Anger

Anger J R Averill, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA ã 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Glossary Aggression The intentional infliction of harm on others, against their wishes and not for their own good. Anger An emotional state that involves both an attribution of blame for some perceived wrong and an impulse to correct the wrong or prevent its recurrence. Category mistake The logical fallacy of assuming that what is true of one category (e.g., aggression) is also true of a related category (e.g., anger); category mistakes are particularly common when the relation between the categories is one of class inclusion, part–whole, or cause–effect. Catharsis A purgation (‘cleansing’) or clarification of emotion; used to explain the relief sometimes associated with vicarious emotional experiences, for example, during theatrical performances (Aristotle) and psychotherapy (Freud). Crime of passion Legal terminology for homicide committed while in an emotional state, typically anger; also termed voluntary manslaughter.

Anger and aggression are often discussed under one heading, a fact that has distorted discussions of both. Anger need not be, and typically is not, manifested in aggression; conversely, aggression is frequently manifested for reasons that have little to do with anger. This article focuses on anger as an emotion; the orientation is social–psychological. Psychologically, anger is an accusation of wrongdoing, an attribution of blame, and a determination to correct the perceived wrong; socially, anger functions as a kind of informal judiciary that helps regulate interpersonal relationships.

Generic and Specific Uses of the Concept of Anger The concept of anger is often used in two distinct ways: first, as a generic term to cover a wide range of related emotional responses, such as envy, jealousy, fury, frustration, annoyance, contempt, and the like; and second, as a specific emotion on a par with other emotions in the same general category (e.g., anger vs. envy). Linguistically, when a single term is used to refer to phenomena at two different levels of generality, the term so used is known as a synecdoche. ‘Anger’ is often used as a synecdoche, both in everyday speech and psychological theory. It is important to distinguish the generic and specific uses of the concept of anger, for what is true of a category at one level of generality need not be true at another (higher or lower) level. To conflate levels of generality is to commit a ‘category mistake.’ Category mistakes are particularly common when

Emotional state A short-term disposition to respond based on an evaluative judgment (e.g., that something is good or bad, challenging or threatening, just or unjust); as traditionally conceived, emotional states differ from other short-term dispositions in that the relevant evaluation is nondeliberate and the ensuing response seems to be beyond personal control (a passion rather than an action). Hate A long-term disposition to respond with hostility. While anger is typically accompanied by physiological arousal and precipitous action, hate is primarily a way of thinking. Hate can foster anger; conversely, unresolved anger can culminate in hate. But hate can also serve as an antidote to one’s own anger for, under normal conditions, those whom we hate cannot hurt us. Social constructionism The view that most emotions, anger included, are not an intrinsic part of human nature (i.e., genetically determined) but, rather, are constructed from elementary processes in conformance with social norms (beliefs and rules).

synecdoches are involved, for the use of the same term makes it easy to traverse between levels of generality without recognizing the shift in meaning. Consider, first, the meaning of anger as a generic category. What do members of the category (e.g., envy, jealousy, and fury, as well as anger as a specific emotion) have in common? On some occasions, at least, all are associated with aggressive behavior. In its generic sense, then, anger may be used to refer to almost any aggressive emotional response. Angry aggression in this sense is typically contrasted with instrumental aggression, that is, aggression deliberately used as a means for achieving some extrinsic reward (as in a robbery). Now, consider anger as a specific emotion. How does anger in a narrow sense differ from other members of the general category of anger-like emotions, such as envy, jealousy, and fury? As is explained more fully below, anger as a specific emotion involves an attribution of blame for wrongdoing and a desire for reparation. Only rarely is anger in this sense accompanied by aggression, at least by physical aggression. The main objective of anger is not to harm the instigator, but to correct the perceived wrong and prevent recurrence. Category mistakes can proceed from the top-down (generic to specific categories) or from the bottom-up (specific to generic categories). An example of a top-down mistake is the common assumption that because anger (in the generic sense) connotes aggression, then anger (in the specific sense) must also involve a tendency toward aggression, even if that tendency is repressed, bottled up, disguised, or otherwise made unobservable. An example of a bottom-up mistake is the

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inclination on the part of perpetrators to excuse aggression of all sorts, from child abuse to urban riots, with the plea: ‘It wasn’t my fault; he/she/they made me angry.’ The following discussion focuses on anger as a specific emotion. No attempt is made to review the vast amount of research related to aggression in general. Considerable advances have been made in understanding the biological (evolutionary) and physiological bases of aggressive behavior; as important as that understanding may be, it is only tangentially related to anger as a social–psychological phenomenon. On the other hand, data relevant to anger come from a wide range of sources, including historical (ethical) teachings, legal proceedings, surveys of everyday experience, experimental studies, cross-cultural research, and clinical practice.

