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Can Germany afford reunification and a space program too?
0160-791x/91 $3.00+ .oo Copyright 0 1990 Pergamon Press plc
Technology in Society, Vol. 12, pp. 355-367,199o Printed in the USA. All rights reserved.
Can Germany Afford Reunification and a Space Program Too? Joan Johnson-Freese
ABSTRACT. As a highly industrialized Western society, West Germanyhas long had an active space program. Their economic and leadership role within the European Space Agency has been second only to France. In 1989, through the creation of a national space agency and a restructuring of German aerospace industry, West Germany gave strong indications that it intended to expand its voice and interests within European and international space aflairs. These intentions may, however, be strongly influenced by the surprising turn of political events that began at the end of 1989 with the demise of the Berlin Wall and will culminate with the total reunification of East and West Germany. The high economic price for reunification that West Germany will have to pay may make implementation of expanded space activity plans impossible, at least in the short term. The attitude a reunified Germany takes toward space, short-term and long-term, will clearly also have ramifications for European space efforts as a whole.
Infroduction 1989 was a year of change for the West German space program. Both the government policy-making structure and the private aerospace industries commenced major restructuring efforts intended to strengthen the West German role in European space affairs and to make West German industry more internationally competitive. There was an air of excitement and rejuvenation among many West Germans concerning space. On 13 February 1990, the four major World War II allies agreed on a framework for negotiating the reunification of Germany after a 45-year Dr.Joan Johnson-Freese is the Director of the Center for Space Policy and Law, and and Associate Professor of Political Science, at the University of Central Florida. She teaches undergraduate and graduate courses on science policy and space policy. Her primary area of research is international cooperation and competition in space, and she has published in such journals as Space Policy and Spaceflight. Her first book, Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space will be available from Kreiger Publishing in August. Much of the information on the German space program used in this article was gathered during a research trip to Germany during the summer of 1989. 355
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division. The swift pace of agreement on the framework indicates that reunification could be a much nearer-term goal than anyone anticipated. Reunification will have profound effects on the heretofore separate West and East German governments, Europe, and international politics generally. Already, Bonn is picking up a considerable tab for the economic costs associated with reunification. The question then arises, will other West German national programs be sacrificed to pay for reunification, and if so, will “space” be considered one of the expendable programs?
The German Space Program A Traditionally Passive German Role in Space As the first country to develop ballistic missiles (V-2) and use them in warfare, Germany has a long history of involvement with space. Because of this history, however, the Germans also have had both externally imposed restrictions and internally imposed inhibitions regarding their post World War II role in space activities. Internally, the V-2 program created a pronounced psychological hesitation among the German people to get involved in areas of space activities beyond the realm of “pure” science. Externally, as a result of their use of the V-2 rockets, missile production was prohibited in Germany by the allies after the war. That prohibition resulted in a German concentration on space sciences and national neglect of any dual-use technologies; those having military or civilian applications. The German space program formally began in 1964 with their charter membership in the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organization (ESRO). It was only through ELDO and ESRO that Germany became involved with dual-use technologies, including not only launchers but remote sensing and communications satellites. Even after the merger of ELDO and ESRO in 1975 to form the European Space Agency (ESA), Germany left space transportation efforts to the French, thus limiting German involvement to cooperative efforts. The goals of their national space program were to encourage European unity, better foreign relations, promote industrial advancement, and position themselves for potential commercial payoffs from space through sciencebased projects. It is important to remember why European counties made the decision early on to invest their limited funds in a space program. In the 1950s and 1960s space meant technology, technology meant industrialization, and industrialization meant economic growth. Fear of being left behind in technological development is evidenced in 1960s “technology gap” literature by such European analysts as Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and, later in the 197Os, by Roger Williams .I The failure of ELDO to catapult Europe into the
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space arena through the development of an European launch vehicle provided the impetus for the creation of ESA. Even before ESA’s official creation the Germans had become advocates of manned spaceflight efforts through the Spacelab program. Both Spacelab and later the Columbus program as the intended European contribution to the US Space Station fit in well with German plans and attitudes since they provide places for carrying out scientific experiments in space that could eventually have economic payoffs. Yet for internal political reasons, German politicians must remain sensitive to the aversion of the German people to any big-ticket programs that could impinge upon the extensive German social welfare program. Almost one-third of the present Bonn budget is devoted to social welfare programs. 2 Hence, although the Germans share with the Americans a pride and popular support for their space program, that pride is tempered with concerns over the inherently high price tag that accompanies manned spaceflight and space ventures generally. Within Germany there have been questions raised, including in the wellknown and well-read publication Der Spiegel3 about the actual extent of spin-offs for private industry generated through space research. It has also been pointed out that “..a sector which, like the space industry, employs only 5,500 persons in the FRG and is almost totally dependent upon state contracts cannot be expected to make much of a dent in the FRG’s greatest economic problem in the 1980s and early 1990s: unemployment.