Between “Authoritarian” and “Empowered” slum relocation: Social mediation in the case of Ennakhil, Morocco

Cities 30 (2013) 140–148

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Between ‘‘Authoritarian’’ and ‘‘Empowered’’ slum relocation: Social mediation in the case of Ennakhil, Morocco Christian Arandel, Anna Wetterberg ⇑ Research Triangle Institute/RTI International, 3040 East Cornwallis Road, Post Office Box 12194, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194, USA

a r t i c l e

i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 11 August 2011 Received in revised form 4 January 2012 Accepted 26 February 2012 Available online 19 March 2012

Over the past four decades, as urbanization has increased in the Global South, pressures have mounted apace to convert slums to higher value use. In spite of policy shifts towards including residents’ viewpoints, involuntary resettlement remains inherently conflictive on at least two levels: between residents and outside actors and among residents themselves. In this paper we present a social mediation approach that addresses these two levels of conflict, illustrating its application in a slum relocation program in Ennakhil, Morocco. Social mediation occupies a middle ground between an authoritarian, urban planning approach to relocation and resettlement programs that have community empowerment as an explicit objective. We argue that a clear emphasis on mediating conflict should be more widely incorporated in slum relocation and other development programs. While the social mediation approach has clear advantages over authoritarian approaches, it is also better suited than the empowerment approach for projects that, like involuntary resettlement, inherently generate conflict and limit the opportunities for disadvantaged groups to control decisions. Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Slums Resettlement Morocco Empowerment Conflict mediation

Introduction Slum resettlement has been called the ‘‘silent companion to urban growth’’ (Cernea, 1993, p. 3). As urbanization has continued in the Global South, pressures have mounted apace to eradicate slums, often for the benefit of more politically connected classes and actors. Slum dwellers who originally settled in peripheral areas may find that the city has grown around them, with accompanying concerns about the economic, environmental, and social conditions and consequences of their settlements (Takeuchi, Cropper, & Bento, 2008). Concurrently, policies towards slum relocation have diversified. From the razing of squatter settlements in the mid-1900s, an emphasis on titling and upgrading emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, adequate compensation and participation of residents in choosing between alternative resettlement options came to the fore, particularly in development programs that resulted in forced relocation (Muraya, 2006). While policies have evolved to take greater account of slum residents’ interests, involuntary resettlement remains inherently conflictive on at least two levels. Relocation is both physically and socially disruptive, stressing residents’ employment opportunities, financial resources, and social networks. Resettlement projects are

thus a source of conflict between residents and outside actors, including officials, housing developers, lenders, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Attitudes towards relocation can also vary within a settlement, generating potential for conflict among residents. We present a social mediation approach that addresses these two levels of conflict, illustrating its application in a slum relocation program in Ennakhil, Morocco. Social mediation occupies a middle ground between an authoritarian approach to relocation and resettlement programs that have community empowerment as an explicit objective. Social mediation has clear advantages over authoritarian approaches; it is also better suited than the empowerment approach for projects that, like involuntary resettlement, inherently generate conflict and limit disadvantaged groups’ control over decisions. We argue that a clear emphasis on mediating conflict should be more widely incorporated in slum relocation and other development programs. After characterizing authoritarian and empowerment approaches to slum relocation, we summarize Morocco’s evolving slum resettlement policies and describe the Ennakhil relocation process. Before concluding, we contrast social mediation with authoritarian and empowerment approaches. Approaches to slum relocation

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 919 541 6343; fax: +1 919 541 6621. E-mail addresses: (A. Wetterberg).

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0264-2751/$ - see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.cities.2012.02.005

Slum relocation is often politically motivated, spurred by well-connected actors who perceive ‘‘more productive’’ uses for

