Beyond social capital: A strategic action fields approach to social licence to operate

Resources Policy 52 (2017) 284–295

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Beyond social capital: A strategic action fields approach to social licence to operate

MARK

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Susan Wrighta, ,1, Sara Biceb a b

School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia, 3010 Melbourne School of Government, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia 3010

A R T I C L E I N F O

A BS T RAC T

Keywords: Social licence to operate Social cohesion Strategic action fields Community relations Australia

Australia's national economy continues to benefit from the extraction and exportation of non-renewable resources, even despite the end of its mining boom. The negative impacts of this primary industry endure and are felt disproportionately by rural communities in close proximity to mining sites. The challenge of holding mining and extractive companies to account for social concerns – which may be difficult to measure or pin down to any one cause – has influenced affected communities to look to other, non-regulatory means of accountability to raise their concerns and see them addressed. ‘Social licence to operate’ (SLO) is often touted as one such tool for holding large resource companies to account. But a growing field of research into the concept has remained largely focused on social capital measures and has yet to consider the conditions necessary to facilitate communities’ successful deployment of SLO as an accountability mechanism or negotiation tool. There remains a gap in our understanding about how SLO can be used meaningfully by communities as a tool for advocacy and accountability, especially in company-community negotiations. This article introduces a strategic action fields (SAFs) approach to SLO to facilitate exploration of the relative strength between and within differing views (power), requirements and agendas of stakeholder groups (strategic agendas) and the aligned interconnections of affected stakeholders (social cohesion), thus enhancing understandings of SLO possible through a social capital approach. In introducing SAFs for SLO, this article extends research on SLO measurement through exploration of three central research questions. First, it asks whether and how SLO might exist as more than a benchmark measurement of acceptability, as defined primarily from corporate, risk-based perspectives? Secondly, building on existing, social capital-based approaches to SLO measurement, are there other approaches that could complement or extend a social capital approach to SLO to understand better a community's ability to operationalise it? Following this, how might insights possible via a complementary means of SLO measurement assist us to expand current understandings about the role of relationships in granting SLO? Three M & E sector case studies from the resource intensive states of Western Australia and Queensland are explored via a set of 105 government, public, media, social media and other related documents. Data was thematically analysed using N*Vivo10 software. Application of social capital and SAFs approaches reveals key tensions in claims to a SLO, especially where, under a social capital-only approach, strong relationships between particular stakeholders would suggest that a SLO has been granted. The addition of a SAFs lens—especially consideration of social cohesion—reveals that even where SLO may be granted, it may not necessarily be operationalizable by communities due to these competing fields. The article concludes with suggestions about the benefits of applying SAFs to SLO measurement, as a means of teasing out the utility of the concept to affected stakeholders. Recommendations for future research adopting this approach are also suggested.

1. Introduction The mining and extractives (M & E) industry in Australia has long been a primary contributor to the national economy. Even despite the

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end of Australia's mining boom, in 2012–13 exports of natural resources amounted to $AUD201.1billion (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2014a), 81% of Australia's total goods exports (valued at $AUD246.9b) for the same period (ABS, 2014b). Although the

Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Wright), [email protected] (S. Bice). Ms Susan Wright is a PhD candidate in the School of Social and Political Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.04.005 Received 31 August 2016; Received in revised form 21 December 2016; Accepted 12 April 2017 0301-4207/ © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

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instance, the privileging of corporate perspectives and related claims to SLO is evidenced in the practice of corporate sustainability reporting wherein SLO is regularly claimed but poorly defined (Parsons and Moffat, 2014; Bice, 2014). Thus, a growing field of research into the concept has yet to consider fully the conditions necessary to facilitate communities’ successful deployment of SLO as an accountability mechanism. This situation represents a critical paradox for the SLO concept: it appears to be used widely and regularly by companies as a ‘signalling’ or rhetorical device to suggest project approval, while at the same time often lacking meaningful utility to affected stakeholders.3 This article contributes to the broader scholarship on resources policy, social impact assessment and management, and to the developing literature on SLO through attending specifically to this paradox and to the operationalization of SLO as an accountability tool, especially within a regulatory context that prioritises environmental or economic concerns. Much previous theoretical literature on SLO focuses on its measurement in terms of community acceptance of a project (e.g. Boutilier and Thomson, 2011) and on the processes through which SLO is mediated (e.g. Moffat and Zhang, 2014). These approaches rely heavily on measures of social capital, involving institutionalised trust, promise keeping, listening, community benefit and procedural fairness. Research on SLO's measurement has provided an important conceptual starting point for engaging the concept more critically. But there remains a gap in our understanding about how SLO can be used meaningfully by affected stakeholders as a tool for advocacy or accountability, especially in company-community negotiations to mitigate impacts or achieve benefits (Harvey and Bice, 2014; Owen and Kemp, 2013; Prno, 2013). This article extends the research on SLO measurement through exploration of three central research questions. First, it explores whether and how SLO might exist as more than a corporate benchmark measurement of project acceptability. Can it also be a meaningful accountability tool for communities dealing with the M & E industry? Secondly, building on existing, social capital-based approaches to SLO measurement, are there other approaches that could complement or extend a social capital approach to SLO in order to understand affected stakeholders’ ability to operationalise it? Following this, how might insights possible via a complementary means of SLO measurement assist us to expand current understandings about the role of relationships in granting SLO? Could such an approach help to shift understandings of SLO towards greater community ownership and away from corporate co-optation? In tackling these questions, the article engages a strategic action fields (SAFs) approach—the strategic alliances, reciprocity and social orders that shape a shared understanding around a particular issue or experience (Blanchet, 2015)—as a means of better understanding the context in which SLO may be operationalised. The article therefore aims to enrich both our understanding of commonly used, social capital-based SLO measurement criteria and to suggest how introduction of a SAFs approach can assist to understand how and in what circumstances SLO might offer greater utility for affected stakeholders. We build on existing social capital frameworks to suggest that SAFs may help to explain whether or how SLO may be advanced beyond a relationship measurement to be operationalised by affected stakeholders for accountability purposes. Importantly, we see the negotiations associated with accountability as more than ‘consultation’ or pure dialogue, but as a process that results in agreed actions, including but not limited to establishment of formal agreements, like those described by O’Fairchelleagh and Corbett (2005) or Ruwhiu and Carter (2016), inclusive of both indigenous and non-native local communities. Equally importantly, we recognise ‘affected stakeholders’ and ‘community/ies’

