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Anglophone systemicists and French enunciativists: shall the twain never meet?
Language Sciences 26 (2004) 391–410 www.elsevier.com/locate/langsci
Anglophone systemicists and French enunciativists: shall the twain never meet? David Banks Facult e des Lettres et Sciences Sociales, Universit e de Bretagne Occidentale, 20 rue Duquesne, 29285 Brest, France Accepted 25 June 2003
Abstract Is a rapprochement between Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Theories de l’enonciation possible within the French university system? These seem to represent respectively inductive and deductive modes of thought. It is therefore of interest to look at possible points of contact and dissimilarities. The Theories de l’enonciation are metaphysical theories and as such are not subject to the Principle of Falsification. The domains of the Theories de l’enonciation seem conceptually close to the metafunctions of the systemic model. The Theories de l’enonciation might benefit from adopting the distinction between thematic and information structure common in the systemic approach. Systemic Functional Linguistics treats texts as a whole, whereas the Theories de l’enonciation tend to analyse individual segments within a text. They also tend to treat only those grammatical questions with which the theory deals well. The Theories de l’enonciation appear to have a link with formalist approaches in that they accept basic forms which are subsequently modified in the cognitive process; Systemic Functional Linguistics may have produced something similar in the concept of congruent forms. Although starting from diametrically opposed points, it might be hoped that these two theories are working towards each other, and might at some point meet. 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Deduction; Grammar; Induction; Systemic Functional Linguistics; Text; Theories de l’enonciation
E-mail address: [email protected] (D. Banks). 0388-0001/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2003.06.002
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1. Introduction It seems opportune, at the beginning of a new century to speculate on the directions in which Systemic Functional Linguistics might develop in the near future. I should like to do this within the context of my own working environment, which is the English Departments of French universities. 1 The teaching of language and linguistics in the English Departments of French universities is dominated by cognitive theories which have been developed in France. These are generally known as Theories de l’enonciation, of which there are two variants. The first, based on the work of Antoine Culioli, is known as the Theorie des operations enonciatives (Culioli, 1990, 1999a,b), while the other, originally an offshoot from the Theorie des operations enonciatives, based on the work of Henri Adamczewski, is known as La grammaire metaoperationnelle (Adamczewski and Delmas, 1982; Adamczewski, 1996). To some extent both of these can be traced back to the work of Emile Benveniste (Benveniste, 1966, 1977), although Culioli himself has recently disclaimed any significant influence of Benveniste on his own work (Culioli, 2002). An earlier cognitive theory known as Psychomecanique, based on the work of Gustave Guillaume (Joly and OÕKelly, 1990) also has some currency, and some try to find a rapprochement between this and the Theories de l’enonciation. The publications in this field have been almost exclusively in French (though this may now be beginning to change), and published in French journals. As a result, these theories are almost unknown outside of France. Indeed the work of Culioli himself is scattered throughout a number of fairly obscure publications, not always easy for anyone outside this school of thought to locate. Fortunately, the most important of these have recently been collected in three volumes (Culioli, 1990, 1999a,b). On the other hand, Systemic Functional Linguistics has made little impact in France. The name of Michael Halliday is well known, but most frequently associated with Cohesion in English (Halliday and Hasan, 1976). It is rare to find more than fleeting knowledge of later work, almost as though Systemic Functional Linguistics had dropped dead in its tracks in the 1970s. There is a French functional school, based on the work of Andre Martinet (e.g. Martinet, 1962, 1979, 1970), but this has virtually no impact within the English Departments of the university system. This thumbnail sketch is, of course, not in any way an exhaustive survey of linguistic activity in France. Significant work has been done in the area of Speech Acts (e.g. Ducrot, 1984, 1972; Recanati, 1981) and Generative Grammar (e.g. Pollock, 1997), to mention only two other fields. If Systemic Functional Linguistics is to develop in France, then it must, for the foreseeable future, do so alongside the Theories de l’enonciation. In this context, it is
1 An earlier version of this paper was read at the 12th Euro-International Systemic Functional Linguistics Workshop, Glasgow, 2000. I should like to thank those who took part in the discussion following the oral presentation of the paper, as well as Janet Ormrod, Pierre Cotte, and an anonymous LS referee for their comments on earlier drafts. It goes without saying that none of these are responsible for any shortcomings that remain.
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useful to ask whether the development of these two very different theoretical approaches can be more than separate parallel developments. Are there any points of contact and is there any room for mutual influence? Is there anything that they can learn from one another? Is a rapprochement possible between these two apparently separate worlds? It would be impossible to give a full summary of the Theories de l’enonciation here; such an undertaking would be far beyond the scope of this paper. What I hope to do is to point out a few areas which indicate that although they are theoretically very different, these two approaches do nevertheless have points of contact, and can in some ways complement each other. For those who want a fuller picture, I can do no better than direct them to the relevant works in the reference list at the end of this paper, notably Adamczewski, 1996, Bouscaren, 1991, Delmas and Girard, 1993, Gilbert, 1993.
2. Two ways of thinking––a caricature It seems to me that the Theories de l’enonciation represent a typically ‘‘French’’ way of thinking, while Systemic Functional Linguistics is basically ‘‘Anglophone’’. This is an old story which goes back at least as far as the disputes between Locke and Descartes in the 17th century. LockeÕs approach to knowledge is based on experience, even if he does allow for ‘‘internal’’ experience (Bennet, 1971). It is an empirical approach, and as such owes a great deal to Bacon. Locke says: Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper void of all characters, without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring (Locke, 1688 [1965], 2.1.2). Descartes on the other hand puts ideas first. Mathematics is the model on which his vision of knowledge is based, and everything else is produced by a process of deduction. These long chains of reasonings, quite simple and easy, which geometers are accustomed to using to teach their most difficult demonstrations, had given me cause to imagine that everything which can be encompassed by manÕs knowledge is linked in the same way, and that, provided only that one abstains from accepting any for true which is not true, and that one always keeps the
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right order for one thing to be deduced from that which precedes it, there can be nothing so distant that one does not reach it eventually, or so hidden that one cannot discover it. And I was in no great difficulty in seeking which to begin with because I know already that it was with the simplest and easiest to know; and considering that, among all those who have already sought truth in the sciences, only the mathematicians have been able to arrive at any proofs, that is to say, certain and evident reasons, I had no doubt that it was by the same things which they had examined that I should begin, although I did not expect any other usefulness from this than to accustom my mind to nourish itself on truths and not to be content with false reasons (Descartes, 1637 [1968] (trad. F.E. Sutcliffe)). 2 Thus LockeÕs model is an empirical model, 3 while that of Descartes is mathematical (OÕConnor, 1967). These two opposing points of view, when applied to language give two ways of dealing with linguistic phenomena. The inductive method, derived from Locke, looks at data first, and then on the basis of that data attempts to construct a theory. This is the bottom-up, empirical approach of the anglophone tradition. The deductive method, derived from Descartes, is top-down. It develops a theory, and then attempts to verify the theory by looking at data. This is the French cartesian tradition. This is obviously a simplistic caricature. No academic enquiry takes place in a vacuum, and so all studies are to some extent influenced (positively or negatively) by previous work in the field. So even inductive enquiry has the background of existing theory and will have some idea about the theory that it will (perhaps even wishes to) ultimately construct. In the same way deductive research will have some knowledge of the data available while building its theoretical framework. It is for this reason that those working within the Theories de l’enonci-
2
The original French reads as follows: Ces longues cha^ınes de raisons, toutes simples et faciles dont les geometres ont coutume de se servir pour parvenir a leurs plus difficiles demonstrations, mÕavaient donne occasion de mÕimaginer que toutes les choses qui peuvent tomber sous la connaissance des hommes sÕentre-suivent en m^eme facßon, et que pourvu seulement quÕon sÕabstienne dÕen recevoir aucune pour vraie qui ne le soit, et quÕon garde toujours lÕordre quÕil faut pour les deduire les unes des autres, il nÕy en peut avoir de si eloignees auxquelles enfin on ne parvienne, ni de si cachees quÕon ne decouvre. Et je ne fus pas beaucoup en peine de chercher par lesquelles il etait besoin de commencer, car je savais deja que cÕetait par les plus simple et les plus aisees a conna^ıtre, et considerant quÕentre tous ceux qui ont ci-devant recherche a verite dans les sciences il nÕy a eu que les seuls mathematiciens qui ont pu trouver quelques demonstrations, cÕest-a-dire quelques raisons certaines et evidentes, je ne doutais point que ce ne f^ ut par les m^emes quÕils ont examinees; bien que je nÕen esperasse aucune autre utilite, sinon quÕelles accoutumeraient mon esprit a se repa^ıtre de verites et ne se contenter point de fausses raisons (Descartes (1637 [1965]), 2e partie).
3 Some might claim that it is possible to espouse empirical method without necessarilly holding an empiricist view of the nature of knowledge. Locke himself was of course both an empiricist, and a believer in empirical method.
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ation can claim that they also Ôstart from dataÕ. However, even if this view of things is a caricature, all caricatures have an element of truth in them, and to that extent it can serve as a useful starting point for this enquiry. Although I am presenting Systemic Functional Linguistics as part of the anglophone tradition derived from Locke, there are naturally exceptions to this trend. Probably the most obvious case is that of Chomsky, and of generative grammar in general, which is distinctly deductive in its approach and firmly attached to the cartesian tradition, even to the extent of virtually enshrining that claim in the title of one of his books, Cartesian Linguistics (Chomsky, 1966).
3. Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Theories de l’enonciation If the above simplistic caricature is now applied to Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Theories de l’enonciation, it might be said that Systemic Functional Linguistics starts from language and moves towards the cognitive, while the Theories de l’enonciation start from the cognitive with the intention of getting to language. If this is true, it would seem that the two theories are on the same road, but are moving towards each other from opposite ends. In this case they could be expected to meet each other at some half-way point. For many years the word ÔcognitionÕ seemed to be taboo in systemic circles, but more recently there has been a recognition that it does have a place. This is particularly noticeable in the work of Matthiessen (1998) and has recently been explicitly concretized in Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999. It seems to us that our dialogue is relevant to current debates in cognitive science. In one sense, we are offering it as an alternative to mainstream currents in this area, since we are saying that cognition ‘‘is’’ (that is, can most profitably be modelled as) not thinking but meaning: the ‘‘mental’’ map is in fact a semiotic map, and ‘‘cognition’’ is just a way of talking about language. In modelling knowledge as meaning, we are treating it as linguistic construct: hence, as something that is construed in the lexicogrammar. Instead of explaining language by reference to cognitive processes, we explain cognition by reference to linguistic processes (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999, p. x). It is possible that this cognitive element has always been to some extent implicit in the systemic model. The notion of a system network is one of the basic tenets of the model, even if systems tend to get discussed rather less than they used to. The system presents the set of options or choices which is available to the speaker, so it is basically to do with speaker choice. This is something which has remained fairly constant in systemic theory over at least a quarter of a century, as the following quotes show. A system is a set of options in a stated environment (Halliday (1970) in Kress, 1976, p. 26).
