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Beyond the art of diking: interactive policy on river management in The Netherlands
Water Policy 3 (2001) 283–296
Beyond the art of diking: interactive policy on river management in The Netherlands Mark A. Wiering, Peter P.J. Driessen* Centre for Environmental Law and Policy, Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80115, NL-3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands Received 18 February 2001; received in revised form 16 July 2001; accepted 19 July 2001
Abstract High water is a recurrent problem in the rivers that form the delta of the Netherlands. Understandably, the government is deeply concerned about the safety of those who live and work near these rivers. This paper considers recent trends in the Dutch approach to water safety. Whereas the traditional solution had been to reinforce the dikes, the trend is now toward integrated river management. Accompanying this development is a new strategy of governance. Increasingly, people recognize the value of an interactive approach to policy. This paper sheds light on the conditions that promote interactive governance when the state adopts a new approach to water safety. r 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction The Dutch are renowned for their expertise in cultivating land, both old and new, and in building dikes to keep their feet dry (Van de Ven, 1993). The hydrological conditions of the Netherlands explain some of its other names: the Low Countries and the European Delta. To the Dutch, water is both a constant companion and an ever-present adversary. To cope with water as friend and foe, the Dutch have built up a long tradition of water policies, river management, and measures to protect the landscape and its users. In recent years, fundamental changes have taken place regarding protection from high water levels. These changes show up in two different areas. First, there has been a shift in the way policy arrangements for water safety are designed and implemented. The new direction combines the need for urgent action and ‘speed legislation’ with the desire for interactive policy design and implementation. Second, the content of these arrangements has been transformed. The approach to water management seems to be moving away from building higher dikes toward adjusting and extending the territory in which rivers *Corresponding author. Tel.: +31-30-253-2359; fax: +31-30-253-2746. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M.A. Wiering), [email protected] (P.P.J. Driessen). 1366-7017/01/$ - see front matter r 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 1 3 6 6 - 7 0 1 7 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 0 7 5 - 7
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runFand occasionally flood. That new direction is captured in the slogan ‘Make Room for the Rivers’ (Ruimte voor de rivier). ThisFremarkably radicalFdeparture from past policy focuses the public and political discussion on the issues of river management, nature development along the rivers, farming, and housing. The new approach creates both new obstacles and new opportunities for the design and implementation of policy on water safety. This paper describes and evaluates the old and the new operations for water safety. The aim is to identify the conditions for integrated and interactive policy-making. In addressing the underlying issue of decision-making in complex policy settings, we try to find the point at which coercion and cooperation are in balance. To that end, we look for the common ground between hierarchy and equality. We focus on two seemingly contradictory societal developments: first, the process of centralizing and speeding up decision-making by applying tailor-made project legislation, with often stricter rules, and streamlining and cutting back the formal procedures for citizen participation. Second, the macro-level cultural tendency to make hierarchy less rigid, to reduce differences in status, to make government more responsive, to take advantage of local knowledge, and to make politics and policy more interactive. The ‘old’ regime of water safetyFwhereby the primary aim was to build dikes that were stronger and in some cases higherFmade two claims on the decision-making process. One, a demand for speed, reflected the urgency of the Dutch situation after the floods of 1993 and 1995 and required uncompromised hierarchical measures. The other was a call for careful integration of diverse priorities such as safety, landscape protection, environmental quality, the preservation of nature, and the historical culture of the locale surrounding the dikes. This disparate set of claims had to be combined with the expressed need for consultation and public support. The outcome was a form of ‘conditioned’ interactive policy implementation. The question is, how are these divergent claims honored in the many and diverse projects for dike improvement? This paper answers that question and evaluates the various outcomes. Some of the data come from studies evaluating the juridical regimes of particular legislation, namely the Major Rivers Delta Act (Deltawet Grote Rivieren) and the Embankment Act (Wet op de Waterkering) (Driessen & De Gier, 1997; Driessen, De Gier, & Wiering, 1999). The follow-up stage of water safety policyFas embodied in the effort to ‘make room for the river’Fis an entirely new operation. At the time of writing, the policy arrangements are still in their infancy. This paper can merely explore some of the possibilities and constraints of the plans and the new approach to governance. It is instructive to review the experiences under the old regime and compare them with recent experiences. The juxtaposition may shed light on the conditions for interactive policy on water safety. At another level, the exercise may add to the discussion on interactive policy-making with respect to river management.
2. Complex policy projects Over the past few years, the literature on Dutch policy has devoted much attention to the planning and execution of complex infrastructure projects (see, for example, De Bruijn, De Jong, Korsten, & van Zanten, 1996; WRR, 1994). The literature singles out the new freight railroad that is to run between Rotterdam and Germany (the Betuwelijn), the high-speed railway connections (HSL), the development of Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport into a mainport, the expansion of the
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world’s biggest port in Rotterdam, and the Dutch experience with water management as the big issues (Glasbergen, 1995). These projects can be seen as complex in different ways. There are different values at stake, different policy actors, and different costs and (environmental) effects. This complexity forms the ingredients of the policy configuration surrounding the project. Termeer (1993, pp. 28–36) distinguishes between the cognitive and the social dimension of a policy configuration or network. The cognitive dimension is about ‘what and why’. What values are at stake? The social dimension is about ‘who’. Who are the policy actors forming the configuration, and how do they interact? The cognitive element concerns the ‘frames of reference’, ‘definitions of reality’, or ‘mental maps’ that fuel the policy. The social element consists of the institutions, social rules, dependency relations, habits, and social codes in the network. Some authors make a different distinction, namely between social, normative, and cognitive complexity (see Geurts & Mayer, 1996), wherein the normative dimension concerns values and the cognitive concerns (project-) information. We feel it may become difficult to analytically separate the normative from the cognitive dimension of a policy configuration, as we regard normative considerations to be a part of the (broader) cognitive dimension. What the Geurts and Mayer distinction points at is that the cognitive dimension of a policy configuration itself consists of two different but strongly intertwined elements: the different stake holders values and ‘frames’ form the normative complexity and the technical and substantial information in the policy projectFsometimes still ‘unframed’ informationFforms the technical–informational complexity. At the end, the cognitive dimension of a policy configuration is the product of framing-processes between substantial (project-) information and perceptions of stakeholders. We use these terms to analyze decision-making on large policy projects. It follows that policy actors have to overcome the cognitive complexity that derives from both divergent and often conflicting values and frames of reference (what and why) and technical–informational complexity (what and how). Moreover, the decision-making process has to deal with social complexity (who). Any large project will involve diverse groups in society, stakeholders both public and private, and governments both national and regional. All of these parties will have a say in the design and implementation of the policy measures. We thus have a first tool with which to disentangle that complex setting, allowing us to focus on the temporary policy arrangements (see also Van Tatenhove, Arts, & Leroy, 2000) that are designed to address that complexity. From this perspective, policy-making is a means to reduce (temporarily) complexity. Cutting across this intricate fabric are three fundamental but intertwined dilemmas that affect the decision-making process. One concerns information. Whereas policy-makers are hired to decide something, they always have to take a degree of uncertainty into account. Uncertainty is inherent in long-term developments and technological inputs but also in the financial, social, ecological, and economic outcomes. The task of the decision-makers is to interpret the facts and to chart trends in the fields of transport, mobility, and the European context, among others. In the case discussed in this paper, their task is to predict the impact of a rising sea level and the effects of various forces on the water level in major rivers. In so doing, they play an essential role in diagnostic and prognostic ‘framing processes’ that serve to both promote and discredit infrastructure projects. Secondly, there is the already mentioned dilemma of the way of steering, related to the ongoing debate on government or governance, top down or bottom up, negotiated or juridically imposed measurements and outcomes. Thirdly, there is the dilemma of efficiency, strongly connected with
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the other two, but, nevertheless, a dilemma in its own right as it focuses on the relation between speed and quality of the project, a subject that will often be on top of the agenda of policy-makers. River management projects fall squarely under the heading of ‘large projects’. The following sections analyze how the policy configuration in river management has dealt with the three forms of complexity distinguished above and with the three dilemmas confronting policy-makers.
