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Automated Informational Flows: Why Human Intervention is Still Necessary
Copyright © IFAC 12th Triennial World Congress, Sydney, Australia, 1993
AUTOMATED INFORMATIONAL FLOWS: WHY HUMAN INTERVENTION IS STILL NECESSARY J.-P. Durand University of Paris-Evry, Prospecta, 4 boulevard des Coquibus, 91025 Evry Cedex. France
Abstract:
The field of my talk shall limit itself to the social production of production technology. In my mind, the system of technology cannot be separated from its social matrix of production : we shall demonstrate this by explaining how the preconcieved images that designers have of the worker's labour and of Man's place in regards to maller clearly show through the main characteristics of automated production. We shall then allemptto explain these images through the social position of the designers of technology and by underlining the way production is characterized by the dissociation between operators who are interchangeable and the command and control of the process of transformation that is kept aloof of the shopfloor. Through the concept of socio-Icchnical SICPS it is possible to formalize the social preconditions of the production of technology.
Thus, the links between computering and capitalism can also be inscribed in the same approach. The specificities of computering are here put forth through the issues of the nature of the communication and its memoprospective function. Which in turn leads us to consider the social nature of information.
Main conclusions and/or issues : Social command and control of techniques is an illusion or a fal se question : the essence lies in social relations. What should be thought of information as a social relation?
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demonstrate the shirt between the image of reality they offer and that reality itself. Finally we will show how IS can not do without a permanent process of negotiation, without arbitrations, for which human intervention is a prerequisite.
Over and beyond the more use of micro computers and elcctronics in the course of automating machine tools and production processes. Information Technology has extended to all fields of industry through the creation of information flows mimicking the material flows, no less. With technical complications inherent to material flows now mostly a thing of the past it can now be said that what gives the competitive advantage to one competitor over the rest lies with the control of informational flows, It is through optimized control of such information flows. It is through optimized control of such informational flows that a manufacturer can follow up on and improve the quality of his products, can indeed produce them and spend on inventory. He can thus check his production costs at all times while still gelling organized to vary his supply in real time in order to offer his customers a beller service, or beller still to anticipate on market fluctuations.
1.
WHO SUPPLIES AND VALID
Thanks to computer systems, all corporate players can boast shared information . However for the information to be of any use to achieve the level of efficiency which all actions aim at, the information m ust also be sin g le . This means that the information pertaining to this or that object must be the same in every part of the corporation at any given point in time. This applies to the classification and coding of parts as well as to the follow up of production. Now any product is a live objcct which will evolve and be upgraded constantly between batches, right to the end of the production cycle. In addition it is no longer possible to think in terms of stocks or inventories, but rather in terms of flows. In other words to give a valid representation of manufacturing, you need a motion, rather than a fixed point. And yet all the images and items of information still have to be the same in every part of the corporation at a given point in time. In other words, the singleness of the information is a prerequisite for the integration of the various corporate functions as stressed in various acronyms in use e.g. AlP (Automatisation Intcgrce de la Production) or CIM (Computer Integrated Manufacturing).
That informational flows have now become critical to production is now widely accepted. Yet the question remains - how come the implementation of information systems has not generated the corresponding (and expected) revolution? In other words, once the computer driven automation gets under way, how come it seems not to become all pervasive? Why are there still so many key human agents down the line of information systems? And what makes man a non expandable factor in the conduct and monitoring of automated production systems? Based on a detailed study of the infonnation systems implemented by a French car manufacturer, we shall henceforth demonstrate the frailty inherent to artificial information systems (IS) in the face of a complex reality inhabited by and interfered with by human beings. For brevity'S sake let us say that IS might work to satisfaction where required to manufacture the same products over and over again. As it happens the pressure of competition on markets which have furthermore been depressed for over a decade is such that there is a need for enhanced variety as well as quality (and, where possible at ever falling costs) ; this entails both a permanent change in and a strict follow up on production itself. In the event, the management of this constantly fluctuating state of affairs will be passed on to computers who will also have to avoid any drift on plan.
In the case in point, because a given part could be found under a half dozen codes or more, it was decided in the mid 80s to set up a single information system under the name Nomenclatures et Gestion de Production (NGP) i.e. Classification and Production Management. As the name implies, NGP was designed to follow up on the flow of materials once the manufacturing process had been triggered 011 and the classi fication and management of constantly upgraded parts and components. Each label or reference for each item displays the following information : its code number, name, price, supplier (or suppliers) - with delivery lead time - buffer stock (self sufficiency in days, weeks and/or quantities) . Furthermore, NGP does not only manage individual parts, but components or sub assemblies. It is considered that the assembling of the various sub-assemblies opens up 2270 000 possible combinations. To make the management of this easier, it was decided that the number of possible combinations would be set at 600, and the name of these combinations is common elements of
We will observe the frailty of these artificial IS from the standpoint of the production of a single information throughout the corporate structure and from the standpoint of its neutrality as we examine the nature of information systems. We shall see where they stop being effective, when we
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vehicle description (Elements Communs de Definition de Vehicules -ECDV- in French). These ECDV bring together either vehicles or sets of parts per families. Finally NGP does not simply manage components and sub-sets: it actually manages their relations. Whenever an item is changed, the system will automatically change its relations to other items as of their date of creation. So over and above problems of classification and coding, NGP monitors the whole manufacturing process of all the parts made or assembled in-house. It will therefore be easily imagined how vital is the management of changes, which changes may occur at any time in the process to accommodate a change in design or a change in process; it is indeed critical in order to maintain the singleness of informatio~ up and down the corporate structure.
there arc as many as 3 or 4 changes per week on a gear box alone, a sub assembly which boasts betwecn 150 and 200 individual parts. Hence the system's ful.i.!.ly. This is true with this system as of any other Information System that size. Take any modification (or indeed the creation of a new item for a new part simply superseding another), well the procedure is as follows if we examine it from the point of view of the computer entries: - Say the modification or creation has been sanctioned by the shop (and validated by the process and methods people) the production site then has to create the item into the data bank situated upstream of NGP. (This is called Central Technical Base, or Base Technique Central - BTC -in French, and is the Process and Methods Department's major tool) . The creation on this item has to include the following information: purchase code (for outside suppliers), machining scheme thermal process, code of finished part ready for assembly. - after data acquisition, all this is processed at night in balches (as NGP does not work on line) and is transferred back to the production site who must then notify NGP of finalization .
In terms of production monitoring NGP manages the production of all subassemblies produced inhouse, and it follows up on the supplies for each site (with their in-house or outside suppliers). Supplies arc scheduled to four different time periods as follows: - periodic : programming for the coming month, with indications leading into the coming two or three months; - weekly: the programming is more finely tuned over each five working day week with as much information as possible into the following week. Obviously the order for week onc is firm for those suppliers who work on a weekly basis. - SPARTE : this is a sliding programme covering a five day period (five day is what it takes to assemble a car). In other words the idea is to have a 5 day buffer at all times. Like the weekly programme, SPARTE is delivered on paper print-outs, but the plants only get it on the Wednesday for the following Monday, which in their opinion is cutting it very fine . - sync hronous : here the customer confirms his order for the following day and for the forecasted production of the following two or three days. Todate only Bertrand-Faure, the scat manufacturer actually supplies the Rennes plan following the synchronous system .
The site technicians then enter the schemes into the NGP system (after the local representative from the Process and Methods Department has validated them) together with operation numbers and test numbers cycle times, materials, designated machines and tools etc . Then trouble shooting information has to be entered (in case the prescribed machine becomes unavailable) and further information on rates (and on alternative means ,of production for cerUlin types of products). In addition, it will be remembered that the NGP system does not only require technical information, since it also has to fulfill the other facet of its work i.e . the management of inventories. So other information has to be acquired: the item's code number, supply code, supplier account code number, accounting code number, mode of delivery to site, availability guarantccs etc. You will infer that the information of this NGP system is of strategic importance since unless it is done, NGP is not updated and continues to live on with obsolete codes which no longer correspond to actual facL'; . Thus in the example under review, the information of NGP by the production site is the prerequisite for its quality. No wonder that update of NGP is seen as a major problem by all agents who, on site or at Headquarters have to watch over NGP.