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Systems are lists of choices which are available in the grammar of a language (Berry, 1975, p. 142). [Systemic grammar] interprets language not as a set of structures but as a network of SYSTEMS, or interrelated sets of options for making meaning (Halliday, 1994a, p. 15). The notion of the system posits that the resources of a language are such that it supplies the speaker with a series of choices. These choices form a network which constitutes the system. If we conceive of this in terms of language production or generation, then we must think of the system in terms of speaker choice, and if we are concerned with speaker choice, we must in some sense be dealing with a cognitive domain. Choosing is a mental, hence cognitive, activity, and even if it is claimed that in this area choosing is subconscious, motivation and criteria must be present for the choice to take place. It cannot be thought of as haphazard. Hence, the systemic approach has always had a cognitive facet, albeit implicit and tacit. Turning now to the Theories de l’enonciation, this approach places theory in a primary position. The linguist should. . . study the way language functions as a meaningful activity of representation, that is as an activity of production and recognition of ‘‘linguistic forms’’. . .. Given the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the phenomena to be considered, and if there is a wish to cast light on whatever regularity there is, it is not possible to do so without a theoretical framework. . . It is first necessary to adopt a theory of observable entities in order to determine what types of data are to be subjected to analysis (Gilbert, 1993, 64–65). 4 Adamczewski and Gabilan (1996), writing for the secondary education sector, put it like this. The secret is to look in the grammar, understood as the set of construction procedures proper to a given language. Creating even the simplest sentence brings
4 This, and all subsequent translations, are my own. they are not intended to be polished translations, but to give something of the flavour of the original French. The original French of this quote is as follows.
Le linguiste doit. . . etudier le foncionnement du langage en tant quÕactivite signifiante de representation, cÕest-a-dire en tant quÕactivite de production et de reconnaissance de formes ‘‘linguistiques’’. . .. Etant donne la multiplicite et lÕheterogeneite des phenomenes a envisager, et si lÕon desire mettre a jour quelque regularite que ce soit, il nÕest pas possible de faire lÕeconomie dÕune construction theorique,. . . Il faut tout dÕabord se doter dÕune theorie des observables pour determiner quels sont les types de donnees que lÕon va soumettre a lÕanalyse (Gilbert, 1993, pp. 64–65).
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into play a whole series of operations, of choices, carried out spontaneously, unconsciously (automatisms) according to the rules of the game of the grammar. . .. How can the grammar (the rules of the grammatical game) be discovered? These rules, these ordering operations and these choices are not visible. What is visible, or rather audible in the case of spoken language, is the result of the subterranean work carried out by the speaker (Adamczewski and Gabilan, 1996, p. 7). 5 The importance of speaker choice is particularly clear in the second of these quotes. So both of these theories have a concern with the question of speaker choice, though in rather different ways. In the case of systemic theory, it is a question of the set of choices that the system makes available to the speaker, so systemic theory starts from the language end of the equation. In the case of AdamczewskiÕs version of the Theories de l’enonciation, it is the way in which the human mind operates in producing language that interests him. He sets out to attempt to discover the mental operations of the speaker in the course of the act of speaking. These constitute a set of choices. Adamczewski is thus very much at the speakerÕs end of things. However, although these are different ways of approaching speaker choice, indeed, in terms of point of view, they might seem diametrically opposed, nevertheless they are not totally different, and certainly not incompatible. They provide then a point of contact. There is of course a distinction between language as an abstract system, and language as what is produced as speech or writing. It may be significant that French distinguishes lexically between these, having langage for the former, and langue for the latter, whereas in English language covers both these. Consequently the distinction, if it is to be made in English, must be made specifically, whereas in French this distinction is in a sense automatic, being built into the lexis, and one might hypothesize that French-speakers might as a result be more conscious of the move from system to production.
4. Verification and falsification I would now like to make a philosophical digression, but one that I hope will later be seen to be significant. I would like to consider the nature of the knowledge that
5
Original French: Le secret. . . est donc a chercher dans la grammaire, comprise comme l’ensemble des procedes de construction propres a une langue donne. Fabriquer la moindre phrase met en jeu toute une serie d’operations, de choix effectues spontanement, non-consciemment (automatisme) selon les regles du jeu de la grammaire. . .. Comment decouvrir la grammaire (les regles du jeu grammatical). . ., Ces regles, ces operations de mise en ordre et ces choix ne sont pas visibles. Ce qui est visible, ou plut^ ot audible dans le cas de la langue parlee, cÕest le resultat de tout le travail souterrain effectuee par l’enonciateur (Adamczewski and Gabilan, 1996, p. 7).
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these two approaches provide. Ayer (1936 [1971], 1956) basing his point of view on the work of the Vienna Circle, suggested that in order for knowledge to be accepted as such it must satisfy the Verification Principle. According to this principle, we must know what it would be necessary to do to verify a proposition in order for it to be accepted as knowledge. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express. . . [otherwise] it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. The sentence expressing it may be emotionally significant to him; but it is not literally significant Ayer (1936 [1971], p. 48). If we have no way of verifying or testing, even in principle, the proposition in question, then, it is claimed, we cannot know what it means. It is literally meaningless, and hence cannot constitute knowledge. A statement. . . has meaning if and only if itÕs testable in some way. If you present me with a statement and can think of no way it could be tested, if no observation you can think of would have any bearing on its truth or falsity, would you know what it means? And if two statements could be verified by exactly the same series of observations, wouldnÕt they have the same meaning? (Hospers, 1967, 262). According to this point of view, it was not necessary that it be possible to actually carry out the verification. At that time, in the 1930s, it was technically impossible to verify statements about the dark side of the moon. Nevertheless, such statements were considered meaningful, since what had to be done to verify them was known, even though technically impossible at that time. Where, however, verification is not possible, not even in principle, the proposition is a Ômetaphysical pseudo-propositionÕ; it belongs to the realm of metaphysics, which for Ayer means that it has no literal significance, and hence is, strictly speaking, nonsense. This position runs into trouble in the case of universal statements (Caws, 1965). For example, the proposition All crows are black can never be totally verified, for no matter how many black crows have been observed, the possibility of observing a non-black crow always remains. Thus verification is impossible, and if one sticks to the strict Verification Principle one would have to claim that universal statements are meaningless, which is obviously counter-intuitive. In order to accommodate this objection, Popper (1959, 1994) suggested replacing the Verification Principle with a Falsification Principle. According to this principle, for a statement to be meaningful, it is necessary to know what it would be necessary to do to show it to be false. In PopperÕs sense ÔmeaningfulÕ is to be taken in the context of distinguishing science from non-science, rather than distinguishing sense from nonsense; and it formed part of a larger strategy by which Popper attempted to distance himself from the Vienna Circle (Edmonds and Eidinow, 2001). In the case of All crows are black, it would be necessary to observe one non-black crow to show this statement to be false; hence it is meaningful.
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. . . only if I can say how my theory might be refuted, or falsified, can I claim that my theory has the character of an empirical theory. It does not imply that irrefutable theories are false. Nor does it imply that they are meaningless. But it does imply that as long as we cannot describe what a possible refutation of a certain theory would be like, that theory may be regarded as lying outside the field of empirical science Popper (1963 [1994], p. 88). This is the version which I prefer, and I believe it constitutes a difficulty, though not an insuperable one, for the Theories de l’enonciation. The findings of the Theories de l’enonciation are essentially about the workings of the human mind, in other words about non-observable phenomena. As such they are non-falsifiable, they do not fulfil the Principle of Falsifiability. These findings then are non-physical in the sense that they do not relate to the physical world; they fall within the metaphysical domain. For example, one of the main findings of this approach in relation to English is that the use of progressive aspect in a proposition, or predicate relationship (relation predicative in enunciative terminology) is that this indicates that the proposition has been preconceived or preconstructed by the speaker. The evidence for this in language is that there is frequently a trace of the alleged phenomenon in the form of some sort of anaphoric reference. This is an interesting point because as long as anaphora is taken in a fairly wide sense, these anaphoric references can be found in most cases where progressive aspect is used. There remain, however, a few cases where it is impossible to find anything that can be described as anaphoric, and this is where the difficulty arises, since it is claimed that even here mental preconstruction has taken place. Thus in this case it is claimed that absence of the expected trace does not invalidate the theory. Hence it is impossible to falsify, and is not subject to the Principle of Falsification. A further example is that it is claimed that in using the English word ‘‘any’’, the speaker scans all items of a class without selecting any particular individual item. Once again it is difficult to see what sort of information or observations would be necessary to verify or falsify this claim. It seems to me then that the Theories de l’enonciation provide hypotheses, but that they cannot go beyond this hypothetical state. The only person I know of working with this framework who openly accepts the purely hypothetical nature of their results is Cotte (1996, 1997). It is more usually stated, and taught, in axiomatic fashion, as though it were established incontravertible truth. I do not think that the hypothetical nature of the findings of the Theories de l’enonciation in any way invalidates them. Hypotheses and statements of a metaphysical nature can be highly interesting in their own right. Theology is the obvious area where many of the claims are of a metaphysical nature, and whether one agrees with these claims or not, it would be difficult to say that they are of no interest simply because of their metaphysical nature. Even without going into an area which some might think of as marginal, many fields within the Social Sciences (psychology, sociology, etc.) make claims of a metaphysical nature. Again one would not want to deny the interest of these claims because they are metaphysical. On the other hand it is important to recognise the true nature of the results of academic enquiry, and to distinguish
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between metaphysical results which of their very nature must remain hypothetical, and empirical results, which, if true, can be taken as verifiable (or falsifiable) fact.