Anger in Historical Perspective Historically, and today, anger appears on nearly every list of ‘basic’ emotions. Often, this is taken to mean that anger is somehow prior to society, for example, that anger is a relic of biological evolution. Anger, however, does not arise from the depths of some presocial self. It embodies a history of social meanings. From early infancy, we are emotional apprentices, first to our parents, and then to teachers, ministers, artists, entertainers, and other formal agents of cultural transmission. The apprenticeship continues on a less formal basis throughout life as we interact with family, friends, and acquaintances in everyday, face-to-face encounters. In the process, we learn the beliefs and rules that help constitute our emotions, and the skills to enact them properly. Subsequently, we may refine and transform what we have acquired, but we can never completely escape the vestiges of our cultural heritage. Western culture has been greatly influenced by the confluence of two main streams of thought, Greco-Roman philosophy and Judeo-Christian theology. Each stream has contributed its share to current conceptions of anger. A little later, we will consider briefly the views of three early representatives of these traditions, namely, Aristotle, Seneca, and Lactantius. But first, a bit of etymology may be helpful. Anger is an emotion. On that, everyone would agree. But what is an emotion? On that, few psychologists agree. For most of Western history, from the time of the ancient Greeks until about the middle of the eighteenth century, what we now call emotions were commonly referred to as passions. As traditionally conceived, a passion is anything a person (or physical object) ‘suffers’; this would include, in the case of humans, both emotions and diseases. Hence, from the same root (the Greek, pathe¯, and the Latin, pati, passiones), we get such emotion-related terms as passion, pathos, and sympathy and such disease-related terms as patient, pathogen, and pathology. Aristotle considered that the passions formed one of ten fundamental categories of being. Actions – things a person does deliberately and with forethought – formed another distinct category. This distinction between passions and actions is embedded in our ordinary language, as when we say of a person that he was ‘gripped,’ ‘seized,’ and ‘overcome’ by emotion. Anger, in particular, is often depicted as a ‘wild beast’ that must be ‘tamed,’ or as an ‘inner force’ that will ‘explode’ if not adequately ‘vented.’ Such conventional ways of speaking

help constitute the way we think and feel. But linguistic conventions can mislead as well as inform. When addressing the practical concerns of rhetoricians, as opposed to the theoretical concerns of metaphysicians, Aristotle defined anger “as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends” (Rhetoric, 1378a30). Two aspects of this definition are especially noteworthy. First, the ‘slight’ (by which Aristotle meant any show of contempt, spite, or insolence, especially by a friend or inferior) had to be ‘without justification.’ A reprove that is deserved is not an adequate provocation to anger, no matter how upsetting it might be. Second, the revenge must be ‘conspicuous’; otherwise the offender will not realize that he or she is being punished for the slight. To these two points, we should add a third important feature of Aristotle’s analysis, namely, the response must be appropriate to the provocation and the situation, being neither too weak nor too strong. Aristotle’s analysis contains a paradox. If anger is a passion, how can it be so finely tuned to the social context, in both initiation and expression? One way to resolve this paradox is to deny that anger, at least under ordinary circumstances, is beyond personal control: to assert, in effect, that the classification of anger as a passion is based more on metaphor than on fact. More will be said about this possibility later. Another possible resolution is to regard anger as a primitive reaction to painful stimuli, an impulse that is regulated but not constituted by social norms. This is the position of many current psychological theories of anger and aggression. It was also the position taken by Aristotle, who believed that the physiological changes that accompany anger (e.g., a ‘boiling of blood about the heart’) can impel a person to act in a nondeliberate and irrational manner. Aristotle’s answer, however, hardly seems adequate. The physiological changes that accompany a brisk walk, say, exceed those that accompany most episodes of anger, and yet a brisk walk does not lead a person to act irrationally. Conversely, some of the worst deeds committed in the name of anger are done in a cold and calculated manner, with no more than usual physiological involvement. The Roman philosopher and statesman Seneca (4 BC–AD 65) wrote the first full work devoted entirely to anger. As a follower of Stoicism, Seneca defined passion as a form of false judgment, the mental analogue of a physical disease. (After all, who would deliberately, ‘in his right mind,’ make a false judgment?) This definition of passion led Seneca to reject the notion that anger is necessarily tied to one’s bodily condition or that it could be anything but a human emotion. A false judgment, no less than a true judgment, is born of reason, no matter how ill-begotten the false judgment might be. Seneca also rejected the Aristotelian notion that anger, properly directed and in moderation, can be considered good. If on occasion a false judgment produces a beneficial outcome, it is a fortunate happenstance. Whatever good is done in anger, according to Seneca, can be done even better and with greater surety, following rational deliberation. In a manner prescient of current cognitive therapies, Seneca offered advice on how to reinterpret events so that they are no longer judged offensive, or, when that is not possible because the offense is too egregious, to correct the wrong in a rational and deliberate manner.