“4 Even industry groups like the Federation of German Industries (BDI) are not totally supportive of space efforts. They fear that the increasing costs of space research could take research funding from other, perhaps more lucrative, fields. These fears are based on figures such as the 1988 German government allotment for space being raised from 11% to 18% of total govemment research expenditures.5 Supporters, however, have not been so narrow in their interpretation of spin-off benefits or potential. They have recognized that regardless of how much popular support is generated through pride in the space program, that support is short-lived without a demonstration of direct benefit. Therefore, they have been quick to point out the more immediate and personal benefits of space research and activity, such as a lowering of the cost of phone calls and improved television transmission and reception capabilities, along with the more long-range goals of space research. It has been cautioned, however, that this positive approach can be taken too far and have detrimental results. Advances within the set (space) goals need empirical proof. The economic utility of space exploration must be made clear and proven to the public. For this purpose only key arguments are valid, ones that can stand up to the most critical examinations. Supporters of space exploration have often made the mistake of using short-term and changeable arguments for its (space) practical applications, which become apparent only in the long run.6
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West German politicians who support space do not want to be seen as promising more than they can deliver. Supporters of German space efforts have also stressed the importance of in power politics and economics. In an October 1987 “knowledge” Parliamentary debate, Free Democratic Party deputy Jurgen Timm responded to critics of the space program with the reminder that “...we are a country poor in raw materials and reliant upon the development of knowledge.“7 This argument basically goes back to traditional German attention to science, where payoffs can be long term, but where the learning curve is such that one cannot afford to fall behind. The point is, however, that in 1988 the space budget for the first time reached an amount that it became politically visible, and hence subject to more intense debate than in the past. Changes in Attitude and Changes in Structures Within Germany a new phenomenon has been experienced and assimilated into the German space program. Even before the demise of the Berlin Wall, there was a noticeable change in attitude among Germans, that a little nationalism is acceptable and even desirable. German pride has been returning, and war guilt subsiding. Although inconsequential in the national elections, the fact that the neo-Nazis in Germany have received as much as 10% of the votes in some regional elections is frightening, particularly to the majority of Germans. Hence nobody wants to appear aggressive or act too quickly. But German achievements and capabilities are no longer downplayed or allowed to be usurped by others. This is a dramatic change. Prestige seems to have crept into the German space program much as it has been evident in other countries. This has the potential to change past patterns of cooperation and interaction (to a still unknown degree) but with not necessarily undesirable results since German capabilities are already well known and accepted and may now be more effectively utilized and promoted. However, Germans are also aware that external critics are particularly apt to attack costly efforts (in any field) which smack of national prestige. Clearly, Germans have many decisions to make for themselves as well as constantly reacting to decisions being made by others. Their role and reasons for being involved in space affairs are in a period of redefinition. Until 1989 West Germany was one of the few countries with an active space program not to have a separate space agency; most policies and programs were developed and administered through the Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT). BMFI’ has traditionally worked with the Deutsche Forschungs und Versuchsanstalt fur Luft und Raumfahrt (German Aerospace Research Establishment, formerly known as DFVLR, the acronym was recently shortened to DLR) in areas of research. DLR focuses on multidisciplinary research of a long-term nature which could lead to industrial utilization, but of too high an economic risk to be dealt with by industry on its own. As such, it acts as an intermediary between the State, industry, and
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science.8 In 1989, however, the Deutsche Agentur fiir Raumfaurtangelegenheiten (DARA) was established, to take over responsibility for implementation of Germany’s space program for BMFT. The second area of restructuring concerns German industry. German mega-industries Daimler-Benz, Messerschmidt Bolkow Blohm (MBB), Dornier, Motoren und TurbinemUnion (MTU), and Telefunken Systemtechnik (TST) have merged into, the new Deutsche Aerospace, with the intent of making Germany more internationally competitive. These two moves were to pave the way for a new German role in European space affairs. On 21 April 1989, DARA was created to better coordinate West German space activities; generate more German space initiatives, especially to ESA; and increase the cost effectiveness and controllability of German space programs. Unlike NASA, DARA is not intended to be an R&D agency, but rather a management agency. Toward that end, DARA is set up as a private company with all shares owned by the federal government. Although DARA will prepare a financing plan for the German space program, it will still receive its funds from the federal ministries. Similarly, DARA will draft a space agenda for Germany, subject to the approval of the federal government. It is important to get a relative idea of how much (or how little) of West Germany’s resources are actually directed to space. The 1988 space budget was approximately DM1.7 billion ($1 billion); DM1.2 billion from BMFT; and DM.5 billion from other governmental departments. In 1989 that increased to DM1.9 billion ($1.12 billion), an increase of 12%. Also, in 1989 the German Parliament approved a.DFvf400 million, five-year development program for the Sanger space plane (DM220 million from government sources, the rest from industry), a program which marks Germany’s return to the space transportation field. All told, however, total German expenditures on space were only .04% of the national budget. When compared with France, where .12% of their national budget was devoted to space, the relative German commitment is clearly minimal for a country with its economic prowess.
