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Black Mafia: Ethnic succession in organized crime
272
BOOK
Black Mafia: Simon
Ethnic
and Schuster,
Succession Publisher
REVIEWS
in Organized (630 Fifth
Crime
by Francis
Avenue,
New York,
account
and analysis
A.J.
Ianni.
New York
10020),
1974, 381 pp., hardcover-$8.95. Francis
A. J.
Ianni
has written
a fascinating
organized crime. The book weaves in and out of descriptions the actors in the various illegal enterprises, and historical
of ghetto-based
of street action, and comparative
narration analyses
by of
organized crime as practiced by Italians, blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans in the New York City metropolitan area. The first and most complex network of organizedcrime activities is situated in central Harlem. Ianni shows the loosely symbiotic relationships that link pimps and prostitutes with drug dealers and pushers with hijackers and fences and retail outlets. The second “snapshot” is of organized crime in Paterson, New Jersey, focusing primarily on drugs and the relationship between the Italian and black dealers. Other descriptions include a Bedford-Stuyvesant juvenile gang; the links between groups, or “courts,” in prison; a brief look at Puerto Rican and Cuban drug rings; and three different gypsy cab organizations, included for contrast. The cab operations appear to be comparable to organized crime enterprises in almost every way but one:although formally illegal, they are not criminal, and strict law enforcement is impossible because they provide a service not provided by the legitimate taxicab industry. Ianni defines organized crime as “an integral part of the American social system that demands goods and services that are defined as illegal, an organization of individuals who produce or supply those goods and services, and corrupt public officials who protect such individuals for their own profit or gain” (p. 14). \Tiolence, or the threat of violence, is often included in the definition of organizedcrime (e.g., Cressey, 1969). Ianni has not done so, and I agree with this omission. Violence in organized crime should not be condoned, but it should not be seen as a necessary ingredient of organized crime. Rather, it can be viewed as a substitute for political and financial power, to be used by those who lackaccess to the subtler means of coercion. And as the criminal enterprise evolves and matures, we see the more sophisticated means of persuasion used by its members. “The penetration of legitimate of this maturation process. business by organized crime” is the normal manifestation Although we look upon such penetration asanathema, consider the alternative: reinvesting in and expanding the criminal enterprises. Perhaps by attempting to prevent the organized crime groups from legitimatizing themselves we may beassuring that their activities remain violent. Besides, this process is as American as apple pie: in the term “robber barons” the adjective is not mere hyperbole. Ianni’s definition gets down to the bare essentials:a society that producesa demand for a good or service (and a law to proscribe it); an organimtion that supplies it; and a means of insuring that the marketing arrangement is not interrupted by the law (i.e., corruption). But at least one of his conclusions is not in consonance with hisdefinition-his hypothesis that “organized crime as we know it in the United States requires an underclassof minority class (emphasis added). (I assume that by “minority class ethnics in order to be operative” ethnics” Ianni means a group identifiable by a common heritage which has little or no political power-for, after all, in certain parts of the country WASPS are a “minority.“) However, he seems to have forgotten that he started with minority class ethnics, both in studying the Lupollos from their immigrant beginnings to the present (Ianni, I972), and in his current study of the blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. There are other groups who engage in organized crime without this ethnicity. For example, the bookies who take the
BOOK
thousand-dollar bets on a football import and distribute marijuana; cigarettes
KE\.ltWS
27s
game, not the dollar bets on a number; or the groups that or the groups that hijack truckloads of televisions or
or razor blades and have retail and discount
outlets
to market
racketeers who arrange “sweetheart contracts” to the detriment of their imagine that we will soon see a black market createdin tirecrackers, now Product Safety Commission has banned their sale to the public. And I alligator poachers in the South rely on some form of official corruption
them; or the labor union members. I that the Consumer have no doubt that to stay in business.