Anger

Stoicism was the dominant philosophy of the Roman Empire, and views such as those expressed by Seneca were very influential – in theory, if not in practice. And although it might at first seem like a relatively minor footnote to the history of thought, Seneca’s treatment of anger also posed a major challenge to the ascendancy of Christianity. Jehovah of the Old Testament is often depicted as wrathful, vengeful, and punishing. The biblical Christ, too, was not without anger, as when he drove the moneychangers from the temple. How could an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving God be susceptible to anger, if anger is indeed a passion (whether conceived as a form of false judgment or a physiologically based impulse)? This question was addressed by Lactantius, a Roman convert to Christianity and confidant to the Emperor Constantine (fourth century AD). Lactantius criticized the notion that anger involves a desire for revenge. Rather, anger in the strict sense (i.e., righteous or just anger) is a mental act motivated to restrain offenses. Such anger is proper to God and necessary to humankind, according to Lactantius, for no one who is good and just can fail to be moved at the sight of evil. We therefore rise to punishment, not for the sake of revenge, but in order that morals be preserved and license suppressed. Of course, Lactantius recognized that angry people sometimes do more harm than good. That, however, is a feature of ‘unjust’ anger, a debasement of true anger that (in a manner similar to Aristotle) he attributed to interference from bodily reactions. The views of Aristotle, Seneca, and Lactantius, although presented here in the most cursory manner, highlight some of the issues and controversies that still divide contemporary theories of anger. Is anger a passion or an action? In terms of the language we use to describe anger in everyday discourse, it is clearly a passion. On this point, Aristotle, Seneca, and Lactantius would agree; however, the reasons they give for this classification are very different, a fact that might call into question the nature of the classification itself. Indeed, Lactantius comes close to denying that anger is a passion, at least when he speaks of divine or (in humans) righteous anger. Perhaps the closest modern analog of Lactantius’s divine anger (a fully rational, disembodied anger) can be found in the area of Artificial Intelligence. Computers can be programmed to simulate righteous anger, that is, to evaluate ‘offenses,’ interrupt ongoing activity, and take corrective measures. We need not postulate special circuitry, no less some primitive anger ‘instinct’ or ‘drive’ on the part of the computer. All that is required is the programming of appropriate rules. What is the role of physiological arousal in anger? To the extent that anger leads to vigorous action, it may be accompanied by noticeable bodily changes. There is also evidence that the physiological changes associated with anger are somewhat different from those typically associated, say, with fear. (Anger shows a norepinephrine-like pattern; fear, an epinephrine-like pattern.) Moreover, research suggests that when a person is physiologically aroused, for whatever reason, and regardless of the patterning of the arousal, he or she may be more prone to anger or to any other emotion appropriate to the situation than would otherwise be the case. Thus, the potential importance of physiological arousal during anger should not be underestimated, but neither should it be overestimated.

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Physiological arousal is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for anger. Fundamentally, anger is to be understood primarily in cognitive rather than physiological terms. This fact was recognized by Aristotle and even more unequivocally by Seneca and Lactantius. What is the function of anger? When appropriately experienced and expressed, anger serves an important social function, namely, the restraint of offense (Aristotle, Lactantius); indeed, when faced with adequate provocation, anger is not only appropriate, but it is also a God-given duty (Lactantius). Needless to say, anger can be, and too often is, used for selfish and even antisocial ends (Seneca). But a phenomenon must be understood in terms of its normative application, not its misapplication, although the latter may be more dramatic and in need of attention. To conclude this section, we might ask with regard to historical teachings in general: Does anger exist outside of a particular sociohistorical context, or is it a product of that context? Theorists who adopt the first alternative are sometimes referred to as ‘naturalists,’ for they believe that anger is an inherent part of human nature. Those who favor the second alternative are known as ‘social constructionists,’ for they believe that anger is constituted, not just regulated, by social beliefs and rules. For social constructionists, views such as those presented by Aristotle, Seneca, and Lactantius are of more than historical interest; they help form the cultural matrix within which anger is constituted.