The twofold functionality of NGP (management of classifications and codes and their modifications; production monitoring after manufacturing process is triggered off) can be described by the figure on the following page. The complexity of the system is due not to the large volumes of parts it has to deal with, but to its twofold function and to the large number of features describing each item or part (the above list was only a very small sample) which of course increases the possible causes of error in the course of each modification process. You have to remember that
Because it is essentially management oriented, NGP has to be fully informed all the time to help the
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FLOW OF CLASSIFICATIONS engineering office
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manufacturing side do their job. But paradoxically, it also has to be fed information by the manufacturing people, but manufacturing people with other logics in mind (i .e. the preparation and implementation of modifications) than those driving the men at the very end of the chain, busy in physically bringing to life the finished product, from a multiplicity of parts with a multiplicity of more or less exact or relevant code numbers.
Someone I was talking to at corporate headquarters in fact spotted this contradiction when using the phrase "cannibalization of the production sites" to describe this phenomenon. Thus the plants petition for decentralized update of the classifications and codes; but then the singleness of classifications and codes has to be maintained for each part, under what is known as the reference. So which production site is to be picked as the reference . So which production site is to be picked as the pilot site? No doubt selecting headquarters as a central site is simpler. But this lead s to a hierarchy being established forthwith . Similarly, maintaining autonomous production site generates transaction and coordination cosL<;.
At slake here is the matter of the information of a computerized system by a certain category of workers who, if they do their work shoddily, do not stand to be punished by the IS if, say, the IS in question can no longer continue to run through lack of information. Indeed , quite another category of workers will be penalized should NGP become frail as a consequence of shoddy work by these people. We are here at the cord of the problem set by an IS within the corporate organization. It is now self evident that the creation of an IS cannot be considered separately from the organization of production and the organization labour. Further, it would seem that the creation of an IS cannot afford to go without some thorough reorganization of work practices.
So that is the price to pay for integration. And we have this contradiction, not a formal onc admilledly, which would lead to an aporia, but a contradiction nonetheless in the way it is implemented, in the actual way it operates. There are ways out of this contradiction, albeit eminently labile and transitory, as compromise s always arc . In one such compromise, head office delegates part of its prerogatives to men reporting back direct, but who arc based (the term is "hosted") in the plants. Until March 1989, the department of computer systems reported to the plants. Since that date, the Head of the computer department now reports direct to head office. Such centralization is justified solely by the wish to avoid the development, in various plants, of similar applications written in different languages ...
In which case one must go one step further and consider that all the difficulties I have mentioned here regarding the information of NGP point to the maller of the design modalities of an information ~, due to the fact that those modalities in fact excluded the final users, and especially the people on the production line, the manufacturers of the product.
So we are looking here at the same problem as in the writing of occupation software in the field of CAD/CAM. Either the programmes arc written by profess ionals insufficiently trained in computer science in which case they come a cropper and can be used by no-onc but their author. Or else, through excessive centralization in the computer department, the re is the danger of overlooking the various occupational functionalities altogether. So people tend to find some sort of balance of powers and put together mixed teams of experts comprised of users familiar with their line of trade and computer scientists who have worked their way through CAD/CAM. In the case under consideration, the y solved the problem by creating a number of "CADists" who are analysts and programmers with a CAD\CAM speciality whose job is to adapt and upgrade the software used in the production sites in close coope ration with the engineer in charge of the site. There are twenty or so of them for the whole corporation, working at all the production sites, and their average age is lower than that of draftsmen. The truth of the matter is that none of them is a computer specialist (which does not mean they have not had some form of computer training during their initial schooling) and
In other words, the internal structure of an IS, its design, simply cannot afford to dispense with the opinion of all its users. Further, the structure of the IS cannot be contemplated separately from the more general context of the company's inner organization, and the organization of work . Onc might even say that information systems refer back , in a novel way, to the age-old issue of centralization versus decentralization. For example, out of the following three : the workshop, the process and methods department, or the local process and methods people, who is in a position to best decide what bit of information is correct in order to validate an item of information which will become Wlgk within a general IS such as this NGP? This discussion leads us back to the question of integration , and more especially to onc of the issues at its very core - that of the opposition between the nature of integration requiring a single site of decision, the ultimate and strategic decision (centralizing trend) versus a multiplicity of effective decision making sites or points in space where the various activities are carried out.
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the company prefers to hire people who have an intimate knowledge of the industry (possibly with low grade qualification) and are then given some computer training.
This clear representation of various ISs enables the artefact to remain independent which seems essential in view of the fact that as a technology, the artificial IS has its own technical density, its own autonomy governed by its own laws for technical development (technical artefacts have their own physical and chemical limitations as well as logical limits in view of the limited knowledge their designers have of natural phenomena).
This example of the "CADists" is a good illustration of the middle of the road, or syneretic attitude towards reducing - without ignoring the issue of centralization versus decentralization which lies at the heart of this matter of integration.
2. INFORMATION SYSTEMS THEIR DESIGN MODALlTIES
This definition of artificial information system as integrated within a more general IS including men and their social relationships leads directly to the question of the interpretation of bits of information received by the receivers. This is precisely what a number of scientists have researched from the concept of the neutrality of information where they decided that the desired objective should be that all those who received information would affect it with the same meaning and it would thus be defined as neutral.
AND
Quite apart from the objective of a single information made available to all (i.e. shared) we have the question of the singleness of its rece~Jtion by all the players in the field, that is to say the singleness of its interpretation, the singleness of meaning of the information received . Indeed, through information as a whole comes in the form of ~ given to the computers and the computer people who operate the system, what essentially is of interest to men in an IS is the meani ng of this information.
In actual fact each receiver of information has his history, his own culture, and works for a specific department where he fulfiIls a specific function and each receiver therefore has his own point of view. So there is a chance that each will interpret the same item of information in a different way. Information is thus seen as what it is, i.e. not a data, but a social construct.
This point about the twofold character of information (i .e. signs and meaning) leads us to make a point on the very concept of IS. We have been at pains to define NGP as an artificial IS , thus stressing that we are talking of an artefact. like any other machine with whom human individuals carry out a number of man/machine relation s hips. However the IS artefact has some very specific characteristics in the sense that it handles information as a human individual does. Because the artefact deals with ~ exclusively while men are more interested in the meaning we have conceived a concentric or dovetailed system of information, in which the general IS thus fits around the artificial IS, the social system of exchanges between men and the specific ManIMachine relationships. general IS
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specific man/ machine system (IS) because if handles information shared by both parties (signs and meaning)
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Let us take as an example of information item the cost of a part or of a service. Professor Riveline has all these years been criticizing the "ideology of costs" showing how cost is in fact a myth and how far it is in fact related to the varioys observers' points of view. In addition, any individual cost figure is put to three completely incompatible uses - control, selection criterion in the decision making process, price computation. Now if a given unit cost is worked out for control purposes then it is incorrect to use this unit cost to work out the price as the method and component implemented in the control activity are largely foreign to the price breakdown of a given product. The same applies to cost as a selection criterion for investment or for opting for one of two solutions (say whether to carry out repairs or to simply live with a recurrent machine failure). In his demonstrations, Prof. Riveline underscores the relative value (for observers) of cost and the differences of cost construction modalities according to the objective to be reached.
artificial SI (handles only signs)
Cost is like any other item of information in that it is a social construct and is worked out on the basis of conventions agreed by the various players regarding various and hierarchical objectives.
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tightness between one department and the next. It is hence absolutely essential that all the social users in all the relevant departments be associated to the design of the IS .
So we have to agree that singleness of information is found only in form or layout which tells us nothing of the interpretation its receivers will make of it. In other words : - information is certainly not single in its interpretation, and, as a consequence, in the way it will be acted upon by its users (xhether or not they belong to the same department of the company) - information is not necessarily ideally suited in its expression, its layout, its access conditions to the needs, expectations and demands of all its users.
b) ImDlemenIation and Dolysemy of information: as far as we are concerned we think that the polysemy of information can be made less and controlled through a set of freely accepted and agreed conventions. But they cannot be done away with. At least not unless a novlang is available. But polysemy can also be controlled if the cultural level of all correspondents is raised concurrently. This would enhance their capacity for social communication and empathy, the foundation of mutual undrestanding and communication.
The matter of form, layout, conditions of access, modalities of handling of this single information by widely diverse players then becomes a key problem if it is desired that information remain single in a shared system. But it in effect becomes obvious that almost every single artificial information system working to-date was in fact designed by the EDP people and them alone, without either the social sciences people or the final users being so much as associated to the design process. The said IS are engineers' machines who pay liltle or no altemion to matters of social organisation . Their designers perceive information as a sequence of signspursuant to Shannon theory of information while they view the organisation as a simple series of interlocking systems. Nowhere and at no time have they allowed for the upredictability, uncertainty or variations of human and social behaviours as specific factors.