In these cases ethnicity is unimportant. his experience in studying “minority
Ianni appears to be generalizing too much basedon class ethnics” in organized crime. organized crime, criminal What Ianni has described in Black Mafza is “leftover” enterprises based on the leavings of those groups which antedated the entry of blacks and Latin Americans into organized crime. Doubtless these ethnic groups will matureandenter the same activities presently performed by their predecessors, until they reach the pinnacle of success: they no longer have to violate the laws because they write the laws. Ianni feels that black militancy could combine with black organized crime networks to develop a true black Mafia, one that furnishes “a parallel machine of law and organized power.” He concludes that “The new black mafioso will, in fact, bean urban social bandit” (p. 329). Yet this picture is undermined by his very next sentence, in which he mentions the blacks’ “better access to political power and the ability to corrupt it.” There is no parallel between the Mafia in Sicily and black organized crime in the United States in this respect: accommodation through the accession to legitimate political power is occurring here, which was not the case when the Mafia was growing in Sicily. Furthermore, it is hard to picture the successful drug dealers, pimps, and fences portrayed in Ianni’s book storming the barricades, especially since the barricades seem to be lalling of their own weight. It appears to be more common for groups to start out with political ideals in mind and end up interested only in personal gain (Albini, 1971). I believe that Ianni’s conclusion rests on his assumption that not even organized crime can be used by blacks as a means of escaping the slums, as a vehicle of social mobility. This assumption is not supported (or contradicted) by his research; perhaps it is based on his impression of current trends in American society. 1 don’t happen to have the same impression, especially when more and more political power is being wielded by blacks. Nor do I feel that blacks will develop “a parallel machine of law and organized power”; rather than that occurring, we read of calls for more police victims of “unorganized crime.” The book contains a thorough in research
the methodology
in the ghetto description
circumscribes
to protect
the blacks
of the research the problems
methods
who are the primary employed.
Too often
to be studied and therefore
limits
the data to be obtained. In this case, Ianni allowed the nature of the research problem to dictate the methods. He found and recruited as field assistants ex-offender parolees who were no longer involved in crime, but who still had access to those who were. He trained them in the skills of observation and interview techniques, developed a system to protect the identities of individuals about whom information was gathered, and checked the inlormation insofar as possible for accuracy and validity. Ianni used an anthropological technique known as network charting to analyze and model criminal interactions. These were valuable aids to understanding the loose, illdefined relationships among the actors in the various criminal enterprises. But the network charts were of less utility in analyzing the more formal business relationshipsamong gypsy cab companies, their customers, and their insurance companies. A method of depicting these devious business relationships would be a valuable contribution to the study and
274
BOOK REVIEWS
reduction of organized crime. After reading a book like The Fall and Rise of Jimmy Hoffa (1972), one gets the feeling that you can’t tell the players even with a scorecard:corporations and insurance companies are created with blinding speed; the true owners of these organizations are hidden; all money flows in cash; and other similar strategems are used to confuse the issue of who is doing what to whom. A new method of charting these activities would aid tremendously in their understanding. There is much food for thought in this book, especially in the organizational area. We can contrast the hierarchical structure of the Lupollos with the loose liaisons in the black organizations. To what extent do these differences reflect their respective culture backgrounds; to what extent are they ordained by the particular good or service being offered; to what extent do they reflect the particular law enforcement strategy used to counter the activity? Black Mafia has already found a wide audience in the general public. With a few caveats about its conclusions it can also find a place in the classroom, as supplementary reading on current trends in the organization and operation of organized criminal enterprises. Michael Maltz Associate Professor College of Liberal Arts and Sciences Department of Criminal Justice Box 4348 University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Chicago, Illinois 60680
REFERENCES Albm, J.L. (1971). The Amermzn York, New York, 10017.
Mafia:
Genesis
of a Legend.
Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Grssey, D.F. (1969). Theft oj the Natzon: The Structure and Operatms Row, 10 E. 53rd Street, New York, New York, 10022.
ojOrganued
750 Third Avenue, New
Crme
zn America.
Harper
md
Iamu, F.A.J. (1972). AFamrlyBusiness:KlnshrpandSocIalControIln 230 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10017. Sheridan,, W. (1972). The Fall and Rue New York, 10003.
ojjzmmy
Hojja
Organmad
Saturday
Crzme.
