Anticipating the future: ‘Biotechnology for the poor’ as unrealized promise?

Futures 41 (2009) 436–445

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Anticipating the future: ‘Biotechnology for the poor’ as unrealized promise? Kees Jansen a,*, Aarti Gupta b a b

Technology and Agrarian Development Group, Wageningen University, P.O. Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, The Netherlands Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University, P.O. Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, The Netherlands

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Article history:

This article analyses visions of the future articulated by proponents of ‘biotechnology for the poor’, those who claim that an embrace of transgenic technology in agriculture is critical to alleviating poverty in developing countries. Specifically, we analyse how such ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents represent a future with or without transgenic crops. Such representations include visions of a beckoning (promising) future, where much is to be gained from an embrace of transgenic technology in agriculture, and an onrushing (threatening) future, where much will be lost if the technology is not embraced. The article shows that claims about a beckoning or onrushing future by ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents are based upon unexamined or problematic assumptions about the poor and poverty. As such, poverty becomes merely a moral backdrop against which visions of a future are articulated. Furthermore, ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings do not engage in dialogue with alternative voices in articulating their perspectives on the future, losing a key opportunity to democratize debate about this crucial issue. We conclude by considering the policy consequences (in regulatory and institutional terms) of ‘biotechnology for the poor’ depictions of the future, particularly for the global South where such consequences will be felt. ß 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Available online 5 February 2009

1. Introduction In conflicts over genetic modification of food and feed crops, imageries of the future form a basic discursive arena for contrasting narratives about benefits and threats of modern biotechnology. With the future of one of the key technologies of the modern period at stake, the fate of the poor in developing countries has been introduced into the heart of the debate. The poor appear to be passive subjects drawn into the controversies between the USA and Europe (about Europe’s moratorium on the approval of genetically modified organisms), and between the pro- and anti-biotechnology advocacy groups. In referring to the potential role for transgenic crops to fight hunger and famine in Africa, United States (US) President George Bush, for example, stated that, ‘‘For the sake of a continent threatened by famine, I urge the European governments to end their opposition to biotechnology. We should encourage the spread of safe, effective biotechnology to win the fight against global hunger’’ [1]. This call was made in the context of the ongoing confrontation between the US and the European Union (EU) about the reluctance of the EU to open its markets to

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 317 484097; fax: +31 317 485616. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (K. Jansen), [email protected] (A. Gupta). 0016-3287/$ – see front matter ß 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2009.01.008