Australian economy benefits from the extraction and exportation of non-renewable resources, the negative impacts of this primary industry are felt disproportionately by rural communities in close proximity to mining sites (Owen and Kemp, 2013). The presence of an ongoing mining operation in rural areas has the potential to create negative health, economic, and social impacts for community members (see, for example Measham et al., 2013, in RSJ Special Issue). Much academic attention has been given to the social impacts that the M & E industry has on communities nearest to its operations, including but not limited to: the introduction of a non-resident fly-in/fly-out (FIFO)2 workforce; an increase in the costs of goods and services which are set in relation to mining wages; demographic changes and increased levels of crime; pressures on local infrastructure and services; increased levels of stress and anxiety; and poor health outcomes (see, for example; HaslamMckenzie, 2011; Larson, 2011; Reeson et al., 2012). While companies do attend to social issues, largely via community relations roles and regulatory requirements associated with impact assessments, these concerns are frequently subjugated to environmental or engineering concerns. For example, regulatory structures which tend historically to situate social impact assessments (SIAs) within environmental impact assessments (EIAs) implicitly value environmental over social concerns. In Australia—the focus for this article's case studies—government regulation impels corporate attention to social impacts, but formal regulation is mostly limited to or circumscribed within requirements concerning environmental impacts. Consequently, there continues to be a tension between community concerns regarding extraction's negative impacts and the regulatory environment in which the M & E industry operates. When M & E companies acknowledge their non-financial impacts, they often assert their commitments to operating ‘beyond compliance’ and efforts to ‘earn and maintain a social licence to operate’ (SLO) (Bice, 2016). Meanwhile, communities continue to seek effective means of holding M & E companies to account for social concerns that may be difficult to measure or pin down to any one cause (Morrison-Saunders et al., 2014). Many affected communities therefore look to other, nonregulatory means of accountability to raise their concerns and see them addressed. SLO is often touted as one such tool to achieve accountability and redress of grievances. The SLO concept is generally defined as ‘the ongoing acceptance and approval of a [project] by local community members and other stakeholders that can affect its profitability’ (Moffat and Zhang, 2014). The most widely used definitions for SLO arise from prior research focused largely on defining ways for M & E companies to measure their SLO, drawing heavily from studies of social capital (e.g. Thomson and Boutilier, 2011; Harvey and Bice, 2014; Moffat and Zhang, 2014). While this approach has been widely adopted, it is also critiqued for its lack of clear licensing criteria or brokerage processes as defined by communities (Bice, 2014) and for its utility to communities and its ‘capture’ by M & E companies (Owen and Kemp, 2013). Indeed, much research concerning SLO approaches it from a corporate perspective through which effort is concentrated on providing firms with measurement tools (e.g. Boutilier and Thomson, 2011; Moffat and Zhang, 2014; Prno and Slocombe, 2012) to assist their strategic management of stakeholder relations. Surprisingly little research approaches SLO from communities’ perspectives, leaving a gap in our understanding as to how communities view, define and operationalise SLO. This is the case even despite SLO being touted as a tool through which communities can hold resources companies to account (Boutilier, 2014). For

2 Due to the physical remoteness of many mine sites in Australia and the requirement for specialised skill sets, M & E operations are largely reliant on a non-resident workforce, employed on a fly-in/fly-out (FIFO), bus-in/bus-out (BIBO) or drive-in/drive-out (DIDO) basis. This arrangement sees employees enter into a cyclic schedule that entails commuting to the mine for an extended rostered shift, followed by a return home (usually an Australian capital city) for an extended rest period, before heading back to the mine for the next cycle (Blackman et al., 2014; Haslam-McKenzie, 2011).

3 We use the term ‘affected stakeholders’ consciously here and throughout. ‘Stakeholders’ are commonly defined as those groups or individuals who may affect or are affected by a company or operation. Here, we are most concerned with those groups or individuals on the affected side of the equation and choose to make this explicit.

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as complex and contested terms. Each of the case studies represent diverse groups and organisations, representative of multiple interests and communities within communities. For purposes of analysis and discussion, however, we use these terms to refer to the non-corporate actors implicated in claims to SLO in the case studies, as defined in the empirical section of the article. We remain ever-mindful of the challenges inherent within this usage. This article proceeds by briefly reviewing the social capital approach to SLO, as prevalent in the current literature. SAFs and the related concepts of power, strategic agendas and social cohesion are then introduced as a conceptual adjunct to traditional social capital frameworks. The context for three illustrative case studies of SLO in Australia is set through a brief overview of the regulatory environment in which the projects operate and which affects societal expectations directly related to securing a SLO. Cases are examined via a thematic analysis of 105 community, media, social media, government and other public documents. Findings are presented in relation to social capital approaches to SLO and findings from a SAF approach are also introduced. Following this, we suggest that SAFs, especially the related concept of ‘social cohesion’, enrich the social capital SLO measurement model through drawing attention to the competing power dynamics that assist or hinder affected stakeholders’ abilities to operationalise SLO, at the very least within the Australian M & E industry. Opportunities for future research applying this enriched conceptualisation of SLO are suggested in the concluding discussion.

Fig. 1. Model of the Social Licence to Operate. Source: Boutilier and Thomson (2011).

munity expectations (see, Harvey and Bice, 2014). Interactional trust indicates that the community can engage with the company, and when doing so, feels heard and that the company honours its contracts and promises (Moffat and Zhang, 2014). Institutionalised trust is gained when the community's representative organisations and the company attain a relationship based on mutual regard for the interests of the other (Boutilier and Thomson, 2011). Thus, in measuring SLO, economic legitimacy is captured by examining community benefits; socio-political legitimacy via mutual respect; interactional trust via promise keeping; and institutionalised trust via shared values and goals. The Boutilier and Thomson (2011) model provides a useful conceptual framework for measuring the relational levels of acceptance between a M & E proponent and community members. This approach, however, positions community dissatisfaction as a risk to the profits of the M & E operation, suggesting that SLO finds its value primarily as a signalling device for corporate operations management, not as a tool for community use. A social capital approach makes it possible for a company to take measurements of relationship quality that may suggest that a social licence has been granted, even where that SLO holds little or no utility for the communities in question (Owen and Kemp, 2013). In other words, social capital measures may indicate that a SLO is granted without consideration of whether or how affected stakeholders are using or will be able to use it. This situation illustrates a critical paradox in social capital approaches to SLO: a community does not necessarily require the capacity to operationalise SLO before a company can claim that it has one. In these instances, from a community perspective, SLO is a toothless tiger. But from a corporate perspective, it is a green light. Moreover, the framing of SLO as part of a risk management due diligence exercise conducted before undertaking a major project leans toward the historical tendency of industry to extend an economic rationalist standpoint to social considerations (Owen and Kemp, 2013).

2. Conceptual framework: from social capital to SAFs SLO is commonly measured through a social capital lens. Broadly, this involves identifying the extent to which trustful and mutually respectful relationships exist between M & E companies and local communities (Harvey and Bice, 2014). In perhaps the most widely applied definition of SLO, Robert Boutilier and Ian Thomson (2011, p.2) describe it as a “community's perceptions of the acceptability of a company and its local operations”. Here, community perceptions of project legitimacy are necessary to gaining a SLO. Within a social capital approach, measurement focuses on elements such as, promise keeping, community benefit and institutionalised trust, as defined in Table 1, below. Using social capital measures, Boutilier and Thomson (2011) contend that SLO exists on a continuum spanning four levels, from the withdrawal or withholding of SLO through acceptance, approval and finally psychological identification (i.e. assimilation) (see Fig. 1). Further, Boutilier and Thomson (2011) identify four factors which they hold to be necessary for a SLO to be granted: economic legitimacy, socio-political legitimacy, interactional trust, and institutionalised trust. Economic legitimacy is gained when a company offers only financial benefits to a community. Socio-political legitimacy is achieved when the community perceives that the company acts with fairness and respect, contributes to the community's wellbeing and satisfies com-

Table 1 Social capital-related criteria for measuring SLO. CRITERIA

DESCRIPTION

Criteria suggested in SLO literature Promise Keeping Promise-keeping facilitates gaining the trust of the community and gives the M & E project socio-political legitimacy. It is fundamental to the achievement of an SLO (Thomson and Boutilier, 2011; Putnam, 1993). Community Benefit The promise of benefit to the community in the form of financial gains as well as non-financial benefits gives economic-legitimacy to the M & E proponent (Owen and Kemp, 2013). Institutionalised Trust Founded on the ongoing respect between the M & E proponent and community organisations (including but not limited to Local Government, The Chamber of Commerce and Industry), and important in building a relationship of reciprocity and concern for the ongoing benefits of the proponent and the community (Moffat and Zhang, 2014; Harvey and Bice, 2014; Prno, 2013).