3. Building dikes and embankments The Netherlands faced a near national disaster in January 1995, as the water rose to extreme levels in the country’s major riversFthe Rhine, the Waal, the IJssel, and the Meuse. Of course, high waters are not unusual in these rivers. This time, however, the combination of extremely high water levels and the long duration of high water led to an emergency. About 250,000 people and much livestock had to be evacuated, as the authorities feared that the dikes along the Rhine, Waal, and IJssel would not hold. In the Meuse floodplain, there were no dikes or natural embankments. There, people had to be evacuated as the water levels rose in areas where many homes had been built on or near the water meadows in the floodplain. The economic damage caused by the threat of flooding was great. In the end, the dikes along the Rhine, Waal, and IJssel did hold, but only just. Nonetheless, the scare raised serious doubt about the country’s water safety. First of all, policy-makers were concerned about the cognitive policy dimension, which covers values and information. Before the 1995 floods, there was a long historyFat least 25 yearsFof public and political debate on the need to reinforce the dikes and how to do it. The situation of the 1970s might be described as one of cognitive complexity. There was a continual clash of values and uncertainty about the options, making choices difficult. On the one hand, the government agencies in charge of reinforcing the dikesFmainly the Directorate General for Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat) and the regional water boardsFwere primarily concerned with safety issues. On the other hand, diverse partiesFenvironmental groups, local inhabitants, and regional groups in civil societyFtried to preserve the characteristic fluvial dike landscape. They extolled the virtues of its cultural and historical elements, the nature peculiar to the locale, the dwellings along the dikes, and the farms. In those early years, the government carried out some large-scale projects for dike reinforcement. However, the results were not well received. On the contrary, the dikes were seen as an insult to the landscape. The diking operation even called for the demolition of a small village, alerting local groups to strongly oppose further diking activities (Van Eeten, 1999, p. 40). Secondly, there was widespread disagreement and uncertainty about the ‘facts and figures’ that underpinned the dike reinforcement projects. Many factors and circumstances can cause the water level to rise in rivers. The calculated levels of high water and safety risk norms differed from one study to the next. Some presented high water as an immediate risk, others as a highly theoretical possibility. Indeed, even the calculations and norms seemed to be pretty changeable (Van Dael, 1996). This undermined the position of the hardliners on safety, giving various groups in civil society a strong argument in support of the standpoint that safety risk norms are arbitrarily produced norms. In short, the clash of values went along with a high degree of technical– informational complexity in the dike reinforcement projects.
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There was some social complexity as well, not only as an extension of the conflicting values but also due to the sheer number of stakeholders in each project. Who is in charge of the diking projects? Is it up to the national government, the provinces, the regional water boards, or the local authorities to carry out, manage, and finance the dike projects? Where does the responsibility lie? Where did the support for the opposing groups come from? Who wielded control over the finances? Environmental groups and local communities alike resisted the traditional technocratic and top–down style preferred by the water boards and associated agencies, where civil engineers tend to hold sway. The above profile typifies the policy configuration as it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Skipping ahead to the last five years of the last centuryFup to the end of the year 2000Falmost all of the major dike projects have been completed. In general, the dike reinforcement operation has enjoyed strong public and political support. How was that accomplished? How did the parties in charge deal with the various forms of complexity that muddied the policy for water safety? The work performed by various advisory boards reduced the degree of cognitive complexity. Their work revolved around three key objectives: (1) to clarify the ‘facts and figures’ that underpin the issue of water safety; (2) to integrate the values involved; and (3) to generate public support for the dike reinforcement operation. Initially, this work was done by the Becht Commission (1977); later, the Boertien Commission (1993) took over. While acknowledging the need for dike reinforcement, the Becht Commission adjusted the stringent norm for the safety risk: from 1 : 3000, they changed it to 1 : 1250 (that is, there is a chance of a flood occurring any one year of 1 : 1250). According to the report by the Becht Commission, dike reinforcement had to be carried out in such a way that landscape, nature, and cultural and historical values would be preserved. This was to be achieved mainly through a sophisticated design of the dikes. Unfortunately, the Becht report did not have the impact that some had hoped for. Although the proposed norm for safety risk was accepted, a new method of calculation meant that the dikes had to be much higher than had been foreseen (Van Eeten, 1997, 1999). This only fanned the flames of protest among various societal groups. Then too, there were other reasons why the commission’s advice was not heeded. The first was economic: large-scale cutbacks on government spending were imposed in the 1980s. Hydraulic engineering works along the coast were given priority, as they protected the economic interests in the western part of the country. Consequently, work in the riverine areas just had to wait (Potman, 1995; Driessen & De Gier, 1997). The second reason was juridical: the fragmentation of pertinent legislation led to all kinds of legal barriers. Indeed, there were at least ten regulations spread over the fields of spatial planning, the environment, and water policy. The third reason was procedural: there were few if any opportunities to join in the decision-making process at an early stage (Driessen & De Gier, 1997). That situation eventually led to delays in the formal procedures. In fact, it took another 15 years before the dike reinforcement operation picked up momentum. In 1992, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management installed a second advisory board, the Boertien Commission. Once again, the task was to formulate new proposals for ways to make dike reinforcement operations more successful. As this new commission lamented, the recommendations of its predecessor, the Becht Commission, had not been adopted. Furthermore, the Boertien Commission stated that the general public and the local authorities should become more actively involved in preparing plans for dike projects. The report advised
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making an environmental impact assessment procedure (EIA) compulsory. Only an EIA could ensure that the interests of nature and the landscape would be treated comprehensively in the decision-making process. The high water of 1993 did not recede for a long time. This was an early warning of the critical situation yet to come. In January 1995, the water levels in the major rivers broke all recent records. The gravity of the situation took both the politicians and the public by surprise. The flooding led to evacuations, fear, uncertainty, and economic loss. The crisis of 1995 was also a chance to break the impasse in the discussion on the need for dike reinforcement. In the aftermath of the public alarm about water safety, the minister drew up a national emergency plan for the country’s major rivers (Deltaplan Grote Rivieren). An emergency law, replacing all legislation then in force pertaining to flooding, backed up this plan. The emergency plan called for reinforcing the dikes along the Rhine, the Waal, and the IJssel that were the most critical to safety. The works, which were to be carried out within a short period of time, resorted under the Major Rivers Delta Act. Measures of a different kind were required along the River Meuse, where embankments had to be built. The plan may be summarized in terms of its three priorities: 1. Speed: This means concentrating decision-making and legal protection, reducing the time frame for planning and judicial procedures, and making expropriation of land possible when necessary. 2. Centralization: This means coordination by the provinces, which were also financially responsible for dike reinforcement. 3. Integration: This means an overall approach to safety, landscape, and ecological interests. Whereas environmental impact assessment had previously been recommended by the Boertien Commission, this procedure was temporarily suspended. Nonetheless, the projects had to be considered from an integral perspective in the decision-making process. The Major Rivers Delta Act was a temporary arrangement. It was followed by a ‘second round’ of dike reinforcement projects, which resorted under another temporary measure, the Embankment Act (Wet op de Waterkering). These projects were less urgent than those carried out in the first stage and had to be completed by the end of the year 2000. The Embankment Act incorporated some of the elements of the 1995 emergency legislation, though the new legislation differed in terms of its coordination and certain juridical arrangements. This time, the agencies in charge of implementation did carry out environmental impact assessment.
4. Evaluation of dike reinforcement projects In less than two years, construction was underway on 96 percent of the dike reinforcement projects that had been given ‘high priority’. The provinces, regional water boards, and municipalities made a concerted effort to implement the plans, backed up by strong public support and a heightened sense of urgency. With respect to its speed as well as the decisionmaking process, the operation was considered to be very successful (Driessen & De Gier, 1997).
