- Email: [email protected]
parker contra tomlin
tangmge sciences, Volume Printed in Great Britain
13, Number 1, pp. 79-88,
1991
0388~0OOl/91 $3.00+.00 Pergamon Press plc .--
Basic Word Order Frequencies or Manning/Parker Contra Tomlin
Bert Peeters
University of Tasmania
ABSTBACT This paper is a reply to Manning and Parker’s &rrtguage Sciences 11. 43-65 (1989)l recent contribution in this journal on the basic word order frequency hierarchy for natural languages. It argues that Manning and Parker are wrong when they assume that the majority offered explanations
for the hierarchy
a theory of biological a type of biological Lamarckianism, interpretation meaning Moreover,
form which has been discarded
by modern bioiogists.
of figure/ground
interpretation
the SOV > of Tomlin
of form.
findings
linguistic
effects.
based
and on the idea that word order is a linear to the superficial
As it does not, their explanation
reader, but implies that must be abandoned.
> OSV frequency hierarchy as it stands must be revised in the light K%rsic Word Or&r:
(1986)l. SOV and SVO are numerically Tomlin’s
is not
which, rather like
Manning and Parker’s own explanation,
of semantic form, may seem convincing
exists independent
of the findings
As language
form, there is nothing n priori wrong with an explanation
is based on functional principles.
on the principles
of previously
are to be rejected because of a flavor of Lamarckianism,
and argues
Funcrionaf ~~i~cip~e~,London:
Croom
Helm
even, and so are VOS and OVS. The paper summa&es
that universal
principles
do not have to have the same cross-
INTRODUCTION Way back in the sixties and the seventies (see e.g. Greenberg 1963, 1966; Ultan 1969; Pullum 1977), it was believed that object-initial languages of the OVS- and OSV-types did not exist. Languages had to be either subject- or verb-initial, i.e. SOV, SVO, VSO or VOS. Ruhlen’s (1975) study changed the picture quite dramatically, and a new study by Pullurn (1981) showed the existence of at least eight OVS- and four OSV-languages where Ruhlen had found only two instances of OVS and just one of OSV. Further research by Mallinson and Blake (1981) and by Hawkins (1983) has shown that SOV-languages probably represent from 41 to 52% of the world’s languages,
SO
Language Sciences,Volume 13, Number 1 (1991)
SVO-languages 32-35 % , VSO-languages 9- 13 % , VOS-languages 2 % and OVS- and OSV-languages up to 1% each. There is therefore a basic word order frequency hierarchy, which Manning and Parker (1989:43) represent as in (1) and abbreviate as in (2).
sov > svo > vso > vos > ovs > osv sov > . . > osv
(1)
(2)
Having provided in more detail the figures quoted above, Manning and Parker set out to prove that previous theories (Emonds 1980; Mallinson and Blake 1981; Krupa 1982; Hawkins 1983; Maxwell 1984), which aimed at explaining the relative frequency of the six basic word orders, fail to account for “particular facets of the frequency hierarchy” (Manning and Parker 1989:45). Not only do they fail to do full justice to the details of the hierarchy as stated in (1); they also “succumb to reasoning identified with one of two now-discarded theories of biological form” (Manning and Parker 1989:45). In the rest of this paper, I would like to argue that Manning and Parker’s own explanation is no better than the previous attempts they so categorically reject, and that a far better explanation can be found in Tomlin (1986). I will start off, however, by claiming that Manning and Parker condemn the work done before them, at least in part, for the wrong reasons. LANGUAGE,
A TYPE
OF BIOLOGICAL
FORM?
According to Manning and Parker (1989), the existing accounts for the basic word order frequency hierarchy are either of a formal or of a functional nature. The formal accounts are reminiscent in their reasoning of creationism, the functional accounts of Lamarckianism. Creationism and Lamarckianism are theories of biological form which are now superseded by more accurate accounts of the evolution of biological species. Just as creationism holds that function and environment are irrelevant to the form of a species, formal accounts of word order variation across languages consider function and semantics to be irrelevant to syntactic mechanisms. Similarly, just as Lamarckianism holds that function and environment play a central determining role with regard to the form of a species, functional accounts of word order variation consider function and semantics to play a key role in syntactic ordering. Manning and Parker’s main point is that “given the common assumption in modern linguistics that language form is a type of biological form . . . , identification of formal and functionalist explanations of word order with generally untenable theories of biological form constitutes a valid criticism of these two approaches” (Manning and Parker 1989:45). According to the authors, the “common assumption” referred to is reflected in the work of linguists such as Chomsky and Lightfoot. The argument seems
Manning/Parker Contra Tomlin
81
to be: “Chomsky and Lightfoot have said it, so it must be true, because what they say is of course representative of the way in which all other linguists think.” I cannot help imagining that I am not the only linguist who has been rather unimpressed by Chomsky’s so-called contribution to modem linguistics. The fact that he says that language is a type of biological form does not mean much to me at all. But is that really what he says? Let us put it this way: the fact that Manning and Parker say that Chomsky says that language is a type of biological form does not impress me a lot. Manning and Parker refer to Chomsky (1980:226-31), i.e. part of an essay on “Language and unconscious knowledge.” The irony is that this essay immediately follows another one on the “biological basis of the language capacities. ” Of all things, why should one refer to part of an essay that deals with a larger topic when the preceding essay seems to be entirely devoted to language and biology? Even better, Manning and Parker invite their readers to stop reading at p. 231, just where Chomsky is about to start answering the second of five questions raised on p. 227. What exactly does Chomsky say? For brevity’s sake, I will examine Chomsky (1980:229-40) only, p. 240 being the one where the answers to the fourth and the fifth questions are given. The closest Chomsky comes to saying what Manning and Parker make him say is when he states that “the human language faculty is much like other organs known to biology” (Chomsky 1980:233). Now, this is a very weird statement indeed. “Human language faculty” is