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the originally marginal but, after years of urban development, often valuable land occupied by informal settlements. Two polar opposite approaches to slum relocation have emerged: at one end of the spectrum is an authoritarian approach, and at the other, an empowerment approach. The authoritarian approach prioritizes technocratic engineering and urban planning goals over the social and economic concerns of residents or of the slum as a community. Resettlement projects are considered successful if they meet or exceed technical requirements, such as requisite quality and quantity of housing completed within the time and funds allocated. Because standards for authoritarian approaches are not based on the needs or concerns of slum dwellers, there is no explicit goal to reflect their points of view or mechanism to elicit participation or empowerment of residents. Instead, this method of slum relocation assumes that the plan and its execution address all residents’ needs. Implementation flows from ‘‘a decision . . . made in some city management quarters to administratively impose a displacement and relocation’’ (Cernea, 1993, p. 12, emphasis in original). This characterization is an oversimplification—few local agencies would deny outright a concern for residents’ needs and priorities—but there is ample evidence that, in spite of moves towards participation and resident consultation in urban development projects, authoritarian practices remain prevalent. For example, a review of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles (VSB) program in Morocco laments ‘‘the implementing actors’ focus on technical aspects rather than on much-needed social support and participation’’ (World Bank, 2006, p. 4). Another assessment notes that VSB managers ‘‘sell the concept and the program to residents, rather than inviting them to state what they want and what they will be willing to pay for it. [It is] a top-down approach which results in some households being forced into making payments for improvements in their environment for which there is no effective demand’’ (Martin & Mathema, 2008, p. 6). The tendency towards authoritarian approaches is not limited to Morocco. Njoh (2011, p. 2) notes that throughout Africa ‘‘the view of planning as the exclusive domain of experts and government bureaucrats that was inherited from colonial authorities is only beginning to wane . . . authorities often resort to making no more than token efforts to enlist citizen participation.’’ Similar attitudes persist in other regions (Muraya, 2006; Riley, Fiori, & Ramirez, 2001; Uysal, 2012 Viratkapan & Perera, 2006). Authoritarian approaches fail to achieve urban renewal goals because they do not provide viable alternatives to slums. Lacking mechanisms to gauge community social structures and needs, they do not consider whether new locations provide jobs and services comparable to those that residents relied on at their original site (Cernea, 1993; Viratkapan & Perera, 2006). Without these, residents are unable to sustain themselves in the new locations and are forced to move again, often to other existing slums. Authoritarian approaches also set housing costs without taking residents’ abilities to pay into account (Takeuchi et al., 2008). As a result, residents cannot afford the intended new housing, stimulating resales and sub-letting to wealthier households while the relocated residents are forced to find yet another home. Authoritarian relocation plans also ignore disruptions to social networks (Uysal, 2012). Relocating slum dwellers without consideration for existing connections between neighbors, family groups, or ethnic enclaves destroys capacity for collective action and networks for mutual aid that are not easily replaced. Ignoring established ties between slum dwellers may result in politicization and conflict within the community (Cernea, 1993). In contrast, empowerment approaches involve slum dwellers in all aspects of relocation, including pre-move negotiations about housing design, sites, costs, etc., as well as maintenance and service provision after relocation (Nijman, 2008). These relocation efforts

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draw on a concept of empowerment in which the intended beneficiaries have expanded ‘‘freedom of choice and action to shape [their lives] . . . [through] control over resources and decisions’’ (Narayan, 2005, p. 4). Narayan’s conceptual framework posits empowerment through the interaction of enhanced agency of the poor with expanded opportunities for decision-making and control over resources (Fig. 1). If key institutions become more inclusive of disadvantaged groups, the previously marginalized will have room to influence decisions and structures that affect their lives. To ensure they can capitalize on the more receptive opportunity structure, the individual and collective resources of the poor must also be enhanced, as constraints on human, social, psychological, political, and material assets and capabilities limit the poor’s influence and negotiating position. Poor groups are seen as possessing strong collective capabilities as they are ‘‘high in ‘bonding’ social capital – close ties and high levels of trust with others like themselves’’ (Narayan, 2005, p. 11). To mobilize lasting change, these ties need to be complemented by ‘‘bridging’’ social capital that connects the poor to other groups. In the empowerment framework, the enhanced agency of the poor and widened opportunity structures combine to improve development outcomes. Change occurs through feedback loops; as poor groups organize to demand improvements, officials become more responsive to their needs, further enhancing the poor’s ability to shift resources and political and social structures in their favor (Narayan, 2005, p. 9). Laws, rules, and procedures result that allow ‘‘citizens and poor people’s organizations to interact effectively with their governments’’ (Narayan, 2005, p. 12). For resettlement projects that apply the empowerment framework, shifting the balance of power in favor of the community is an explicit objective. As a result, lack of community involvement at any stage is a sign of project failure, regardless of technical excellence in execution or maintenance. In addition to strengthening slum dwellers’ rights to self-determination in housing decisions, empowerment approaches posit gains in sustainability. When slum dwellers have a say in relocation plans, they are likely more committed to their new community (Riley et al., 2001, p. 530). One example of the empowerment approach is the rehabilitation and resettlement component of the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP), which relocated 20,000 households to make way for rail upgrading and new roads (Zérah, 2009, p. 863–864). NGOs were enlisted as intermediaries to encourage community participation, to set up democratic spaces, and to enhance the efficiency of service delivery (Zérah, 2009). The MUTP had residents’ empowerment as a project objective; when it became evident that communities were not participating at desired levels, the World Bank loan funding the project was temporarily suspended (Zérah, 2009, p. 870). The empowerment approach attempts to address the failures of the authoritarian approach by gathering residents’ inputs and encouraging their direct involvement in resettlement. However, the benefits and costs of participation can vary substantially, and the net benefits cannot be assumed to be positive (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Mansuri & Rao, 2004). In analyzing participatory relocation programs in South Africa, Lizarralde and Massyn (2008) find that the planned participation of residents often goes unfulfilled. Going further, Njoh (2011, p. 2) calls participatory elements of relocation ‘‘time-consuming at best and wasteful at worst,’’ pointing to requirements for residents’ participation that take them away from meeting daily needs and their lack of expertise in the matters on which they are consulted. Cooke and Kothari (2001) emphasize that participation often transfers project costs to residents. They further warn that empowerment approaches frequently ignore power relations within communities and potential for elite co-optation.

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Fig. 1. Conceptual framework for empowerment approaches. Source: Adapted from Narayan (2005, p. 7).

