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Assessing the president: The media, elite opinion and public support
Public Relations Review
There are, however, some intellectual “sidestreets” in the book-anthropological linguistics, the ideology of consensus and transitivity. These may be of genuine value to academics developing or improving curricula in such areas, but they certainly tired the old eyes of this reviewer. Too, Fowler exhausts the layman with his in-depth semantic and semiotic analysis. In a two-chapter review of the recent Salmonella-in-eggs controversy, he piles examples of newspaper coverage and food industry communication to dizzying heights only to conclude, once again, that “an individual event cannot be reported independently of cultural values and ideology.” Fundamentally, Fowler reminds us that ‘(the vaunted independence of the press is an illusion” certainly an idea worth periodic reflection. But he sure makes us work for this nugget. John Paluszek, APR President Ketchum Public Affairs New York, NY
Richard A. Brody
Assessin. the President: The Media, Elite Opinion and Public Support Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991,198
pp.
This thin digestible volume deserves a place on communication scholars’ bookshelves. However, its appeal to this audience might improve if it were re-titled “Beyond Agenda Setting.” The primary (almost sole) dependent variables are the percentages of people approving and disapproving of how the president of the United States does his job. The Gallup organization has collected such ratings often and continuously throughout the period studied here (from Truman through Reagan). And recently other pollsters have picked this up with little change in wording. The major independent variable is the “cumulative news ratio.” Here the researcher examines the “lead” national-international story in each day’s New %orb Times (from 1961 through 1972) and the CBS-W Evening News (after 1972, when Vanderbilt University began publishing its Television News Abstracts and Index). He codes each story as a) goods neutral or bad, depending on how it reflects on presidentially pet expectations and b) focusing on proposals by the administration or results. Coverage of proposals correlates very little, overall, with approval or disapproval. However, the cumulative news ratio for results stories turns out to be a powerful positive predictor of approval, and negative predictor of disapproval, across time and polls. The CNR is simply the cumulative (throughout the president’s term until a given poll which it is used to predict) number of good-
316
Vol. 18, No. 3
Baak Re~icm
results stories coded minus the number of bad-results stories divided by the total number of results stories. Another important predictor is the approval rating just prior to the poll in question, suggesting a good deal of inertia in how people view their leaders. The data give limited support for at least four other factors often seen as affecting presidential popularity. However, these variables accounted for little variance once the CNR has entered regression equations. Other factors include: 1.
An ear&term UY~~~ey~~~~ eflct. Here the press and political opponents hold their fire for perhaps 6-7 months (unless a very controversial action such as President Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon intervenes). Approval ratings tend to decline after this, all right, but perhaps not for an entire term in office.
2.
A tendency to rally behind the president at times of international crisis. Looking at 65 such crises since 1947, Brody finds gains in
presidential approval immediately following 43. Major exceptions include summit meetings (which are planned ahead of time and may not quality as crises) and developments in ongoing wars (for example, the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam). The data also suggest such rallies tend to dissipate rather quickly. In explaining them, Brody emphasizes information av~ab~i~ (the government has most of the info~ation available to Americans-and undisputed control over it- with international crises). He doubts, based on available data, that many people rally behind their leader out of pure patriotism. 3.
Presidential appearances on television. Looking at Presidents Kennedy through Ford, the more often a chief executive appears on TV between polls the greater his gain in approval from one the earlier poll to the later one. However, this factor was only about one-fourth as powerful a predictor as CNRin 1961-1976. And the variable appears not to have been tested clearly with Carter and Reagan.
4.
~ac~~ecu~u~ic indicators. Certainly unemplo~ent and inflation figure prominently in “results”-hence in the CNR However, once news coverage (the CNR) is controlled, these economic factors correlated slightly (and negatively) with approval ratings during Reagan’s first term but not during the Carter administration. A problem with economic results as a determinant of presidential popularity (or unpopularity) is that inflation and unemployment tend to correlate negatively. Steps which increase one tend to reduce the other, creating something of a no-win situation.