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transgenic crops from the US. This reason for invoking the poor needs to be distinguished from the public relations (PR)-oriented activities of the private sector engaged in development of transgenic crops. This, again, needs to be distinguished from the perspectives of those working in the public sector and their supporters, who seek to explicitly tailor biotechnology programmes towards the needs of the poor. It is this latter set of writings that interests us here. Since the late 1990s, a growing stream of publications has discussed how biotechnology programmes can target the needs of the poor in developing countries (characterized in the remainder of this article as ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents). These writings, and their authors, consciously position themselves as being outside what they proclaim to be the sterile and unproductive pro- versus anti-biotechnology debates (for a discussion of these two sides, see Stone [2]). Such biotechnology for the poor proponents include representatives of international agricultural research centres with a mandate to develop new crops and technologies that will alleviate poverty [3–5], policy researchers at international centres [6–8], representatives of agencies funding agricultural research in developing countries [9–11], multilateral organizations or their consultants [12–16], academics, often linked to the international centres of agricultural research [17–30], advisory councils on bioethics [31], and independent consultants [32]. These authors and institutions play key roles in setting the agenda of international agricultural research for developing countries. A key demand made by biotechnology for the poor proponents is an increase in public sector research funding for transgenic crops. Many of these writings present a defence of the public good, suggesting that public research will provide different transgenic technologies (e.g. other crops and other traits) from those generated by private research (e.g. [6–9,20–22]). Before scarce public funds are given over to transgenic crop development, however, much more clarity is needed about the conditions under which transgenic crops – even those that are publicly funded and oriented to the poor – contribute to poverty alleviation, and the prospects that such conditions can be realized, in the short and long term. Much hangs in the balance, therefore, in how competing visions of a future with or without transgenics are constructed by biotechnology for the poor proponents and the premises about the poor and poverty that underlie such visions. In this article, we analyse how biotechnology for the poor proponents construct a particular vision of the future and how they characterize current barriers to realizing that future. Sections 2 and 3 below explore the notions of a beckoning (promising) versus an onrushing (threatening) future as discernible in biotechnology for the poor writings. We also highlight here how biotechnology for the poor proponents frame the problems of regulatory voids and capacity building in developing countries in articulating their visions of the future. The following section examines assumptions about the poor and poverty that underpin biotechnology for the poor writings. In concluding, we consider the extent to which ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings engage in dialogue with alternative views in constructing their visions of the future, and the consequences for policy and institutional directions in the South. 2. Anticipating the future: beckoning and onrushing futures In considering how biotechnology for the poor proponents depict a future with or without transgenics, we rely on a concept introduced by de Wilde [33], the ‘future industry’. de Wilde uses the notion of a future industry to identify voices that project an optimistic future based on new technology without learning from the past. According to de Wilde, statements about a better future will incite people to invest in new activities. In Disney’s terms: Optimism sells! In a future oriented culture, discontinuity is highly valued relative to continuity. de Wilde identifies two important metaphors used by the future industry: the ‘beckoning future’ and the ‘onrushing future’. The beckoning future, according to de Wilde, describes a new era with positive changes and a better life. The futurists do not negate possible risks but argue that those who are willing to take these risks will be rewarded. The prophesy conditions: society will only benefit if it behaves according to the prophecy. Beckoning futures tend to emphasize autonomy and realization of the benevolent future if external constraints can be reduced. New technologies create a larger freedom of action in this perspective. The past controlled us but we will increasingly control the future, is the message of the beckoning future. Where futurists use the beckoning future as a carrot, they also make use of a stick: the onrushing future. This metaphor tells us that our current world leaves little choice. If nothing changes, people are doomed to suffer. Whereas the beckoning future is like a road to an enticing new country, this is the other way around. We are not moving to the future, but the future approaches us. The onrushing future is almost a permanent menace. The future is in a hurry. There is no time for fundamental questions. If we wait too long before acting according to the prophecies, the future will overrule us with new disasters. The onrushing future recognizes only one apposite answer: collaboration. Resistance is impossible (and in our case morally reprehensible: one cannot be in favour of hunger and poverty). The onrushing future uses the language of winning or losing. It teaches us that we have to ensure that we are among the first to join the future. If not, domination by others will be the result. Given that biotechnology for the poor is, even in the view of its proponents, still a largely unrealized promise, how do its proponents view the future? This question is considered next, drawing on de Wilde’s notions of the future industry and beckoning and onrushing futures.