Anger in Courts of Law In contemporary society, the law of homicide both embodies and promotes social norms with respect to anger. In AngloAmerican common law, two grades of criminal homicide are generally recognized, murder and manslaughter, and each of these may be divided into two subcategories, first and second degree murder, and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Murder is homicide committed with ‘malice aforethought,’ that is, deliberately and with the intent of gain (cf. instrumental aggression). Second degree murder differs from first degree murder in the presence of mitigating circumstances. Manslaughter is a lesser crime than murder. Voluntary manslaughter is the technical name for a ‘crime of passion,’ that is, homicide committed during emotion, typically anger. It is ‘voluntary’ because the angry person wants to attack the victim. Involuntary manslaughter is accidental, but nevertheless culpable homicide, for example, due to negligence. As just noted, anger serves to mitigate a charge of homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter. This is no trivial matter. A conviction for murder can mean a life sentence or even the death penalty. By contrast, voluntary manslaughter carries a much lighter sentence – typically little more than a few years in prison, and often probation. Why should this disparity exist? And how does a jury decide whether a defendant was truly angry at the time of the crime? The law stipulates four major criteria for deciding whether a person was truly angry at the time of a killing: adequacy of provocation, heat of passion, insufficient cooling time, and a causal connection between the provocation and the crime. ‘Heat of passion’ is a vague reference to the behavior of the

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individual at the time of the homicide; and ‘causal connection’ refers to the fact that the aggression must be a direct response to the provocation. The other two criteria – the adequacy of provocation and insufficient cooling time – are the most interesting from an analytical point of view, for they are judged by the so-called ‘reasonable-man test.’ This test stipulates that the provocation be sufficient to arouse an ordinary member of the community to anger so intense that it might lead to homicide and, again according to community standards, that there be insufficient time for the anger to dissipate before the homicide is committed. The reasonable-man test provides ostensibly objective criteria (community standards) against which the feelings and reactions of the defendant can be compared. If there is a match, the defendant may be considered to have been in an angry state; if there is no match, the defendant is not judged to have been angry, regardless of his or her feelings at the time. Put differently, the reasonable-man test objectifies anger; no longer does anger refer simply to a state of mind of the defendant, but to an objectively existing state of affairs to which the individual may or may not have attained. The so-called ‘reasonable-man’ is, after all, no actually existing person, but is, rather, an idealized embodiment of the norms of the community. The above considerations suggest that the attribution of anger in courts of law is a kind of social subterfuge. The crime of passion is still a crime, but one that is to some degree excusable. The angry person was, after all, doing his duty by correcting some wrong as defined by community standards. He is therefore given a two-way excuse. First, the victim is, in a sense, put on trial along with the defendant; and if the victim (instigator) was sufficiently guilty (had committed a provocation egregious enough to be judged ‘adequate’), then he or she must share the blame for having provoked the incident. Second, as anger is classified as a passion, the defendant cannot be held fully responsible for behavior that was presumably beyond personal control.

Anger in Everyday Affairs Crimes of passion present a misleading picture of anger in one very important respect – they are crimes. The presumed ‘reasonable-man’ has proven himself to be unreasonable in his resort to excessive violence. To what extent can we generalize from crimes of passion to anger in everyday affairs? Anger is a very common emotion. When asked to keep diary records, most people report becoming mildly angry once or twice a day, and seriously angry once or twice a week. The most frequent targets of anger are friends and loved ones; the most common instigations involve some perceived misconduct, for example, an intentional wrongdoing or avoidable accident; and the motivation of the angry person is to correct or prevent recurrence of the ‘wrong,’ not to hurt the instigator. Anger may be expressed in a great variety of ways, depending on the person and situation. Common responses include talking the incident over with the instigator, verbal reprimands, withdrawal of privileges, brooding, and so on. At higher levels of intensity, an angry episode may include such behaviors as shouting, slamming doors, and stomping out. Only rarely does anger result in direct physical aggression

against the instigator, at least among adults. In fact, being unusually kind to or solicitous of the instigator – a ‘contrary reaction’ – is more common than direct physical aggression. Needless to say, it is easy to think of episodes of anger that do not conform to the above pattern. For example, on occasion we all have become angry at an inanimate object, as when our car stalls in the middle of an intersection; in such instances, however, we typically imbue the object with human qualities (the car had no ‘right’ to stall). Overwhelmingly, anger is an interpersonal emotion; it is directed at persons or other entities (the self, human institutions) that in some way can be held accountable for their actions. Few people find pleasure in their own anger; to be the target of another person’s anger is even more unpleasant. Nevertheless, surveys indicate that the consequences of most everyday episodes of anger are evaluated positively. Even instigators (the ‘wrongdoers’) report that, in the majority of cases, they gain from being the target of anger, for example, by coming to realize their own faults or by gaining a better understanding of the angry person’s point of view. An important caveat must be added to this last observation: The more aggressive the response, the less likely it is that anger will have a positive outcome. Rather than being a typical manifestation of anger, aggression reflects a failure of anger to achieve its objective, which is to correct the wrong, not to hurt the target.

