Baldwin’s two developmental resolutions of the mind–body problem

Developmental Review 23 (2003) 79–108 www.elsevier.com/locate/dr

BaldwinÕs two developmental resolutions of the mind–body problem Michel Ferrari* Department of Human Development and Applied Psychology, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 252 Bloor Street West, 9th Floor, Toronto, Ont., Canada M5S 1V6 Received 10 December 2001; revised 13 May 2002

Abstract Baldwin was a seminal thinker at the turn of the century and a giant in the intellectual landscape of his day. Bill Kessen made a detailed study of a 1905 paper in which Baldwin proposes two developmental solutions to the mind–body problem. BaldwinÕs approach to the mind–body problem presages the ideas of developmental theorists like Piaget and Karmiloff-Smith, and of philosophers like Dennett and Foucault, which may explain KessenÕs careful attention to his ideas. Baldwin proposed that our current scientific ideas about mind and body are themselves the product of historical distinctions that were developed in the history of Western culture and within each individual over the course of development. BaldwinÕs ‘‘outer’’ solution proposed resembles that of Dennett, in that Baldwin proposes an evolutionary, psychophysical, reconciliation of first and third person accounts of the mind–body relation. BaldwinÕs second solution issues from an idealist or ‘‘experiential’’ perspective and involves the contemplation of beauty as a way to personally reconcile fact and value that presages Foucault discussion of the historical development of ‘‘technologies of self’’ by which individuals craft an ‘‘aesthetics of existence.’’ It is this breadth of treatment that still makes Baldwin such a fascinating writer to consider today. Ó 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

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1. Baldwins inner and outer developmental resolutions of the mind–body problem Bill Kessen made a detailed study of a paper by Baldwin (1905) in a talk he gave at Yale University. BaldwinÕs 1905 paper was delivered in at the WorldÕs Fair in St. Louis, one of the most prestigious events of that time (Lamolinara, 1999). This paper pursues KessenÕs analysis of BaldwinÕs (1905) paper by examining its two proposed solutions to a perennial concern for psychology and philosophy—the mind–body problem. Many contemporary attempts to address this problem are in response to a deeply Cartesian tradition that posits an irreconcilable divide between mind and body. Baldwin refuses to accept a fundamental and unbridgeable divide between mind and body that leaves the problem unsolvable in principle. He proposes possible ways to reconcile first and third person perspectives in the science of consciousness; solutions that deserves the attention of contemporary neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers interested in these issues. 1. Materialist solution. Baldwin advocates provisionally adopting a psychophysical parallelism between first and third person approaches to studying consciousness for purposes of scientific research. He argues that ultimately both terms of this parallelism will mutually assimilate each other, as knowledge of neuroscience progresses. Despite their disagreements, the positions adopted by contemporary neuroscientists like Varela (Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie, & Varela, 2002) and Pribram (1997), by developmental psychologists like Karmiloff-Smith (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, in press), and by philosophers like Dennett (1991, 1996) all seem to be variations on this theme. 2. Idealist solution. For Baldwin, aesthetic experience affords an essential union of two points of view: that of the ÔproducerÕ of a work of art, and that of the ÔspectatorÕ; a union in which we find our experience is a richer whole. Aesthetic appreciation suggests a form of immediate experience in which the dualism of external and subjective becomes blurred and, at least ideally, tends to disappear. Baldwin believes such self-forgetting is true of any instance of deep contemplation. This view resembles the state of mind described as flow by Csikszentmihalyi (1997) in which individuals lose any sense of self as distinct from their activity. Although insightful, BaldwinÕs ideas need to be adapted to bring them into the 21st century. FoucaultÕs (1988, 1994) ideas about the ‘‘art of living’’ provides an interesting interpretative lens through which to view BaldwinÕs developmental teleology. But unlike Baldwin, Foucault claims that there is no essential human nature to be discovered and perfected; rather, there are different ways of acting toward each other, understanding each other and ourselves, that are themselves historically situated—that have their own historical genealogy. Thus, our subjectivity is invented through our rela-

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tionship with others and with ourselves; relationships reflect prevailing social conditions and broad cultural category systems. In this way, Foucault supports KessenÕs (1979, 1984, 1990) claim that the child and even child development are cultural inventions; also, Foucault adds that our own autobiographies are cultural inventions as well. The implication of Foucault and KessenÕs views are that—although a deeply personal knowledge of ourselves is the finest expression of our humanity—it is knowledge that draws on historically generated cultural practices and adapts them to individual lives. If so, then as Foucault (1988, 1994) suggests, one way for scientists to reconcile first and third person perspectives on development is to study the practices by which we foster what we consider most good, true, and beautiful in ourselves.

2. Need to approach this question through genealogy and ‘‘genetic logic’’ For Baldwin, the mind/body problem must be addressed through ‘‘genetic logic,’’ a term he coined to describe his approach (genetic psychology) that is now somewhat misleading.1 A better label today might be ‘‘generative psychology,’’ since he explores the generation (and resulting geneaology, or ‘‘genetic series’’) of what we now call ‘‘radical conceptual changes’’ to our subjective experience of reality and to our theories about human experience (Chi, 1992; Ferrari & Elik, 2003). Baldwin (1930) objected to the quantitative method used in the ‘‘exact sciences’’ (e.g., that of Herbert Spencer) as it reduces complex phenomena to a static structure of simpler components—the antithesis to how knowledge evolves. Baldwin argued that any study of conceptual change in oneÕs understanding of the mind and body required a method that would explain how new attributes of both emerge at each new level of conceptual understanding. His Ôtheory of genesisÕ proposed two fundamental postulates about our psychological experience: (1) All truly genetic series are irreversible and (2) each new stage in such a genetic series is sui generis, a novel mode of 1 Baldwin gives a very compelling explanation of why he chose the term. He notes that he chose ÔlogicÕ to ‘‘designate the course of organization (whether it be by integration, synthesis, or what not) by which a given developing function maintains and advances itself.’’ (Baldwin, 1930, p. 11). He notes that the term ÔdialecticÕ was used by Hegel, following Aristotle, to speak of the absolute as proceeding from a dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; but in the case of thinking, the word ÔlogicÕ is commonly used (e.g., logic of experience, of ethics, of history). ‘‘Genetic logic was, in my usage, the term adopted to designate the body of inside or psychic processes in which mental development takes place. Within this logic, all the varied special motives of adaptation, opposition, assimilation, etc. uncovered in the detailed researches, show themselves in the panorama of personal and social progress.’’ (1930, p. 12). Unfortunately, this term has not weathered well, since logic is now the province of philosophy and genetics has become its own field of biological enquiry.

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presence in subjective reality (Baldwin, 1930). Thus, every genetic change constitutes a real progression of nature to ‘‘a higher mode of reality.’’ This approach has important implications for understanding of the concepts of mind and body.

3. Baldwins generative genealogy of the concepts of mind and body BaldwinÕs generative (or genealogical) approach to the mind–body problem sought to coordinate two main dimensions of human experience: one sociohistorical (as seen in the refinement of theories in philosophy and psychology—disciplines that aim to explain the human psyche); and the other individual (as seen in the increasing appreciation of the distinction between mind and body during ontogenesis). I will look at each of these aspects in turn. 3.1. Cultural development of the notions of mind and body Although individual and cultural concepts are dialectically related, there is a sense in which culture is primary for Baldwin. Baldwin (1911) states that: The institution is only the permanent form in which the organization of members of a group embodies itself for carrying on its social function. The school, the state, the church, are typical institutions, thus understood. (p. 119).