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2.2. Social cohesion and SAFs

Indeed, recent research confirms strong interest in translating social risks into terms of project delays, industrial or legal action and quantifiable effects on profit (e.g. Franks et al., 2014; Graetz and Franks, 2013). Returning to the critical paradox, the situation becomes more complicated: While a social capital-based approach to measuring SLO has its merits, its focus on defining company risk further precludes attention to whether the SLO measured can be employed by communities in a manner that is both meaningful and functional. This situation exists because social capital measures define the existence of SLO through relationship quality proxies, not through examination of the licence's use by or usefulness to affected stakeholders. Again, it becomes possible for a company to claim that it has a SLO even where that SLO has little or no utility for communities. Considering the above, a social capital approach to SLO does not provide necessary information about affected stakeholders’ ability to operationalise it. Returning to the research questions, it is therefore constructive to ask whether there are other approaches that could complement or extend a social capital approach to SLO in order to understand communities’ ability to operationalise it?

Social cohesion is a factor in both social capital and social resilience and is reflected in the levels of community involvement, social interaction and relationships, and the presence of trust and reciprocity within community relationships (Townshend et al., 2014). In this way, social cohesion is reflective of the core social capital concerns in the existing SLO model. But it extends and enriches these concerns by providing an indication of the likelihood or level to which we might expect a particular group of affected stakeholders (i.e. a SAF) to act meaningfully or strategically. For instance, studies show that social cohesion is visible in the way communities respond to hardship – a socially cohesive community will develop resilience—the ability to return to equilibrium after change (Walker and Salt, 2006)—by forming SAFs that allow them to overcome their difficulties together (Townshend et al., 2014). Research indicates that social cohesion crafted through SAFs is vital to unified action in response to social impacts (Putnam, 1995). It follows that SAFs are critical to communities’ ability to use SLO. Social cohesion represents the combined social networks of each SAF, along with the inherent interpersonal trust and reciprocity – the social capital of the given community. This provides valuable resources that facilitate coordinated action (Putnam, 1995). Following Cheshire et al. (2014), it is theorised here that social cohesion plays a critical but largely undiscussed role in community's power4 and agency within SAFs, especially within the dynamic between communities and companies and communities and governments. In other words, communities’ capacities to grant and leverage SLO are linked tightly not only to social capital (Boutilier and Thomson, 2011), but also to their degree of strategic agendas, power and social cohesion, visible via the interactions of SAFs. It is proposed that a SAFs approach, incorporating these considerations, offers an important complement to common SLO measurement to allow for a better understanding of the level of SLO granted—a strategically supported and cohesive SLO is stronger than a divided one—and to provide an indicator of the ability of communities to operationalise SLO, especially in relation to M & E projects (see, Table 2). Social cohesion can be largely understood by identifying the different views, needs and concerns within each case. Each SAF comprises socially constructed and embedded members who share a basic consensus regarding the issues at hand. SAFs make use of combined social capital to generate strategic advantage (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). SAF boundaries are usually defined by the specific conflict or issue in which the group is engaged, and are dynamic in nature and able to change in relation to changing conflict (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). This is particularly important when we consider the dynamic nature of social capital and social risks—often made visible through regulation—closely associated with SLO. To summarise so far, a social capital approach to SLO provides a useful framework for suggesting the relational level of SLO present, particularly from a corporate perspective in terms of corporate risk. But social capital approaches tell us little about affected stakeholders’ ability to operationalise SLO and do not explicitly incorporate contextual tensions related to risk and regulation, nor do they make explicit the influence of diverse, competing stakeholder views. A SAFs approach facilitates exploration of the relative strength between and within differing views, requirements and agendas of stakeholder groups, thus enhancing findings possible through a social capital approach. This suggested approach, however, is not without its challenges. If communities are divided into a diverse web of SAFs, each displaying

2.1. A Strategic Action Fields approach to SLO: understanding utility We introduce SAFs as a means of complimenting and enriching a social capital approach to SLO, not as a suggestion that a social capital approach be disregarded. Rather, we argue that consideration of SAFs could enrich and deepen understandings of the tensions and dynamics at play within and between affected stakeholders, M & E proponents, political agendas and the legislative and regulatory framework through which conflicts and issues are negotiated. ‘Strategic action fields’ (SAFs) offer a helpful means of understanding the disparate forces within any given community that may affect its ability to operationalise SLO. Widely used in the field of organisational sociology, SAFs reflect the discipline's interest in the study of internal dynamics and hierarchy found within an organisation, as well as the ties that connect organisations to one-another and to the communities in which they operate. These ties include strategic alliances and reciprocity (Godwyn and Gittell, 2012)—concepts closely linked to the social capital that comprises SLO. Leading organisational sociology scholars Fligstein and McAdam, p3) (2011) define SAFs as: “a meso-level social order where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the field's rules”. Thus, SAFs allow us to think of communities in terms of a combination of different stakeholder groups with alliances and relationships both within and between each group (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). The interactions resulting from SAFs, and the consequent impact on power, strategic agendas and social cohesion—the extent to which a community is unified through a variety of factors (Townshend et al., 2015)—offer important insights into the machinations necessary to operationalise SLO. That is, the utility (not just ‘signalling’) of a SLO is critical to affected stakeholders’ capacity to leverage the licence as a means of improving asymmetrical power dynamics (Lukes, 2005) and related negotiations with M & E proponents (Owen and Kemp, 2013). A SAF approach to SLO facilitates improved attention to the diverse parties involved and also addresses the various strategic agendas and power influences that are in play. By aiding examination of dynamics between and within community groups, a SAF approach offers a means for understanding various priorities, power differentials and the roles that both perform in gaining a consensus regarding a particular issue. It is this consensus—or ‘social cohesion’—which we propose is especially critical to affected stakeholders’ ability to operationalise SLO.

4 We acknowledge that the concept of power is broadly contested and our use of the term aligns with the approach of Lukes (2005) who acknowledges the relationship between power and decision-making rights and asymmetrical abilities to exercise those rights.

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Table 2 SLO framework incorporating social capital and SAFs. Considerations Social capital approach Promise Keeping Community Benefit Institutionalised Trust

SAFs approach Strategic agendas, power and social cohesion

Description

Promise-keeping facilitates gaining the trust of the community and gives the M & E project socio-political legitimacy. It is fundamental to the achievement of an SLO (Thomson and Boutilier, 2011; Putnam, 1993). The promise of benefit to the community in the form of financial gains as well as non-financial benefits gives economiclegitimacy to the M & E proponent (Owen and Kemp, 2013). Founded on the ongoing respect between the M & E proponent and community organisations (including but not limited to Local Government, The Chamber of Commerce and Industry), and important in building a relationship of reciprocity and concern for the ongoing benefits of the proponent and the community (Moffat and Zhang, 2014; Harvey and Bice, 2014; Prno, 2013).

