Beyond resistance to change: Behavioral science on the firing line

What happened when top management in one organization simultaneously introduced The Managerial Grid, management by objectives, and participative management? A blooming buzz of confusion with mixed messages and, predictably, mixed results as seen by the lower-level managers who had to implement the programs and adapt to them.

BEHAVIORAL

SCIENCE ON THE FIRING LINE

Walter R. Nord Douglas E. Durand

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any behavioral scientists have attempted to convince managers that less autocratic, more participative management of employees would improve organizational performance. On balance, however, failures in persuading managers to adopt participative approaches appear to have outnumbered successes. What has caused the failures? Resistance to change by subordinates, low commitment by top management, and the impractical nature of the ideas advocated by behavioral scientists are among the reasons most frequently cited for the failure of many such innovations in management style to take root. However, such general statements provide little insight into the actual processes through which new knowledge and techniques are considered, modified, accepted and used, or rejected. In order to discover what some of the factors in the actual processes of introducing change are and how they influence the acceptance and application of behavioral science knowledge, we undertook an in-depth study of one organization, Manchester Manu-

facturing Co., that applied The Managerial Grid@, management by objectives (MBO), and participative management (PM). Bac&v-ound The authors are indebted to the staff and managers of Manchester Manufacturing for their cooperation in this project. Manchester Manufacturing is a medium-sized company with three major plants and several smaller operations located in several Midwestern and Southern cities. Most of the company’s sales are of products manufactured using mass production technology, but approximately 25 percent of the firm’s $25 million total annual sales comes from products produced through continuous process operations. At the time of our study two and one-half years ago, top management consisted of a president and four other men. The president, Jim Atkins, was a major stockholder in the firm and spent long hours at the business. A somewhat contemplative personality, he was very popular with his employees, who viewed

him with respect and affection and agreed that he displayed a strong concern for their welfare. In addition to the president, the topmanagement group included Harold Field, Charles Post, a sales manager, and a young M.B.A. Harold Field, an organizational process consultant, was hired as a member of the top team by the president. His primary duties involved implementing “team management” throughout the organization and maintaining and restructuring previously instituted management programs. Because Field had been hired only six months prior to our study, he played no part in introducing most of the programs described in this article. Charles Post initially entered the company as an assistant to Atkins. Post was an engineer by training but had developed an intimate knowledge of the applications‘ of recent developments in the behavioral sciences. As he saw it, he was selected to complement Atkins’s 1,9 Managerial Grid style. Because of his commanding personality, technical expertise, high energy level, and verbal skills, Post greatly influenced Atkins. He played a key role in the company’s change effort. The sales manager had many years’ experience at Manchester Manufacturing; the young M.B.A. had been with the company only three years or so. Research

procedure

In order to assessthe factors that influenced the relative successor failure of the various innovations in management practices the company was attempting, we interviewed 49 of the 50 managers in the organization, down to, but not including, first-line supervisors. Each interview averaged about 90 minutes. Interviews included a number of open-ended questions relevant to the strengths and weaknesses of the organization and the degree to which various managers had been able to implement

participative management concepts in their work. Several points are important: First, although we asked about both the organization in general and the individual’s work unit, our questions about management-program utilization were individually oriented-we asked about what each person had or had not done. Second, we were concerned with the perceptions of the people interviewed only at the time of the research. In those instances where lower-level participants and top management viewed things differently, it was not possible for us to determine whose perceptions were really accurate. However, we believe that these conflicting perceptions are important data in themselves. Finally, because we were investigating the dynamics of the process as they appeared at one point in time, we did not evaluate the overall successof the changes. While we will comment on some of the apparent outcomes, our major interest was in the problems of implementation, not the results themselves.

PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT

APPROACH

Several years prior to our research, Manchester had begun to introduce a participative management system. Through this system, top management hoped to use human resources more effectively to achieve a greater return on investment. While participative management means different things to different people, in this firm it meant moving operational decision making down to the organizational level with the most complete knowledge of the situation. Post emphasized that the whole effort to introduce this new system to the company was experimental in the sense that it had to be designed to fit Manchester. Despite a thorough search, he had been unable to find any models that had really reduced participative management to a set of procedures. It was his opin-

the company, had been used to develop needed skills and attitudes. Work

Most of his research has centered on the application of psychological and sociological knowledge to the understanding of the behavior of people in formal organizations. He has a continuing interest in the social exchange model as a vehicle for understanding organizational processes; currently he is writing a book on this topic. Recently he has become interested in the limitations of psychologically based models for humanizing social systems and organizations. Among his publications are Concept and Controversy in Organizational Rehavior and articles in a number of psychological and organizational journals.

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ion (and we believe rightly so) that Manchester was in the forefront of the field in its effort to do this. Manchester had spent much time and money to equip its managers to operate under a general PM system. Every manager had had the one-week Phase 1 training program of the Managerial Grid. This training was a prelude to other Grid training, which by the time of our research had progressed to the introduction of managerial work teams as a fundamental mode of operation. Moreover, much effort hda gone into developing an MB0 system and training individuals to set objectives. Other training experiences, both within and outside