Quite apart form this control of polysemy, or at any rate for this pursuit of a common understanding all matters perta ining to the implementation and content of information should concurrently involve: - the arc hitec ture of the IS which should not be hierarchic while still taking on board the matter of respon sability and the validation of enriched information, - the layout of information so that it can be accessible to all and achieve full singleness of understanding, - the polys c my whic h constitutes information, starting from the substance and aiming at the full harmonisation of possible meanings so as to acieve singleness of understanding.
As a result we suggest that a radical second look be given to the problems connected to the design of information systems. This review should be done from two essential standpoints: that of the diversity of needs based on the diversity of objectives, on the one hand, and on the other that of how difficult it is to rise to that level of diversity because of the implementation of information and the polysemy of information presenting multidimensional aspects (largely interconnected of course).
The lalter point on the layout and polysemy of information throughout the company has only just emerged and will probably not be solved in the near future . The former however, of a more organisational nature, is already very much with us, including in active strategies relative to the major corporate functions. But it is now being solved only thanks to a number of all too frail and all too labile compromises (e .g . through the change in flow charts) to be conductive to lasting results. It now appears, however, that it takes a long time to design an IS and that this design can only take place especially within the framework of a modified philosophy so that such a design is no longer the exclusive province of the EDP people - can only take place in circumstances of stability. It is up to top corporate managements to ensure this muchneeded stability; alas it would seem that at this stage they are not fully aware of the strategic importance of the circumstances under which ISs are produced. In other words it would seem that ISs are perceived by General Managements as just one tool among many, so that they fail to detect how far these sy stem s freeze social relationships in their current status which in turn tends to freeze things for the future s in ce much depends on the
a) diversity of needs and objectives: this is fundamentally based on the multiplicity of functions which make up a firm and create information which is continually enriched. There is no need at this point to make a comprehensive list of the ways this is so; it is enough for example to show how heterogeneous are the objectives of the process and methods department (who work out in effect the technical process necessary for going into production) and those of the production planning department (who prepare the production schedules) to understand that the information regarding a given part can and should be various to comply with this twofold objective while still remain consistent in order to organise the shift from one logic to another. Furthermore this consi stency must be thought out, must be allowed for and organised under penalty of increa sing the existing water-
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operationality - or non operationality as the case may be - of the system as an IS.
the stand-alone IS . On the one hand (NG?) we have a batch processing in which though information is entered at any time of day it is only cleared and updated overnight with a final statement coming through only in the morning. On the other hand, the local IS is working on line in real time and is notified every morning by NG? of the new inventory levels. On those days when shipped numbers are higher than the morning inventory levels - which is a possibility in view of a day's production potential - the stand-alone IS displays negative stock levels!
It is possible that this will in fact be one of the major benefits of our work in so far as we tried to show, not simply through pragmatic recommendations, but also on the basis of a conceptual and theoretical demonstration on the nature of information itself that the design philosophy of artificial information systems has taken on strategic importance in the process of integration and in the business of sustained competitiveness.
In other words, the stand-alone IS does not have a reliable image of the real inventories, except at time of downloading by NG?, and provided no shipping operation has been carried out between the time when NG? begins its treatment (23:00) and the time when it offloads into the stand-alone IS (05:00). So though the IS does offer the advantage that it does the above described check procedures, it is the case that inventory management is still very much done by hand , or at any rate in the minds of the supervisors of the shipping department with the help of paper print-outs, since after all their IS does not afford them a realistic and reliable image of what is really available in stock.
The same weaknesses in the design of information systems may lend such systems to offer false representations of reality.
3. WHERE THE IMAGE OF REALITY FAILS TO TALLY WITH REALITY
Having information systems is one thing, but it is quite another to have them produce an image of ~ that actually reflects a faithful image of it. We have now seen how much the correct information or the correct image can vary according to points of view (i.e. according to which function/s is/are using it and according to respective needs for information). What we want to do here is to stress how different the image of reality may be in the absolute and disconnected from any reality . The shift may affe~ttime or it may be due to faulty data collection or mistaken validation, or yet again to some disconnection to do with the structural frailty of the IS etc.
In addition, ISs are extremely frail creatures. Because they keep a chek on a complex reality (flows of materials: i.e. products and more especially sub assemblies) they have to be extremely complex themselves and their information, their updating has to be carried out with much tender loving care. In spite of any number of automatic cheks and controls, data collection errors will and do happen, entailing faulty resulL<; and a false image of reality.
The best illustration of such a time shift is what happens in the gear bor shipping department. The department owns its own stand-alone computer system. Shipping orders com through the GAllA electronic mail facility or over the telex or telephone and are manually entered into the standalone IS. This system edits a shipping note which makes for the automatic monitoring of loading operations from the reading of the bar code labels on each pallet. In that way they can make sure - that no truck gets overloaded - that customer X is not being sent a consignment of gear boxes he never ordered - that they retain all transport follow up documenL<; so taht the GALlA system knows where all products are located between the time they are ordered and the time when they are delivered.
Data collection si tes and the profile of data collecting people (and here it must be said that data collection is an immensely unprepossessing job) are therfore key facLOrs in the quality of this work. Which does not stop errors happening. So what it boils down to is the need to create a simple procedure so that the operator keys in a correct piece of information, and keys it in only once (and for instance does not forget to close his application after feeding it the appropriate information!). Here we use the phrase hot information, among which the statement of the day's output, which must be done on the basis of the suppliers' documents so as to lead to a correct list of inventories. This of course is a basic condition for the plant\ day-to-day life . A correct image of inventory levels on products (in their full variety) and components (those made in-house or those available at the suppliers' works) soon becomes an obsession when people have to work with
When each vehicle leaves the premises, a NGP data notifies NG? that such gear boxes are to be removed from the production site inventory while an automatic decrement of inventory is recorded into
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an infinite manufacturing potential whereas one line we examined in the study can only produce 3 800 gear boxes per day. To make up for this break in continuum between NGP and actual production conditions the production unit has to "boost its shipping orders", as they say, which means that while globally complying with the NGP requests (total production per weck, or per month), the unit bypasses the system by maintaining informal links with its customer's immediate needs and the realities of production potential (not forgetting the plants' real stock levels).
practically zero stock levels (the level averages between one day and half a day). The production process is far more frail in view of the system of minimal stock levels (the ideology of zero stocks) and requires a fully rliable informational system to manage the system and/or to supply at all times an image thereof. This extreme reliability in turn leads to further complexification of the IS, which, in turn, generates further frailty in the pursuit of perfection in the informational quality of the IS. That yet another price to pay for integration ... Say one department does its data capture shoddily, the errors will simply cascade down and along - often validated by the built-in control systems - and soon downstream systems will find it impossible to operate under normal conditions. According to one person I talked to at head office, because the informational systems of the assembly plants are far more integrated, with a larger number of components, the problems arising at commissiionning time are even more serious and difficult: "when the theoretical vsion of the IS does not tally with reality, it is extremely difficult to shoot the trouble".
This break in continuum between NGP, a forecasting tool, and actual conditions has a number of reasons. Here is a list of the major ones, with the makeshift solutions locally implemented. a - The expressed need as of booked orders is 4 000 gear boxes a day, while the actual potential is only 3 800 a day. So the balance is made up by the Saturday shift (1 000 extra gear boxes) or week-end shift (over I 000 extra gear boxes). The problem remains how to decide whose gear boxes will be processed each day in view of booked orders and of gear boxes already in stock from the previous weekend shifts. This is the kind of balancing act which, as we have already seen, has to be done manually since NGP is unable to work this out, this type of calculation being quite outside its scope. After all it was not designed to deal with that type of problem at all.
The problem confronting us is that of the complexity of automata versus man's intervention. This has no certain answer. If we are to believe the party of "authropocentrists" we can decide that the production plant will always require human intervention I . In that case it is higly desirable not to automate all informational ressources, and to organise data collections so that it is in the interest of operators, for their future work to be harmonious, to do their data collection and actually produce a faultless representation of reality. This leads us back to the relationships within the genral framework of the manufacturing process, with work being made meaningful.
b - The gap between the image and the real situation is also due to the fact that NGP is not cognizant of the fact that some customers get irregular consignments, delivered on alternate days, say, as is the case of the Vigo (Spain) plant who are sent approximately 800 boxes each time, and 4 400 the next. Yet again, this is worked out manually. c - Then again, there arc one shot orders (and then there arc public holidays which arc not part of the NGP computations) and differences between working calendars applying to the various plants.