presumably synonymous with “the gift of speech;” would anyone ever say that the gift of speech is like other organs known to biology? Alternatively, from the claim that “ultimately, the study of language is a part of human biology” (Chomsky 1980:226), one could not and should not infer that language is a type of biological form. The study of high blood pressure is definitely a part of human biology too; yet, is high blood pressure a biological form? Having said that “in recent years there has been exciting work on the nature and growth of the organ of vision, work that is highly suggestive for the study of cognitive structures such as language as well,” Chomsky (1980:229) invites us to “attempt to study language on the model of a bodily organ. ” This definitely looks like one of a set of possible approaches to language. But it does not imply that language itself is a biological form. Other quotes could be added, but I think that my point is sufficiently clear. In a review published five years ago (Peeters 1986), I quoted Itkonen’s (1983:13) observation “I am interested in what Chomsky does, not in what he says he does.” Quite exceptionally, I have shown myself to be interested in what Chomsky says, and not impressed by what other people say he says. In my own view (Peeters 1982), language is not a biological form. It is not an organism that grows within each individual and that evolves through time. It is a system of elements and rules which is acquired or learnt by each individual speaker, in rather the same way as a second, third, and fourth language are learnt or acquired, UC lbl-F
82
Language Sciences, Volume 13, Number 1 (1991)
the main difference being that the acquisition of one’s first language is essentially an unconscious process, whereas the second, third, etc. language learning processes are usually
far more conscious,
and thereby
less successful.
I do not believe
in a
genetically determined universal grammar, which is one of Chomsky’s favourite hobby-horses. I do believe in a genetically determined disposition of what we call the human speech organs: they alone allow a child to acquire a language if exposed to it. Where there is no exposure, there won’t be language. Chomsky (1980:232) is unhappy about the usual phrase “language learning”: “it seems that biological endowment sharply constrains the course of language growth, or what is called, with somewhat misleading connotations, ‘language learning’. ” In fact, he says (Chomsky 1980:236), “language grows or matures.” It definitely does not, not at least in any literal way, as an organism does. If we do not say that language grows but that a child learns a language, it is mainly because we feel that that is what a child does and what a language does not. It is important to add “we feel”: we also say, as Chomsky himself remarks, that the sun rises, and we say so not because that is what the sun does it does not - but because that is what we feel that the sun does. WORD
ORDER,
A LINEAR
INTERPRETATION
OF SEMANTIC
FORM?
Let us get back to basic word order, and to Manning and Parker’s account of why it is the case that “SOV > . . > OSV.” Having rejected as inaccurate both the formal and the functional accounts provided in earlier research, the former for building on the assumption that there is no direct causal relationship between semantics and syntactic mechanisms, the latter for building on the assumption that such a causal relationship does hold and is crucial, Manning and Parker (1989:49) opt for an intermediate solution: “In our view, semantic form is neither irrelevant to, nor the direct cause of, any basic word order; rather, word order is a linear interpretation of semantic form. ” According to Manning and Parker, semantic form is composed minimally of the unordered components diagram, as in Fig. 1.
S, 0 and V. It can be presented
Figure
1.
in the form of a semantic
In the course of syntactic (i.e. linear) interpretation, S, 0 and V will be ordered, the actual order being determined by the principles of figure/ground interpretation. Figure 1 can be interpreted in six different ways, listed in Table 1 in descending order of preference {the informal descriptions are those provided by Manning and Parker). The hierarchy in Table f corresponds rigorously to the basic word order frequency hierarchy SOV > . . . > OSV. TABLE 1 Figure/ground inte~re~tion
Informal description
S before (0 before V) S before (V before 0) V before (S before 0) V before (0 before S) (0 before V) before S (0 before S) before V
Dime-on-a-cake-on-a-plate Ball-before-a-hoop-on-a-wall Hoop-before-a-ball-on-a-wall Looking-down-a-well ~nut-on-a-Pete-Wilma-hole-~-it
Clearly, fanning and Parker assimilate word order processing to the processing in the human mind of a visual stimulus. They fail to ask themselves whether such an assimilation is legitimate. I do not believe it is, When I close my eyes, thereby preventing my brain from processing in one out of six possible ways a picture consisting of three concentric circles, that very picture does not disappear in any absolute manner. It is still there, although I do not see it. It is there to be seen and processed by other onlookers who did not close their eyes. The same cannot be said about the so-called unordered meaning components S, 0 and V. They cannot be ordered by a human language learner in a so-called process of syntactic interpretation, because they do not exist as such, independent of any particular language. They do not exist as a part of universal grammar either, as in my view universal grammar itself does not exist (at least not as a genetically determined piece of knowledge). Linguists all too often tend to forget that meaning without form, i.e. without language, is inconceivable, One cannot talk about meaning irrespective of the form, or the language, in which it is couched. S, 0 and V only exist within particular languages, not as abstractions leading any sort of an independent existence. The same holds true for so-called semes or distinctive semantic features. They are not units of meaning without form (see Hervey 1975; Koch 19843, nor can they be. If they are anything at all, they are words or phrases, just as the words and the phrases they are claimed to describe {see also Pee&s i991), In short, fanning and Parker’s account of the basic word order frequency hierarchy, appealing though it may seem, is based on the wrong premises. As we have seen, their
84
Language Sciences,Volume 13, Number 1 (1991)
condemnation
of previous
accounts
is at least partly based on wrong premises,
It is time, then, to forget about their interpretation thing better.