SAFs attend to “a meso-level social order where actors interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships of the field and the field's rules” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). Key factor within SAFs that enable a community to operationalise SLO, include development of shared, strategic agendas, the power of stakeholders within the SAF and social cohesion. Social cohesion, in particular, facilitates the utilisation of existing social capital within the community. Where social cohesion is strong and SLO is granted, it may simultaneously generate new social capital through a strong and trustful, mutually supportive relationship with the M & E proponent.

these concentrated locations. We also focused in on the town of Moranbah in the Bowen Basin region of Queensland as a site of conflict between community members and the M & E proponent. Whilst other Australian regions and towns are also resourceindustry intense, these cases offer typical examples of social impacts related to SLO and resulting from local M & E projects. While the study does not attempt to generalise to a national level, it does build a ‘middle range theory’ for an SAF approach to SLO (Davis and Marquis, 2005). This style of theory building can help to reveal and explain normative and political considerations which other types of theory may not. Thus, the careful selection of cases allows suggestions about the types of issues and impacts, related to SLO, that one could expect to see in similarly affected resource-intense areas. The case studies presented offer an appropriate and practical means of early investigation for purposes of theory building. The data set, detailed below, allowed for rich qualitative analyses of a type used in previous studies as a means of understanding complex sociological phenomena (Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006). The dense and complicated narratives emerging from the data also suggest a “rich problematic” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 84) that offers an effective way to improve and extend our understanding of a SLO. The research was conducted using a combination of primary and secondary documents relating to the operations and impacts of resource projects in each community. Primary documents included: Hansard transcripts (the transcripts of the proceedings from Commonwealth and State Parliament and their committees), Commonwealth and State Acts and Regulations, Government Policy documents, minutes from Local Government meetings, Community Reference Group minutes, and SIAs and social impact management plans (SIMPs) (where available). The secondary documents included: print media reports, social media dialogues, government and industry websites and academic papers. A total of 105 documents were thematically analysed using NVivo10 software (see Table 3).

differing requirements and agendas, and each showing different thresholds for social acceptance of an M & E project, how can SLO be used? For example, does a SLO granted at the ‘approval’ level (according to social capital measures) and associated with stakeholders in a certain SAF outweigh a ‘withheld’ SLO related to a divergent SAF? Are there multiple and competing SLOs in play (see, for example, Jijelava and Vanclay, 2014)? Or is there only ever a single SLO available at any given time and which requires a particular level of agreement about its level of approval in order to be operationalised? While it is interesting to consider the existence of multiple SLOs, each related to particular stakeholder groups and their interests, such a perspective dilutes the meaningfulness and usefulness of the concept. The assumption made here is instead that a certain degree of community unification around the level of SLO granted to a project is critical to that community's ability to use the ‘one available’ SLO successfully—and for a project proponent to claim SLO with any degree of surety. Social cohesion, as identifiable through attention to SAFs, is therefore proposed as a means of enhancing SLO models to indicate the likelihood or capability of affected stakeholders to operationalise SLO. In the sections that follow, three case studies from Australian M & E projects are explored to illustrate the usefulness of SAFs and social cohesion to enhancing the social capital SLO model. We situate these projects within their social and regulatory contexts, as these environments are influential for both whether corporate claims to SLO are made and for the strength of the SLO, relative to other, potentially competing agendas. Close attention is paid to understanding whether and how SLO is operationalised and the extent to which social cohesion played a role in facilitating this. Before detailing the cases and findings, we first provide a review of the research method. 3. Research method This study adopted a comparative case study approach (Yin, 1993) that enabled the multiple variables that impact upon social capital for SLO and related SAFs to be explored. The three illustrative cases selected – Onslow, Western Australia (WA), Port Hedland, WA and Moranbah, Queensland (QLD)– were chosen as representative of towns hosting major operations within diverse regulatory and operating environments but with common issues affecting regional M & E communities that influence local opinion. These issues include, conflict around broken promises, community benefits, procedural transparency and community members ‘not feeling heard’ (Owen and Kemp, 2013). Within the Pilbara region the study focused on two specific towns, Onslow and Port Hedland, due to the intensity of M & E operations in

Table 3 Breakdown of Document Type. Documents Analysed

Number

Media Government Industry Bodies Social Media Forums Othera

50 32 12 3 8

a

288

Legal Opinions.

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Parliament. It is important to note here that, in WA at least, the negotiation of the State Agreement is between the Minister for State Development and the proponent and “there is no opportunity for detailed scrutiny of the agreement either by the public or by the legislature” (Fitzgerald, 2002, p.315). This has particular implications for the relationships that influence State Agreements and, by extension SLO, as will become apparent in the cases below. State Agreements are initially negotiated at the beginning of a project and can be renegotiated throughout a project's life by the State Government and the M & E proponent. The purpose of State Agreements is to document the rights and responsibilities of both parties for the life of the operation and include such issues as dispute resolution procedures, rent and royalty agreements, and which party is responsible for the financing and development of infrastructure (Chambers, 2006; Fitzgerald, 2002). In Western Australia and Queensland these ratified agreements are granted priority over other legislation, as codified in the mining legislation (LexisNexis, 2010, [170-80]). The agreements are negotiated by the M & E proponent and senior advisors within the relevant government department, “without public review or an opportunity being offered to other interested parties” (Fitzgerald, 2002, p.315). In addition to Federal and State-based acts and State Agreements, the Australian M & E industry is also subject to environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements that vary according to jurisdiction. Of direct interest to an investigation of SLO, in recent years, social impact assessments (SIA) have also been requested or required by Australian State and Territory Governments to assess, monitor and manage the adverse social impacts and potential benefits resulting from M & E projects. As such, SIAs offer an important means of establishing evidence for the support or withholding of a SLO. SIAs, like other relevant regulation, have developed differently across Australia, for the jurisdictional reasons noted previously. Importantly, in Australia, SIAs usually fall within the EIA process. This often leads to a restricted emphasis on social impacts (Esteves et al., 2012). Across Australia regulatory-required impact assessments lack an overarching or unifying framework that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of industry in predicting, mitigating and rectifying social impacts. This situation has contributed to a mismatch between the expectations of the public and interventions designed by proponents to directly address impacts or demonstrate their responsibility to society (Bice, 2013; Franks and Vanclay, 2013). Research also shows that the historically predictive and often one-off nature of regulated SIAs contributes further to gaps between expectations and performance, as the assessments usually fulfil only a perfunctory, box-ticking role. Thus, SIA often fails to address the concerns it could ideally engage, such as ensuring long term community benefits through providing employment and business opportunities locally, as well as having ongoing involvement in managing negative impacts resulting from a M & E operation (Nish and Bice, 2011). Consequently, SIA rarely achieves the ‘democratic development’ possible through its ongoing application to M & E projects (Vanclay, 2009). Regulatory SIA processes—in Australia and elsewhere—may also contribute to conflict between affected communities and M & E proponents, a loss of trust for the M & E industry and a loss of community goodwill towards M & E proponents and operations (Moffat and Zhang, 2014; Prno, 2013). For instance, as Moffat and Zhang (2014) point out in their work to understand the processes through which SLO is mediated, the development of a relationship that is based on a mutual regard for the wellbeing of the community is critical. Support for a project may be further strengthened through transparency, open communications and the fulfilment of commitments. Yet regulatorybased SIAs rarely require ongoing engagement of the type that would empower affected communities with the evidence necessary to engage equally with the M & E proponent, or to establish whether a SLO should