Finally, the current ISs, in spite of the extreme complexity which has becn discussed at length are generally extremely rigid and will not easily accomodate the irregular motions of reality. NGP also has this rigidity so that men have to move around it in order to be sure they achieve the production targets.
d - And customers' needs are readjusted over the monthly period. The customers know that gear boxes (as well as engines) are key factors, and that they are the bottleneck of the whole process of vehicle production because mechanic shops work at saturation levels Oat out; as a result, they overstate their orders early in the month. They act as though they were in conditions of scarcity leading to severe competition for parts and they thus create an artificial rush on demands at the turn of the month to make sure they will get the desired quantities in time. They adjust their demand as the month drags on but the gear box manufacturers also wish to be on top of what lexlks like a sec-sawing demand (but
As we have seen, NGP indicates production schedules for the month, the week, the day. The IS, however, is a general one and does not take on board the realities of production (a line's manufacturing potential, the possible number of changes from one batch to the next in the course of one working day etc.). One instance is that NGP reasons in terms of 1 cf. K. EBEL "L'usine automatisce a besoin de la main de l'homme" in Revue Internationale du Travail vol. 128 1989 WS.
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in fact hides quite constant real needs) because their manufacturing capacity is insufficient albeit constant.
conditions the successful assembly of motor-ears on order from the final users. So how can we be surprised at the emergence of gaps between firm orders flowing through GALlA and forecasts made by NGP, albeit constantly revised? In the event, there always are a number of specific orders (though obviously still standard gear boxes) which will upset the NGP forecasts and which are usually very short batches (in the 5 to 10 unit range) or even one sing1c gear box. Hence the use of the word small 100D (as compared to the long information loop in NGP specifications) since they designate components which will require individual assembly. To do this successfully the men need to check that all the relevant parts are available before they start the line, and if this is not the case they have to call the stock room or, as the case may be, have the part specially machined (which of course should never happen since C&C's function is to make sure a minimum level of inventory is maintained at a1\ times).
To sum up, admittedly customer behavior adversely affects the image of reality as reflected by NGP versus their theoretical needs (this behavior is justified by mechanical workshops working to capacity at all times). But this behaviour is made worse because NGP pays no heed to real shipping conditions (such as irregular deliveries or deliveries on alternate days) and concrete manufacturin g constraints. As a result, NGP forecasts, in other words its image of the immediate future is simply no use to the manufacturers. In view of the constantly discrepant representation of reality by NGP, man and man alone can do anything to interpret the information correctly and ~ either to correct or to leave things as they are since they will, in the subsequent stage in the production or shipping cycle, once more come to represent reality. Admittedly, living with this credibility gap gives rise to a great many "manual" arbitrations or negotiations. In other words, it leaves the system open to human decision and human decision alone.
4. A PERMANENT PROCESS NEGOCIA TIONS AND HUMAN ARBITRATIONS
So the whole organization of the start-up of gear box manufacturing is condensed in the D..a.U< manager. Which is nothing more than an EDP system (a micro computer or a mini computer with peripherals and local area network) supervising and monitoring the assembly of gear boxes according to a daily schedule. As far as the observer is concerned, the main point of the system is to highlight the importance of human negotiation and human intelligence within the whole complex informational system . Indeed there is found here a triple interface. working under very stringent time constrainL~ interconnecting:
OF
An illustration of the need for this human intervention into the arbitration and decisionmaking process is that of the "pace manager" ('cadenceur' in French) in the plant studied - in charg~ of working out the schedu1c for the assembly process per quantities and types, for every 24 hour period.
- whatever NGP has prepared as the day's schedule as a function of the forecasts and has to be complied to (slow downs or speed ups to be effected to compensate foresceab1c disruptions) ;
This system reads the orders, at 1cast everything to do with product description or product line and quantities. It does this through two distinct channels which complement one another: first through NGP, which has defined production levels to be achieved for the coming day, with precise instructions relative to the 5 subsequent days, if not for the whole month; and the second through GAllA, the e1cctronic mail facility along which customers confirm their order from the shipping department for the current day. Notice that the two information systems are in fact heterogeneous, NGP being a push system (in other words a planning and forecasting tool) whi1c GAllA is a puJIing system (in which the system is downstream driven) whose function is to confirm the orders whose fulfiJIment
- what the shipping department needs after synthesizing the GAllA messages from the various customers. As it happens the shipping department defines its needs not only in terms of quantities hut also works out the sequence of outputs (at least in a general way) for order fulfillmellt ; - the actual availahility of parts to assemble the gear hoxes (taking into account priorities defined by the shipping department). If parts are not availahle, the schedule has to be changed and the shipping advised (hy the supervisor in charge of pace management) so as to stop the gaps as far as possi hie.
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of money, it is today possible to formalize these problems for a limited number of situations; but the real issue is that situations are ever-changing which requires for the system not only to acquire information, but also, but rather to re-enter the negotiation process with the relevant partners.
It is in fact plain to see that man as interface is, at least for the foreseeable future, irreplaceable as no expert system now on the market can carry out the mUltiple adjusUnents necessary in such a short time (one and a half hour to two hours each morning). In the last analysis the interface is also the place where a multi-partner negotiation takes place and no electronic prosthesis could do this as flexibly as man does.
In addition, what machines and information systems most lack is not just a capacity for leaming, but a capacity to identify just the relevant information enabling them to solve problem x at the exact point in time required (2) (or at least to extract the item needing to be given priority in the negotiation transaction so that it can make a representation validly in the transaction).
One of the people we talked to at head office likened the process of shifting from NGP to GAllA at manufacturing to "the organizational problem of update" and "a global planning strategy". Production sheet D-l (NGP) inventory of available parts customer requirements D Day (via GAllA) out of which emergencies time lag (forwards or backwards) and production level optimal sequence of oulDut for the day
So the meaning of all this is as follows: within the framework of the social system that is the corporation and its environment, the manipulation of signs by a computer system is not enough to achieve arbitration and negotiation levels. Because he works on the basis of how signs interpenetrate each other, man alone can deal with the problems he has set for himself.
The above-mentioned rigid formalization only shows the arbitration capacity invested in man to change the pace manager and in other words decide what manufacturing sequence will be followed through the day. As a maLLer of fact arbitration only comes at the end of a negotiation process between all the major players involved, i.e. the shipping department, the assembly line and those who have to supply missing parts (either in-house or outside the company). Further, the arbitration is never final for anyone day but has to be reviewed and revised constantly following the ups and downs of part deliveries, the demands of the shipping people.
This conclusion in turn leads to a thorough review of how artificial information systems are designed. Indeed if man is a prerequisite in their successful operation and integration within the type of general IS described above, then it becomes necessary 1Q recognize that man is a full-blown comDonent in the system. Which might mean the end of trying to sit man as a kind of appendage to artificial IS's and in fact quite the reverse, building artificial IS's and their interfaces around the capacity of men to negotiate and arbitrate those constraints they tend to create. This is only the outset of the informational era, and ilftificiallS's have hardly been around for a decade in our production units. Yet it is already possible to detect in their design and their construction modalities the very same mistake which are all too often a characteristic of manufacturing systems, i.e. that their final users were excluded from the design stages.
Another thing which cannot be stressed too much here is that the arbitrations take place as a strict function of thc amount of eXDcriencc the men have required is their daily struggle with the other factors in the negotiations, their capacity to face up to required targets (time and quantity targets), the customers' capacity to hold up when deliveries are not fulfilled, etc . And finally these arbitnltions take place over time, or to put it another way they establish some hierarchy - though admiLLedly with fluctuating parameters - among all immediate constraints while still keeping an eye on the medium term (seen here as a matter of a few days to one month).
Yet in this case the mistake might well prove fatal for although it was possible to train users to monitor machines which had come about altogether outside themselves (with the advent of a crisis affecting simple labour still very much unsolved), it is doubtful whether socially meaningful artificial information systems can be made to work in the same way . Because the issue of information's
So these are all reasons for man's intervention, for in spite of their formidable storage and memory facilities, in spite of their enormous computing powers, EDP systems and informational systems lack the capacity to adapt to ever-changing and random circumstances. Though it would cost a lot
cf. Chapter entitled "La societe de l'information" in J.P. DURAND & F.X. MERRIEN, Sortie de SiITk., Paris, Vigot, 1991. (2)
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signifier and signified is extremely confused, generally leading to the advantage of the former, the continued exclusion of social issues and final users could lead in the very short term to the construction of the monumental EOP machines with only very limited benefits. What is needed is a review of the way in which artificial information systems are designed. This could become the base for a real, competitive difference in industrial efficiency.
