- Email: [email protected]
Cairo and climate change: a win–win opportunity
Global Environmental Change 10 (2000) 93}96
Viewpoint Cairo and climate change: a win}win opportunity Brian C. O'Neill* Watson Institute for International Studies & Center for Environmental Studies, Brown University, Box 1943, Providence, RI 02912, USA Received 2 February 2000
Abstract The landmark Program of Action agreed to at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo calls for a wide range of population-related policies motivated primarily by the improvement of individual well being. Currently, a funding shortfall threatens continued progress toward the Cairo goals. This shortfall risks missing an opportunity not only to improve the lives of individuals around the world, but also to reduce the environmental consequences of population growth. Recent estimates of environmental externalities to childbearing associated with global climate change indicate that climate-related returns to investments in such policies could be of the same order of magnitude as the investments themselves. Thus, continued support of the Cairo program is clearly a `win}wina strategy. 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Population; Climate change; Policy
At the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, 179 countries agreed to a Program of Action that marked a fundamental shift in the motivation for population-related policies. Demographic targets were rejected in favor of a new focus on individual well being. The Cairo program set a number of goals for 2015 that re#ected this perspective, among them universal access to comprehensive reproductive health services, including family planning; reductions in infant, child, and maternal mortality; and universal access to primary education, with an emphasis on closing the `gender gapa between girls and boys. In 1999 a series of UN-sponsored meetings assessed progress, identi"ed priorities for the future, and called on governments and other partners to recommit themselves to achieving the goals laid out "ve years before at Cairo. This `ICPD#5a process culminated in a Special Session of the UN General Assembly, where a document was adopted that laid out a wide range of key actions for further implementation of the Cairo Program and highlighted the substantial progress that has already been made (UN, 1999a). For example, many countries are now developing policies and beginning to implement pro-
* Tel.: #1-401-863-9916; fax: #1-401-863-2700. E-mail address: [email protected] (B.C. O'Neill).
grams within the broad-based de"nition of reproductive health, mortality levels have fallen in most regions, and increased partnerships with civil society organizations bode well for future implementation. On the other hand, the document also noted that in a number of countries progress has been limited or conditions have deteriorated. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has reduced life expectancy in some countries, improvements in education have been slow, and millions of couples still have an unmet need for contraception. The most serious threat to reinvigorating progress toward the Cairo goals is a funding shortfall. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimated that achieving goals related to basic reproductive health (including family planning) would require total annual costs reaching $17 billion in 2000 and $22 billion by 2015 (UNFPA, 1994). The Cairo program called on developing countries to provide two-thirds of this total, with one-third to come from donor countries. Yet while developing countries have reached about 70% of their goal, donors have met only about a third of their commitment. As a result, resource #ows for these population activities currently total less than $10 billion annually (UN, 1999b). The ICPD#5 meetings consistently emphasized that the disturbing failure to meet funding obligations risks missing an opportunity to achieve real improvements in
0959-3780/00/$ - see front matter 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 5 9 - 3 7 8 0 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 1 3 - 3
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B.C. O'Neill / Global Environmental Change 10 (2000) 93}96
the well being of individuals around the world. Much less attention has been given to the fact that this missed opportunity would extend to the consequences of population growth as well. Although the kinds of policies called for by the Program of Action are not primarily motivated by their potential e!ect on demographic trends, many of them would likely lead to lower fertility and slower population growth and, in turn, reduced human impact on the environment. Investments in these policies therefore make sense not only because they would directly improve human welfare, but also because they would indirectly bene"t the environment. For example, investments in female education and voluntary family planning programs are almost universally considered desirable in their own right. Female education has a wide range of social, economic, and health bene"ts, and voluntary family planning programs provide couples with the means to have the number of children they desire. These policies also tend to lower fertility * family planning programs by narrowing the gap between actual and desired fertility, and education through a variety of means, including raising the age of marriage, making women's time more valuable outside the home, and setting in motion a series of changes in the social perception of women's role in society (Jejeebhoy, 1995). Thus if slowing population growth has any environmental bene"t at all, such policies can be considered `win}wina strategies. The crucial question, however, is whether the environmental `wina is by a large enough margin to substantially strengthen the already strong individual rights-based case for supporting such