In the history of psychology, the institution is that of the academy, or the university lab, along with social practices that allow for the development of knowledge about the psyche.2 According to Baldwin, institutions undergo a genealogical progression of forms which concretize views of man and his relation to the world that are analogous to those seen in childrenÕs conceptual change during development (see Table 1). In fact, Baldwin (1905, 1913a, 2 Another classic example of an institution that concerns individual selves and one much older than psychology, is organized religion. Religious institutions and religious law show how subjective idealization acquires permanent sociocultural form. Indeed, the ideal of selfperfection is not only a social ideal, nor is it best expressed through social institutions or practices: It is primarily personal. Thus, according to Baldwin (1911), the religious spirit goes beyond existing religious institutions, which serve only as the vehicle for personal revelation (see also James, 1902). God is beyond the church, and if someone is inspired to be the source of divine revelation they must distance themselves from existing religious institutions and perhaps lead a protest or reform. Thus, in religious institutions, both the individual and collective strivings for perfection are fulfilled. (Baldwin, 1911). But precisely because of the transcendent nature of the Christian God, as commonly understood, Religion cannot overcome the dualism between self and other (i.e., God)—a point also made by Piaget (1928). For Baldwin, this tension is resolved in aesthetic experience, as will be discussed later.

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Table 1 Genesis of the mind/body problem: Cultural developmental sequence Projective (Prelogical) One substance (fire, water) (Thales/Heraclitus) Subjective (Quasilogical) Reality is (inner) ideas (Democritus/Plato) Reality is material (outer) world (Aristotle) Objective (logical) Mind and body considered incommensurate substances (Descartes) Reflective (Extralogical, 19th c. scientific psychology) Individual Empirical (subjective) (Locke/Hume) Experimental (objective) (Wundt) Social Social contract (subjective) (Rousseau/Comte) Biological evolution (objective) (Darwin) Aesthetic (Hyperlogical) Pancalism. Still to be developed as psychological science, now present in art production

1913b) considers the entire history of psychology as more or less directly parallel to the development of individual understanding of the relation of mind and body over the course of development. The parallelism or concurrence of [the raceÕs and the individualÕs progressive understanding of the self] is this: the course of human interpretation presents a series of progressive stages which bear analogy, both in character and in order of appearance, to the stages of the individualÕs progressive understanding of the self. [. . .] The racial progression is due to a series of assimilations, on the part of society, of the thoughts or interpretations of individuals. [. . .] On the other hand, the results reached by individuals are re-interpretations of socially current material. Individual invention and originality always proceed by a re-reading of earlier knowledge, belief, or practice. (1913a, pp. 134–135).

Both series of progressions were considered natural and good (see Cahan, this issue). Briefly, for Baldwin (1905, 1913a, 1913b), ancient views about psychology were spontaneous and unreflective (what Baldwin calls ÔprojectivistÕ) (see glossary). Thus, Baldwin notes that the Ionian presocratic philosophers, like Thales, made no conceptual distinctions between mind and body—they saw nature as undifferentiated (see also Snell, 1953/1982). Of course, Baldwin (1905) is careful to add that ‘‘This is not to say that the adult person himself—for example, a thinker such as Thales—was not self-conscious and did not deal practically with the problem of self vs. things; but only that, in his reflection, he did not segregate the elements of his one general experience in explicit dualisms.’’ (p. 145, footnote). Thus, individuals certainly operate with an implicit distinction between thoughts and things that allows them to deal successfully in the world, but only with

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time does this distinction become conceptualized and understood (Dennett, 1991, 1996; Piaget, 1970, 1974a, 1974b). Only with the atomists (e.g., Democritus) did the subjective or ÔinnerÕ principle become conceptualized as distinct from external reality, in the ‘‘doctrine of the relativity of the sense qualities’’ (1905, p. 146). This inner–outer distinction was carried into ‘‘the general sphere of truth by the sophists’’ (1905, p. 146) and found their ultimate expression in Socrates and Plato. Aristotle grounded his theory in the outer principle of this same basic dualism of inner and outer as two aspects of the same reality. Modern views on mind and body are not seen before Descartes (although he was foreshadowed by Augustine) since Descartes was the first to propose two separate substantive principles for mind (thought) and body (extension) (Baldwin, 1913a). But even Descartes focused only on the general principle of mind and body; it remained for Locke and especially Hume to extend the discussion to personal identity and the importance of individual subjective experience based on reflection on the ideas in their own minds. By contrast, more contemporary experimenters like Wundt made objective tests of othersÕ individual experiences. Likewise, subjective reflection was the source of a new set of ideas about the social group as seen in Rousseau and Comte, who advanced the importance of social identity as a social contract, whereas Darwin launched an objective genealogical treatment of mental and physical development of biological organisms considered as a group. It is to this last tradition that Baldwin himself subscribes, although he clearly hopes to reconcile all of these currents within a single unified theory of development. It is precisely this ambition to integrate so many diverse currents of thought into a single developmental theory—albeit at times problematic—that made Baldwin such an important historical figure for Bill Kessen (1965; see Cahan, this issue). According to Baldwin, all of these thinkers 3 were intellectual giants who radically transformed Western cultural understanding of self and world, mind and body. In particular, the reflective enlightenment philosophers, set the stage for the modern empirical and experimental study of the mind. [T]he platform upon which the entire development [of contemporary psychology as a science] is projected [. . .] is that of the cognitive and reflective self-consciousness of such a sort as that which the individual has attained when he thinks of his inner life as a more or less consistent unity, passing through a continuous and developing experience: a self different from things, and also different from other selves; yet finding its experience and exercising its functions in closest touch with both. (1905, p. 156).

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And many other transitional figures too numerous to mention here, but I encourage anyone interested to read BaldwinÕs (1905, 1913a, 1913b) fascinating portrayal of the development of psychology as a discipline.