Teams

Work teams were a major innovation by which top management attempted to increase participation of lower-level managers. While these teams had been in the planning stage for some time, it was only a month or so before our interviews that most teams began operation. Consequently, few specific statements about the effectiveness of the teams appeared in our interviews, and those that did appear were concerned primarily with operational matters. This emphasis was consistent with the major reason for introducing participative management in the first place-that is, improving the quality of operational decisions. The kind of participation that occurred can be demonstrated best by several examples. One manager commented that his work team invited “guests” from other teams in order to ascertain why the work team was not receiving better cooperation. Moreover, several managers believed that work teams helped them execute tasks more effectively. For example, one manager discussed a team that was responsible for managing a small plant. He noted, “We determine what needs to be done and have carte blanche to do it.” Similarly, a member of the accounting team noted, “We make our own decisions. We have full responsibility on accounting. We don’t have to wait on someone else. Under the old concept, you always had to deal with your boss’sreaction to things.” Despite the short history of the teams, several reactions of the managers suggested that the teams were beginning to break down previous barriers, encouraging more open communication among members. Other members commented that greater enthusiasm and team spirit appeared to be evolving. Last, there was at least one example of the use of teams providing a way for nonmanagers to contribute

more effectively to the organization’s performance: One manager related how a switchboard operator complained to other members of her team about the bad impression she made on callers when she tried to locate a manager who had gone out of town without telling her. Action was taken to see that the problem would not arise again.

WHAT MANAGERS THOUGHT ABOUT MANCHESTER AND ITS PROCEDURES

A number of findings emerged from our conversations with individual managers. In general, their attitudes toward the firm were quite favorable. The following statement was representative: “While we have a lot of complaints around here, it’s better than any other place to work.” Similarly, another manager observed that “while we have a lot of bitches, our bitches are at a higher level than elsewhere.” Moreover, relative to other firms we studied, a norm of openness pervaded Manchester; in only a few cases did individuals seem guarded in their discussions with us. Thus, although we did not take specific measurements, interest in the work itself, openness in communication, and satisfaction with the firm as a place to work characterized most managers at Manchester. On the basis of these criteria, which frequently are used by behavioral scientists as indices of the successof participative management, it seemed to be working. Despite the generally favorable attitudes toward the company of its managers, lower-level managers were very specific in their criticisms of the participative mode that top management had undertaken. An understanding of these attitudes, and their bases, may be helpful in understanding problems that managers are apt to encounter in attempting to make participative-management strategies operati’onal. One of the most frequent complaints

Douglas E. Durand is assistant management and organizational

professor of behavior in

the School of Business Administration at the University of Missouri, St. Louis. He received his Ph.D. (1972) and M.B.A. degrees from Washington University, where he specialized in organizational behavior. Dr. Durand’s research interests have focused on personal and organizational change strategies. These studies have concentrated on the behavioral e#ects of achievement motivation and traditional management training. His current interests include the exploration of @owledge utilization and managerial work behaviors. Dr. Durand’s publications include articles in Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Academy of Management Journal, and Decision Science.

was that the changes in management approach had not resulted in improved organizational performance. With all the planning, objective setting, team meetings, and introduction of “management systems,” profits still had not increased. Though a few individuals believed that factors outside the organization were responsible for any deficiencies in organizational performance, a larger number blamed internal organizational factors. One major set of comments focused on the tendency of people within the organization to make decisions but not to follow through on them. Some managers blamed top management for this low action orientation. As one manager described it, Top management is not action-oriented. They shouldn’t remove themselves from the thrust of the company’s effort as they often have done. They must be involved more totally with things such as customers and conflict within departments.

Other managers attributed the low degree of “follow through” to the sheer proliferation of new management programs. As one man said, In the past, we’ve had a number of different systems but haven’t taken a set of policiesand stuck with it. We’ve had so many changes, it’s like “future shock.” We tend to jump around from one to another; we change every six months when it really takes two years to see if it would work.

In addition, some individuals suggested that top management used the participative techniques as a way to avoid making decisions or taking action. To the degree that new approaches appeared to delay action, they contributed to the pervasive feeling that the firm was not results-oriented. Many of the changes were considered dysfunctional for the achievement of organizational goals in other ways. Some of the innovations such as MB0 were considered becoming ends in themselves. For example, many participants thought that completing the paperwork required by the MB0 program had become more important than the actual achievement of the goals themselves. While the “means becoming ends” theme was most frequently voiced about MBO, a few individuals made similar comments about the teams. (For example, “We have meetings just to have meetings.“) In addition, some managers perceived that new management programs overemphasized people: Over 20 percent of the managers commented that high concern for people interfered with the organization’s achieving its task objectives. In sum, there were a number of complaints about the failure of the organization to be task-oriented. Many of the managers attributed this failure to the participative management programs. Other data suggested, however, that the introduction of the behavioral science oriented management procedures really reflected the personal needs of members of the top-management team.

IhfPACT

OF

PARTICIPATIVE

TOP

MANAGEMENT

ON

MAKAGEhlENT

“The president d oesn’t like to direct; he prefers to arbitrate and referee. He can arbitrate a zero-sum situation so that both parties lose. Because he doesn’t want to have hard feelings, both parties wind up losing.” Both also get something, but what they get isn’t related to the matter in conflict. This view of one manager seemed to be shared by many. Atkins was perceived to be fair, interested in people, not wanting to offend, and indecisive. A number of managers referred to his “professorial” approach. Other managers viewed him as a caring father and as a teacher. One man observed that the president is “very impressed with formal degrees.” Another manager expressed concern that the company seemed to be more of a laboratory for trying out psychological theories than a profit-making organization. Last, Atkins’s personal style was academic. For example, he explained difficulties involving newly implemented management programs as “a problem of poor pupils. Good pupils pick up the ideas quite easily.” We present this characterization for two reasons: first, to suggest that some of our findings may be unique to the personal characteristics of top management in this organization; second, to indicate the need to consider the motivation of top management in introducing participative systems. Frequently, the explicit reason given by top management for its decision to introduce such changes is to improve organizational performance as measured by traditional economic criteria. Clearly, top management at Manchester was no exception; the new strategies were developed to provide optimal conditions given the president’s management style. However, the form that the new management systems took was shaped by the personal characteristics and needs (conscious and unconscious) of individuals at the

top-management level. Consequently, the nature of the changes experienced by middle- and lower-level managers as a concrete program emerges may be quite different from either what they had expected or what the designers of the system had intended. Our data provided suggestions on how this transmutation may occur.

