry. Similarly, several roll-on roll-off vessels have also been lost in circumstances which have given cause to question their stability, despite the fact that they too were no doubt constructed according to accepted standards. We have to ask ourselves why such events continue to occur today. In 1836 it might have been argued that many constructional failures were due to lack of knowledge. But it is difficult to argue that ignorance lies at the root of today's failures. While specialists will always point to interesting problems that have yet to be solved, there is now no shortage of technical knowledge. Rather it might be argued that the maritime industry fails to apply effectively what is already known. Throughout maritime history experience has invariably taken precedence over theoretical knowledge. The construction of ships has always depended upon the skill and practical knowledge of craftsmen. Even in the first half of the nineteenth century the application of scientific principles to the design, construction and operation of ships was minimal. In 1836, while the C o m m i t t e e were sitting, experiments with screw propulsion were going on, unsupported by a rational theory of propeller action or ship resistance; 5 iron was becoming established as a shipbuilding material, unsupported by any rational theory of structures; 6 and ships were being launched and sent to sea without any certainty that they would float the right way up. 7 Such theoretical knowledge as was available was often ignored. The principles of ship stability were certainly known in France in the early eighteenth century when Bouger invented the metacentre, and in Spain when Santacilla devised a practical inclining experiment. But their work was
5Notwithstanding that proposals for using windmills in ships were made in England by Hooke, 1681 and in France by Duquet, 1699; Dubost, 1743; Bernouilli, 1752; and in America by Bushnell, 1776; nor that patents for screw propulsion were awarded to Bramah, 1784; Lyttleton, 1794; Shorter, 1799; Dallery, 1803; Bourdon, 1824 and Sauvage, 1832; or that the report of the Nautical and Hydraulic Experiments conducted between 1796 and 1798 by Beaufoy and the Society for the Improvement of Naval Architecture were published posthumously in 1834. 6The method still employed for estimating shear forces and bending moments was first described by Edward Reed, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 1871, although earlier insights had been provided by inter alia Thomas Young, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 1814. 7Notwithstanding that the principles of ship hydrostatics had been explored by inter alia Hoste, 1697; Bouguer, 1746; Euler, 1749, 1773; Santacilla, 1771; Watson, 1776; Atwood, 1798; Dupin, 1822; the first recorded inclining experiment conducted in Britain took place aboard HMS Scylla in 1830.
An Inquiry into the causes of shipwrecks: J King disregarded in Britain by practical shipbuilders. Only two inclining experiments are known to have been conducted in Britain before the capsizing of the Perseverance in 1855. In 1850, 100 years after Bouger published his classic work 8, Moseley 9 explained the concept of dynamical stability. Yet the significance of calculating even statical stability curves was not recognised in Britain by any practical shipbuilder before the loss of H M S Captain w in 1871. Even as late as 1897 Martell, Chief Surveyor of Lloyd's Register, was still able to say: to require the captain of a ship to go into the study of and understand the elements of calculating the stability of a ship is perfectly monstrous H and only in 1948 did the provision of stability information to the masters of both passenger ships and cargo ships b e c o m e mandatory, under the Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea. Dynamical stability criteria were not introduced as a formal requirement for merchant ships until 1966, and a practical resolution of the instability of roll-on rolloff ships arising from the flooding of the vehicle deck has still not been implemented. The conclusion is unavoidable that things move slowly in the maritime world. Problems persist from one generation to the next. Solutions are rarely acted upon when they are first devised. Rules which define actual practice reflect what is acceptable rather than what is possible and so continue to lag far behind the growth of knowledge. This is not a new state of affairs: • . . the defective construction of ships appears to have been greatly encouraged by the system of classification • . . followed at Lloyd's 12 So observed the Select C o m m i t t e e in 1836 referring to a system of classification that had in fact existed since 1708; so might we also observe, in equivalent terms today. Ships are still designed to rules. Classification Society Rules, I M O rules and the like provide a familiar if sometimes anachronistic f r a m e w o r k for ship construction and operation. Such rules are in large measure a relic of early maritime history. T h e y represent a codification of experience which, in a pre-scientific age, would have been held in the shipwright's head, as for example: Suppose a Ship of 300 Tunnes be 29 foot at the Beame. If
8Pierre Bouger, Traite du Navire, Paris, 1746. 9Rev H Moseley, 'On dynamical stability and the oscillations of floating bodies', Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 1850. ~°N Barnaby, 'The relative influence of breadth of beam and height of freeboard in lengthening out the curves of stability', Trans. Inst. Nav. Arch. 1871. ~lln J MacFarlane Gray, A Note on the Geometry of Stability, Trans. Inst. Nav. Arch. 1897. 121bid, para 12.