Fall 1992
317
Public
Relations Review
In another interesting analysis, Brody distinguishes between position issues (in which people disagree about major goals as well as means of reaching them) and valence issues (with agreement on goals such as prosperity and peace but disagreement on how to achieve them). Disagreement about goals tends to entail ambiguity in assessing achievement of them. Citizens often resolve this, apparently, by accepting the president’s own stated goals and outcome expectations. Unfortunately, this latter premise seems to rule out real consideration of position issues such as abortion rights an which many groups clearly differamong themselves and with the president -about goals as well as means. The researcher regards the predictive value of resztltcoverage as indicative ofthe American public’s pragmatism. Also, he sees the low apparent salience ofproposals as consistent with an oft-noted lack of interest in ideology. Ideologues presumably evaluate proposals based on how they square with underlying assumptions (individuals ultimately control their own fate, etc.), and with each other, rather than on outcomes. The rather thin implications chapter takes comfort in the idea that Americans apparently are not easily manipulated by a charismatic ideologue. They look for results. Also, their apparent inertia in assessing the president may help guard against sudden, intemperate changes. Missing is thorough consideration of possible implications such as the following: 1.
A suggested tendency for political leaders to follow rather than lead, seeking desired short-term outcomes to enhance their popularity. Perhaps statesmanship requires that presidents “take the heat” for a while in solving long-term problems.
2.
The idea that leaders can enhance their popularity by controlling the release of news and information. Some observers feel Reagan and Bush have overdone such control by holding few press conferences, refusing to answer questions while boarding helicopters, seeking to thwart or kill the Freedom of Information Act, covering up mistakes, etc. Of course, polls indicate many Americans do not stress or understand the First Amendment. However, recent events suggest that even citizens of the U.S.S.R, with their lack of democratic institutions and traditions, can come to resent being kept in the dark by their government.
As a political scientist, Brody pays little attention to some issues of concern to communication scholars. He does not defend his focus on each day’s number one story as an index of overall media coverage, the extent to which CBS Newsand the New York Times are representative of press coverage nationwide, or inter-coder agreement with regard to subjective directional (positive vs. negative vs. neutral) coding. He also says little about the efficacy and importance of global approval ratings. (He does buy, without much proof, the oft-noted claim that presidents
318
Vol. 18, No. 3
Book Reviews
can capitalize on high ratings to promote their programs and electoral chances.) And he uses aggregate data to test theory (especially that of attitude integration a la Norman Anderson) which seems to demand careful study of how people function as individuals. Despite these problems, the study deserves attention. It provides important support, from a new direction, for the agenda-setting hypothesis viewed at a more abstract level (results defined as good or bad rather than in terms of individual issue salience) than has been traditional. Hugh M. Culbertson, Ph. D. Professor of Journalism Ohio University
Craig R Smith and Scott Lybarger The Ratification of the Bill of Rights, 1789-91 The Center for First Amendment Studies at California State University-Long Beach 132 pp.
This is a conservative interpretation of the origins and meanings of the Bill of Bights added to our Constitution two years after the adoption of the original document. As the authors candidly state: “protecting and defining the doctrine of original intent has been a major project of ours since the establishment of the Freedom of Expression Foundation in 1982 and the Center for First Amendment Studies in 1988”. The political cast of the book is also revealed in this sentence: “. . . beginning with the Warren Court’s Mapp v. Ohio decision, the tradition of judicial restraint and original intent were trampled “Today, some in the name of expedience.” They add, in a gross understatement, balance has been restored to the Supreme Court.” In the opinion of many, the pendulum has swung too far to the right, to a “Presidential Court.” This monograph is timely not only in the sense that we celebrated the two hundredth anniversary of the Bill of Bights in December, 1991, but in the sense that debate on the origins and meanings of the Bill of Bights’ provisions is as vigorous and robust today as it was at the time of their adoption. As the authors foresee: “. . . if the road of the Bill of Bights stretches into the past, it also wends its way into contemporary history and beyond. . . We continue to debate its meaning, its application, its intent, and its history.” We certainly do. The elastic, amorphous term, “natural law,” was vigorously debated in the Senate Judiciary Committee during the confirmation hearings on Justice Clarence Thomas. The thrust of the debate there and elsewhere, fueled by Justice Thomas’ many writings invoking natural law, epitomizes the term’s capture by conservatives to buttress rights not articulated in the Constitution. It is true that as the authors assert. “. . . an atmosphere for debate has been established which first assumed
Fall 1992
319
There are, however, some intellectual “sidestreets” in the book-anthropological linguistics, the ideology of consensus and transitivity. These may be of genuine value to academics developing or improving curricula in such areas, but they certainly tired the old eyes of this reviewer. Too, Fowler exhausts the layman with his in-depth semantic and semiotic analysis. In a two-chapter review of the recent Salmonella-in-eggs controversy, he piles examples of newspaper coverage and food industry communication to dizzying heights only to conclude, once again, that “an individual event cannot be reported independently of cultural values and ideology.” Fundamentally, Fowler reminds us that ‘(the vaunted independence of the press is an illusion” certainly an idea worth periodic reflection. But he sure makes us work for this nugget. John Paluszek, APR President Ketchum Public Affairs New York, NY
Richard A. Brody
Assessin. the President: The Media, Elite Opinion and Public Support Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991,198
pp.