DECISION

MAKING

“TRANSMUTATION

AND

THE

PROCESS”

Gouldner described the transmutation process in the application of social research. He wrote : The client sometimes undertakes a research (program) so that he does not have to solve certain problems, and so he need not change. In this case, the very conduct of research provides participation in a problem-solving ceremonial. It is a ritual particularly pleasing to the consciences of men reared in a rational tradition. Moreover, it provides a publicly evident token of the client’s good faith and of his sincere interest in resolving the problem.. . . This pattern of resistance is one in which the very preparations for action are transmuted into devices for postponing action.

We believe a similar transmutation process may have occurred with decision making at Manchester. Several sets of forces appeared to be affecting the decision-making process at Manchester. First, top management intended to include all managers in making decisions to the degree that the individual manager’s knowledge enabled them to contribute. Second, many of the lower-level managers believed that top management (particularly one or two individuals) had difficulty in making and implementing decisions; 36 percent of the managers claimed that there was a lack of direction from the corporate leaders. It was impossible to determine to

what degree top management’s effort to get greater input from below was responsible for the subordinates’ perception that top management did not give adequate direction. However, a number of comments made by individuals at all levels of management lead us to believe that top management had often appeared indecisive even prior to the introduction of participative systems. (For example, Post’s perception that he had been hired to complement the president’s 1,9 style.) Assuming this reluctance to make decisions, certain experiences reported by lower-level managers suggest how the participative systems could have been used to satisfy the personal needs of higher-level individuals. Many subordinates expressed a great deal of frustration with what was perceived to be an overemphasis on process. Typical comments included : “We sometimes develop alternatives [in decision making] for their own sake.” “ We talk a decision to death; by the time the decision is made, it’s too late to act.” “We are good planners but poor executors.” In short, there was strong circumstantial evidence that the outcomes of the participative innovations were useful to some members of top management primarily by helping them to avoid those things they wished to avoid. These observations suggest that behavioral scientists who have stressed the importance of commitment by top management as a necessary prior condition for the effective implementation of participative management may have been a bit naive. Top management may be “committed” for a number of different reasons; some of these reasons may lead to a form of participative process that serves the needs of top management (with or without improving Power

organizational

needs and participative

performance). management

The formal purpose of the participative management system at Manchester Manufacturing

was to develop an organizational climate that strengthened the relationship between a person’s knowledge and the influence he or she had on operational decisions. Behavioral scientists often have assumed that such a climate would promote power equalization in the sense that the difference between the amount of decisional influence exercised by lower-level participants and that exercised by higher-level managers would be less than under more traditional organizational climates. However, Mark Mulder cited evidence that participation does not always lead to power equalization; in fact, participation may often lead to greater inequality in the distribution of power or influence. Our observations at Manchester support Mulder’s findings and suggest some of the organizational dynamics through which this process may operate. In particular, two sets of factors appeared to reduce the extent to which power equalization occurred. One set of factors stemmed from the fact that the participative systems changed the ways by which people could exercise influence. Moreover, the skills and abilities of certain high-level people, particularly those of Post, were exceptionally well suited to the new ground rules. Charles Post is best described as second in command. He is heavily involved in managing many aspects of the firm and was responsible for the design and implementation of the managerial innovations. Under the new rules or programs, influence was associated with knowledge, and the interpersonal process involved an open interchange and debate. In these circumstances, Post had many of the skills required for success. His personality, intelligence, and verbal skills certainly increased the likelihood that he would be a “winner” in many face-to-face discussions. Furthermore, he was perceived as enjoying such “combat.” As one manager suggested, Post (and one other member of the

top-corporate group) got a “real thrill out of winning or crushing someone.” Consequently, the greater the participation and openness of communication, the greater would be their ability to increase their influence. Thus, rather than narrowing the influence gap between top- and lower-level managers, under certain conditions participative management can increase power inequalities. Participative management appeared to augment the power of upper-level managers in yet another way. During the introduction of a new innovation, top managers were the most informed individuals about what applied behavioral science models should look like. Consequently, their knowledge about behavioral science gave them a potential source of power. They could (and at Manchester they appeared to) affect the behavior of subordinates by introducing knowledge from the behavioral sciences to quell opposition and set norms consistent with their needs. Requests for action by top management could be disarmed by pointing out the dangers of 9,l leadership styles. Knowledge of behavioral science was used as an instrument of power in much the same way that Charles Perrow has described the general use of resources in organizations: A tool is something you can get sometIling clone with. It is n resource if you control it. It gives you power that others do not have.