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The second stage of the national plan, the part resorting under the Embankment Act, has not yet been fully implemented. Most projects are expected to be finished on schedule, and this operation too is now deemed a success. The results of case studiesFand particularly the interviews among key informants from various tiers of government and civil organizationsFreveal overall satisfaction with the effect of the legislation. It proved that the Major Rivers Delta Act and the Embankment Act made it possible to speed up the decision-making while ensuring the quality of the process and the continued public support for dike reinforcement. Interestingly, various projects made provisions either to compensate for nature values that had already been lost or to give extra attention to nature development (Driessen & De Gier, 1997; Driessen et al., 1999). How did this packageFthe national emergency plan and the two pieces of legislationFaddress the dilemmas encountered in the decision-making process? Finally, which elements of the package made the dike improvement operations a success? 4.1. Normative complexity First of all, the normative complexity was strongly reduced by the sudden change in the balance of values due to the ‘almost disaster’ of 1995. In the aftermath of the 1995 floods, the pendulum swung to the side of uncompromised safety. It also illustrates the principle ‘‘that the dialogue of the deaf will persist until external conditions dramatically alter the balance of power’’ (Van Eeten, 1999, p. 39, citing Sabatier, 1988). Actually, we could take this principle a step further. This external condition (flooding) changed not only the balance of power (in the social dimension) but also the balance of values (in the cognitive dimension) at the level of each individual policy actor, including the radical environmental activist. 4.2. The dilemma of information The dilemma of information revolved around the ‘facts and figures’ of safety and dike improvement in a constantly changing physical and political context. That dilemma was temporarily resolved by adopting standard norms of safety risk for all diking projects. This solution was written into the Major Rivers Delta Act and the Embankment Act, thereby making the use of these norms mandatory under law. In some cases, this led to problems. For instance, some regional water boards wanted more flexibility. They wanted to be able to adopt a higher norm for safety in order to be prepared for the higher norms that were expected in the near future. This is where the mandatory nature of the legislation got in the way. The ‘advantage’ was that the enduring discussion on safety norms was closed. The public accepted these norms as the minimum level required for safety. 4.3. The dilemma of steering The dilemma of steering, which is closely (but not exclusively) tied to the social complexity dimension, was resolved by allocating specific tasks to each of the government agencies. The legislation stipulates an unambiguous and workable division of labor between the provinces and the water boards in particular, assigning other tasks to the rest of the administrative bodies.
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The Major Rivers Delta Act required the regional water boards to present integral plans for dike reinforcement to the provincial government. In the Embankment Act, the regional water boards had to present the draft plans and the accompanying environmental impact assessment to the provincial government for approval. In all cases, the planning and implementation of the dike reinforcement projects had to be carried out in close cooperation with the local authorities, the general public, and groups in civil society at both a regional and a local level. To meet this requirement, members of various societal groups took part in the project organization. In other cases, those groups served as a sounding board during the implementation phase of the dike reinforcement project. Most projects made roomFin one way or anotherFfor direct citizen participation. Since it was an emergency, there was no time to discuss whether intervention was useful or even necessary. As often noted, the rationale behind the reinforcement of dikes and construction of embankments in the built-up area was no longer a topic of discussion after the periods of high water in 1993 and 1995. It is no surprise that as soon as the situation had become critical, there was public outcry for measures to prevent a recurrence in the future. What is surprising is that this sense of urgency is still so acute nearly five years after that? Perhaps the strong political interest in water management through the years has helped people realize that protection from water should be a core task of government. In any event, until the end of the operation in the year 2000 there still was widespread public support for the dike reinforcements. That support has given strong impetus to progress in decision-making and implementation. It has also had an effect on other groups in civil society, leading them to adopt a more constructive attitude. Municipalities, citizens, and civil organizations were closely involved in the development of the plans. This gave everyone a sense that there was room to bring in individual desires and that the interests of all parties were being taken seriously. As a representative of the regional water board put it, ‘‘we no longer confronted people with our solutions but with our problems’’. This approach often encouraged people to help find a solution. It also prevented resistance to the plan, which would have led to delays. We can conclude on the dilemma of steering that the emergency plan and the legislation itself were examples of vertical regulation from the top down, while the implementation made way for more horizontal and ‘bottom–up’ interaction. 4.4. The dilemma of efficiency The third dilemmaFthat of efficiency, meaning finding a balance between speed and quality of dike improvementFwas resolved by adopting speed legislation and an integrated approach to policy. Many procedures for public participation were shortened or simply abandoned. At the same time, the draft versions of the plans for dike reinforcement were tested. They had to accommodate the desires of individuals and meet the standards set by groups in civil society as much as possible. According to the administrative and juridical evaluations of the legislation, the legal framework was critical to the way the dike reinforcements were carried out. Indeed, the quality of the legal framework was identified as a key factor of success. The acceleration of the procedures, as intended in the Major Rivers Delta Act and the Embankment Act, has worked out well in practice. The juridical regime introduced several changes within the administrative setting. It
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linked decisions and decrees in parallel; it shortened the length of time allocated for public consultation, reaching agreement, approval, and appeal; it ensured that implementation decisions are made in a coordinated manner; it concentrated the protection of legal rights and it shortened the administrative procedure for expropriation. Furthermore, both laws contained guarantees that the plans would have a high-quality content; this too had a strong influence in practice. The laws required that not only safety issues would be taken into account; the interests of landscape, nature, and cultural history also had to be heeded. The plans indicated how the projects would impact the landscape, ecology, cultural–historical elements, spatial planning, public housing, and the environment. They had to demonstrate that all relevant interests had been taken into consideration. Conflicting values could easily have arisen in the process of designing and implementing the projects. Taking an integral approach was very important in the effort to avoid conflicts of interest. This effort was strongly stimulated by the practice that had been developed among dike managers in the years following the publication of the report by the Boertien Commission. They had become accustomed to letting dike reinforcement projects be accompanied by integral considerations regarding safety, environmental values, nature values, landscape values, housing, cultural history, and archeology. On the grounds of these experiences, the range of expertise was broadened. Whereas the task had previously been seen exclusively from the perspective of civil engineering, its interactive and process-oriented aspects then came to the fore. From these experiences emerged yet other qualities, such as the generally effective project management carried out by the water boards and the provincial authorities. Finally, we should not underestimate the importance of having access to sufficient financial means and the possibility to compensate for lost nature values and expropriated properties. These factors in particular facilitate the planning and decision-making process and make it more likely that it will be effective.
5. A new challenge: make room for the river In 1997, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management announced a new direction for river management. The underlying directive was simply called ‘make room for the river’ (ruimte voor de rivier). In itself, the original directive was not too ambitious. It provided guidelines for conservation of the winter bedding of the major rivers. This meant that no new objects (infrastructure, houses, farms, etc.) could be built in the winterbedding of the river unless there was an overriding public necessity to do so. It also made it difficult to make any changes in existing objects. The directive formed part of a broader policy to conserve the existing capacity of the rivers to carry water. It was associated with a policy to compensate for any and all quantitative changes in the size of the riverbed (e.g., when dikes were reinforced and thereby diminished the riverbed). That compensation entailed creating new room for the river elsewhere along its stream. The main thrust of the water policy gradually changed. Policy-makers realized that to create a lasting and sustainable policy for water safety, it was no longer enough to build higher dikes; something else had to happen. A change in policy was inevitable due to at least three developments: the expected rise in the sea level; the reduced capacity of rivers to transport water;
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and the growing supply of water due to the accelerated runoff. The last factor is caused by infrastructural works, building activity, and the deforestation taking place upstream (in Germany and Switzerland). Together, these developments pose a new challenge. At the start of the 21st century, the question is how to increase the carrying capacity of the main rivers in one of the densely populated countries in the world, a country that is known for its long history of intensive use of the physical environment. The material precipitate of that history takes the form of houses, farms, roads, dikes, the precarious state of nature, recreational activities, and so on. This, in turn, raises many other questions. Should we create ‘calamity polders’? If so, should such contingency space be created in the east of the country, where the rivers enter the Netherlands, or in the west, where the impending rise in the sea level will be felt most acutelyFor on both borders? Should we create a buffer zone in a single region, or should buffers be spread over many areas? Which new norms for safety risk should be adopted in legislation? How much damage is likely to occur and require compensation, and who will pay the bill? Not surprisingly, these new questions affect the policy configuration and the dimensions of its complexity. The normative, informational and social complexityFall of which had been reduced and made transparent so nicely in the old situation of reinforcing dikesFhave made a comeback on the political agenda and in the societal debate. Also, there is more at stake this time around. Thus, the cognitive dimension of the policy arrangement, both normative and informational, is changing. Enlarging the riverbed or using land as a buffer zone affects more than dike reinforcement. Space is a scarce commodity in the Netherlands. Sophisticated design alone is not enough to integrate different spatial functions. There are important political choices to be made. Which values should prevail? Where is the new point of balance between different claims on the physical environment? The values and interests of the riversFregarding safety, agriculture, nature development, recreation, and housingFare again being brought together in the political arena, though now in a new context. The guidelines set forth in the Major Rivers Delta Act (Deltaplan Grote Rivieren) and the Embankment Act were specifically formulated to secure safety by reinforcing dikes. However, those guidelines are not appropriate to a spatial policy that seeks to give rivers more room. The Embankment Act deals with dikes, not with the land they safeguard. Another problem is that this legislation is both temporary and geared to an emergency, making it static in character. There are no rules for adjusting the safety level. There are few possibilities to integrate a long-term approach to safety issues in river management. One consequence of the cognitive shift mentioned earlier is the emerging discussion about new institutions and legislation. The Embankment Act might not be the best legal framework for the new policy of making room for rivers. Nonetheless, the government may benefit from the experience gained in the effort to reinforce the dikes. These projects show that it is perfectly possible to integrate values that had formerly been outright contradictory while producing dikes that are both safe and esthetically pleasing. Indeed, there are now promising avenues to integrate river management with other activities. For instance, water management can easily be combined with the creation of new areas for nature development. Policy-makers have already profiled this development as wet nature. Certain agricultural activities may be combined with nature conservation and recreation. The scarce natural areas will be opened up for recreational use (LNV, 2000). With a little imagination,