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3. Biotechnology for the poor: visions of the future and their consequences 3.1. Visions of the future: continuity versus discontinuity Drawing on de Wilde’s analysis, we begin by examining the extent to which ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents value discontinuity relative to continuity, a key characteristic of the ‘future industry’.1 In many biotechnology for the poor writings, discontinuity appears to be more highly valued than continuity. This is reflected in the notion that existing knowledge evolution and improvement of agricultural practice will be insufficient to provide the required growth of production to keep up with the world’s demographic growth. A radical new path has to be followed. de Janvry et al. [12], for example, talk about the ‘biotechnological revolution’ thus emphasizing the discontinuity with the past. As they state, ‘‘Since the growth rate in yields achieved with traditional plant breeding and agronomic practices has been declining, the next phase of yield increases in agriculture will likely have to rely importantly on the new scientific advances offered by biotechnology’’ ([12], p. 1). Conway [9] announces his desired Doubly Green Revolution, a replica of the Green Revolution with regard to introduction of new technologies that increase productivity, but now taking into account diversity of circumstances (adapted to African agro-ecological diversity) as well as environmental sustainability. As he puts it, ‘‘There are four sub-revolutions I see as necessary bases for the coming Green Revolution in Africa’’ ([9], p. 7). Characteristic of such a framing is the creation of a discourse of revolutionary progress. Not all biotechnology for the poor writings foresee that a fast, revolutionary type of change will result from new technologies, however. The Nuffield Council [31] sketches an institutional stickiness that constrains social change. Biotechnology, in this context, will only be able to make small, but sometimes crucial, steps forward. As the report states ([31], p. xiii): ‘‘Food insecurity prevails, even in developing countries with food surpluses. One proposed solution, the redistribution of surpluses among and within countries poses serious practical and political challenges. Food aid programmes and efforts towards land reform have achieved much and should continue. However, improving the productivity of small farms is by far the best means of achieving a substantial reduction of food insecurity and poverty. Many people are poor, and therefore hungry, because they can neither produce enough food on their small farms, nor obtain enough employment by working on those of others. Enhancement of yields on small farms tends to increase the demand and hence rewards for poor labourers.’’ The Nuffield Council assumes that, due to institutional, political, and practical constraints, it is difficult to redistribute surpluses and means of production, but that there are fewer constraints to making biotechnological applications available. Hence, while the Nuffield Council seems aware of structural conditions of inequality, and stays away from revolutionary claims more so than most other ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings, it separates the discussion of the potential of new technology from such structural issues. Although it supports a more equitable distribution of land, a lowering of trade barriers to imports from poor countries, and reduction of farm subsidies in developed countries, it states that ‘‘(..) history suggests that these situations will improve only slowly. Moreover, even changes in global trading rules will do little to help the many very poor farmers in developing countries, especially those in Africa, who are in substantial food deficit. (..) We conclude that resuming and spreading rapid sustainable growth of farm yields [through the application of biotechnology], especially for food crops in developing countries, still remains crucial to achieving better income and food security for the world’s poor.’’ ([31], p. 16) History is used here as evidence to indicate that unequal trade will not change rapidly. This narrative thus proposes interim, technological solutions as an alternative to the larger project of working on structural change in global trade. Similar combinations of a nuanced view on the complexity of change combined with a defence of interim technological solutions can be found in Bouis [17], who argues that the long-term sustainable solution to micronutrient malnutrition is substantial dietary improvement via higher consumption of (expensive) non-staple foods, which at the moment the poor cannot afford. For the time being, then, nutrient-enriched staple food (Golden Rice) is presented as the solution.2 In sum, whether revolutionary change is feasible or not, an embrace of transgenics is seen as a necessary break from past practices in many biotechnology for the poor writings.