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Most contemporary historians of psychology reject the notion of a necessary progress in the science of psychology (and all necessary progress has been seriously challenged by postmodernism generally)— certainly Kessen (1984, 1990) was among them. Instead historical accounts of social and institutional transformation are now framed as conceptual ‘‘paradigm shifts’’ (Kuhn, 1962) or ‘‘historical conceptual change’’ (Carey, 1999), or the mundane effects of power struggles, new food-production techniques, disease, and military technology (Diamond, 1997). But this is not to say that there is no relation between historical and individual conceptual change, even for Kuhn (1964/1980; see also Piaget & Garcia, 1983). Before considering this question, let us first look at the relations between social understanding and that of particular individuals. 3.2. Individual and social development BaldwinÕs theory postulates an intimate relation between personal and cultural development (see Cahan, this issue). Society and the individual are not two distinct things or forces that act separately; rather, they are two sides of an emergent organic whole (Baldwin, 1911). The individualÕs absorption of the cultureÕs Ôsocial heritageÕ generates a continuous body of accretions (language, institutions, customs, etc.) through social traditions and practices. The notion of self as socially constructed is essential to BaldwinÕs theory of self-development. By imitating others, individuals gain a sense of their self-identity, along with its correlative term, the social other; both conceptions draw on the same body of experiences. In each social situation this sense of self and other are largely identical; only partially and progressively do they become different (Baldwin, 1930; Bruner & Kalmar, 1998; Mueller & Runions, this issue). This dynamic constitutes a Ôdialectic of personal growth,Õ which is simultaneously that of social organization. Thus, ‘‘the individual is a Ôsocial outcome, not a social unit.Õ We are all members of one another.’’ (Baldwin, 1930, p. 5). Or again, ‘‘We all breath in a social atmosphere; and our growth is by this breathing-in of the traditions and examples of the past.’’ (Baldwin, 1896, p. 314). Personal identity is unintelligible outside of this social atmosphere. BaldwinÕs views concord with those of Taylor (1989, 1995), who does not directly address the mind–body problem, but does introduce a phenomenological approach to interpreting the social embeddedness of human experience that seems very close to Baldwin. In TaylorÕs (1989) view, self is constituted through communally shared values and ideas. Thus, for both Taylor and Baldwin, it is unintelligible to speak of the self unless one refers to what is considered rational and to what is considered good within a community. However, Taylor (like Bruner, 1990, 1996) places less emphasis on

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self-concept, as compared to Baldwin, and more on the role of narrative in oneÕs sense of becoming a person. There is a close connection between the different conditions of identity, or of oneÕs life making sense [. . .]. One could put it this way: because we cannot but orient ourselves to the good, and thus determine our place relative to it and hence determine the direction of our lives, we must inescapably understand our lives in narrative form, as a Ôquest.Õ But one could perhaps start from another point: because we have to determine our place in relation to the good, therefore we cannot be without orientation to it, and hence we must see our lives in story. From whichever direction, I see these conditions as connected facets of the same reality, inescapable structural requirements of human agency.’’ (Taylor, 1985, pp. 51–52)

Here we see a limitation in BaldwinÕs views—although he certainly alludes to narrative in his work (Baldwin, 1899), it is not integral to his theory. And yet recent research has shown the importance of narrative for childrenÕs developing sense of self as embodied persons. In fact, childrenÕs autobiographical sense of self is often co-constructed through shared narratives (Bruner, 1990, 1996; Miller, 1994; Nelson, 1997). Whether or not one agrees with this specific sequence of seminal thinkers in the history of psychology, Baldwin makes the compelling point that current understanding is based on increasingly subtle distinctions regarding the nature of human experience. In fact, such historical conceptual changes are perhaps best understood from the perspective of what Taylor (1995; see also Gadamer, 1995, 1996) calls perspicuous contrasts. Such contrasts allow new distinctions about mind, body and self to be developed by extraordinary minds (Gardner, 1997, 2002; Kuhn, 1964/1980) in each different historical period. Baldwin thus seems to echoes BourdieuÕs (1994, 1997) point about how fields of human understanding develop. Bourdieu notes that extraordinary individuals are considered the most insightful individuals within a tradition and become heroes and standard bearers for their views of what is critical to preserve and foster (see also Amsterdam & Bruner, 2000; Becker, 1974; Dennett, 1991, 1995). Thus Baldwin and Bourdieu suggest that new social understandings are generated by individuals who stand out from the common crowd and are considered to be geniuses precisely because they more deeply articulate the implications of commonly held conceptions (Taylor, 1989, 1995). Of course, new views are also sometimes discovered piecemeal by groups of individuals working within a particular tradition (Latour, 1999; Simonton, in press). That is, the dynamic of conceptual development described by Baldwin might equally be based on the work of a group of thoughtful people working in the same area who communicate and share ideas with each other (Simonton, in press), or entrepreneurs

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who create new institutions to study and important problem, whether they themselves are a genius or not (Simon, 2002). These possibilities do not detract from BaldwinÕs fundamental claim that knowledge will develop through increasingly refined theories about the phenomena in question.

3.3. Genius as the agent of sociohistorical development Be that as it may, for Baldwin, new conceptual distinctions (such as increasingly refined distinctions between mind and body) are generated by particular geniuses who make their own understanding readily available to the wider public. In this sense, although geniuses judge by the same standards as their social teachers, they see farther and thus can introduce innovations that are later adopted and institutionalized and become the new standard practice.4 Baldwin thus suggests that while each child recapitulates cultural development to date within that culture because personal identity is socially constructed, great minds presage cultural development.5 And when individual visionaries come head-to-head with institutions and traditional cultural groups that oppose them, Baldwin states: The ethical in the man represents the essential and highest outcome of his individual nature [. . .]. The socially established represents the highest outcome of the collective activities of man [. . .]. What can be done in the case of conflict between these two? Nothing! Nothing can be done. [. . .] This is the final and irreducible antinomy of society. [. . .]//Just as the individual is often condemned for lawÕs sake, so society is often Ôdamned for conscienceÕs sake.Õ (1899, pp. 538–540 passim)

So while Gandhi is considered a great moral leader and an inspiration to many in the West today, he was jailed as a dangerous political dissident by the British and was assassinated by an extremist because of his views. These considerations of conflict between the individual and society merely

4 Like Bruno Latour (1999), Baldwin stops short of endorsing a pure relativism and subjectivism by holding that, ‘‘both as a biological function of trial and error and as an epistemological instrument of scientific and social progress, knowledge presupposes a dualism of controls: The agent on the one hand, and the recognized worlds of truth and reality that is, recognized by him on the other.’’ (1930, p. 10). 5 According to Baldwin, even the genius can develop only in advance of where current knowledge in their society has developed to date. In other words, those born into a society in which all participate emotionally in the life of the group, with no substantive distinction between mind and body, will not be in a position to appreciate this distinction unless they already have distinguished inner from outer attributes of experience; human understanding is constituted through a communal interpretation of reality (Nussbaum, 2001; Taylor, 1989).

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nuance BaldwinÕs basic thesis, which is simply that as individual social agents we are necessarily constituted by, and judge, our experience within a certain sociocultural matrix that itself has a certain historical genealogy. While we may react to this cultural heritage in a variety of ways, we can never repudiate it because the historical concepts and narratives handed down to us are central to what Dennett (1991) calls our ‘‘narrative center of gravity’’; that is, our deepest sense of self and of what it means to be a good person:conceptions and narratives by which we orient our lives (Taylor, 1989).6 With all of this in mind, let us now consider how an individual child develops into an adult concerned about the mind–body problem, before we consider possible ways Baldwin suggests that the problem can be overcome.

