Are personality effects upon average mood due to personality effects upon mood variation?

Person. in&i
ARE

PERSONALITY

DUE

0191.8869/93 $5.00 + 0.00 Copyright c 1992 Pergamon Press Ltd

EFFECTS

TO PERSONALITY

UPON

EFFECTS

AVERAGE UPON

MOOD

MOOD

VARIATION? D. G. WILLIAMS Psychology

Group,

University

of Sussex, Arts Building,

Falmer,

Brighton

BNl

9QN, England

(Received 21 November 1991; received for publication 29 May 1992) Summary-This article examines the sufficiency of the ‘reactive’ model in which an association between extraversion and greater variation into positive mood explains the better average mood of extraverts, and an association between neuroticism and greater variation into negative mood explains the poorer mood of high neuroticism scorers. Using the Mood Survey, this study with 127 men and 135 women found that extraversion was associated with characteristically better mood (on a happy-sad continuum), but was not linked with mood reactivity (the frequency and intensity of mood changes) when other influences were controlled. Neuroticism was associated with both characteristically poorer mood and greater mood reactivity. The reactive model is correct only in that neuroticism predisposes to negative mood reactions. It does not account for personality differences in mood averages that remain when mood variation is controlled.

of the major dispositions of personality, extraversion and neuroticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), are known to be associated with effects upon moods (or affects) but the precise pattern of these effects and the mechanisms behind them are still to be agreed. In a landmark paper Costa and McCrae (1980) assessed positive and negative affect, defined in broad terms by the Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn, 1969), and found neuroticism was correlated with negative but not positive affect, whereas extraversion was correlated with positive but not negative affect. These results indicated a plausible causal model, that neuroticism has a special role in increasing the characteristic levels of negative affects and extraversion a special role in increasing positive affects, but an implausible descriptive model of the surface relationships that appear as a consequence of the underlying causal processes. It seemed as if something which increased the level of positive affect had no consequences for the level of negative affect, and vice versa. This problem was solved by Warr, Barter and Brownbridge (1983) who noted that the Affect Balance Scale differed from usual procedures for assessing recent moods because Ss were simply required to note whether experiences of different kinds had or had not occurred in past weeks. Warr et al. asked Ss instead to estimate the proportion of the total time each type of affect had been experienced. The result was a more plausible descriptive model of relationships in which extraversion was associated with both higher levels of positive and lower levels of negative affect, and neuroticism was associated with more negative and less positive affect. This pattern was confirmed in a series of studies involving measures of momentary mood (Williams, 1990). In accord with the broad effects assumed for neuroticism in Costa and McCrae’s causal model, high neuroticism scorers reported higher average levels of depression, fatigue, tension, and confused thinking, but in accord with the Warr et al. descriptive model they also reported lower average levels of cheerfulness and energy. In turn, extraverts reported higher average levels of cheerfulness and energy but also lower levels of depression, fatigue, and confused thinking. In a less satisfactory approach to the same problem, Tellegen and his colleagues (Zevon & Tellegen, 1982; Watson & Tellegen, 1985) redefined negative and positive affect in the descriptive model so that they could appear to vary independently instead of the inverse relationship implied in usual definitions. Their proposed definitions resemble the dimensions of ‘tense arousal’ and ‘energetic arousal’ described by Thayer (e.g. 1986) and would appear to require that the direct causal effects of neuroticism and extraversion also be redefined to be narrowly focused upon these arousal dimensions. First, however, tense and energetic arousal have only the net appearance of orthogonality when the complex relationship between them in real data is discounted (Thayer, Two