too.
of the facts, and to look for some-
A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF TOMLIN’S (1986) FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF WORD ORDER VARIATION Tomlin’s (1986) account of word order variation across the languages of the world is based on a new sample consisting of 402 languages (a number surpassed only by Ruhlen (1975), whose catalogue comprises 435 items). Table 2 compares Tomlin’s data with the data gathered by Ruhlen, Mallinson and Blake, and Hawkins.
TABLE 2 Word Order
Ruhlen No.
%
svo
222 155
51 35
vso vos ovs osv
47 8 2 1
sov
11 2 0.5 0.25
Mallinson and Blake No. %
Hawkins
Tomlin
No.
%
No.
%
41 35
41 35
174 109
52 32
180 168
44.78 41.79
9 2 1 1
9 2 1 1
45 8 -
13 2 -
31 12 5 -
9.20 2.99 1.24 -
By and large, Tomlin’s findings correspond to those of his predecessors (see Manning and Parker (1989:63) for an explanation of the percentage column in the case of Mallinson and Blake, where the total is 89 rather than 100). The frequency hierarchy in (1) remains valid. Or does it? Tomlin subjects his own percentages to a chi-squared test and finds that there is no significant superiority of SOV over SVO and of VOS over OVS. Statistical rigor obliges the scholar to revise the commonly accepted frequency hierarchy as in (3).
sov = svo > vso > vos =ovs > osv
(3)
Manning and Parker (1989:63) mention two language samples (Greenberg 1966; Culicover and Wexler 1974) which, in contrast with the samples summarized in Table 2, contain more SVO- than SOV-languages. They go on to say that “both of these studies were admitted to be incomplete and not necessarily representative.” Both studies were definitely incomplete [no VOS- and no object-initial languages in Greenberg
Manning/Parker
(1966), no OVS-languages new frequency hierarchy resentative
as Manning
Contra Tomb
85
in Culicover and Wexler (1974)l. However, with Tomlin’s in mind, one tends to wonder whether they are as unrepand Parker would have us believe.
According to Tomlin, three functional principles help explain why the frequency hierarchy looks the way it does. Tomlin calls them the Theme First Principle or TFP, the Verb-Object Binding Principle or VOB and the Animated First Principle or AFP. The first principle requires no further explanation: it is basically the same as the wellknown assumption that old information comes first and new information next. The second principle should sound familiar too: it holds that there is a tighter bond between the object of the transitive verb and the verb itself than there is between the subject of such a verb and the verb itself. The third principle is probably the most novel of the three: it says, as its name suggests, that in a basic transitive clause the more animated NPs will precede the less animated ones. Having defined all three principles, Tomlin then goes on to say that in accordance with a fourth principle, said “of maximal realization” (MRP), the most common order is going to be the one where the three functional principles are fully realized. Basic word orders where none or only one or two principles are operational are necessarily less common. It is important to realize that Tomlin’s three functional principles (TFP, VOB and AFP) are not what many a linguist is prone to believe they are. Here is how Manning and Parker (1989:49) criticize functional explanations for the basic word order frequency hierarchy: “Finally, functional explanations per se are entangled in a dilemma. For example, if they construe functional or semantic criteria to motivate the predominant SOV word order, they are immediately at a loss to explain any of the conflicting word orders, which presumably must be subject to the same functional or semantic influences. Either universal causes do not have the same cross-linguistic effects . . . or each language type is affected by a different set of universal factors . . . . Both horns of the dilemma act to raise more questions than to provide answers.” The important words are “universal causes” and “universal factors. ” If that is what functional principles are, then Manning and Parker may be right, and their criticism could be a valid one. But is it correct to say that functional principles are true “universals”? Obviously, this is a question which can be answered in two ways. If the answer is negative, i.e. if functional principles do not act as “universal causes or factors”, there is nothing wrong with the very idea of a functional explanation for basic word order frequencies. On the other hand, if the answer is positive, i.e. if functional principles do act as “universal causes or factors,” there seems to be a problem. My own belief is that the latter answer is more likely to be correct, but that at the same time the problem is only apparent. A comparison with language economy as defined by Andre Martinet can be useful here (see Peeters (1983) for details). Language economy is a universal functional principle: it states that “linguistic
86
Language Sciences, Volume 13, Number 1 (1991)
evolution
in general
can be conceived
of as regulated
by the permanent
antinomy
between the expressive needs of man and his tendency to reduce his mental and physical exertions to a minimum” (Martinet 1952:26). Although we are dealing here with a universal principle - language economy manifests itself in all languages of the world - it is not unusual for a particular language change to obtain, even if it seems to be incompatible with the economy of the particular language in which it obtains. Such apparently aberrant changes must be attributed to external factors [mainly language contact or interference; cp. Peeters (1984)1 which occasionally override the principle of (internal) language economy. In exactly the same way as there are external factors overriding the universal principle of language economy, there are for sure internal factors overriding functional principles such as Tomlin’s. Tomlin provides an impressive collection of examples drawn from the various languages included in his sample in order to support, if need be, the reality of each one of his three functional principles. Unfortunately, he does reach the conclusion that OSV-languages do not exist, as they would not allow any of the three principles to obtain. This is clearly a wrong conclusion. The truth is that the basic word order of a language in which none of the three principles obtains must be the rarest of all possible basic word orders, not necessarily a non-existing one. For further details on Tomlin’s findings, I must refer the reader to Tomlin’s book, or else to Ashby (1988), for a rather sympathetic and quite extensive review.