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AUTOMATED INFORMATIONAL FLOWS: WHY HUMAN INTERVENTION IS STILL NECESSARY J.-P. Durand University of Paris-Evry, Prospecta, 4 boulevard des Coquibus, 91025 Evry Cedex. France
Abstract:
The field of my talk shall limit itself to the social production of production technology. In my mind, the system of technology cannot be separated from its social matrix of production : we shall demonstrate this by explaining how the preconcieved images that designers have of the worker's labour and of Man's place in regards to maller clearly show through the main characteristics of automated production. We shall then allemptto explain these images through the social position of the designers of technology and by underlining the way production is characterized by the dissociation between operators who are interchangeable and the command and control of the process of transformation that is kept aloof of the shopfloor. Through the concept of socio-Icchnical SICPS it is possible to formalize the social preconditions of the production of technology.
Thus, the links between computering and capitalism can also be inscribed in the same approach. The specificities of computering are here put forth through the issues of the nature of the communication and its memoprospective function. Which in turn leads us to consider the social nature of information.
Main conclusions and/or issues : Social command and control of techniques is an illusion or a fal se question : the essence lies in social relations. What should be thought of information as a social relation?
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demonstrate the shirt between the image of reality they offer and that reality itself. Finally we will show how IS can not do without a permanent process of negotiation, without arbitrations, for which human intervention is a prerequisite.
Over and beyond the more use of micro computers and elcctronics in the course of automating machine tools and production processes. Information Technology has extended to all fields of industry through the creation of information flows mimicking the material flows, no less. With technical complications inherent to material flows now mostly a thing of the past it can now be said that what gives the competitive advantage to one competitor over the rest lies with the control of informational flows, It is through optimized control of such information flows. It is through optimized control of such informational flows that a manufacturer can follow up on and improve the quality of his products, can indeed produce them and spend on inventory. He can thus check his production costs at all times while still gelling organized to vary his supply in real time in order to offer his customers a beller service, or beller still to anticipate on market fluctuations.
1.
WHO SUPPLIES AND VALID
Thanks to computer systems, all corporate players can boast shared information . However for the information to be of any use to achieve the level of efficiency which all actions aim at, the information m ust also be sin g le . This means that the information pertaining to this or that object must be the same in every part of the corporation at any given point in time. This applies to the classification and coding of parts as well as to the follow up of production. Now any product is a live objcct which will evolve and be upgraded constantly between batches, right to the end of the production cycle. In addition it is no longer possible to think in terms of stocks or inventories, but rather in terms of flows. In other words to give a valid representation of manufacturing, you need a motion, rather than a fixed point. And yet all the images and items of information still have to be the same in every part of the corporation at a given point in time. In other words, the singleness of the information is a prerequisite for the integration of the various corporate functions as stressed in various acronyms in use e.g. AlP (Automatisation Intcgrce de la Production) or CIM (Computer Integrated Manufacturing).
That informational flows have now become critical to production is now widely accepted. Yet the question remains - how come the implementation of information systems has not generated the corresponding (and expected) revolution? In other words, once the computer driven automation gets under way, how come it seems not to become all pervasive? Why are there still so many key human agents down the line of information systems? And what makes man a non expandable factor in the conduct and monitoring of automated production systems? Based on a detailed study of the infonnation systems implemented by a French car manufacturer, we shall henceforth demonstrate the frailty inherent to artificial information systems (IS) in the face of a complex reality inhabited by and interfered with by human beings. For brevity'S sake let us say that IS might work to satisfaction where required to manufacture the same products over and over again. As it happens the pressure of competition on markets which have furthermore been depressed for over a decade is such that there is a need for enhanced variety as well as quality (and, where possible at ever falling costs) ; this entails both a permanent change in and a strict follow up on production itself. In the event, the management of this constantly fluctuating state of affairs will be passed on to computers who will also have to avoid any drift on plan.
In the case in point, because a given part could be found under a half dozen codes or more, it was decided in the mid 80s to set up a single information system under the name Nomenclatures et Gestion de Production (NGP) i.e. Classification and Production Management. As the name implies, NGP was designed to follow up on the flow of materials once the manufacturing process had been triggered 011 and the classi fication and management of constantly upgraded parts and components. Each label or reference for each item displays the following information : its code number, name, price, supplier (or suppliers) - with delivery lead time - buffer stock (self sufficiency in days, weeks and/or quantities) . Furthermore, NGP does not only manage individual parts, but components or sub assemblies. It is considered that the assembling of the various sub-assemblies opens up 2270 000 possible combinations. To make the management of this easier, it was decided that the number of possible combinations would be set at 600, and the name of these combinations is common elements of
We will observe the frailty of these artificial IS from the standpoint of the production of a single information throughout the corporate structure and from the standpoint of its neutrality as we examine the nature of information systems. We shall see where they stop being effective, when we
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vehicle description (Elements Communs de Definition de Vehicules -ECDV- in French). These ECDV bring together either vehicles or sets of parts per families. Finally NGP does not simply manage components and sub-sets: it actually manages their relations. Whenever an item is changed, the system will automatically change its relations to other items as of their date of creation. So over and above problems of classification and coding, NGP monitors the whole manufacturing process of all the parts made or assembled in-house. It will therefore be easily imagined how vital is the management of changes, which changes may occur at any time in the process to accommodate a change in design or a change in process; it is indeed critical in order to maintain the singleness of informatio~ up and down the corporate structure.
there arc as many as 3 or 4 changes per week on a gear box alone, a sub assembly which boasts betwecn 150 and 200 individual parts. Hence the system's ful.i.!.ly. This is true with this system as of any other Information System that size. Take any modification (or indeed the creation of a new item for a new part simply superseding another), well the procedure is as follows if we examine it from the point of view of the computer entries: - Say the modification or creation has been sanctioned by the shop (and validated by the process and methods people) the production site then has to create the item into the data bank situated upstream of NGP. (This is called Central Technical Base, or Base Technique Central - BTC -in French, and is the Process and Methods Department's major tool) . The creation on this item has to include the following information: purchase code (for outside suppliers), machining scheme thermal process, code of finished part ready for assembly. - after data acquisition, all this is processed at night in balches (as NGP does not work on line) and is transferred back to the production site who must then notify NGP of finalization .
In terms of production monitoring NGP manages the production of all subassemblies produced inhouse, and it follows up on the supplies for each site (with their in-house or outside suppliers). Supplies arc scheduled to four different time periods as follows: - periodic : programming for the coming month, with indications leading into the coming two or three months; - weekly: the programming is more finely tuned over each five working day week with as much information as possible into the following week. Obviously the order for week onc is firm for those suppliers who work on a weekly basis. - SPARTE : this is a sliding programme covering a five day period (five day is what it takes to assemble a car). In other words the idea is to have a 5 day buffer at all times. Like the weekly programme, SPARTE is delivered on paper print-outs, but the plants only get it on the Wednesday for the following Monday, which in their opinion is cutting it very fine . - sync hronous : here the customer confirms his order for the following day and for the forecasted production of the following two or three days. Todate only Bertrand-Faure, the scat manufacturer actually supplies the Rennes plan following the synchronous system .
The site technicians then enter the schemes into the NGP system (after the local representative from the Process and Methods Department has validated them) together with operation numbers and test numbers cycle times, materials, designated machines and tools etc . Then trouble shooting information has to be entered (in case the prescribed machine becomes unavailable) and further information on rates (and on alternative means ,of production for cerUlin types of products). In addition, it will be remembered that the NGP system does not only require technical information, since it also has to fulfill the other facet of its work i.e . the management of inventories. So other information has to be acquired: the item's code number, supply code, supplier account code number, accounting code number, mode of delivery to site, availability guarantccs etc. You will infer that the information of this NGP system is of strategic importance since unless it is done, NGP is not updated and continues to live on with obsolete codes which no longer correspond to actual facL'; . Thus in the example under review, the information of NGP by the production site is the prerequisite for its quality. No wonder that update of NGP is seen as a major problem by all agents who, on site or at Headquarters have to watch over NGP.
The twofold functionality of NGP (management of classifications and codes and their modifications; production monitoring after manufacturing process is triggered off) can be described by the figure on the following page. The complexity of the system is due not to the large volumes of parts it has to deal with, but to its twofold function and to the large number of features describing each item or part (the above list was only a very small sample) which of course increases the possible causes of error in the course of each modification process. You have to remember that
Because it is essentially management oriented, NGP has to be fully informed all the time to help the
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FLOW OF CLASSIFICATIONS engineering office
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manufacturing side do their job. But paradoxically, it also has to be fed information by the manufacturing people, but manufacturing people with other logics in mind (i .e. the preparation and implementation of modifications) than those driving the men at the very end of the chain, busy in physically bringing to life the finished product, from a multiplicity of parts with a multiplicity of more or less exact or relevant code numbers.