Slum resettlement policies in Morocco Morocco has been lauded for its efforts to meet the housing needs of a growing urban population (UN Habitat, 2010). Regardless, slum settlements continued to grow at an annual rate of 6% between 1992 and 2001 (Benjelloum, 2003 cited in World Bank, 2010a, p. 22). Inadequate supply of affordable housing and weak support for low-income families resulted in one third of the urban population living in sub-standard housing in 2003 (World Bank, 2006, p. 6). The varied motivations for addressing Morocco’s fast-growing slum population include: fighting poverty and providing better opportunities to the poor; controlling a potentially rebellious urban population; recapturing valuable urban land; and projecting an image of modernity. One common assumption of these various impulses is that the bidonvilles,1 and by extension the bidonvillois (slum dwellers), do not belong in the formal modern city. As such,

1 Bidonville, literally ‘‘tin city,’’ is the term commonly used in Morocco and former French colonies for slum settlements.

they pose a technical problem that the government—helped by urban planners, engineers, and housing developers—must resolve. Approaches to resolving the perceived problem have evolved significantly since independence in 1956. Zaki (2005) describes the initial intentional neglect as ‘‘management through scarcity’’ (gestion par le manque), whereby authorities largely left slum residents to precarious livelihoods and housing, using repression when needed to maintain a firm control on the slums. In the 1980s, however, structural adjustment programs exacerbated social tensions and exposed the limitations of this approach. The 1981 Casablanca riots marked a turning point in the state’s attitude toward bidonvilles (Bogaert, 2011). Increasingly conscious of the ‘‘security risks’’ posed by bidonvilles, Moroccan authorities shifted to a logic of territorial control with the eradication of slums as a stated goal. A second violent event, the 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings carried out by slum dwellers, prompted another radical reassessment of the approach (Bogaert, 2011; Iraki, 2006). One year later, the government launched, with World Bank support, the VSB that aimed to eliminate all slums from Moroccan cities by 2010. VSB incorporated new approaches that had emerged since the 1990s and gave more consideration to the actual needs and desires of the bidonvillois. The limits of the authoritarian approach had

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been made evident by frequent reselling of subsidized apartments at market prices, with relocated residents moving onto another bidonville. When relocation efforts ignore the population’s needs, residents move quickly from new locations to homes that are more financially and socially viable. In Morocco, an estimated 10–50% of apartment units are resold (Navez-Bouchanine, 2008).2 The new approach that emerged now incorporated two important dimensions—physical and social—and gave equal consideration to both. Officials introduced the term accompagnement social (social guidance) to designate the set of actions that address the social dimension of resettlement. However, accompagnement social remains loosely defined and open to a variety of interpretations and objectives ranging from administrative support to populations to ensure project success to empowerment of slum residents (Le Tellier & Guérin, 2009). An early effort to introduce the social dimension demonstrates the limitations and potential for manipulation of the approach (Navez-Bouchanine, 2008). In 1999, the upgrading of a small bidonville in Tangiers was hailed by officials as a successful model for citizen involvement. Interviews with residents, however, revealed that the committee of local habitants had been co-opted into consenting to solutions that did not suit the community and benefited wellplaced real estate investors. The process generated considerable acrimony and divided the population. Thus, the VSB program launched in 2004 integrated accompagnement social. To achieve the program’s ambitious objectives, ten low-income housing agencies were consolidated into the Al Omrane holding group, and the private sector was given a lead role in supplying up to 100,000 housing units and serviced plots yearly (World Bank, 2006). These sweeping goals have not been met; by 2010, VSB had reached half of stated targets (World Bank, 2010a, p. 22–23). Ennakhil slum relocation

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underscoring weak cross-cutting ties across the slum. A significant division existed between residents of the former army barracks— mostly retired members of the military (28% of residents) who had lived in the community for decades—and more recent arrivals. There was little history of collaboration between the two groups and lingering mistrust. Perhaps as a result of these cleavages, only 1% of household heads were involved in neighborhood associations, and only 26% expressed interest in joining after learning more about them. Eighteen percent of respondents pointed to internal conflicts to explain the reluctance to join local groups. Al Omrane and Chaabi Lil Iskane, a prominent private developer,6 led the VSB slum eradication operation, also collaborating with Nouaceur Province, Al Amana (a micro-credit association), and Nouaceur Commune. The VSB program identified Ennakhil as a relocation priority because of its proximity to the international airport. To project an image of prosperity and modernity to visitors, officials wanted to replace dilapidated army barracks and haphazard housing with more orderly vistas by relocating residents to apartments two kilometers from Ennakhil. The project’s profile was raised with the involvement of King Mohamed VI, who strongly supported VSB and visited the Ennakhil site (World Bank, 2010a). Conflicts between authorities and residents escalated. Residents were arrested for protesting the proposed resettlement (Martin & Mathema, 2008). Officials and housing operators avoided Ennakhil because of attacks by stone-throwing residents ‘‘largely uninformed about the nature and time plan of the future interventions, suspicious of the local authorities and fearful’’ (World Bank, 2006, p. 61). Although 90% of household heads knew of the relocation and mandatory financial contributions, most had learned of these plans from neighbors, not from VSB officials. Despite VSB’s efforts at accompagnement social, only 3% of households were aware of possibilities to participate in relocation decisions (Near East Foundation, 2006). Government representatives and housing operators realized that an alternate approach was needed. They called upon the Local Governance Project (LGP)7 to help resolve the situation.