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1986). Second, neuroticism is associated with higher levels of fatigue and lower energy (Williams, 1990) so that the effects of neuroticism overlap with the effects of extraversion on energetic arousal. In fact, as already outlined, the broad effects of high neuroticism are somewhat compatible with, though not necessarily identical to, the effects of low extraversion, and the effects of high extraversion are compatible with low neuroticism (Williams, 1990). Following the solution by Warr et al. for the problem of Costa and McCrae’s descriptive model the approach taken by Watson and Tellegen is not mandatory. Ultimately, their narrow arousal model is subsumed within the broad affect model but can be seen as attributing particular importance to the effects of neuroticism on tense arousal or anxiety, and to extraversion on energetic arousal. Because Watson and Tellegen (1985) regard depression as a ‘mixed emotion’ comprising relatively high ‘tense’ negative affect and relatively low ‘energetic ’ positive affect, and happiness as a mixed emotion of converse pattern, the evidence that levels of happiness experienced in the “past week, including today” correlate positively with extraversion and negatively with neuroticism (Argyle & Lu, 1990a, b; Furnham & Brewin, 1990) is compatible with both the narrow arousal and broad affect models. The distinction between happiness and unhappiness or sadness is thus common ground on which to examine some hidden assumptions of these models. Although there was nothing in the data of Costa and McCrae (1980) to address the issue of mood variation, a link between personality and variation was implied in their discussion where people who were low in both neuroticism and extraversion (i.e. stable introverts) were assumed to be seldom depressed but just as seldom elated whereas people who were high on both dimensions (neurotic extraverts) were prone to both extremes of mood. Thus both stable introverts and neurotic extraverts achieved similar overall levels of life satisfaction or happiness on average but did so in rather different ways. Eysenck and Eysenck (1985, Fig. 17) attempted a pictorial representation of these relationships in which high neuroticism scorers were assumed to show wider swings from neutral (or ‘indifference’) levels into negative affects than is the case for more stable individuals. Conversely, extraverts were assumed to show greater variation in mood from neutral into positive affects than is the case for introverts. The combined impact of both dispositions was thus assumed to be such that stable extraverts show more change into positive than into negative moods so that their moods are positive on average, stable introverts show only modest changes either way and so have neutral mood on average, neurotic introverts are prone to larger changes into negative than into positive moods so their moods are negative on average, but neurotic extraverts are prone to large changes in both negative and positive moods and are therefore the most variable of groups even though achieving a neutral mood on average. Two issues emerge from this account. First, the use made of the notion of neutral mood (or ‘indifference level’) with its implication that the average mood in the population as a whole is neutral. Second, the shift to a causal model which focuses upon mood changes and in which personality relationships with mood averages appear as a secondary consequence of personality effects upon mood variation. Concerning the first issue, average mood is not neutral. During the main part of the waking day people usually feel reasonably wide-awake and modestly cheerful, and so the general finding in mood studies is that average scores for positive affect scales exceed the averages for negative affect measures (Williams, 1990). People do of course show variations in their moods from time to time but these changes are not distributed symmetrically about the personal average position. Although positive affect predominates for the greater proportion of total time, intense positive affect seems to occur rather rarely and the positive affect experienced is mainly mild or moderate in intensity (Diener, Sandvik & Pavot, 1991). The more intense and memorable emotions are of the negative kind, typically aroused in situations involving family, work, and friends (Scherer & Tannenbaum, 1986). The net result of these occasional sharp deviations into negative affects combined with the more usual moderate variations within positive affect is to produce an individual generalized distribution from broadly negative to positive affect that is negatively skewed about the personal average (Flugel, 1925; Underwood & Froming, 1980; Williams, 1990). Ultimately, the net effects of personality have to be seen to be reconcilable with this natural pattern of mood variation. Concerning the second issue raised by the Eysenck and Eysenck model, most of the evidence so far for personality effects relates to average mood rather than mood variation (Hepburn & Eysenck, 1989). The focus upon mood variation in the Eysencks’ causal model therefore needs to be justified. In fact it is consistent with the current zeitgeist for interactional explanations where