This thin digestible volume deserves a place on communication scholars’ bookshelves. However, its appeal to this audience might improve if it were re-titled “Beyond Agenda Setting.” The primary (almost sole) dependent variables are the percentages of people approving and disapproving of how the president of the United States does his job. The Gallup organization has collected such ratings often and continuously throughout the period studied here (from Truman through Reagan). And recently other pollsters have picked this up with little change in wording. The major independent variable is the “cumulative news ratio.” Here the researcher examines the “lead” national-international story in each day’s New %orb Times (from 1961 through 1972) and the CBS-W Evening News (after 1972, when Vanderbilt University began publishing its Television News Abstracts and Index). He codes each story as a) goods neutral or bad, depending on how it reflects on presidentially pet expectations and b) focusing on proposals by the administration or results. Coverage of proposals correlates very little, overall, with approval or disapproval. However, the cumulative news ratio for results stories turns out to be a powerful positive predictor of approval, and negative predictor of disapproval, across time and polls. The CNR is simply the cumulative (throughout the president’s term until a given poll which it is used to predict) number of good-
316
Vol. 18, No. 3
Baak Re~icm
results stories coded minus the number of bad-results stories divided by the total number of results stories. Another important predictor is the approval rating just prior to the poll in question, suggesting a good deal of inertia in how people view their leaders. The data give limited support for at least four other factors often seen as affecting presidential popularity. However, these variables accounted for little variance once the CNR has entered regression equations. Other factors include: 1.
An ear&term UY~~~ey~~~~ eflct. Here the press and political opponents hold their fire for perhaps 6-7 months (unless a very controversial action such as President Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon intervenes). Approval ratings tend to decline after this, all right, but perhaps not for an entire term in office.
2.
A tendency to rally behind the president at times of international crisis. Looking at 65 such crises since 1947, Brody finds gains in
presidential approval immediately following 43. Major exceptions include summit meetings (which are planned ahead of time and may not quality as crises) and developments in ongoing wars (for example, the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam). The data also suggest such rallies tend to dissipate rather quickly. In explaining them, Brody emphasizes information av~ab~i~ (the government has most of the info~ation available to Americans-and undisputed control over it- with international crises). He doubts, based on available data, that many people rally behind their leader out of pure patriotism. 3.
Presidential appearances on television. Looking at Presidents Kennedy through Ford, the more often a chief executive appears on TV between polls the greater his gain in approval from one the earlier poll to the later one. However, this factor was only about one-fourth as powerful a predictor as CNRin 1961-1976. And the variable appears not to have been tested clearly with Carter and Reagan.
4.
~ac~~ecu~u~ic indicators. Certainly unemplo~ent and inflation figure prominently in “results”-hence in the CNR However, once news coverage (the CNR) is controlled, these economic factors correlated slightly (and negatively) with approval ratings during Reagan’s first term but not during the Carter administration. A problem with economic results as a determinant of presidential popularity (or unpopularity) is that inflation and unemployment tend to correlate negatively. Steps which increase one tend to reduce the other, creating something of a no-win situation.