A second set of factors that reduced the diffusion of influence was that important elements of the formal hierarchy and authority system remained unchanged. Even though this firm had committed significant resources to participative management, top management had not relinquished its right to resort to more traditional modes of control. In fact, the organization had formally designated 9,l as the appropriate back-up style in situations where 9,9 had proven ineffective. Top man-

agement took a position similar to Douglas McGregor’s that “the assumptions of Theory Y do not deny the appropriateness of authority, but they do deny that it is appropriate for all purposes and under all circumstances.” Thus the possibility that management would “reassert” its authority always existed; and as Gouldner has observed: Power, in short, exists not simply when authority breaks down or before authority has had a chance to mature. It exists as a factor in the lives of subordinates, shaping their behavior and beliefs, at every moment of their relations with those above then). Attitudes toward their superiors are continually influenced by the awareness-sometimes focal and sometimes only subsidiary-that superiors can give or withhold at will things that men greatly want, quite apart from their own agreement or consent, and that crucial gratifications depend upon allocations and decisions by their superiors. It is the sheer ability of the powerful to do this, quite apart from their right to do so, that is an independent, ever-present element in the ser.,zile attitudes that subordinates often develop toward their superiors. Legitimacy and “authority” never eliminate power; they merely defocnlize it, make it latent.

Our data revealed the importance of Gouldner’s observation for understanding difficulties that are apt to occur when participative management is introduced into modern organizations but no changes are made in the formal power structure. The important issue is not whether authority is used or not but rather who has the authority to say whether it will be used. The power issue was viewed somewhat differently by a number of managers who were unclear about the motives of top management in introducing participative management. Several of them stated that they did not trust some members of top management-especially Post. Some suggested that he had devised the PM system to enhance his own power and position in the company. In short,

some managers believed participative management, in practice, was a form of manipulation. A double-bind

for

top management

The term “double-bind” is psychological jargon for a “you’re damned if you do and you’re damned if you don’t” situation. Our investigation suggested that a major problem in implementing participative techniques stemmed from a double-bind situation. On the one hand, top management may decide that it is appropriate to exclude lower-level participants from a particular decision. Such a refusal can result in a belief by subordinates that top management is insincere in its professed participative philosophy. On the other hand, engaging in substantive participative efforts may be perceived as indecisive or weak leadership by some subordinates. (For example, “Participative management easily can become permissive management.“) Under these conditions, no matter what high-level managers do, they will violate some of these expectations and be subjected to pressures from below to change their style. Moreover, these pressures seem to grow in strength as lower-level managers become more frustrated with problems in administrating the new programs. Top management was aware of the lack of direction sensed by lower-level participants. This awareness was reflected by Post who had begun to think that the PM system did not develop leaders as naturally as a 9,l system. He suggested that special attention was needed to develop leaders. Thus, from time to time, top management stopped attempting to use a 9,9 style and resorted to “the 9,l back-up style.” Post, commenting on the problems top management experienced, observed, “We can get ideas from people, but at some point the leader has to say ‘this is what we are going to do’ and not pass his own anxieties on to the group.” He then described his handling of a critical operating decision that resulted from

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long-term interpersonal conflict. “Someone must step in. There has to be a hierarchy; someone must make decisions and get this [conflict] ironed out or get someone to leave. Yesterday I said, ‘This is not a PM meeting; something has to change. If the new manager doesn’t get support, I’ll get rid of anyone who doesn’t support him.’ It was a thirty-minute meeting instead of the usual four-hour one.” This problem is another manifestation of the double-bind condition, which may well be inherent in implementing a 9,9 managerial style. The problem stems from the fact that behavior, of necessity, is sequential in time. Thus, while a manager over all can be equally high on both task and structure, at any given time his specific actions are likely to appear to be concerned either with tasks or with people. While in his mind he may be a 9,9 supervisor (and on average he is), people viewing his behavior, such as his subordinates, may consider him inconsistent. A number of comments of top management indicated a frustration with the ability to be perceived as truly committed to a 9,9 style. For example, Post observed that “if a manager takes any direct action, he is often labeled 9,l.” This observation is interesting if the reader will recall the earlier observation that top management was, at least during the initial move toward participative management, able to use behavioral concepts to exert much influence. Over time, it appears that the subordinates learned to play this “game” as well; they could resist management’s influence by suggesting that management was not “practicing what it was preaching.” More study of the problems that top management encounters in an attempt to become more participative is needed; we believe that behavioral scientists often have failed to prepare managers for the pressures they will experience. Although top management at Manchester is still enthusiastic about the re-

sults of their on-going PM system, the difIiculties encountered over the years make it easy to understand why participative management may often be discarded. It may be abandoned not because of a low level of commitment but in response to the tensions and frustrations it can create for top management.

CRITICISMS OF SPECIFIC PARTICIPATIVE PR0~k4Ms AS INNOVATIONS

Although the managerial innovations introduced at Manchester Manufacturing were extensive, in our interviews the managers primarily focused on three programs: The Managerial Grid and MB0 were mentioned most often and participative management to a lesser extent. Their reactions suggested additional potential problems in applying these concepts. The Managerial

Grid

The overall reaction to the Grid was positive; 26.5 percent commented that the Grid was a good technique. Moreover, most individuals thought that they had personally benefited from the Grid. Specifically, 57.1 percent commented that it had facilitated or improved communications and candor, and 42.9 percent stated that it helped people to work better in a group. Moreover, 28.6 percent reported that it had aided their self-development, and 18.4 percent believed that it had improved their ability to think and analyze problems. (Note: These percentages are apt to understate the extent of beliefs because of the method of collection. A scaling instrument where people have all the alternatives before them presumably would have elicited more reactions.) The Grid seemed to affect behavior as well as attitudes. Many managers reported specific personal learning that they had received in the process of getting feedback from their colleagues and other people during the