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dispositions are regarded as mediating variables which determine a proneness to respond with criterion behaviours only when given appropriately precipitating or evoking situations. King and Endler (1990) offer a particularly thoughtful account of such an interactional model for different varieties of anxiety proneness. High and low dispositionally prone individuals are maximally different in their criterion behaviours in a highly precipitating situation, but in an irrelevant or neutral situation neither shows the criterion behaviour. When behaviour is observed in a variety of situations, some more dispositionally relevant and others less so or not at all, the high prone individual shows greater variation in the criterion behaviours across the situations than does the low prone individual. As a consequence of this greater variation the high prone individual inevitably shows more of the criterion behaviour on average across situations than does the low prone person. This ‘person by situation’ interactional explanation needs to be contrasted with the traditional ‘main effects’ assumption in trait theory (Endler & Magnusson, 1976) that depends upon chronic, pervasive, or ‘context-free’ effects across situations, one result of which is that high and low prone individuals would differ in their level of the criterion behaviour even in supposedly neutral situations. Pervasive effects would inevitably have a direct influence upon the average level of a criterion behaviour that is not merely a secondary consequence of variation across different situations. Two questions then arise for the Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) causal model of personality effects in mood. First, what evidence is there for the situationally reactive effects assumed in the interactional model and consequently for personality effects upon mood variation? Second, is there evidence for pervasive effects of personality that might affect mood averages independently of mood variation? For neuroticism there is clear evidence that increasing levels of neuroticism lead to stronger reactions to negative events. For example, Schalling (1975) showed that neuroticism potentiates the response to stressors, and Blackburn, Cameron and Deary (1990) showed that high neuroticism scorers reacted more strongly to a depression-induction procedure. The processes involved in these reactions would certainly contribute to greater mood variation being observed over time and across different situations. However, in addition, clear evidence has been obtained in a number of studies for the pervasive effects of neuroticism (Bolger & Schilling, 1991; Watson & Clark, 1984; Williams, 1989). The latter study is particularly informative because the high neuroticism scorers remained more depressed than the more stable Ss despite the large changes in mood between conditions involving relaxation and disco dancing. There was, however, no indication of a neuroticism by condition interaction for depression, presumably because, in the terms of the reactive interactional model, none of the conditions was appropriately precipitating for depression. Neuroticism therefore has two distinguishable types of influence upon mood, one type which operates pervasively across situations, and one type which is more context-dependent in that it serves to augment the negative affect engendered by situations as perceived by the individual (a ‘personality by situation interaction’). Some studies have been able to demonstrate the presence of both sorts of effect within the same data set (Bolger & Schilling, 1991; Williams, 1982). Few studies so far have had both the necessary design and analysis to identify the pervasive effects of extraversion. One study that did (Williams, 1989) obtained clear indications that extraverts were pervasively more cheerful and less depressed than introverts even though the mood of all Ss changed considerably between different conditions. On the other hand the evidence that extraversion is associated with increased variation into positive affect or with some process that would lead to such an outcome is not at all clear. In a statistical review of six mood studies from the same laboratory (Williams, 1990) no convincing evidence was found that extraversion led to the enhancement of positive mood reactions or increased mood variation, even when the conditions included a dancing session that elicited some clear displays of extraverted behaviour (Williams, 1989). On the limited evidence available it was concluded that if extraversion had any effect at all upon mood variation it was one which reduced variation by limiting the swings into negative mood. Some tangential support for this conclusion comes from findings of smaller startle responses (Ljubin & Ljubin, 1990) greater tolerance for noise stress (Dornic & Ekehammar, 1990) and less reactivity to sensory stimulation (Stelmack, 1990) in extraverts. Against this must be set three studies, two of which (Hepburn & Eysenck, 1989; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991) used versions of the Zevon and Tellegen (1982) ‘arousal’ definitions of affect. First, Hepburn and Eysenck (1989) did find a positive correlation between extraversion and ‘positive affect’ variation, but the security and