4. Baldwins generative genealogy of individual understandings of mind and body during child development Baldwin (1903) proposes a three-staged sequence of ‘‘genetic progressions’’ through which individuals generate the distinction between mind and body, and adds a fourth stage in subsequent writings (1905, 1913a, 1913b) (see Table 2). Let us now explore this sequence in detail as it clarifies the distinctions that he draws about the cultural evolution of the concepts of mind and body. 4.1. Projective progression (pre-logical) Following the general consensus of thinkers at that time, Baldwin suggests that, at first, an infantÕs apprehension of reality is what he calls Ôa-dualisticÕ or projective (a claim still endorsed, nearly a century later by Piaget, 1970). In other words, ‘‘consciousness, in its earliest experiences, does not have the distinction between the ÔinnerÕ and the Ôouter,Õ the self and the world.’’ (1903, p. 226). Baldwin calls this state ÔprojectiveÕ (to distinguish it from subjective or objective), in the positive sense that even without this conceptual distinction between subject and object, a mental content is still presented or ÔprojectedÕ as the particular sense from which that content arises.7 6 This is not to say that a particular tradition of thought cannot have a greater grasp of the truth when explaining some particular phenomenon, thus allowing one to avoid complete relativism with regard to knowledge and value—a point important to thinkers as diverse as Baldwin (1930), Foucault (1994) and Taylor (1995). 7 In this way, Baldwin seems to endorse a phenomenological approach similar to HeideggerÕs (1996) Dasein, in describing individualÕs foundational experience of reality.

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Table 2 Genesis of the mind/body problem: Individual developmental sequence Projective (undifferentiated experience) Imitate others and discover own agency SelfÕs agency is increasingly distinguished from that of others Subjective (inner outer distinction) Realization that that certain attributes of experience are not in outer objects, but in our inner experience (e.g., a pole looks bent to us when half under water, but is not ÔreallyÕ bent.) Ejective personification (Objective; mind/body distinction, substantive) Mind is now considered substantially different from body Reflective (mental contents and social contract) Realization that our own minds have their unique contents and personal interpretations Pancalism (Hyperlogical; aesthetic experience or contemplation) Individual art appreciation or contemplation that transcends these previous dualisms

All of these views are consistent with BaldwinÕs proposal (admittedly very difficult to test) that this distinction is based on different stimulus properties of persons and things. Thus, the first distinction to emerge in infants is a Ôprojective progression,Õ in which ‘‘projects become personal-projects and thing-projects’’ (1903, p. 229). The beginning of the distinction between mind and body (i.e., the projective progression) stems from infantÕs realizing that sensations are projected from both persons and things. Baldwin grants that it is far from clear what the entire content of such Person-Projects might include, but minimally they include effort, and pleasure and pain, which in some ‘‘mysterious way’’ belong to the individual himself. In more modern terms, BaldwinÕs Person-Projects seems to refer to what Bruner (1990; Bruner & Kalmar, 1998) calls selfindicators (e.g., agency, commitment, inner resources, evaluations, qualia, and coherence). Persons, because they engage in spontaneous movement, are much more interesting things for infants to attempt to imitate. ThingProjects, by contrast, ‘‘stand stubborn’’; they refer to things that can be left behind, shared, or manipulated and resist subjective efforts—all of which is not so obviously true of agents. At this point, there is still no distinction between external things and self; persons and things are distinctions of stimuli that occur largely through infantsÕ accommodating their activities to various life situations (see also Mueller & Runions, this issue). Mitigated support for BaldwinÕs ideas is found in contemporary theory and research. Bruner and Kalmar (1998) acknowledge that the distinction between self and other is certainly innately determined (while remaining flexible to cultural influences). They point out that in an important way, having a sense of self requires appreciating the difference between predicates that apply to persons and those that apply to things. In other words, conceptualizing the self necessarily requires a contrast class that allows an

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experienced event to be classified as belonging to the self or to some other class or events. We develop a sense of self in large measure because we are treated as though we have a mind and a self (something Bruner, 2000—citing a study by Sue Savage Rumbaugh—argues affects even chimpanzees that are reared by humans as opposed to those raised by other chimpanzees.8 Neisser (1997) seems to have something similar in mind when he suggests that infants develop two prototypical senses of self: an ecological self that situates their conception of body within a physical environment, and an interpersonal self that situates themselves as agents in relation to other agents. Like virtually all contemporary writers, Baldwin (1894) grants that certain simple orientations toward classes of stimuli (e.g., persons and things) and reflex predispositions to action are present at birth, and may be needed to get the whole process of conceptual development going. Indeed, research indicates that infants distinguish between being touched by their own fingers from being touched by other objects from the day they are born (Rochat, 2000). And Meltzoff (1997)—who says that his work shows more affinity with Baldwin than it does with Piaget—has many studies that suggest that infants already seem predisposed to imitate other persons, and it is upon this predisposition that they build the distinction between persons and things (Meltzoff, Gopnik, & Repacholi, 1999). In all of these cases, these innate capacities for discrimination are no guarantee that the child is explicitly aware of the difference between persons and things. And even if more details about early infant self-knowledge are now available, BaldwinÕs point—here closer to Dennett (1996; see also Popper, 1994, Piaget, 1970; Piaget & Garcia, 1983)—is that even if a distinction between self and things is innate in human infants, this distinction is necessarily the result of evolutionary selection that solidified that distinction as necessary for our Ôkind of mind.Õ Still, the notion of implicit knowledge of self and others is problematic for Baldwin, although he granted the importance of such experience based on studies of hypnotism and other forms of suggestion reported by Janet and Ribot (while scoffing at the claims made by Freudian psychodynamic theory, which he found unoriginal and overblown, see Baldwin, 1930). In any case, the advent of explicit subjective conscious experience in infants is still problematic for contemporary developmental theorists who tackle a similar genealogical account of self-development 8 Much as many, myself included, would like to see this quintessentially human capacity extended at least in germ to our nearest biological relative. Daniel Povinelli has a series of studies that show that chimps raised in captivity have no sense of intersubjectivity either as regards joint actions or with regard to an appreciation of other minds. His careful studies need a careful refutation by any who wish to support the claims of Bruner and Rumbaugh (see recent work by Tomasello in this regard).

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and self-understanding (Case, 1991), or for neuroscientists and philosophers who sometimes dub this ‘‘the hard problem’’ of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996). 4.2. Subjective progression (quasi-logical) Once this Ôprojective progressionÕ has occurred, the infant is in a position to experience what Baldwin calls the subjective progression, in which ‘‘personal projects become subject-self and object-self’’ (1903, p. 229). The radical conceptual change that produces concepts of subject and object in the infant comes about through an increasing appreciation of animation, movement, and change. The immature reflection of the individual finds, in the perception of animation and capricious movement, the road toward a solidified and concreted dualism. Through this type of reflection, the world circle closes in somewhat on upon a personal center. It neglects the fixed, changeless, inanimate things of the world as in so far unexistent or hypothetical. In respect to them the senses can deceive. (1905, p. 145)

It is the relativity and deceptiveness of, for example, the colors or smell of things that leads children to the broader question of whether or not the ÔinnerÕ is a sphere to be distinguished from the ÔouterÕ (Baldwin, 1905). In this growing distinction is found the germ of the difference between the outer and external (which can be left behind and returned to) and the inner and subjective (the ever present, the always owned) (Baldwin, 1903). An essential feature of this stage of the progress of consciousness is that Person-experiences, which become ÔsubjectiveÕ by this act of interpretation are simultaneously, ‘‘by the same act of apprehension, common to the individual’s psychic self [. . .] and to the other self or projective person already presented in contrast to things.’’ (1903, p. 227). Thus, there is no problem of ‘‘other minds’’ since they predate the conceptual distinction between subject and object (see Mueller & Runiions, this volume, for details). According to contemporary views, the conceptual differentiation between self and external world is certainly in place, in a rudimentary way, by about age 18 months, when infants can recognize their own reflection in a mirror (Case, 1991; Kagan, 1981; Mascolo & Fisher, 1998). Certainly, by age 3–5, children gain an Ôintuitive knowledgeÕ and understanding of psychology, in that they know that there are two orders of reality: subjective reality and perceptible reality (Johnson, 1988). Research clearly shows that children do have an appreciation of othersÕ desires, and can interpret behavioral indicators of their representational intentions from a very young age, before acquiring a Ôtheory of mindÕ in which they appreciate the possibility of false belief (Wellman, Cross, &