policies. Results from a number of studies over the past several years shed light on this issue by providing estimates of environmental externalities to childbearing, using the case of global climate change as an illustrative example. Childbearing externalities are costs or bene"ts to society at large (or to future generations) resulting from an additional birth that are not taken into account by parents (Lee, 1991; Lee and Miller, 1991; Willis, 1987). While results vary over a wide range, on balance they indicate that fertility-related population policies may generate external bene"ts associated with the climate change issue alone that rival the cost of the policies themselves. Externality calculations have focused on the link between population growth and emissions of greenhouse gases. The threat of human-induced climate change This should not be taken to mean that the relationship between population and emissions is the only important link between demography and climate change. For example, changes in population size, growth rate, and age structure will likely in#uence the ability of societies to adapt to the expected impacts of climate change. There are other policy-relevant links as well. For example, well-formulated migration policies could ameliorate migration responses to environmental stress, while improvements in health care systems would increase the resilience of populations to the projected health impacts of climate change (O'Neill et al., 2000).
stems from the accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere as a result of human activity (primarily the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas, although the conversion of forests to agricultural land makes a signi"cant contribution as well). Continued greenhouse gas emissions are expected to lead to a generalized warming of the Earth's surface, rising sea levels, and changes in precipitation patterns (Houghton et al., 1996). While consequences remain uncertain, the potential impacts of these changes are many and varied * more frequent and intense heat waves, changes in the frequency of droughts and #oods, increased coastal #ooding, and more damaging storm surges * with attendant consequences for human health, agriculture, economic activity, biodiversity, and ecosystem functioning (Watson et al., 1996). The life activities of each person, and that person's stream of future descendents, give rise to greenhouse gas emissions through direct or indirect use of energy and land. Therefore, each birth that is averted as a result of population-related policies will reduce the cost of climate change to society in potentially two ways. First, total greenhouse gas emissions may fall, reducing the magnitude of future climate change relative to what it otherwise would be, and reducing climate change damage costs in#icted on society. Second, if a particular country is held to a cap on total emissions, as is currently envisioned for industrialized countries by the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN, 1997), then a smaller population would allow for greater per capita emissions and reduced mitigation costs. Either way, total costs to society are reduced. As shown in Table 1, several estimates of the climaterelated costs of childbearing have been made, and generally range from several hundred to several thousand dollars per birth. These "gures represent the discounted sum of future climate-related costs resulting from an additional birth, and their values depend on a wide range of factors. For example, a birth in a developing country where per capita greenhouse gas emissions rates are relatively low has, on average, a smaller impact than a birth in an industrialized country. The impact of a developing country birth is not negligible, however, since per capita emissions are expected to grow in the future. In addition, assumptions about the discount rate, the institutional arrangements under which emission reductions are made, the stringency of assumed future emission reductions, the marginal cost of reductions, and several other factors all can substantially a!ect the results. Nonetheless, the conclusion that the costs are substantial appears to be relatively robust. The costs are surprisingly high partly because stabilizing the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases * the ultimate goal of the FCCC * will eventually require steep emissions reductions (Schimel et al., 1996) with high marginal costs (Hourcade, 1996). A smaller population size inevitably
B.C. O'Neill / Global Environmental Change 10 (2000) 93}96
95
Table 1 Estimates of the climate-related costs to childbearing Reference
Region of analysis
Cost per birth (1990 US$)
Birdsall (1994) Cline (1992) Nordhaus and Boyer (1998)
Africa/India World U.S. Middle income countries India MDCs LDCs
400}1200 700}3500 1400}13,200 600}2800 200}400 1200}6800 500}5100
O'Neill and Wexler (2000)
All costs are the present values of the future streams of climate-related costs, aggregated over the region of analysis. Undiscounted costs calculated based on author's assumptions of 20}60 tC emitted over a lifetime and constant marginal emissions reduction costs of $20/tC. Does not take into account emissions associated with descendents. Based on constant marginal reduction cost of $175/tC. Discounted at 2}7%. Based on Regional Integrated Climate-Economy model for 13 world regions; representative results shown here. Ranges re#ect sensitivity to emissions scenario: emissions follow optimal path, are limited to current rates, or are constrained to prevent concentrations from doubling relative to pre-industrial levels. Assumes atmospheric CO concentrations are eventually stabilized. Ranges re#ect sensitivity to assumptions regarding stabilization level, timing of emissions reductions, future population growth, marginal emissions reduction costs, and whether or not emissions trading is allowed.