Industry The German economy since World War II has been used as an exemplary case study for many academic business programs. The Gross National Product (GNP) of the Federal Republic of Germany was approximately DM3,OOO bilhon in 1988. That figures reflects a 3.6% growth rate in 1988, with a 4% growth rate calculated for 1989, the highest growth rate in 10 years.9 Why then, some German indi\strialists ask, has French industry, with its lower GNP, been consistentlyable to lead the way in so many of the European space (and other) ventures. The answer to that question seems to stem from two sources: differences in government leadership attitudes and differences in government-industry relationships.
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After World War II, the French wanted to take a leadership role in Europe, and the Germans willingly stepped aside and allowed France to do so. With regard to the differences in government-industry relations, this is primarily related to differences in government structure. Whereas France is a highly centralized country, Germany is equally decentralized. Decentralization certainly allows industry more independence, but it also takes away the government as an assured customer for their products and services. DARA is intended to strengthen the role of German industry in policy making. It is also important to recognize, however, that BMFT is responsible for far more than space, so funding from BMFT is competitive among a variety of areas of research and technology. Because of centralization, French industry has little influence on government policy; the French national space agency, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, (CNES) is dominant. However, publicly owned industries are far more common in France than in Germany, giving the government a direct link to industry and providing industry the lw
Whereas space is a political power factor in France, such has not been the case in Germany. Political leaders who view space as an important factor in Germany’s political-or economic-future, have been the exception rather than the rule. This has given France the political will to be the European leader in space, something not shown heretofore in Germany. The Sanger spaceplane is the project with which German space leaders have planned to break out of the passive role Germany has assumed in space transportation. Eugene S anger, the man who first developed the spaceplane concept during World War II, was quoted in the 1950s as saying: ...the use of outer space will lead to a concentration of power, especially in the hands of those who are directly involved, which will be without precedence in the history of mankind.10
German politicians have disregarded that premise for many years. In the late eighties, however, that line of thought began slowly but surely reap pearing among policymakers.
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A majority of the German political parties are pro-space. Their support for space, however, has stemmed primarily from economic motivations. German analyst Stephan von Welck has pointed out that the foreign policy element of space is not a major factor for either liberals or conservatives, except that “A common European effort in the exploration and use of space is seen as a major contribution to West Europe’s political integration.“” With the strain on the German economic system that will accompany reunification, political support for space exploration becomes increasingly uncertain.