1 Biotechnology is regularly defended with the argument that it is nothing new. In this sense, there is an element of underlining continuity. Humankind has always changed natural processes since it started to brew beer. This is a counter-claim made against the opposition to biotechnology which considers genetic modification as unnatural and therefore unwanted. It is noteworthy, however, that in ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings, this discussion is hardly referred to (except for Herring [29]). 2 Elsewhere in the article, Bouis [17] states that it will take years before an nutrient-enriched rice appears on the market and decades (and several other conditions) before biotechnology will make an important contribution to reducing malnutrition.

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3.2. Biotechnology for the poor: a beckoning versus an onrushing future Although most biotechnology for the poor narratives highlight that transgenic crops have the potential to reduce hunger and alleviate poverty, they abstain from sketching a new paradise. This indicates that the metaphor of the onrushing future is more prominent in such writings than the metaphor of the beckoning future.3 Some elements of the beckoning future are present, such as the emphasis on autonomy, i.e. on the free choice of farmers and the creation of freedom for innovative biotechnology research. However, the onrushing future seems to be a metaphor that more accurately reflects biotechnology for the poor narratives. This metaphor, present in many biotechnology for the poor writings, contains the message instead that we are running out of time. If we wait to act, the future will overrule us with new disasters, such as lower growth rates in agricultural production, more hunger, more poverty, and more inequality. A key message of the onrushing future is that we cannot afford to postpone action. As Atanassov et al. ([6], p. 39) put it, ‘‘Delays [in evaluating and advancing once proven technologies] can mean rising costs, lack of impact at the rural level, regulatory requirements in need of clarification, and more direct accountability. Such concerns are emerging issues in developing countries. The combined effect is delayed impact and uncertainty of the technologies, both of which are used by biotechnology’s detractors nationally and internationally’’. The implicit message is that we have to act now, since delays in technology assessment and regulation will strengthen opposition to GMOs. Taking time to carefully explore the risks of the technology increases uncertainty and may lead to possible failure. As Atanassov et al. ([6], p. 38) emphasize, proper regulation should be put in place as soon as possible since ‘‘the longer the waiting period the more likely the trait and or germplasm becomes ineffective as disease pressure change and more productive varieties are released’’ (see Lipton [22], for a similar argument).4 Postponement of action may cause social disorder and promote illegal behaviour. Delmer, for example, states that ‘‘(..) if governments, as was the case in Brazil with Roundup Ready soybean, delay approval of a GM crop that farmers clearly want, the farmers often find a way to get it illegally, compromising both the quality of seed available, the viability of the private seed sector, and the ability of the government to provide adequate regulation’’ ([11], p. 15743; see also [30]). Postponement of action may also, according to such a view, further weaken the position of poorer farmers in developing countries. The Nuffield Council states: ‘‘The use of Bt cotton and other GM crops is likely to become more widespread in developed countries. Any lowering of production costs for GM cotton growers is likely to lead to an increase in the global supply of cotton and probably, in the short term, to lower cotton prices. Those farmers who use non-GM varieties would face sharply reduced net income per unit of output. There is also the possibility of losing markets. It is therefore of crucial importance that developing countries have the opportunity to use high-yielding crops to allow their exports to compete on the world markets. Failure to develop the capacity to use GM crops safely may result in increasing the gap between the wealthy and the poor even further.’’ ([31], p. 50) In this quote, it is not the paradise that is calling (the beckoning future in which GM crops will end hunger) but the onrushing future. Transgenic crops are no longer the simple road to higher farm incomes because of increased and more stable yields, something proclaimed elsewhere in the Nuffield Council report. In this quote, the poor are seen to be worse off when transgenic crop spread in wealthier countries and they can do nothing else but jump on the band-wagon. Only then will the future not turn against them. This is the language of winning and losing via the onrushing future. Within this language of winning and losing, the market is naturalized, with little acknowledgement of how competition in markets is socially shaped (for a similar argument, see also Levidow [34]). 3.3. Barriers to realizing the desired future: lack of regulation and regulatory capacity In articulating their visions of the future, biotechnology for the poor proponents place central emphasis on the need for rapid action to develop biotechnology and biosafety regulation. Biotechnology for the poor narratives warn governments to regulate in harmony with the onrushing future, given that any delay to do so will have negative consequences. Importantly, the make-up of the future rests in the power of regulation (‘‘Failure to develop the capacity to use GM crops safely may. . .’’). ‘Biotechnology for the poor’ writings call for regulatory frameworks for intellectual property rights (e.g. [24]), and biosafety (e.g. [19]). Although the idea that biosafety regulation will guarantee higher levels of safe use of transgenics is discussed, much more emphasis (e.g. expressed in length of text) is placed on the notion that the absence of regulatory frameworks is a major constraint to further investment in biotechnological research. Promotional regulation appears then to be the appropriate kind of regulation. For example, Atanassov et al. [6] argue that many inventions are waiting on the shelf to be scaled-up in larger field trials and to be commercialized, but that they require

3 de Wilde ([33], p. 90) emphasizes that the distinction between the metaphors of a beckoning and onrushing future is analytical. Authors may combine the metaphors smoothly and change casually from one metaphor to another. 4 Additionally, if this would be true one could interpret this point as a counter-argument against the transformation events, the GMOs, which they see as crucial for addressing poverty. More productive varieties appear without biotechnology and disease pressure changes so rapidly that the invented technology would not be necessary after all.