reduces the need for the most expensive reductions at the margin. In comparison, estimates of the costs of programs called for by the Program of Action, when converted into costs per birth averted, are generally in the range of several hundred dollars or less. For example, one estimate (Summers, 1994) puts the cost of education programs in developing countries at less than $200 per birth averted. Similarly, estimates of the costs of voluntary family planning programs range from about $30 to $330 per birth averted (Pritchett, 1994). There is considerable uncertainty in these "gures due to regional variation, uncertainty in the relationship between programs and fertility, and uncertainty in program cost estimates. Still, it appears that per birth costs of these programs are, at most, of the same order of magnitude as, and possibly even less than, their potential climate-related returns. Expressing program costs in per birth terms does not imply that fertility reduction is, or should be, their main objective. Rather, this approach provides a means to compare costs with the potential bene"ts of their environmental consequences. Similarly, the fact that policies that tend to lower fertility also substantially reduce climate change costs does not mean that slowing population growth is the most e!ective or most equitable means of mitigating climate change. While analyses have shown that slower population growth can substantially reduce emissions in the long run, they have also concluded that it is no panacea (O'Neill et al., 2000). Reductions in per capita emissions must be the principle route to emission
This comparison is conservative since the population policy-related costs are "nancial costs, while the climate-related costs are true costs to the economy (i.e. deadweight loss).
reductions over the next several decades, and must play a central role in long-term emission reductions as well. Nonetheless, slower population growth would make the climate problem easier to solve, and capturing these long-term bene"ts requires investments in population policies in the immediate future. Moreover, even though the Program of Action focuses primarily on developing countries, the argument presented here also applies to industrialized countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Japan where a surprisingly large fraction of births are unplanned (AGI, 1999; Henshaw, 1998). While the scope for policy-driven changes in population growth is much greater in absolute terms in developing countries, reducing unwanted fertility in MDCs would have a larger impact per birth on climate change than fertility reductions in LDCs (see Table 1). In summary, the potential environmental return to investments in the Cairo Program of Action suggests that the current funding shortfall for its implementation is ill advised on more than one count. At a time when many desirable goals compete for scarce development resources, the best choices are those with the potential for multiple bene"ts. Population-related policies are already well justi"ed in terms of human needs. Their environmental bene"ts are another good reason for not missing the opportunity created by the Cairo conference.
References Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI), 1999. Sharing Responsibility: Women, Society and Abortion. New York. Birdsall, N., 1994. Another look at population and global warming. In: Population, Environment, and Development. United Nations, New York.