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Watson, 2001). All of this work still seems to rely on a distinction between internal and external attributes of experience, and not on a substantive distinction between psychic and material things: It is thus generally in agreement with BaldwinÕs theory. 4.3. Ejective progression (personification, logical) Once the inner self becomes a possible object of interpretation, children are in a position to experience the ejective progression, in which ‘‘object-self becomes mind and body’’ (1903, p. 229). Only now does a complete dualism between mind and body emerge. Children not only distinguishes Person-characteristics from Thing-characteristics, but also appropriates the Person-characteristics as their own—as identical with some of their own subjective states. Thus, they begin to distinguish their subjective-self-part from their thing-part and to consider their own body on a par with that of others. They learn to call the thing part ÔBody,Õ and the self-part ÔMind.Õ The self is one of a number of Minds; and the equally numerous things which go with selves are Bodies (Baldwin, 1903). The key point, according to Baldwin (1905), is that one advances from: a dualism of Ôinner–outerÕ to one of Ômind–bodyÕ: from what may be called a distinction of attributes to one of substances. The individual proceeds, in his generalization, to carry over the physical part of his own person—separating it substantially from the psychical part—to the side of the ÔouterÕ as such. It is only when he is able to do this, and does it, that the dualism of mind and body is anything like complete (p. 150).

This is the Cartesian position, of course, and the question immediately arises as to the relations between these two substance terms—a point not lost on Baldwin (1903, 1905, 1913a, 1913b). In terms of experimental research, Johnson & Wellman (1982) found that elementary school children see the brain as a sort of ‘‘inner I’’ that interprets and guides experience. And certainly a large body of careful research shows that children do not have a ‘‘theory of mind,’’ in the sense of understanding belief entitlement (and hence false-beliefs) in others before sometime around age 4 or 5 (Flavell, 1999, Wellman et al., 2001). Research on self-conscious emotions like pride and shame—which imply an appreciation of self as the object of positive or negative appraisal by another—shows that these also emerge around the same age (Lewis, 1999). According to Baldwin (1894, 1903), these three progressions are sufficient to account for contemporary conceptualization of the relation between mind and body. However, in his later work Baldwin (1905, 1913a, 1913b) proposes another individual progression, which he calls Ôreflective.Õ At the

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risk of muddying the waters, let us briefly consider this further refinement of BaldwinÕs scheme. 4.4. Reflective progression (extralogical, and ‘metacognitive’) According to Baldwin (1905, 1913a, 1913b), the thought of a separate personal self is a late occurrence in individual development and is due to reflection. The earlier stages of dualistic thought are so essentially social that the mind–body dualism is an abstraction in both its terms; mind represents many minds, and body many bodies. Only when children reflect on their thoughts as objects open to interpretation, Baldwin suggests, do they reach the further refinement of having a unique personal mind that is not on identical to that of all other individuals. The movement by which the logical or reflective faculty comes into operation in the individual mind [. . .] involves simply the recognition by the individual that all the objects of knowledge—percepts, images, notions, ideals—all are, whatever else may be said, in his own mind; all are ideas, whatever else they may prove to be besides. [. . .] In this distinction between the subject and the whole of experience considered as objective to it, we have the further statement of dualism in the form known as ‘‘reflection.’’ [. . .] it involves a certain reserve of the self over against the entire contents in the mind. In this sense it affords a new dualism: the self is distinguished from the entire body of its ideas or thoughts; upon these it passes judgment. They are its objects, its ideas, its experiences, no matter what differences of value may be assigned to them as the result of reflection. [. . .] all come forward as objects of thought for the inspection and judgment of the self which is the subject. The dualism of reflection is a subject-object dualism. (Baldwin, 1913b, pp. 145–146)

The emergence of this further distinction between differentiation of mind from body into self and the objects of thought has not received much experimental study. Research indicates that children are known to appreciate the occurrence of false beliefs in other minds due to their lacking or having faulty information by age 5. But if one sets the added criteria of being able to interpret the import of otherÕs experiences, given their personal interpretation of a situation, then this ability does not seem to occur before age 7 (Chandler & Carpendale, 1998). At about the same age children begin to appreciate that others have an inner life when there is no external manifestation of mental activity (Flavell, Green, Flavell, & Grossman, 1997), and some (e.g., Pinard, 1986) suggest that truly being able to reflect on oneÕs own cognitive activity—in a principled way—may not occur before adolescence. Indeed, only in mid-adolescence do most people begin to worry about the coherence and consistency of their personality and their ‘‘true self’’ (Fischer & Biddell, 1998; Harter, 1999; Mascolo & Fisher, 1998), and have a ‘‘life story,’’ in the adult sense of the term (Habermas & Bluck, 2000).

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In any case, although childrenÕs understanding of theory of mind has been well studied by Flavell and many others (see Wellman et al., 2001), to my knowledge, little work has examined whether a deeper understanding of this distinction self and thought is associated with a radical conceptual change in childrenÕs understanding of mind and body as predicted by Baldwin (1903, 1905). The only empirical study to specifically integrate BaldwinÕs ideas in exploring conceptual change in peopleÕs understanding of mind and body that I know of is by Broughton (1982), in which he was able to show general support for the genetic sequence proposed by Baldwin in subjects ranging from age 5 to 25. Clearly, this is still a rich area of potential research. And to add to Baldwin on this final stage, Foucault and Bourdieu have pointed out that oneÕs body, too, is a personal body that is subject to what Foucault (1988, 1994) calls ÔgovernanceÕ or social control just by virtue of the sort of body it is. Thus, if ill, one is placed in a hospital designed to cure the body, or if insane, one is placed in a mental hospital that one is not allowed to leave. Different types of body are subject to different forms of social power, as seen in different treatment of people according to social constructions of race or gender that lead to different political and even psychological attributes being ascribed to them (Amsterdam & Bruner, 2000; Foucault, 1994). More personally, each of us in Western cultures can decide to donate our blood or even body-organs after our death, as though these are objects that are our personal property (just as our thoughts are our personal thoughts)—a view not shared by people in Japan (Lock, 2002). In some cases, we also enlist others to help care for ourselves, through advice and even through medication like Ritalin (to deal with Attention Deficit Disorder) or Lithium (to deal with depression). These medications, despite their controversy and acknowledged side-effects, are designed to transform our body– minds in ways that allow us to lead better lives. This class of activities speaks to the ways we need to reconceptualize the mind–body problem, considered next. But first, here is a summary of BaldwinÕs argument so far. 4.5. Summary of Baldwin’s sequence of progressions Baldwin first suggests that experienced stimuli (projects) are categorized into those that are attributed self-agency (persons) and those that are not (things) (Progression 1). This distinction, coupled with imitation of significant others—the most interesting class of stimuli for BaldwinÕs infant—prompts an appreciation of oneÕs own inner experience as distinct from that of others, through which the infantÕs general sense of agency is then divided into that of their own self and of other selves (Progression 2). Other selves are then realized to also share in agency—now conceptu-

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alized as mind—but they are also seen to be things, i.e., bodies (a substantial difference); likewise, oneÕs own self is conceived of as a mind that is also associated with a body (Progression 3). Finally, the very contents in oneÕs mind (i.e., thoughts, images, sensations) come to be considered things upon which the self can reflect (Progression 4) (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. BaldwinÕs four genetic progressions that generate the mind–body problem for Western culture and the individuals who inhabit it.