Fall 1992
317
Public
Relations Review
In another interesting analysis, Brody distinguishes between position issues (in which people disagree about major goals as well as means of reaching them) and valence issues (with agreement on goals such as prosperity and peace but disagreement on how to achieve them). Disagreement about goals tends to entail ambiguity in assessing achievement of them. Citizens often resolve this, apparently, by accepting the president’s own stated goals and outcome expectations. Unfortunately, this latter premise seems to rule out real consideration of position issues such as abortion rights an which many groups clearly differamong themselves and with the president -about goals as well as means. The researcher regards the predictive value of resztltcoverage as indicative ofthe American public’s pragmatism. Also, he sees the low apparent salience ofproposals as consistent with an oft-noted lack of interest in ideology. Ideologues presumably evaluate proposals based on how they square with underlying assumptions (individuals ultimately control their own fate, etc.), and with each other, rather than on outcomes. The rather thin implications chapter takes comfort in the idea that Americans apparently are not easily manipulated by a charismatic ideologue. They look for results. Also, their apparent inertia in assessing the president may help guard against sudden, intemperate changes. Missing is thorough consideration of possible implications such as the following: 1.
A suggested tendency for political leaders to follow rather than lead, seeking desired short-term outcomes to enhance their popularity. Perhaps statesmanship requires that presidents “take the heat” for a while in solving long-term problems.
2.
The idea that leaders can enhance their popularity by controlling the release of news and information. Some observers feel Reagan and Bush have overdone such control by holding few press conferences, refusing to answer questions while boarding helicopters, seeking to thwart or kill the Freedom of Information Act, covering up mistakes, etc. Of course, polls indicate many Americans do not stress or understand the First Amendment. However, recent events suggest that even citizens of the U.S.S.R, with their lack of democratic institutions and traditions, can come to resent being kept in the dark by their government.
As a political scientist, Brody pays little attention to some issues of concern to communication scholars. He does not defend his focus on each day’s number one story as an index of overall media coverage, the extent to which CBS Newsand the New York Times are representative of press coverage nationwide, or inter-coder agreement with regard to subjective directional (positive vs. negative vs. neutral) coding. He also says little about the efficacy and importance of global approval ratings. (He does buy, without much proof, the oft-noted claim that presidents
318
Vol. 18, No. 3
Book Reviews
can capitalize on high ratings to promote their programs and electoral chances.) And he uses aggregate data to test theory (especially that of attitude integration a la Norman Anderson) which seems to demand careful study of how people function as individuals. Despite these problems, the study deserves attention. It provides important support, from a new direction, for the agenda-setting hypothesis viewed at a more abstract level (results defined as good or bad rather than in terms of individual issue salience) than has been traditional. Hugh M. Culbertson, Ph. D. Professor of Journalism Ohio University
Craig R Smith and Scott Lybarger The Ratification of the Bill of Rights, 1789-91 The Center for First Amendment Studies at California State University-Long Beach 132 pp.
This is a conservative interpretation of the origins and meanings of the Bill of Bights added to our Constitution two years after the adoption of the original document. As the authors candidly state: “protecting and defining the doctrine of original intent has been a major project of ours since the establishment of the Freedom of Expression Foundation in 1982 and the Center for First Amendment Studies in 1988”. The political cast of the book is also revealed in this sentence: “. . . beginning with the Warren Court’s Mapp v. Ohio decision, the tradition of judicial restraint and original intent were trampled “Today, some in the name of expedience.” They add, in a gross understatement, balance has been restored to the Supreme Court.” In the opinion of many, the pendulum has swung too far to the right, to a “Presidential Court.” This monograph is timely not only in the sense that we celebrated the two hundredth anniversary of the Bill of Bights in December, 1991, but in the sense that debate on the origins and meanings of the Bill of Bights’ provisions is as vigorous and robust today as it was at the time of their adoption. As the authors foresee: “. . . if the road of the Bill of Bights stretches into the past, it also wends its way into contemporary history and beyond. . . We continue to debate its meaning, its application, its intent, and its history.” We certainly do. The elastic, amorphous term, “natural law,” was vigorously debated in the Senate Judiciary Committee during the confirmation hearings on Justice Clarence Thomas. The thrust of the debate there and elsewhere, fueled by Justice Thomas’ many writings invoking natural law, epitomizes the term’s capture by conservatives to buttress rights not articulated in the Constitution. It is true that as the authors assert. “. . . an atmosphere for debate has been established which first assumed
Fall 1992
319