In order to measure emerging themes which are based on the social capital SLO literature, we developed an iterative coding frame. Data for each town was explored in relation to the social capital criteria defined in the Thomson and Boutilier model–promise-keeping, providing community benefit, institutionalised trust—and SAFs were also explored. We coded for community benefit (economic legitimacy) promise keeping (socio-political legitimacy and interactional trust), and institutionalised trust, as well as including aspects of strategic agendas, power and social cohesion, based on the literature and informed by empirical analysis as guided by the research questions. Thematic analysis allowed for social impacts, social capital-related SLO criteria and SAFs to be analysed and categorised (Flyvjberg, 2001). For each community studied, the thematic analysis assisted with identifying and mapping the differing perceptions held within these communities regarding the social impacts of resource projects, thereby defining SAF boundaries. Iterative coding was performed in NVivo10 to facilitate the emergence of themes from the data (Neuendorf, 2002). This coding facilitated the development of a framework of understandings and created a “web-like network as an organizing principle and a representational means” (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p.388). 3.1. Method limitations Despite the availability of comprehensive media coverage of the issues in each case studied, there are some important limitations that must be addressed. Firstly, the media reports from each of the cases are neither uniform in number nor in the mix of media and social media sources. For example, there is no local newspaper in Onslow, but the Edith Cowan University Journalism School produced five newspapers (Tracking Onslow) between 2012 and 2014 that documented the transition of the community during the construction and implementation of two major resource projects. This resulted in a significantly higher amount of data gathered from print media in Onlsow than in other communities. Port Hedland, on the other hand, has a number of highly utilised social media campaigns that are run by and for community members, and despite having its own local newspaper (The North-West Telegraph), a large amount of data originated from social media. The data gathered from the Bowen Basin is the result of a more balanced mix of social media and print media available in these regions. Notwithstanding these differences, the data remains comparable. 3.2. Regulatory environment: Setting the case studies’ SLO context SLO operates within a complex environment of economic agendas, environmental impacts, social risks and trade-offs. Many of these related issues are articulated through the regulatory environment governing M & E projects. Given the article's use of Australian examples, it is helpful to first review the regulatory environment that sets the context for understanding SLO, before introducing the cases. The Australian M & E industry is predominantly regulated by State and Territory based legislation, however, the Federalist system means that both Commonwealth and State/Territory based legislation applies, with Commonwealth legislation overriding State legislation when covering the same matter (Chambers, 2006). In terms of this article's case study states—Western Australia (WA) and Queensland (QLD)— WA mining falls principally under the Mining Act 1978, while QLD mining is governed predominantly by the Mineral Resources Act 1989, with each act adopting a similar regulatory approach yet lacking uniform consistency (Chambers, 2006). Besides state-based mining acts, M & E operations within each state are regulated by a State Agreement, which is a legal agreement developed between the State Government and the M & E proponent for a project, and which is then presented for ratification to the State

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has implications for Local Government resourcing due to a loss of income that would otherwise have been generated through rates and taxes associated with the housing development. As Brian Cameron, (Executive Manager of Development and Regulatory Services, Shire of Ashburton) observes, “because Chevron is based outside the town, the financial pressure for constructing these things falls on the ratepayer and the Shire” (Cameron, in Pegrum, 2014, p.11). The above examples concerning economic and socio-political legitimacy suggest that Chevron's SLO in Onslow was under threat. At the same time, however, social capital between certain, powerful stakeholders increased, suggesting a SLO for the project was in place. This situation exemplifies the difficulties of attempting to determine the existence or level of SLO approval based on social capital alone, as explained below. From a social capital perspective, the State Agreement negotiation had considerable but different implications for SLO, relative to institutionalised trust. Instead of harming SLO, the renegotiated agreement reveals the strength of the relationship between the M & E proponent and the State Government with weight given towards building political capital at the state but not the local level (Brueckner et al., 2014). Political legitimacy and support for the Wheatstone project can be seen through the leveraging of the legislative framework governing the industry, with clear implications for affected stakeholders, including those described above. In seeking to change the agreement that would have seen the workforce housed in Onlsow, Chevron negotiated directly with the WA Premier and the new agreement was presented to Parliament as a ‘fait accompli’ (Government of Western Australia, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). The Onslow case study demonstrates how a social capital approach to SLO reveals tensions in which the strength of relationship between two crucial stakeholders is visible, but primarily only as it prizes institutionalised trust between powerful stakeholders while damaging institutionalised trust with other, less powerful stakeholders. Findings from a social capital approach leave us questioning whether a SLO can be claimed to exist based primarily on the institutionalised trust between a few key actors, as appears to have happened here? A different perspective is needed to assist us to understand whether and how SLO holds utility for affected stakeholders in such a contested environment.

be granted (Nish and Bice, 2011). In other words, regulatory approaches to SIA affect company and community understandings of SLO and may exacerbate tensions between competing policy agendas and community concerns; tensions made visible by application of a SAF lens (Blanchet, 2015). 4. Findings In the sections that follow we present the key findings of the thematic analysis, organised according to the three cases studied. For each case, we summarise the findings related to a social capital approach to SLO, especially community benefit, promise keeping and institutionalised trust. We go on to present findings related to the SAFs identified in each case and what those tell us about strategic agendas, power, social cohesion and related implications for SLO. The findings suggest that SAFs offer valuable insights into the potential utility of SLO for affected stakeholders and add helpful nuance to social capital approaches to SLO. 4.1. Chevron in Onslow, WA 4.1.1. Background Onslow is a regional coastal town located 1386 km north of Perth and is the host community for the onshore processing facilities for the Wheatstone liquid natural gas (LNG) project, a Chevron Corporation (Chevron)-led joint venture to develop and export natural gas from the Carnarvon Basin in Western Australia (Chevron, n.d.). The onshore facilities are located 12 km south-west of Onslow at the Ashburton North Strategic Industrial Area (ANSIA). This case study focused on Chevron's decision to build a worker's camp at the ANSIA, instead of within the township itself, as originally agreed. Chevron's Wheatstone project in Onslow has a capital budget of $29 billion, began its five-year construction phase in 2011 and was expected to become operational in 2016 (Chevron, n.d.). During the project planning phase Chevron, the State Government and the Shire of Ashburton reached an agreement whereby Chevron would invest $250 million in Onslow in the form of infrastructure, facilities and services. This agreement involved Chevron purchasing a nine hectare ‘super-lot’ within Onslow to house their workforce in purpose-built workers housing (Government of Western Australia, Department of State Development (DSD), 2014). This commitment would also see the Onslow population grow from 667 people (ABS, 2013) to approximately 2000 permanent residents in 2022, representing considerable growth for the community (DSD, 2014).

4.1.3. SLO from a SAFs perspective Findings show that there are two powerful SAFs at play in this case, with the relationship between Chevron and the State Government forming one SAF around the State Agreement. The second SAF emerges through the relationship that developed between Chevron and the Onslow Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) during which it funded the OCCI to build a business resource centre. In each of these SAFs, the shared purpose of the field (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011) centred on the economic benefit that concerned parties expected to gain from Chevron. Both SAFs have important implications for understanding the utility of any claimed SLO for Chevron in Onslow, more broadly. These SAFs revealed high levels of strategic agendas (i.e. all sought self-serving economic benefit), power (i.e. the State Government's decision to renegotiate the State Agreement overran Local Government opposition) and social cohesion (i.e. the actors within these SAFs demonstrated a united front to support the controversially renegotiated State Agreement). The successful strategic agendas of these SAFs (i.e. to secure Chevron's operation, despite negative impacts or economic losses to Onslow) suggest there is a level of socio-political legitimacy for these actions. Indeed, standard social capital measures would suggest that there exists a SLO. Yet an examination of SAFs, which aids understanding of the relationships and agendas amongst key parties, reveals who is included in the agreement making and who is excluded. In this case, SLO was claimed only because of the united strategic agendas of powerful actors. For instance, further examination of the Onslow case from a SAFs