her main Mast be 24 inches diameter, the length of it must be 24 yards, for every inch in thicknesse is allowed a yard in length t3 Action stemming from the deliberations of Committees of Inquiry has often taken the form of new or modified rules which inevitably challenge the ingenuity of designers. They, in their turn, produce new forms of ships that may be extreme or otherwise defective, but which nevertheless possess the doubtful virtue of perverting the rules they are required to follow. The slender and unsafe forms of the late nineteenth century, for instance, which included the curious awning-deckers and spar-deckers, were the result of attempts to circumvent c o n t e m p o r a r y rules whose legacy to the twentieth century has been the tonnage hatch and other similar contrivances. In the same way, m o d e r n roll-on roll-off ferries now have low freeboards because their vast, unsubdivided vehicle deck spaces are ruled to be superstructures which allows them to enjoy benefits from rules that were never devised to a c c o m m o d a t e their special arrangements. We may also recall paragraph ships whose description blatantly advertises successful circumvention of the rules. Once there was a rule that restricted the length of an oil cargo tank to 30 feet. This rule was relaxed when supertankers began to be built because, so it was argued, it led to hull structures that were too heavy and penalised large vessels. Following the rule change, tankers were built with fewer bulkheads and hence with much larger cargo tanks, any one of which probably exceeded the capacity of an entire ship of an earlier generation. It is interesting to speculate on how much less oil would have spilled into the sea in subsequent years had this rule not been changed in this way. Rules provide a practical way to solve problems without having to start from first principles. They are particularly useful when the underlying principles are unknown, as was the case when John Smith's contemporaries built a mast. But the m o r e complicated the situation the less likely it is that a satisfactory general rule can be devised, as Smith also recognised. But to give a true Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportion of the building of all sorts of Ships, were they all built after one mould . . . a methodicall rule might be projected; but their lengths, bredths, depths, rakes and burthens are so variable and different, that nothing but experiences can possibly teach it. 14 There are still times when we might feel that the maritime industry has not yet come fully to terms with the scientific age. Brunel complained that shipbuilders left too much to the experience of
1aJohn Smith, A Sea Grammar, London, 1627• 14Ibid•
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craftsmen ~5 and in the first paper given to the newly formed Institution of Naval Architects on 1 March 1860, the Rev Joseph Woolley 16 argued for a more scientific approach to ship design and construction, comparing British practice unfavourably with that of the French because it lacked the theoretical basis of the latter. Today, we might note that the general tenor of such criticisms remains valid. While theoretical knowledge has increased substantially, practical ship design and operation are still heavily rule-based, especially in areas like safety which has always been uppermost in the maritime consciousness. Here the rules bear closer resemblance to those introduced 100 years ago by the Board of Trade than to the analytical procedures which today are more common in industries no less hazardous than shipping, such as chemicals or offshore oil. While offshore operators analyse safety cases and devise emergency plans, ship operators count fire extinguishers. Lord Donaldson stands at the end of a long, distinguished and largely ignored line of advocates of a more analytical, or safety case approach to marine safety. "Not invented here" is a phrase sometimes heard in respect of the attitude of the maritime world towards developments that take place beyond its boundaries. Shipbuilding may have pioneered the use of steam and iron technology in the nineteenth century, but maritime industry in Britain has lagged far behind in its use of the electronics and information technologies of the twentieth century. That is not to say they have had no impact. The management and operation of shipping was fundamentally changed by the introduction of radio communication which, more than anything else perhaps, was responsible for the decline in the powers, if not the responsibilities, of the shipmaster and transferred all strategic and many day-to-day decisions to desks ashore. All this began early in the present century and has crept up on us by stealth, unnoticed until fairly recently when it became obvious to everyone that many traditional practices could no longer be sustained. The managed introduction and use of such means to achieve specific aims has been alien to the maritime industries, however. Those who have pointed out the possible marine applications of non-maritime technological developments have often placed their own personal credibility at risk. Who, in the 1960s exactly 100 years after the first separation scheme for the English Channel was proposed, would have risked his professional reputation by daring to suggest that marine traffic control might learn something from aviation? Now Lord Donaldson proposes 151fyou look carefully at the structure of the Great Britain you can still see what he meant. ~6Rev Joseph Wooliey, 'The present state of the mathematical theory of Naval architecture', Trans. Inst. Nav. Arch. 1860.