96
B.C. O'Neill / Global Environmental Change 10 (2000) 93}96
Cline, W.R., 1992. The Economics of Global Warming. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC. Henshaw, S.K., 1998. Unintended pregnancy in the United States. Family Planning Perspectives 30, 24}49. Houghton, J.T. et al. (Eds.), 1996. Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hourcade, J.C., 1996. Estimating the costs of mitigating greenhouse gases. In: Bruce, J.P., Lee, H., Haites, E.F. (Eds.), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 263}296. Jejeebhoy, S.J., 1995. Women's Education, Autonomy, and Reproductive Behaviour: Experience from Developing Countries. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lee, R.D., 1991. Comment: The second tragedy of the commons. In: Bernstam, M., Davis, K. (Eds.), Resources, Environment, and Population: Present Knowledge, Future Options. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lee, R.D., Miller, T., 1991. Population growth, externalities to childbearing, and fertility policy in developing countries. Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1990, pp. 275}304. Nordhaus, W.N., Boyer, J., 1998. What are the external costs of more rapid population growth? Theoretical issues and empirical estimates. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia. O'Neill, B.C., Wexler, L., 2000. The greenhouse externality to childbearing: a sensitivity analysis. Climatic Change, in press. O'Neill, B.C., MacKellar, F.L., Lutz, W., 1999. Population and Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, in press.
Pritchett, L.H., 1994. Desired fertility and the impact of population policies. Population and Development Review 20, 1}55. Schimel, D. et al., 1996. Radiative forcing of climate change. In: Houghton, J.T., et al. (Eds.), Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 65}132. Summers, L.H., 1994. Investing in all the people: educating women in developing countries. EDI Seminar Paper 45, World Bank, Washington, DC. UNFPA, 1994. Background note on the resource requirements for population programmes in the years 2000}2015. 13 July. United Nations (UN). 1997. Kyoto protocol to the framework convention on climate change. (FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1; http://www. unfccc.de/resource/convkp.html). United Nations (UN). 1999a. Key actions for the further implementation of the programme of action of the international conference on population and development (A/S-21/5/Add.1; http://www.undp. org/popin/unpopcom/32ndsess/gass.htmCas215a1). United Nations (UN). 1999b. Report of the international forum for the operational review and appraisal of the implementation of the programme of action of the international conference on population and development (ICPD) (http://www.unfpa.org/ICPD/round& meetings/hague}forum/reports/forumrept.htm). Watson, R.T. et al. (Eds.), 1996. Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change: Scienti"c-Technical Analyses. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Willis, R.J., 1987. Externalities and population. In: Lee, R.D., Johnson, D.G. (Eds.), Population Growth and Economic Development: Issues and Evidence. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, NI.
Viewpoint Cairo and climate change: a win}win opportunity Brian C. O'Neill* Watson Institute for International Studies & Center for Environmental Studies, Brown University, Box 1943, Providence, RI 02912, USA Received 2 February 2000
Abstract The landmark Program of Action agreed to at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo calls for a wide range of population-related policies motivated primarily by the improvement of individual well being. Currently, a funding shortfall threatens continued progress toward the Cairo goals. This shortfall risks missing an opportunity not only to improve the lives of individuals around the world, but also to reduce the environmental consequences of population growth. Recent estimates of environmental externalities to childbearing associated with global climate change indicate that climate-related returns to investments in such policies could be of the same order of magnitude as the investments themselves. Thus, continued support of the Cairo program is clearly a `win}wina strategy. 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Population; Climate change; Policy
At the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, 179 countries agreed to a Program of Action that marked a fundamental shift in the motivation for population-related policies. Demographic targets were rejected in favor of a new focus on individual well being. The Cairo program set a number of goals for 2015 that re#ected this perspective, among them universal access to comprehensive reproductive health services, including family planning; reductions in infant, child, and maternal mortality; and universal access to primary education, with an emphasis on closing the `gender gapa between girls and boys. In 1999 a series of UN-sponsored meetings assessed progress, identi"ed priorities for the future, and called on governments and other partners to recommit themselves to achieving the goals laid out "ve years before at Cairo. This `ICPD#5a process culminated in a Special Session of the UN General Assembly, where a document was adopted that laid out a wide range of key actions for further implementation of the Cairo Program and highlighted the substantial progress that has already been made (UN, 1999a). For example, many countries are now developing policies and beginning to implement pro-
* Tel.: #1-401-863-9916; fax: #1-401-863-2700. E-mail address: [email protected] (B.C. O'Neill).