THE

MANAGERIAL

GRID

The Grid developed by Doctors Robert Blake and Jane Srygley Mouton is the single most popular approach to organizational development, having been adopted in whole or in parts by thousands of organizations. It begins with the premise that every manager practices one of five basic styles of managing that reflect varying degrees of concern with production and people. To Blake and Mouton, there is one best style-what they call 9,9 in which the manager displays an equal and integrated concern for production and people. How do you persuade people to adopt the best style, to move from being a 1,9 manager, for example, who concentrates on people and neglects production, or the converse, the 9,l manager? The answer is a step-by-step process; in this case, a six-phase strategy of conversion. In Phase 1, typically a week-long seminar, participants are first exposed to the model and then forced to analyze their behavior and match it against the model-in Blake’s words, “to see how really lousy you are in comparison with where you should be.” Phase 2 repeats the methodology of Phase 1, but this time it is for real. Participants are members of the same work team, which utilizes the Grid as a framework within which they analyze their work performance and plan how to improve it. Phase 3 focuses on improving intergroup performance, Phase 4 on developing a model of the organization as a whole, Phase 5 on implementing that model, and Phase 6 on measuring and evaluating the progress made since the Grid began.

first days of the Grid. Others reported cases in which they had allowed their subordinates to participate more in decisions. These also had been. successful. Another positive outcome of the Grid was to give managers a language or terminology to communicate about their managerial styles and the organizational climate. Terms such as “9,l”; 1,9”; and “candid” were widely used by the managers to describe supervisory styles, organizational priorities, and organizational or departmental cultures. Of course, not all reactions to the Grid were positive, but the negative criticisms were considerably less frequent. Several managers (12.2 percent) commented that there was too much emphasis on people, and 8.2 per cent noted that the Grid was not constructive because it was used as a personal weapon by others in the organization. There was also a belief that the Grid resulted in much internal analysis but did not directly lead to effective performance.

On the basis of our observations at Manchester, we believe that Phase I, in which everyone went to a retreat setting for a week, is a meaningful experience for many participants. Many managers were motivated to try new things and develop high expectations for improvements. While several individuals reported improvements in their own managerial style after Phase 1, many became disappointed when they did not see any rapid improvement in the organization’s performance. One disappointed member of the top team complained, “I know that the organization is better as a result of what we have done [the systems we have introduced]. However, it has not showed up in profits yet, and I’m trained out. I’m not satisfied to train for other programs. We have to develop ways to execute things we’re doing now.” At lower levels in the organization, there were forces inhibiting use of Grid training. Some of the problems stemmed from the

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fact that not everyone felt free to be open. As one manager observed about Phase 2, “It won’t work because a subordinate can’t tell a boss what he thinks. You just don’t pick apart your boss.” Another said, “You have to assume that the guy above you is doing his job. You just can’t be too candid on some things.” Thus, despite the general popularity of the Grid among managers, they experienced conflict between what they learned from the Grid that they ought to do and what seemed prudent. The informal organizational values were that candor was good, but the reinforcements, at least as they were perceived by some, made it risky. One final point about the Grid as an OD strategy deserves mention. Often behavioral scientists seem to assume that organizations as they exist prior to OD interventions are 9,l; most training has been concerned with development of the people dimension. However, at Manchester some people (most notably Post) thought that the organization had more of a 1,9 climate when Post entered the firm. He believed that moving to a 9,9 style from a I,9 style was far more difficult than moving from 9,l to 9,9. (Every time a manager became strongly task-oriented people thought he was being 9,l.) While a number of lowerlevel managers might disagree with Post’s belief that the company was characterized by a 1,9 style to begin with, his observation suggested a weakness in many OD strategies-an assumption that the first order of business is to increase concern for people. Management

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by objectives

As mentioned earlier, MB0 was instituted by Post as a strategy for translating the underlying philosophy of the Grid into an operational system for individuals. However, in the minds of most managers, the resulting MB0 system was in conflict with the Grid. Furthermore, they did not think it was a technique for pro-

moting participative management. As Figure 1 reveals, 22.4 percent of the employees thought they were forced to participate in the MB0 system. Though a large number of managers (43 percent) thought that MB0 was technically a good management tool, 51 percent expressed the belief that as implemented at Manchester, it required too much paperwork. One manager expressed the thoughts of many with these words : “Management by objectives panned out bad. I don’t like a lot of paperwork, and I was spending more time on MB0 paperwork than on things that had to be done.” Many managers saw MB0 as an extreme form of devoting time to planning and contemplation as opposed to action. There were strong and widely held negative criticisms about the amount of time spent filling out detailed plans and rewriting them in conformity with the procedures and terminology spelled out in the MB0 manual used by the company. Post agreed that a major problem in motivating individuals to use MB0 was their inability to plan meaningful and “stretching” objectives. However, it appeared that his efforts to resolve this problem were widely misunderstood. He mentioned the hours that he personally had spent helping subordinates complete MB0 paperwork. From his perspective, he was teaching these subordinates how to set their own MB0 goals. However, many subordinates perceived this process as one in which Post set for them the goals that he wanted them to achieve. Figure 1 shows that nearly a quarter of the managers (22.4 percent) commented specifically on the inadequate follow-through or otherwise poor implementation of the MB0 program. A number of people (14.3 percent) felt compelled to set objectives that their superior wanted. Also, as mentioned earlier, many subordinates thought that they were forced to