CONCLUSION TheSOV> . . . > OSV frequency hierarchy as it stands must be revised in the light of the findings of Tomlin (1986). SOV and SVO are numerically even, and so are VOS and OVS. Manning and Parker (1989) are wrong in assuming that most previous explanations for the basic word order frequency hierarchy must be incorrect insofar as they imply a form of reasoning reminiscent of Lamarckianism, a now discarded theory of biological form. Their own explanation for the frequency hierarchy, convincing though it may seem to the superficial reader, presents the serious shortcoming of implying that meaning exists independent of individual languages, i.e. independent of form.
REFERENCES Ashby, William “Review of Tomlin (1986)) ” Canadian Journal ofLinguistics 33. 167-73. 1988 Chomsky, Noam 1980 Rules and Representations, New York: Columbia University Press.
Manning/Parker Culicover, 1974
Peter and Kenneth Wexler 7Jre Invariance Principle and Universals of Grammar, of California
Contra Tomlin
Irvine:
87
University
Press.
Emonds, Joseph “Word Order in Generative 1980 1. 33-54.
Grammar,”
Journal of Linguistic
Research
Greenberg, 1963
Joseph “Some Universals of Grammar with Particular Reference to the Order of Meaningful Elements, ” in Universals of Language, pp. 58-90, Joseph Greenberg (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1966 “Some Universals of Grammar with Particular Reference to the Order of Meaningful Elements, ’ ’ in Universals of Language, 2nd Edition, pp. 73-113, Joseph Greenberg (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hawkins, John Word Order Universals, New York: Academic Press. 1983 Hervey , Srindor 1975 “Semantics in Axiomatic Functionalist Linguistics,” in Actes du deuxieme Colloque de Zinguistique fonctionnelle, Clermont-Ferrand: Centre regional de documentation pedagogique. Itkonen, Esa Causality in Linguistic i%eory: a Critical Investigation into the Philosophical 1983 and Methodological Foundations of Non-autonomous Linguistics, London: Croom Helm; Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Koch, Monica Wird die Linguistik der Bedeutung gerecht? Tiibingen: Narr. 1984 Krupa, Viktor 1982
“Syntactic
Typology
and Linearization,”
Language
58. 639-45.
Mallinson, Graham and Barry J. Blake Language Typology, New York: North Holland. 1981 Manning, Alan D. and Frank Parker “The SOV > . . . > OSV Frequency Hierarchy,” Language Sciences 11. 1989 43-65. Martinet, Andre “Function, Structure and Sound Change,” Word 8. l-32. 1952 Maxwell, Daniel 1984 “A Typologically-based Principle of Linearization,” Language 60. 25185. Peeters , Bert “Pour une terminologie precise du changement linguistique,” in S. I. L. F. 1982 Actes du 8e Colloque de Linguistique Fonctionnelle (Cahiers du Centre
88
Language
Sciences, Volume 13, Number 1 (1991)
Interdisciplinaire Toulouse-Le
des Sciences du Langage 4. Travaux de 1‘Universitb de
Mirail 18. 104-S.
“L’economie dans l’enseignement d’Andr6 Martinet, ” La linguistique 19. 105-16. 1984 “Interference, emprunt et propagation,” in S. I. L. F. Actes du IOe Colloque, pp. 53-5, Pierre Martin (ed.), Quebec: Universite Laval. 1986 Review of Itkonen (1983), Studies in engage 10. 208-13. Pullum, Geoffrey 1977 “Word Order Universals and Grammatical Relations,” in Syntax and Semantics, 8: Grammatical Relations, pp. 249-77, Peter Cole and Jerroid M. Sadock (eds.), New York: Academic Press. 1981 “Languages with Object Before Subject: a Comment and a Catalogue,” 1983
Linguistics
19. 147-55.