4.1.2. SLO from a social capital perspective In September 2014 Chevron and the Premier of WA announced that they had renegotiated the State Agreement and would no longer be building the workers’ accommodation within Onslow, instead they would construct a purpose-built workers camp adjacent to the onshore processing plant in the ANSIA development. Further, the commitment of $250 million for infrastructure, services and facilities has been contested by Chevron. Projects earmarked for development from that funding have been subject to delays and cancellation (Shire of Ashburton, 2014). Findings show that this decision was widely interpreted by affected stakeholders as representing a broken promise and has subsequently coloured further engagements. Not only did the renegotiation affect the potential to achieve expected community benefits, findings suggest that the decision affected the project's economic legitimacy, in the form of community benefits perceived as being denied to the area. While Chevron's commitment to invest in infrastructure was contingent upon the workers’ accommodation being built in town, the relocation of the workforce to the ANSIA precinct did not lessen the impact that of the workers’ accommodation on Onslow's water, power and waste management resources (Shire of Ashburton, 2014). It also 290

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enhance it… We’re working hard on the diversification of the economy … and a major industry player has got their foot on the hose because they want an iron ore port and that's it.” (Grylls, in McNeill, 2015, n.p.).5 Community-raised concerns regarding environmental safety and occupational health and welfare identified through the thematic analysis also suggest the perception that BHPBIO is able to operate outside of legislation and is somehow able to bypass regulations regarding safety. This perception indicates further feelings of distrust towards the proponent that appear to flow through to suspicion of the motives of Government, at least among certain groups. For example, one vocal community activist group posted on a well-accessed community Facebook page that:

perspective shows that whilst certain key players granted high levels of economic and socio-political legitimacy to Chevron, these powerful SAFs excluded other parts of the community, equally interested in the company's SLO. But these stakeholders proved unable to question or withdraw Chevron's SLO due to a breakdown in social cohesion. The analysis shows that a break-down in social cohesion began when affected stakeholders raised concerns about the company's inequitable funding of community projects. For example, over the time period studied, there was a diametrical change in attitude of the OCCI towards Chevron. The OCCI was initially very vocal in expressing disapproval of the decision to house the workers at ANSIA. But on receiving a funding grant from Chevron to build a business resource centre in town, the OCCI began openly supporting the decision, and further, began claiming the Shire of Ashburton was not acting in the best interests of the community. Affected stakeholders not receiving such benefits formed SAFs around a shared purpose of opposition, but proved less powerful than those of the State Government and OCCI. The findings highlight the complexities of building effective SAFs that, we argue, are critical to a SLO that offers utility, not just a reflection of strong social capital between certain, powerful actors.

“Do you really think BHP is concerned about the health of the people in the area outside their operations, what about the people that work there? Are they required to wear breathing apparatus for their 12 hour shift? … it's not our dust, it's a multibillion dollar company that is creating the dust and … other multinational companies around the country have had to contain their emissions and dust within their operations, do you think BHP is exempt from this?” (Hobday, 2014, n.p.).

4.2. BHP Billiton Iron Ore in Port Hedland, WA

Findings suggest that community dissatisfaction has also arisen in relation to responses to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) findings about dust pollution levels, leading to a perception of double standards:

4.2.1. Background Port Hedland is a regional coastal community located 1640 km north of Perth and has the world's largest bulk mineral port, providing port facilities for the Pilbara region M & E industry (Pilbara Ports Authority, 2014). In 2012 the Town of Port Hedland (ToPH) along with the State Government announced a $AUD152 million funding package for the development of the waterfront and foreshore precinct in the West End of Port Hedland – the Spoilbank Marina development (Government of Western Australia, Department of Regional Development and Lands, 2012). Once finished the development would include: a marina with four boat launching ramps, 100 boat pens, a lagoon style swimming area, a community events space, commercial and retail space and an eco-tourism development. A residential development, a hotel and transient worker accommodation to support the development would be provided by a private developer (Town of Port Hedland, 2015a). Despite support from the State Government, the development has been opposed by BHP Billiton Iron Ore (BHPBIO) as the preferred location is adjacent to the shipping channel and near the port facilities. A development in this location would require significant changes to BHPBIO's current operations to allow the area to meet with environmental safety requirements (Government of Western Australia, Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), 2014, n.p).

“The so-called dust problem apparently does not affect the people who are working there 12 hours night or day…. Me thinks it is a red herring, solely for BHPBIO and PHPA [Port Hedland Port Authority] to eventually take control of the old part of our historic town” (Hobday, 2014, n.p.). Comments like the above, from the active Pilbara Your Voice Facebook page, are a comprehensive and articulate representation of the depth of community dissatisfaction regarding BHPBIO found throughout the documents analysed and highlight the many intersecting issues related to a social capital-based SLO. Moreover, communityvoiced concerns relating to institutionalised trust are indicative of the perception that BHPBIO is behaving in a manner that is not supportive, respectful and beneficial for the community. For instance, the mediator of the Pilbara Your Voice page, Blanco, states: “Port Hedland was established long before iron ore started rolling out [of] this port, people have lived in the west end of town all their lives, so now a study comes out and they have to move? Development has to stop? Because a multinational company does not want to comply? Is that the standard we are setting in Australia? When a company becomes to [sic] big we have to move out of their way and not question the operating process that affect [sic] ordinary people?” (Blanco, 2014, n.p.).

4.2.2. SLO from a social capital perspective In the Port Hedland case, the importance of a mutually respectful relationship (interactional trust) between affected stakeholders and the proponent to achieve a SLO is highlighted by the tensions arising from the proposed Spoilbank Marina and West End redevelopment, especially through BHPBIO's opposition to plans which findings suggest run counter to widespread community opinion about the development's desirability. A lack of institutionalised trust is also apparent. For example, the Member for Pilbara's public comments reflected similar sentiments about damage to institutionalised trust identified through the analysis. The MP publicly commented that, “It's disappointing that we have a vision to grow Port Hedland into a modern vibrant city and a lot of that relies on a good partnership with BHP” (Grylls, in McNeill, 2015, n.p.). The analysis suggests that mistrust is based partly on concerns that BHPBIO is using its financial clout to buy up portions of the town within the redevelopment proposal. The data shows that BHPBIO for example, owns 39 properties in the West End of Port Hedland that are zoned a mixture of residential and business. Within the documents studied, this ownership was perceived as evidence that BHPBIO is seeking to “stymie growth and expansion rather than

For the community, the proposed resettlement represents a double standard; that the proponent is not prepared to comply with emissions regulations for the existing West End residents and their workforce, while opposing further development on the basis that: “BHP Billiton is seeking to avoid what we consider will be, over the long term, a significant land use conflict. Unless proper planning controls are in place this land use conflict will over time impact the primacy of the Port operations” (Donovan, Head of Corporate Affairs BHPBIO, in letter to the Town of Port Hedland, 2015b, p.8). Thus, from a social capital perspective, the data reveals a SLO that may be in decline due to a loss of institutionalised trust and damage to

5 Attempts were made to contact the journalist to verify this information but she was unable to be contacted.

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operates seven open-cut coal mines in the region. This case study focuses on BMA's policy to employ only FIFO workers at two of its mining operations; the Caval Ridge and Daunia mines. Moranbah is the closest community to the mine sites and lies 30 km from the Daunia mine, and 17 km from the Caval Ridge mine. The decision to exclude local workers from the two mines has resulted in economic loss to the region. This includes loss of jobs and community members being forced to leave town to fly back into town on a FIFO contract to maintain their employment at the mines (Knuth, in Government of Queensland Legislative Assembly, Debates, (GOQLAD), 2014, p.1549).