Rules of Anger On the basis of historical teachings, legal procedures, and everyday experience, it is possible to infer the norms that help determine the way anger is experienced and expressed. Some general rules of anger are presented in Table 1. All theorists recognize the importance of rules for the experience and expression of emotion. There is a crucial difference among theorists, however, in the way the rules are presumed to work. Naturalists assume that anger is an inherent part of human nature and that rules function only to regulate how the emotion is experienced. Social constructionists, by contrast, believe that the rules and associated beliefs not only regulate but also help constitute anger as a distinct emotion. There are other differences among these positions as well. For example, naturalists search for the origins of anger in biological evolution, whereas social constructionists look toward history; naturalists see an essential link between anger and aggression, whereas social constructionists believe that aggression is only one of many ways in which anger may be expressed; and naturalists regard anger as universal, whereas social constructionists consider anger to be culturally specific. The Utku Eskimos supposedly do not have a name for, nor do they express an emotion equivalent to, anger. Social constructionists take such data as support for their contention that anger is not a biologically based, universal phenomenon; naturalists, on the other hand, argue that the Utku simply suppress their anger, or express it in subtle and indirect ways, in order to preserve harmonious social relationships. There is no easy way to resolve these divergent interpretations, for the issue depends partly on how anger is defined, for example, as a general category or as a specific emotion (cf. the earlier

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Table 1

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Some rules of anger as inferred from historical teachings, legal procedures, and self-reports of everyday experiences

1. A person has the right (duty) to become angry at intentional wrongdoing or at unintentional misdeeds if those misdeeds are correctable (e.g., due to negligence, carelessness, or oversight) 2. Anger should be directed only at persons and, by extension, other entities (one’s self, human institutions) that can be held responsible for their actions 3. Anger should not be displaced on an innocent third party, nor should it be directed at the target for reasons other than the instigation 4. The aim of anger should be to correct the situation, restore equity, and/or prevent recurrence, not to inflict injury or pain on the target, or to achieve selfish ends through intimidation 5. The angry response should be proportional to the instigation; that is, it should not exceed what is necessary to correct the situation, restore equity, or prevent the instigation from happening again 6. Anger should follow closely upon the provocation and not endure longer than is needed to correct the situation (typically a few hours or days, at most) 7. Anger should involve commitment and resolve; that is, a person should not become angry unless appropriate follow-through is intended, circumstances permitting Source: Averill JR (1993) Illusions of anger. In: Felson RB and Tedeschi JT (eds.) Aggression and Violence: A Social Interactionist Perspective. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, with permission from American Psychological Association.

discussion of anger as a synecdoche). However, this much can be said: as cross-cultural research continues to reveal the great diversity of ways that human societies have developed to deal with potential frustrations and interpersonal conflicts, the case for the universality of anger as a specific emotion becomes increasingly problematic. Consider liget, a fundamental emotion among the Ilongot, a headhunting people indigenous to the Philippines. Like anger, liget can be occasioned by insults, slights, and other affronts to the self, and the violation of social customs. Unlike anger, the most dramatic manifestation of liget is cutting off the head of another person; the identity of the victim is largely irrelevant – a man, woman, child, anyone will do, but preferably a stranger. The taking of a head helps establish one’s place as an equal and honored member of Ilongot society, and hence may be an occasion for celebration. Liget also finds expression in a variety of ways other than headhunting. For example, male liget is implicated in both courtship and childbirth; ‘concentrated’ in the sperm, it helps make babies. Liget also stimulates work and provides the strength and courage to overcome obstacles. From these few remarks, it is evident that liget is constituted by different rules and beliefs than is anger. A crazed American might cut off the head of another, but only a wellsocialized Ilongot could experience liget. Moreover, if a crazed American did cut off the head of another, we would not attribute the response to anger – neither in a court of law (cf. previous discussion of crimes of passion) nor in everyday affairs. In short, the rules presented in Table 1 may seem selfevident, but that is not because they are universally held. Rather, they are culturally based norms that, when internalized, become part of our ‘second nature.’ Other cultures have different norms, different emotions, different ‘second natures.’

