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Biometrics help apprehend immigration violators
NEWS
Copyright Notice This newsletter and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by Elsevier Ltd, and the following terms and conditions apply to their use: Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier Rights & Permissions Department, PO Box 800, Oxford OX5 1DX, UK; tel: +44 (0)1865 843830, fax: +44 (0)1865 853333, e-mail: [email protected]. You may also contact Rights & Permissions directly through Elsevier’s home page (http://www.elsevier.com), selecting first ‘Support and contact’, then ‘Copyright and permission’. In the USA, users may clear permissions and make payments through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; tel: 978 7508400, fax: +1 978 7504744, and in the UK through the Copyright Licensing Agency Rapid Clearance Service (CLARCS), 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP, UK; tel: +44 (0) 207 436 5931; fax: +44 (0) 207 436 3986. Other countries may have a local reprographic rights agency for payments. Derivative Works Subscribers may reproduce tables of contents or prepare lists of articles including abstracts for internal circulation within their institutions. Permission of the publisher is required for resale or distribution outside the institution. Permission of the publisher is required for all other derivative works, including compilations and translations. Electronic Storage or Usage Permission of the publisher is required to store or use electronically any material contained in this journal, including any article or part of an article. Contact the publisher at the address indicated. Except as outlined above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher. Address permissions requests to: Elsevier Rights & Permissions Department, at the mail, fax and e-mail addresses noted above. Notice No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in particular, independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made. Although all advertising material is expected to conform to ethical (medical) standards, inclusion in this publication does not constitute a guarantee or endorsement of the quality or value of such product or of the claims made of it by its manufacturer.
02265 Printed by Mayfield Press (Oxford) Ltd.
2
Btt reported last month that a second chip supplier is being sought with much tighter guarantee terms. In his evidence to the Public Accounts Committee, Herdan confirmed a second chip supplier was being contracted, but explained why the initial warranty was for just two years in the initial contract: “The decision was taken that the cost of taking additional warranty during the period when the technology was still being proven outweighed the benefits...In any case, one will never get warranty against passport documents being damaged through frequent use – abuse, if you like – so the warranty would have only a limited benefit…But as the technology becomes more mature, and since we intend to regularly re-compete those chip subcontracts and bring in a second supplier later this year, there is every chance that we will be able to get to a longer period of warranty without any significant cost.” Herdan explained that IPS tested lots of different designs, eventually deciding to put the chip inside the biographical data pages inside the document, because this was considered the safest location. Herdan also explained the types of durability tests to which the ePassport had been subjected: “This passport has been subjected to every kind of testing you could think of to simulate that kind of life, including soaking it in all sorts of liquids, putting it through the wash, tauten testing to do that kind of thing to it tens of thousands of times, to see if we can break it, and it has come through all those tests.” The ePassport chip would not survive a stint in the microwave, Herdan noted. Addressing another question raised by the NAO into the poor accuracy of facial recognition when searching large databases, Herdan hinted that while the UK would continue to use facial recognition, it could well eventually use fingerprint technology at the border. “Facial recognition technology is in development. We have already changed the standards of the photographs that we put into these passports to enable the use of facial recognition. In the application processing we now check all suspect applications against the database of about 30,000 images of people who have previously tried to commit fraud against us and we have had, as the report mentions, 400 hits on that database. In terms of, for example, the border posts, moving on from our application for a system of use of facial recognition at border posts, there is first of all the potential to enhance those biographical checks on the suspect index by also checking images of wanted people against images on passports who may have a different name, and that will be a back office function that is again being trialled at the moment, and is in development, which will be a very powerful tool. In Australia, who are the world leaders in this particular technology, they are starting now to check against the whole database, so they are starting a process of automated passage
through border posts by people having the image in their chip compared against their face. That is the ePassport that does that. We will watch with great interest how that goes. Of course it is a smaller population and a smaller number of passports…It may be that the use of fingerprints, which we will be getting to in 2009, may be a better technique.” The full uncorrected and unpublished transcript of evidence is available at: http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubacc/ uc362-i/uc36202.htm
us-visit
Biometrics help apprehend immigration violators The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has announced initial results of a biometric identification pilot program between US-VISIT and the US Coast Guard to target illegal migration in the Mona Passage, a body of water between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Since the start of the pilot program in November 2006, the Coast Guard has interdicted 21 vessels containing 558 undocumented aliens. Twenty-two of the aliens caught face criminal prosecution for immigration offenses that prohibit attempts to enter or re-enter the US illegally. Three of the aliens were previously removed as aggravated felons, and one alien was previously convicted of homicide in the United States. “Biometrics is a powerful tool for the Coast Guard,” said Rear admiral Wayne Justice, Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for Response. “It acts as a force multiplier by helping our officers to quickly and accurately identify the migrants they encounter, and aggressively enforce our immigration laws at sea. We are also sending a strong deterrent message to anyone thinking of entering US territory through this body of water - they will be apprehended.” The pilot program provides a technological capability for the Coast Guard to capture digital fingerprints and photographs from illegal aliens apprehended at sea and compare that biometric information against USVISIT data. Aliens not being prosecuted are returned to the Dominican Republic, and their biometric information is retained and accessible to the Coast Guard to compare against future apprehensions. The pilot project furthers a broader effort to develop a biometric-based mobile solution for collection and analysis, and represents another step in the department’s strategy to secure the nation’s borders.