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Let us now consider two ways Baldwin builds on this sequence to propose developmental solutions to the mind–body problem.

5. Baldwins inner and outer solutions to the mind–body problem According to Baldwin, failure to consider these four progressions accounts for the apparent impasse in philosophical and psychological explanations of the relation between mind and body: they take progression 3 and 4 as given, without asking how they emerged from a less differentiated experience of reality. Looked at generatively, these four progressions have important implications for what seems an intractable philosophical problem. How can body and mind—as we now conceive of them—be reconciled in a single set of facts? It becomes a legitimate problem to determine what sorts of interpretation individual minds and culturally dominant theories makes of their particular truths and values, that is, of possible Ôrealities.Õ Do individuals or theories: (1) accept the dualism between self and the rest of the world as final, or reduce one of these terms to the other (becoming idealist or materialist)? (2) Do they deny the importance of first-person experience through reflection (becoming positivist) or try to escape the primacy of thought (lapsing into mysticism)? (3) Do they make final appeal to something outside the self for inspiration (finding Religion the absolute foundation of reality) or fall back on the majesty of man (as did the romantic poets)? (Baldwin, 1930). The individual falls on occasion into each of these interpretations, following his temperament, training, or the example of others; and the race does likewise, both naturally in its institutions, and reflectively in its philosophy. The great institutions of human progress—scientific, economic, religious, artistic— each rests on one of these motives and builds itself upon it, as if it possessed and could reveal the whole truth. The philosophic thinker, in his turn, seeks some one motive to unify this heritage, while conserving all its elements—all the fine accretions to life and thought that the race has acquired by toil and sacrifice. What, he asks, is at the bottom of it all? What experience reveals the richest synthesis and indicates the most satisfying presence of reality—giving to each of the partial and seemingly equal ÔrealÕ things of thought, desire, and feeling, its proper place and value?’’ (1930, pp. 23–24).

What Baldwin (1903, 1905, 1913a,b, 1930) suggests is that pure idealism and pure materialism are both unintelligible philosophical positions from a genealogical point of view, since the articulation of one concept required the equal articulation of the other. Idealism (for example, the existentialist position of Sartre, 1948) is untenable because it proposes a well-articulated conception of mind without allowing for

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an equally developed conception of the material world. Likewise, a purely materialist and reductionist position like the neuroscience of Churchland and Churchland (1998) is equally unintelligible for the analogous reason: it is simply impossible to develop a conception of the material substrate of experience without necessarily developing an equally articulate conception of oneÕs subjective ability to apprehend that material. Baldwin was equally dismissive of Cartesian interactionism (a criticism which one can extend to its modern variants, e.g., Eccles, 1990), which he felt was a fundamental confusion of categories. There is no intelligible sense in which causal effects from one sphere of conceptualization (e.g., agency) can have an effect in another sphere (e.g., the material world)—although James (1902) and others afterwards have disputed this point. In effect, Baldwin felt that scientists who maintained a strict division between these two spheres of experience were forced to adopt a position such as that of McGinn (1989, 1999), in which any effect of mind on body was essentially the last remaining miracle of the modern worldview. But unlike McGinn (1999), Baldwin refuses to leave off at this point, with a fundamental and unbridgeable divide between mind and body that leaves the mind–body problem unsolvable in principle. BaldwinÕs two proposed paths to overcome this dualism are: (1) psychophysical evolution, that builds from materialist intuitions, and (2) Ôaesthonomic idealism,Õ that builds from subjectivist intuitions. Both are synthetic and aim to overcome the dualisms between mind and body, self and other, without lapsing into a pure relativism. Let us consider each in turn. 5.1. Psychophysical parallelism Baldwin (1903, 1913b) advocates adopting a psychophysical parallelism for purposes of scientific research. He argues that the scientific dualism (common to both physics and psychology) formulated in Progression 3 is expressed through psychophysical parallelism. Indeed, the essence of that theory is to refuse to postulate any positive predicates of the psychophysical relation, and to be satisfied with recognizing sufficient uniformity and generality between the course of physical and mental events to justify investigation by recognized scientific methods in both departments of science (Baldwin, 1903). Baldwin adds that, genetically, psychophysical parallelism justifies itself at the levels of development characterized by both Progression 2 and 3. However, from Progression 2, Baldwin suggests that it is more prudent conceptually to simply refuse the dualism postulated as valid in Progression 3. ‘‘In this case, the phenomena of personality are simply joint phenomena; neither mind nor body are treated under separate categories.’’ (1903, p. 242).

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Interpretation would be from one psychophysical term to another; there is no question of mental or brain states separately affecting subsequent states of the brain or mind or both. This leads him to propose the following simple form of progression ‘‘in which one psychophysical term, taken as a whole, is considered as the antecedent of another, also taken as a whole.’’ (1903, p. 242). For Baldwin, this is the only justifiable scientific method for studying life, in either biology or psychology, since it commands equal recognition for two aspects of phenomena when both are present and banishes the dualism that is abstract and artificial in concrete phenomena. Specifically, he claims that: Evolution is psychophysical, not organic and besides—or possibly, not at all— mental. The psychophysical standpoint is the only valid scientific standpoint for a theory of organic descent, no less than for a theory of individual development; and the two genetic series must be interrelated in some form of Ôintergenetic concurrenceÕ9 (1903, p. 243)

Of course, there still remains the problem of how to formulate such progressions scientifically—that is, by what method to investigate successive Ôgenetic modesÕ of organization. But the important point seems to be that words like mind and body are constitutive of meaning, jointly negotiated, shared and reflecting a background prevalent in a culture; they are not foundational to experience of the world (hence the lack of this distinction in some native cultures) (Baldwin, 1915; Riviere, 1999). It is worth noting that Piaget, another great genetic epistemologist, also adopted psychophysical parallelism (Ferrari, Pinard, & Runions, 2001)—one perhaps inspired by Baldwin. Piaget (1970) makes the elegant suggestion that both terms of this parallelism may mutually assimilate each other as knowledge of neuroscience progresses. More recently, despite their disagreements about specifics, the positions adopted by neuroscientists like Freeman (1993), Pribram, and Varela, by developmental psychologists like Karmiloff-Smith, and by philosophers like Dennett— and perhaps Searle (1998)—all seem to be variations on this position. In fact, attempt to reconcile first and third person perspectives on human experience, is one that at least some contemporary neuroscientists are actively pursuing, and advocate as the best direction for advancing the science of psychology (Freeman, 2000; Varela & Shear, 1999; Lutz et al., 2002). Indeed, Baldwin seems inclined to agree with Dennett (1995) who writes: genuine embodiment in a real world is crucial for consciousness [not] because genuine embodiment provides some special vital juice that mere virtual

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Baldwin developed the term ÔintergeneticÕ to describe the relation existing between racial evolution and individual development, which finds its broadest biological formulation in the law of recapitulation.