5. Domains and metafunctions I would now like to look at a detail of theory, where it seems to me that what is said within the Theories de l’enonciation parallels fairly closely the position in Systemic Functional Linguistics. Delmas, working in the Adamczewskian variant of this approach, has developed the notion of ÔdomainÕ (Delmas et al., 1993; Delmas and Girard, 1993). He suggests that there are three domains. The first of these is the Infraverbal Domain (D1), which concerns the speakerÕs personal analysis of the real. It is . . . the stage which precedes encoding. . . The operations brought into play in D1 (visual and auditive perception, categorization, taking into account spatial and localizing relationships, the location of objects, gestural and graphic links). . . give structure to an extralinguistic representation (Delmas and Girard, 1993, p. 5). 6 The second domain is the Symbolic Domain (D2), which concerns the analysis of the texture of the utterance. In this domain the words are presented in a string. . . Two types of problem. . . are found: • the handling of the linear ordering of the words. . . • the handling of other words, which are structural, and thus create hierarchies, and which are linked to taking into account the texture of linguistic linearity (Delmas and Girard, 1993, p. 5). 7
6
Original French: . . .lÕetape qui precede le codage verbalise. . . Les operations mises eu jeu en D1 (la perception visuelle, auditive, la categorisation, la prise en compte des relations spatiales, localisantes, des reperages dÕun objet, les relais gestuels ou graphiques). . . structurent une representation extralinguistique (Delmas and Girard, 1993, pp. 4–5).
7
Original French: Dans ce domaine, les mots se presentent en une ligne. . . On trouve. . . deux ordres de problemes: • la gestion dans le lineaire des mots. . . • la gestion dÕautres mots, structuraux, donc hierarchisants, lies a la prise en compte de la texture du lineaire linguistique. . . (Delmas and Girard, 1993, p. 5).
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The third domain is the Pragmatic Domain which is intersubjective in nature. This domain concerns everything that the speaker makes or attempts to make his addressee do. • The speaker appeals to his addressee. • The speaker can indicate that he and his addressee have already collaborated in a task of communication and construction. . . (Delmas and Girard, 1993, p. 5). 8 A tripartite system is present, though in less obvious fashion, in the work of Cotte (1996, 1997). If DelmasÕ domains are compared with the metafunctions of the systemic model a series of relations is apparent. According to Halliday (1994a, 179) the ideational metafunction is the clause as representation; it is Ôwhat the clause is aboutÕ. The interpersonal metafunction, the clause as exchange, is Ôwhat the clause is doing, as a verbal exchange between speaker–writer and audienceÕ. And the textual metafunction, the clause as message, is Ôhow the clause relates to the surrounding discourse, and to the context of situation in which it is being producedÕ. Or in ThompsonÕs (1996, 28) version, the ideational metafunction is used . . . to talk about our experience of the world, including the worlds in our own minds, to describe events and states and the entities involved in them. The interpersonal metafunction is used . . . to interact with other people, to establish and maintain relations with them, to influence their behaviour, to express our own viewpoint to things in the world, and to elicit or change theirs. And the textual metafunction is where . . . we organise our messages in ways which indicate how they fit in with the other messages around them and with the wider context in which we are talking or writing. Although the metafunctions and domains are obviously not identical there seems to be a significant series of relationships. The infraverbal domain and the ideational 8
Original French: Dans ce domaine, les mots se presentent en une ligne. . . On trouve. . . deux ordres de problemes:
• la gestion dans le lineaire des mots. . . • la gestion dÕautres mots, structuraux, donc hierarchisants, lies a la prise en compte de la texture du lineaire linguistique. . . (Delmas and Girard, 1993, p. 5).
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metafunction both deal with representations of the world, even if the former deals with a pre-encoding situation and the latter with the semantics of the message as encoded. This is perhaps the weakest of the three relationships, for although both are related to content, the infraverbal domain, dealing with a pre-language level, is in the cognitive or mental field, where the ideational metafunction deals with the clause, a language phenomenon. The pragmatic domain and the interpersonal metafunction both deal with the relationships between the speaker and his addressees. The pragmatic domain is concerned with collaboration in a task of communication and can include the speakerÕs attempts to influence his addresseeÕs actions. The interpersonal metafunction is involved with the verbal exchange, and is about the way people interact, which includes influencing their behaviour. And the symbolic domain and the textual metafunction both deal with the construction and cohesion of the message itself. The symbolic domain concerns the linear ordering of words and the texture of linguistic linearity, while the textual metafunction deals with the clause as message and the way it relates to surrounding discourse and fits in with other messages. It seems reasonable then to see a fairly direct connection, or at least a certain parallelism, between DelmasÕ domains and systemic metafunctions: Infraverbal domain Symbolic domain Pragmatic domain
Ideational metafunction Textual metafunction Interpersonal metafunction
In the work of Culioli, the concept of domain is rather different. Only one domain is posited, the notional domain, and this seems closest to the infraverbal domain of DelmasÕ system. For Culioli, this notional domain is a theoretical space where ideas or notions, and the relations between them, are developed at a prelinguistic stage, before they are in any way realised in language (Culioli, 1990, 1999b).
6. Thematic and information structure The distinction between theme and rheme, and that between given and new are less theoretically marked than many other theoretical concepts, and are common to many theoretical approaches. However, the distinction between thematic structure and information structure is perhaps more clearly brought out in Systemic Functional Linguistics than in some of the other treatments of these notions. Many linguists in the French tradition find themselves with difficult problems because they do not distinguish between the two types of structure. This is not universally the case, for the distinction does exist in French (e.g. Peeters, 1999) between thematisation, which corresponds to thematic structure, and focalisation, which corresponds to information structure. This distinction could quite easily be incorporated into the enunciative framework and would solve many of the problems which cause difficulty at the moment, such as the difference between the kind of ÔemphasisÕ implied by
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thematic position and that implied by new position. This can be illustrated by the following definition which appears in a glossary printed at the end of two otherwise excellent books aimed at university students (Lapaire and Rotge, 1992, 1993). Thematic • For the majority of linguists it is a case of the information status of a given segment. Any unit which refers to something known (given information) is thematic. On the other hand any unit which carries new information is described as rhematic (Lapaire and Rotge, 1992, p. 234; 1993, p. 301). 9 It is clear that since this can only apply to unmarked cases any attempt to apply it in marked cases is going to lead to trouble. Systemic Functional Linguistics, on the other hand, has a terminological problem in the term ÔnewÕ. The new can be subdivided into Ônew and freshÕ and Ônew but contrastiveÕ, and indeed probably into other subcategories as well (Banks, 1999b). However, Ônew but contrastiveÕ is confusing since it is not ÔnewÕ in any ordinary sense of the word. In this ordinary sense Ônew but contrastiveÕ is a contradiction. Perhaps systemicists could take a leaf from the French terminological book, with the term focalisation providing the key. I would like to suggest that the ÔnewÕ be rebaptised the ÔfocalizedÕ. In this area, the waters have been further muddied by Adamczewski (1996), (Adamczewski and Delmas, 1982) who uses rhematique and thematique in senses which are rather different to the use of theme and rheme in terms of the textual metafunction. For Adamczewski, rhematique refers to those mental operations which are primary, elementary or non-presupposing, and he refers to this as Phase 1. The term thematique is the inverse of this referring to mental operations which are secondary, complementary and presupposing; this is Phase 2. These terms then refer to different levels of mental work. The rhematique, Phase 1, is an elementary level of mental operations, while the thematique, Phase 2, is a more advanced stage, after the basic mental work has been carried out. Thus he claims that simple verb forms belong to Phase 1 and are rhematic, while verbs with progressive aspect belong to Phase 2 and are thematic; similarly, the indefinite article beings to Phase 1, and the definite article to Phase 2.
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Original French: Thematique
• chez la plupart des linguistes, il sÕagit du statut informationnel [angl. information status] dÕun segment donne. Est thematique, toute unite qui renvoie a du connu [angl. given information]. Est, en revanche, qualifie de rhematique [angl. rhematic, information providing] toute unite qui vehicule une information nouvelle [angl. new information] (Lapaire and Rotge, 1992, p. 234; 1993, p. 301).
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Although this seems fairly distinct from the concept of thematic structure, there may be some, albeit fairly tenuous, relationship between them. Lapaire and Rotge point out the possible links between the two terminological usages. . . . being elementary and factual [they] often go together, in other words what is rhematic in the domain of operations is frequently so in the domain of information. . .. what has already been dealt with by the mind is often known. . . (Lapaire and Rotge, 1992, p. 234; 1993, p. 301). 10
7. Text Both Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Theories de l’enonciation emphasize the importance of text, but they treat it in different ways. The systemic approach tends to treat a text as a whole, attempting to bring out the meaning of the text as a unit in itself. In the enunciative approach what is usually analysed is an individual segment in the text, but using the co-text to bring out the meaning of that particular segment, as well as its contribution to the text. This is not an essential element of the approach, more a question of usual practice, but exceptions (e.g. Souesme, 1998) are extremely rare. This strongly affects the type of exercise students are required to do, particularly in competition examinations (concours) such as the CAPES and Agregation, which are competition examinations for the recruitment of secondary school teachers. In the linguistic component of these examinations, the candidate is presented with a text in which a number of items are underlined (e.g a determiner, an auxiliary verb, etc); the underlined items are those which are to be analysed. In principle this exercise is neutral and theory-free. The candidate can use the theoretical framework of his choice. In practice, the conception of the exercise itself and the items to be analysed are heavily influenced by the Theories de l’enonciation, concentrating on those features where this theory works well, and has significant things to say in relation to language or the interpretation of the text.
8. Grammar There has so far been little attempt to provide a complete university level grammar of English on enonciative principles, of the type and level that Downing and Locke (1992) or Morley (2000) attempt for Systemic Functional Linguistics. Souesme, 1992, while it may not be totally successful, is the only attempt to date to provide a
10
Original French: . . . elementarite et factualite vont souvent de pair, autrement dit que ce qui est rhematique dans le domaine des operations lÕest frequemment dans le domaine de lÕinformation. . . ce qui a ete traite par lÕesprit est souvent connu. . . (Lapaire and Rotge, 1992, p. 234; 1993, p. 301).
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grammar of this type. Other books dealing with grammatical questions (e.g. Lapaire and Rotge, 1991; Bouscaren and Chuquet, 1987; Bouscaren, 1991; Adamczewski and Delmas, 1982) treat a number of isolated problems, such as BE + ING (i.e. progressive aspect), the articles, the demonstratives ‘‘this’’ and ‘‘that’’, the distinction between the genitive (Õs) and related constructions with ‘‘of’’, etc. For example BouscarenÕs (1991) slim volume (130 pp.) has a short introduction followed by 20 sections dealing with the following subjects: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
The simple present The BE + ING present The preterite The BE + ING preterite The present perfect: HAVE -EN The present perfect + BE + ING The past perfect: HAD -EN Modality Shall, should, will, would Be going to Is to Have A note on the passive construction Nominal determination Quite Some notes on the infinitive and the gerundive Some note on relatives. The difference between the use of that and of who or which 18. ; and that after declarative verbs 19. Some notes on resultative constructions 20. Levels of utterance The much longer book by Lapaire and Rotge (1991), which weighs in at a hefty 734 pages, has, in addition to a theoretical introduction, three parts, the first of which deals with various markers (determiners, proforms, connectors, prepositons and adverbial units), and has sections on the following: This and that The articles ;, a and the Any Some From ever to every All It Then and There As and so And, or and but
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The second part, which deals with the verbal domain, has sections on: Simple assertion and the subject–predicate relationship BE + V-ING HAVE + V-EN Modals Lexical verb to auxiliary do And the final part, dealing with the complex sentence, has sections on: A syntactic and functional study of the complex sentence Elements in WH-/TH;/That Which/that Which/what Where/when I hope that these two examples give some idea of the range of subject matter covered in books of this type. As in the case of the exams mentioned above, it would seem that these books treat those areas of the grammar about which the theory has significant things to say, but this means that fairly large areas are not treated at all. As a result these books, while being interesting on the points they deal with, tend to have a piecemeal feel about them.