grams within the broad-based de"nition of reproductive health, mortality levels have fallen in most regions, and increased partnerships with civil society organizations bode well for future implementation. On the other hand, the document also noted that in a number of countries progress has been limited or conditions have deteriorated. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has reduced life expectancy in some countries, improvements in education have been slow, and millions of couples still have an unmet need for contraception. The most serious threat to reinvigorating progress toward the Cairo goals is a funding shortfall. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimated that achieving goals related to basic reproductive health (including family planning) would require total annual costs reaching $17 billion in 2000 and $22 billion by 2015 (UNFPA, 1994). The Cairo program called on developing countries to provide two-thirds of this total, with one-third to come from donor countries. Yet while developing countries have reached about 70% of their goal, donors have met only about a third of their commitment. As a result, resource #ows for these population activities currently total less than $10 billion annually (UN, 1999b). The ICPD#5 meetings consistently emphasized that the disturbing failure to meet funding obligations risks missing an opportunity to achieve real improvements in
0959-3780/00/$ - see front matter 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 5 9 - 3 7 8 0 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 1 3 - 3
94
B.C. O'Neill / Global Environmental Change 10 (2000) 93}96
the well being of individuals around the world. Much less attention has been given to the fact that this missed opportunity would extend to the consequences of population growth as well. Although the kinds of policies called for by the Program of Action are not primarily motivated by their potential e!ect on demographic trends, many of them would likely lead to lower fertility and slower population growth and, in turn, reduced human impact on the environment. Investments in these policies therefore make sense not only because they would directly improve human welfare, but also because they would indirectly bene"t the environment. For example, investments in female education and voluntary family planning programs are almost universally considered desirable in their own right. Female education has a wide range of social, economic, and health bene"ts, and voluntary family planning programs provide couples with the means to have the number of children they desire. These policies also tend to lower fertility * family planning programs by narrowing the gap between actual and desired fertility, and education through a variety of means, including raising the age of marriage, making women's time more valuable outside the home, and setting in motion a series of changes in the social perception of women's role in society (Jejeebhoy, 1995). Thus if slowing population growth has any environmental bene"t at all, such policies can be considered `win}wina strategies. The crucial question, however, is whether the environmental `wina is by a large enough margin to substantially strengthen the already strong individual rights-based case for supporting such policies. Results from a number of studies over the past several years shed light on this issue by providing estimates of environmental externalities to childbearing, using the case of global climate change as an illustrative example. Childbearing externalities are costs or bene"ts to society at large (or to future generations) resulting from an additional birth that are not taken into account by parents (Lee, 1991; Lee and Miller, 1991; Willis, 1987). While results vary over a wide range, on balance they indicate that fertility-related population policies may generate external bene"ts associated with the climate change issue alone that rival the cost of the policies themselves. Externality calculations have focused on the link between population growth and emissions of greenhouse gases. The threat of human-induced climate change This should not be taken to mean that the relationship between population and emissions is the only important link between demography and climate change. For example, changes in population size, growth rate, and age structure will likely in#uence the ability of societies to adapt to the expected impacts of climate change. There are other policy-relevant links as well. For example, well-formulated migration policies could ameliorate migration responses to environmental stress, while improvements in health care systems would increase the resilience of populations to the projected health impacts of climate change (O'Neill et al., 2000).