Someone I was talking to at corporate headquarters in fact spotted this contradiction when using the phrase "cannibalization of the production sites" to describe this phenomenon. Thus the plants petition for decentralized update of the classifications and codes; but then the singleness of classifications and codes has to be maintained for each part, under what is known as the reference. So which production site is to be picked as the reference . So which production site is to be picked as the pilot site? No doubt selecting headquarters as a central site is simpler. But this lead s to a hierarchy being established forthwith . Similarly, maintaining autonomous production site generates transaction and coordination cosL<;.
At slake here is the matter of the information of a computerized system by a certain category of workers who, if they do their work shoddily, do not stand to be punished by the IS if, say, the IS in question can no longer continue to run through lack of information. Indeed , quite another category of workers will be penalized should NGP become frail as a consequence of shoddy work by these people. We are here at the cord of the problem set by an IS within the corporate organization. It is now self evident that the creation of an IS cannot be considered separately from the organization of production and the organization labour. Further, it would seem that the creation of an IS cannot afford to go without some thorough reorganization of work practices.
So that is the price to pay for integration. And we have this contradiction, not a formal onc admilledly, which would lead to an aporia, but a contradiction nonetheless in the way it is implemented, in the actual way it operates. There are ways out of this contradiction, albeit eminently labile and transitory, as compromise s always arc . In one such compromise, head office delegates part of its prerogatives to men reporting back direct, but who arc based (the term is "hosted") in the plants. Until March 1989, the department of computer systems reported to the plants. Since that date, the Head of the computer department now reports direct to head office. Such centralization is justified solely by the wish to avoid the development, in various plants, of similar applications written in different languages ...
In which case one must go one step further and consider that all the difficulties I have mentioned here regarding the information of NGP point to the maller of the design modalities of an information ~, due to the fact that those modalities in fact excluded the final users, and especially the people on the production line, the manufacturers of the product.
So we are looking here at the same problem as in the writing of occupation software in the field of CAD/CAM. Either the programmes arc written by profess ionals insufficiently trained in computer science in which case they come a cropper and can be used by no-onc but their author. Or else, through excessive centralization in the computer department, the re is the danger of overlooking the various occupational functionalities altogether. So people tend to find some sort of balance of powers and put together mixed teams of experts comprised of users familiar with their line of trade and computer scientists who have worked their way through CAD/CAM. In the case under consideration, the y solved the problem by creating a number of "CADists" who are analysts and programmers with a CAD\CAM speciality whose job is to adapt and upgrade the software used in the production sites in close coope ration with the engineer in charge of the site. There are twenty or so of them for the whole corporation, working at all the production sites, and their average age is lower than that of draftsmen. The truth of the matter is that none of them is a computer specialist (which does not mean they have not had some form of computer training during their initial schooling) and
In other words, the internal structure of an IS, its design, simply cannot afford to dispense with the opinion of all its users. Further, the structure of the IS cannot be contemplated separately from the more general context of the company's inner organization, and the organization of work . Onc might even say that information systems refer back , in a novel way, to the age-old issue of centralization versus decentralization. For example, out of the following three : the workshop, the process and methods department, or the local process and methods people, who is in a position to best decide what bit of information is correct in order to validate an item of information which will become Wlgk within a general IS such as this NGP? This discussion leads us back to the question of integration , and more especially to onc of the issues at its very core - that of the opposition between the nature of integration requiring a single site of decision, the ultimate and strategic decision (centralizing trend) versus a multiplicity of effective decision making sites or points in space where the various activities are carried out.
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the company prefers to hire people who have an intimate knowledge of the industry (possibly with low grade qualification) and are then given some computer training.
This clear representation of various ISs enables the artefact to remain independent which seems essential in view of the fact that as a technology, the artificial IS has its own technical density, its own autonomy governed by its own laws for technical development (technical artefacts have their own physical and chemical limitations as well as logical limits in view of the limited knowledge their designers have of natural phenomena).
This example of the "CADists" is a good illustration of the middle of the road, or syneretic attitude towards reducing - without ignoring the issue of centralization versus decentralization which lies at the heart of this matter of integration.
2. INFORMATION SYSTEMS THEIR DESIGN MODALlTIES
This definition of artificial information system as integrated within a more general IS including men and their social relationships leads directly to the question of the interpretation of bits of information received by the receivers. This is precisely what a number of scientists have researched from the concept of the neutrality of information where they decided that the desired objective should be that all those who received information would affect it with the same meaning and it would thus be defined as neutral.
AND
Quite apart from the objective of a single information made available to all (i.e. shared) we have the question of the singleness of its rece~Jtion by all the players in the field, that is to say the singleness of its interpretation, the singleness of meaning of the information received . Indeed, through information as a whole comes in the form of ~ given to the computers and the computer people who operate the system, what essentially is of interest to men in an IS is the meani ng of this information.
In actual fact each receiver of information has his history, his own culture, and works for a specific department where he fulfiIls a specific function and each receiver therefore has his own point of view. So there is a chance that each will interpret the same item of information in a different way. Information is thus seen as what it is, i.e. not a data, but a social construct.
This point about the twofold character of information (i .e. signs and meaning) leads us to make a point on the very concept of IS. We have been at pains to define NGP as an artificial IS , thus stressing that we are talking of an artefact. like any other machine with whom human individuals carry out a number of man/machine relation s hips. However the IS artefact has some very specific characteristics in the sense that it handles information as a human individual does. Because the artefact deals with ~ exclusively while men are more interested in the meaning we have conceived a concentric or dovetailed system of information, in which the general IS thus fits around the artificial IS, the social system of exchanges between men and the specific ManIMachine relationships. general IS
., .,
man/man SI
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specific man/ machine system (IS) because if handles information shared by both parties (signs and meaning)
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Let us take as an example of information item the cost of a part or of a service. Professor Riveline has all these years been criticizing the "ideology of costs" showing how cost is in fact a myth and how far it is in fact related to the varioys observers' points of view. In addition, any individual cost figure is put to three completely incompatible uses - control, selection criterion in the decision making process, price computation. Now if a given unit cost is worked out for control purposes then it is incorrect to use this unit cost to work out the price as the method and component implemented in the control activity are largely foreign to the price breakdown of a given product. The same applies to cost as a selection criterion for investment or for opting for one of two solutions (say whether to carry out repairs or to simply live with a recurrent machine failure). In his demonstrations, Prof. Riveline underscores the relative value (for observers) of cost and the differences of cost construction modalities according to the objective to be reached.
artificial SI (handles only signs)
Cost is like any other item of information in that it is a social construct and is worked out on the basis of conventions agreed by the various players regarding various and hierarchical objectives.
-~
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tightness between one department and the next. It is hence absolutely essential that all the social users in all the relevant departments be associated to the design of the IS .
So we have to agree that singleness of information is found only in form or layout which tells us nothing of the interpretation its receivers will make of it. In other words : - information is certainly not single in its interpretation, and, as a consequence, in the way it will be acted upon by its users (xhether or not they belong to the same department of the company) - information is not necessarily ideally suited in its expression, its layout, its access conditions to the needs, expectations and demands of all its users.
b) ImDlemenIation and Dolysemy of information: as far as we are concerned we think that the polysemy of information can be made less and controlled through a set of freely accepted and agreed conventions. But they cannot be done away with. At least not unless a novlang is available. But polysemy can also be controlled if the cultural level of all correspondents is raised concurrently. This would enhance their capacity for social communication and empathy, the foundation of mutual undrestanding and communication.
The matter of form, layout, conditions of access, modalities of handling of this single information by widely diverse players then becomes a key problem if it is desired that information remain single in a shared system. But it in effect becomes obvious that almost every single artificial information system working to-date was in fact designed by the EDP people and them alone, without either the social sciences people or the final users being so much as associated to the design process. The said IS are engineers' machines who pay liltle or no altemion to matters of social organisation . Their designers perceive information as a sequence of signspursuant to Shannon theory of information while they view the organisation as a simple series of interlocking systems. Nowhere and at no time have they allowed for the upredictability, uncertainty or variations of human and social behaviours as specific factors.