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well-defined regulations for product testing, as well as partnerships with private companies to do these larger tests. Typically, when they discuss the need for regulation, most biotechnology for the poor writings assume that investment in and use of biotechnology will increase when regulatory systems have been put to work. Once a proper biosafety regulatory regime is in place, the right technology innovation will be fostered (cf. [5,19]). The focus on promotional regulation does not mean that biotechnology for the poor writings evade the topic of risk, i.e. possible damage to the environment due to introduction of transgenics. Even here, however, a shared narrative trajectory can be identified, one that moves from (potential) benefits of biotechnology, to a discussion of risks, and from there, to identifying what is seen as the biggest challenge facing biotechnology in developing countries: a lack of appropriate regulation and regulatory capacity. As stated by UNDP ([15], p. 66), ‘‘most developing countries are at a disadvantage in the face of technological change because they lack the regulatory institutions needed to manage risks’’ (see also [5,23]). According to this view, possible harms to human health and the environment call for appropriate regulatory policies and procedures, for which capacity has to be built (more trained personnel, improved communication, harmonized standards, increased transparency). This inevitably raises the question of what constitutes ‘proper’ or appropriate regulation (precautionary? scientifically sound? case by case?) Most ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents do not distinguish between wanted and unwanted modifications in emphasizing the need for biosafety regulations. One major exception is the Nuffield Council [31] which explicitly states that the costs, benefits and risks of GMOs have to be assessed on a case by case basis. Risky GMOs will then be filtered out and benign technologies approved and adopted (see also [27]). Thies and Devare put it as follows ([27], p. 121): ‘‘Gene flow, resistance management and soil ecology issues, among others, warrant caution and long-term monitoring in the field. We conclude that while there is a reason to be optimistic about the potential for transgenic crops technologies to be beneficial in low-income agriculture, there is also an imperative to exert the highest scientific and regulatory standards possible to ensure negligible long-term ecological effects of deploying transgenic crops.’’ Such a view calls, at least, for technical study of potential environmental harm. This does not necessarily go hand in hand, however, with suggestions that an increased capacity to assess transgenics in the context of local ecosystems could lead to higher levels of precaution. The general notion is that developing countries need more capacity to assess biosafety risks, so that field testing of transgenic crops and trade not be hampered [15,19,31]. Reference to risk is used to argue for more investment in developing expertise and capacity, though little is said about how this should be done (e.g. whether this might mean that one needs to train more ecologists to study possible harm to the environment). Biotechnology for the poor proponents support capacity building in the field of regulation to promote development and deployment of transgenics. In sum, many ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings start with an expose´ of the (potential) benefits of biotechnology, either in general or relating to a specific biotechnology such as Golden Rice (e.g. [17,26]). Thereafter, the initial optimism is tempered by suggestions that the potential is not always realized. Among the reasons mentioned are a lack of interest by the industry [4], regulatory delays and costs [22], lack of regulatory frameworks [15], lack of proper intellectual property regimes [18], and lack of research capacity [24]. As stated by Stein et al. ([26], p. 155): ‘‘If development and dissemination of the technology [of Golden Rice] are not supported, the impacts will be relatively low’’. The thrust of the argument is that the technology to solve problems of the poor is present or in the research pipeline, it only needs adequate policy support in order to be realized. In many biotechnology for the poor writings, the discourse shifts to capacity building and regulation when lack of the technology’s success and the constraints resulting from conditions of underdevelopment have to be confronted. How capacity building and regulation might, in turn, be constrained by the very institutional failures that it seeks to address (on this point, see for e.g. [35]) is not adequately acknowledged by ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents. 4. Anticipating the future: poverty as moral platform The biotechnology for the poor vision of the future imagines the alleviation of poverty if transgenics get a chance to realize their potential. A premise of biotechnology for the poor writings is that a direct relationship exists between technology and the reduction of poverty, that simple availability of new technology will improve the situation of the rural poor. The evidence most often offered to support this is that smallholders profit from current introductions of herbicide-resistant soybean or insect-resistant (Bt) cotton. The most-oft cited examples of smallholders using transgenics are to Bt cotton in China, India, and South Africa (e.g. [36] for a recent assessment; also [20]). Even leaving aside contested ongoing debates over whether or not smallholders in these countries have benefited from growing Bt cotton or not, these examples of trickling down of technologies designed for larger farmers elsewhere are quite specific, and ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings do not generally discuss to what extent they are reproducible. Such analyses would also have to consider possible interactions between technical change and social change, such as social differentiation, whereby peasant farmers may be pushed out of agriculture, very often to become migrant labour (see e.g. [37]). This suggests that the impact of the introduction of transgenic crops is not predictable in universal terms and cannot be assumed in advance (see on this point Glover [38]). It also highlights that both poverty and the introduction of new technology has to be analysed in the context of dynamic social relationships.