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meaning of this result is uncertain given the unexpected finding of a substantial positive correlation between extraversion and average ‘negative affect’. Next, Larsen and Ketelaar (1989, 1991) made two attempts to show that extraverts react particularly strongly to a positive mood induction procedure compared to introverts, but no more strongly than introverts to a negative mood induction. Only a “marginally significant” result was found in the first study, but their second study seemed more successful. Unfortunately, Larsen and Ketelaar (1991) did not consider the possibility that floor effects in their mood measures had led to the distortion of the pervasive influence (i.e. ‘main effect’) of extraversion to give the false appearance of an extraversion by condition interaction. When Ss are offered a unipolar response scale (0 = ‘not at all’, . . . ,6 = ‘extremely much’) to record their level of ‘positive affect’ they cannot score less than zero on any item regardless of whether they are just a little unhappy or are seriously depressed. As situations become less capable of inducing positive affect and turn to negative (i.e. significant situation ‘main effect’), the introverts, who are characteristically less happy than extraverts (significant personality ‘main effect’), meet the floor on the response scale sooner (start zeroing many or most of the items comprising the ‘positive affect’ scale), thus progressively reducing the apparent difference between them and the extraverts. So, when negative and positive conditions are compared, the outcome for ‘positive affect’ is what appears to be an extraversion by condition interaction. Far from demonstrating that extraverts react more strongly to the positive mood induction procedure the results of Larsen and Ketelaar (1991) are probably due to the deficiencies of the mood rating system in the other induction conditions. Furthermore, if floor effects were the explanation for the apparent extraversion by condition interaction in ‘positive affect’ scores then one would expect a corresponding artifactual interaction for ‘negative affect’ scores when stable and neurotic groups are compared in the different mood induction conditions. Stable Ss characteristically experience less ‘negative affect’, but their difference from high neuroticism scorers would be obscured by the floor on the response scale in the positive induction condition. This is indeed what Larsen and Ketelaar appear to have found. Thus, sadly, there seems as yet no clear and unambiguous demonstration that extraversion is associated with the augmentation of positive mood reactions or with increased positive mood variation. In summary, the evidence so far indicates that neuroticism has both pervasive (personality ‘main effect’) and reactive (‘personality by situation interaction’) effects in increasing levels of negative affects. Extraversion may have some pervasive effect on positive affects but the evidence for reactive effects is not yet convincing. Further studies of momentary mood properly designed to distinguish between pervasive and reactive dispositional effects are needed but face the difficulty of ensuring representative sampling of both precipitating and non-precipitating situations. An alternative approach with a different mix of strengths and weaknesses but which guarantees some ecological validity is simply to ask Ss to report on their characteristic mood quality and how much it varies. Such trait-like summary descriptions offer another perspective from which to triangulate with the results obtained from studies of momentary mood. A convenient instrument is provided by the Mood Survey questionnaire (Underwood & Froming, 1980) whose relationships with extraversion and neuroticism have never been assessed, although there is evidence for the concurrent and discriminant validity of the Mood Survey with other trait measures (op. cit.). The Mood Survey has a scale to assess characteristic mood level (average mood on a happy-sad continuum) and a scale to assess mood reactivity. The Reactivity scale assesses the characteristic frequency and the characteristic intensity of mood changes along the happy-sad continuum. Though these were at first thought by Underwood and Froming to be different aspects of mood variation the respective items had loaded upon the same factor during test development and could not be separated. If mood variations caused by personality by situation interaction (the ‘reactive’ model) are a sufficient cause of mood averages then two predictions follow. First, neuroticism will correlate positively with Mood Reactivity and negatively with Mood Level, but this latter correlation will be insignificant when Mood Reactivity is controlled. Second, extraversion will correlate positively with Mood Reactivity and positively with Mood Level, but this latter correlation will be insignificant when Mood Reactivity is controlled. Corollaries are that Mood Level will be a joint function of extraversion (positive) and neuroticism (negative), and Mood Reactivity will be a joint function of extraversion (positive) and neuroticism (positive).

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Predictions for an alternative model are derivable from the evidence as already reviewed: both extraversion and neuroticism have some pervasive influences upon mood that are independent of mood variation, and the only securely known effect upon variation is that of neuroticism in enhancing negative mood reactions. First, neuroticism will correlate positively with Mood Reactivity and negatively with Mood Level, but this latter correlation will still be significant when Mood Reactivity is controlled (as will the correlation of neuroticism with Reactivity when Mood Level is controlled). Second, extraversion will correlate positively with Mood Level but will be essentially uncorrelated with Mood Reactivity, though a small negative correlation is a possibility (Williams, 1990). Corollaries are that Mood Level will be a joint function of extraversion (positive) and neuroticism (negative), as also predicted by the exclusively ‘reactive’ model, but that when Mood Reactivity is regressed upon extraversion and neuroticism, only neuroticism will emerge as a significant predictor. The current definition of extraversion (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) emphasizes sociability and liveliness. However, some mood researchers continue to use an older definition of extraversion which included impulsiveness items (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1965). Rocklin and Revelle (198 1) argued that impulsivity is responsible for several findings previously attributed to extraversion, and that this evidence raises serious doubts about the usefulness of the more recent extraversion scale. In order to check on these worries in the context of mood research the impulsiveness items from the older definition of extraversion were included in the study.