Quite apart form this control of polysemy, or at any rate for this pursuit of a common understanding all matters perta ining to the implementation and content of information should concurrently involve: - the arc hitec ture of the IS which should not be hierarchic while still taking on board the matter of respon sability and the validation of enriched information, - the layout of information so that it can be accessible to all and achieve full singleness of understanding, - the polys c my whic h constitutes information, starting from the substance and aiming at the full harmonisation of possible meanings so as to acieve singleness of understanding.
As a result we suggest that a radical second look be given to the problems connected to the design of information systems. This review should be done from two essential standpoints: that of the diversity of needs based on the diversity of objectives, on the one hand, and on the other that of how difficult it is to rise to that level of diversity because of the implementation of information and the polysemy of information presenting multidimensional aspects (largely interconnected of course).
The lalter point on the layout and polysemy of information throughout the company has only just emerged and will probably not be solved in the near future . The former however, of a more organisational nature, is already very much with us, including in active strategies relative to the major corporate functions. But it is now being solved only thanks to a number of all too frail and all too labile compromises (e .g . through the change in flow charts) to be conductive to lasting results. It now appears, however, that it takes a long time to design an IS and that this design can only take place especially within the framework of a modified philosophy so that such a design is no longer the exclusive province of the EDP people - can only take place in circumstances of stability. It is up to top corporate managements to ensure this muchneeded stability; alas it would seem that at this stage they are not fully aware of the strategic importance of the circumstances under which ISs are produced. In other words it would seem that ISs are perceived by General Managements as just one tool among many, so that they fail to detect how far these sy stem s freeze social relationships in their current status which in turn tends to freeze things for the future s in ce much depends on the
a) diversity of needs and objectives: this is fundamentally based on the multiplicity of functions which make up a firm and create information which is continually enriched. There is no need at this point to make a comprehensive list of the ways this is so; it is enough for example to show how heterogeneous are the objectives of the process and methods department (who work out in effect the technical process necessary for going into production) and those of the production planning department (who prepare the production schedules) to understand that the information regarding a given part can and should be various to comply with this twofold objective while still remain consistent in order to organise the shift from one logic to another. Furthermore this consi stency must be thought out, must be allowed for and organised under penalty of increa sing the existing water-
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operationality - or non operationality as the case may be - of the system as an IS.
the stand-alone IS . On the one hand (NG?) we have a batch processing in which though information is entered at any time of day it is only cleared and updated overnight with a final statement coming through only in the morning. On the other hand, the local IS is working on line in real time and is notified every morning by NG? of the new inventory levels. On those days when shipped numbers are higher than the morning inventory levels - which is a possibility in view of a day's production potential - the stand-alone IS displays negative stock levels!
It is possible that this will in fact be one of the major benefits of our work in so far as we tried to show, not simply through pragmatic recommendations, but also on the basis of a conceptual and theoretical demonstration on the nature of information itself that the design philosophy of artificial information systems has taken on strategic importance in the process of integration and in the business of sustained competitiveness.
In other words, the stand-alone IS does not have a reliable image of the real inventories, except at time of downloading by NG?, and provided no shipping operation has been carried out between the time when NG? begins its treatment (23:00) and the time when it offloads into the stand-alone IS (05:00). So though the IS does offer the advantage that it does the above described check procedures, it is the case that inventory management is still very much done by hand , or at any rate in the minds of the supervisors of the shipping department with the help of paper print-outs, since after all their IS does not afford them a realistic and reliable image of what is really available in stock.
The same weaknesses in the design of information systems may lend such systems to offer false representations of reality.
3. WHERE THE IMAGE OF REALITY FAILS TO TALLY WITH REALITY
Having information systems is one thing, but it is quite another to have them produce an image of ~ that actually reflects a faithful image of it. We have now seen how much the correct information or the correct image can vary according to points of view (i.e. according to which function/s is/are using it and according to respective needs for information). What we want to do here is to stress how different the image of reality may be in the absolute and disconnected from any reality . The shift may affe~ttime or it may be due to faulty data collection or mistaken validation, or yet again to some disconnection to do with the structural frailty of the IS etc.
In addition, ISs are extremely frail creatures. Because they keep a chek on a complex reality (flows of materials: i.e. products and more especially sub assemblies) they have to be extremely complex themselves and their information, their updating has to be carried out with much tender loving care. In spite of any number of automatic cheks and controls, data collection errors will and do happen, entailing faulty resulL<; and a false image of reality.
The best illustration of such a time shift is what happens in the gear bor shipping department. The department owns its own stand-alone computer system. Shipping orders com through the GAllA electronic mail facility or over the telex or telephone and are manually entered into the standalone IS. This system edits a shipping note which makes for the automatic monitoring of loading operations from the reading of the bar code labels on each pallet. In that way they can make sure - that no truck gets overloaded - that customer X is not being sent a consignment of gear boxes he never ordered - that they retain all transport follow up documenL<; so taht the GALlA system knows where all products are located between the time they are ordered and the time when they are delivered.
Data collection si tes and the profile of data collecting people (and here it must be said that data collection is an immensely unprepossessing job) are therfore key facLOrs in the quality of this work. Which does not stop errors happening. So what it boils down to is the need to create a simple procedure so that the operator keys in a correct piece of information, and keys it in only once (and for instance does not forget to close his application after feeding it the appropriate information!). Here we use the phrase hot information, among which the statement of the day's output, which must be done on the basis of the suppliers' documents so as to lead to a correct list of inventories. This of course is a basic condition for the plant\ day-to-day life . A correct image of inventory levels on products (in their full variety) and components (those made in-house or those available at the suppliers' works) soon becomes an obsession when people have to work with
When each vehicle leaves the premises, a NGP data notifies NG? that such gear boxes are to be removed from the production site inventory while an automatic decrement of inventory is recorded into
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an infinite manufacturing potential whereas one line we examined in the study can only produce 3 800 gear boxes per day. To make up for this break in continuum between NGP and actual production conditions the production unit has to "boost its shipping orders", as they say, which means that while globally complying with the NGP requests (total production per weck, or per month), the unit bypasses the system by maintaining informal links with its customer's immediate needs and the realities of production potential (not forgetting the plants' real stock levels).
practically zero stock levels (the level averages between one day and half a day). The production process is far more frail in view of the system of minimal stock levels (the ideology of zero stocks) and requires a fully rliable informational system to manage the system and/or to supply at all times an image thereof. This extreme reliability in turn leads to further complexification of the IS, which, in turn, generates further frailty in the pursuit of perfection in the informational quality of the IS. That yet another price to pay for integration ... Say one department does its data capture shoddily, the errors will simply cascade down and along - often validated by the built-in control systems - and soon downstream systems will find it impossible to operate under normal conditions. According to one person I talked to at head office, because the informational systems of the assembly plants are far more integrated, with a larger number of components, the problems arising at commissiionning time are even more serious and difficult: "when the theoretical vsion of the IS does not tally with reality, it is extremely difficult to shoot the trouble".
This break in continuum between NGP, a forecasting tool, and actual conditions has a number of reasons. Here is a list of the major ones, with the makeshift solutions locally implemented. a - The expressed need as of booked orders is 4 000 gear boxes a day, while the actual potential is only 3 800 a day. So the balance is made up by the Saturday shift (1 000 extra gear boxes) or week-end shift (over I 000 extra gear boxes). The problem remains how to decide whose gear boxes will be processed each day in view of booked orders and of gear boxes already in stock from the previous weekend shifts. This is the kind of balancing act which, as we have already seen, has to be done manually since NGP is unable to work this out, this type of calculation being quite outside its scope. After all it was not designed to deal with that type of problem at all.
The problem confronting us is that of the complexity of automata versus man's intervention. This has no certain answer. If we are to believe the party of "authropocentrists" we can decide that the production plant will always require human intervention I . In that case it is higly desirable not to automate all informational ressources, and to organise data collections so that it is in the interest of operators, for their future work to be harmonious, to do their data collection and actually produce a faultless representation of reality. This leads us back to the relationships within the genral framework of the manufacturing process, with work being made meaningful.
b - The gap between the image and the real situation is also due to the fact that NGP is not cognizant of the fact that some customers get irregular consignments, delivered on alternate days, say, as is the case of the Vigo (Spain) plant who are sent approximately 800 boxes each time, and 4 400 the next. Yet again, this is worked out manually. c - Then again, there arc one shot orders (and then there arc public holidays which arc not part of the NGP computations) and differences between working calendars applying to the various plants.