Local context Project interventions Located in the commune of Nouaceur in the Greater Casablanca metropolitan area, Ennakhil is a slum neighborhood of 5200 inhabitants (approximately 1000 households). According to a 2006 survey (Near East Foundation, 2006),3 a substantial majority of residents (86%) had lived there for more than a decade, and only 5% had arrived in the last 5 years. About one-quarter of residents occupied former military barracks, while the remainder (74%) lived in housing constructed of a mix of more permanent and improvised materials. Slightly more than 50% of household heads reported owning their home; others had no claims on the land or residence. In the absence of electricity, most residents used gas for lighting. Almost all residents (99%) used water from standpipes, but access to improved sanitation was substantially lower than the national average (63%).4 While many residents found employment at the airport abutting the slum or at factories in nearby industrial parks, the unemployment rate of 16% was higher than the national average.5 Poverty was high, with 14% of households reporting no income, and 73% earning less than MAD 2000/month (about USD 250/month). The 2006 survey highlighted internal divisions. About threequarters of households preferred to keep the same neighbors, 2 Rates are similar to those observed elsewhere (Uysal, 2012; Viratkapan & Perera, 2006, p. 162). 3 The survey was carried out by the Local Governance Project’s partner the Near East Foundation (NEF) as part of the project interventions described below. 4 On average 98% of urban residents had access to improved water sources in 2008, and 83% had improved sanitation (World Bank, 2010b). 5 Note, however, that 16% of all Ennakhil residents reported being unemployed, whereas 9.6% of Morocco’s labor force was unemployed in 2008 (World Bank, 2010b).

While LGP interventions drew on the empowerment framework, project staff were aware of the limitations of using the empowerment approach within VSB and questioned the feasibility of meaningful participation where critical decisions had already been made. The social mediation approach described below demonstrates, through the Ennakhil case study, how the project adapted and built on elements of the empowerment framework to enable slum residents to participate in decision-making and complete the relocation process. These interventions included consultation mechanisms and service provision, implemented by the Near East Foundation (NEF), a US-based NGO that was a subcontractor to RTI under the project.

Consultation mechanisms LGP established two consultation mechanisms. Four local facilitators made up the social mediation unit (SMU) and were present daily in an Ennakhil office between early 2006 through 2008. They worked to inform residents and encourage dialogue within the community, through a series of mutually reinforcing activities, including the socio-economic survey, ad hoc discussion groups 6

Together, these actors are referred to as the housing operators. In 2005, USAID awarded RTI International a contract to implement the Local Governance Project (LGP, 2006–2008). One author was closely involved in LGP’s design and implementation. LGP provided technical assistance to local governments to practice participatory planning, enhance revenues, manage resources more transparently, and, in general, better respond to citizen needs. One project component was to support implementation of accompagnement social in VSB. 7

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on specific issues, information dissemination, and immediate responses to address residents concerns and problems. The community coordination unit (CCU) met regularly for consultations between all actors involved in the slum relocation. Its members included the Nouaceur mayor, representatives of local authorities, Al Omrane, Chaabi Lil Iskane, Al Amana, community associations, and the SMU. CCU decisions were based on consensus. Service provision To complement the consultation mechanisms, LGP provided services to prepare residents to afford the cost of their new homes and for the shift to apartment living. Services for individual households included trainings on literacy, household finance, and community living. To prepare residents to collectively address issues related to apartment living, LGP provided small grants and developed alternative income sources and opportunities for collaboration through a women’s cooperative and co-owners’ associations. A center was set up to provide administrative assistance and access to credit (for full list of services see Management Systems International, 2009, p. 113–118). Enabling Ennakhil residents’ agency in resolving conflicts

flict that had defined relations between residents and local authorities. Activities included the following:  Mobile dialogue and information forums: three teams of representatives of project partners gathered in Ennakhil’s central square to meet residents.  Site visits: interested residents were transported to the resettlement site and visited a model apartment.  Arts workshops and sporting events: children and youths actively participated. Despite poor weather, an estimated 700 residents (13%) attended. The event signaled a clear break with past practices. Many residents recognized it as an effort to improve interactions with local authorities and housing operators and to initiate a process of consultation. Some noted that it was the first time their opinion mattered. For example, a local woman said, ‘‘I have been living here for thirty years, I have lost my teeth and my sight in this wretched place, the authorities never came to our help before, and until today nobody ever asked for my opinion’’ (NEF organizer, personal communication, April 15, 2006). The event also provided local officials an opportunity to see the potential of citizen involvement in relocation plans.