economic legitimacy through threats to the Spoilbank and West End developments. At the same time, however, BHPBIO's long history to Port Hedland and its broader economic legitimacy bolster its SLO, even in light of controversy. Given these complexities, to what extent might BHPBIO's contested SLO be of use to affected stakeholders, as opposed primarily to providing a means for BHPBIO to claim legitimacy of its opposition to a development expected to benefit the town, more broadly? 4.2.3. SLO from a SAFs perspective This case study reveals the emergence of three key SAFs, in addition to a number of secondary SAFs that place constraints on the achievement of social cohesion among Port Hedland's affected stakeholders. The SAFs identified in the analysis relate largely to community perceptions that BHPBIO contributes considerably to the state economy and therefore the State Government will not intervene on behalf of the community. Moreover, powerful SAFs from within Port Hedland formed on the basis that BHPBIO's position in the community required protection due to its broader potential to contribute economically, despite threats to the proposed developments. For example, within this particular SAF, the Port Hedland Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PHCCI) remains opposed to representing affected stakeholders desires to pursue the development, as it has positioned itself as protecting future business opportunities with BHPBIO. Similarly, within this SAF, the ToPH has its focus on financial concerns and appears to have taken the strategic choice not to represent opposing views from within the community that it represents. The other SAFs in play (e.g. community groups united around a push for the development) present conflicting views and agendas. These findings therefore suggest that social cohesion is going to be difficult to achieve, making any claimed SLO questionable and also hindering any utility it may offer. The Port Hedland case study shows that the actions of BHPBIO have indicated to affected stakeholders who are not direct economic beneficiaries a lack of consideration and respect. This situation is further complicated by competing SAFs and lack of social cohesion within the community, as evidenced by the emergence of opposing SAFs with differing views regarding whether the proponent, the ToPH, the State Government or even the PHCCI, are the responsible party for the development. Here, community disunity represents a further complexity in the granting and use of SLO. The PHCCI has remained silent during the conflict, leaving members of the community interpreting its silence as an alignment with BHPBIO, protecting the interests of its members who seek future business with them (Leahy, 2015, n.p.). But findings reveal that other affected stakeholders believe that the ToPH is not representing the best interests of Port Hedland and are calling for a Government inquiry into the financial affairs of the council, citing as evidence financial mismanagement visible in the lack of infrastructure maintenance (Blanco, 2014). These diverse SAFs are developing against a backdrop of continued residential rate increases, despite a decrease in property valuations by an average of 39% (Town of Port Hedland, 2015b). Although certain sources cite BHPBIO's contribution of jobs to the community as a socio-economic benefit, the analysis suggests that these views are in the minority. Thus, similarly to the Onslow case, a social capital approach suggests a SLO in existence but under pressure, while a SAFs approach suggests that dissension among affected stakeholders around the development as a strategic issue of concern results in divisiveness, damages social cohesion and gives little capacity for affected stakeholders within less powerful SAFs to withdraw BHPBIO's SLO or use it in a meaningful way.

4.3.2. SLO from a social capital perspective Prior to becoming the Premier in the March 2012 QLD state election, Campbell Newman made election promises that “100 per cent fly-in fly-out applications would not be acceptable under his Government” (Knuth, in Government of Queensland Legislative Assembly Debates (GOQLAD), p.1549). Newman argued that the policy was “unfair on locals and would force many to move to Brisbane to gain work on a project that is just kilometres from their home” (Knuth, in GOQLAD, 2014, p.1549). However, on becoming Premier Newman elected to support the Policy citing benefits for the whole state, rather than one region, as his reason (Government of Queensland, Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, 2013b). This shift in stance reflected considerable, prior machinations around the policy, and these are worth reviewing briefly here. In 2011 BMA successfully applied to the then Bligh Labor Government to remove the limits of existing agreement for employment (with a ratio of 70 per cent local workers to 30 per cent FIFO workers) at Caval Ridge and Daunia mines, due to market limitations which restricted them from achieving this quota (Queensland Parliament, 2015; Bowden and Barry, 2015). With the cap removed BMA adopted the Policy, which stated that 50% of the workers would be sourced from Cairns (a coastal QLD town 860 km from Moranbah) and the other half from Brisbane, and contained specific clauses stating that local residents would be excluded from employment at both sites (Bowden and Barry, 2015). The broken promises of the Premier left the community with perceptions that they were unheard and ignored by both the State Government and BMA and that they had no ability to influence decisions affecting their livelihood (DIPNR, 2015). This situation led certain affected stakeholders to call for a way to operationalise SLO. For example, Councillor Kelly Vea Vea (Isaac Council), stated: “The dialogue that I feel has been left out of this discussion since it started is the need to reinvigorate the mining social licence to operate. I think it needs to take specific responsibility for industry's part in shaping the social and development outcomes in mining communities” (DIPNR, 2015, pp.13). This comment not only shows explicit awareness of SLO, but also indicates a desire to leverage it as a method for negotiating with BMA. Further, Councillor Vea Vea identifies the need for an SLO framework that is supported by Government, actively monitored by an independent party and which holds sanctions for non-compliance as a means to ensure the M & E industry behaves in a responsible manner (DIPNR, 2015). Findings also reveal affected stakeholders regularly citing the financial impact on local businesses, as evidenced through the BMA decision to cancel supplier contracts in Moranbah in favour of suppliers based in Brisbane and Cairns, resulting in the closure of at least fifteen local businesses (DIPNR, 2015). Attempts by the Moranbah Traders Association to contact BMA regarding contracts for local suppliers were reportedly not acknowledged, leaving members of the community with the belief that BMA's actions were destroying the town (DIPNR, 2015). From a social capital perspective, economic legitimacy to support BMA's SLO was under fire. Further economic loss was experienced through a decline in real estate value and rental rates as workers were forced to move out of the region to comply with the Policy and keep their employment.

4.3. Moranbah, QLD 4.3.1. Background The town of Moranbah lies in the Central Queensland region of the Bowen Basin (the Isaac Local Government region) and is host community for a BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance (BMA) joint venture that 292

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context of SAFs, while demonstrating the potential of understanding strategic agendas, power and social cohesion as a means to anticipating affected stakeholders’ abilities to operationalise SLO.

Community members were also facing an investment loss when relocating from the region to Cairns or Brisbane – cities with a higher cost of living than the regional areas from which they came (DIPNR, 2015). The links between providing community benefits and developing interactional and institutionalised trust are missing in this case study, with findings suggesting that a withdrawal of SLO was likely felt appropriate by many affected stakeholders. Like the previous cases, however, the social capital-related situation of SLO is complicated when SAFs are considered.

5. Discussion The illustrative cases from Australia's M & E sector demonstrate the complexities and tensions plaguing the concept of social licence to operate. In these cases, we see operations proceeding, supported by government policies and certain affected stakeholders, suggesting a SLO is in place. This is supported in the analysis by rhetorical support for and claims to SLOs in each case study, based largely on attention to traditional social capital-related considerations. But application of a SAFs lens suggests that all may not be as it seems with these SLOs. By introducing considerations of actors’ power, strategic agendas and social cohesion, a SAFs framework reveals how claims to SLO for particular projects may be influenced or even co-opted by particular actors, reducing or negating the utility of SLO to other affected stakeholders. In the case of Onslow, for example, findings demonstrate that Chevron laid claim to a SLO for its Wheatstone project largely through the institutionalised trust achieved between itself and State Government and the local chamber of commerce. But despite this inferred SLO, findings demonstrate that other affected stakeholders remained opposed to Chevron's actions in the area, but had little capacity to protest or withdraw the SLO due to the powerful SAFs at play. This strategic positioning meant that SLO was claimed through the machinations of united and powerful SAFs, reducing both the voice of other affected stakeholders to withdraw the SLO or to use its threatened withdrawal as a means of leverage in negotiations to keep the workers’ accommodation in the township, as originally promised. Here, we see rhetorical SLO with little or no utility for affected stakeholders whose views do not match those of the most powerful SAFs. Similarly, in Port Hedland, the analysis reveals a SLO for BHPBIO which social capital measures would suggest exists but is under pressure. This is particularly due to damage to interactional trust and socio-political legitimacy occurring in relation to BHPBIO's opposition to the Spoilbank and West End developments that, the analysis suggests, many affected stakeholders support. Applying a SAF lens, however, it becomes clear that the strategic positioning of a few powerful actors—here, the State Government PHCCI and the ToPH— results in a situation that props up BHPBIO's SLO on claims to economic legitimacy, denying less powerful SAFs the ability to question or withdraw BHPBIO's SLO based on their own concerns about sociopolitical legitimacy. Again, the SLO paradox is raised: How meaningful is SLO if it is pursued through strategic attention to a few, particularly powerful actors? When does SLO's disconnection from less powerful