Reunification’s
Economic Impact
The day after the wartime allies announced reunification plans in Ottawa, Bonn approved a supplementary budget of $4.1 billion in aid to East Germany until reunification can be achieved. There was also another $1.2 billion earmarked for specific uses, ranging from business credits to currency exchanges. Although this was not as much as then East German Rime Minister Hans Modrow had hoped for ($9 billion), it certainly indicated Bonn’s support for the Ottawa decision. 12 More critically, it indicates the kind of near-term financial commitment that will be necessary for reunification to be achieved. As much as $300 billion will be necessary in order to overhaul the East German economy. 13 Other European countries such as France and Britain are already worrying that in the long term reunification could make the already economically dominant West Germany rich and powerful enough to comprehensively dominate European affairs. That German reunification will affect European affairs is already clear. Converting Ostmarks to D-Marks will impact not only the German economy but have European and international implications as well. In a surprise move in April, Bonn announced it would give a l-1 conversion rate for wages, pensions, and savings accounts up to $2,300. A 2-l rate would be used for personal savings over that amount and for East German private and corporate debts. In response to the conversion rate announcement prices on the Frankfurt stock exchange plunged 2.5%, alarming some financial analysts about more potential problems in the times to come. These exchange-rate negotiations have been going on at the same time as discussions concerning the European Monetary Union (EMU), a union Bonn is committed to as part of the planned moves toward increased European political integration. If German interest rates rise as expected during reunification, the value of the D-Mark will also likely rise. This could make the EMU process far more difficult, as well as complicate calculations for German contributions to joint European ventures. All in all, some European leaders have worried that German reunification could complicate-and subsequently delay-European integration plans. West German Chancellor Kohl has tried to assure other European leaders otherwise. At a March 1990
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visit to the European Commission in Brussels, he even suggested that plans for European integration be accelerated, in an attempt to show that German reunification will not be a hindrance to broader European goals. Most Germans seem to feel that reunification is culturally and politically desirable, and with as many as 1,800 East Germans relocating in West Germany every day, it is now apparently inevitable. Edzard Reuter, the head of Daimler Benz, was quoted as saying, “What does economics count in times like these? It’s a political decision. I think it’s politically correct, and we all have to support it.“14 But reunification may indeed be economically very painful for West Germans. With unemployment as West Germany’s single largest social and economic problem even before reunification, the situation is likely to be exacerbated by the rejoining of the two governments. Experts have predicted that unemployment could jump to as much as 13% of the work force within a year of reunification. 1s Although 2 July 1990 was set as the official date for economic and societal union of the two Germanys, with political union to follow, complete integration will be an extended process. Until complete integration occurs, Bonn will clearly be responsible for all German citizens. Although the vast majority of West Germans want to be united again with East Germany, they cannot help but wonder who is going to pay for everything (the answer to which is obvious, but avoided) and how will it be done. Some West Germans have already been complaining that East German refugees are treated better than the poor of West Germany. Although the rate of migration from East to West has slowed since the East German elections in March 1990, Bonn decided on a 1 July 1990 deadline for aid to East Germans moving West. After that time the special reception centers that have been set up will be closed and most benefits programs stopped. Resentments among West Germans.toward East Germans may well increase rather than decrease before all are simply “Germans” again. Extrapolating the questions and concerns about social welfare programs, the broader issue for West Germans is whether taxes must rise to maintain social programs and pay for reunification, too. If that is the case, the German budget will certainly be carefully trimmed of programs considered expendable.
Reunification
Impacts On The Space Program
European Space Agency (ESA) The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) is a member of the European Space Agency. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) is not. The legal status of a newly reunited, single nation of Germany in the European Space Agency is unclear. Certainly there will be many legal ques-
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tions like this that will need to be examined in connection with reunification, and some, including the ESA issue, have financial aspects. The West German space budget from BMFT has almost consistently allocated approximately 60% of its funds to ESA and 40% to bilateral and national programs. This strong German commitment to ESA has made it ESA’s second largest contributor (providing approximately 25% of the ESA budget in 1986, behind France’s 28%). The ESA budget is broken down into mandatory programs and optional programs. All members must contribute to the mandatory program, determined for a period of five years in advance by a unanimous vote of all Member States, with revision after three years to account for special circumstances. The.percentage each member must contribute to the unanimously agreed upon mandatory program is proportionate to the member’s GNP, averaged over a three year-period. It is estimated that in the first year after reunification East Germany will contribute about $140 billion (or 11% of the combined total) to the German GNP.16 That could well make Germany liable for a larger ESA contribution, if the German GNP is not leveled off at the time of the third year-revision. The increased GNP figures will be misleading since the per capita GNP would certainly go down. Special circumstances were anticipated in the ESA charter, but how they would be applied in this extraordinary case becomes a critical question. With regard to ESA optional programs, reunification costs may well cut into German ability to participate. Thisoccurs at exactly the time when those involved in aerospace had hoped for an