Anger and the Social Order We question the sincerity and even the character (or mental health) of a person who claims to be angry but who declines to take action, circumstances permitting (see Rule #7, Table 1). This link between anger and action is not due simply to the fact that anger is a reaction to unpleasant events. Of greater importance is the fact that anger involves a commitment to the shared values that make social life possible. The demand for

action is thus a social as well as a psychological imperative. In traditional moral teachings, the failure to become angry under appropriate circumstances was regarded to be as sinful as excessive or unjustified anger; in the words of the seventeenth century divine, Thomas Fuller, “anger is one of the sinews of the soul; he that wants it hath a maimed mind.” A modern extension of this traditional teaching can be found in the popularity of ‘assertiveness training.’ In most everyday episodes, the transgressions that provoke anger are relatively minor – breaking a promise, ignoring a responsibility, being inconsiderate and the like. This fact tends to obscure the role that anger plays in maintaining the social order. No matter how trifling our everyday promises, responsibilities, and considerations may seem to be, they are the threads from which the fabric of society is woven. If they are too frequently broken without mend, society unravels. In a very real sense, then, the many small mendings that are the everyday experiences of anger, each minor in its own right, help sustain a way of life. Anger can be a tool for social change as well as maintenance. There may come a time when we commit ourselves to values other than those embraced by the larger society. In a fight for civil rights and equality, for example, we may turn our anger on people and institutions to whom we previously held fealty. But the new norms we now seek to establish are, typically, old norms applied to new circumstances or extended to new groups (e.g., women, minorities). Even as a tool for radical social change, anger tends to be conservative of the norms it embodies.

Anger in Health and Disease Anger has implications for the health of the individual as well as society. Evidence for an etiological role of anger is best documented in the case of coronary heart disease and stroke. Chronically experienced anger that goes unexpressed, or that is expressed too vehemently, appears to be especially damaging to the cardiovascular system, increasing the risk of both coronary heart disease and stroke. Unexpressed or repressed anger has also been postulated as a cause of depression. The concept of repression owes much to Freud and psychoanalysis, although it is not tied to any one theoretical position. The notion of repressed anger has even

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passed into the legal system (thus extending the ‘insufficient cooling time’ criterion for crimes of passion). The basic idea is that, due to situational or personal constraints, anger is too threatening for the individual to even admit experiencing. Banned from consciousness, the anger nevertheless finds outlet in a disguised and maladaptive fashion. Depression can have many causes, both physiological and psychological. It need not, and typically does not, have anything to do with repressed anger. There are occasions, however, when depressive-like symptoms can take on some of the qualities of an angry response. Consider the case of a woman who is so fatigued that she finds it difficult to get out of bed in the morning, feels despondent through most of the day, and is haunted by frequent thoughts of suicide. Life becomes a burden both to her and to those around her. Now add the following considerations: the woman’s husband treats her with neglect; she sincerely believes that she has no right to be angry with her husband, for his neglect of her is somehow deserved; nevertheless, in subtle ways her behavior causes considerable inconvenience to her husband; and, finally, she derives barely concealed satisfaction from her husband’s discomfort. In such a case, we might well speak of the woman’s depression as being a manifestation of ‘repressed’ anger. That, however, is a metaphorical way of speaking, for the woman’s behavior follows only some, but not all, of the standard norms for anger. A more parsimonious explanation might be that the woman has acquired, in this situation, at least, a set of idiosyncratic beliefs and rules that help constitute an emotion that resembles both anger (retaliation for a perceived wrong) and depression (fatigue, despondency, self-reproach). Recall the emotion of liget described earlier. It bears some semblance to anger within our own culture, but it is constituted by different norms and hence represents a different emotion. Norms of emotion can vary within, as well as between, cultures. There exist subcultures of increasingly smaller scope, down to the level of the family and ultimately the individual. An emotion that is the product of personal (idiosyncratic) norms is particularly subject to misinterpretation because usual forms of consensual validation are lacking. But nothing is gained by way of clarity, and much may be lost, if we label the nonconforming emotion by some common name (‘anger,’ say, or ‘depression’) and attribute its idiosyncrasy to repression. Less often recognized than its pathogenic effects, anger can also have ameliorative effects on the course of disease. For example, patients suffering from serious diseases such as cancer have a better prognosis if they become angry at their condition than if they become merely frightened or depressed. Although the underlying mechanisms are not clear, a possible explanation is that the angry person is more likely to ‘fight’ the illness, for example, by taking an active role in his or her treatment.