Ruhlen, Merrit 1975 A Guide to the Languages of the World, Stanford: Merrit Ruhlen. Tomlin, Russell S. 1986 Basic Word Order: Functional Principles, London: Croom Helm. Ultan, R. 1969 “Some General Characte~sti~s of Interrogative Systems,” Working Papers in Language Universafs 1. 41-63a.
13, Number 1, pp. 79-88,
1991
0388~0OOl/91 $3.00+.00 Pergamon Press plc .--
Basic Word Order Frequencies or Manning/Parker Contra Tomlin
Bert Peeters
University of Tasmania
ABSTBACT This paper is a reply to Manning and Parker’s &rrtguage Sciences 11. 43-65 (1989)l recent contribution in this journal on the basic word order frequency hierarchy for natural languages. It argues that Manning and Parker are wrong when they assume that the majority offered explanations
for the hierarchy
a theory of biological a type of biological Lamarckianism, interpretation meaning Moreover,
form which has been discarded
by modern bioiogists.
of figure/ground
interpretation
the SOV > of Tomlin
of form.
findings
linguistic
effects.
based
and on the idea that word order is a linear to the superficial
As it does not, their explanation
reader, but implies that must be abandoned.
> OSV frequency hierarchy as it stands must be revised in the light K%rsic Word Or&r:
(1986)l. SOV and SVO are numerically Tomlin’s
is not
which, rather like
Manning and Parker’s own explanation,
of semantic form, may seem convincing
exists independent
of the findings
As language
form, there is nothing n priori wrong with an explanation
is based on functional principles.
on the principles
of previously
are to be rejected because of a flavor of Lamarckianism,
and argues
Funcrionaf ~~i~cip~e~,London:
Croom
Helm
even, and so are VOS and OVS. The paper summa&es
that universal
principles
do not have to have the same cross-
INTRODUCTION Way back in the sixties and the seventies (see e.g. Greenberg 1963, 1966; Ultan 1969; Pullum 1977), it was believed that object-initial languages of the OVS- and OSV-types did not exist. Languages had to be either subject- or verb-initial, i.e. SOV, SVO, VSO or VOS. Ruhlen’s (1975) study changed the picture quite dramatically, and a new study by Pullurn (1981) showed the existence of at least eight OVS- and four OSV-languages where Ruhlen had found only two instances of OVS and just one of OSV. Further research by Mallinson and Blake (1981) and by Hawkins (1983) has shown that SOV-languages probably represent from 41 to 52% of the world’s languages,
SO
Language Sciences,Volume 13, Number 1 (1991)
SVO-languages 32-35 % , VSO-languages 9- 13 % , VOS-languages 2 % and OVS- and OSV-languages up to 1% each. There is therefore a basic word order frequency hierarchy, which Manning and Parker (1989:43) represent as in (1) and abbreviate as in (2).
sov > svo > vso > vos > ovs > osv sov > . . > osv
(1)
(2)
Having provided in more detail the figures quoted above, Manning and Parker set out to prove that previous theories (Emonds 1980; Mallinson and Blake 1981; Krupa 1982; Hawkins 1983; Maxwell 1984), which aimed at explaining the relative frequency of the six basic word orders, fail to account for “particular facets of the frequency hierarchy” (Manning and Parker 1989:45). Not only do they fail to do full justice to the details of the hierarchy as stated in (1); they also “succumb to reasoning identified with one of two now-discarded theories of biological form” (Manning and Parker 1989:45). In the rest of this paper, I would like to argue that Manning and Parker’s own explanation is no better than the previous attempts they so categorically reject, and that a far better explanation can be found in Tomlin (1986). I will start off, however, by claiming that Manning and Parker condemn the work done before them, at least in part, for the wrong reasons. LANGUAGE,
A TYPE
OF BIOLOGICAL
FORM?
