Attitudinal effects of stress and justification: A replication and extension

JOIJRNAL

OF EXPERIMENTAL

Attitudinal

SOCIAL

4, 153-161 (1968)

PSYCHOLOGY

Effects

of Stress

A Replication

and

and Justification: Extension’

ROBERTL. HELMREICH University

of Texas

The effects of stress, justification, and timing of justification on liking for a dull task were investigated in a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design. The results under Low Fear replicated an earlier study by Freedman : when justification was given before performing the task, the lower the justification, the greater the liking for the task; but when justification was given after completing the labor, the less the justification, the less the enjoyment of the task. Under High Fear, no significant effects for either justification or timing of justification were found. However, High-Fear subjects found the task significantly more enjoyable than those under LOW Fear, supporting a view that dissonance aroused by commitment to an unpleasant, forthcoming experience was reduced by positively evaluating the experimental task. One of the more intriguing predictions from Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance is that a person given low justification for performing a dull task should find the task more enjoyable than a person given adequate justification. This prediction is derived directly from dissonance theory on the premise that an individual faced with performing a boring task with inadequate justificat,ion will experience dissonance between the cognition that he is performing the task and the cognition

that the task i,q worthless. One met,hod of reducing the dissonance is through evaluating the task as more pleasant. An ingenious experiment by Freedman (1963) pitted this hypothesis against the reinforcement, prediction to more

t8hat greater justification for performing an act should positive el-xluation of the act. Subjects in his experiment

lead were

nsked io write a long sequence of random numbers (presumably a dull and

noxious

task).

Before

beginning

the task,

some subjects

were

told

that the job was extremely useful (High Justification) while others were told that enough data had already been collected and that. the task was 1 This research was supported by Contract NOOO14-67-A-0126-0001 with the Group Psychology Branch, Office of Naval Research. Thanks are due to Kathleen McCue, Tim Throckmorton, Paul Gaido, Sandra Goodwin, Kathleen Jones, Melvyn Moy, and John Waid, who assisted in the research. 153

154

ROBERT

L.

HELMREICH

therefore useless (Low Justification). Other subjects were told nothing concerning t’hc value of their labor before undertaking the tusk, but were told after writing random numbers for 12 minutes that the task was either c’xtremely useful (High Justification) or that it had been a futile endeavor (Low Justification). The experiment thus had four groups: Those given high or low justification before the task and those given high or low justification after completing the undertaking. The dependent variable was how much the subjects reported enjoying the task. There was a clear dissonance cffcct when the justification w:is given before t’he task was commenced. Subjects given the low-justification manipulation rated the task as significantly more enjoyab!e t,hsn those told that it was extremely useful. The opposite effect wa:: found, bon-ever, in groups given the justification manipulation after they had written numbers for twelve minutes. In this condition, thoAr given high justification found the task significantly more enjoyable than those told that their labors were in vain. Carlsmith and Freedman (in press) interpret the latter finding as illustrating a situation where no dissonance is aroused. They argue that the subject had no reason to believe that the task was futile before he undertook it in good faith. Consequently, he need feel no dissonance about having wasted his time on a useless t,ask. The new information is unpleasant, but not dissonance-arousing. In this case, the information that his labor adds to the body of scientific information (High Justification) may serve as a reinforcement leading t#o a more positive evaluation of the task itself. A recent series of studies investigating the effects of psychological stress on attitudes and at,t.itude change (Helmreich, Kuiken, and Collins, 1968; Helmreich and Hamilton, 1968; Sigall and Helmreich, 1967) indicates that stress is associated with significant changes in attitudes which are not relevant to t,he source or nat,ure of the stress. In othcl words, the emotional arousal from threat of physical sufferin% is associated with shifts in attitudes about issues unrelated to the cause of the stress. Also, in a field study of responses to extreme stress. high levels of perceived stress were strongly related to positive nttitudcs towards the stressful environment (Helmreich, 1966). Based on these findings, a goal of the present study was to investigate the effect,s of irrelevant stress on attitudes towards a dull task. Several effects of emotional arousal on at,titudcs are possible. A person about to undergo an unpleasant experience might view all of his current activities negatively. Threat might cause a negative “halo effect” t:o color an individual’s evaluation of all aspects of his present environmenk. For csnmple. a research subject performing a dull task while awaiting pain-