9. Form(alism) Linguistic theories fall into three main groups, the functional, the cognitive, and the formal. However, whichever group one works within, language is encoded in forms. Consequently, form must have some place in all linguistic theories. The difficulty with formalist approaches such as Generative Grammar (from a nonformalist point of view) is in the notion that language consists of nothing but form, or at least that form is the only thing worth considering. It is, however, perhaps possible to see some sort of link between Generative Grammar and the Theories de l’enonciation. Generative Grammar, even from its early stages, suggested that language was built up by operating transformations on a small number of kernel sentences (Chomsky, 1957, 1965). In the Theories de l’enonciation, particularly in its Adamczewskian form, basic forms are worked on by means of mental operations to produce language. More recently, Cotte (1998, 1999) has developed a theorie de la reelaboration. The reelaboration hypothesis posits that meaning is constructed over time and that its recent states retain a memory of its former states. It predicts that its
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various age constituents sometimes follow each other in the string, and it invites us to turn away from a superficial view of syntax (Cotte, 1998, p. 438). 11 Although transfered to a cognitive context, this notion of basic forms which are in some way modified to produce actual language does appear to bear some debt to the original transformational concept. This however poses the question of which forms are to be considered primary. Are there criteria by which these primary forms can be recognized? Or is it simply a question of intuition; are there some sort of linguistic primes, rather like mathematical primes, which we simply recognize as such? Systemic Functional Linguistics seems to take a different tack in that the concept of system treats alternative encodings as being forms which are simultaneously available to the speaker. It is not a question of one being derived from the other. One may be selected more frequently than another, but they exist in parallel. There may, however, be an area where the systemic approach is not so different. In some recent work, notably in discussions of grammatical metaphor (Halliday, 1988, 1994b, 1998; Halliday and Martin, 1993; Banks, 1996, 1999a), great play has been made of the notion of Ôcongruent formsÕ. Halliday (1994a) describes a congruent form as Ôthe less metaphorical variantÕ, while Thompson (1996) says that Ôthe term congruent can be informally glossed as ‘‘closer to the state of affairs in the external worldÕÕ Õ, which seems to have faint echoes of AdamczewskiÕs Phase 1. Consequently there is a tendancy to think of congruent forms as being more basic or primary. However, Halliday and Matthiessen admit that From a purely descriptive point of view, each version is metaphorical from the standpoint of the other; there is no inherent priority accorded to either (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999, p. 537). This admission notwithstanding, they claim that congruent forms are prior from three points of view: phylogenetically, in the history of the language; ontogenetically, in the development of the individual; and logogenetically, in the development of text. I do not see how the phylogenetic priority squares with HallidayÕs claim that totally non-metaphoric texts occur only in the language of young children, which is presumably reflected in the ontogenetic priority. And even if logogenetic priority is the general rule, surely it is a tendency to which there are exceptions. Nevertheless, it would seem that there is general agreement on which forms are congruent, despite the difficulty of establishing criteria for congruency. I therefore feel that there are theoretical difficulties related to the concept of congruency as it is used in Systemic Functional Linguistics that have not yet been 11
Original French: LÕhypothese de la reelaboration suppose que le sense se construit dans le temps et que ses etats recents gardent la memoire des anciens. Elle prevoit donc que des constituants dÕ^age different se succedent parfois dans la cha^ıne et elle invite a se detourner dÕune vision superficielle de la syntaxe (Cotte, 1998, p. 438).
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worked out. On the other hand I feel, intuitively, that this notion is basically correct. What is interesting from the present point of view, is that insofar as the notion of congruency suggests that there are basic forms and derived forms, this might supply us with a further point of contact with the Theories de l’enonciation, where the notion is common that some language forms are produced by mental operations carried out on more basic linguistic forms.
10. Closing remarks In this short paper I have tried to show that Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Theories de l’enonciation are travelling towards each other from opposite directions, but whereas Systemic Functional Linguistics is an inductive method of enquiry, the Theories de l’enonciation are deductive. This places Systemic Functional Linguistics in a Lockean empirical tradition, and the Theories de l’enonciation in the cartesian tradition. The Theories de l’enonciation do not conform to the Principle of Falsification and consequently their findings are of a hypothetical, not axiomatic nature. This in no way obviates their interest, but it is important to recognize their true nature. The fact that the findings of the Theories de l’enonciation are hypotheses that cannot be falsified places them in the metaphysical rather than a physical field. The concept of domains, as developed by Delmas, parallels fairly closely that of semantic metafunctions in systemic theory. This constitutes a strong point of contact between these theories. Two of the three domains are virtually the same as the corresponding metafunctions, while the third deals from a cognitive viewpoint matters which Systemic Functional Linguistics treats from a functional point of view. The systemic version of thematic and information structure is one that could be beneficially integrated into the Theories de l’enonciation without too much difficulty. Distinguishing between thematic structure and information structure would avoid many of the problems caused by the fused approach which is commonly used, but not essential to, the Theories de l’enonciation. Both approaches analyse texts extensively, but in different ways. Systemic Functional Lingusitics analyses whole, or at least large stretches of text, whereas the Theories de l’enonciation usually analyse single constituents within a co-text. The Theories de l’enonciation tend to concentrate on specific grammatical questions rather than the grammar as a whole. Once again this is a question of current general practice, not an essential element of the theory, so it is not too difficult to see future developments extending towards a more complete grammar of English. Both approaches face a potential theoretical problem concerning the criteria for distinguishing a basic form from which other forms are derived. In the case of Systemic Functional Linguistics the problem relates to the criteria for distinguishing congruent forms. The problems faced by each of these theories in this area seem to be of the same type. It is my contention that these very different approaches have a number of points of contact and meaningful differences which could be investigated with mutual
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benefit. I earlier used the image of two parties on the same road but travelling towards each other from opposite ends, and suggested that if this were the case they should meet somewhere in the middle. I would like to think that this paper moves us a little way towards that meeting point. References Adamczewski, H., 1996. Genese et developpement dÕune theorie linguistique, suivi de les dix composantes de la Grammaire Metaoperationnelle de lÕanglais. La TILV, Paris. Adamczewski, H., Delmas, C., 1982. Grammaire linguistique de lÕanglais. Armand Colin, Paris. Adamczewski, H., Gabilan, J.-P., 1996. Dechiffrer la grammaire anglaise. Didier, Paris. Ayer, A.J., 1936 [1971]. Language, Truth and Logic. Penguin, Harmondsworth. Ayer, A.J., 1956. The Problem of Knowledge. Penguin, Harmondsworth. Banks, D., 1996. The passive and metaphor in scientific writing. Cuadernos de Filologıa Inglesa 5 (2), 13–22. Banks, D., 1999a. Aspects of the development of grammatical metaphor in scientific writing. Les Cahiers de lÕAPLIUT 19 (1), 5–25. Banks, D., 1999b. Decoding the information structure of journalistic clefts. Interface, Journal of Applied Linguistics 14 (1), 3–24. Bennet, J., 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Central Themes. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Benveniste, E., 1966. Problemes de linguistique generale, Tome 1. Gallimard, Paris. Benveniste, E., 1977. Problemes de linguistique generale, Tome 2. Gallimard, Paris. Berry, M., 1975. Introduction to Systemic Linguistics. In: Vol. 1 Structures and Systems. B.T. Batsford, London. Bouscaren, J., 1991. Linguistique anglaise, Initiation a une grammaire de lÕenonciation. Ophrys, Gap. Bouscaren, J., Chuquet, J., 1987. Grammaire et textes anglais, Guide pour lÕanalyse linguistique. Ophrys, Gap. Caws, P., 1965. The Philosophy of Science, A Systematic Account. D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, NJ. Chomsky, N., 1957. Syntactic Structures. Mouton, The Hague. Chomsky, N., 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Chomsky, N., 1966. Cartesian Linguistics. Harper & Row, New York. Cotte, P., 1996. LÕexplication grammaticale de textes anglais. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Cotte, P., 1997. Grammaire linguistique. CNED/Didier Erudition, Paris. Cotte, P., 1998. Have nÕest pas un verbe dÕaction: LÕhypothese de la reelaboration. In: Rousseau, A. (Ed.), La transitivite. Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, Lille, pp. 415–439. Cotte, P., 1999. Reelaboration et structure: lÕheritage dans la langue et en linguistique. ASp, la Revue du GERAS 23/26, 7–27. Culioli, A., 1990. Pour une linguistique de lÕenonciation, Tome 1, Operations et representations. Ophrys, Gap. Culioli, A., 1999a. Pour une linguistique de lÕenonciation, Tome 2, Formalisation et operations de reperage. Ophrys, Gap. Culioli, A., 1999b. Pour une linguistique de lÕenonciation, Tome 3, Domaine notionnel. Ophrys, Gap. Culioli, A., 2002. Variations sur la linguistique. Entretiens avec Frederic Fau. Klincksiek, Paris. Descartes, R., 1637 [1965]. Discours de la methode. Bordas, Paris. Descartes, R., 1637 [1968]. Discourse on Method and the Meditations (trad. Sutcliffe, F.E.) Penguin, Harmondsworth. Delmas, C., Adams, P., Delechelle, G., Girard, G., Lancri, A., Naude, G., 1993. Faits de langue en anglais, Methode et pratique de lÕexplication grammaticale. Dunod, Paris. Delmas, C., Girard, G., 1993. Grammaire metaoperationnelle et theorie des phases. In: Cotte, P., Joly, A., OÕKelly, D., Gilbert, E., Delmas, C., Girard, G., Gueron, J. (Eds.), Les theories de la grammaire anglaise en France. Hachette, Paris, pp. 97–124. Downing, A., Locke, P., 1992. A University Course in English Grammar. Prentice Hall International, Hemel Hempstead.