According to Manning and Parker (1989), the existing accounts for the basic word order frequency hierarchy are either of a formal or of a functional nature. The formal accounts are reminiscent in their reasoning of creationism, the functional accounts of Lamarckianism. Creationism and Lamarckianism are theories of biological form which are now superseded by more accurate accounts of the evolution of biological species. Just as creationism holds that function and environment are irrelevant to the form of a species, formal accounts of word order variation across languages consider function and semantics to be irrelevant to syntactic mechanisms. Similarly, just as Lamarckianism holds that function and environment play a central determining role with regard to the form of a species, functional accounts of word order variation consider function and semantics to play a key role in syntactic ordering. Manning and Parker’s main point is that “given the common assumption in modern linguistics that language form is a type of biological form . . . , identification of formal and functionalist explanations of word order with generally untenable theories of biological form constitutes a valid criticism of these two approaches” (Manning and Parker 1989:45). According to the authors, the “common assumption” referred to is reflected in the work of linguists such as Chomsky and Lightfoot. The argument seems
Manning/Parker Contra Tomlin
81
to be: “Chomsky and Lightfoot have said it, so it must be true, because what they say is of course representative of the way in which all other linguists think.” I cannot help imagining that I am not the only linguist who has been rather unimpressed by Chomsky’s so-called contribution to modem linguistics. The fact that he says that language is a type of biological form does not mean much to me at all. But is that really what he says? Let us put it this way: the fact that Manning and Parker say that Chomsky says that language is a type of biological form does not impress me a lot. Manning and Parker refer to Chomsky (1980:226-31), i.e. part of an essay on “Language and unconscious knowledge.” The irony is that this essay immediately follows another one on the “biological basis of the language capacities. ” Of all things, why should one refer to part of an essay that deals with a larger topic when the preceding essay seems to be entirely devoted to language and biology? Even better, Manning and Parker invite their readers to stop reading at p. 231, just where Chomsky is about to start answering the second of five questions raised on p. 227. What exactly does Chomsky say? For brevity’s sake, I will examine Chomsky (1980:229-40) only, p. 240 being the one where the answers to the fourth and the fifth questions are given. The closest Chomsky comes to saying what Manning and Parker make him say is when he states that “the human language faculty is much like other organs known to biology” (Chomsky 1980:233). Now, this is a very weird statement indeed. “Human language faculty” is presumably synonymous with “the gift of speech;” would anyone ever say that the gift of speech is like other organs known to biology? Alternatively, from the claim that “ultimately, the study of language is a part of human biology” (Chomsky 1980:226), one could not and should not infer that language is a type of biological form. The study of high blood pressure is definitely a part of human biology too; yet, is high blood pressure a biological form? Having said that “in recent years there has been exciting work on the nature and growth of the organ of vision, work that is highly suggestive for the study of cognitive structures such as language as well,” Chomsky (1980:229) invites us to “attempt to study language on the model of a bodily organ. ” This definitely looks like one of a set of possible approaches to language. But it does not imply that language itself is a biological form. Other quotes could be added, but I think that my point is sufficiently clear. In a review published five years ago (Peeters 1986), I quoted Itkonen’s (1983:13) observation “I am interested in what Chomsky does, not in what he says he does.” Quite exceptionally, I have shown myself to be interested in what Chomsky says, and not impressed by what other people say he says. In my own view (Peeters 1982), language is not a biological form. It is not an organism that grows within each individual and that evolves through time. It is a system of elements and rules which is acquired or learnt by each individual speaker, in rather the same way as a second, third, and fourth language are learnt or acquired, UC lbl-F
82
Language Sciences, Volume 13, Number 1 (1991)
the main difference being that the acquisition of one’s first language is essentially an unconscious process, whereas the second, third, etc. language learning processes are usually
far more conscious,
and thereby
less successful.
I do not believe
in a
genetically determined universal grammar, which is one of Chomsky’s favourite hobby-horses. I do believe in a genetically determined disposition of what we call the human speech organs: they alone allow a child to acquire a language if exposed to it. Where there is no exposure, there won’t be language. Chomsky (1980:232) is unhappy about the usual phrase “language learning”: “it seems that biological endowment sharply constrains the course of language growth, or what is called, with somewhat misleading connotations, ‘language learning’. ” In fact, he says (Chomsky 1980:236), “language grows or matures.” It definitely does not, not at least in any literal way, as an organism does. If we do not say that language grows but that a child learns a language, it is mainly because we feel that that is what a child does and what a language does not. It is important to add “we feel”: we also say, as Chomsky himself remarks, that the sun rises, and we say so not because that is what the sun does it does not - but because that is what we feel that the sun does. WORD
ORDER,
A LINEAR
INTERPRETATION
OF SEMANTIC
FORM?
Let us get back to basic word order, and to Manning and Parker’s account of why it is the case that “SOV > . . > OSV.” Having rejected as inaccurate both the formal and the functional accounts provided in earlier research, the former for building on the assumption that there is no direct causal relationship between semantics and syntactic mechanisms, the latter for building on the assumption that such a causal relationship does hold and is crucial, Manning and Parker (1989:49) opt for an intermediate solution: “In our view, semantic form is neither irrelevant to, nor the direct cause of, any basic word order; rather, word order is a linear interpretation of semantic form. ” According to Manning and Parker, semantic form is composed minimally of the unordered components diagram, as in Fig. 1.
S, 0 and V. It can be presented
Figure
1.