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even housing can be made to coexist with expanding riverbeds and water-rich areas. The question is, can all of these functions be integrated? In view of the balance of political power, it looks like the agrarian sector will have to give in on some points. About 70 percent of the land in the Netherlands is still used for agriculture. However, agrarian forces have weakened tremendously in the political and societal arena over the past decade. To attain some degree of transparency and stabilityFas under the old water safety policyFthe water policy needs a new cognitive framework, one that is conducive to interactive decisionmaking at a later stage. In short, the information dilemma has not been resolved yet. At present, we are in the process of developing new frameworks for integrated spatial planning. Once an integrated approach to the mixed use of land has been worked out, other instruments can come into play. For instance, with environmental impact assessment, we can explore ways to integrate current values at the level of implementation. Social complexity is also in flux. At the time of the dike projects, the division of labor within governmentFcentral, provincial, and regional water boardsFwas fairly straightforward. The provinces coordinated the activities and took responsibility for staying on budget. The regional water boards took charge of implementation. Under the new operation (make room for the rivers), the national and international levels will come into play. Coordination between provinces will become important. Furthermore, it is still unknown who will actually carry out the projectsFthat will depend on the scale of the operations. Apart from the question of centralized or decentralized control, it is important to recognize that new stakeholders will come into the arena at newFthat is, regional and nationalFlevels, where they will assert their claims on space. Some of the key issues are value based and call for setting priorities. For instance, there is currently a housing shortage in the western part of the country, and consequently pressure to build in rural areas. At the same time, however, there is also a claim for nature development as part of the national ecological infrastructure. Another thing that should be kept in mind is that even though there has been broad public support for the issue of water safety since 1995, there is no guarantee that it will continue. When the interests of water safety are confronted with economic interests, the issue could easily get much lower priority. In fact, this is what happened in the early 1980s. The dilemma of governance will not be resolved as long as it remains unclear which values and interests are tied to particular stakeholders or who will be in charge of implementing the new river management program and who will control its budget. Finally, the issue of technical–informational complexity is back on the agenda. The task of calculating water levels and norms of safety risk is neither as complex nor as riddled with uncertainty as it was in the 1970s. Nonetheless, new uncertainties have emerged: the rising sea level and the influence of desiccation, to name just two. In fact, different kinds of uncertainty arise. If an area is designated as a calamity polder, which activities could be carried out there, and how can the people living and working there be prepared for the floods? By building new dikes around human dwellings? How can existing activities (which are supposedly safe, lying behind the improved dikes) be compensated for the change in policy? What about changes in the landscape? What are the implications for biodiversity and recreational use? How can dwellings be built in an area that has to serve as a back-up water reservoir in the near future? We still have a long way to go before we can resolve the dilemma of efficiency.
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6. Conclusions Policy scientists are always tempted to predict the direction of policy and to design a process for implementing it. Unfortunately, real life is complex, which means that their predictions rarely come true. The most we can do is to learn from recent experienceFin this case, regarding water safety. The lessons we draw may help us deal with the new complexity and the new policy on water management. The dike reinforcement projects carried out between 1995 and 2000 were successful for several reasons. The most important one is the balanced combination of both strict, transparent guidelines and interactive policy implementation. That balance was dictated by the urgency of the situation. Decision-making was hierarchical in the sense that the national plan consisted of an uncompromising definition of the problem. In other words, the cognitive map had safety at its center and a clear time frame. This was accompanied by a set of goals for the intermediate term and by temporary norms for safety risk, all of which were specified in special project legislation. It took the form of speed legislation, which concentrated and reduced the decision-making procedures as well as the formal legal protection. It also reduced the procedural and juridical time limits and allowed direct expropriation of land when necessary. Some critics even called it ‘wartime legislation’ (see Driessen & De Gier, 1997). Be that as it may, it did lend the policy goals and safety risk norms a degree of transparency, albeit temporarily. Furthermore, it clarified the division of labor among the governmental actors and it streamlined the legal framework guiding the operation. In broad strokes, the policy style consisted of an integrative and open strategy. It was applied by the regional water boards that carried out the projects. That strategy was conducive to participation and interaction at an early stage of decision-making on each individual project. We may conclude that interactive policy-making can thrive when there are no more fundamental discussions and when the cognitive dimension of the policy arrangement is stable and transparent. At the same time, we realize that this can only be a temporary situation. Politics is about taking chances. The cynics might counter that interactive policy-making can only succeed when it runs in tandem with a cognitive and social transparency that is created by hierarchical and formalized lines of decision-making. From another perspective you could say that the open and interactive policy approach is trying to bring different stakeholders into the position of actively choosing and accepting risk rather than passively accepting the assurance of structural engineering that all is safe. It is a way of confronting people with problems, instead of confronting them with solutions. The water safety and river management operations of the futureFresorting under the policy of making room for the riversFwill generate new forms of complexity. One of the questions this raises is whether that policy should be guided by speed legislation as under the previous policy. It is not likely that the process will be driven by such a profound sense of urgency as was the case during the floods of 1995Fassuming no new ‘near disaster’ will occur. We should critically review the elements of the legislation that were successful and enjoyed wide public support to see if they should be incorporated into existing legislation or written into pending agreements. With respect to the new allocation of responsibilities among governmental actors, there are forces toward both centralization and decentralization. The pull toward central control derives from the fact that rivers do not recognize regional or provincial borders. Thus, the need for
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coordination among provinces indicates a task for the national government. The push toward regional control reflects the experience that, on the whole, the regional water boards were a responsive tier of government in the dike reinforcement operations. With respect to bottom–up interactivity, a government actor should be as close as possible to the local stakeholders and the public at large. In order to achieve more transparency, at first it will be necessary to create a new cognitive framework on water policy management. The necessity of the new water safety operation must be made clear, by informing the public about the new challenges and threats, like the rising of the sea level and the foreseen consequences of climate change. Then, interactive decision-making may thrive in the following step. The framing process is now underway. It is taking place in political discussions and in public consultations, for instance by the Commission Water Policy 21st century. The dike reinforcement projects are of great value in promoting integrative and participatory policy. They allow us to explore ways to balance and integrate values on a project basisFfor instance, through the instrument of environmental impact assessment. Of course, such projects are not intended as sounding boards for political discourse. The process of formulating water policy can also be interactiveFand there are examples of this in practice. It is important to make an inventory of all possible problems and (integrative) solutions that stakeholders bring forward and to create early confrontations between the relevant interests. It is also important to create and consolidate support for the policy in society at large. But it will never relieve the Dutch politicians from the responsibility of making choices in the arena of competing spatial claims.
References De Bruijn, J. A., De Jong, P., Korsten, A. F. A., & van Zanten, W. P. C. (1996). Grote projecten. Besluitvorming en management. Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom H.D. Tjeenk Willink. Driessen, P. P. J., & De Gier, A. A. J. (1997). Uit nood geboren een bestuurlijk-juridische evaluatie vande dijkversterkingen en kadenaanleg onder de deltawet grote rivieren. Den Haag: VUGA. Driessen, P. P. J., De Gier, A. A. J., & Wiering, M. A. (1999). Versterking van rivierdijken. Een bestuurlijk-juridische evaluatie va nde plan- en besluitvormingsprocedures zoals opgenomen in de Wet op de waterkering. Den Haag: Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat. Geurts, J. L. A., & Mayer, I. S. (1996). Methods for participatory policy analysis; towards a conceptual model for research and development. WORC report 9.16.12.008/3. Tilburg: Tilburg University. Glasbergen, P. (Ed.) (1995). Managing environmental disputes. Network management as an alternative. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. LNV (2000). Natuur voor mensen, mensen voor natuur, nota natuur, bos en landschap in de 21 eeuw. Den Haag: LNV. Potman, H. P. (1995). Besluitvorming over rivierdijken. Bestuurskunde, 4(8), 348–352. Sabatier, P. A. (1988). An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy oriented learning therein. In: Policy sciences, Vol. 21(2) (pp. 13–40). Termeer, C. J. A. M. (1993). Dynamiek en inertie rondom mestbeleid. Een studie naar veranderingsprocessen in het varkenshouderijnetwerk. (diss. Rotterdam) Den Haag: VUGA. Van Dael, R. L. H. (1996). Veranderende rationaliteiten bij technisch-complexe projecten. In J. A. De Bruijn, P. De Jong, A. F. A. Korsten, & W. P. C. van Zanten (Eds.), Grote projecten. Besluitvorming en management (pp. 203–217). Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom H.D. Tjeenk Willink. Van De Ven, G. P. (1993). Leefbaar laagland; geschiedenis van de waterbeheersing en landaanwinning in nederland. Utrecht: Uitgeverij Matrijs.