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Ducrot, O., 1984. Le dire et le dit. Minuit, Paris. Ducrot, O., 1972. Dire et ne pas dire, Principes de semantique linguistique. Hermann, Paris. Edmonds, D., Eidinow, J., 2001. WittgensteinÕs Poker, The story of a ten-minute argument between two great philosophers. Faber & Faber, London. Gilbert, E., 1993. La theorie des Operations Enonciatives dÕAntoine Culioli. In: Cotte, P., Joly, A., OÕKelly, D., Gilbert, E., Delmas, C., Girard, G., Gueron, J. (Eds.), Les theories de la grammaire anglaise en France. Hachette, Paris, pp. 63–96. Halliday, M.A.K., 1988. On the Language of Physical Science. In: Ghadessy, M. (Ed.), Registers of Written English: Situational factors and linguistic features. Pinter, London, pp. 162–178. Halliday, M.A.K., 1994a. An Introduction to Functional Grammar, second ed. Arnold, London. Halliday, M.A.K., 1994b. The construction of knowledge and value in the grammar of scientific discourse, with reference to Charles DarwinÕs The Origin of Species. In: Coulthard, M. (Ed.), Advances in Written Text Analysis. Routledge, London, pp. 136–156. Halliday, M.A.K., 1998. Things and relations: regrammaticising experience as technical knowledge. In: Martin, J.R., Veel, R. (Eds.), Reading Science, Critical and Functional Perspectives on Discourses of Science. London, Routledge, pp. 185–235. Halliday, M.A.K., Hasan, R., 1976. Cohesion in English. Longman, London. Halliday, M.A.K., Martin, J.R., 1993. Writing Science, Literacy and discursive power. Falmer Press, London. Halliday, M.A.K., Matthiessen, C.M.I.M., 1999. Construing Experience through Meaning, A Languagebased Approach to Cognition. Cassell, London. Hospers, J., 1967. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, second ed. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Joly, A., OÕKelly, D., 1990. Grammaire systematique de lÕanglais. Nathan, Paris. Kress, G. (Ed.), 1976. Halliday: System and Function in Language. Oxford University Press, London. Lapaire, J.-R., Rotge, W., 1991. Linguistique et grammaire de lÕanglais. Presses Universitaires du Mirail, Toulouse. Lapaire, J.-R., Rotge, W., 1992. Reussir le commentaire grammatical de textes. Ellipses, Paris. Lapaire, J.-R., Rotge, W., 1993. Seminaire pratique de linguistique anglaise. Presses Universitaires de Mirail, Toulouse. Locke, J., 1688 [1965]. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Dent, London. Martinet, A., 1962. A Functional View of Language. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Martinet, A., 1970. Elements de linguistique generale. Armand Colin, Paris. Martinet, A., 1979. Grammaire fonctionnelle du Francßais. Didier, Paris. Matthiessen, C.M.I.M., 1998. Construing processes of consciousness: from the commonsense model to the uncommonsense model of cognitive science. In: Martin, J.R., Veel, R. (Eds.), Reading Science, Critical and Functional Perspectives on Discourses of Science. Routledge, London, pp. 327–356. Morley, G.D., 2000. Syntax in Functional Grammar, an Introduction to Lexicogrammar in Systemic Linguistics. Continuum, London. OÕConnor, J.D., 1967. John Locke, second ed. Dover, New York. Peeters, J., 1999. Thematisation et focalisation: deux principes distincts et complementaires de construction du sens. In: Guimier, C. (Ed.), La thematisation dans les langues. Peter Lang, Bern, pp. 45–61. Pollock, J.-Y., 1997. Langage et cognition, Introduction au programme minimaliste de la grammaire generative. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Popper, K.R., 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Basic Books, New York. Popper, K.R., 1994. The Myth of the Framework. In: Notturno, M.A. (Ed.), Defence of science and rationality. Routledge, London. Recanati, F., 1981. Les enonces performatifs. Minuit, Paris. Souesme, J.-C., 1992. Grammaire anglaise en contexte. Ophrys, Gap. Souesme, J.-C., 1998. Approche linguistique dÕun passage de The Partner de J. Conradiania Anglophonia 4, 167–179. Thompson, G., 1996. Introducing Functional Grammar. Arnold, London.
Anglophone systemicists and French enunciativists: shall the twain never meet? David Banks Facult e des Lettres et Sciences Sociales, Universit e de Bretagne Occidentale, 20 rue Duquesne, 29285 Brest, France Accepted 25 June 2003
Abstract Is a rapprochement between Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Theories de l’enonciation possible within the French university system? These seem to represent respectively inductive and deductive modes of thought. It is therefore of interest to look at possible points of contact and dissimilarities. The Theories de l’enonciation are metaphysical theories and as such are not subject to the Principle of Falsification. The domains of the Theories de l’enonciation seem conceptually close to the metafunctions of the systemic model. The Theories de l’enonciation might benefit from adopting the distinction between thematic and information structure common in the systemic approach. Systemic Functional Linguistics treats texts as a whole, whereas the Theories de l’enonciation tend to analyse individual segments within a text. They also tend to treat only those grammatical questions with which the theory deals well. The Theories de l’enonciation appear to have a link with formalist approaches in that they accept basic forms which are subsequently modified in the cognitive process; Systemic Functional Linguistics may have produced something similar in the concept of congruent forms. Although starting from diametrically opposed points, it might be hoped that these two theories are working towards each other, and might at some point meet. 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Deduction; Grammar; Induction; Systemic Functional Linguistics; Text; Theories de l’enonciation
E-mail address: [email protected] (D. Banks). 0388-0001/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2003.06.002
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1. Introduction It seems opportune, at the beginning of a new century to speculate on the directions in which Systemic Functional Linguistics might develop in the near future. I should like to do this within the context of my own working environment, which is the English Departments of French universities. 1 The teaching of language and linguistics in the English Departments of French universities is dominated by cognitive theories which have been developed in France. These are generally known as Theories de l’enonciation, of which there are two variants. The first, based on the work of Antoine Culioli, is known as the Theorie des operations enonciatives (Culioli, 1990, 1999a,b), while the other, originally an offshoot from the Theorie des operations enonciatives, based on the work of Henri Adamczewski, is known as La grammaire metaoperationnelle (Adamczewski and Delmas, 1982; Adamczewski, 1996). To some extent both of these can be traced back to the work of Emile Benveniste (Benveniste, 1966, 1977), although Culioli himself has recently disclaimed any significant influence of Benveniste on his own work (Culioli, 2002). An earlier cognitive theory known as Psychomecanique, based on the work of Gustave Guillaume (Joly and OÕKelly, 1990) also has some currency, and some try to find a rapprochement between this and the Theories de l’enonciation. The publications in this field have been almost exclusively in French (though this may now be beginning to change), and published in French journals. As a result, these theories are almost unknown outside of France. Indeed the work of Culioli himself is scattered throughout a number of fairly obscure publications, not always easy for anyone outside this school of thought to locate. Fortunately, the most important of these have recently been collected in three volumes (Culioli, 1990, 1999a,b). On the other hand, Systemic Functional Linguistics has made little impact in France. The name of Michael Halliday is well known, but most frequently associated with Cohesion in English (Halliday and Hasan, 1976). It is rare to find more than fleeting knowledge of later work, almost as though Systemic Functional Linguistics had dropped dead in its tracks in the 1970s. There is a French functional school, based on the work of Andre Martinet (e.g. Martinet, 1962, 1979, 1970), but this has virtually no impact within the English Departments of the university system. This thumbnail sketch is, of course, not in any way an exhaustive survey of linguistic activity in France. Significant work has been done in the area of Speech Acts (e.g. Ducrot, 1984, 1972; Recanati, 1981) and Generative Grammar (e.g. Pollock, 1997), to mention only two other fields. If Systemic Functional Linguistics is to develop in France, then it must, for the foreseeable future, do so alongside the Theories de l’enonciation. In this context, it is
1 An earlier version of this paper was read at the 12th Euro-International Systemic Functional Linguistics Workshop, Glasgow, 2000. I should like to thank those who took part in the discussion following the oral presentation of the paper, as well as Janet Ormrod, Pierre Cotte, and an anonymous LS referee for their comments on earlier drafts. It goes without saying that none of these are responsible for any shortcomings that remain.
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useful to ask whether the development of these two very different theoretical approaches can be more than separate parallel developments. Are there any points of contact and is there any room for mutual influence? Is there anything that they can learn from one another? Is a rapprochement possible between these two apparently separate worlds? It would be impossible to give a full summary of the Theories de l’enonciation here; such an undertaking would be far beyond the scope of this paper. What I hope to do is to point out a few areas which indicate that although they are theoretically very different, these two approaches do nevertheless have points of contact, and can in some ways complement each other. For those who want a fuller picture, I can do no better than direct them to the relevant works in the reference list at the end of this paper, notably Adamczewski, 1996, Bouscaren, 1991, Delmas and Girard, 1993, Gilbert, 1993.