Methodology

Negotiating equitable apartment prices

To understand how the social mediation approach influenced the Ennakhil relocation, we identified conflicts that emerged as part of the relocation process and how LGP’s interventions and consultation mechanisms contributed to resolving these disputes. We summarize the Ennakhil case through three events selected to demonstrate how the project activities went beyond the authoritarian approach to ensure residents’ awareness of relocation plans and mobilization to resolve the resulting conflicts. These events reflect aspects of the empowerment approach. However, they also demonstrate social mediation’s aim of completing relocation plans as defined by officials and housing operators and of resolving the relatively circumscribed conflicts these plans engender. In terms of Gerring’s (2004, p. 343) typology of case study designs, the analysis below constitutes Type I. By examining a single unit over time, the Ennakhil experience demonstrates how social mediation enabled the resolution of the stalled slum resettlement (resulting from the authoritarian approach) through a focus on internal and external conflicts. To a limited extent, we also include post-move observations, which reflects elements of Type III (breaking down the primary unit into sub-units, observed diachronically). The descriptions below are drawn from project documents (RTI International, 2006; RTI International, 2009), including the final evaluation report (Management Systems International, 2009), as well as one author’s participant observation as the director of LGP. Descriptions of post-move conditions are from September 2010, when the same author revisited Ennakhil. During that visit, he conducted one focus group discussion with commune and governorate officials and representatives of Al Omrane. In addition, he individually interviewed the head of the women’s cooperative, a former SMU facilitator still active in Nouaceur, and a NEF representative working with beneficiaries at the new site. Finally, he walked through the new site to observe and document physical conditions of apartments and common spaces.

As the relocation process regained momentum, a dispute arose regarding the price and size of the new housing units. When residents visited their future apartments, they realized a discrepancy between what they had been promised and what they would receive. They had been told each apartment would be P60 m2 but the actual area varied from 47 m2 to 62 m2.8 To make matters worse, the price for each apartment had been set at MAD 55,000 (about USD 7000) regardless of actual size. Residents viewed this discrepancy as a major breach of trust, and tensions flared. In response, the SMU organized a series of meetings with community leaders so that they could devise their own solution to the problem. In the course of these discussions, residents decided to stick together, as even households that could have gained from the size discrepancies refused to pay unless an equitable solution was found. This show of solidarity strengthened residents’ position in proposing an alternative to housing operators. Based on these SMU-organized discussions, community leaders proposed a plan for prorated prices to the CCU, with smaller apartments sold for MAD 50,000 and larger apartments kept at MAD 55,000. After intense negotiations the developer agreed to residents’ proposed solution, thereby ending the conflict.

Opening lines of communication When LGP became involved, the relocation process was stalled, with open hostilities between residents and authorities. In March 2006, LGP staff organized an open public forum, labeled a ‘‘day of dialogue and information,’’ to break the cycle of mistrust and con-

Ensuring housing rights for all residents Based on a 1999 census, local authorities and housing operators had identified 910 households as legitimate beneficiaries of the relocation process. Subsequently, approximately 200 households had moved into the neighborhood, and they claimed the same right to new housing as other residents. Housing operators were aware of the discrepancy but planned to address it only after all eligible households had been relocated. This strategy proved unviable, however, as many newer households were related to eligible households who refused to move unless the entire family could move with them. One of the main obstacles to resolving the situation was financial. The financial sustainability of the project rested on a crosssubsidization scheme: housing units for Ennakhil residents were 8 About half of residents had living areas >65 m2 in Ennakhil (Near East Foundation, 2006). The anticipated area of their future homes was therefore already a substantial reduction for many residents.

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heavily subsidized and the housing developers planned to profit by selling remaining housing units at market price (up to MAD 200,000). Should these units also be sold below market price, the operators would be losing money. The CCU worked with the SMU to solve the conflict. First, the CCU enlisted community leaders and officials to produce an updated list of eligible households to determine the number of units affected. Second, CCU partners negotiated the price to be charged and who would provide needed subsidies. At this stage the stakes were very high, but the SMU facilitators were able to convince all actors that unless they reached a compromise, each stood to lose. The final solution reflected this common understanding as everyone contributed: concerned households agreed to pay more for their units, the developer reduced the price, and the Commune and Ministry of Housing increased their subsidies. Post-move conditions For authoritarian approaches to resettlement, criteria for success are straightforward and short-term: the transfer of residents to the relocation site. In the medium term, however, a resettlement is judged successful if it ‘‘develop[s] a new, functioning social and economic order’’ (Partridge, 1993, p. 352). From an empowerment perspective, residents should also have gained enhanced standing in their relations with local officials for the resettlement to be deemed successful. At the close of LGP in 2008, an external evaluation described the Ennakhil relocation as follows: The [facilitators] supported by LGP came at a time where people openly rejected the choice imposed by the Ministry of Housing – apartments rather than lots. The social support process has overcome this obstacle, to accept the imposed choice and to initiate an open and constructive dynamic between local officials and the public. . . . In this small town, the relationship between elected officials and people entered a new paradigm and managers have experienced a close collaboration, intense and successful in a highly complex issue. The effects of the experience on local actors in Nouaceur are palpable: an open dialogue between elected officials and the population is established for the first time in the life of the community; elected officials have played their full part; the actors from various sectors have learned to work openly and effectively in the [CCU] to produce a concrete outcome. (Management Systems International, 2009, p. 22–23).9

No in-depth study has been conducted to assess the continuing effects of the move or the social mediation approach on residents. At the time of the September 2010 revisit by one of the authors, 300 households remained in Ennakhil, but officials indicated their new apartments were finished, the administrative formalities completed, and relocation was imminent. Many of the observations indicate that residents have adapted to their new location. We can cautiously speculate that these positive signs bode well for the future, as research in other countries has shown that continued community cohesion and strong leadership during the 2–3 years after relocation are associated with improved long-term development outcomes (Viratkapan & Perera, 2006; see also Partridge, 1993).