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Van Eeten, M. (1997). Sprookjes in Rivierenland, beleidsverhalen over wateroverlast en dijkversterking. In: Beleid & Maatschappij, Vol. 24(1) (pp. 32–43). Van Eeten, M. (1999). Dialogues of the deaf, defining new agendas for environmental deadlocks. (diss. Delft) Delft: Eburon. Van Tatenhove, J., Arts, B., & Leroy, P. (2000). Political modernisation and the environment. The renewal of environmental policy arrangements. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. WRR (1994). Besluiten over grote projecten, SDU Uitgeverij, Den Haag.
Beyond the art of diking: interactive policy on river management in The Netherlands Mark A. Wiering, Peter P.J. Driessen* Centre for Environmental Law and Policy, Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80115, NL-3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands Received 18 February 2001; received in revised form 16 July 2001; accepted 19 July 2001
Abstract High water is a recurrent problem in the rivers that form the delta of the Netherlands. Understandably, the government is deeply concerned about the safety of those who live and work near these rivers. This paper considers recent trends in the Dutch approach to water safety. Whereas the traditional solution had been to reinforce the dikes, the trend is now toward integrated river management. Accompanying this development is a new strategy of governance. Increasingly, people recognize the value of an interactive approach to policy. This paper sheds light on the conditions that promote interactive governance when the state adopts a new approach to water safety. r 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction The Dutch are renowned for their expertise in cultivating land, both old and new, and in building dikes to keep their feet dry (Van de Ven, 1993). The hydrological conditions of the Netherlands explain some of its other names: the Low Countries and the European Delta. To the Dutch, water is both a constant companion and an ever-present adversary. To cope with water as friend and foe, the Dutch have built up a long tradition of water policies, river management, and measures to protect the landscape and its users. In recent years, fundamental changes have taken place regarding protection from high water levels. These changes show up in two different areas. First, there has been a shift in the way policy arrangements for water safety are designed and implemented. The new direction combines the need for urgent action and ‘speed legislation’ with the desire for interactive policy design and implementation. Second, the content of these arrangements has been transformed. The approach to water management seems to be moving away from building higher dikes toward adjusting and extending the territory in which rivers *Corresponding author. Tel.: +31-30-253-2359; fax: +31-30-253-2746. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M.A. Wiering), [email protected] (P.P.J. Driessen). 1366-7017/01/$ - see front matter r 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 1 3 6 6 - 7 0 1 7 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 0 7 5 - 7
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runFand occasionally flood. That new direction is captured in the slogan ‘Make Room for the Rivers’ (Ruimte voor de rivier). ThisFremarkably radicalFdeparture from past policy focuses the public and political discussion on the issues of river management, nature development along the rivers, farming, and housing. The new approach creates both new obstacles and new opportunities for the design and implementation of policy on water safety. This paper describes and evaluates the old and the new operations for water safety. The aim is to identify the conditions for integrated and interactive policy-making. In addressing the underlying issue of decision-making in complex policy settings, we try to find the point at which coercion and cooperation are in balance. To that end, we look for the common ground between hierarchy and equality. We focus on two seemingly contradictory societal developments: first, the process of centralizing and speeding up decision-making by applying tailor-made project legislation, with often stricter rules, and streamlining and cutting back the formal procedures for citizen participation. Second, the macro-level cultural tendency to make hierarchy less rigid, to reduce differences in status, to make government more responsive, to take advantage of local knowledge, and to make politics and policy more interactive. The ‘old’ regime of water safetyFwhereby the primary aim was to build dikes that were stronger and in some cases higherFmade two claims on the decision-making process. One, a demand for speed, reflected the urgency of the Dutch situation after the floods of 1993 and 1995 and required uncompromised hierarchical measures. The other was a call for careful integration of diverse priorities such as safety, landscape protection, environmental quality, the preservation of nature, and the historical culture of the locale surrounding the dikes. This disparate set of claims had to be combined with the expressed need for consultation and public support. The outcome was a form of ‘conditioned’ interactive policy implementation. The question is, how are these divergent claims honored in the many and diverse projects for dike improvement? This paper answers that question and evaluates the various outcomes. Some of the data come from studies evaluating the juridical regimes of particular legislation, namely the Major Rivers Delta Act (Deltawet Grote Rivieren) and the Embankment Act (Wet op de Waterkering) (Driessen & De Gier, 1997; Driessen, De Gier, & Wiering, 1999). The follow-up stage of water safety policyFas embodied in the effort to ‘make room for the river’Fis an entirely new operation. At the time of writing, the policy arrangements are still in their infancy. This paper can merely explore some of the possibilities and constraints of the plans and the new approach to governance. It is instructive to review the experiences under the old regime and compare them with recent experiences. The juxtaposition may shed light on the conditions for interactive policy on water safety. At another level, the exercise may add to the discussion on interactive policy-making with respect to river management.
2. Complex policy projects Over the past few years, the literature on Dutch policy has devoted much attention to the planning and execution of complex infrastructure projects (see, for example, De Bruijn, De Jong, Korsten, & van Zanten, 1996; WRR, 1994). The literature singles out the new freight railroad that is to run between Rotterdam and Germany (the Betuwelijn), the high-speed railway connections (HSL), the development of Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport into a mainport, the expansion of the
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world’s biggest port in Rotterdam, and the Dutch experience with water management as the big issues (Glasbergen, 1995). These projects can be seen as complex in different ways. There are different values at stake, different policy actors, and different costs and (environmental) effects. This complexity forms the ingredients of the policy configuration surrounding the project. Termeer (1993, pp. 28–36) distinguishes between the cognitive and the social dimension of a policy configuration or network. The cognitive dimension is about ‘what and why’. What values are at stake? The social dimension is about ‘who’. Who are the policy actors forming the configuration, and how do they interact? The cognitive element concerns the ‘frames of reference’, ‘definitions of reality’, or ‘mental maps’ that fuel the policy. The social element consists of the institutions, social rules, dependency relations, habits, and social codes in the network. Some authors make a different distinction, namely between social, normative, and cognitive complexity (see Geurts & Mayer, 1996), wherein the normative dimension concerns values and the cognitive concerns (project-) information. We feel it may become difficult to analytically separate the normative from the cognitive dimension of a policy configuration, as we regard normative considerations to be a part of the (broader) cognitive dimension. What the Geurts and Mayer distinction points at is that the cognitive dimension of a policy configuration itself consists of two different but strongly intertwined elements: the different stake holders values and ‘frames’ form the normative complexity and the technical and substantial information in the policy projectFsometimes still ‘unframed’ informationFforms the technical–informational complexity. At the end, the cognitive dimension of a policy configuration is the product of framing-processes between substantial (project-) information and perceptions of stakeholders. We use these terms to analyze decision-making on large policy projects. It follows that policy actors have to overcome the cognitive complexity that derives from both divergent and often conflicting values and frames of reference (what and why) and technical–informational complexity (what and how). Moreover, the decision-making process has to deal with social complexity (who). Any large project will involve diverse groups in society, stakeholders both public and private, and governments both national and regional. All of these parties will have a say in the design and implementation of the policy measures. We thus have a first tool with which to disentangle that complex setting, allowing us to focus on the temporary policy arrangements (see also Van Tatenhove, Arts, & Leroy, 2000) that are designed to address that complexity. From this perspective, policy-making is a means to reduce (temporarily) complexity. Cutting across this intricate fabric are three fundamental but intertwined dilemmas that affect the decision-making process. One concerns information. Whereas policy-makers are hired to decide something, they always have to take a degree of uncertainty into account. Uncertainty is inherent in long-term developments and technological inputs but also in the financial, social, ecological, and economic outcomes. The task of the decision-makers is to interpret the facts and to chart trends in the fields of transport, mobility, and the European context, among others. In the case discussed in this paper, their task is to predict the impact of a rising sea level and the effects of various forces on the water level in major rivers. In so doing, they play an essential role in diagnostic and prognostic ‘framing processes’ that serve to both promote and discredit infrastructure projects. Secondly, there is the already mentioned dilemma of the way of steering, related to the ongoing debate on government or governance, top down or bottom up, negotiated or juridically imposed measurements and outcomes. Thirdly, there is the dilemma of efficiency, strongly connected with
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the other two, but, nevertheless, a dilemma in its own right as it focuses on the relation between speed and quality of the project, a subject that will often be on top of the agenda of policy-makers. River management projects fall squarely under the heading of ‘large projects’. The following sections analyze how the policy configuration in river management has dealt with the three forms of complexity distinguished above and with the three dilemmas confronting policy-makers.