in the form of a semantic
In the course of syntactic (i.e. linear) interpretation, S, 0 and V will be ordered, the actual order being determined by the principles of figure/ground interpretation. Figure 1 can be interpreted in six different ways, listed in Table 1 in descending order of preference {the informal descriptions are those provided by Manning and Parker). The hierarchy in Table f corresponds rigorously to the basic word order frequency hierarchy SOV > . . . > OSV. TABLE 1 Figure/ground inte~re~tion
Informal description
S before (0 before V) S before (V before 0) V before (S before 0) V before (0 before S) (0 before V) before S (0 before S) before V
Dime-on-a-cake-on-a-plate Ball-before-a-hoop-on-a-wall Hoop-before-a-ball-on-a-wall Looking-down-a-well ~nut-on-a-Pete-Wilma-hole-~-it
Clearly, fanning and Parker assimilate word order processing to the processing in the human mind of a visual stimulus. They fail to ask themselves whether such an assimilation is legitimate. I do not believe it is, When I close my eyes, thereby preventing my brain from processing in one out of six possible ways a picture consisting of three concentric circles, that very picture does not disappear in any absolute manner. It is still there, although I do not see it. It is there to be seen and processed by other onlookers who did not close their eyes. The same cannot be said about the so-called unordered meaning components S, 0 and V. They cannot be ordered by a human language learner in a so-called process of syntactic interpretation, because they do not exist as such, independent of any particular language. They do not exist as a part of universal grammar either, as in my view universal grammar itself does not exist (at least not as a genetically determined piece of knowledge). Linguists all too often tend to forget that meaning without form, i.e. without language, is inconceivable, One cannot talk about meaning irrespective of the form, or the language, in which it is couched. S, 0 and V only exist within particular languages, not as abstractions leading any sort of an independent existence. The same holds true for so-called semes or distinctive semantic features. They are not units of meaning without form (see Hervey 1975; Koch 19843, nor can they be. If they are anything at all, they are words or phrases, just as the words and the phrases they are claimed to describe {see also Pee&s i991), In short, fanning and Parker’s account of the basic word order frequency hierarchy, appealing though it may seem, is based on the wrong premises. As we have seen, their
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Language Sciences,Volume 13, Number 1 (1991)
condemnation
of previous
accounts
is at least partly based on wrong premises,
It is time, then, to forget about their interpretation thing better.
too.
of the facts, and to look for some-
A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF TOMLIN’S (1986) FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF WORD ORDER VARIATION Tomlin’s (1986) account of word order variation across the languages of the world is based on a new sample consisting of 402 languages (a number surpassed only by Ruhlen (1975), whose catalogue comprises 435 items). Table 2 compares Tomlin’s data with the data gathered by Ruhlen, Mallinson and Blake, and Hawkins.
TABLE 2 Word Order
Ruhlen No.
%
svo
222 155
51 35
vso vos ovs osv
47 8 2 1
sov
11 2 0.5 0.25
Mallinson and Blake No. %
Hawkins
Tomlin
No.
%
No.
%
41 35
41 35
174 109
52 32
180 168
44.78 41.79
9 2 1 1
9 2 1 1
45 8 -
13 2 -
31 12 5 -
9.20 2.99 1.24 -
By and large, Tomlin’s findings correspond to those of his predecessors (see Manning and Parker (1989:63) for an explanation of the percentage column in the case of Mallinson and Blake, where the total is 89 rather than 100). The frequency hierarchy in (1) remains valid. Or does it? Tomlin subjects his own percentages to a chi-squared test and finds that there is no significant superiority of SOV over SVO and of VOS over OVS. Statistical rigor obliges the scholar to revise the commonly accepted frequency hierarchy as in (3).
sov = svo > vso > vos =ovs > osv
(3)
Manning and Parker (1989:63) mention two language samples (Greenberg 1966; Culicover and Wexler 1974) which, in contrast with the samples summarized in Table 2, contain more SVO- than SOV-languages. They go on to say that “both of these studies were admitted to be incomplete and not necessarily representative.” Both studies were definitely incomplete [no VOS- and no object-initial languages in Greenberg
Manning/Parker
(1966), no OVS-languages new frequency hierarchy resentative
as Manning
Contra Tomb
85
in Culicover and Wexler (1974)l. However, with Tomlin’s in mind, one tends to wonder whether they are as unrepand Parker would have us believe.
According to Tomlin, three functional principles help explain why the frequency hierarchy looks the way it does. Tomlin calls them the Theme First Principle or TFP, the Verb-Object Binding Principle or VOB and the Animated First Principle or AFP. The first principle requires no further explanation: it is basically the same as the wellknown assumption that old information comes first and new information next. The second principle should sound familiar too: it holds that there is a tighter bond between the object of the transitive verb and the verb itself than there is between the subject of such a verb and the verb itself. The third principle is probably the most novel of the three: it says, as its name suggests, that in a basic transitive clause the more animated NPs will precede the less animated ones. Having defined all three principles, Tomlin then goes on to say that in accordance with a fourth principle, said “of maximal realization” (MRP), the most common order is going to be the one where the three functional principles are fully realized. Basic word orders where none or only one or two principles are operational are necessarily less common. It is important to realize that Tomlin’s three functional principles (TFP, VOB and AFP) are not what many a linguist is prone to believe they are. Here is how Manning and Parker (1989:49) criticize functional explanations for the basic word order frequency hierarchy: “Finally, functional explanations per se are entangled in a dilemma. For example, if they construe functional or semantic criteria to motivate the predominant SOV word order, they are immediately at a loss to