Computers & Security, Vol. 18, No. 7
data transfers”, says Andrew Rigby, Head of E-commerce and Digital Media at IT solicitors Tarlo Lyons. “In general terms, exporting data protections laws are uniform and well developed. Generally, however, countries outside this area do not have similar laws protecting consumers sending personal information. The United States is a prime example of a country that does not have similar laws. In the absence of reciprocal data protection laws in the importing country, global businesses need to enter in inter-company contracts so as to avoid breaching the law.” Computer Fraud G Security, September 2999, p. 4. Virus is wrapped and all ready for Christmas day. Virus writers have created a virus that will deliver a hardware-destroying payload on 25 December. W32.Kriz will erase the CMOS set-up on an unprotected system. It will attempt to corrupt the Bios, try to overwrite all files on the local hard drive, and fill the network drive with nonsense. If it succeeds at corruption, the computer will not operate and it is possible that the Bios chip will need to be replaced. It uses the same Flash Bios destruction routine as the CIH virus, but as it is polymorphic it can also affect NT machines. Network News, August 25, 1999, p.3. Termination threat hangs over thin client software, John L.eyden. Network managers have been warned to review thin client security policies, after the discovery of a denial of service attack against Windows NT Terminal Server. Windows NT Server 4.0 Terminal Server Edition ‘listens’ for terminal connections on TCP port 3389. Before a user can be logged into the server, a resource-intensive series of operations must occur. Hackers can mount a denial of service attack by making extensive bogus connection requests and consuming all memory on the terminal server.This will cause a disruption for users currently logged on and prevent new terminal connections. Network News, August 25, 1999, p. 7. Clinton administration calls for network monitoring. The administration of US President Bill Clinton wants the FBI to oversee an extensive computer monitoring system to protect the nation’s crucial data networks form intruders. A sophisticated software system has been called for, that will monitor
activities on non-military government networks. A separate system will track networks used in the banking, transportation and telecommunications industries. Critics of the plan say that it could lead to a surveillance infrastructure that would have great potential for misuse. Network Security, September 1999, p. 3. Back Orifice an excuse to legalize hacking? The Cult of the Dead Cow hacker group has recently released Back Orifice 2000. This is version two of the Back Orifice Trojan horse that was released in August last year. Although it can be used as a Trojan horse, it is also a legitimate software package for remote access and control ofWindows 95,98 and NT systems. It now employs stronger encryption that will make it harder to detect.The software arrives at a victim’s computer as an E-mail attachment. Once the attachment is opened, the software secretly installs itself and turns the victim’s PC into a ‘client’. Anyone with the other half of the Back Orifice software (the administrator tool) can control the victim’s PC from anywhere on the Internet.The hacker is then able to view, create, delete and rename files and directories; reconfigure machines; steal passwords; and redirect network traffic. Back Orifice is at the centre of one of the key debates in the security industry. The Cult maintains that the software was produced to reveal products, although security flaws in Microsoft Microsoft say that this is just a cover-up to legitimize hacking. Computer Fraud G Security, August 1999, p. 2. Don’t go proprietary, crypt0 expert urges, Ann Harrison. Cryptography expert Bruce Schneier has said that most systems and products that use cryptography are insecure. He recommended that companies use strong random number generators and published nonproprietary algorithms and cryptographic protocols. Schneier noted that it is difficult to distinguish bad cryptography from good cryptography in products, and that flaws can be found almost anywhere: from the threat model, the design, the algorithms and protocols to the implementation, configuration, user interface and usage procedures. He said that usually there is no reason to use a new or unpublished algorithm in place of an older and better analysed one. Computer World, July 12, 1999, p. 8.
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