3. Building dikes and embankments The Netherlands faced a near national disaster in January 1995, as the water rose to extreme levels in the country’s major riversFthe Rhine, the Waal, the IJssel, and the Meuse. Of course, high waters are not unusual in these rivers. This time, however, the combination of extremely high water levels and the long duration of high water led to an emergency. About 250,000 people and much livestock had to be evacuated, as the authorities feared that the dikes along the Rhine, Waal, and IJssel would not hold. In the Meuse floodplain, there were no dikes or natural embankments. There, people had to be evacuated as the water levels rose in areas where many homes had been built on or near the water meadows in the floodplain. The economic damage caused by the threat of flooding was great. In the end, the dikes along the Rhine, Waal, and IJssel did hold, but only just. Nonetheless, the scare raised serious doubt about the country’s water safety. First of all, policy-makers were concerned about the cognitive policy dimension, which covers values and information. Before the 1995 floods, there was a long historyFat least 25 yearsFof public and political debate on the need to reinforce the dikes and how to do it. The situation of the 1970s might be described as one of cognitive complexity. There was a continual clash of values and uncertainty about the options, making choices difficult. On the one hand, the government agencies in charge of reinforcing the dikesFmainly the Directorate General for Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat) and the regional water boardsFwere primarily concerned with safety issues. On the other hand, diverse partiesFenvironmental groups, local inhabitants, and regional groups in civil societyFtried to preserve the characteristic fluvial dike landscape. They extolled the virtues of its cultural and historical elements, the nature peculiar to the locale, the dwellings along the dikes, and the farms. In those early years, the government carried out some large-scale projects for dike reinforcement. However, the results were not well received. On the contrary, the dikes were seen as an insult to the landscape. The diking operation even called for the demolition of a small village, alerting local groups to strongly oppose further diking activities (Van Eeten, 1999, p. 40). Secondly, there was widespread disagreement and uncertainty about the ‘facts and figures’ that underpinned the dike reinforcement projects. Many factors and circumstances can cause the water level to rise in rivers. The calculated levels of high water and safety risk norms differed from one study to the next. Some presented high water as an immediate risk, others as a highly theoretical possibility. Indeed, even the calculations and norms seemed to be pretty changeable (Van Dael, 1996). This undermined the position of the hardliners on safety, giving various groups in civil society a strong argument in support of the standpoint that safety risk norms are arbitrarily produced norms. In short, the clash of values went along with a high degree of technical– informational complexity in the dike reinforcement projects.
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There was some social complexity as well, not only as an extension of the conflicting values but also due to the sheer number of stakeholders in each project. Who is in charge of the diking projects? Is it up to the national government, the provinces, the regional water boards, or the local authorities to carry out, manage, and finance the dike projects? Where does the responsibility lie? Where did the support for the opposing groups come from? Who wielded control over the finances? Environmental groups and local communities alike resisted the traditional technocratic and top–down style preferred by the water boards and associated agencies, where civil engineers tend to hold sway. The above profile typifies the policy configuration as it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Skipping ahead to the last five years of the last centuryFup to the end of the year 2000Falmost all of the major dike projects have been completed. In general, the dike reinforcement operation has enjoyed strong public and political support. How was that accomplished? How did the parties in charge deal with the various forms of complexity that muddied the policy for water safety? The work performed by various advisory boards reduced the degree of cognitive complexity. Their work revolved around three key objectives: (1) to clarify the ‘facts and figures’ that underpin the issue of water safety; (2) to integrate the values involved; and (3) to generate public support for the dike reinforcement operation. Initially, this work was done by the Becht Commission (1977); later, the Boertien Commission (1993) took over. While acknowledging the need for dike reinforcement, the Becht Commission adjusted the stringent norm for the safety risk: from 1 : 3000, they changed it to 1 : 1250 (that is, there is a chance of a flood occurring any one year of 1 : 1250). According to the report by the Becht Commission, dike reinforcement had to be carried out in such a way that landscape, nature, and cultural and historical values would be preserved. This was to be achieved mainly through a sophisticated design of the dikes. Unfortunately, the Becht report did not have the impact that some had hoped for. Although the proposed norm for safety risk was accepted, a new method of calculation meant that the dikes had to be much higher than had been foreseen (Van Eeten, 1997, 1999). This only fanned the flames of protest among various societal groups. Then too, there were other reasons why the commission’s advice was not heeded. The first was economic: large-scale cutbacks on government spending were imposed in the 1980s. Hydraulic engineering works along the coast were given priority, as they protected the economic interests in the western part of the country. Consequently, work in the riverine areas just had to wait (Potman, 1995; Driessen & De Gier, 1997). The second reason was juridical: the fragmentation of pertinent legislation led to all kinds of legal barriers. Indeed, there were at least ten regulations spread over the fields of spatial planning, the environment, and water policy. The third reason was procedural: there were few if any opportunities to join in the decision-making process at an early stage (Driessen & De Gier, 1997). That situation eventually led to delays in the formal procedures. In fact, it took another 15 years before the dike reinforcement operation picked up momentum. In 1992, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management installed a second advisory board, the Boertien Commission. Once again, the task was to formulate new proposals for ways to make dike reinforcement operations more successful. As this new commission lamented, the recommendations of its predecessor, the Becht Commission, had not been adopted. Furthermore, the Boertien Commission stated that the general public and the local authorities should become more actively involved in preparing plans for dike projects. The report advised
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making an environmental impact assessment procedure (EIA) compulsory. Only an EIA could ensure that the interests of nature and the landscape would be treated comprehensively in the decision-making process. The high water of 1993 did not recede for a long time. This was an early warning of the critical situation yet to come. In January 1995, the water levels in the major rivers broke all recent records. The gravity of the situation took both the politicians and the public by surprise. The flooding led to evacuations, fear, uncertainty, and economic loss. The crisis of 1995 was also a chance to break the impasse in the discussion on the need for dike reinforcement. In the aftermath of the public alarm about water safety, the minister drew up a national emergency plan for the country’s major rivers (Deltaplan Grote Rivieren). An emergency law, replacing all legislation then in force pertaining to flooding, backed up this plan. The emergency plan called for reinforcing the dikes along the Rhine, the Waal, and the IJssel that were the most critical to safety. The works, which were to be carried out within a short period of time, resorted under the Major Rivers Delta Act. Measures of a different kind were required along the River Meuse, where embankments had to be built. The plan may be summarized in terms of its three priorities: 1. Speed: This means concentrating decision-making and legal protection, reducing the time frame for planning and judicial procedures, and making expropriation of land possible when necessary. 2. Centralization: This means coordination by the provinces, which were also financially responsible for dike reinforcement. 3. Integration: This means an overall approach to safety, landscape, and ecological interests. Whereas environmental impact assessment had previously been recommended by the Boertien Commission, this procedure was temporarily suspended. Nonetheless, the projects had to be considered from an integral perspective in the decision-making process. The Major Rivers Delta Act was a temporary arrangement. It was followed by a ‘second round’ of dike reinforcement projects, which resorted under another temporary measure, the Embankment Act (Wet op de Waterkering). These projects were less urgent than those carried out in the first stage and had to be completed by the end of the year 2000. The Embankment Act incorporated some of the elements of the 1995 emergency legislation, though the new legislation differed in terms of its coordination and certain juridical arrangements. This time, the agencies in charge of implementation did carry out environmental impact assessment.
4. Evaluation of dike reinforcement projects In less than two years, construction was underway on 96 percent of the dike reinforcement projects that had been given ‘high priority’. The provinces, regional water boards, and municipalities made a concerted effort to implement the plans, backed up by strong public support and a heightened sense of urgency. With respect to its speed as well as the decisionmaking process, the operation was considered to be very successful (Driessen & De Gier, 1997).