Figure INTERVIEW

RESPONSES

MANAGEMENT

1

OF MANAGERS BY OBJECTIVES

REGARDING

THE

PROGRAM Percent

Coded

Giving

Response

Good management and/or planning technique No follow through; lousy implementation Forced participation; low employee role in setting up program Had to set objectives my superior wanted Threatens employees; used as a club Too much paper work; too long; more emphasis on MB0 than work; waste of time; frustrating Opened communications among people Candor caused problems; hurt morale Caused conflict between group and individual goals (compensation plan emphasized individuals at expense of group) Helps learn about self Hard for a person to do Hard to set good objectives * Percent

of managers

mentioning

of Managers Response

42.9x 22.4 22.4 14.3 8.2 51.0 6.1 4.1

22.4 6.1 16.3 4.1

this topic.

participate in the program. As several managers stated, “We are asked to choose between accepting management by objectives and not working here.” How realistic was this perception? One top manager conceded that over time, MB0 had been made less voluntary than it was at first. There was a pervasive feeling that top management’s approach to MB0 was inconsistent with its commitment to a participative approach. One of the most significant findings concerning the MB0 system was the belief that it conflicted with the achievement of organizational goals. Figure 1 reveals that 22.4 percent of the individuals believed that the MB0 system inhibited effective teamwork. Some managers, for example, commented that they wanted to work on a particular project but that it was part of someone else’s objectives. Consequently, they were reluctant to work on it.. As one manager stated, “We wound up fighting with each other for credit.

It sort of separated us. We couldn’t work on what someone else was on or couldn’t cross goal lines. The Grid suggested that you work as a team. In MB0 you just thought about yourself. MB0 seemed to undermine the Grid.” Thus some believed that the MB0 system conflicted with some of the other innovations. Last, the MB0 system and the interdependency of individuals also combined to generate tension among certain managers when mistakes were made. Three managers commented that “you set objectives but then get frustrated by mistakes that other people make.” Mistakes attributed to top management received the most severe criticism by lowerlevel managers, who remarked that all the planning they had done was rendered useless by “top management blunders.” Over all, one result of MB0 was an increase in the vulnerability of all managers to criticism from others. MB0 appeared to in-

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crease the vulnerability of both lower-level and upper-level participants because the expectations and actions of all members became more known to other managers. From top management’s perspective, the reasons for these criticisms stemmed from a general resistance to MBO. Post observed that MB0 was resisted for a number of reasons: l The inability of individuals to either identify, plan, or accomplish meaningful and stretching objectives. l The natural unwillingness of individuals to make their weaknesses visible to themselves as well as others. l The lack of knowledge that a boss has of his subordinate’s job and personal objectives. l The lack of immediate results from a substantial investment of time in system development. l The day-to-day emphasis and demands of operating problems that minimize the available time for analysis and planning discussions between boss and subordinate. Comparison of these observations with the comments of the lower-level participants is instructive. Most lower-level managers at Manchester would agree with the last two points; many managers would likely agree with some substantive aspects of the first three points. However, the tone of Post’s statements places the blame on the lower-level participants, while the tone of statements from lower managers places it on the MB0 system and its designers. Thus managers at all levels saw similar symptoms, but they disagreed as to the causes and remedies.

SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

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Management innovations that we have discussed were part of a general effort to imple-

ment participative management. Figure 2 illustrates the paradox of success: Although the behaviorally based innovations produced many of the positive outcomes stressed by their advocates-improvements in motivation, teamwork, and morale-there seems to be a real danger that traditional management functions may receive too little emphasis to suit many subordinates. Many of the negative comments were related to traditional management functions of planning, organizing, directing, and so on. Almost 43 percent of the managers said top management did not lead enough; a similar number observed that the company was poorly organized. Unclear goals was a complaint by 34.7 percent of the managers; a similar proportion complained about compensation. By contrast, many managers were pleased about a number of things: 32.7 percent commented on the good teamwork, 38.8 percent commented on the strong commitment of their subordinates to their work, and 77.6 percent commented favorably on the competence of their fellow managers. While generalization is risky, the experience of Manchester Manufacturing supports a number of cautions about participative management as a general strategy. We mention them not because they are new but because they are so often ignored by academicians and professional managers in their rush to employ various fads. First, reactions to any innovations are likely to be a function of the degree to which the organizational members perceive the innovation as relevant. One of the most frequently voiced complaints at Manchester was that “top management tries to operate this company like General Motors.” In another form, a similar complaint was that the new systems required too many staff personnel; 22 percent of the managers commented that “we have lots of staff specialists, but I don’t see results” and “we get little assistance or direction from corporate

Figure INTERVIEW

RESPONSES

OF MANAGERS Organizational

2 REGARDING

THE ORGANIZATION

Factors

Unclear goals or objectives Too internally oriented (too many reports) Well organized company or division Top management does not lead enough Poorly organized company or division (also poor planning) Compensation problems Too much change Task vs. procedure conflict (especially MBO) Poor stat&g/selection (people have jobs they are not qualified Communication

and

Good teamwork Good feelings/compatibility Interpersonal conflict Interdepartmental communications

Interpersonal

bad/hindered,

Individual

Decision

* Percent

of managevs

mentioning

Relations

and so forth

32.7 29.5 22.4 20.4

Variables

Job commitment (employees committed/motivated High technical competence of employees Low technical competence of top management Low results orientation Willingness to change; flexible Reluctant to make changes Poor implementation of change programs

for)

34.7x 30.6 20.4 42.9 42.9 34.7 40.8 40.8 18.4

to work)

38.8 77.6 32.7

Making

28.6 38.8 38.8 26.6

this topic.

staff, but we sure get assessed [overhead charge] a helluva lot for them.” Second, managers should not expect a uniform response to participative management from all employees. In fact, the ability of management. to identify and cope with differences among people and departments in a way that is perceived as being consistent with the spirit of the program may be one of its most crucial tasks. Manchester’s experiences suggest several employee groups that may need particular attention. The managers at the home plant generally responded far more favorably to the participative systems than did

managers working in other locations. In addition, managers from differing functional areas responded differently. Most notable was the tendency of sales personnel to put far greater stress on money than on participation. Last, some older, less educated managers seemed less able and/or willing to participate fully in the new systems than did their younger peers. The rate of change also can be an important source of problems. At Manchester, most managers believed that the new programs or systems were changed so frequently that the results of previous changes could neither be consolidated nor evaluated.