STRESS

AND

JUSTIFICATION

155

ful electric shock might evaluate the task as being especially unpleasant as part of his generalized response to the research environment. On the other hand, an individual might experience dissonance between the cognition that he is voluntarily serving as a research subject and the cognition that he is going to suffer physical pain for such service. This dissonance might cause him to evaluate the research activity more favorably than one undergoing low stress. A dull task might also be more enjoyable under stress if it served as a distraction from the anticipation of future suffering. The specific hypotheses were: (a) Under low fear, low justification given prior to a dull task should produce more liking for the task than high justification. (b) Under low fear, low justification given after performance should result in less liking for the task than high justification. (c) High fear should result in greater enjoyment’ of the task. METHOD The overall design was a 2 x 2 X 2 factorial consisting of High- and Low-Fear conditions, High and Low Justification for performing a tedious task, and presentation of justification either before or after completion of the task. Subjects were 267 students in Introductory Psychology classes at the University of Texas who volunteered to take part in two experiments to earn an hour of credit for research participation. Subjects signing up were randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental conditions and were run in groups of 616. Three groups were run in each condition. Subjects arriving for the experiment were directed to seats in a classroom in the Psychology building. After all were seated, the fear experimenter (a male) entered the room and introduced himself. The experimenter then explained to all subjects that, as they knew, they were to take part in two short experiments to gain their hour’s credit. He then added that the first experiment was a randomnumber study which would be cxl)lainrd hy Miss McCue who was running it, while the male experimenter would later takr the subjects downstni7.c to his li1~~omiory to take part in the second experiment. At this point, the scrillf$ di~:~r:rrcl iir,c8clr;ling to Fear condition. The following script was used for High-Fear subjects: This is an experiment on the effects of electrical stimulation on perception. In this study you will be working at a very simple perceptual task. A stimulating electrode will be attached to your arm and you will receive a series of electric shocks during the course of the experiment. The shocks will let us measure what effects electric shock has on perception. The shocks are fairly strong and most subjects report that they are somewhat painful. However, I can assure you that they are not dangerous. We are also going to mrasure what changes take plare in the composition of your blood during stimulation. I will take three blood samples-at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of the expc>rimental tadi. Low-Fear subjects were given the identical introduction to the experi,ment but were told that they would receive only mild stimulations. The experimenter

156

ROBERT

L.

HELMREICH

concluded his speech by saying “The stimulation is so mild that you will probably not even feel it.” NO mention was made of any blood samples being taken. At this point, the first experimenter excused himself to prepare his equipment and the second experimenter (a female-blind as to Fear condition) arrived and introduced herself. This experimenter stated that before beginning the study a little information had to be collected. She remarked that, as subjects knew, mood affects how people do anything. Therefore, a questionnaire would be given to collect data on Participants ,moods so that this could be controlled for in the data. At this point, the experimenter handed out a 34-item mood-adjective checklist which subjects completed and rc~turncd. After all checklists had been completed and returned, the following description of the task was given : This study involves concepts of numbers and we are studying this by a method involving the writing of random numbers. The way in which people deviate from randomness is indicative of implicit assumptions about number systrms. We analyze the numbers written by a complicated computer procedure. At this point again procedures Subjects in the Justification After task without further explanation. received one of the two Justification Low-Justification subjects were This study has been going on we need last week and the data scheduled you, we decided to formance will not be included find something to do with them, High-Justification

subjects

were

diverged according to experimental condition. conditions were set to work on the experimenta Subjects in the Justification Before conditions manipulations. told: for a long time. In fact, we ran all the subjects are already being analyzed. Since we had already run you anyway, but the data from your perin the analysis of the results. We will probably but they will not be very useful. told:

This study has been going on for a long time and we need just a few more subjects to complete it. After running you and just a few more, we will be all finished and can finally begin to analyze the data. The data from your performance will be extremely useful since they will just about complete the study and will be used in the analysis of the results. After the Justification manipulation, subjects in the Justification Before conditions were set to work on the task. This was done for all subjects by passing out five sheets of 8% x ll-inch paper ruled into half-inch squares with instructions to work rapidly and to fill in randomly chosen numbers between zero and nine in each block. All subjects were allowed to work on the task without interruption for 10 minutes. At the end of 10 minutes, the experimenter stopped the group a&l either started her final speech or administered one of the two Justification manipulations to subjrcts in the Justification After conditions. All subjects received this final speech: Oh, by the way, I almost forgot. There is one more thing. Before you tak(. part in the perception and stimulation study, the coordinator of research would like each of you to fill out this form asking about your reactions to the experiment. This refers only t,o the random-number experiment; you will be asked to fill out another questiohnaire about the second experiment. When you have completed the form, please fold it up and put it in the envelope provided.

STRESS

A?;D

157

JUSTIFICATIOh-

Please seal the envelope and place it in the box at the front, of the room whrn vou go out. At this point, the experimenter handed out the post-t&, which was a I-page questionnaire attached with a paper clip to an envelope addressed for campus mail to Dr. Louis Roberts, Research Coordinator, Department of Psychology. The questionnaire was headed “University of Texas, Subject’s Evaluation of Experiment Number (with the number 17 written in the blank). The questionnaire asked the subject to make ratings on a seven-point scale of both the experimentrxr and the experiment. The instructions stated that the evaluations would be used to improve experimental procedures. Imbedded in numerous filler items wt=rc two crucial questions asking thr subject to evaluate how enjoyable the exprrimcnt was and how useful he felt it was. The seven-point scales were labeled at the end points (“Not at all” and “Extremely”) and at the midpoint (“Neutral”). After all subjects had completed this form, the vxperiment,cr announced that the experiment had been completed and esplaincd fully the purposes of the study, answering any questions. RESULTS

AKD

DISCUSSION

Manipulation checks. Group means were used as the entering arguments for all analyses. The mean number of subjects in each group is shown in Table 1. The mood-adjective checklist served as a take measure for t.he fear manipulation. Based on previous research (Helmreich, 1966; Helmreich et al., 1968)) an a priori fear scale was formed by summing six of the adjectives (jittery, afraid, alarmed, frightened, restless, terrified) . A three-way (Fear X Justification X Timing) analysis of variance was performed on the fear index. The main effect for fear was significant at bett’er than the .OOl level, two-tailed (F = 46.85, 1 and 16 df) , while no other main effect’s or interactions approached significance. The post-test rating of task usefulness served as a check on the justification manipulation. The three-way analysis of variance reveals a highly significant main effect for justification (F = 35.91, I and 16 crf, p < .OOl) with High-Justification subjects rating the task as more useful under both time and fear conditions. No other main effects or interactions approached significance. A check was made for the possibility that a random unequal dist,ribution of first- and lake-horns having differential responsesto stress might account, for the obt’ainetl results (Helmreich, 1966; Helrnreich and Collins, 1967; Helmreich et al., 1968). The tlist,rihut8ion of first- and laterhorns was approximately equal across all condit,ions. The distrihution of malei: and females was also approximately equal across all cell?. The patt#ern of means indicated no interactions between sex, birth order, and the experiment,al manipulations. The possibility also existed t,hat differential performance on the ranrtom-number

task

might)

muse

artifactual

rCsultc.

If,

for

example,

158

ROBERT

L.

