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Biotechnology research—in an age of terrorism
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Book Review / Diagnostic Microbiology and Infectious Disease 50 (2004) 77–79
The major focus of this book is to provide information on the wide range of micro- organisms that may be encountered in an OI and how these may be prevented or treated when they do occur. However, each chapter begins with an introduction to the genus and in many instances the species within a genus if several species can cause OI. Although the Book’s introductory portions do not go into depth as would one on infectious diseases, it does provide ample information and detail to familiarize (or refamiliarize) the reader with each agent under discussion; how and where anatomically the OI occurs; the patient’s pre- existing medical conditions that serve as predisposing factors for the establishment of a foothold by a nosocomial agent, and how it may progress to a dominant factor in an individual’s existing illness. Predisposing factors are numerous and often surprising, as is also the route by which the opportunistic agent gains entrance into the host. The host response to the OI is discussed, followed by a detailed presentations, therapeutic measures, and what can or should be done to prevent reoccurrence or occurrence in others. Recognizing that there is no end to the kind of organisms that present themselves as OI, the author has done a remarkably good job in writing a very useful textbook on an infectious disease process that is not likely to go away. This book should be a welcome addition to the library of those whose medical responsibility involves opportunistic infections. Albert Balows Book Editor doi:10.1016/j.diagmicrobio.2004.04.018
Biotechnology Research—In an Age of Terrorism The National Research Committee of The National Academies, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. 2004, paperback, 129 p. ⫹ 3 appendices, US $35.00 Since 1863, the nation has turned to the National Academy of Sciences and in the following years the National Academy of Engeneering, The Institute of Medicine, and The National Research Council for independent, objective advice on issues that affect peoples lives. Acts of terrorism are as old as recorded history and perhaps reached a climax during World War I with the research and preparation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continuing through WWII and beyond. Every major country in the world promoted programs for the development of WMD and maintained research and production of agents until the final acceptance and ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The United States in delayed compliance destroyed large stock piles of chemical and biological agents. In 1970, the United States confined
biological agents and toxins research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety. In 1972 the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union sponsored “The Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention.” This was formally adopted in 1975 by 148 countries. In 1996 testimony was given to the US Senate Armed Services Committee . . . “that these chemical and biological weapons are more accessible now than at any other time in history”. So in 20 years we have come full circle and live in an age of terrorism. This prompted the formation of a Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology. The committee consists of 16 illustrious members from various academic and research institutions. The charge to the committee was to consider ways to minimize threats from biological warfare and bioterrorism without hindering biotechnology and biotechnologic research, which are essential to the health of the nation. To meet this charge the committee held 3 meetings with an objective developed for each 2-day meeting. Several individuals whose expertise was paramount to each meeting were invited to give an original assigned presention for discussion and consultation. Following this, 3 additional meetings were held to review the content, structure, and the substance of writing assignments. From these assignments a detailed report—subsequently this book— emerged (see appendix C). This book consists of an excellent summary followed by 4 chapters: Introduction; The Evolving Regulatory Environment for Life Science in Research in the 21st Century; Information, Restriction, and Control Regimes; and Conclusions and Recommendations. Considerable thought and very circumspect attention was obviously given to every topic in each chapter. To illustrate, Chapter 1 discusses the “dual use” dilemma: that is the development of technologies intended for civilian application that can also be used for military purposes. Chapter 2 presents the “US Regulatory Environment” that spells out the laboratory requirements of any investigator or laboratory that receives National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding (of which NIH grantees are well aware). There are additional existing and evolving regulatory requirements for life sciences. Among such regulations are those promulgated by the Air Transport Association, the Universal Postal Union, and other shippers and carriers when hazardous goods are involved. Included in this portion are two tables that bear directly on the handling and management for infectious agents in so far as biosafety levels are concerned and a listing of organisms and toxins covered by regulations. Openess in science is highly valued as free communication among all scientists is essential if science is to go forward. Several major journals have a policy that covers publication of sensitive material and security. A summary on types of information controls as adopted by the Association of American Universities is reproduced. The control of secret information is also dealt with and sup-
Book Review / Diagnostic Microbiology and Infectious Disease 50 (2004) 77–79
ported with definitions, classified and unclassified approaches, etc. I found only one slight error in the reference to the 1994 publications of the Centers for Disease Control/NIH “Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories”. These guidelines were last published in 1999. Other than this I found this book to contain virtually all the information
79
required to conduct biotechnology research in the USA. This is a valuable, inexpensive, and very necessary book for anyone whose work or interests are currently in biomedical research. Albert Balows Book Editor doi:10.1016/j.diagmicrobio.2004.04.019