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that shipping adopt transponders, first used by aircraft during the Second World War. Who, in the 1970s, could convince the shipping industry that it should take computers seriously, or was prepared to speculate openly on their potential in the face of the widespread belief that they would offer little benefit and probably would not work at sea? The idea that the sea is special has sustained maritime tradition through the centuries. It has justified much maritime practice and encouraged the historical isolation of shipping. For many practitioners, its truth remains self-evident. But is this view still valid; or is it part of the ballast that burdens the maritime world? Until the last few decades seafarers were the guardians of all maritime experience. They alone knew how to survive at sea and doubtless their unique status fostered the mystique which still surrounds their profession. But today their position is no longer unique; the sea is no longer remote in the way that it was. Offshore industry in all its many forms has broadened the scope of maritime endeavour. It has introduced to the sea many people with neither previous marine experience nor preconceptions about working in the marine environment• Yet it has barely called upon traditional maritime skills; seafarers and shipbuilders have played only a subsidiary role in these new developments. Traditional maritime skills are becoming more scarce, even within shipping. Processes at work today have increased labour productivity, reduced manning scales and dried up recruitment. They have also depleted the stock of experience upon which the operation of ships has traditionally relied• Thus, today just as in 1836, the competence of crews is in doubt• • . . the frequent incompetency of masters and officers appears to be admitted . . . arising from the want of skill and knowledge in seamanship, but more frequently from the want of an adequate knowledge of navigation; it being proved that some masters have been appointed to command after having been for a very short time at sea; that others have hardly known how to trace a ship's course on a c h a r t . . . 17 Seafaring is no longer a lifetime's career for many people. It is again possible to find masters who have accumulated little sea-time, officers who have little knowledge of navigation, engineers who are unfamiliar with basic watch-keeping procedures and crews who do not share a common language. The implications are obvious, both for the shipping industry itself now losing the pool of experience whence it has habitually drawn its superintendents and other senior operations staff, and also for those ancillary maritime occupations which once recruited seafarers. Nowadays, citizens of traditional maritime
171bid, para 18.
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countries are reluctant to go to sea; countries that began supplying seafarers' services in the 1960s and 1970s are now also finding their own citizens similarly reluctant. We should not be surprised, therefore, to hear today of ships in the charge of officers whose combined experience barely matches that of the apprentices in a medium-sized cargo vessel of 40 years ago. We ought not to be surprised when such ships get into difficulties. Sea-sense and ordinary practice o f seamen are phrases that are increasingly reminiscent of an age that is rapidly passing• The cost of marine accidents is high, often much higher than is implied by the sums recorded in the accounts of those directly involved in the actions which led to them. This is because external factors such as personal injury, loss of life or pollution are often ignored or greatly underestimated in practice. Shipping has been slow to adopt the procedures for calculating them used in other sectors of the transport industry, even though it has long been recognised that the costs of externalities are ultimately borne by the public. the system of Marine Insurance, though affording the means of protecting individuals from excessive loss, has nevertheless a tendency, by transferring the pecuniary responsibility for such losses from the owners of ships to the underwriters who insure them, to induce less care in the construction of ships, less efficiency in their equipment, and less security for their adequate management at sea; inasmuch as the risk of such loss to the shipowners can be covered by a fixed premium of insurance, which, being charged on the freight, and then re-charged on the goods conveyed, fixes the real responsibility and real loss ultimately on the public; as all the parties actually engaged in the transaction can secure themselves from any participation in such loss by the aid of Marine Insurance. )8 •
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Official drafting succinctly encapsulates a problem which remains with us today. The real cost of marine casualties falls ultimately on the public, either through real losses for which no compensation is available or through a general increase in the cost of sea transportation. Losses are often highly visible as in the case which Lord Donaldson addressed. But the rise in transportation costs, stemming from a widening of the scope of compensation in accordance with the polluter pays principle, is arguably m o r e significant. Thus, in accordance with the principles set out in G r e s h a m ' s Law, the upright ship o p e r a t o r carries the burden of increased insurance costs, while the unscrupulous one avoids his responsibilities in a variety of ways. A section of the public, the shippers, may be t e m p t e d to avoid paying higher freight required by the f o r m e r by accepting the services of the latter whose incompetence, should it result in a casualty, will mainly injure those who are remote ~81bid, para 22.