2. Two ways of thinking––a caricature It seems to me that the Theories de l’enonciation represent a typically ‘‘French’’ way of thinking, while Systemic Functional Linguistics is basically ‘‘Anglophone’’. This is an old story which goes back at least as far as the disputes between Locke and Descartes in the 17th century. LockeÕs approach to knowledge is based on experience, even if he does allow for ‘‘internal’’ experience (Bennet, 1971). It is an empirical approach, and as such owes a great deal to Bacon. Locke says: Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper void of all characters, without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring (Locke, 1688 [1965], 2.1.2). Descartes on the other hand puts ideas first. Mathematics is the model on which his vision of knowledge is based, and everything else is produced by a process of deduction. These long chains of reasonings, quite simple and easy, which geometers are accustomed to using to teach their most difficult demonstrations, had given me cause to imagine that everything which can be encompassed by manÕs knowledge is linked in the same way, and that, provided only that one abstains from accepting any for true which is not true, and that one always keeps the
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right order for one thing to be deduced from that which precedes it, there can be nothing so distant that one does not reach it eventually, or so hidden that one cannot discover it. And I was in no great difficulty in seeking which to begin with because I know already that it was with the simplest and easiest to know; and considering that, among all those who have already sought truth in the sciences, only the mathematicians have been able to arrive at any proofs, that is to say, certain and evident reasons, I had no doubt that it was by the same things which they had examined that I should begin, although I did not expect any other usefulness from this than to accustom my mind to nourish itself on truths and not to be content with false reasons (Descartes, 1637 [1968] (trad. F.E. Sutcliffe)). 2 Thus LockeÕs model is an empirical model, 3 while that of Descartes is mathematical (OÕConnor, 1967). These two opposing points of view, when applied to language give two ways of dealing with linguistic phenomena. The inductive method, derived from Locke, looks at data first, and then on the basis of that data attempts to construct a theory. This is the bottom-up, empirical approach of the anglophone tradition. The deductive method, derived from Descartes, is top-down. It develops a theory, and then attempts to verify the theory by looking at data. This is the French cartesian tradition. This is obviously a simplistic caricature. No academic enquiry takes place in a vacuum, and so all studies are to some extent influenced (positively or negatively) by previous work in the field. So even inductive enquiry has the background of existing theory and will have some idea about the theory that it will (perhaps even wishes to) ultimately construct. In the same way deductive research will have some knowledge of the data available while building its theoretical framework. It is for this reason that those working within the Theories de l’enonci-
2
The original French reads as follows: Ces longues cha^ınes de raisons, toutes simples et faciles dont les geometres ont coutume de se servir pour parvenir a leurs plus difficiles demonstrations, mÕavaient donne occasion de mÕimaginer que toutes les choses qui peuvent tomber sous la connaissance des hommes sÕentre-suivent en m^eme facßon, et que pourvu seulement quÕon sÕabstienne dÕen recevoir aucune pour vraie qui ne le soit, et quÕon garde toujours lÕordre quÕil faut pour les deduire les unes des autres, il nÕy en peut avoir de si eloignees auxquelles enfin on ne parvienne, ni de si cachees quÕon ne decouvre. Et je ne fus pas beaucoup en peine de chercher par lesquelles il etait besoin de commencer, car je savais deja que cÕetait par les plus simple et les plus aisees a conna^ıtre, et considerant quÕentre tous ceux qui ont ci-devant recherche a verite dans les sciences il nÕy a eu que les seuls mathematiciens qui ont pu trouver quelques demonstrations, cÕest-a-dire quelques raisons certaines et evidentes, je ne doutais point que ce ne f^ ut par les m^emes quÕils ont examinees; bien que je nÕen esperasse aucune autre utilite, sinon quÕelles accoutumeraient mon esprit a se repa^ıtre de verites et ne se contenter point de fausses raisons (Descartes (1637 [1965]), 2e partie).
3 Some might claim that it is possible to espouse empirical method without necessarilly holding an empiricist view of the nature of knowledge. Locke himself was of course both an empiricist, and a believer in empirical method.
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ation can claim that they also Ôstart from dataÕ. However, even if this view of things is a caricature, all caricatures have an element of truth in them, and to that extent it can serve as a useful starting point for this enquiry. Although I am presenting Systemic Functional Linguistics as part of the anglophone tradition derived from Locke, there are naturally exceptions to this trend. Probably the most obvious case is that of Chomsky, and of generative grammar in general, which is distinctly deductive in its approach and firmly attached to the cartesian tradition, even to the extent of virtually enshrining that claim in the title of one of his books, Cartesian Linguistics (Chomsky, 1966).
3. Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Theories de l’enonciation If the above simplistic caricature is now applied to Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Theories de l’enonciation, it might be said that Systemic Functional Linguistics starts from language and moves towards the cognitive, while the Theories de l’enonciation start from the cognitive with the intention of getting to language. If this is true, it would seem that the two theories are on the same road, but are moving towards each other from opposite ends. In this case they could be expected to meet each other at some half-way point. For many years the word ÔcognitionÕ seemed to be taboo in systemic circles, but more recently there has been a recognition that it does have a place. This is particularly noticeable in the work of Matthiessen (1998) and has recently been explicitly concretized in Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999. It seems to us that our dialogue is relevant to current debates in cognitive science. In one sense, we are offering it as an alternative to mainstream currents in this area, since we are saying that cognition ‘‘is’’ (that is, can most profitably be modelled as) not thinking but meaning: the ‘‘mental’’ map is in fact a semiotic map, and ‘‘cognition’’ is just a way of talking about language. In modelling knowledge as meaning, we are treating it as linguistic construct: hence, as something that is construed in the lexicogrammar. Instead of explaining language by reference to cognitive processes, we explain cognition by reference to linguistic processes (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999, p. x). It is possible that this cognitive element has always been to some extent implicit in the systemic model. The notion of a system network is one of the basic tenets of the model, even if systems tend to get discussed rather less than they used to. The system presents the set of options or choices which is available to the speaker, so it is basically to do with speaker choice. This is something which has remained fairly constant in systemic theory over at least a quarter of a century, as the following quotes show. A system is a set of options in a stated environment (Halliday (1970) in Kress, 1976, p. 26).
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Systems are lists of choices which are available in the grammar of a language (Berry, 1975, p. 142). [Systemic grammar] interprets language not as a set of structures but as a network of SYSTEMS, or interrelated sets of options for making meaning (Halliday, 1994a, p. 15). The notion of the system posits that the resources of a language are such that it supplies the speaker with a series of choices. These choices form a network which constitutes the system. If we conceive of this in terms of language production or generation, then we must think of the system in terms of speaker choice, and if we are concerned with speaker choice, we must in some sense be dealing with a cognitive domain. Choosing is a mental, hence cognitive, activity, and even if it is claimed that in this area choosing is subconscious, motivation and criteria must be present for the choice to take place. It cannot be thought of as haphazard. Hence, the systemic approach has always had a cognitive facet, albeit implicit and tacit. Turning now to the Theories de l’enonciation, this approach places theory in a primary position. The linguist should. . . study the way language functions as a meaningful activity of representation, that is as an activity of production and recognition of ‘‘linguistic forms’’. . .. Given the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the phenomena to be considered, and if there is a wish to cast light on whatever regularity there is, it is not possible to do so without a theoretical framework. . . It is first necessary to adopt a theory of observable entities in order to determine what types of data are to be subjected to analysis (Gilbert, 1993, 64–65). 4 Adamczewski and Gabilan (1996), writing for the secondary education sector, put it like this. The secret is to look in the grammar, understood as the set of construction procedures proper to a given language. Creating even the simplest sentence brings
4 This, and all subsequent translations, are my own. they are not intended to be polished translations, but to give something of the flavour of the original French. The original French of this quote is as follows.
Le linguiste doit. . . etudier le foncionnement du langage en tant quÕactivite signifiante de representation, cÕest-a-dire en tant quÕactivite de production et de reconnaissance de formes ‘‘linguistiques’’. . .. Etant donne la multiplicite et lÕheterogeneite des phenomenes a envisager, et si lÕon desire mettre a jour quelque regularite que ce soit, il nÕest pas possible de faire lÕeconomie dÕune construction theorique,. . . Il faut tout dÕabord se doter dÕune theorie des observables pour determiner quels sont les types de donnees que lÕon va soumettre a lÕanalyse (Gilbert, 1993, pp. 64–65).
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into play a whole series of operations, of choices, carried out spontaneously, unconsciously (automatisms) according to the rules of the game of the grammar. . .. How can the grammar (the rules of the grammatical game) be discovered? These rules, these ordering operations and these choices are not visible. What is visible, or rather audible in the case of spoken language, is the result of the subterranean work carried out by the speaker (Adamczewski and Gabilan, 1996, p. 7). 5 The importance of speaker choice is particularly clear in the second of these quotes. So both of these theories have a concern with the question of speaker choice, though in rather different ways. In the case of systemic theory, it is a question of the set of choices that the system makes available to the speaker, so systemic theory starts from the language end of the equation. In the case of AdamczewskiÕs version of the Theories de l’enonciation, it is the way in which the human mind operates in producing language that interests him. He sets out to attempt to discover the mental operations of the speaker in the course of the act of speaking. These constitute a set of choices. Adamczewski is thus very much at the speakerÕs end of things. However, although these are different ways of approaching speaker choice, indeed, in terms of point of view, they might seem diametrically opposed, nevertheless they are not totally different, and certainly not incompatible. They provide then a point of contact. There is of course a distinction between language as an abstract system, and language as what is produced as speech or writing. It may be significant that French distinguishes lexically between these, having langage for the former, and langue for the latter, whereas in English language covers both these. Consequently the distinction, if it is to be made in English, must be made specifically, whereas in French this distinction is in a sense automatic, being built into the lexis, and one might hypothesize that French-speakers might as a result be more conscious of the move from system to production.
4. Verification and falsification I would now like to make a philosophical digression, but one that I hope will later be seen to be significant. I would like to consider the nature of the knowledge that
5
Original French: Le secret. . . est donc a chercher dans la grammaire, comprise comme l’ensemble des procedes de construction propres a une langue donne. Fabriquer la moindre phrase met en jeu toute une serie d’operations, de choix effectues spontanement, non-consciemment (automatisme) selon les regles du jeu de la grammaire. . .. Comment decouvrir la grammaire (les regles du jeu grammatical). . ., Ces regles, ces operations de mise en ordre et ces choix ne sont pas visibles. Ce qui est visible, ou plut^ ot audible dans le cas de la langue parlee, cÕest le resultat de tout le travail souterrain effectuee par l’enonciateur (Adamczewski and Gabilan, 1996, p. 7).
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these two approaches provide. Ayer (1936 [1971], 1956) basing his point of view on the work of the Vienna Circle, suggested that in order for knowledge to be accepted as such it must satisfy the Verification Principle. According to this principle, we must know what it would be necessary to do to verify a proposition in order for it to be accepted as knowledge. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express. . . [otherwise] it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition. The sentence expressing it may be emotionally significant to him; but it is not literally significant Ayer (1936 [1971], p. 48). If we have no way of verifying or testing, even in principle, the proposition in question, then, it is claimed, we cannot know what it means. It is literally meaningless, and hence cannot constitute knowledge. A statement. . . has meaning if and only if itÕs testable in some way. If you present me with a statement and can think of no way it could be tested, if no observation you can think of would have any bearing on its truth or falsity, would you know what it means? And if two statements could be verified by exactly the same series of observations, wouldnÕt they have the same meaning? (Hospers, 1967, 262). According to this point of view, it was not necessary that it be possible to actually carry out the verification. At that time, in the 1930s, it was technically impossible to verify statements about the dark side of the moon. Nevertheless, such statements were considered meaningful, since what had to be done to verify them was known, even though technically impossible at that time. Where, however, verification is not possible, not even in principle, the proposition is a Ômetaphysical pseudo-propositionÕ; it belongs to the realm of metaphysics, which for Ayer means that it has no literal significance, and hence is, strictly speaking, nonsense. This position runs into trouble in the case of universal statements (Caws, 1965). For example, the proposition All crows are black can never be totally verified, for no matter how many black crows have been observed, the possibility of observing a non-black crow always remains. Thus verification is impossible, and if one sticks to the strict Verification Principle one would have to claim that universal statements are meaningless, which is obviously counter-intuitive. In order to accommodate this objection, Popper (1959, 1994) suggested replacing the Verification Principle with a Falsification Principle. According to this principle, for a statement to be meaningful, it is necessary to know what it would be necessary to do to show it to be false. In PopperÕs sense ÔmeaningfulÕ is to be taken in the context of distinguishing science from non-science, rather than distinguishing sense from nonsense; and it formed part of a larger strategy by which Popper attempted to distance himself from the Vienna Circle (Edmonds and Eidinow, 2001). In the case of All crows are black, it would be necessary to observe one non-black crow to show this statement to be false; hence it is meaningful.