Russell Sage-Basic Books,
Review Press, 201 Park Avenue S., New York,
BOOK
Black Mafia: Simon
Ethnic
and Schuster,
Succession Publisher
REVIEWS
in Organized (630 Fifth
Crime
by Francis
Avenue,
New York,
account
and analysis
A.J.
Ianni.
New York
10020),
1974, 381 pp., hardcover-$8.95. Francis
A. J.
Ianni
has written
a fascinating
organized crime. The book weaves in and out of descriptions the actors in the various illegal enterprises, and historical
of ghetto-based
of street action, and comparative
narration analyses
by of
organized crime as practiced by Italians, blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans in the New York City metropolitan area. The first and most complex network of organizedcrime activities is situated in central Harlem. Ianni shows the loosely symbiotic relationships that link pimps and prostitutes with drug dealers and pushers with hijackers and fences and retail outlets. The second “snapshot” is of organized crime in Paterson, New Jersey, focusing primarily on drugs and the relationship between the Italian and black dealers. Other descriptions include a Bedford-Stuyvesant juvenile gang; the links between groups, or “courts,” in prison; a brief look at Puerto Rican and Cuban drug rings; and three different gypsy cab organizations, included for contrast. The cab operations appear to be comparable to organized crime enterprises in almost every way but one:although formally illegal, they are not criminal, and strict law enforcement is impossible because they provide a service not provided by the legitimate taxicab industry. Ianni defines organized crime as “an integral part of the American social system that demands goods and services that are defined as illegal, an organization of individuals who produce or supply those goods and services, and corrupt public officials who protect such individuals for their own profit or gain” (p. 14). \Tiolence, or the threat of violence, is often included in the definition of organizedcrime (e.g., Cressey, 1969). Ianni has not done so, and I agree with this omission. Violence in organized crime should not be condoned, but it should not be seen as a necessary ingredient of organized crime. Rather, it can be viewed as a substitute for political and financial power, to be used by those who lackaccess to the subtler means of coercion. And as the criminal enterprise evolves and matures, we see the more sophisticated means of persuasion used by its members. “The penetration of legitimate of this maturation process. business by organized crime” is the normal manifestation Although we look upon such penetration asanathema, consider the alternative: reinvesting in and expanding the criminal enterprises. Perhaps by attempting to prevent the organized crime groups from legitimatizing themselves we may beassuring that their activities remain violent. Besides, this process is as American as apple pie: in the term “robber barons” the adjective is not mere hyperbole. Ianni’s definition gets down to the bare essentials:a society that producesa demand for a good or service (and a law to proscribe it); an organimtion that supplies it; and a means of insuring that the marketing arrangement is not interrupted by the law (i.e., corruption). But at least one of his conclusions is not in consonance with hisdefinition-his hypothesis that “organized crime as we know it in the United States requires an underclassof minority class (emphasis added). (I assume that by “minority class ethnics in order to be operative” ethnics” Ianni means a group identifiable by a common heritage which has little or no political power-for, after all, in certain parts of the country WASPS are a “minority.“) However, he seems to have forgotten that he started with minority class ethnics, both in studying the Lupollos from their immigrant beginnings to the present (Ianni, I972), and in his current study of the blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. There are other groups who engage in organized crime without this ethnicity. For example, the bookies who take the
BOOK
thousand-dollar bets on a football import and distribute marijuana; cigarettes
KE\.ltWS
27s
game, not the dollar bets on a number; or the groups that or the groups that hijack truckloads of televisions or
or razor blades and have retail and discount
outlets
to market
racketeers who arrange “sweetheart contracts” to the detriment of their imagine that we will soon see a black market createdin tirecrackers, now Product Safety Commission has banned their sale to the public. And I alligator poachers in the South rely on some form of official corruption
them; or the labor union members. I that the Consumer have no doubt that to stay in business.