from the original transaction. A circular process is thereby established which disadvantages the upright o p e r a t o r further. Moreover, this process is accelerated by the unwillingness of insurers to recognise the efforts of the good operator to improve his operation by investing in safety measures. The operation of marine insurance appears to be as much a matter of concern as it was a century and a half ago. Inquiries are usually charged both with identifying causes and proposing remedies. This was so in 1836; Lord Donaldson has similarly made r e c o m m e n d a tions for action, many of which have been proposed in essence by earlier inquiries. The principal recommendations of the 1836 Inquiry covered inter alia the following points: (1) compilation and consolidation of a Code of Maritime Law 19 (2) promotion and encouragement of Nautical Improvement~° • perfection of a system of Classification of Ships 21 • collection of information as to the best methods of building, surveying, fitting out, equipping, loading and furnishing . . . all ships 22 (3) formation of certain standards of qualifications in seamanship and navigation to be obtained by officers and by masters 23 • appointment of examiners in seamanship and navigation for the public examination of all candidates for appointment as officers or commanders 24 (4) arrangement of a plan for the institution of Courts of Inquiry to examine the circumstances of every shipwreck 25 (5) opening (of) a negociation (sic) with all the maritime powers of the world . . . in order to effect a comprehensive treaty with each and all of them, to use their best endeavours for the preservation of the lives and property...26 •
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Once again we find a f r a m e w o r k which could be useful today. It embraces (1) the legal basis for shipping, (2) the technology that renders it possible, (3) the h u m a n skills to conduct it competently, (4) the means for investigating whatever goes wrong and (5) a mechanism for gaining the consent of all who engage in it. W h a t m o r e is needed? Perhaps the most interesting of the foregoing recommendations is that concerned with the opening of negotiations with maritime powers. In 1836 the U K fleet greatly surpassed all others in size, with 20 388 vessels of 2.349 million net tons. The fleet was protected by the Navigation Act which was not to be ~91bid, para 2°lbid, para 2~Ibid, para =21bid, para
231bid, para 241bid, para 251bid, para 261bid, para
27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 36. 43.
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repealed for another 13 years. Yet the C o m m i t t e e still noted that: the British shipowner had also to meet the competition of foreigners . . . who, from the many advantages enjoyed by them in the superior cheapness of their materials for building, equipping and provisioning their vessels, and the lower rates of wages paid to their crews, were enabled to realise profits on terms of freight which would not even cover the expenses of British ships. 27 •
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This observation has been repeated m a n y times since as in, for example, the R e p o r t of the Select C o m m i t t e e of 1860 which noted: the Merchant Shipping of the United Kingdom, which for many ages was deemed an important element in our national wealth and power, has been in a state of great depression; and in the struggle of competition to which British shipowners are now exposed with foreigners, they view with the greatest jealousy the restrictions still imposed by foreign nations zs •
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The practice of blaming foreigners for the ills of British shipping has continued to the present day. Blame is now cast from a position of much greater weakness than in 1836, however. On the one hand foreign flag vessels are still perceived as possessing unfair commercial advantages; on the other hand foreign flag vessels, by virtue of their numbers, are more likely than British flag vessels to come to grief on our coasts. While negotiations with maritime powers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries succeeded in aligning international maritime practice to British precedents, British maritime influence is much diminished today. Lord Donaldson's repeated and plaintive use of the formula "The U K G o v e r n m e n t should work through I M O [or] Paris M O U partners [or] EC Commission t o . . . " in his recommendations, serves only to underline the extent to which things have changed. The World no longer automatically follows a British lead and we should not forget this when we propose actions intended to preserve our own interests. The Conventions that today govern shipping are the successors to traditional maritime rules. They have been formulated by negotiation and therefore reflect what can be agreed rather than what m a n y might regard as best or even desirable practice. As the centre of gravity of the World's fleet has shifted away from the traditional maritime countries, the gap has widened between those states that have experience of ships but diminishing tonnage and those that have direct responsibility for ships but few resources. In consequence, the former have tended to b e c o m e frustrated by their own impotence and the latter have failed to introduce the new thinking 271bid, para 14. 28Repo~ from the Select Committee on Merchant Shipping, House of Commons, 7 August 1860.