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The second stage of the national plan, the part resorting under the Embankment Act, has not yet been fully implemented. Most projects are expected to be finished on schedule, and this operation too is now deemed a success. The results of case studiesFand particularly the interviews among key informants from various tiers of government and civil organizationsFreveal overall satisfaction with the effect of the legislation. It proved that the Major Rivers Delta Act and the Embankment Act made it possible to speed up the decision-making while ensuring the quality of the process and the continued public support for dike reinforcement. Interestingly, various projects made provisions either to compensate for nature values that had already been lost or to give extra attention to nature development (Driessen & De Gier, 1997; Driessen et al., 1999). How did this packageFthe national emergency plan and the two pieces of legislationFaddress the dilemmas encountered in the decision-making process? Finally, which elements of the package made the dike improvement operations a success? 4.1. Normative complexity First of all, the normative complexity was strongly reduced by the sudden change in the balance of values due to the ‘almost disaster’ of 1995. In the aftermath of the 1995 floods, the pendulum swung to the side of uncompromised safety. It also illustrates the principle ‘‘that the dialogue of the deaf will persist until external conditions dramatically alter the balance of power’’ (Van Eeten, 1999, p. 39, citing Sabatier, 1988). Actually, we could take this principle a step further. This external condition (flooding) changed not only the balance of power (in the social dimension) but also the balance of values (in the cognitive dimension) at the level of each individual policy actor, including the radical environmental activist. 4.2. The dilemma of information The dilemma of information revolved around the ‘facts and figures’ of safety and dike improvement in a constantly changing physical and political context. That dilemma was temporarily resolved by adopting standard norms of safety risk for all diking projects. This solution was written into the Major Rivers Delta Act and the Embankment Act, thereby making the use of these norms mandatory under law. In some cases, this led to problems. For instance, some regional water boards wanted more flexibility. They wanted to be able to adopt a higher norm for safety in order to be prepared for the higher norms that were expected in the near future. This is where the mandatory nature of the legislation got in the way. The ‘advantage’ was that the enduring discussion on safety norms was closed. The public accepted these norms as the minimum level required for safety. 4.3. The dilemma of steering The dilemma of steering, which is closely (but not exclusively) tied to the social complexity dimension, was resolved by allocating specific tasks to each of the government agencies. The legislation stipulates an unambiguous and workable division of labor between the provinces and the water boards in particular, assigning other tasks to the rest of the administrative bodies.
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The Major Rivers Delta Act required the regional water boards to present integral plans for dike reinforcement to the provincial government. In the Embankment Act, the regional water boards had to present the draft plans and the accompanying environmental impact assessment to the provincial government for approval. In all cases, the planning and implementation of the dike reinforcement projects had to be carried out in close cooperation with the local authorities, the general public, and groups in civil society at both a regional and a local level. To meet this requirement, members of various societal groups took part in the project organization. In other cases, those groups served as a sounding board during the implementation phase of the dike reinforcement project. Most projects made roomFin one way or anotherFfor direct citizen participation. Since it was an emergency, there was no time to discuss whether intervention was useful or even necessary. As often noted, the rationale behind the reinforcement of dikes and construction of embankments in the built-up area was no longer a topic of discussion after the periods of high water in 1993 and 1995. It is no surprise that as soon as the situation had become critical, there was public outcry for measures to prevent a recurrence in the future. What is surprising is that this sense of urgency is still so acute nearly five years after that? Perhaps the strong political interest in water management through the years has helped people realize that protection from water should be a core task of government. In any event, until the end of the operation in the year 2000 there still was widespread public support for the dike reinforcements. That support has given strong impetus to progress in decision-making and implementation. It has also had an effect on other groups in civil society, leading them to adopt a more constructive attitude. Municipalities, citizens, and civil organizations were closely involved in the development of the plans. This gave everyone a sense that there was room to bring in individual desires and that the interests of all parties were being taken seriously. As a representative of the regional water board put it, ‘‘we no longer confronted people with our solutions but with our problems’’. This approach often encouraged people to help find a solution. It also prevented resistance to the plan, which would have led to delays. We can conclude on the dilemma of steering that the emergency plan and the legislation itself were examples of vertical regulation from the top down, while the implementation made way for more horizontal and ‘bottom–up’ interaction. 4.4. The dilemma of efficiency The third dilemmaFthat of efficiency, meaning finding a balance between speed and quality of dike improvementFwas resolved by adopting speed legislation and an integrated approach to policy. Many procedures for public participation were shortened or simply abandoned. At the same time, the draft versions of the plans for dike reinforcement were tested. They had to accommodate the desires of individuals and meet the standards set by groups in civil society as much as possible. According to the administrative and juridical evaluations of the legislation, the legal framework was critical to the way the dike reinforcements were carried out. Indeed, the quality of the legal framework was identified as a key factor of success. The acceleration of the procedures, as intended in the Major Rivers Delta Act and the Embankment Act, has worked out well in practice. The juridical regime introduced several changes within the administrative setting. It
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linked decisions and decrees in parallel; it shortened the length of time allocated for public consultation, reaching agreement, approval, and appeal; it ensured that implementation decisions are made in a coordinated manner; it concentrated the protection of legal rights and it shortened the administrative procedure for expropriation. Furthermore, both laws contained guarantees that the plans would have a high-quality content; this too had a strong influence in practice. The laws required that not only safety issues would be taken into account; the interests of landscape, nature, and cultural history also had to be heeded. The plans indicated how the projects would impact the landscape, ecology, cultural–historical elements, spatial planning, public housing, and the environment. They had to demonstrate that all relevant interests had been taken into consideration. Conflicting values could easily have arisen in the process of designing and implementing the projects. Taking an integral approach was very important in the effort to avoid conflicts of interest. This effort was strongly stimulated by the practice that had been developed among dike managers in the years following the publication of the report by the Boertien Commission. They had become accustomed to letting dike reinforcement projects be accompanied by integral considerations regarding safety, environmental values, nature values, landscape values, housing, cultural history, and archeology. On the grounds of these experiences, the range of expertise was broadened. Whereas the task had previously been seen exclusively from the perspective of civil engineering, its interactive and process-oriented aspects then came to the fore. From these experiences emerged yet other qualities, such as the generally effective project management carried out by the water boards and the provincial authorities. Finally, we should not underestimate the importance of having access to sufficient financial means and the possibility to compensate for lost nature values and expropriated properties. These factors in particular facilitate the planning and decision-making process and make it more likely that it will be effective.