METHOD Questionnaires Three questionnaires were employed in the study: the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ: Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975); the impulsiveness items from Form A of the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI: Eysenck & Eysenck, 1965); the Mood Survey (Underwood & Froming, 1980). The EPQ provides assessments of the major dispositions of psychoticism (P), extraversion (E), and neuroticism (N), together with a lie scale (L). The Mood Survey has 8 Mood Level items (e.g. “I usually feel quite cheerful”), and 7 Mood Reactivity items (e.g. “I may change from happy to sad and back several times in a week”). Four Level items and 3 Reactivity items are reversed for scoring. High Level scores represent happiness, and high Reactivity scores indicate greater mood variation. A 5-point scoring format was used (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree: scored t&4), giving a potential range O-32 for Level scores (with 16 the neutral midpoint) and t&28 for Reactivity scores (with 14 the midpoint). Procedure University students and non-students answered the three questionnaires anonymously in no set order and, apart from 60 students in a laboratory class, in their own time. A total of 423 questionnaire sets were distributed, and 292 (69%) were returned. Of these, 30 were rejected: 14 because of items missed despite reminders; 8 with lie scores above 13 (leaving a more symmetrical distribution of lie scores in the retained sample); 8 with miscellaneous signs of careless responding. Subjects The 262 Ss included 135 women and 127 men (71 women and 64 men were university students; 64 women and 63 men were not students). Preliminary analyses showed that the distinction between the students and non-students was not worth preserving, even though the latter varied widely in their self-described occupations. The non-students were on average older than the students (31.8 and 23.0 years, respectively; t = 7.82, P < 0.001) and had higher lie scores (6.0 and 4.9, respectively; t = 2.85, P < O.Ol), but did not differ significantly from the students on any of the other variables.

RESULTS Summary statistics for all variables in the study are presented in Table 1. Note that the average Mood Level score for both men and women was above the neutral score of 16. The men had higher

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D. G. WILLIAMS Table 1. Means and standard

deviations for men, women, and all A’s: ages, EPQ, impulsiveness, and Mood Survey scales Men (n = 127)

Variable

Age (year) P E N L Impulsiveness Mood Level Mood Reactivity

Women (n = 135)

Total (n = 262)

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

26.6 5.7 12.9 12.1 4.9 4.6 19.1 14.1

9.4 3.3 4.6 5.5 3.0 2.0 5.2 5.6

28.0 3.9 14.2 13.2 6.0 4.7 21.3 15.3

10.7 2.6 4.5 5.0 3.2 1.9 5.0 5.2

27.3 4.7 13.6 12.7 5.4 4.6 20.2 14.7

10.1 3.1 4.6 5.3 3.2 1.9 5.2 5.4

P scores (t = 5.09, P < 0.001) lower E scores (t = -2.27, P < O.OS), lower L scores (t = -2.91, P < O.Ol), and lower Mood Level scores (t = -3.54, P < 0.001) than the women. When the variables in Table 1 were intercorrelated, the product-moment correlation between N and Mood Reactivity in the men (0.672) was significantly higher than in the women (0.497), z = 2.15, P c 0.05, but otherwise there were no gender differences in corresponding correlations. Consequently, this presentation concentrates upon the results for the whole group of 262 Ss, although separate results for the men and the women are occasionally presented as a convenient way to examine the replication of results in two independent samples. The correlations between all variables for the whole sample are displayed in Table 2. Given the number of correlations and the large number of Ss involved it is the correlations with P < 0.001 which merit more detailed discussion. Some of the correlations in Table 2 are of only minor interest. The positive correlation between age and L scores was to be expected (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). The only other notable effect of increasing age was lower Mood Reactivity. P and L scores were negatively correlated as expected (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), but there was no correlation between L scores and N, Mood Level, or Mood Reactivity scores to indicate distortions of the data through social desirability and allied effects. Finally, impulsiveness was correlated with both P and E scores as expected (cf. Rocklin & Revelle, 1981, Table 1). The first of the important relationships in Table 2 is the negative correlation between Mood Level and Mood Reactivity, and it is in the range of those reported by Underwood and Froming (1980). Those people who were on average less happy had also experienced more frequent and intense changes in mood. Also, as expected by both the ‘reactive’ and alternative models, Mood Level was correlated positively with E, and negatively with N, and Mood Reactivity was correlated positively with N. However, E had only a small correlation with Mood Reactivity which, contrary to the ‘reactive’ model, was significantly negative, not positive. One finding that was not anticipated by either model was the positive correlation between P and Mood Reactivity. Finally, impulsiveness had a minor correlation with Mood Level which seemed entirely due to the mutual relationship of these variables to E. When the effects of E were controlled, the correlation between impulsiveness and Mood Level was not significant (partial r = -0.077); whereas, when the effects of impulsiveness were controlled, the correlation between E and Mood Level was hardly changed (partial r = 0.471, P < 0.001). There is no a priori reason to expect that impulsiveness should have a direct influence upon characteristic mood level. The minor relationships between P and N and between E and N, although in line with those found elsewhere (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975, 1976) complicate the direct interpretation of these results, so partial correlations between key variables with various confounding influences controlled