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. . . only if I can say how my theory might be refuted, or falsified, can I claim that my theory has the character of an empirical theory. It does not imply that irrefutable theories are false. Nor does it imply that they are meaningless. But it does imply that as long as we cannot describe what a possible refutation of a certain theory would be like, that theory may be regarded as lying outside the field of empirical science Popper (1963 [1994], p. 88). This is the version which I prefer, and I believe it constitutes a difficulty, though not an insuperable one, for the Theories de l’enonciation. The findings of the Theories de l’enonciation are essentially about the workings of the human mind, in other words about non-observable phenomena. As such they are non-falsifiable, they do not fulfil the Principle of Falsifiability. These findings then are non-physical in the sense that they do not relate to the physical world; they fall within the metaphysical domain. For example, one of the main findings of this approach in relation to English is that the use of progressive aspect in a proposition, or predicate relationship (relation predicative in enunciative terminology) is that this indicates that the proposition has been preconceived or preconstructed by the speaker. The evidence for this in language is that there is frequently a trace of the alleged phenomenon in the form of some sort of anaphoric reference. This is an interesting point because as long as anaphora is taken in a fairly wide sense, these anaphoric references can be found in most cases where progressive aspect is used. There remain, however, a few cases where it is impossible to find anything that can be described as anaphoric, and this is where the difficulty arises, since it is claimed that even here mental preconstruction has taken place. Thus in this case it is claimed that absence of the expected trace does not invalidate the theory. Hence it is impossible to falsify, and is not subject to the Principle of Falsification. A further example is that it is claimed that in using the English word ‘‘any’’, the speaker scans all items of a class without selecting any particular individual item. Once again it is difficult to see what sort of information or observations would be necessary to verify or falsify this claim. It seems to me then that the Theories de l’enonciation provide hypotheses, but that they cannot go beyond this hypothetical state. The only person I know of working with this framework who openly accepts the purely hypothetical nature of their results is Cotte (1996, 1997). It is more usually stated, and taught, in axiomatic fashion, as though it were established incontravertible truth. I do not think that the hypothetical nature of the findings of the Theories de l’enonciation in any way invalidates them. Hypotheses and statements of a metaphysical nature can be highly interesting in their own right. Theology is the obvious area where many of the claims are of a metaphysical nature, and whether one agrees with these claims or not, it would be difficult to say that they are of no interest simply because of their metaphysical nature. Even without going into an area which some might think of as marginal, many fields within the Social Sciences (psychology, sociology, etc.) make claims of a metaphysical nature. Again one would not want to deny the interest of these claims because they are metaphysical. On the other hand it is important to recognise the true nature of the results of academic enquiry, and to distinguish
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between metaphysical results which of their very nature must remain hypothetical, and empirical results, which, if true, can be taken as verifiable (or falsifiable) fact.
5. Domains and metafunctions I would now like to look at a detail of theory, where it seems to me that what is said within the Theories de l’enonciation parallels fairly closely the position in Systemic Functional Linguistics. Delmas, working in the Adamczewskian variant of this approach, has developed the notion of ÔdomainÕ (Delmas et al., 1993; Delmas and Girard, 1993). He suggests that there are three domains. The first of these is the Infraverbal Domain (D1), which concerns the speakerÕs personal analysis of the real. It is . . . the stage which precedes encoding. . . The operations brought into play in D1 (visual and auditive perception, categorization, taking into account spatial and localizing relationships, the location of objects, gestural and graphic links). . . give structure to an extralinguistic representation (Delmas and Girard, 1993, p. 5). 6 The second domain is the Symbolic Domain (D2), which concerns the analysis of the texture of the utterance. In this domain the words are presented in a string. . . Two types of problem. . . are found: • the handling of the linear ordering of the words. . . • the handling of other words, which are structural, and thus create hierarchies, and which are linked to taking into account the texture of linguistic linearity (Delmas and Girard, 1993, p. 5). 7
6
Original French: . . .lÕetape qui precede le codage verbalise. . . Les operations mises eu jeu en D1 (la perception visuelle, auditive, la categorisation, la prise en compte des relations spatiales, localisantes, des reperages dÕun objet, les relais gestuels ou graphiques). . . structurent une representation extralinguistique (Delmas and Girard, 1993, pp. 4–5).
7
Original French: Dans ce domaine, les mots se presentent en une ligne. . . On trouve. . . deux ordres de problemes: • la gestion dans le lineaire des mots. . . • la gestion dÕautres mots, structuraux, donc hierarchisants, lies a la prise en compte de la texture du lineaire linguistique. . . (Delmas and Girard, 1993, p. 5).
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The third domain is the Pragmatic Domain which is intersubjective in nature. This domain concerns everything that the speaker makes or attempts to make his addressee do. • The speaker appeals to his addressee. • The speaker can indicate that he and his addressee have already collaborated in a task of communication and construction. . . (Delmas and Girard, 1993, p. 5). 8 A tripartite system is present, though in less obvious fashion, in the work of Cotte (1996, 1997). If DelmasÕ domains are compared with the metafunctions of the systemic model a series of relations is apparent. According to Halliday (1994a, 179) the ideational metafunction is the clause as representation; it is Ôwhat the clause is aboutÕ. The interpersonal metafunction, the clause as exchange, is Ôwhat the clause is doing, as a verbal exchange between speaker–writer and audienceÕ. And the textual metafunction, the clause as message, is Ôhow the clause relates to the surrounding discourse, and to the context of situation in which it is being producedÕ. Or in ThompsonÕs (1996, 28) version, the ideational metafunction is used . . . to talk about our experience of the world, including the worlds in our own minds, to describe events and states and the entities involved in them. The interpersonal metafunction is used . . . to interact with other people, to establish and maintain relations with them, to influence their behaviour, to express our own viewpoint to things in the world, and to elicit or change theirs. And the textual metafunction is where . . . we organise our messages in ways which indicate how they fit in with the other messages around them and with the wider context in which we are talking or writing. Although the metafunctions and domains are obviously not identical there seems to be a significant series of relationships. The infraverbal domain and the ideational 8
Original French: Dans ce domaine, les mots se presentent en une ligne. . . On trouve. . . deux ordres de problemes:
• la gestion dans le lineaire des mots. . . • la gestion dÕautres mots, structuraux, donc hierarchisants, lies a la prise en compte de la texture du lineaire linguistique. . . (Delmas and Girard, 1993, p. 5).
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metafunction both deal with representations of the world, even if the former deals with a pre-encoding situation and the latter with the semantics of the message as encoded. This is perhaps the weakest of the three relationships, for although both are related to content, the infraverbal domain, dealing with a pre-language level, is in the cognitive or mental field, where the ideational metafunction deals with the clause, a language phenomenon. The pragmatic domain and the interpersonal metafunction both deal with the relationships between the speaker and his addressees. The pragmatic domain is concerned with collaboration in a task of communication and can include the speakerÕs attempts to influence his addresseeÕs actions. The interpersonal metafunction is involved with the verbal exchange, and is about the way people interact, which includes influencing their behaviour. And the symbolic domain and the textual metafunction both deal with the construction and cohesion of the message itself. The symbolic domain concerns the linear ordering of words and the texture of linguistic linearity, while the textual metafunction deals with the clause as message and the way it relates to surrounding discourse and fits in with other messages. It seems reasonable then to see a fairly direct connection, or at least a certain parallelism, between DelmasÕ domains and systemic metafunctions: Infraverbal domain Symbolic domain Pragmatic domain
Ideational metafunction Textual metafunction Interpersonal metafunction
In the work of Culioli, the concept of domain is rather different. Only one domain is posited, the notional domain, and this seems closest to the infraverbal domain of DelmasÕ system. For Culioli, this notional domain is a theoretical space where ideas or notions, and the relations between them, are developed at a prelinguistic stage, before they are in any way realised in language (Culioli, 1990, 1999b).
6. Thematic and information structure The distinction between theme and rheme, and that between given and new are less theoretically marked than many other theoretical concepts, and are common to many theoretical approaches. However, the distinction between thematic structure and information structure is perhaps more clearly brought out in Systemic Functional Linguistics than in some of the other treatments of these notions. Many linguists in the French tradition find themselves with difficult problems because they do not distinguish between the two types of structure. This is not universally the case, for the distinction does exist in French (e.g. Peeters, 1999) between thematisation, which corresponds to thematic structure, and focalisation, which corresponds to information structure. This distinction could quite easily be incorporated into the enunciative framework and would solve many of the problems which cause difficulty at the moment, such as the difference between the kind of ÔemphasisÕ implied by
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thematic position and that implied by new position. This can be illustrated by the following definition which appears in a glossary printed at the end of two otherwise excellent books aimed at university students (Lapaire and Rotge, 1992, 1993). Thematic • For the majority of linguists it is a case of the information status of a given segment. Any unit which refers to something known (given information) is thematic. On the other hand any unit which carries new information is described as rhematic (Lapaire and Rotge, 1992, p. 234; 1993, p. 301). 9 It is clear that since this can only apply to unmarked cases any attempt to apply it in marked cases is going to lead to trouble. Systemic Functional Linguistics, on the other hand, has a terminological problem in the term ÔnewÕ. The new can be subdivided into Ônew and freshÕ and Ônew but contrastiveÕ, and indeed probably into other subcategories as well (Banks, 1999b). However, Ônew but contrastiveÕ is confusing since it is not ÔnewÕ in any ordinary sense of the word. In this ordinary sense Ônew but contrastiveÕ is a contradiction. Perhaps systemicists could take a leaf from the French terminological book, with the term focalisation providing the key. I would like to suggest that the ÔnewÕ be rebaptised the ÔfocalizedÕ. In this area, the waters have been further muddied by Adamczewski (1996), (Adamczewski and Delmas, 1982) who uses rhematique and thematique in senses which are rather different to the use of theme and rheme in terms of the textual metafunction. For Adamczewski, rhematique refers to those mental operations which are primary, elementary or non-presupposing, and he refers to this as Phase 1. The term thematique is the inverse of this referring to mental operations which are secondary, complementary and presupposing; this is Phase 2. These terms then refer to different levels of mental work. The rhematique, Phase 1, is an elementary level of mental operations, while the thematique, Phase 2, is a more advanced stage, after the basic mental work has been carried out. Thus he claims that simple verb forms belong to Phase 1 and are rhematic, while verbs with progressive aspect belong to Phase 2 and are thematic; similarly, the indefinite article beings to Phase 1, and the definite article to Phase 2.