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Throughout the organization, managers commented that “Post reads a book over the weekend and Monday we have a new system.” In

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fact, top management’s desire to make the new managerial system work contributed to the rapidity of these innovations. In attempting to operationalize PM, Post thought he was proceeding without tested guidelines and constantly needed to readjust programs that were not working. Certainly such an experimental attitude is consistent with the advice given by behavioral scientists. However, from the perspective of the subjects (that is, lower-level participants) the changes may appear to be arbitrary or, even worse, to stem from a desire to take something from them. Moreover, the rapid rate of change seemed to compound problems for individuals who believed top management was not providing enough direction. Many of their comments were well summarized by one manager who said, “One of the advantages of the 9,l organization is that people know the rules, the goals, and the structure. In this company, these aspects often are unclear to people.” Interestingly, at the time of our interviews, there seemed to be some disillusionment about the value of participative management among some top managers as well. One top manager noted that participative management faces two basic problems: “First, it does not develop leaders. Basically it deemphasizes the need for leadership. Second, participative management diffuses responsibility. Some people don’t know where they fit.” Displaying a different concern, one of the top managers commented that “management bought the behavioral science view of participative management and assumed that the organization already had the traditional mechanisms and skills with which to make it operative; but it didn’t. What is needed now is a new system of controls.” This remark was paralleled by those from two other members of the top-manage-

ment group who expressed an increased interest in reinforcement theory by noting that “what we need now is to focus on consequences. We need to structure the environment so that people have favorable consequences from doing what I [as a member of top management] want. If they are not doing things, it’s my fault. Traditional psychology is good at understanding why things happen but not good at making things happen.” The dynamics of the change process revealed a number of tensions with both theoretical and practical implications. Management programs at best provide guidelines to action. This observation is not new. What seems new is the finding that commitment of top management to a program must be interpreted in the context of the needs of top-level managers themselves. The reasons for top-level management commitment to these efforts shapes the program, and this shaping process is a vital determinant of the operational reality of the program. In Manchester’s case, the sometimes sometimes conflicting percomplementary, sonal needs of the two top managers, Atkins and Post, greatly influenced the specific implementation of the program. Atkins, with his 1,9 management orientation, had two simultaneous needs-to insert a stronger task element in the decision-making process and to delegate more decisions downward to the appropriate levels. His commitment to participative management was very real, but his grasp on how it might be implemented was not well formulated. Besides, he was perceived to be indecisive. By contrast, it could be argued that Post’s commitment was somewhat ambivalent, but he had a much deeper understanding of the technique and he was more decisive. The comparative failure to implement PM (for example, the emphasis on team development and management as advocated by the Grid combined with an individually oriented ap-

preach to MBO) at one level reflects top management’s lack of understanding and, to some extent, commitment. By encouraging a program in which the overall lines of responsibility tended to be confused (remember that Post was the chief executor of all the behavioral science programs), Post tended to diffuse the effects of the program and retain more responsibility for the top team of which he was the most effective member. Post was fascinated with the possibilities behavioral science techniques afforded for improving organization performance; and as the man best qualified at Manchester to implement them, he knew that the process of implementation would augment his already considerable influence-something incidentally that Post would never admit. It is only fair to add that Post didn’t feel ambivalent about the participative management program as he understood it. On the contrary, he was enthusiastic. Power equalization was outside the bounds of PM as Post conceptualized it. In short, the inconsistency existed at least in the perceptions of some of Post’s subordinates but went unrecognized by him. In other words, Post’s behavior generated a mixture of measures among his subordinates; some apparently thought he was concerned with power equalization as a goal in itself-although this was not his concern. In. addition, the techniques themselves can become the basis for a new set of games; managers at all levels employ these techniques to meet their own needs and to get the things they want. Thus it appeared to us that individuals at all levels would use parts of the new systems when it appeared useful to accomplishing what they wanted. When more traditional means of influence appeared likely to satisfy their needs, these would be used. In short, PM did not eliminate manipulation. Instead it enabled attempts at manipulation to assume new forms.