Table 2. Product-moment

correlations

between age and EPQ, impulsiveness, P

P E N L Impulsiveness Mood Level Mood Reactivity ‘P

<

0.05; **p

-0.161** -0.152’ -0.156’ 0.242”’ -0.058 -0.026 -0.229*** <

0.01; ***p

< 0.001,

0.040 0.123+ -0.336*** 0.198*** -0.102 0.179**

E

-0.186” -0.127’ 0.473*** 0.490”’ -0.141’

N

- 0.084 0.050 -0.424*‘* 0.594***

and Mood Survey scales: all Ss (n = 262) L

-0.067 0.020 -0.105

Imp

0.173** 0.02 I

Level

-0.425***

Personality Table

3. Partial correlations confounding influences

Key relationship

Variables

N Reactivity N & Reactivity N Level N & Level E Reactivity E & Reactivity E Level E & Level N Reactivity N & Reactivity N Level N & Level E N E&N

N vs Level

N vs Reactivity

P “S Level

P vs Reactivity

Level vs Reactivity

lP < 0.05; ***p

205

in key relationships with various controlled: all Ss (n = 262)

E vs Level

E vs Reactivity

and mood

controlled

Partial

r

0.462”: 0.480*** 0.467*** -0.038 0.086 0.083 -0.389*** -0.236;” -0.201*** 0.583*** 0.504*** 0.504*** -0.055 -0.029 -0.025 0.132’ 0.151* 0.123’ -0.412*** -0.237”’ -0.248***

Table 4. Rotated

(varimax)

urinciual-comuonents

Component

I

Component

matrix 2

h2

Mood Level Mood Reactivity E N

- 0.46 0.88 0.01 0.86

0.73 -0.10 0.93 -0.16

0.74 0.79 0.87 0.77

% Total variance

43.35

35.80

79.15

< 0.001.

are reported in Table 3. Before addressing the main results it is worth noting that the small correlation between P and Mood Reactivity was still significant even after the effects of both N and Mood Level were controlled, but there was no evidence for any relationship between P and Mood Level. The main findings were as follows. The correlation between E and Mood Level was almost unchanged when the effects of Mood Reactivity were controlled, thus disconfirming the ‘reactive’ model for the effects of extraversion. The small negative correlation between E, and Mood Reactivity was eliminated when the effects of N were controlled so, although a small negative relationship is allowed for in the alternative model, it has to be concluded that the relationship could have been due to the association between E and N in these data. The correlation between N and Mood Level was still significant, albeit substantially reduced, when the effects of Mood Reactivity were controlled, thus disconfirming the exclusively ‘reactive’ model, but in line with the alternative model which expects some pervasive effect of neuroticism. Commensurate with this the negative correlation between Mood Level and Mood Reactivity was much reduced, though still significant, when the effects of N were controlled. The correlation between N and Mood Reactivity was reduced but still sizeable when the effects of Mood Level were controlled. These results indicate that only N out of the three major personality variables had effects upon both Mood Level and Mood Reactivity, but that its influence upon Mood Level may occur through two routes, one of which is direct and the other is indirect via its influence upon Mood Reactivity. When these causal links were examined in a path analysis, Mood Level was a joint function [R = 0.475, F(2,259) = 37.8, P < 0.0001; adj. R square = 0.2201 of N (/I = -0.266, P = 0.0001) and Reactivity (p = -0.267, P = 0.0001). Thus, of the total effect of N upon Mood Level (r = -0.424), 62.7% was direct (p = -0.266) and 37.3% was indirect via Mood Reactivity. When the combined influences of all the EPQ variables and impulsiveness were examined in stepwise multiple regressions (0.05 significance criterion for including a regression coefficient), Mood Level was a function of E (/I = 0.426) and N (/? = -0.345) only [R = 0.596, F(2,259) = 71.3, P < 0.0001; adj. R square = 0.3501. This result was replicated in the men (R = 0.616: 0.424 E -0.398 N) and the women (R = 0.592: 0.373 E -0.363 N) separately. This outcome is consistent with the predictions of both the ‘reactive’ and the alternative models. In the corresponding analysis for Mood Reactivity, Reactivity was a function of N (p = 0.580) and P (p = 0.107) only [R = 0.603, F(2,259) = 74.0, P < 0.0001; adj. R square = 0.3591. This pattern was separately observed in the women (R = 0.536: 0.482 N + 0.204 P) but not in the men where only N was included in the regression equation. This gender difference occurred, despite similar correlations between P and Mood Reactivity in the men (Y = 0.217, P < 0.05) and women (r = 0.239, P < 0.01) because P was slightly (but not significantly) more associated with N amongst the men (r = 0.234, P < 0.01) than the women (1. = 0.073). What may be a real relationship between P and Mood Reactivity in the men was therefore discounted in the stepwise multiple regression procedure because it did not add