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world simulations cannot secrete, but for the more practical reason— or hunch—that unless you saddle yourself with all the problems of making a concrete agent take care of itself in the real world, you will tend to overlook, underestimate, or misconstrue the deepest problems of design. (p. 483)

Still, Baldwin (and others) point out that even if the resulting science were to succeed at creating a new psychophysical approach, it nevertheless remains objective and impersonal. Such a science necessarily presupposes a distinction between oneÕs own body/mind and that of others; a gap that remains unbridgable. To overcome this divide, the only remaining possibility for Baldwin is to push reflection on the mind–body problem further, and find a category of personal experience that allows both the material and the mental conceptual sequences to advance, while being simultaneously held in a single thought without contradiction (Baldwin, 1903). Let us now consider this second solution of the mind–body problem, this time proceeding from the personal or subjective pole of reality. 5.2. Aesthetic contemplation within a community of embodied minds For those committed to Progression 4, which posits a reflective dualism between mind and body, Baldwin (1903, 1930) sets out to find an interpretation of experience that does not invalidate but rather transcends this dualism: what he calls hyper- or meta- or super-logical reality. This point is seen more clearly when we recap the progression of the categories of mental and physical throughout the course of individual development. For Baldwin, as we have seen, during individual development the exigencies of life require and produce adaptations that generate a dualism between selves and things, between mind and body, between subject and object. This dualism involves a series of transformations which, although they undergo refinement, nevertheless harden and intensify, until logical and reflective thinking arise. This dualism takes on the most refined and varied forms in the crucible of reflection, resulting in the Humean position, or something like it. But for Baldwin, this is not the whole story. the category of final interpretation must be[. . .] sought in the actual coefficient of the fullest reality of which we can have experience.’’ (1903, p. 245). What fullness means, in this case, is that there exists ‘‘a mental organization which [. . .] ÔtranscendsÕ [. . .] the opposition between fact [. . .] on the one hand, and purposes, ends, values, and Progressions, on the other hand; it is what is commonly known as Aesthetic experience. (1903, p. 245)

Such aesthetic experience is itself the product of a developmental progression. The development of the imaginative function also develops, pari passu, alongside logic—imagination which, at each stage, generates

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a sort of imaginative or ideal unity. So at each stage, dualismÕs finality is denied to reveal an immediate intuition of things as ideally complete and whole extending to all of mental life. For Baldwin, in the aesthetic interest, the mind spontaneously seeks a way to reconcile its realities and values among themselves, and to do so relies on what he calls ÔsemblanceÕ or make-believe. This is true at all the stages of mental development (e.g., in play, reverie, imagination, hypothesis, even mystic absorption). In each case, people create the Ôself-illusion of a complete and harmonious reality, where, at least for a moment, they find both peace and freedom (Baldwin, 1930). This imaginative function achieves its fullest form in aesthetic experience, which surpasses and clarifies earlier mystic modes of intuition. Something beautiful, whether found in nature or in art, is apprehended as being both an ideal thing and ideal for the self. ‘‘In the individual, in sum, the development of the theoretical reason or intelligence culminates in laws of Truth for him absolute, that of practical reason or will in norms of absolute Goodness, and that of the emotional life, with which the imagination is charged, in rules of absolute Beauty. (Baldwin, 1913b, pp. 149–150).

At the highest reaches of mental development, individual thinkers normally arrive at understandings of themselves and the world that either verify or modify naive conceptions and beliefs. Baldwin considered this final stage of imaginative interpretation of experience a form of affectivism, that includes all simpler kinds of immediatism and mysticism, with religious mysticism being its most important historical form (Baldwin, 1930). But, for Baldwin (1903, 1930) only in art do an individualÕs imaginings lose their ‘‘temporary and capricious character’’ and acquire a permanent and genealogically progressive form. ‘‘In the aesthetic semblance of fine art we find a permanent mode of reconciliation which includes all the serious factors of life and welds them into a full and satisfying intuition of reality.’’ (1930, p. 25). Baldwin called his philosophical theory of reality pancalism, (Baldwin often cites this as the motto in Greek to kalon pan literally, ‘‘All is Good/Beautiful’’). Pancalism is the Platonic view that aesthetic intuition—as exercised in contemplation of a work of art—provides an experiential basis for a philosophical outlook that escapes the partiality and exclusion of traditional alternatives for addressing mind and body, self and world. By recognizing what is valid in each of these other views, and by deeply considering the spontaneous conscious process itself, one sees how a truly synthetic principle is found in the realm of Art (Baldwin, 1930; see Cahan, this issue; Zelazo & Lourenco, this issue). For Baldwin, aesthetic experience affords an essential union of two points of view: that of the ÔproducerÕ of a work of art, and that of the

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ÔspectatorÕ; a union in which we find our experience becomes a richer whole. Aesthetic appreciation suggests a form of immediate experience in which the dualism of external and subjective becomes blurred and, at least ideally, tends to disappear. Thus pancalism, or aesthonomic idealism, perhaps resembles the state of mind described as flow by Csikszentmihalyi (1997)—in which individuals lose any sense of self as distinct from their activity—developed by many forms of contemplative meditative practice. Of course, this view is not without its problems. As Jansen & Jansen (1995) note, what constitutes art is very tricky question. Certainly, Amsterdam & Bruner (2000) have a very different view or the role of art and the artist, which is that of someone who ‘‘disturbs the peace’’ and causes us to reflect on what we consider legitimate, opening up new possible worlds for interpretation. In this way, artists can serve the role that Baldwin reserves for the genius—to challenge us with new ways of conceiving reality. Likewise, not everyone agrees that contemplation is the way to fuse subject and object. For Becker (1974; see also Barnes, 1991) this fusion is the essential point of positive transference, which he equates with both agape and romantic love—other ways in which we lose our sense of being a separate self by giving the deepest possible value to others while affirming our own eternal value and worth. In fact, for Becker anxiety about death, and the search for a heroic way to overcome it are what spur personal and cultural development. And with agape or compassion, one doesnÕt need to be a genius to care for everyone in virtue of their being human. In this light, it is striking that there is little mention of death in BaldwinÕs system of thought, only of eternal personal and cultural development (but see BaldwinÕs 1930 reflections about the personal and cultural impact of World War I). While such alternative perspectives and even gaps in BaldwinÕs thinking are worth considering they do not undermine the importance of finding a way to give our lives deep meaning unavailable to those who limit their experience to understanding an impersonal objective world. A quest for meaning that clearly preoccupied Baldwin for his entire career (Baldwin, 1894, 1930). 5.3. Art of life Perhaps ironically, the clearest contemporary expression of BaldwinÕs ideal of a quintessential genealogical advance is FoucaultÕs (1994) call to pursue the ‘‘art of living.’’ For Foucault (contra Baldwin) this idea is a very old idea, borrowed from the ancient Greeks. However, it is an idea that can be adapted to our own time by considering art and aesthetics not as a property of objects, but of our own personal lives. For Foucault (1988, 1994; also Veyne, 1997), thinkers are necessarily embedded in particular