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Instead of using such a relational and contextualized view of poverty, one of the most widespread ways in which ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings do address the poor and poverty is by listing problems that poor farmers confront, to which transgenic crops may offer a solution. For example, Thies and Devare [27] review the work on insect-resistant and herbicide-resistant crops, drought resistance and other abiotic stresses, nutrient-enriched food, toxicity elimination in food, production of pharmaceuticals and vaccines using transgenics, and so on. Invariably, such discussions make references to how farmers or the population in general will benefit from higher yields, reduced labour costs, zero-till practices, and healthier food (see also [13]). In many cases, realized (insect-resistant crops and herbicide-resistant crops) and as yet unrealized applications (most other traits) are treated together in the discussion. A key aim of such narratives is to highlight unrealized technological progress. This is not necessarily accompanied by detailed consideration of how specific biotechnologies can alleviate concrete cases of poverty. Instead, we have a piecemeal construction of benefits without clues provided about how these may reach the poor under current conditions. This ignores the critical literature that discusses transgenic crops in the context of a world in which hunger and poverty are rooted in inequality and lack of access to (readily available) food (e.g. [39,40]). ‘Poverty’ then risks becoming no more than the stage on which moral assertions about the present and future value of biotechnology are made. There are some ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents who present a more nuanced set of arguments, which do engage with classical debates in the field of development studies. In particular, these writings acknowledge the more structural roots of poverty. The most elaborate arguments are given by de Janvry et al. [12], the Nuffield Council [31], Conway [9], and Lipton [22]. In his earlier work [41], de Janvry addresses how processes of agrarian modernization, such as the Green Revolution, were interrelated with the political economy of agrarian structures. In an article on biotechnology for the poor [12], however, this interrelationship gets a particular shape. The authors distinguish two phases of the Green Revolution, before and after 1975, with backlash effects in the first phase but with a second phase in which benefits of the Green Revolution were extended to small farmers. With this, the backlash effects of the Green Revolution on non-adopting poor farmers is locked into the past. The narrative then moves smoothly from the Green Revolution to biotechnology, stating that ‘‘The quest for traits additional to yield, in particular traits desirable for poor farmers and improved natural resource management, was thus the trademark of the second phase of the Green Revolution. As a consequence, direct effects on poverty reduction were significantly enhanced’’ ([12], p. 9). The paper does identify some possible risks for poor people, such as labour replacing transgenic crops (see also [22]) and describes a range of problems regarding knowledge appropriation by private actors. But the concept of two phases of the Green Revolution appears to serve a discursive purpose: the concerns about social differentiation within the farming population are a thing of the past. Similarly, Conway [9] observes two phases: the growing inequality in the first phase of the Green Revolution in India and China, with a second phase when pro-poor policies helped resource-poor farmers to benefit from new technologies. The narrative suggests that after the early days of the Green Revolution the question about whether the introduction of a new technology in a particular configuration may endanger the livelihoods of some farmers (while benefiting other farmers) has become out-dated. This discussion of phases has as a consequence that questions about unequal development among farmers are pushed to the background. This permits the generalized claim often encountered in biotechnology for the poor narratives that if a farmer benefits from a transgenic crop somewhere, all farmers, including the poor, will benefit from it. The implicit message is that developing new technologies and setting research agendas can be uncoupled from issues of structural inequality, unequal distribution of resources among farming populations, and institutional failure. The explicit message is that well-designed technological innovations that build on awareness about potential socio-economic risks and propoor research priorities (and changed incentive structures for public and private sector research) will reduce poverty. Yet how or why this might be feasible, and the fact that such conditions do not obtain, is never fully addressed (for a similar argument, see also Newell [42]). Such a move permits the visions of the future articulated by biotechnology for the poor proponents. However, not everybody accepts these future narratives. The next section discusses how biotechnology for the poor proponents engage (or do not engage) with critical voices speaking out against the prospects of a biotechnology for the poor. 5. Anticipating the future and pro-poor biotechnology: lack of dialogicality In constructing visions of the future, how do biotechnology for the poor writings engage with alternative voices? Views about technology and its interaction with social, economic, political, and cultural futures constitute a shared field of interest between development studies, science and technology studies, and futures studies [43–46]. Within this research field, a key issue is how particular technologies and the problems that technology is meant to solve are framed and by whom [47–53]. Such writings consider questions such as who is considered a legitimate voice and the extent to which different voices are treated symmetrically. In reflecting upon this, our point of departure here is the move made by biotechnology for the poor proponents to position themselves as outside the heated debate between proponents and opponents of biotechnology, as offering a more balanced middle way (e.g. [9–11,31]). Yet, a closer reading suggests that the construction of a self-asserted ‘balanced position’ goes together with a reluctance to enter into a dialogue with other voices. Most ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings list benefits of transgenics in developing countries without dealing substantially with counter arguments. For example, Delmer writes