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to the variance in Reactivity already explained by N. The partial correlation between P and Mood Reactivity, controlling for N, was significant for the women (partial r = 0.234, P < 0.01) but not for the men (partial r = 0.083). Overall, because E was not included in the regression set as a predictor of Mood Reactivity, the ‘reactive’ model for extraversion was disconfirmed. Though P may make a very small contribution to mood reactivity, it seems that the major links to be clarified are between Mood Level, Mood Reactivity, E, and N, where all four variables were significantly correlated with each other. A principal-components factor analysis (SPSS-X) of the intercorrelations between these four variables revealed two components with eigenvalues > 1 (2.15, 1.01) together accounting for 79.1% of the total variance. When these two components were rotated by the varimax (orthogonal) procedure the outcome was exceptionally clear and is displayed in Table 4. The first component showed N associated with high Mood Reactivity and somewhat low Mood Level. The second component was E associated with high Mood Level. Similar patterns emerged when the results for men and women were analysed separately. The inclusion of P in the analyses reduced the total variance explained by the first two components from 79.1 to 66.2%, but the same basic picture was recognizable with P loading primarily upon the Reactivity/N component. DISCUSSION A common objection when questionnaires are intercorrelated is that the results are merely due to overlaps in item content. Could the relationships between the EPQ and Mood Survey scales be so explained? It would be a difficult argument to sustain for E or P because the references to mood experiences in their EPQ items are tangential at best. The closest examples are 3 (out of 21) E items, 2 of which refer to liveliness (e.g. “Are you rather lively?“) and one that asks “Would you call yourself happy-go-lucky?“. The situation is different for N where approximately half of the 23 items in the EPQ N scale refer to aspects of mood (e.g. “Do you often feel fed up?“) and, although only 2 items refer explicitly to mood variation (“Does your mood often go up and down?“; “Are you sometimes bubbling over with energy and sometimes very sluggish?“), some items have reactive connotations (e.g. “Are you touchy about some things?“; “Are you easily hurt when people find fault with you . . .?“). It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that there should be some correlation between the N scale and the Mood Level and Mood Reactivity scales. However, the results obtained are compatible with other independent research (e.g. Bolger & Schilling, 1991). Furthermore, what could not have been predicted in advance from any content analysis are the precise details of the interrelationships and the model that these lead to. The weak association identified between P and Mood Reactivity needs to be taken with some caution. The description of high P scorers is rather ambiguous in this respect. They are said to be ‘altogether insensitive’ and ‘lacking in feeling’ (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) which indicates low mood affect, reactivity, yet they are also ‘hostile’ and ‘aggressive’, implying episodes of anger-related which would certainly be mood reactivity of a kind. McConville and Cooper (1989) in a study of daily moods did find correlations between P and the interquartile ranges for measures of negative affect and anxiety but, on the whole, the results with the P scale in mood studies so far have been disappointing (Williams, 1990). Taking the association with Mood Reactivity at face value there are two points worth noting. First, the impulsiveness component in P seemed to play no part in the effect. For both men and women the correlations between P scores and Mood Reactivity were still significant when the effects of impulsiveness were controlled. Second, the lack of an association between P and Mood Level indicates that the reactivity may not be strongly biased in its direction of action. Any effect of P in enhancing mood reactivity would seem rather minor compared to the impact of N. The results show that those people who are on average less happy also experience more frequent and intense changes in mood. Happier people show less mood variation. This is in line with the negative correlations between Mood Level and Mood Reactivity (from -0.36 to -0.45 in three samples) found by Underwood and Froming (1980). An important contributor to this covariation is the influence of neuroticism. The effects of neuroticism are clearly biased to produce negative mood reactions. If they were not biased the correlation between N and Mood Level would have been unaffected when Reactivity was controlled: instead, the correlation was substantially reduced.