9
Original French: Thematique
• chez la plupart des linguistes, il sÕagit du statut informationnel [angl. information status] dÕun segment donne. Est thematique, toute unite qui renvoie a du connu [angl. given information]. Est, en revanche, qualifie de rhematique [angl. rhematic, information providing] toute unite qui vehicule une information nouvelle [angl. new information] (Lapaire and Rotge, 1992, p. 234; 1993, p. 301).
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Although this seems fairly distinct from the concept of thematic structure, there may be some, albeit fairly tenuous, relationship between them. Lapaire and Rotge point out the possible links between the two terminological usages. . . . being elementary and factual [they] often go together, in other words what is rhematic in the domain of operations is frequently so in the domain of information. . .. what has already been dealt with by the mind is often known. . . (Lapaire and Rotge, 1992, p. 234; 1993, p. 301). 10
7. Text Both Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Theories de l’enonciation emphasize the importance of text, but they treat it in different ways. The systemic approach tends to treat a text as a whole, attempting to bring out the meaning of the text as a unit in itself. In the enunciative approach what is usually analysed is an individual segment in the text, but using the co-text to bring out the meaning of that particular segment, as well as its contribution to the text. This is not an essential element of the approach, more a question of usual practice, but exceptions (e.g. Souesme, 1998) are extremely rare. This strongly affects the type of exercise students are required to do, particularly in competition examinations (concours) such as the CAPES and Agregation, which are competition examinations for the recruitment of secondary school teachers. In the linguistic component of these examinations, the candidate is presented with a text in which a number of items are underlined (e.g a determiner, an auxiliary verb, etc); the underlined items are those which are to be analysed. In principle this exercise is neutral and theory-free. The candidate can use the theoretical framework of his choice. In practice, the conception of the exercise itself and the items to be analysed are heavily influenced by the Theories de l’enonciation, concentrating on those features where this theory works well, and has significant things to say in relation to language or the interpretation of the text.
8. Grammar There has so far been little attempt to provide a complete university level grammar of English on enonciative principles, of the type and level that Downing and Locke (1992) or Morley (2000) attempt for Systemic Functional Linguistics. Souesme, 1992, while it may not be totally successful, is the only attempt to date to provide a
10
Original French: . . . elementarite et factualite vont souvent de pair, autrement dit que ce qui est rhematique dans le domaine des operations lÕest frequemment dans le domaine de lÕinformation. . . ce qui a ete traite par lÕesprit est souvent connu. . . (Lapaire and Rotge, 1992, p. 234; 1993, p. 301).
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grammar of this type. Other books dealing with grammatical questions (e.g. Lapaire and Rotge, 1991; Bouscaren and Chuquet, 1987; Bouscaren, 1991; Adamczewski and Delmas, 1982) treat a number of isolated problems, such as BE + ING (i.e. progressive aspect), the articles, the demonstratives ‘‘this’’ and ‘‘that’’, the distinction between the genitive (Õs) and related constructions with ‘‘of’’, etc. For example BouscarenÕs (1991) slim volume (130 pp.) has a short introduction followed by 20 sections dealing with the following subjects: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
The simple present The BE + ING present The preterite The BE + ING preterite The present perfect: HAVE -EN The present perfect + BE + ING The past perfect: HAD -EN Modality Shall, should, will, would Be going to Is to Have A note on the passive construction Nominal determination Quite Some notes on the infinitive and the gerundive Some note on relatives. The difference between the use of that and of who or which 18. ; and that after declarative verbs 19. Some notes on resultative constructions 20. Levels of utterance The much longer book by Lapaire and Rotge (1991), which weighs in at a hefty 734 pages, has, in addition to a theoretical introduction, three parts, the first of which deals with various markers (determiners, proforms, connectors, prepositons and adverbial units), and has sections on the following: This and that The articles ;, a and the Any Some From ever to every All It Then and There As and so And, or and but
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The second part, which deals with the verbal domain, has sections on: Simple assertion and the subject–predicate relationship BE + V-ING HAVE + V-EN Modals Lexical verb to auxiliary do And the final part, dealing with the complex sentence, has sections on: A syntactic and functional study of the complex sentence Elements in WH-/TH;/That Which/that Which/what Where/when I hope that these two examples give some idea of the range of subject matter covered in books of this type. As in the case of the exams mentioned above, it would seem that these books treat those areas of the grammar about which the theory has significant things to say, but this means that fairly large areas are not treated at all. As a result these books, while being interesting on the points they deal with, tend to have a piecemeal feel about them.
9. Form(alism) Linguistic theories fall into three main groups, the functional, the cognitive, and the formal. However, whichever group one works within, language is encoded in forms. Consequently, form must have some place in all linguistic theories. The difficulty with formalist approaches such as Generative Grammar (from a nonformalist point of view) is in the notion that language consists of nothing but form, or at least that form is the only thing worth considering. It is, however, perhaps possible to see some sort of link between Generative Grammar and the Theories de l’enonciation. Generative Grammar, even from its early stages, suggested that language was built up by operating transformations on a small number of kernel sentences (Chomsky, 1957, 1965). In the Theories de l’enonciation, particularly in its Adamczewskian form, basic forms are worked on by means of mental operations to produce language. More recently, Cotte (1998, 1999) has developed a theorie de la reelaboration. The reelaboration hypothesis posits that meaning is constructed over time and that its recent states retain a memory of its former states. It predicts that its
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various age constituents sometimes follow each other in the string, and it invites us to turn away from a superficial view of syntax (Cotte, 1998, p. 438). 11 Although transfered to a cognitive context, this notion of basic forms which are in some way modified to produce actual language does appear to bear some debt to the original transformational concept. This however poses the question of which forms are to be considered primary. Are there criteria by which these primary forms can be recognized? Or is it simply a question of intuition; are there some sort of linguistic primes, rather like mathematical primes, which we simply recognize as such? Systemic Functional Linguistics seems to take a different tack in that the concept of system treats alternative encodings as being forms which are simultaneously available to the speaker. It is not a question of one being derived from the other. One may be selected more frequently than another, but they exist in parallel. There may, however, be an area where the systemic approach is not so different. In some recent work, notably in discussions of grammatical metaphor (Halliday, 1988, 1994b, 1998; Halliday and Martin, 1993; Banks, 1996, 1999a), great play has been made of the notion of Ôcongruent formsÕ. Halliday (1994a) describes a congruent form as Ôthe less metaphorical variantÕ, while Thompson (1996) says that Ôthe term congruent can be informally glossed as ‘‘closer to the state of affairs in the external worldÕÕ Õ, which seems to have faint echoes of AdamczewskiÕs Phase 1. Consequently there is a tendancy to think of congruent forms as being more basic or primary. However, Halliday and Matthiessen admit that From a purely descriptive point of view, each version is metaphorical from the standpoint of the other; there is no inherent priority accorded to either (Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999, p. 537). This admission notwithstanding, they claim that congruent forms are prior from three points of view: phylogenetically, in the history of the language; ontogenetically, in the development of the individual; and logogenetically, in the development of text. I do not see how the phylogenetic priority squares with HallidayÕs claim that totally non-metaphoric texts occur only in the language of young children, which is presumably reflected in the ontogenetic priority. And even if logogenetic priority is the general rule, surely it is a tendency to which there are exceptions. Nevertheless, it would seem that there is general agreement on which forms are congruent, despite the difficulty of establishing criteria for congruency. I therefore feel that there are theoretical difficulties related to the concept of congruency as it is used in Systemic Functional Linguistics that have not yet been 11
Original French: LÕhypothese de la reelaboration suppose que le sense se construit dans le temps et que ses etats recents gardent la memoire des anciens. Elle prevoit donc que des constituants dÕ^age different se succedent parfois dans la cha^ıne et elle invite a se detourner dÕune vision superficielle de la syntaxe (Cotte, 1998, p. 438).
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worked out. On the other hand I feel, intuitively, that this notion is basically correct. What is interesting from the present point of view, is that insofar as the notion of congruency suggests that there are basic forms and derived forms, this might supply us with a further point of contact with the Theories de l’enonciation, where the notion is common that some language forms are produced by mental operations carried out on more basic linguistic forms.
10. Closing remarks In this short paper I have tried to show that Systemic Functional Linguistics and the Theories de l’enonciation are travelling towards each other from opposite directions, but whereas Systemic Functional Linguistics is an inductive method of enquiry, the Theories de l’enonciation are deductive. This places Systemic Functional Linguistics in a Lockean empirical tradition, and the Theories de l’enonciation in the cartesian tradition. The Theories de l’enonciation do not conform to the Principle of Falsification and consequently their findings are of a hypothetical, not axiomatic nature. This in no way obviates their interest, but it is important to recognize their true nature. The fact that the findings of the Theories de l’enonciation are hypotheses that cannot be falsified places them in the metaphysical rather than a physical field. The concept of domains, as developed by Delmas, parallels fairly closely that of semantic metafunctions in systemic theory. This constitutes a strong point of contact between these theories. Two of the three domains are virtually the same as the corresponding metafunctions, while the third deals from a cognitive viewpoint matters which Systemic Functional Linguistics treats from a functional point of view. The systemic version of thematic and information structure is one that could be beneficially integrated into the Theories de l’enonciation without too much difficulty. Distinguishing between thematic structure and information structure would avoid many of the problems caused by the fused approach which is commonly used, but not essential to, the Theories de l’enonciation. Both approaches analyse texts extensively, but in different ways. Systemic Functional Lingusitics analyses whole, or at least large stretches of text, whereas the Theories de l’enonciation usually analyse single constituents within a co-text. The Theories de l’enonciation tend to concentrate on specific grammatical questions rather than the grammar as a whole. Once again this is a question of current general practice, not an essential element of the theory, so it is not too difficult to see future developments extending towards a more complete grammar of English. Both approaches face a potential theoretical problem concerning the criteria for distinguishing a basic form from which other forms are derived. In the case of Systemic Functional Linguistics the problem relates to the criteria for distinguishing congruent forms. The problems faced by each of these theories in this area seem to be of the same type. It is my contention that these very different approaches have a number of points of contact and meaningful differences which could be investigated with mutual
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