Finally, the current ISs, in spite of the extreme complexity which has becn discussed at length are generally extremely rigid and will not easily accomodate the irregular motions of reality. NGP also has this rigidity so that men have to move around it in order to be sure they achieve the production targets.
d - And customers' needs are readjusted over the monthly period. The customers know that gear boxes (as well as engines) are key factors, and that they are the bottleneck of the whole process of vehicle production because mechanic shops work at saturation levels Oat out; as a result, they overstate their orders early in the month. They act as though they were in conditions of scarcity leading to severe competition for parts and they thus create an artificial rush on demands at the turn of the month to make sure they will get the desired quantities in time. They adjust their demand as the month drags on but the gear box manufacturers also wish to be on top of what lexlks like a sec-sawing demand (but
As we have seen, NGP indicates production schedules for the month, the week, the day. The IS, however, is a general one and does not take on board the realities of production (a line's manufacturing potential, the possible number of changes from one batch to the next in the course of one working day etc.). One instance is that NGP reasons in terms of 1 cf. K. EBEL "L'usine automatisce a besoin de la main de l'homme" in Revue Internationale du Travail vol. 128 1989 WS.
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in fact hides quite constant real needs) because their manufacturing capacity is insufficient albeit constant.
conditions the successful assembly of motor-ears on order from the final users. So how can we be surprised at the emergence of gaps between firm orders flowing through GALlA and forecasts made by NGP, albeit constantly revised? In the event, there always are a number of specific orders (though obviously still standard gear boxes) which will upset the NGP forecasts and which are usually very short batches (in the 5 to 10 unit range) or even one sing1c gear box. Hence the use of the word small 100D (as compared to the long information loop in NGP specifications) since they designate components which will require individual assembly. To do this successfully the men need to check that all the relevant parts are available before they start the line, and if this is not the case they have to call the stock room or, as the case may be, have the part specially machined (which of course should never happen since C&C's function is to make sure a minimum level of inventory is maintained at a1\ times).
To sum up, admittedly customer behavior adversely affects the image of reality as reflected by NGP versus their theoretical needs (this behavior is justified by mechanical workshops working to capacity at all times). But this behaviour is made worse because NGP pays no heed to real shipping conditions (such as irregular deliveries or deliveries on alternate days) and concrete manufacturin g constraints. As a result, NGP forecasts, in other words its image of the immediate future is simply no use to the manufacturers. In view of the constantly discrepant representation of reality by NGP, man and man alone can do anything to interpret the information correctly and ~ either to correct or to leave things as they are since they will, in the subsequent stage in the production or shipping cycle, once more come to represent reality. Admittedly, living with this credibility gap gives rise to a great many "manual" arbitrations or negotiations. In other words, it leaves the system open to human decision and human decision alone.
4. A PERMANENT PROCESS NEGOCIA TIONS AND HUMAN ARBITRATIONS
So the whole organization of the start-up of gear box manufacturing is condensed in the D..a.U< manager. Which is nothing more than an EDP system (a micro computer or a mini computer with peripherals and local area network) supervising and monitoring the assembly of gear boxes according to a daily schedule. As far as the observer is concerned, the main point of the system is to highlight the importance of human negotiation and human intelligence within the whole complex informational system . Indeed there is found here a triple interface. working under very stringent time constrainL~ interconnecting:
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An illustration of the need for this human intervention into the arbitration and decisionmaking process is that of the "pace manager" ('cadenceur' in French) in the plant studied - in charg~ of working out the schedu1c for the assembly process per quantities and types, for every 24 hour period.
- whatever NGP has prepared as the day's schedule as a function of the forecasts and has to be complied to (slow downs or speed ups to be effected to compensate foresceab1c disruptions) ;
This system reads the orders, at 1cast everything to do with product description or product line and quantities. It does this through two distinct channels which complement one another: first through NGP, which has defined production levels to be achieved for the coming day, with precise instructions relative to the 5 subsequent days, if not for the whole month; and the second through GAllA, the e1cctronic mail facility along which customers confirm their order from the shipping department for the current day. Notice that the two information systems are in fact heterogeneous, NGP being a push system (in other words a planning and forecasting tool) whi1c GAllA is a puJIing system (in which the system is downstream driven) whose function is to confirm the orders whose fulfiJIment
- what the shipping department needs after synthesizing the GAllA messages from the various customers. As it happens the shipping department defines its needs not only in terms of quantities hut also works out the sequence of outputs (at least in a general way) for order fulfillmellt ; - the actual availahility of parts to assemble the gear hoxes (taking into account priorities defined by the shipping department). If parts are not availahle, the schedule has to be changed and the shipping advised (hy the supervisor in charge of pace management) so as to stop the gaps as far as possi hie.
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of money, it is today possible to formalize these problems for a limited number of situations; but the real issue is that situations are ever-changing which requires for the system not only to acquire information, but also, but rather to re-enter the negotiation process with the relevant partners.
It is in fact plain to see that man as interface is, at least for the foreseeable future, irreplaceable as no expert system now on the market can carry out the mUltiple adjusUnents necessary in such a short time (one and a half hour to two hours each morning). In the last analysis the interface is also the place where a multi-partner negotiation takes place and no electronic prosthesis could do this as flexibly as man does.
In addition, what machines and information systems most lack is not just a capacity for leaming, but a capacity to identify just the relevant information enabling them to solve problem x at the exact point in time required (2) (or at least to extract the item needing to be given priority in the negotiation transaction so that it can make a representation validly in the transaction).
One of the people we talked to at head office likened the process of shifting from NGP to GAllA at manufacturing to "the organizational problem of update" and "a global planning strategy". Production sheet D-l (NGP) inventory of available parts customer requirements D Day (via GAllA) out of which emergencies time lag (forwards or backwards) and production level optimal sequence of oulDut for the day
So the meaning of all this is as follows: within the framework of the social system that is the corporation and its environment, the manipulation of signs by a computer system is not enough to achieve arbitration and negotiation levels. Because he works on the basis of how signs interpenetrate each other, man alone can deal with the problems he has set for himself.
The above-mentioned rigid formalization only shows the arbitration capacity invested in man to change the pace manager and in other words decide what manufacturing sequence will be followed through the day. As a maLLer of fact arbitration only comes at the end of a negotiation process between all the major players involved, i.e. the shipping department, the assembly line and those who have to supply missing parts (either in-house or outside the company). Further, the arbitration is never final for anyone day but has to be reviewed and revised constantly following the ups and downs of part deliveries, the demands of the shipping people.
This conclusion in turn leads to a thorough review of how artificial information systems are designed. Indeed if man is a prerequisite in their successful operation and integration within the type of general IS described above, then it becomes necessary 1Q recognize that man is a full-blown comDonent in the system. Which might mean the end of trying to sit man as a kind of appendage to artificial IS's and in fact quite the reverse, building artificial IS's and their interfaces around the capacity of men to negotiate and arbitrate those constraints they tend to create. This is only the outset of the informational era, and ilftificiallS's have hardly been around for a decade in our production units. Yet it is already possible to detect in their design and their construction modalities the very same mistake which are all too often a characteristic of manufacturing systems, i.e. that their final users were excluded from the design stages.
Another thing which cannot be stressed too much here is that the arbitrations take place as a strict function of thc amount of eXDcriencc the men have required is their daily struggle with the other factors in the negotiations, their capacity to face up to required targets (time and quantity targets), the customers' capacity to hold up when deliveries are not fulfilled, etc . And finally these arbitnltions take place over time, or to put it another way they establish some hierarchy - though admiLLedly with fluctuating parameters - among all immediate constraints while still keeping an eye on the medium term (seen here as a matter of a few days to one month).
Yet in this case the mistake might well prove fatal for although it was possible to train users to monitor machines which had come about altogether outside themselves (with the advent of a crisis affecting simple labour still very much unsolved), it is doubtful whether socially meaningful artificial information systems can be made to work in the same way . Because the issue of information's
So these are all reasons for man's intervention, for in spite of their formidable storage and memory facilities, in spite of their enormous computing powers, EDP systems and informational systems lack the capacity to adapt to ever-changing and random circumstances. Though it would cost a lot
cf. Chapter entitled "La societe de l'information" in J.P. DURAND & F.X. MERRIEN, Sortie de SiITk., Paris, Vigot, 1991. (2)
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signifier and signified is extremely confused, generally leading to the advantage of the former, the continued exclusion of social issues and final users could lead in the very short term to the construction of the monumental EOP machines with only very limited benefits. What is needed is a review of the way in which artificial information systems are designed. This could become the base for a real, competitive difference in industrial efficiency.
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