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‘‘[Pro versus anti-] arguments are not the focus of this article, except to say that most reasonable people understand that the truth lies somewhere between these extremes. (..) Whatever one’s opinion on these issues, there seems to be little doubt that the endless, and often shrill, GM debate has limited the development of crops that could be very relevant to poor farmers by reducing the number of donors willing to support such efforts, raising concerns over liability in companies considering the provision of their technologies for use in public-sector projects and creating confusion and uncertainty about whether to allow even simple testing of the efficacy of new transgenic crops in developing world countries.’’ ([11], p. 15742) This appears to be a characteristic twist in many ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings. Delmer states that one has to recognize that every new technology can have its downsides and that transgenic crops are only one of many approaches available to solve world hunger. The reasonable author thus distances him or herself from extreme positions. Biotechnology critics are in fact framed as unreasonable. The next step in the argument then moves to the debate itself. The debate about new technologies becomes the cause of the problem and, in fact, constrains the targeted development of biotechnology which could be beneficial for the poor. In this way, the ‘biotechnology for the poor’ position, as far as we have encountered it, always turns out to become a pro-biotech position. Conway [10], for example, considers the debate over the safety and environmental impacts of biotechnology as a major obstacle in its potential to eradicate hunger. As he puts it, ‘‘[the international debate about biotechnology] is a bit like a game of American volleyball among large institutional interests in which the debate over new farming technologies goes back and forth with each side responding for fear that the ball will drop on their side of the net and they will lose a point. But this is not a game – literally billions of lives are at stake – and the idea that it is all about not losing any debating points effectively rules out the idea of a useful dialogue’’ ([10], p. 5). Remarkably, the debate itself is not seen as part of a dialogue. Conway [9] dislikes the either/or nature of this volleyball game and defends an alternative both/and view: both biotechnology and other means to address hunger and poverty. The sub-text is that Conway places himself outside the game, discrediting other voices as not more than representations of institutional interests (see also [16,22,29]). Only very few ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings really seem to engage with objections to transgenics in developing countries. The Nuffield Council paper starts in Section 1 with a section on possible benefits and a section on possible risks posed by transgenic technology. The possible benefits are prudently introduced – ‘‘GM crops might offer advantages’’ (p. 5) – and in a later chapter on ‘Current and Potential Uses of GM Crops in Developing Countries’ more boldly presented. The possible risks are also prudently introduced, but more strongly presented as views of others: ‘Some commentators take the view that’, ‘critics argue that’, ‘critics point to the risk of’ and ‘There are those who fear that’. One recurrent element in several writings is simply blaming anti-GMO positions for obstructing the development of biotechnology and thus its applications in solving hunger and alleviating poverty. Nobel prize winner Borlaug [28] makes a parallel, for example, between ‘‘the emotional anti-GMO campaign’’ and ‘‘the period, primarily during the time of Stalin, when Lysenko dominated agriculture in the former Soviet Union. With his brand of ideologically based pseudo-science, Lysenko had some of the Soviet Union’s best plant scientists banished, imprisoned, and even killed’’ ([28], p. 77). Atanassov et al. ([6], p. 39) choose simply to call oppositional voices ‘detractors’ without saying more about their views. Lipton ([22], p. 41) refers to ‘‘a tiring, boring struggle against pseudo-environmentalist PR and scientific ignorance’’ but does not indicate who or what arguments he is writing about. The message is that with emotional, unscientific, or ideological voices, there is no need to enter into a rational discussion. A consequence of this position is that normative aspects become labelled as irrational, thus ruling them out from reasoned debate. This is exemplified in the quote from Cohen and Paarlberg ([19], p. 1569) below, who are writing about Argentina: ‘‘The latter part of 1998, however, an abrupt turnaround in public opinion occurred. Highly negative articles began to appear in newspapers, magazines, and on TV. Their inflammatory messages duplicated the more radical arguments seen and heard in Europe, India, and elsewhere. Lack of understanding in the media confused the public; many people came to believe that plots and corruption taint biotechnology products. The timing and strength of this anti-biotech media campaign caught the biotechnology community unprepared. Months passed before biotechnology proponents began to mount a public response. While the response was limited to newspaper and television interviews and publication of general articles, there is general agreement that not enough information is being distributed to counteract the misinformation.’’ Negative articles are labelled here as ‘inflammatory’ and containing only ‘misinformation’ even as no further information is provided to the reader about the authors or contents of these articles. Quite subtly, the other voices are depicted as unfair: they ‘‘caught the biotechnology community unprepared’’. This quote illustrates a notion that often goes together with blaming other voices: the so-called deficit model of public understanding [54]. In this notion, public rejection of science is a consequence of public ignorance of science. Due to a lack of proper information, the public can be misled by detractors. The only proper response is to distribute more information to remove the ‘deficit in knowledge’ (for a critique of this notion, see also Gupta [55]). This combination of blaming anti-GMO voices, rejecting them as serious interlocutors, and the deficit model of public understanding of science is also present in the following quote from within the FAO system:

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‘‘Some of these achievements [in plant transgenics and genomics] have been acclaimed by end-users whereas other accomplishments, e.g. release of genetically modified organisms (GMO), are being attacked, not only in words but also in deeds, by political activists. Some of these educated middle-class campaigners are expressing in this way their rampant ‘eco-paranoia’, while others hide their real agenda to manipulate the fashionable ecological movement. This controversy has attracted the attention of non-scientific partisans to each side. There have been negative comments about transgenic plants by a crown prince and contrasting positive comments by a former president, both of whom may not have the required technical knowledge to assess the potential of biotechnology for crop improvement.’’ ([14], p. 7). In this quotation, the blaming draws another important boundary. It suggests that anti-GMO activism is partly driven by hidden interests. This assertion can be found in several other papers, although sometimes formulated in a very careful way: ‘‘We are sceptical about claims from individuals or organizations who found their arguments on political convictions rather than scientific evidence’’ ([31], p. xviii). Based on these observations, we conclude that ‘biotechnology for the poor’ perspectives often contain little ‘dialogicality’, a term introduced by Fairclough [56] to denote dialogical relations between the voice of the author (pro-biotechnology) and other voices, here anti-GMO activists. Instead, such writings are characterized by ‘non-attributed intertextuality’, i.e. they do not tell the reader what the voices of the critical GMO positions say or who they are or what they do (generally anti-biotech assertions are not attributed to specific individuals or groups in concrete social struggles addressing real concerns). Nevertheless, the anti-GMO position is assumed to be there and is represented in these writings (mainly as negative about technology, negative about progress, negative about change, resistant to taking risks, etc.). In line with Fairclough ([56], p. 61) we argue that such a reduction of dialogicality is an attempt to universalize a particular representation of the role of biotechnology. Biotechnology for the poor positions that do mention (rather than discuss) criticisms of current GMO introductions tend to locate the sources of such criticism almost entirely in Europe. A picture is sketched in which Europe is the centre of concern about biotechnology (this concern is either delegitimized as emotional and unscientific, or labelled as acceptable for Europe, but something which should not hinder use of biotechnology by developing country farmers). Paarlberg [23], for example, reduces Brazilian opposition to introduction of transgenic crops as a concern induced by the international organization Greenpeace. This picture is at variance with analyses of several Brazilian scholars, who locate emergence of opposition towards transgenic crops in the historical struggle for autonomous farmers’ communities in the country. In this struggle, networks of different social actors in Brazil supported farmers’ access to seed and other technologies in the face of expanding corporate control over agriculture [57,58]. In a rather similar style, African opposition to GMOs in food aid has been ridiculed [28]. While oppositional voices tend to be turned into European voices, pro-biotech voices or actions by farmers tend to be turned into ‘local’ or ‘developing country’ voices. There is a tendency to elevate African voices defending biotechnology, or farmers’ use of transgenic crops in India, China or South Africa, as the real local choices/voices, while opposition to transgenics is painted as foreign and influenced (e.g. [15]). 6. Conclusions This paper has examined visions of the future embraced by ‘biotechnology for the poor’ proponents, most of whom construct a ‘‘positive causal relationship between the new technology and the realization of an already existing value’’ ([33], p. 70), i.e. eradicating poverty. Even as poverty forms the moral backdrop for claims about the future, the relational character of poverty remains underexplored. The outcome is a renewed technological optimism: the basis of addressing poverty is new technology (and not redistribution or shifts in power). In many of these writings, biotechnology gets its essential characteristics and value outside humans and human relationships, and is thus mostly not viewed and assessed as a societal product. In embracing visions of a sometimes beckoning but largely onrushing future, the urgent need of the hour for biotechnology for the poor proponents becomes (and remains confined to) greater public sector investment in biotechnology, capacity building, and appropriate (i.e. promotional) biosafety regulations, particularly in the South. As we have argued above, this ignores structural constraints to poverty alleviation within which particular futures will have to be realized. Finally, the construction of a self-declared reasonable position in the pro- versus anti-biotechnology debate serves to constrain dialogue between different voices instead of improving it. This can have concrete consequences for policy choices, particularly in the South. Some recent high-level policy proclamations about the global food crisis, for example, assign an important role to transgenic crops to mitigate soaring food and feed prices (see, for e.g. [59]). Such a context makes it vital that ‘biotechnology for the poor’ writings and their articulations of the future do not become a leverage point for fading out critical voices. Engagement with different voices may, instead, be essential to rethinking the future promise and threats posed by embrace of new technologies. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Dominic Glover and Frank Biermann for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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