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traditions, each with their own historical development and with their own standards of truth—some (like economics or medicine) concerned with issues of power and control over othersÕ physical bodies, some (like psychotherapy) designed to enhance the quality of our lives by fostering Ôcare of the selfÕ (Foucault, 1994). The important point for Foucault—and the key contrast with Baldwin—is his claim that what is at issue is power: Power over oneÕs self through techniques of self (Ôtechniques de soiÕ) or power over others through techniques to dominate them (Ôtechniques de dominationÕ). Note that this view does not necessarily require any progressive historical development of human understanding. In fact, Foucault claims just the opposite. Our subjectivity is invented through our relationship with others and with ourselves. Like Kessen (1984, 1990; also Bruner, 1990), Foucault proposes that our relationships change to reflect prevailing social conditions and broad cultural category systems. There is no essential human nature to be discovered and perfected, as Baldwin seems to suggest. Rather, there are different ways of acting toward each other, understanding each other, and understanding ourselves, that are themselves historically situated—that have their own historical genealogy. These self-practices do not necessarily gain in refinement, they are merely adapted to new purposes (Foucault, 1988). Oddly enough, Foucault uses many of the same historical figures as Baldwin to describe the history of these techniques of self, but for a very different purpose. Through reading Foucault (1988; see also Nussbaum, 2001), we discover that the ancient Greeks were not merely developing conceptions of human experience in the abstract, they were concerned with how to care for themselves. True, this care was not individualized, but rather dealt with the ethical issue of how to make the best contribution to the polis (city state). The Greek techniques of self-care (e.g., examining the significant events of each day) were later adapted by Neoplatonists and combined with Christian teachings of confession to purify the soul from sin—a very different purpose. In modern times, these same techniques have been adapted to aid Ôindividual self-discoveryÕ in psychoanalysis and Ônew ageÕ meditative techniques, for example. In all cases, for Foucault (1988, 1994), these techniques of self are just ways that individuals (with and through others) constitute themselves as a certain sort of person—ideally, to promote happiness or acquire wisdom. While this self-creation is not infinitely plastic (as it expressed through our evolved human biology [Dennett, 1991; Pinker, 2002]) it is extremely malleable. It is the origins of the techniques used today—what he calls a history of the present—that is of particular interest to Foucault. Following the Greeks, Foucault urges us to cultivate an Ôaesthetics of lifeÕ through social relationships and education. Conceptions of the good life are themselves never divorced from our social/cultural context in which we live and

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develop. Through what Hacking (1995) calls a looping effect, people apply techniques and concepts to themselves as ways of interpreting their own experience of happiness and of efforts to achieve it, regardless of what the specific criteria for a good life may be. Reinterpreting Baldwin in this light, I think, allows us to bring his views into the new century. A genealogical analysis of BaldwinÕs sequence provides rich insight into the fault lines upon which present-day distinctions between mind and body are likely to rest. But some may suggest that everything discussed by Foucault is pure philosophy and not science. Bourdieu (1990, 1994) provides a rich empirical analysis of techniques of domination (what he calls a Ôlogic of practiceÕ) inspired by the same French structuralist tradition that underpins the work of Jean Piaget, a direct heir to BaldwinÕs generative psychology. For Bourdieu, by implication, technologies of the self and their concomitant practices to develop wisdom necessarily rely on historically created Ôcultural capitalÕ that sustains a particular sort of personality, or habitus, which he defines as follows: Unlike scientific estimations, which are corrected after each experiment according to rigorous rules of calculation, the anticipations of the habitus, practical hypotheses based on past experience, give disproportionate weight to early experiences. [. . .] The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective practices—more history—in accordance with the schemes generated by history. It ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought, and action, tend to guarantee the ÔcorrectnessÕ of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms. (1990, p. 54)

Whether there is a human nature that informs a search for wisdom (Latour, 1999, 2000; Pinker, 2002), or only one that is culturally invented and sustained through personality or habitus (Bourdieu, 1990; Foucault, 1988, 1994), to the extent that our being a person is a synthesis of biological experience and cultural memes (as Dennett, 1995, suggests), any art of living will be one that is personally valued and pursued by individuals in a community; values that can develop and change over generations. The implication is that such deeply personal knowledge is indeed the finest expression of our humanity—one that draws on cultural practices to develop wisdom and adapts them to our own lives. If so, then an ultimate goal for developmental scientists who seek an immediate reconciliation of first and third person understanding, is to study the practices by which we come to appreciate the significance (and fragility) of what is most Good, True, and Beautiful in ourselves (Nussbaum, 2001). This philosophically and historically informed search for ultimate meanings is what both Baldwin and Kessen pursued, and would encourage in all of us today.

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6. Summary and conclusion Baldwin was a seminal thinker at the turn of the century and a giant in the landscape of his day. In advocating an ‘‘outer’’ evolutionary, psychophysical, approach to the mind/body problem, Baldwin presaged many contemporary solutions to this perennial problem. BaldwinÕs second solution to the problem—an aesthetic appreciation that reconciles objective fact and personal value—is original and merits further discussion. Those who doubt BaldwinÕs claim that aesthetic appreciation is the end of a natural and unique sequence in human psychological development, must grant that it is itself an important technique of self, in FoucaultÕs sense—one echoed in the writings of great thinkers like Plato. Ironically, FoucaultÕs proposal to revive an aesthetics or art of life is a natural extension of Baldwin, since it returns to a personal pursuit of aesthetics that relies on practices that are a product of history; yet, while FoucaultÕs techniques of self (and BourdieuÕs habitus) do transcend traditional categories of mind and body, they deny necessary developmental and historical progress in their lived immediacy. In this way, Foucault supports KessenÕs (1979, 1984, 1990) claim that the child and even child development are cultural inventions; in fact, Foucault adds, our own autobiographies are cultural inventions as well.

Acknowledgments Thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada, for support of this project. Thanks, too, to Lora Pallotta, Carrie Richardson, Nhi Vu, Ljiljana Vuletic, and many other students who commented on earlier versions of this paper.

References Amsterdam, A. G., & Bruner, J. (2000). Minding the law: Culture, cognition, and the court. New York: Harvard University Press. Baldwin, J. M. (1894). Mental development in the child and race. New York: The Macmillan Company. Baldwin, J. M. (1896). The genius and his environment. Popular Science Monthly, 49, 312–320, see also pp. 522–534. Baldwin, J. M. (1899). Social and ethical interpretations in mental development: A study in social psychology (2nd ed). New York: The Macmillan Company, Reprint Edition 1973 by Arno Press Inc. Baldwin, J. M. (1903). Mind and body, from the genetic point of view. Psychological Review, 10, 225–247. Baldwin, J. M. (1905). Sketch of the history of psychology. Psychological Review, 12, 144–165. Baldwin, J. M. (1911). The individual and society or psychology and sociology. New York: The Macmillan Co, Reprint Edition 1974 by Arno Press Inc.

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