Book Review / Diagnostic Microbiology and Infectious Disease 50 (2004) 77–79
The major focus of this book is to provide information on the wide range of micro- organisms that may be encountered in an OI and how these may be prevented or treated when they do occur. However, each chapter begins with an introduction to the genus and in many instances the species within a genus if several species can cause OI. Although the Book’s introductory portions do not go into depth as would one on infectious diseases, it does provide ample information and detail to familiarize (or refamiliarize) the reader with each agent under discussion; how and where anatomically the OI occurs; the patient’s pre- existing medical conditions that serve as predisposing factors for the establishment of a foothold by a nosocomial agent, and how it may progress to a dominant factor in an individual’s existing illness. Predisposing factors are numerous and often surprising, as is also the route by which the opportunistic agent gains entrance into the host. The host response to the OI is discussed, followed by a detailed presentations, therapeutic measures, and what can or should be done to prevent reoccurrence or occurrence in others. Recognizing that there is no end to the kind of organisms that present themselves as OI, the author has done a remarkably good job in writing a very useful textbook on an infectious disease process that is not likely to go away. This book should be a welcome addition to the library of those whose medical responsibility involves opportunistic infections. Albert Balows Book Editor doi:10.1016/j.diagmicrobio.2004.04.018
Biotechnology Research—In an Age of Terrorism The National Research Committee of The National Academies, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. 2004, paperback, 129 p. ⫹ 3 appendices, US $35.00 Since 1863, the nation has turned to the National Academy of Sciences and in the following years the National Academy of Engeneering, The Institute of Medicine, and The National Research Council for independent, objective advice on issues that affect peoples lives. Acts of terrorism are as old as recorded history and perhaps reached a climax during World War I with the research and preparation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continuing through WWII and beyond. Every major country in the world promoted programs for the development of WMD and maintained research and production of agents until the final acceptance and ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The United States in delayed compliance destroyed large stock piles of chemical and biological agents. In 1970, the United States confined
biological agents and toxins research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety. In 1972 the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union sponsored “The Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention.” This was formally adopted in 1975 by 148 countries. In 1996 testimony was given to the US Senate Armed Services Committee . . . “that these chemical and biological weapons are more accessible now than at any other time in history”. So in 20 years we have come full circle and live in an age of terrorism. This prompted the formation of a Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology. The committee consists of 16 illustrious members from various academic and research institutions. The charge to the committee was to consider ways to minimize threats from biological warfare and bioterrorism without hindering biotechnology and biotechnologic research, which are essential to the health of the nation. To meet this charge the committee held 3 meetings with an objective developed for each 2-day meeting. Several individuals whose expertise was paramount to each meeting were invited to give an original assigned presention for discussion and consultation. Following this, 3 additional meetings were held to review the content, structure, and the substance of writing assignments. From these assignments a detailed report—subsequently this book— emerged (see appendix C). This book consists of an excellent summary followed by 4 chapters: Introduction; The Evolving Regulatory Environment for Life Science in Research in the 21st Century; Information, Restriction, and Control Regimes; and Conclusions and Recommendations. Considerable thought and very circumspect attention was obviously given to every topic in each chapter. To illustrate, Chapter 1 discusses the “dual use” dilemma: that is the development of technologies intended for civilian application that can also be used for military purposes. Chapter 2 presents the “US Regulatory Environment” that spells out the laboratory requirements of any investigator or laboratory that receives National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding (of which NIH grantees are well aware). There are additional existing and evolving regulatory requirements for life sciences. Among such regulations are those promulgated by the Air Transport Association, the Universal Postal Union, and other shippers and carriers when hazardous goods are involved. Included in this portion are two tables that bear directly on the handling and management for infectious agents in so far as biosafety levels are concerned and a listing of organisms and toxins covered by regulations. Openess in science is highly valued as free communication among all scientists is essential if science is to go forward. Several major journals have a policy that covers publication of sensitive material and security. A summary on types of information controls as adopted by the Association of American Universities is reproduced. The control of secret information is also dealt with and sup-
Book Review / Diagnostic Microbiology and Infectious Disease 50 (2004) 77–79
ported with definitions, classified and unclassified approaches, etc. I found only one slight error in the reference to the 1994 publications of the Centers for Disease Control/NIH “Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories”. These guidelines were last published in 1999. Other than this I found this book to contain virtually all the information
79
required to conduct biotechnology research in the USA. This is a valuable, inexpensive, and very necessary book for anyone whose work or interests are currently in biomedical research. Albert Balows Book Editor doi:10.1016/j.diagmicrobio.2004.04.019