Biometric Technology Today • March 2007
Copyright Notice This newsletter and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by Elsevier Ltd, and the following terms and conditions apply to their use: Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier Rights & Permissions Department, PO Box 800, Oxford OX5 1DX, UK; tel: +44 (0)1865 843830, fax: +44 (0)1865 853333, e-mail: [email protected]. You may also contact Rights & Permissions directly through Elsevier’s home page (http://www.elsevier.com), selecting first ‘Support and contact’, then ‘Copyright and permission’. In the USA, users may clear permissions and make payments through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; tel: 978 7508400, fax: +1 978 7504744, and in the UK through the Copyright Licensing Agency Rapid Clearance Service (CLARCS), 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP, UK; tel: +44 (0) 207 436 5931; fax: +44 (0) 207 436 3986. Other countries may have a local reprographic rights agency for payments. Derivative Works Subscribers may reproduce tables of contents or prepare lists of articles including abstracts for internal circulation within their institutions. Permission of the publisher is required for resale or distribution outside the institution. Permission of the publisher is required for all other derivative works, including compilations and translations. Electronic Storage or Usage Permission of the publisher is required to store or use electronically any material contained in this journal, including any article or part of an article. Contact the publisher at the address indicated. Except as outlined above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher. Address permissions requests to: Elsevier Rights & Permissions Department, at the mail, fax and e-mail addresses noted above. Notice No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in particular, independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made. Although all advertising material is expected to conform to ethical (medical) standards, inclusion in this publication does not constitute a guarantee or endorsement of the quality or value of such product or of the claims made of it by its manufacturer.
02265 Printed by Mayfield Press (Oxford) Ltd.
2
Btt reported last month that a second chip supplier is being sought with much tighter guarantee terms. In his evidence to the Public Accounts Committee, Herdan confirmed a second chip supplier was being contracted, but explained why the initial warranty was for just two years in the initial contract: “The decision was taken that the cost of taking additional warranty during the period when the technology was still being proven outweighed the benefits...In any case, one will never get warranty against passport documents being damaged through frequent use – abuse, if you like – so the warranty would have only a limited benefit…But as the technology becomes more mature, and since we intend to regularly re-compete those chip subcontracts and bring in a second supplier later this year, there is every chance that we will be able to get to a longer period of warranty without any significant cost.” Herdan explained that IPS tested lots of different designs, eventually deciding to put the chip inside the biographical data pages inside the document, because this was considered the safest location. Herdan also explained the types of durability tests to which the ePassport had been subjected: “This passport has been subjected to every kind of testing you could think of to simulate that kind of life, including soaking it in all sorts of liquids, putting it through the wash, tauten testing to do that kind of thing to it tens of thousands of times, to see if we can break it, and it has come through all those tests.” The ePassport chip would not survive a stint in the microwave, Herdan noted. Addressing another question raised by the NAO into the poor accuracy of facial recognition when searching large databases, Herdan hinted that while the UK would continue to use facial recognition, it could well eventually use fingerprint technology at the border. “Facial recognition technology is in development. We have already changed the standards of the photographs that we put into these passports to enable the use of facial recognition. In the application processing we now check all suspect applications against the database of about 30,000 images of people who have previously tried to commit fraud against us and we have had, as the report mentions, 400 hits on that database. In terms of, for example, the border posts, moving on from our application for a system of use of facial recognition at border posts, there is first of all the potential to enhance those biographical checks on the suspect index by also checking images of wanted people against images on passports who may have a different name, and that will be a back office function that is again being trialled at the moment, and is in development, which will be a very powerful tool. In Australia, who are the world leaders in this particular technology, they are starting now to check against the whole database, so they are starting a process of automated passage
through border posts by people having the image in their chip compared against their face. That is the ePassport that does that. We will watch with great interest how that goes. Of course it is a smaller population and a smaller number of passports…It may be that the use of fingerprints, which we will be getting to in 2009, may be a better technique.” The full uncorrected and unpublished transcript of evidence is available at: http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubacc/ uc362-i/uc36202.htm
us-visit
Biometrics help apprehend immigration violators The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has announced initial results of a biometric identification pilot program between US-VISIT and the US Coast Guard to target illegal migration in the Mona Passage, a body of water between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Since the start of the pilot program in November 2006, the Coast Guard has interdicted 21 vessels containing 558 undocumented aliens. Twenty-two of the aliens caught face criminal prosecution for immigration offenses that prohibit attempts to enter or re-enter the US illegally. Three of the aliens were previously removed as aggravated felons, and one alien was previously convicted of homicide in the United States. “Biometrics is a powerful tool for the Coast Guard,” said Rear admiral Wayne Justice, Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for Response. “It acts as a force multiplier by helping our officers to quickly and accurately identify the migrants they encounter, and aggressively enforce our immigration laws at sea. We are also sending a strong deterrent message to anyone thinking of entering US territory through this body of water - they will be apprehended.” The pilot program provides a technological capability for the Coast Guard to capture digital fingerprints and photographs from illegal aliens apprehended at sea and compare that biometric information against USVISIT data. Aliens not being prosecuted are returned to the Dominican Republic, and their biometric information is retained and accessible to the Coast Guard to compare against future apprehensions. The pilot project furthers a broader effort to develop a biometric-based mobile solution for collection and analysis, and represents another step in the department’s strategy to secure the nation’s borders.
Biometric Technology Today • March 2007