increase, particularly through the European space infrastructure program, including the multi-aspect Columbus project as the European contribution to the US Space Station, the European mini-shuttle Hermes, and the Ariane V launcher. Of immediate concern to ESA as a whole, is the Hermes space plane. In February 1990, ESA announced that it would delay the decision on Phase 2 of the program, for full-scale development, until July 1991 due to technical and political considerations. The technical considerations relate primarily to redefinition of the NASA international space station: The political considerations relate to German national elections. Development costs for Hermes are estimated at about $4.5 billion. With German attention currently focused on reunification and the associated costs, ESA officials did not want Hermes to become an election issue. The political issues raised by reunification and the German role in ESA are also important. If a reunited Germany is forced in the short term to delay their plans for expanding their role and influence in ESA, could other countries, particularly France, use that opportunity to aggrandize their own positions, perhaps at Germany’s expense? Realistically, France is probably the only country that could or would seek to expand its role in ESA. Britain has been financially reluctant to maintain its current level of space activity, mating expansion unlikely. Although Italy might politically want to expand its role, realistically it too would be financially unable to assume the role Germany has played in ESA. None of the
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other ESA countries individually have the resources or the industrial base to support an expanded role. This, in fact, has already been a problem for ESA. The ESA system of national jusfe retour for optional program commitments and the subsequent awarding of industrial contracts has already caused problems. Most European countries do not have the level of industrial facilities and capabilities commensurate with their desires for contracts; contracts have had to be awarded according to geography rather than qualifications. A weak economy and limited industrial resources would likely be the inhibiting factor against France’s gaining further dominance within ESA also. There is only so much their industry can handle. Under current conditions, German industry is a requisite part of a strong ESA. Questions also arise whether changes in East-West bloc relations will affect ESA. The broad cooperative agreement signed on 25 April 1990 between ESA and the Soviet Union opens the door for more joint ventures, but financial pressures that have accompanied peresfroika in the Soviet Union have also impacted their space program. Soviet space launches for 1989 numbered only 74, the lowest number of launches for that country since 1972. The decrease has been attributed to longer-lived satellites and budget restraints.18 Those budget restraints make it unlikely that large-scale space plans will develop with the Soviets, but rather that work will initially be kept to space science experiments and data exchanges. It is likely, however, that there will be an increased number of Soviet and East European scientists seeking to work with ESA, again due to the cutbacks in Soviet space spending. Whereas the Soviets have in the past offered free rides for East European equipment aboard Soviet launchers, satellites, and space stations, those giveaways appear to be ending as the Soviets seek ways to make their program more profitable.19 Space science, however, would be the last area of German space activity to be affected by reunification economics, because of tradition and because the scientists’ lobby is very strong through organizations such as the Max Planck Society. Therefore, East European participation in ESA programs will likely affect Germany no more than any other ESA country. High-tech
Versus Consumer Goods
Although among those best off of the eastern bloc countries, East Germans have suffered for years from shortages of consumer goods. Thus, with the reunification of the two Germanys, East Germans are likely to consume German products that would have otherwise been targeted for overseas. Germany may have to import certain goods to keep up with initial demand, again affecting their heretofore enviable balance-of-trade statistics. In the short term, the high demand for consumer goods could well necessitate at least a short-term reorientation of West German industrial priorities. Whereas the German aerospace industries viewed the creation of DARA and the specially approved (due to antitrust concerns) formation of
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Deutsche Aerospace as indicators of increased government support for aerospace projects, it simply may not be politically or economically possible over the next several years. Political and economic support for the Singer program, for example, could be jeopardized. In fact, the 1988 increase in the German allotment for space research may become an anomaly unable to be repeated until reunification is complete. Although the Ministry for Research and Technology will certainly still be receiving funds, its budgetary allotment may well be cut in favor of short-term domestic needs. Within the ministry, competition for funds will remain as intense as ever, especially to fund projects and fields which generate immediate jobs.
Political Support Keeping in mind that potential economic benefits have been the primary reason for partisan support for German space efforts, immediate economic concerns-indeed crises-will likely be the reason that politicians will feel compelled to pull back on support for increasing space activities; support that seemed more likely in 1989 than at any previous time. Whereas public support for high-ticket, high-tech programs has always been lukewarm at best, politicians will feel little compulsion to protect the space program, or more specifically the budget, based on constituent demand. In that respect, Germany and the United States are very much alike. Both of their programs are hindered not by capabilities, but by the lack of political will, which is reflected in their budgets. Reunification will magnify that situation. Space, however, has been one of the most unifying forces in Europe. ESA has successfully risen in the past 20 years to become not only a partner to other major space programs, but in some cases, a competitor as well. In a time when German reunification is being viewed cautiously, if not skeptically, throughout the rest of Europe as potentially interfering with European integration plans, acknowledgement should be given in Bonn to the positive role that continued and steady German participation in ESA could play.