Moreover, any action by an individual could be defended by reference to some set of principles without addressing the underlying reasons why he invoked that particular principle. For example, an indecisive manager could avoid a difficult decision by insisting on a different analysis or on the need for consensus. Similarly, a manager who was reluctant to be held accountable for his shortcomings could challenge MB0 as requiring too much analysis and could criticize top management for not providing enough direction. Also, a manager with formal authority could invoke that authority from time to time and maintain that this behavior was not inconsistent with the participative system-because PM involves the “appropriate use of authority,” people should be permitted to participate in decisions only to the degree that they have the knowledge to share in decision making. To the researchers, the tensions described above appeared to inhibit participation by organization members in decisions. Consistent with this point, comments by managers at Manchester suggested that full openness did not really characterize the system. As Field commented, the system was characterized by “general politeness rather than trust.” While the degree of trust seemed very high relative to most other organizations, the trust level was not high enough for everyone to be open about a number of important issues, especially their own needs and fears. Despite the problems we have described, we should stress again that these difficulties occurred simultaneously with many of the positive consequences promised by the advocates of participative management, MBO, the Grid, and so forth. Managers were committed to and satisfied with the organization; they were task-oriented, and they evaluated the competence and motivation of most colleagues positively. In general, they possessed many of the attitudes that the behavioral

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scientist suggests his program will instill. Thus, a change effort based on the behavioral sciences appeared to have worked in many ways, but the total outcome was a mixture of these benefits as well as new tensions that developed as the innovations interacted with personal needs and existing structural elements. Those managers who attempt to use the behavioral sciences must be aware that a mechanical approach to an organic system almost inevitably will fail. Managers may have been misled into thinking that using behavioral science concepts is easier than it really is. While we still believe that the behavioral sciences have much to offer the manager, a great disservice is done when practitioners are encouraged to adopt ideologies and techniques without helping them to anticipate the tensions and transmutations that are inherent in the utilization of knowledge. As behavioral scientists, when our ideas fail, we tend to blame the victim. We say, “Top management was not committed,” or “The subordinates resisted the change.” Based on our work at Manchester and the work of other writers such as Albert Cherns, we now view these phrases as ways of overlooking an important blind spot. Managers operate under very real constraints of resources, technology, and time. Their behavior is further constrained by the expectations of a number of groups including their subordinates, superiors, customers, and other managers. We know very little about how to make organizations more participative without proposing changes that are well outside of the range of acceptability of most managers. Our observations concur with Charles Perrow’s :

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The prospects for participative management are . reduced to minor innovations within a complex network of established premises for action. The organization is not static, by any means, but change is incremental, partial, hit-or-miss, and

ch.lnneletl atlapt;ltionc.

in the well-bvorn

grooves

of established

Changes in interpersonal relations of the kind envisioned by the Grid and participative management concepts are inadequate by themselves if the organization is to surmount what Robert Blake and Jane Mouton have dubbed “cultural drag,” escape from its own past, and effectively implement participative management. If we want to change behavior in the direction of increased participation, working on attitudes is not enough. We also must change structure-and in no small ways. William F. Whyte’s insight was correct: “While recognizing the need to examine interpersonal relations, we should not see these relations simply as the interplay of personalities. Unless we change the pattern, we can do little to change the behavior.” Certainly, Manchester goes a long way toward validating Whyte’s insight. The structural changes intended as underpinnings for the new participative management style were good as far as they went. But they did not go far enough in embodying structural changes to make the system fully participative. Remember the manager’s observation that what Manchester needed was a new system of controls. Precisely. To make participative management really effective, top management would have had to change the power structure, the compensation structure, and the reward and recognition structure in ways that were not even discussed by any of our respondents during the period that we conducted our interviews. The one major structural change underway at the time of the interviews was the creation of work teams that in varying degrees seemed to be exercising a measure of discretion formerly reserved for top management. But even with the work teams, there was ambivalence: first, the ambivalence previously

noted of conflict between team-oriented Grid and individual-oriented MB0 and second, ambivalence in applying the Grid. According to Post, Manchester had gone through several phases of the Grid, including Phase 2, which most experts agree is crucial to establishing effective work teams. As one of them has written : “There is always a fadeout, and eventually, without Phase 2, the fadeout becomes a blackout.” The problem is that only a few managers were able to recollect Phase 2; a larger number were on record as feeling cheated because they had been deprived of the opportunity to go beyond Phase 1. Part of the problem was that Phase 2 was not identified as such; participants were “in the Grid” without knowing it. But obviously an unremembered learning experience is an unmemorable learning experience. The ambivalence of top management toward participation and toward change in general is strikingly reflected in the divided perceptions among the managers at Manchester. Precisely 38.8 percent viewed the organization as flexible and willing to change, and by an amazing coincidence, the same number of managers viewed the organization as reluctant to make changes. Clearly, the lower-level managers were receiving different and contradictory messages from the top. Did this perceptual confusion arise from ambivalence on top management’s part, faulty perceptions by some lower-level managers, or a combination of the two? Our data doesn’t permit a definitive answer. Certainly, a number of managers seemed

to believe that participation for the most part would be restricted to matters of secondary importance and that most decisions of consequence would still be made at the top or not at all.

SELECTEDBIBLIOGRAPHY

Edwin Malone reported a case study on “The Non-Linear Systems Experiment in Participative Management” (lournal of Business, January 1975). Harry Levinson’s “Management by Whose Objectives?” (Harvard Business Review, JulyAugust 1970), Stephan Carroll and Henry Tosi’s Management by Objectives (Macmillan, 1973), and Anthony Raia’s “Goal Setting and Self-Control” (~oumul of Management Studies, September 1965) provide valuable ideas on the problems of implementing MBO. Mauk Mulder’s “Power Equalization Through Participation?” (Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1971) suggests some ways in which participation may increase power inequalities. A number of articles and books provide insights into the problems of the application of behavioral science knowledge. Some of the most stimulating ideas can be found in Alvin’s Gouldner’s The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (Basic Books, 1970), Gouldner’s essay “Explorations in Applied Social Science” in Applied Sociology (Free Press, 1965), Charles Perrow’s Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (Scott, Foresman, 1972), and Albert B. Cherns’s “Can Behavioral Scientists Help Managers Improve Their Organizations?” (Organizational Dynamics, Winter 1973).

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