5. A new challenge: make room for the river In 1997, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management announced a new direction for river management. The underlying directive was simply called ‘make room for the river’ (ruimte voor de rivier). In itself, the original directive was not too ambitious. It provided guidelines for conservation of the winter bedding of the major rivers. This meant that no new objects (infrastructure, houses, farms, etc.) could be built in the winterbedding of the river unless there was an overriding public necessity to do so. It also made it difficult to make any changes in existing objects. The directive formed part of a broader policy to conserve the existing capacity of the rivers to carry water. It was associated with a policy to compensate for any and all quantitative changes in the size of the riverbed (e.g., when dikes were reinforced and thereby diminished the riverbed). That compensation entailed creating new room for the river elsewhere along its stream. The main thrust of the water policy gradually changed. Policy-makers realized that to create a lasting and sustainable policy for water safety, it was no longer enough to build higher dikes; something else had to happen. A change in policy was inevitable due to at least three developments: the expected rise in the sea level; the reduced capacity of rivers to transport water;
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and the growing supply of water due to the accelerated runoff. The last factor is caused by infrastructural works, building activity, and the deforestation taking place upstream (in Germany and Switzerland). Together, these developments pose a new challenge. At the start of the 21st century, the question is how to increase the carrying capacity of the main rivers in one of the densely populated countries in the world, a country that is known for its long history of intensive use of the physical environment. The material precipitate of that history takes the form of houses, farms, roads, dikes, the precarious state of nature, recreational activities, and so on. This, in turn, raises many other questions. Should we create ‘calamity polders’? If so, should such contingency space be created in the east of the country, where the rivers enter the Netherlands, or in the west, where the impending rise in the sea level will be felt most acutelyFor on both borders? Should we create a buffer zone in a single region, or should buffers be spread over many areas? Which new norms for safety risk should be adopted in legislation? How much damage is likely to occur and require compensation, and who will pay the bill? Not surprisingly, these new questions affect the policy configuration and the dimensions of its complexity. The normative, informational and social complexityFall of which had been reduced and made transparent so nicely in the old situation of reinforcing dikesFhave made a comeback on the political agenda and in the societal debate. Also, there is more at stake this time around. Thus, the cognitive dimension of the policy arrangement, both normative and informational, is changing. Enlarging the riverbed or using land as a buffer zone affects more than dike reinforcement. Space is a scarce commodity in the Netherlands. Sophisticated design alone is not enough to integrate different spatial functions. There are important political choices to be made. Which values should prevail? Where is the new point of balance between different claims on the physical environment? The values and interests of the riversFregarding safety, agriculture, nature development, recreation, and housingFare again being brought together in the political arena, though now in a new context. The guidelines set forth in the Major Rivers Delta Act (Deltaplan Grote Rivieren) and the Embankment Act were specifically formulated to secure safety by reinforcing dikes. However, those guidelines are not appropriate to a spatial policy that seeks to give rivers more room. The Embankment Act deals with dikes, not with the land they safeguard. Another problem is that this legislation is both temporary and geared to an emergency, making it static in character. There are no rules for adjusting the safety level. There are few possibilities to integrate a long-term approach to safety issues in river management. One consequence of the cognitive shift mentioned earlier is the emerging discussion about new institutions and legislation. The Embankment Act might not be the best legal framework for the new policy of making room for rivers. Nonetheless, the government may benefit from the experience gained in the effort to reinforce the dikes. These projects show that it is perfectly possible to integrate values that had formerly been outright contradictory while producing dikes that are both safe and esthetically pleasing. Indeed, there are now promising avenues to integrate river management with other activities. For instance, water management can easily be combined with the creation of new areas for nature development. Policy-makers have already profiled this development as wet nature. Certain agricultural activities may be combined with nature conservation and recreation. The scarce natural areas will be opened up for recreational use (LNV, 2000). With a little imagination,
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even housing can be made to coexist with expanding riverbeds and water-rich areas. The question is, can all of these functions be integrated? In view of the balance of political power, it looks like the agrarian sector will have to give in on some points. About 70 percent of the land in the Netherlands is still used for agriculture. However, agrarian forces have weakened tremendously in the political and societal arena over the past decade. To attain some degree of transparency and stabilityFas under the old water safety policyFthe water policy needs a new cognitive framework, one that is conducive to interactive decisionmaking at a later stage. In short, the information dilemma has not been resolved yet. At present, we are in the process of developing new frameworks for integrated spatial planning. Once an integrated approach to the mixed use of land has been worked out, other instruments can come into play. For instance, with environmental impact assessment, we can explore ways to integrate current values at the level of implementation. Social complexity is also in flux. At the time of the dike projects, the division of labor within governmentFcentral, provincial, and regional water boardsFwas fairly straightforward. The provinces coordinated the activities and took responsibility for staying on budget. The regional water boards took charge of implementation. Under the new operation (make room for the rivers), the national and international levels will come into play. Coordination between provinces will become important. Furthermore, it is still unknown who will actually carry out the projectsFthat will depend on the scale of the operations. Apart from the question of centralized or decentralized control, it is important to recognize that new stakeholders will come into the arena at newFthat is, regional and nationalFlevels, where they will assert their claims on space. Some of the key issues are value based and call for setting priorities. For instance, there is currently a housing shortage in the western part of the country, and consequently pressure to build in rural areas. At the same time, however, there is also a claim for nature development as part of the national ecological infrastructure. Another thing that should be kept in mind is that even though there has been broad public support for the issue of water safety since 1995, there is no guarantee that it will continue. When the interests of water safety are confronted with economic interests, the issue could easily get much lower priority. In fact, this is what happened in the early 1980s. The dilemma of governance will not be resolved as long as it remains unclear which values and interests are tied to particular stakeholders or who will be in charge of implementing the new river management program and who will control its budget. Finally, the issue of technical–informational complexity is back on the agenda. The task of calculating water levels and norms of safety risk is neither as complex nor as riddled with uncertainty as it was in the 1970s. Nonetheless, new uncertainties have emerged: the rising sea level and the influence of desiccation, to name just two. In fact, different kinds of uncertainty arise. If an area is designated as a calamity polder, which activities could be carried out there, and how can the people living and working there be prepared for the floods? By building new dikes around human dwellings? How can existing activities (which are supposedly safe, lying behind the improved dikes) be compensated for the change in policy? What about changes in the landscape? What are the implications for biodiversity and recreational use? How can dwellings be built in an area that has to serve as a back-up water reservoir in the near future? We still have a long way to go before we can resolve the dilemma of efficiency.
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6. Conclusions Policy scientists are always tempted to predict the direction of policy and to design a process for implementing it. Unfortunately, real life is complex, which means that their predictions rarely come true. The most we can do is to learn from recent experienceFin this case, regarding water safety. The lessons we draw may help us deal with the new complexity and the new policy on water management. The dike reinforcement projects carried out between 1995 and 2000 were successful for several reasons. The most important one is the balanced combination of both strict, transparent guidelines and interactive policy implementation. That balance was dictated by the urgency of the situation. Decision-making was hierarchical in the sense that the national plan consisted of an uncompromising definition of the problem. In other words, the cognitive map had safety at its center and a clear time frame. This was accompanied by a set of goals for the intermediate term and by temporary norms for safety risk, all of which were specified in special project legislation. It took the form of speed legislation, which concentrated and reduced the decision-making procedures as well as the formal legal protection. It also reduced the procedural and juridical time limits and allowed direct expropriation of land when necessary. Some critics even called it ‘wartime legislation’ (see Driessen & De Gier, 1997). Be that as it may, it did lend the policy goals and safety risk norms a degree of transparency, albeit temporarily. Furthermore, it clarified the division of labor among the governmental actors and it streamlined the legal framework guiding the operation. In broad strokes, the policy style consisted of an integrative and open strategy. It was applied by the regional water boards that carried out the projects. That strategy was conducive to participation and interaction at an early stage of decision-making on each individual project. We may conclude that interactive policy-making can thrive when there are no more fundamental discussions and when the cognitive dimension of the policy arrangement is stable and transparent. At the same time, we realize that this can only be a temporary situation. Politics is about taking chances. The cynics might counter that interactive policy-making can only succeed when it runs in tandem with a cognitive and social transparency that is created by hierarchical and formalized lines of decision-making. From another perspective you could say that the open and interactive policy approach is trying to bring different stakeholders into the position of actively choosing and accepting risk rather than passively accepting the assurance of structural engineering that all is safe. It is a way of confronting people with problems, instead of confronting them with solutions. The water safety and river management operations of the futureFresorting under the policy of making room for the riversFwill generate new forms of complexity. One of the questions this raises is whether that policy should be guided by speed legislation as under the previous policy. It is not likely that the process will be driven by such a profound sense of urgency as was the case during the floods of 1995Fassuming no new ‘near disaster’ will occur. We should critically review the elements of the legislation that were successful and enjoyed wide public support to see if they should be incorporated into existing legislation or written into pending agreements. With respect to the new allocation of responsibilities among governmental actors, there are forces toward both centralization and decentralization. The pull toward central control derives from the fact that rivers do not recognize regional or provincial borders. Thus, the need for
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coordination among provinces indicates a task for the national government. The push toward regional control reflects the experience that, on the whole, the regional water boards were a responsive tier of government in the dike reinforcement operations. With respect to bottom–up interactivity, a government actor should be as close as possible to the local stakeholders and the public at large. In order to achieve more transparency, at first it will be necessary to create a new cognitive framework on water policy management. The necessity of the new water safety operation must be made clear, by informing the public about the new challenges and threats, like the rising of the sea level and the foreseen consequences of climate change. Then, interactive decision-making may thrive in the following step. The framing process is now underway. It is taking place in political discussions and in public consultations, for instance by the Commission Water Policy 21st century. The dike reinforcement projects are of great value in promoting integrative and participatory policy. They allow us to explore ways to balance and integrate values on a project basisFfor instance, through the instrument of environmental impact assessment. Of course, such projects are not intended as sounding boards for political discourse. The process of formulating water policy can also be interactiveFand there are examples of this in practice. It is important to make an inventory of all possible problems and (integrative) solutions that stakeholders bring forward and to create early confrontations between the relevant interests. It is also important to create and consolidate support for the policy in society at large. But it will never relieve the Dutch politicians from the responsibility of making choices in the arena of competing spatial claims.
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