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This bias to the action of neuroticism was assumed in both the exclusively ‘reactive’ and alternative models. However, contrary to the ‘reactive’ model but as expected by the alternative, neuroticism was still associated with the experience of poorer average mood in a way that was not fully accounted for by this bias to strong or frequent negative responses to events. In the terms of the alternative model, neuroticism has direct effects upon mood level (less happy in general) and upon mood reactivity (frequent short-term changes into even lesser happiness) and, in addition, it has an indirect effect upon mood level via the bias to negative mood reactions. Although the current data indicate that the reactive effects of neuroticism are quite large, other work with ‘mood now’ or ‘daily mood’ measures indicates that it is the pervasive effects of neuroticism that are the larger (Bolger & Schilling, 1991; Williams, 1990). The respective strengths of the pervasive and the reactive effects of neuroticism may be easier to evaluate when there are clearer ideas on the processes involved. The results provided no evidence that impulsiveness was associated with either the characteristic mood level or reactivity once the broader influence of E was controlled. On the other hand, controlling for differences in impulsiveness did not alter the relationship between E and mood level. This agrees with other evidence that impulsiveness is not an important influence upon mood (Emmons & Diener, 1986; Hepburn & Eysenck, 1989). It seems, therefore, that it is the sociability and liveliness features of extraversion which underpin the better moods of extraverts. The problem is to explain how this happens without there being much discernable effect upon mood variation. The answer is not simple. Some part of the influence of extraversion on average mood seems due to pervasive effects which ensure that extraverts are consistently more cheerful than introverts across a variety of situations (Williams, 1989). However, Argyle and Lu (1990a) have shown that about half of the greater happiness of extraverts can be explained by their greater participation in social activities. Contacts with some situations such as ‘debates’, ‘dancing’, ‘meeting new people’, and ‘noisy parties’ are particularly predictive of overall levels of happiness, and it is these situations which introverts tend to withdraw from. The reasons seem to be that introverts are more socially anxious and less assertive than extraverts, especially in initiating social interactions and confronting other people (Argyle & Lu, 1990b). Also, Graziano, Feldesman and Rahe (1985) noted that introverts anticipate more disagreements between themselves and others than do extraverts, and find interpersonal disagreements more aversive. If introverts then avoid encounters that they expect to find difficult, they deny themselves the happiness-inducing effects of these situations on those occasions when things run relatively smoothly. This analysis involves the same distinction that Fowles (1987) makes for anxiety, between underlying vulnerability and the frequency with which that vulnerability is tested by events, People who know they are likely to become anxious in certain situations will attempt to avoid them, and so will minimize the extent to which state anxiety occurs in their lives. Similarly, introverts avoid situations which they think might become awkward, embarrassing or ‘difficult’. Thereby they maintain mood stability, albeit at a lower overall level of happiness. However, if introverts can reduce mood variation by avoiding certain situations why do high neuroticism scorers not do the same? The answer is that they probably do to some extent, as Fowles’ discussion of anxiety suggests, but the difficulties of the introverts may be relatively specific to some social settings whereas those of neurotics are more general and widespread and occur in situations that are not so easily avoided. If introverts maintain stability by avoiding some situations, then extraverts maintain stability by the way they behave within those same situations. Thorne (1987) showed that extraverts find it easier to get a conversation going and keep it going, will talk about more pleasant things and less about personal problems, will try more to agree with and to compliment others, and generally act in a way that is pleasant and rewarding for others. These social skills of extraverts must act in a transactional manner to maintain the positive tone of social encounters and to avoid, deflect, and defuse potentially less pleasant developments. Thus, in their different ways, introverts and extraverts act to avoid the potential for negative affect in social situations. In conclusion, the exclusively ‘reactive’ interactional model is correct only in so far as neuroticism increases negative affect reactions. The model does not account for personality differences in average mood that remain when mood variation is controlled. In line with studies of momentary moods there was no evidence to indicate that extraversion is associated with increased variation into positive affect. However, the relationships between the Mood Survey scales and the parameters derived from repeated measures of actual momentary moods need to be examined to complete the overall picture.

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