stems from the accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere as a result of human activity (primarily the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas, although the conversion of forests to agricultural land makes a signi"cant contribution as well). Continued greenhouse gas emissions are expected to lead to a generalized warming of the Earth's surface, rising sea levels, and changes in precipitation patterns (Houghton et al., 1996). While consequences remain uncertain, the potential impacts of these changes are many and varied * more frequent and intense heat waves, changes in the frequency of droughts and #oods, increased coastal #ooding, and more damaging storm surges * with attendant consequences for human health, agriculture, economic activity, biodiversity, and ecosystem functioning (Watson et al., 1996). The life activities of each person, and that person's stream of future descendents, give rise to greenhouse gas emissions through direct or indirect use of energy and land. Therefore, each birth that is averted as a result of population-related policies will reduce the cost of climate change to society in potentially two ways. First, total greenhouse gas emissions may fall, reducing the magnitude of future climate change relative to what it otherwise would be, and reducing climate change damage costs in#icted on society. Second, if a particular country is held to a cap on total emissions, as is currently envisioned for industrialized countries by the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN, 1997), then a smaller population would allow for greater per capita emissions and reduced mitigation costs. Either way, total costs to society are reduced. As shown in Table 1, several estimates of the climaterelated costs of childbearing have been made, and generally range from several hundred to several thousand dollars per birth. These "gures represent the discounted sum of future climate-related costs resulting from an additional birth, and their values depend on a wide range of factors. For example, a birth in a developing country where per capita greenhouse gas emissions rates are relatively low has, on average, a smaller impact than a birth in an industrialized country. The impact of a developing country birth is not negligible, however, since per capita emissions are expected to grow in the future. In addition, assumptions about the discount rate, the institutional arrangements under which emission reductions are made, the stringency of assumed future emission reductions, the marginal cost of reductions, and several other factors all can substantially a!ect the results. Nonetheless, the conclusion that the costs are substantial appears to be relatively robust. The costs are surprisingly high partly because stabilizing the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases * the ultimate goal of the FCCC * will eventually require steep emissions reductions (Schimel et al., 1996) with high marginal costs (Hourcade, 1996). A smaller population size inevitably
B.C. O'Neill / Global Environmental Change 10 (2000) 93}96
95
Table 1 Estimates of the climate-related costs to childbearing Reference
Region of analysis
Cost per birth (1990 US$)
Birdsall (1994) Cline (1992) Nordhaus and Boyer (1998)
Africa/India World U.S. Middle income countries India MDCs LDCs
400}1200 700}3500 1400}13,200 600}2800 200}400 1200}6800 500}5100
O'Neill and Wexler (2000)
All costs are the present values of the future streams of climate-related costs, aggregated over the region of analysis. Undiscounted costs calculated based on author's assumptions of 20}60 tC emitted over a lifetime and constant marginal emissions reduction costs of $20/tC. Does not take into account emissions associated with descendents. Based on constant marginal reduction cost of $175/tC. Discounted at 2}7%. Based on Regional Integrated Climate-Economy model for 13 world regions; representative results shown here. Ranges re#ect sensitivity to emissions scenario: emissions follow optimal path, are limited to current rates, or are constrained to prevent concentrations from doubling relative to pre-industrial levels. Assumes atmospheric CO concentrations are eventually stabilized. Ranges re#ect sensitivity to assumptions regarding stabilization level, timing of emissions reductions, future population growth, marginal emissions reduction costs, and whether or not emissions trading is allowed.
reduces the need for the most expensive reductions at the margin. In comparison, estimates of the costs of programs called for by the Program of Action, when converted into costs per birth averted, are generally in the range of several hundred dollars or less. For example, one estimate (Summers, 1994) puts the cost of education programs in developing countries at less than $200 per birth averted. Similarly, estimates of the costs of voluntary family planning programs range from about $30 to $330 per birth averted (Pritchett, 1994). There is considerable uncertainty in these "gures due to regional variation, uncertainty in the relationship between programs and fertility, and uncertainty in program cost estimates. Still, it appears that per birth costs of these programs are, at most, of the same order of magnitude as, and possibly even less than, their potential climate-related returns. Expressing program costs in per birth terms does not imply that fertility reduction is, or should be, their main objective. Rather, this approach provides a means to compare costs with the potential bene"ts of their environmental consequences. Similarly, the fact that policies that tend to lower fertility also substantially reduce climate change costs does not mean that slowing population growth is the most e!ective or most equitable means of mitigating climate change. While analyses have shown that slower population growth can substantially reduce emissions in the long run, they have also concluded that it is no panacea (O'Neill et al., 2000). Reductions in per capita emissions must be the principle route to emission
This comparison is conservative since the population policy-related costs are "nancial costs, while the climate-related costs are true costs to the economy (i.e. deadweight loss).