HELMREICH

TABLE 1 MEAN RATINGS OF ENJOYMENTS Justification before Low fear Low justification High justification High fear Low justification High justification

Mean Justification group size after

Mean group size

4.09 3.37

11 13

2.88 3.79

9 10

4.21 4.10

12 9

4.03 4.16

14 11

a Means are the mean of the three group means in each condition. b A score of 7 represents maximum enjoyment.

High-Justification or High-Fear subjects worked harder at writing numbers, they might be expected to find the task less enjoyable. amount of work accomplished was measured by simply counting the number of random digits written during the 10 minutes. The mean number completed in 10 minutes by all subjects was 556. A three-way analysis of variance contrasting conditions revealed no Fs greater than 1. TABLE 2 OVERALL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ENJOYMENT Source

Of

A-fear B-justification C-timing AXB AXC BXC AXBXC Error mean square

df Error

1 1 I 1 1 1 1 0 17 16

P 13 .s3*** <1 1 .M <1
* p < .lO. **p < .05. ***p < .Ol.

Liking for the task. The critical variable was enjoyment of the task. Means for this variable are presented in Table 1. The overall 2 X 2 X 2 (Fear X Justification X Timing) analysis of variance is summarized in Table 2. The main effect for fear was significant at better than the .Ol level. High-Fear subjects found the task more enjoyable than t.hose under Low Fear. Under all justification and timing conditions, the corresponding score for High-Fear subjects is higher than under Low Fear.

STRESS

AND

159

JUSTIFICATION

The interaction between justification and timing was significant at better than the .05 level, while the triple interaction between fear, justification, and timing of justification did not reach the .05 level. The reactions of Low- and High-Fear subjects to justification and timing are shown in Figs. 1 and 2. As is clearly evident, the pattern of means under 4.50

-

4.25 4.00

-

4.04 HIGH

JUSTIFICATION

2.88 LOW

JUSTIFICATION

3.79 3.50 3.25 3.00 3.75i 2.75

3.37 y

FIG. 1. Liking

JUSTIFICATION BEFORE

JUSTIFICATION AFTER

TASK

TASK

for experimedal

task by Low-Fear

subjecta.

Low Fear is almost identical to that obtained by Freedman (1963). Low Fear subjects given low justification for the task before embarking on it found the labor more enjoyable than those offered adequate reasons for productivity. Exactly the opposite pattern held for presentation of the justification after the work was already a fait accompli. In this circumstance, those given good reasons for their labor found the task 4.50 4.25

-

4.00 3.75 3.50 3.25 3.00 2.75

-

FIG. 2. Liking

HIGH JUSTIFICATION LOW JUSTIFICATION 4.10

I JUSTIFICATION BEFORE TASK

for experimental

4.16

JUSTIFICATION AFTER TASK

task by High-Frar

subjects.

more pleasant than those told their work was fut,ile. Under High Fear, while the pattern of result,s is in the same direction, the magnitude of differences between conditions is greatly attenuated. High-Fear subjects found the task more pleasant than those under Low Fear, but the justification and timing manipulations had little effect on enjoyment. The two patterns of results were tested statistically by computing the simple interactions between Just,ificstion and Timing under Low- and

160

ROBERT

L.

HELhfREICH

High-Fear conditions (Winer, 1962, p. 174). The interaction was significant at better than the .Ol level for Low-Fear subjects, while the corresponding F for t.hose under High Fear was less than unity.’ Results of this analysis are summarized in Table 3. The replication of Freedman’s (1963) results in the Low-Fear condition using an independent post-tester adds strength to the argument of Carlsmith and Freedman (in press) that dissonance will occur when an individual has prior knowledge that he is engaging in a futile endeavor, but not when he has already completed an act before finding that the effort was to no avail. The fact that the “reinforcement” theory prediction is supported only in the Justification hfter condition t,ends to TABLE INTERACTION

OF JUSTIFICATIOE;