4.3.3. SLO from a SAFs perspective The analysis demonstrates that social cohesion in Moranbah appears strong, perhaps due to the scale of negative social and economic impacts arising from the introduction of the Policy. The two most prominent SAFs in this case have been formed between BMA and the State Government and between particular community members and organisations. Importantly, and unlike the other cases, the two most powerful SAFs in this case represent divergent strategic agendas. The SAF incorporating the State Government and BMA centres on agreed support for the Policy, while the community-based SAF coalesces around opposition to the Policy. Analysis of the community-based SAF reveals a very strong amount of social cohesion to support a withdrawal of BMA's SLO. Different to the previous cases, the strong interconnections of key Moranbah stakeholders and their formation of a SAF around objection to the policy appears to improve their social cohesion and offers a form of agency to these affected stakeholders not achieved in the other cases. This finding highlights the importance of understanding SAFs and the impact they have on affected stakeholders’ ability to influence and operationalise SLO for their own strategic purposes. Conversely, the case study findings also suggest that the costs to community benefits resulting from the Policy are damaging the fabric of the community, a situation which could reduce levels of social cohesion. The loss of residents impacts the community's clubs and recreational organisations which are further impacted through the Policy, as it also restricts all workers from entry into the town, limiting opportunities to build social capital and social cohesion (DIPNR, 2015). When considering SLO from a SAFs perspective, it becomes important, therefore, to remain mindful of the contexts within which SAFs operate. In summary, the findings from these case studies reveal the social capital approach commonly used to demonstrate existence of SLO fails to engage equally important considerations of strategic agendas, power and social cohesion that have implications for SLO's meaning and utility, especially for less powerful stakeholders. The cases unpacked the most commonly measured social capital components of SLO, while introducing a SAF perspective (see, Table 4, below). In so doing, the analysis shows the importance of understanding SLO within the

Table 4 Case studies summary: high level findings: social capital and SAF SLO approaches. SLO criteria/ Case study town

Onslow

Port Hedland

Moranbah

Case overview

Workers to be housed at ANSIA instead of in Onslow

Promise-keeping Community Benefit Institutionalised Trust

Promises broken Loss of infrastructure and economic loss Lacking

BHPBIO objecting to Marina and Waterfront development No evidence Loss of alternative economy Lacking

100% FIFO employment policy at Daunia and Caval Ridge mines Promises broken Loss of employment and business Lacking

SAFs

Powerful/influential actors hold sway with shared purpose of self-service economic development

Unification of powerful actors to preserve broader economic benefit

Community-based SLO achieved power comparable to that of government

Diametrecially opposed strategic agendas, Damage to social cohesion

Poor levels of social cohesion

Key SAFs represented oppositional positions High levels of social cohesion

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munity concerns, the lack of enforceable SLO criteria, and concerns about the utility of the concept to affected communities. The SAF framework presented here is limited by its case study focus on Australia and by its reliance on secondary data. Nevertheless, investigations of available data and the comparability of the case studies suggest that consideration of SAFs in relation to SLO presents a fruitful avenue for future inquiries. Future research could use social network analysis—commonly used alongside the social capital analysis already present in much SLO research—to identify SAFs and examine the various webs of influence. Institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012) could then be applied to further explore how decisions about the granting or withholding of SLO are made. Moreover, through better understanding of strategic agendas, power and social cohesion, future research may be able to suggest ways in which to build communities’ capacities for stronger SAFs to allow them to leverage SLO in a meaningful way, making them more powerful players in the M & E context.

actors mean the concept has lost its purpose, let alone its utility? Finally, the case of Moranbah suggests that where affected stakeholders are united and able to support a cohesive position, they may be able to jockey successfully for a strategic position that allows them to influence SLO. In Moranbah, the organisations opposed to the Policy represented considerable numbers of stakeholders, a situation that may also have influenced the attention paid by other, more powerful SAFs. Also of interest, SAFs formed within the Moranbah case explicitly and strategically invoked SLO as a means of pursuing their agenda. This supports our theoretical suggestion that social cohesion may play a critical role in the ability of affected stakeholders to operationalise SLO. Finally, we feel it is important to note that community members in all case studies reported frustration through ‘not feeling heard’ by the M & E proponent, further contributing to a lack of trust felt towards each proponent. For Moffat and Zhang (2014), ‘having a voice’ in a decision-making process leads to perceptions of procedural fairness and trust. Harvey and Bice (2014) argue that even in an instance where the decision is not welcomed, a process of decision-making that includes community consultation, being heard, and not deviating from the decision, builds a trustful relationship. The formation of SAFs provides a means of solidifying particular positions and relationships and may offer an important means for affected stakeholders to enhance their voice and the likelihood that it is heard by other, likely more powerful actors (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). Within each of the cases, analysis pointed towards an abundance of social capital, including established ties between members, histories, areas of expertise and reciprocal relationships which could be captured for the purpose of forming collective and cohesive negotiations with M & E proponents. Notwithstanding this, the case study data also shows that, apart from Moranbah where the community is united against ‘the Policy’, there exist differing levels of social cohesion within each community, limiting their ability to be heard or to compete against more powerful SAFs. In all cases, a SAFs approach revealed evidence of factions developing within the community, illustrating crucial tensions around SLO as affected stakeholders jockey for their views and positions to be heard. For those powerful stakeholders better able to lay claim to SLO through appeals to social capital, the SLO becomes a means of blocking the strategic agendas of other affected stakeholders in oppositional SAFs. Here, SLO becomes a strategic or political tool employed as a means of enabling the status quo or protecting M & E proponents, reducing its meaning and utility for those affected stakeholders who might otherwise use the threat of its withdrawal as a strategic means to enhance their power in negotiations or decision-making. These examples emphasise the competing interests both within and between SAFs and suggest that a greater understanding of the strategic agendas, power and social cohesion made visible through a SAF lens add nuance to understandings of SLO.

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6. Conclusion This article proposes that a SAFs approach offers an important means of enhancing and extending social capital-based approaches to SLO. Within SAFs, stragetic agendas, power and social cohesion have been posited as key factors enabling affected stakeholders to unite and operationalise SLO. Adopting a SAFs approach can complement and enrich understandings of SLO possible through social capital-based measurement. Importantly, such an approach responds to a critical paradox for SLO—the common disconnection between its use as a signalling or rhetorical device and its level of utility to affected stakeholders. The article argues that it is worthwhile considering the incorporation of SAFs alongside social capital-based SLO measurement frameworks to provide a means of understanding the ability of a community to use SLO. Moreover, the SAF approach addresses important critiques of the SLO concept, especially those which are concerned that a risk-based approach prioritises company over com294

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