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landscaping, with maintenance by the co-owners associations that were formed prior to relocation. The co-owners associations appear to be active, as they receive member dues and collaborate on maintenance. Their viability is a tentative sign that the old division between residents of the barracks and newcomers may have subsided. Associations that previously represented different areas of the slum are now collaborating after their members have dispersed throughout the apartment complex. New leadership has emerged after the relocation. The president of the LGP-initiated women’s cooperative is now an active member of the Nouaceur City council. After benefiting from a quota for women in the 2009 communal elections, she is preparing to run for parliament. She has also raised funds to expand the cooperative’s activities, providing more income-earning opportunities for women. Authorities report that residents make their monthly loan payments (MAD 300–400) without notable delinquencies, though the economic impact of the move on residents is not well understood. It is clear that moving to the new units has generated significant costs to households including monthly repayments, utility bills, and association dues. There are reports that more women are engaging in income-generating activities inside or outside the home. Reselling does not appear to be common. While residents are formally prohibited from selling their units for 5 years, there are ways around this clause. However, there is little evidence of selling on a notable scale. Visits to several apartments show some households investing in improvements, suggesting a desire to stay on. Some risks There have been incidents of youths vandalizing some community infrastructure. Community facilities for youth were included in relocation plans, but were jettisoned when the developer added subsidized units for new households. These events suggest that younger residents’ concerns remained unaddressed in the Ennakhil relocation. Discussion Before comparing social mediation to authoritarian and empowerment approaches, we note that Ennakhil may have been predisposed to successful relocation. First, households were relocated in close proximity to Ennakhil, maintaining similar access to employment, which is particularly important given new financial obligations. Had the site been further removed, as is the case in many resettlement projects that move slum dwellers from central to peripheral locations, it is likely that resistance would have been stronger and reselling more prevalent (Takeuchi et al., 2008; Viratkapan & Perera, 2006). Political pressure on officials may also have facilitated the relocation. Local political dynamics related to the slums can impede relocation processes if politicians take advantage of the project to solidify their electoral base (Bogaert, 2011). The heightened scrutiny of Ennakhil, particularly after a royal visit, may have inspired state actors to rise above politics as usual.

Some positive signs

Social mediation goes beyond the authoritarian approach. . .

The physical aspects of the apartment buildings—occupied since 2008—are encouraging. Individual units are well maintained and common areas have been transformed into well-groomed green spaces. Further investigation revealed that NEF has supported the

In spite of these promising factors, the relocation process was stalled in 2006 when authorities requested support from LGP. The breakdown highlights the deficiencies of the authoritarian approach; even when relocation sites are attractive and officials face conducive political pressures, a purely technical, top-down process is problematic. The social mediation approach broke with the pre-

9

Authors’ translation from French.

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vious authoritarian effort, most fundamentally by involving residents in decisions, rather than simply informing them of official plans. Under the authoritarian approach, residents were a technical problem to be managed as part of the relocation process; the social mediation approach instead treated residents as participants in completing the resettlement. Elements of the shift included provision of accurate information, on-going interaction and consultation with residents, and mechanisms for resolving conflict. Accurate information In the absence of accurate information and a history of trust between residents and authorities, rumors reign and residents assume the worst. LGP provided clear information on the transition to the new site and acknowledged the inherently conflictive nature of the process. Activities like days of dialogue, site visits, and bringing bank representatives to talk to residents helped provide solid, current, and reliable information, creating a baseline of shared knowledge among Ennakhil residents. They also allayed some of residents’ main concerns, especially by clarifying the financial details of the relocation. Establishing a local presence Information is perceived as reliable, however, only if it comes from trusted sources. Another critical change from the authoritarian approach was the SMU’s presence in Ennakhil and the intimate knowledge of the community it afforded the project. Facilitators did not come just to conduct a survey, take the information, and leave. They stayed on the site for 2 years and in the process established personal ties with residents. Facilitators came to understand the complex web of solidarity and divisions among residents, which, because they remained external to the community, enhanced their ability to act as local mediators. They were thus in a position to specifically address social divisions, recognizing that the community was not unified and that considerable negotiation among residents was needed before decisions were made.10 Mechanisms for consultation and negotiation Drawing on its local knowledge and connections, the SMU gathered residents and community leaders to elicit their views on relocation plans. When groups of residents differed in their preferences, the SMU facilitated discussions of the contentious aspects of the relocation to arrive at a compromise that would satisfy the different factions. Residents’ views, as negotiated through the SMU, were then presented to the CCU. While the SMU helped to resolve conflicts among residents, the CCU addressed conflicts between Ennakhil representatives, state agencies, the developer, and financial institutions. Perhaps most significantly, the CCU helped transform these conflicts into meaningful opportunities for resident involvement in major decisions.11 . . .But is distinct from the empowerment approach These elements demonstrate social mediation’s closer alignment with empowerment approaches. Social mediation aims to shift opportunity structures by providing better information to citizens, including them in decisions, and enhancing local organizational capacity through facilitation and creation of structures for consultation (Fig. 1). In line with the empowerment framework, LGP also worked to enhance the agency of the poor by improving both individual and collective capabilities. For instance, the creation of the women’s cooperative boosted both individual incomes 10 For a discussion of the complexity and mutations of social ties in Moroccan informal settlements and of the various forms of social mobilization, please refer to Iraki (2006). 11 Horowitz, Koenig, Grimm, and Konate (1993, p. 244) describe the adverse consequences of omitting a forum for residents to negotiate with other project actors.