Conclusion: The Long Term Versus The Short Term Clearly, elimination of the entire German space effort from the federal budget would not begin to cover the estimated costs of reunification. Space expenditures for the year 1988 were less than the supplementary funds approved in February 1990 after the Ottawa decision. Therefore, the question for Bonn should become: what would be the long-term cost of eliminating the program, or making cuts so substantial-as might seem initially attractive-that, in effect, programs die a lingering death rather than a fast one. In the short term, all German programs, like space, that are highly dependent on government contracts, will most certainly suffer during the reunification transitional process. As Germany has long taken a subdued
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role in space affairs, reunification will most likely mean simply that this role will continue longer than anticipated. This will certainly be disappointing and frustrating for those Germans who saw 1989 as a year of space reinvigoration, but once again, that is probably inevitable. It will be interesting to see how other European countries respond during the lag-time that is inevitable during reunification. With Britain and France especially worried about how a reunited Germany will politically and economically fit into European affairs, they might well consider adopting preemptive economic and political protectionist attitudes, much out of line with the planned integration efforts in Europe that culminate in 1993. On the other hand, responding to “anticipated” German strength may cost other countries more money than they are willing, or able, to spend. Certainly, any move by others in this direction would thwart efforts for Europe to be more internationally competitive. Again, continued cooperative European space efforts through ESA might alleviate European fears somewhat and act as a stabilizing factor. In the longer term, it is interesting to consider what could happen to a reunified Germany if it decides to pursue space activities with increased vigor and commitment. As perhaps the one European country with the industrial and technological base that could support an expanded program, the added technical expertise provided by the integrated East Germans will further bolster their capabilities. National pride was reemerging prior to reunification, and has been fed further by reunification. Space could be an outlet for the national pride. Yet it is difficult to imagine that the basic German attitude toward protection of social welfare programs will change to any significant degree, or that unemployment problems, which skilled space jobs do not significantly impact, will abate. Rather, it is far more likely that there will be a return to the plans of 1989, including: Germany playing an expanded role in ESA, perhaps through space transportation, and German industry becoming more internationally competitive, along with European industry in general. The recognition that Europe suffers when Germany and France do not cooperate cannot be overlooked by either country. German reunification is one of many extraordinary political changes that have occurred in 1989-90. The pieces that made up the puzzle of world affairs prior to the breakup of the eastern bloc, events in South Africa and elections in Nicaragua, are changing at an accelerating pace. The effect of the changes in the larger picture could also impact space in more doctrinal ways. Conceivably, it could make cooperation easier and more politically and economically attractive. Or it could result in countries turning inward to solve more immediate national problems. For those countries with space programs, that might well mean a subsequent decline in civil space ventures and with military programs far more protected if they are considered an aspect of national security. If that is the case, those countries willing to stick with their civil space efforts, even at high short-term costs, may be able to assume a leadership position by default of the other players.
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Space is not expendable. The technology alone that is derived from space projects is an economic driver that cannot be ignored. German policy-makers would do well not to forget that this was their initial motivation for going into space in the first place, and the dire consequences that were anticipated-being left behind in the worldwide technology race-without space as a high-tech driver. In the long term, a reunited Germany can be an even greater economic giant than it is now. But technology leads can be quickly lost, and although the short-term costs might be viewed as high, cuts in high-tech, R&D intensive programs such as space should not be too deep or they may be irrecoverable.
References The American ChaIlenge (New York: Avon Books, 1967); Roger Williams, Europem Technology: The Politics ofCollaboration (London: Croom Helm, Ltd., 1973).
1. J.J. Servan-Schreiber,
2. Socialpolitsche Umschuu, Presse- und Infonnationsamt der Bundesregienmg, No. 193 (16 May 1989). 3. “Raumfahrt: Gegen diese Lobby kommt keiner an,” Der Spiegel (9 November 1987), p. 41. 4. W. Thompson, ‘West Germany’s Space Effort and the European Effort,” in W. C. Thompson and S. W. Guerrier, eds., Space: National Programs and International Cooperation, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 57. 5. Thompson, p. 58. 6.Translation from J. Ruttgers, Europe’s Way into The Universe, (Frankfurt am Main: Umschau Verlag, 1989), p. 106. 7. Thompson, p. 57. 8. German Aervspce Research Establishment, pamphlet, PR 3/89 C:DLR 1./l. 9. “1989: An Excellent Year,” The Week in Germany (12 January 1990), p. 4. 10. Eugene Sanger, “Aeronautics - Some Policy Aspects,” Aussenpolitik (9 June 1957). 11. S. von Welck, ‘West Germany and European Space Policy: Foreign and Security Policy Aspects,” paper presented at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, D.C., 13 December 1988, p. 4. 12. S. Schmemann, “Billions in Help for East Germany Approved by Bonn,” New York Times (15 February 1990), p. 1. 13. R. Knight, ‘The Arithmetic of Unifying Germany,” US News b World Report (5 March 1990), p. 42. 14. Schememann, p. Al8. 15. Knight, p. 43. 16. Knight, p. 43. 17. J. M. Lenorovitz, “ESA Delays Development Decision For Hermes Manned Spaceplane,” Aviation We& b Space Technology (26 February 1990), p. 25. 18. D@nse Daily, Special Supplement (17 January 1990), Sl. 19. I? B. de Selding, “Eastern Europeans Seek Closer ‘Iies with West in Space,” Space News (23-29 April 1990), p. 1.