reductions over the next several decades, and must play a central role in long-term emission reductions as well. Nonetheless, slower population growth would make the climate problem easier to solve, and capturing these long-term bene"ts requires investments in population policies in the immediate future. Moreover, even though the Program of Action focuses primarily on developing countries, the argument presented here also applies to industrialized countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Japan where a surprisingly large fraction of births are unplanned (AGI, 1999; Henshaw, 1998). While the scope for policy-driven changes in population growth is much greater in absolute terms in developing countries, reducing unwanted fertility in MDCs would have a larger impact per birth on climate change than fertility reductions in LDCs (see Table 1). In summary, the potential environmental return to investments in the Cairo Program of Action suggests that the current funding shortfall for its implementation is ill advised on more than one count. At a time when many desirable goals compete for scarce development resources, the best choices are those with the potential for multiple bene"ts. Population-related policies are already well justi"ed in terms of human needs. Their environmental bene"ts are another good reason for not missing the opportunity created by the Cairo conference.
References Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI), 1999. Sharing Responsibility: Women, Society and Abortion. New York. Birdsall, N., 1994. Another look at population and global warming. In: Population, Environment, and Development. United Nations, New York.
96
B.C. O'Neill / Global Environmental Change 10 (2000) 93}96
Cline, W.R., 1992. The Economics of Global Warming. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC. Henshaw, S.K., 1998. Unintended pregnancy in the United States. Family Planning Perspectives 30, 24}49. Houghton, J.T. et al. (Eds.), 1996. Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hourcade, J.C., 1996. Estimating the costs of mitigating greenhouse gases. In: Bruce, J.P., Lee, H., Haites, E.F. (Eds.), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 263}296. Jejeebhoy, S.J., 1995. Women's Education, Autonomy, and Reproductive Behaviour: Experience from Developing Countries. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lee, R.D., 1991. Comment: The second tragedy of the commons. In: Bernstam, M., Davis, K. (Eds.), Resources, Environment, and Population: Present Knowledge, Future Options. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Lee, R.D., Miller, T., 1991. Population growth, externalities to childbearing, and fertility policy in developing countries. Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1990, pp. 275}304. Nordhaus, W.N., Boyer, J., 1998. What are the external costs of more rapid population growth? Theoretical issues and empirical estimates. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia. O'Neill, B.C., Wexler, L., 2000. The greenhouse externality to childbearing: a sensitivity analysis. Climatic Change, in press. O'Neill, B.C., MacKellar, F.L., Lutz, W., 1999. Population and Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, in press.
Pritchett, L.H., 1994. Desired fertility and the impact of population policies. Population and Development Review 20, 1}55. Schimel, D. et al., 1996. Radiative forcing of climate change. In: Houghton, J.T., et al. (Eds.), Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 65}132. Summers, L.H., 1994. Investing in all the people: educating women in developing countries. EDI Seminar Paper 45, World Bank, Washington, DC. UNFPA, 1994. Background note on the resource requirements for population programmes in the years 2000}2015. 13 July. United Nations (UN). 1997. Kyoto protocol to the framework convention on climate change. (FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1; http://www. unfccc.de/resource/convkp.html). United Nations (UN). 1999a. Key actions for the further implementation of the programme of action of the international conference on population and development (A/S-21/5/Add.1; http://www.undp. org/popin/unpopcom/32ndsess/gass.htmCas215a1). United Nations (UN). 1999b. Report of the international forum for the operational review and appraisal of the implementation of the programme of action of the international conference on population and development (ICPD) (http://www.unfpa.org/ICPD/round& meetings/hague}forum/reports/forumrept.htm). Watson, R.T. et al. (Eds.), 1996. Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change: Scienti"c-Technical Analyses. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Willis, R.J., 1987. Externalities and population. In: Lee, R.D., Johnson, D.G. (Eds.), Population Growth and Economic Development: Issues and Evidence. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, NI.