and organizational capacity. The SMU and CCU enhanced Ennakhil residents’ political capabilities and collective representation. Although social mediation stands closer to empowerment approaches, it has two critical distinctions: in scope and in focus. In terms of scope, both opportunity structures and the agency of the poor were severely curtailed in the Ennakhil case, as the most critical decisions—whether, where, and to what form of housing to relocate—were made without residents’ input and were not open for negotiation. The possibility of a full empowerment approach was eliminated, as the only decisions left to residents’ control were the details required for the completion of the relocation plan. While residents clearly had greater opportunities for input than under the authoritarian approach, the state and private actors retained much of the control over the resettlement. Further, LGP’s efforts to enhance residents’ agency—through financial education, engagement with state actors, and income opportunities—were commensurate with the circumscribed opportunities to influence resettlement plans. Project staff did not attempt to empower residents to address broader political, social, and economic inequities that would represent a more complete ‘‘expansion of assets and capabilities . . . to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives’’ (Narayan, 2005, p. 5). In this sense, social mediation was better suited to the Ennakhil relocation, where full community control of decisions and resources fundamental to the empowerment approach was never a possibility. Social mediation also adds a focus on conflict absent from the empowerment framework.12 Conflict is inherent in empowerment’s challenges to existing power relations. However, the framework provides no systematic mechanisms for conflict resolution. Empowerment approaches fail to acknowledge that expanding the opportunities and agency of the poor inevitably threatens the power of other actors. Officials, elites, and other powerful actors are assumed to readily cede control over decisions and resources to the previously marginalized (Narayan, 2005, p. 9). Without means of addressing conflicts that inevitably result from challenging social and political structures, empowerment approaches lack a critical intermediate step to improving development outcomes. The social mediation approach directly addresses this weakness of the empowerment framework through a clear focus on conflict,13 as it occurs at two levels. First, social mediation works to resolve conflicts with external actors that emerge as slum dwellers are given expanded opportunities to influence the resettlement process. In Ennakhil, when the discrepancies in apartment price and size emerged, for example, the CCU provided a forum for community leaders to propose an alternative to the developer who, after considerable negotiations, agreed to prorate prices for smaller apartments. Second, the social mediation approach recognizes that ‘‘the poor’’ are not necessarily a unified community; internal cleavages can cause frictions that threaten improved outcomes and prevent participation in decision-making. In Ennakhil there were existing tensions between older and newer residents. The relocation process heightened this distinction when only residents identified in the 1999 census were eligible for subsidized apartments. To re12 The reference to conflict under ‘‘social and political structures’’ (Fig. 1) concerns general levels of conflict that ‘‘take place between nation-states, areas within a country, communities, social groups, or households, or even between members of a household’’ (Narayan, 2005, p. 9–10). It is not a vision of conflict as inherent in development projects, resulting from shifts in opportunities or agency, or as an obstacle that must be specifically addressed for improvements in development outcomes. 13 Given the focus of the paper and space limitations, a more complete discussion of conflict and power is beyond our reach. For a thorough treatment of the modalities of power in (urban) Morocco see Bogaert (2011) and Navez-Bouchanine (2008) and, more broadly, Elyachar (2003). For a review of the literature on development projects’ role in both mitigating and exacerbating conflict, see Chapter 2 in Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock (2011).