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that might be expected from States unencumbered by years of maritime tradition. Maritime Conventions have become increasingly numerous since the 1970s. They are not implemented with uniform vigour, however; 29 nor do their provisions stray far from the established f r a m e w o r k of maritime and international law which the 1836 C o m m i t t e e was so keen to see strengthened. It could be argued that some of the tenets which underpin this f r a m e w o r k are now anachronistic or unhelpful. The Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS), for instance, is widely seen as a significant advance because it assigns to coastal States rights in respect of the seabed where none had previously been defined; but it also preserves the long-established right of innocent passage when nowadays it might be more appropriate to allow coastal States rights in respect of the benign control of passing traffic. Support for the active m a n a g e m e n t and control of the operation of ships has grown in recent years. There are, however, still many who cherish traditional maritime freedom, and who should perhaps ask themselves whether the exercise of such freedom hinders the i m p r o v e m e n t of operational standards. Port State Control (PSC), especially if it involves sharing intelligence and concerted action by coastal States, is one measure that might help to raise standards. But PSC deals in actions whose effects are always potential. D e m a n d s that defects be rectified may be met but they cannot guarantee safer operation when the ship sails. Once at sea no further action can be taken to ensure proper navigation. A n d regardless of the many secondary measures that have been proposed in the past, and are proposed again by Lord Donaldson, such as designated areas and routes, radar surveillance etc, no effective action in respect of vessels at sea is ever going to be possible until the obstacle to direct action by coastal States imposed by International Law is removed. 3° It was argued in 1836 that the Code of Maritime Law should be consolidated. This must surely be the objective of international negotiations today. The powers that States may take to protect themselves against the consequences stemming from ships failing to navigate properly in the vicinity of their coasts are very limited. Little will be achieved by applying them, however ingeniously, until the principles upon which they are necessarily based are modified. A ship that cannot sink cannot be built, any more than an aircraft that cannot crash cannot be built. Thus it is not reasonable to argue as some do that roll-on roll-off ships should never capsize or that tankers should never spill oil. But it is reasonable that, within the bounds of the current state of 29For example, reception facilities for wastes required under MARPOL 73/78 are still not generally available. 3°See for example the recommendations concerning radar surveillance or move along please legislation.
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knowledge, everything should be done to minimise the risk. In 1836, the Committee argued for the promotion of nautical improvement and better classification. Their intention was to encourage the development and adoption of marine technology and to provide the mechanisms by which to monitor best practice. Lord Donaldson has similarly argued for improved classification and the adoption of technological improvements in respect of, for example, anchoring systems, double hulls and stress monitoring. None of these embodies new ideas. The anchor is of such antiquity that is difficult to believe that anything new can be said about it; 3t Brunel's double hull pre-dates the oil tanker by 50 years, and a practical means for monitoring hull stresses was introduced 100 years ago. 32 Can we really have confidence that shipping is 31John King, 'Some practical aspects of anchoring large ships', Trans. R. Inst. Nav. Arch. 1984. 320 E Stromeyer, 'A strain indicator for use at sea', Trans. Inst. Nav. Arch. 1886.
using all the means at its disposal when it is still being urged to employ nineteenth century technologY? In 1836, the Committee also argued for international negotiations. These are still called for. Today, however, when an even greater proportion of the cost of marine accidents should be attributed to pollution and other externalities we have to recognise that it is always in the interests of those who create them to move slowly, to delay the implementation of new technologies, to procrastinate despite public disquiet. When Gresham's Law is firmly established, things can only get worse unless there is a fundamental change in the conditions which allow it to flourish. It may be that unilateral actions are the only means of breaking out of the historical rut in which the maritime world is trapped. The recent unilateral actions of the US and Australia hint at what might be done and provide models that could bring about the changes which are needed. We should do well to heed their example.
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