Technology in Society, Vol. 12, pp. 355-367,199o Printed in the USA. All rights reserved.
Can Germany Afford Reunification and a Space Program Too? Joan Johnson-Freese
ABSTRACT. As a highly industrialized Western society, West Germanyhas long had an active space program. Their economic and leadership role within the European Space Agency has been second only to France. In 1989, through the creation of a national space agency and a restructuring of German aerospace industry, West Germany gave strong indications that it intended to expand its voice and interests within European and international space aflairs. These intentions may, however, be strongly influenced by the surprising turn of political events that began at the end of 1989 with the demise of the Berlin Wall and will culminate with the total reunification of East and West Germany. The high economic price for reunification that West Germany will have to pay may make implementation of expanded space activity plans impossible, at least in the short term. The attitude a reunified Germany takes toward space, short-term and long-term, will clearly also have ramifications for European space efforts as a whole.
Infroduction 1989 was a year of change for the West German space program. Both the government policy-making structure and the private aerospace industries commenced major restructuring efforts intended to strengthen the West German role in European space affairs and to make West German industry more internationally competitive. There was an air of excitement and rejuvenation among many West Germans concerning space. On 13 February 1990, the four major World War II allies agreed on a framework for negotiating the reunification of Germany after a 45-year Dr.Joan Johnson-Freese is the Director of the Center for Space Policy and Law, and and Associate Professor of Political Science, at the University of Central Florida. She teaches undergraduate and graduate courses on science policy and space policy. Her primary area of research is international cooperation and competition in space, and she has published in such journals as Space Policy and Spaceflight. Her first book, Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space will be available from Kreiger Publishing in August. Much of the information on the German space program used in this article was gathered during a research trip to Germany during the summer of 1989. 355
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division. The swift pace of agreement on the framework indicates that reunification could be a much nearer-term goal than anyone anticipated. Reunification will have profound effects on the heretofore separate West and East German governments, Europe, and international politics generally. Already, Bonn is picking up a considerable tab for the economic costs associated with reunification. The question then arises, will other West German national programs be sacrificed to pay for reunification, and if so, will “space” be considered one of the expendable programs?
The German Space Program A Traditionally Passive German Role in Space As the first country to develop ballistic missiles (V-2) and use them in warfare, Germany has a long history of involvement with space. Because of this history, however, the Germans also have had both externally imposed restrictions and internally imposed inhibitions regarding their post World War II role in space activities. Internally, the V-2 program created a pronounced psychological hesitation among the German people to get involved in areas of space activities beyond the realm of “pure” science. Externally, as a result of their use of the V-2 rockets, missile production was prohibited in Germany by the allies after the war. That prohibition resulted in a German concentration on space sciences and national neglect of any dual-use technologies; those having military or civilian applications. The German space program formally began in 1964 with their charter membership in the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organization (ESRO). It was only through ELDO and ESRO that Germany became involved with dual-use technologies, including not only launchers but remote sensing and communications satellites. Even after the merger of ELDO and ESRO in 1975 to form the European Space Agency (ESA), Germany left space transportation efforts to the French, thus limiting German involvement to cooperative efforts. The goals of their national space program were to encourage European unity, better foreign relations, promote industrial advancement, and position themselves for potential commercial payoffs from space through sciencebased projects. It is important to remember why European counties made the decision early on to invest their limited funds in a space program. In the 1950s and 1960s space meant technology, technology meant industrialization, and industrialization meant economic growth. Fear of being left behind in technological development is evidenced in 1960s “technology gap” literature by such European analysts as Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and, later in the 197Os, by Roger Williams .I The failure of ELDO to catapult Europe into the
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space arena through the development of an European launch vehicle provided the impetus for the creation of ESA. Even before ESA’s official creation the Germans had become advocates of manned spaceflight efforts through the Spacelab program. Both Spacelab and later the Columbus program as the intended European contribution to the US Space Station fit in well with German plans and attitudes since they provide places for carrying out scientific experiments in space that could eventually have economic payoffs. Yet for internal political reasons, German politicians must remain sensitive to the aversion of the German people to any big-ticket programs that could impinge upon the extensive German social welfare program. Almost one-third of the present Bonn budget is devoted to social welfare programs. 