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solve this conflict, the SMU and CCU worked to gather accurate information on which to base negotiations between factions of residents, the state, and the developer. The SMU also played a critical role in negotiations amongst residents over apartment prices. A middle ground between authoritarian and empowerment approaches Compared to the authoritarian and empowerment poles, the social mediation approach used in the Ennakhil case thus occupies a middle ground. It is a clear departure from authoritarian approaches. It has a clearer focus on conflict but a narrower scope than the empowerment approach, as social mediation enables residents’ participation in the limited decisions available, rather than stipulating resident control over the most critical decisions and resources. In Ennakhil, social mediation was focused on engaging residents in resolving conflicts that threatened progress on the slum resettlement project. In this sense, consulting residents was an instrument for resolving a technical imperative; an expedient way to get the project moving again, rather than a contribution to a separate empowerment objective (Zérah, 2009, p. 870). The social mediation approach’s comparatively narrow scope and focus on conflict may have broader relevance, however, beyond resettlement projects. In many development programs, the agency of the poor and opportunity structures are limited in ways similar to the Ennakhil relocation. Resettlement is an extreme example, but many development projects have clear restrictions—on the sector of investment, who is eligible for benefits, and who can participate in decisions—that effectively eliminate the possibility for beneficiaries to have ultimate control of resources and consequential decisions. While the rhetoric may have changed, and sometimes also the mode through which control is exercised, the balance of power remains with the state and its allies (Bogaert, 2011; Elyachar, 2003). Yet many development projects aspire to an empowerment approach; these mismatches are bound to disappoint both beneficiaries’ and project implementers’ expectations of decision-making processes and outcomes. Social mediation draws on the empowerment framework to strengthen the position of subordinate groups, but rather than premising outcomes on their full control over decision-making, it works in proscribed environments by ensuring that they have opportunities to influence decisions that remain. The social mediation model is also instructive for its clear focus on conflict. In any project that introduces new resources, the potential for conflict arises over access and distribution. At the most general level, all development efforts are a source of conflict as they attempt to change power relations and resource allocations. As Barron et al. (2011) argue, the key to reaching resolution of such conflicts is to incorporate consultation and ‘‘a battery of in-built mechanisms (both people and procedures) that allow tensions to be addressed as they arise’’ (p. 19). In Ennakhil, the established mechanisms for dealing with internal conflicts (through the SMU and its range of activities) and tensions with external actors (through the CCU) could serve as models for other development projects, whether or not they involve a relocation component. Conclusion Social mediation works within the reality of political pressures from elites and official attitudes that, even under a veneer of participation, continue to force disruptions on poor citizens powerless to oppose them and with few material resources to address them successfully. The approach directly acknowledges power relations, which are often ignored in relocation plans and development projects generally. The authoritarian approach assumes that all power

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rightfully rests with authorities who know best and can, if necessary, force residents to relocate if they fail to accept such plans voluntarily. The empowerment approach aims to shift the balance of power in favor of the community. However, it does so indiscriminately, assuming that it can be shifted for all facets of the relocation process, whereas in many development projects the most critical decisions and resources remain out of beneficiaries’ control. Further, empowerment approaches place major decisions in the community’s hands without a means to resolve divisions among intended beneficiaries (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Approaches that assume a unified community and ignore cleavages are likely to exacerbate tensions and undermine the long-term sustainability of the relocation. We argue for incorporating explicit mediation mechanisms in relocation plans that focus on resolving conflicts, addressing social issues that impede the process, and enabling residents to have a say in how they are relocated. Although such a narrow approach does not grant residents decisive control as envisioned in the empowerment framework, it is a step towards enabling residents to sustain themselves in their new environment after the forced relocation takes place. The social mediation approach underscores the need to consider both external (authorities and community) and internal (within community) power struggles that threaten to disrupt relocation process and viability of residents’ social and economic lives at the new site. The social mediation approach should be applied in other resettlement projects. As the world’s urban population is predicted to almost double by 2050 (United Nations, 2010), relentless pressure on city land calls for sustainable approaches that satisfy the demands of residents, as well as the state and other powerful interests. Beyond resettlement, however, the development challenge may be framed as ‘‘not one of limiting conflict per se but of managing it in constructive ways’’ (Barron et al., 2011, p. 42). Such a view argues for wider application of social mediation where development projects threaten existing power relations and introduce competition for resources that may itself drive conflict. Acknowledgements This paper benefited from comments by Derick Brinkerhoff and Richard Martin on earlier drafts and from two anonymous reviewers’ suggestions for improving the manuscript. Any remaining errors are our own. References Barron, P., Diprose, R., & Woolcock, M. (2011). Contesting development: Participatory projects and local conflict dynamics in Indonesia. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. Bogaert, K. (2011). The problem of slums: Shifting methods of neoliberal urban government in Morocco. Development and Change, 42(3), 709–731. Cernea, M. M. (1993). The urban environment and population relocation. Washington, DC: World Bank. Cooke, B., & Kothari, U. (2001). The case for participation as tyrrany. In B. Cooke & U. Kothari (Eds.), Participation: The new tyrrany? (pp 1–15). London: Zed Books. Dasgupta, A., & Beard, V. A. (2007). Community driven development, collective action and elite capture in Indonesia. Development and Change, 38(2), 229–249. Elyachar, J. (2003). Mappings of power: The state, NGOs, and international organizations in the informal economy of Cairo. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 45(3), 571–605. Gerring, J. (2004). What is a case study and what is it good for? American Political Science Review, 98(02), 341–354. Horowitz, M. M., Koenig, D., Grimm, C., & Konate, Y. (1993). Resettlement at Manantali, Mali: Short-term success, long-term problems. In M. M. Cernea & S. E. Guggenheim (Eds.), Anthropological approaches to resettlement: Policy, practice, and theory. Boulder: Westview Press. Iraki, A. (2006). L’organisation des solidarités dans des territoires en construction: Quartiers restructurés au Maroc (The organization of solidairty in territories under construction: Restructured districts in Morocco). Espaces et sociétés, 4, 63–77. Le Tellier, J., & Guérin, I. (2009). «Participation», accompagnement social et microcrédit logement pour la résorption des bidonvilles au Maroc

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