In these cases ethnicity is unimportant. his experience in studying “minority
Ianni appears to be generalizing too much basedon class ethnics” in organized crime. organized crime, criminal What Ianni has described in Black Mafza is “leftover” enterprises based on the leavings of those groups which antedated the entry of blacks and Latin Americans into organized crime. Doubtless these ethnic groups will matureandenter the same activities presently performed by their predecessors, until they reach the pinnacle of success: they no longer have to violate the laws because they write the laws. Ianni feels that black militancy could combine with black organized crime networks to develop a true black Mafia, one that furnishes “a parallel machine of law and organized power.” He concludes that “The new black mafioso will, in fact, bean urban social bandit” (p. 329). Yet this picture is undermined by his very next sentence, in which he mentions the blacks’ “better access to political power and the ability to corrupt it.” There is no parallel between the Mafia in Sicily and black organized crime in the United States in this respect: accommodation through the accession to legitimate political power is occurring here, which was not the case when the Mafia was growing in Sicily. Furthermore, it is hard to picture the successful drug dealers, pimps, and fences portrayed in Ianni’s book storming the barricades, especially since the barricades seem to be lalling of their own weight. It appears to be more common for groups to start out with political ideals in mind and end up interested only in personal gain (Albini, 1971). I believe that Ianni’s conclusion rests on his assumption that not even organized crime can be used by blacks as a means of escaping the slums, as a vehicle of social mobility. This assumption is not supported (or contradicted) by his research; perhaps it is based on his impression of current trends in American society. 1 don’t happen to have the same impression, especially when more and more political power is being wielded by blacks. Nor do I feel that blacks will develop “a parallel machine of law and organized power”; rather than that occurring, we read of calls for more police victims of “unorganized crime.” The book contains a thorough in research
the methodology
in the ghetto description
circumscribes
to protect
the blacks
of the research the problems
methods
who are the primary employed.
Too often
to be studied and therefore
limits
the data to be obtained. In this case, Ianni allowed the nature of the research problem to dictate the methods. He found and recruited as field assistants ex-offender parolees who were no longer involved in crime, but who still had access to those who were. He trained them in the skills of observation and interview techniques, developed a system to protect the identities of individuals about whom information was gathered, and checked the inlormation insofar as possible for accuracy and validity. Ianni used an anthropological technique known as network charting to analyze and model criminal interactions. These were valuable aids to understanding the loose, illdefined relationships among the actors in the various criminal enterprises. But the network charts were of less utility in analyzing the more formal business relationshipsamong gypsy cab companies, their customers, and their insurance companies. A method of depicting these devious business relationships would be a valuable contribution to the study and
274
BOOK REVIEWS
reduction of organized crime. After reading a book like The Fall and Rise of Jimmy Hoffa (1972), one gets the feeling that you can’t tell the players even with a scorecard:corporations and insurance companies are created with blinding speed; the true owners of these organizations are hidden; all money flows in cash; and other similar strategems are used to confuse the issue of who is doing what to whom. A new method of charting these activities would aid tremendously in their understanding. There is much food for thought in this book, especially in the organizational area. We can contrast the hierarchical structure of the Lupollos with the loose liaisons in the black organizations. To what extent do these differences reflect their respective culture backgrounds; to what extent are they ordained by the particular good or service being offered; to what extent do they reflect the particular law enforcement strategy used to counter the activity? Black Mafia has already found a wide audience in the general public. With a few caveats about its conclusions it can also find a place in the classroom, as supplementary reading on current trends in the organization and operation of organized criminal enterprises. Michael Maltz Associate Professor College of Liberal Arts and Sciences Department of Criminal Justice Box 4348 University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Chicago, Illinois 60680
REFERENCES Albm, J.L. (1971). The Amermzn York, New York, 10017.
Mafia:
Genesis
of a Legend.
Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Grssey, D.F. (1969). Theft oj the Natzon: The Structure and Operatms Row, 10 E. 53rd Street, New York, New York, 10022.
ojOrganued
750 Third Avenue, New
Crme
zn America.
Harper
md
Iamu, F.A.J. (1972). AFamrlyBusiness:KlnshrpandSocIalControIln 230 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10017. Sheridan,, W. (1972). The Fall and Rue New York, 10003.
ojjzmmy
Hojja
Organmad
Saturday
Crzme.
Russell Sage-Basic Books,
Review Press, 201 Park Avenue S., New York,