Catharsis The idea of repression is closely tied to that of catharsis. During psychoanalytic therapy (what Freud originally called the ‘cathartic method’), presumably repressed impulses are brought to consciousness and expressed in an adaptive fashion. Using a rather graphic metaphor, Freud compared catharsis to the draining of pus from an infected wound. Continuing

with the example of depression, let us suppose the woman described earlier turns to psychotherapy for help. During treatment, she may come to recognize on a conscious level the unfairness of her treatment, and, blaming her husband rather than herself, she may resolve to do something to change the situation. From a psychoanalytic perspective, it might be said that her depression ‘lifts’ as her repressed anger is ‘released.’ An alternative explanation is that one kind of emotional response (an ill-defined anger/depression combination) has been replaced by a more adaptive response (normative anger). A good deal of experimental research has been devoted to the possible cathartic effects of emotional expression, especially with respect to anger and aggression. On the whole, the results have not been kind to the catharsis hypothesis. More often than not, the expression of anger on one occasion facilitates, and, on subsequent occasions, encourages its expression. This is opposite to the mitigating effect predicted by the catharsis hypothesis. In the case of anger and aggression, as in so many other areas, practice makes perfect or, at least, easier.

When Anger Turns to Hate In popular conception, anger and hate are closely allied conditions. In actuality, the matter is not so simple. As mentioned earlier, anger is more likely to be directed at friends and loved ones than at strangers and enemies. One reason is opportunity: close contact with friends and loved ones offers frequent occasions for anger. Another reason is that friends and loved ones can hurt us in ways that strangers and enemies cannot; a breach of trust, for example, can only occur where trust exists. Most importantly, if we want a relationship to continue, perceived wrongs must be set right, and anger is one way of achieving that end. It is primarily when anger proves ineffective, or is pursued for selfish ends, that it may turn to hatred on the part of the target as well as the angry person. Put differently, unresolved anger may cool and solidify into an enduring animosity, which predisposes an individual to a variety of different emotions depending on the fortunes of the hated person; thus, we may feel sorrow at the success of our enemies and joy (schadenfreude) at their failures, as well as anger at their presumed transgressions. We may even hate persons or entire groups who have never done us any wrong, as in prejudice. While normative anger is focused on the misdeeds of others, real or imagined, and attempts at repair, hatred has an inner dynamic that is more purely destructive of the self as well as of others. In his novel Demian, Hermann Hesse observed: “If you hate a person, you hate something in him that is part of yourself. What isn’t part of ourselves doesn’t disturb us.” That is both an overgeneralization (not all hatreds fit the pattern) and an understatement (something similar could be said of other sentiments; e.g., if you love a person, you love something in him that is part of yourself). Keeping these qualifications in mind, Hesse’s observation contains a truth about hatred that is worth remembering.

Gender Differences A common stereotype is that women are less capable of anger than are men. This stereotype is also sometimes used to explain

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the greater frequency of depression diagnosed among women than men (cf. previous discussion of repressed anger). However, surveys of the everyday experience of anger suggest that women become angry as often, as intensely, and as effectively as men. Gender differences in anger, to the extent that they exist, must be sought on a more subtle plane than suggested by the stereotype. In the conduct of interpersonal relations, men tend to place greater emphasis on competition and individual rights, whereas women tend to place greater emphasis on cooperation and affiliation. Men also tend to be physically more aggressive than women. Such differences in orientation and response style cannot but have reverberations on the way anger is experienced and expressed. Some of the things that a man finds offensive may not offend a woman, and vice versa; and when angry, a man may do and say things that a woman typically would not (e.g., men are more likely than women to engage in physical violence when angry, and women are more likely than men to cry). But as important as such differences may be, they should not be interpreted to mean that anger is less appropriate to women than to men, or that women are less capable of anger than are men. ‘Different’ does not necessarily imply ‘more’ or ‘less.’ Women are as sensitive as men to unfair treatment; and in response to provocations that they deem adequate, women are as likely as men to make their feelings known clearly and effectively.