AND

Low fear-Justification X Timing High fear-Justification X Timing Mean square for error 0.17 df Error 16

3 TIMING

UNDER

1

1

HIGH

AND

Low

FEAR

11.140*

0 ‘233

* p < .Ol.

support an hypothesis that a straight reinforcement effect will occur in the absence of dissonant cognitions. In this situation, being told that the task just completed was import’ant and useful might produce a positive reaction which generalized to the evaluation of the experience. The prediction of greater task enjoyment in the High-Streys conditions was strongly confirmed by the data. The specific mechanism responsible for this finding cannot be isolated within the limits of the present study. can account for the obtained However, two alternative esplanations results. Subjects may have found t,he random-number task a pleasant distract.ion from thoughts about forthcoming pain, and may IMYC reduced anxiety about the shock by concentrating on the task. On the other hand, dissonance formulations cou!d also predict greater enjoyment of the task under High Fear. One can argue that dissonance is present in this aroused by the opposed cognitions “I am voluntarily experimental setting” and “I am going to suffer real pain in this setting.” This dissonance may be greater than that created by the discrepancy between knowledge of the uselessness of a small task and commitment *The error term from the larger (2 X 2 X 2) analysis was used in computing the simple interactions. The Fs and error terms from the respective 2 X 2 anlyses were: Low Fear--F = 14.75, MS error = 0.13, trf error = S; High Fear-F = 0.19, MS error =0.21, df error -8.

STRESS

AiVD

JUSTIFICATION

161

to perform the task. High-Fear subjects could reduce dissonance about suffering for their commitment to research by evaluating the task as more enjoyable. Some support for the view that dissonance was induced in the Fear conditions is found in the fact that High-Fear subjects tended to rate the random-number experimenter more positively on t,he post-experiment questionnaire than did Low-Stress subjects, although the result did not reach acceptable levels of significance (F = 3.76, 1 and 16 df, .lO > p > .05).” The justification and timing conditions and their interactions ~~roduccd no Fs approaching significance. The effects of the strong fear manipulation may have outweighed the importance of justification and timing of justification in influencing perceived enjoyment. The threat of physical harm may well have reduced the salience of justification to the subjects, although the manipulation check indicates that the experimenter’s statement of justification was correctly perceived in all conditions. It seems unlikely that a ceiling effect caused attenuation of the justification effects under High Fear, as the highest mean is only slightly above the midpoint of the scale. Although the specification of mechanism for the fear effect remains open, the result,e re-emphasize the importance of controlling for or assessing emotional stale in studies dealing with perceptions and attitudes. REFERENCES CAI~LSMITH. J. &‘I., AND FREEDM.~N, J. L. Bad decisions and dissonance: Nobody’s perfect. In R. P. Abelson (Ed.). Con.si.stency theoties. New York: Rand McNally, in press. FESTINGER, L. A theory of cognitilse dissonmce. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 195i. FREEDMAN, J. L. Attitudinal effects of inadequare justification. Jow-nnZ o/ Personality, 1963, 31, 371-385. HELMREICH, R. L. SEALAB II: A field study of individual and group reactions to prolonged stress. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale Univ., 19% HELMREICH, R. I,., AND COLLINS, B. E. Situational determinants of affiliative preference under stress. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 79-85. HELMREICH, R., AND HAMILTON, J. Effect,s of stress, communication relevance and birth order on attitude change. ONR Technical Report No. 6, 196% HELMREICR, R. L., KUIKEN, D. L., ASD COLLINS, B. E. Effects of birth order, and irrelevant stress on attitude change. Jou~al of Personality, 1968, in press. SJG.M,L, H., AND HELMREICH, R. Opinion change as a function of stress and communicator credibility. ONR Technical Report NO. 4, 1967. N~INER, B. J. Statistical principles in experimental design. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. (Received May 2, 1967) 3 This experimenter was blind to Fear condition.