explain any of the conflicting word orders, which presumably must be subject to the same functional or semantic influences. Either universal causes do not have the same cross-linguistic effects . . . or each language type is affected by a different set of universal factors . . . . Both horns of the dilemma act to raise more questions than to provide answers.” The important words are “universal causes” and “universal factors. ” If that is what functional principles are, then Manning and Parker may be right, and their criticism could be a valid one. But is it correct to say that functional principles are true “universals”? Obviously, this is a question which can be answered in two ways. If the answer is negative, i.e. if functional principles do not act as “universal causes or factors”, there is nothing wrong with the very idea of a functional explanation for basic word order frequencies. On the other hand, if the answer is positive, i.e. if functional principles do act as “universal causes or factors,” there seems to be a problem. My own belief is that the latter answer is more likely to be correct, but that at the same time the problem is only apparent. A comparison with language economy as defined by Andre Martinet can be useful here (see Peeters (1983) for details). Language economy is a universal functional principle: it states that “linguistic
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Language Sciences, Volume 13, Number 1 (1991)
evolution
in general
can be conceived
of as regulated
by the permanent
antinomy
between the expressive needs of man and his tendency to reduce his mental and physical exertions to a minimum” (Martinet 1952:26). Although we are dealing here with a universal principle - language economy manifests itself in all languages of the world - it is not unusual for a particular language change to obtain, even if it seems to be incompatible with the economy of the particular language in which it obtains. Such apparently aberrant changes must be attributed to external factors [mainly language contact or interference; cp. Peeters (1984)1 which occasionally override the principle of (internal) language economy. In exactly the same way as there are external factors overriding the universal principle of language economy, there are for sure internal factors overriding functional principles such as Tomlin’s. Tomlin provides an impressive collection of examples drawn from the various languages included in his sample in order to support, if need be, the reality of each one of his three functional principles. Unfortunately, he does reach the conclusion that OSV-languages do not exist, as they would not allow any of the three principles to obtain. This is clearly a wrong conclusion. The truth is that the basic word order of a language in which none of the three principles obtains must be the rarest of all possible basic word orders, not necessarily a non-existing one. For further details on Tomlin’s findings, I must refer the reader to Tomlin’s book, or else to Ashby (1988), for a rather sympathetic and quite extensive review.
CONCLUSION TheSOV> . . . > OSV frequency hierarchy as it stands must be revised in the light of the findings of Tomlin (1986). SOV and SVO are numerically even, and so are VOS and OVS. Manning and Parker (1989) are wrong in assuming that most previous explanations for the basic word order frequency hierarchy must be incorrect insofar as they imply a form of reasoning reminiscent of Lamarckianism, a now discarded theory of biological form. Their own explanation for the frequency hierarchy, convincing though it may seem to the superficial reader, presents the serious shortcoming of implying that meaning exists independent of individual languages, i.e. independent of form.
REFERENCES Ashby, William “Review of Tomlin (1986)) ” Canadian Journal ofLinguistics 33. 167-73. 1988 Chomsky, Noam 1980 Rules and Representations, New York: Columbia University Press.
Manning/Parker Culicover, 1974
Peter and Kenneth Wexler 7Jre Invariance Principle and Universals of Grammar, of California
Contra Tomlin
Irvine:
87
University
Press.
Emonds, Joseph “Word Order in Generative 1980 1. 33-54.
Grammar,”
Journal of Linguistic
Research
Greenberg, 1963
Joseph “Some Universals of Grammar with Particular Reference to the Order of Meaningful Elements, ” in Universals of Language, pp. 58-90, Joseph Greenberg (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1966 “Some Universals of Grammar with Particular Reference to the Order of Meaningful Elements, ’ ’ in Universals of Language, 2nd Edition, pp. 73-113, Joseph Greenberg (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hawkins, John Word Order Universals, New York: Academic Press. 1983 Hervey , Srindor 1975 “Semantics in Axiomatic Functionalist Linguistics,” in Actes du deuxieme Colloque de Zinguistique fonctionnelle, Clermont-Ferrand: Centre regional de documentation pedagogique. Itkonen, Esa Causality in Linguistic i%eory: a Critical Investigation into the Philosophical 1983 and Methodological Foundations of Non-autonomous Linguistics, London: Croom Helm; Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Koch, Monica Wird die Linguistik der Bedeutung gerecht? Tiibingen: Narr. 1984 Krupa, Viktor 1982
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Typology
and Linearization,”
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Language
Sciences, Volume 13, Number 1 (1991)
Interdisciplinaire Toulouse-Le
des Sciences du Langage 4. Travaux de 1‘Universitb de
Mirail 18. 104-S.
“L’economie dans l’enseignement d’Andr6 Martinet, ” La linguistique 19. 105-16. 1984 “Interference, emprunt et propagation,” in S. I. L. F. Actes du IOe Colloque, pp. 53-5, Pierre Martin (ed.), Quebec: Universite Laval. 1986 Review of Itkonen (1983), Studies in engage 10. 208-13. Pullum, Geoffrey 1977 “Word Order Universals and Grammatical Relations,” in Syntax and Semantics, 8: Grammatical Relations, pp. 249-77, Peter Cole and Jerroid M. Sadock (eds.), New York: Academic Press. 1981 “Languages with Object Before Subject: a Comment and a Catalogue,” 1983
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Ruhlen, Merrit 1975 A Guide to the Languages of the World, Stanford: Merrit Ruhlen. Tomlin, Russell S. 1986 Basic Word Order: Functional Principles, London: Croom Helm. Ultan, R. 1969 “Some General Characte~sti~s of Interrogative Systems,” Working Papers in Language Universafs 1. 41-63a.