Wrongful Anger The rules presented in Table 1 suggest that anger, properly constituted, serves to correct socially recognized wrongs, and that the anger should not exceed what is necessary to achieve that end. And, as described earlier, the majority of episodes fit that description. However, the rules of anger are easily broken, either unintentionally or willfully, with consequences that are harmful to the self and to interpersonal relationships. When the rules are violated, we may speak of wrongful anger (provided the violation is not so egregious as to preclude the response from being classified as anger altogether). Three types of wrongful anger have already been discussed in passing, namely, anger that goes unexpressed, resulting in continued provocation and unrelieved tension; anger that is expressed indirectly or in accordance with idiosyncratic rules; and anger that is expressed intemperately, resulting in unwarranted violence. To these, we could add anger that is unduly prolonged, is displaced on innocent third parties, is oft-repeated without adequate follow-through, and so forth. The rules of anger may be violated for many reasons, some of which antedate the angry episode – for example, inadequate socialization, neurological dysfunction, and inordinate stress or fatigue. Extraneous stimuli in the immediate situation can also lead to inappropriate anger. According to Berkowitz’s neoassociationistic theory of anger and aggression, aversive stimuli of any kind (which would include aspects of most provocations to anger) tend to automatically elicit aggressive thoughts, feelings, and behavioral inclinations, either innately or through prior experience. These tendencies are especially likely to find expression if other aggressive cues are present (e.g., a weapon) or customary restraints are inhibited (e.g., through the use of alcohol). By contrast, the present article

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has focused on higher order sociocognitive mechanisms by which anger may serve as a rationale for aggression, before, during, and after the fact, regardless of what other precipitating factors may be involved. The two types of mechanisms (sociocognitive and neoassociationistic) are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they tend to complement one another. For a more complete discussion of how anger can go awry, the reader should consult the article on aggression in this Encyclopedia. Regardless of the precipitating factors, with a better understanding of what constitutes an adequate provocation and with the acquisition of effective coping skills, aggressive tendencies can be typically curbed. But the outcome of anger – whether constructive or destructive – does not depend exclusively on the behavior of the angry person. Anger is more like a dialog than a soliloquy; put differently, there are ‘rules of engagement’ for the target as well as for the angry person. The most beneficial response for a target (assuming the anger is justified) is an explanation to correct any misunderstanding, an apology if no misunderstanding exists, and a resolve to prevent recurrence. Too often, unfortunately, anger provokes anger, conflict escalates, attitudes harden, and resentments build; eventually, all goodwill may be squeezed from the relationship (see earlier discussion of when anger turns to hate). When goodwill is absent, the rules of anger may be violated ‘wantonly,’ so to speak. That is, anger may be used deliberately (if not consciously) to achieve ends that are only tangentially related to the instigation. The concept of anger, it will be recalled, has exculpatory implications, and this could be in two ways: firstly, as anger is commonly interpreted as a passion rather than an action, the angry person presumably cannot control his or her own behavior; secondly, if the anger is accepted as justified, the blame for initiating the incident is shifted from the angry person to the instigator. Not surprisingly, perpetrators and their apologists often seek to excuse vicious behavior – child abuse, spouse battering, mugging and robbery, gang warfare, urban riots, etc. – by attributing it to anger. And in a multitude of more minor ways, we all sometimes resort to anger to intimidate and coerce others in the pursuit of selfish ends. Wrongful anger is unwittingly fostered by the misguided advice, often found in popular psychology books, that it is healthy to ‘let your anger out.’ If a response is inappropriate to begin with, letting it out in the name of anger is doubly inappropriate, for a response cannot be labeled as anger without endorsing, no matter how unwittingly, its exculpatory implications. It would be far better to heed the warning of Aristotle: “Anyone can get angry – that is easy; . . . but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble” (Nichomachean Ethics, 1109a25).

See also: Aggression; Depression; Homicide.

Further Reading Averill JR (1982) Anger and Aggression: An Essay on Emotion. New York: Springer-Verlag.

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Averill JR (1993) Illusions of anger. In: Felson RB and Tedeschi JT (eds.) Aggression and Violence: A Social Interactionist Perspective. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Berkowitz L (2003) Affect, aggression, and antisocial behavior. In: Davidson RJ, Scherer KR, and Goldsmith HH (eds.) Handbook of Affective Sciences, pp. 804–823. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Briggs JL (1970) Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Finkel NJ and Parrott WG (2006) Emotions and Culpability. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Friedman HS (ed.) (1991) Hostility, Coping, and Health. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Geen RG (1990) Human Aggression. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. Rosaldo MZ (1980) Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Notions of Self and Social Life. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Rosenwein BH (ed.) (1998) Anger’s Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Tavris C (1989) Anger: The Misunderstood Emotion, rev edn. New York: Simon and Schuster. Thomas SP (ed.) (1993) Women and Anger. New York: Springer. Wyer RS and Srull TK (eds.) (1993) Advances in Social Cognition, Vol. 6: Perspectives on Anger and Aggression. Hillsdale, NJ: LEA. Zillmann D (1983) Transfer of excitation in emotional behavior. In: Cacioppo JT and Petty RE (eds.) Social Psychophysiology: A Sourcebook, pp. 215–240. New York: Guilford Press.