2 Hence, although the Germans share with the Americans a pride and popular support for their space program, that pride is tempered with concerns over the inherently high price tag that accompanies manned spaceflight and space ventures generally. Within Germany there have been questions raised, including in the wellknown and well-read publication Der Spiegel3 about the actual extent of spin-offs for private industry generated through space research. It has also been pointed out that “..a sector which, like the space industry, employs only 5,500 persons in the FRG and is almost totally dependent upon state contracts cannot be expected to make much of a dent in the FRG’s greatest economic problem in the 1980s and early 1990s: unemployment.“4 Even industry groups like the Federation of German Industries (BDI) are not totally supportive of space efforts. They fear that the increasing costs of space research could take research funding from other, perhaps more lucrative, fields. These fears are based on figures such as the 1988 German government allotment for space being raised from 11% to 18% of total govemment research expenditures.5 Supporters, however, have not been so narrow in their interpretation of spin-off benefits or potential. They have recognized that regardless of how much popular support is generated through pride in the space program, that support is short-lived without a demonstration of direct benefit. Therefore, they have been quick to point out the more immediate and personal benefits of space research and activity, such as a lowering of the cost of phone calls and improved television transmission and reception capabilities, along with the more long-range goals of space research. It has been cautioned, however, that this positive approach can be taken too far and have detrimental results. Advances within the set (space) goals need empirical proof. The economic utility of space exploration must be made clear and proven to the public. For this purpose only key arguments are valid, ones that can stand up to the most critical examinations. Supporters of space exploration have often made the mistake of using short-term and changeable arguments for its (space) practical applications, which become apparent only in the long run.6
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West German politicians who support space do not want to be seen as promising more than they can deliver. Supporters of German space efforts have also stressed the importance of in power politics and economics. In an October 1987 “knowledge” Parliamentary debate, Free Democratic Party deputy Jurgen Timm responded to critics of the space program with the reminder that “...we are a country poor in raw materials and reliant upon the development of knowledge.“7 This argument basically goes back to traditional German attention to science, where payoffs can be long term, but where the learning curve is such that one cannot afford to fall behind. The point is, however, that in 1988 the space budget for the first time reached an amount that it became politically visible, and hence subject to more intense debate than in the past. Changes in Attitude and Changes in Structures Within Germany a new phenomenon has been experienced and assimilated into the German space program. Even before the demise of the Berlin Wall, there was a noticeable change in attitude among Germans, that a little nationalism is acceptable and even desirable. German pride has been returning, and war guilt subsiding. Although inconsequential in the national elections, the fact that the neo-Nazis in Germany have received as much as 10% of the votes in some regional elections is frightening, particularly to the majority of Germans. Hence nobody wants to appear aggressive or act too quickly. But German achievements and capabilities are no longer downplayed or allowed to be usurped by others. This is a dramatic change. Prestige seems to have crept into the German space program much as it has been evident in other countries. This has the potential to change past patterns of cooperation and interaction (to a still unknown degree) but with not necessarily undesirable results since German capabilities are already well known and accepted and may now be more effectively utilized and promoted. However, Germans are also aware that external critics are particularly apt to attack costly efforts (in any field) which smack of national prestige. Clearly, Germans have many decisions to make for themselves as well as constantly reacting to decisions being made by others. Their role and reasons for being involved in space affairs are in a period of redefinition. Until 1989 West Germany was one of the few countries with an active space program not to have a separate space agency; most policies and programs were developed and administered through the Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT). BMFI’ has traditionally worked with the Deutsche Forschungs und Versuchsanstalt fur Luft und Raumfahrt (German Aerospace Research Establishment, formerly known as DFVLR, the acronym was recently shortened to DLR) in areas of research. DLR focuses on multidisciplinary research of a long-term nature which could lead to industrial utilization, but of too high an economic risk to be dealt with by industry on its own. As such, it acts as an intermediary between the State, industry, and
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science.8 In 1989, however, the Deutsche Agentur fiir Raumfaurtangelegenheiten (DARA) was established, to take over responsibility for implementation of Germany’s space program for BMFT. The second area of restructuring concerns German industry. German mega-industries Daimler-Benz, Messerschmidt Bolkow Blohm (MBB), Dornier, Motoren und TurbinemUnion (MTU), and Telefunken Systemtechnik (TST) have merged into, the new Deutsche Aerospace, with the intent of making Germany more internationally competitive. These two moves were to pave the way for a new German role in European space affairs. On 21 April 1989, DARA was created to better coordinate West German space activities; generate more German space initiatives, especially to ESA; and increase the cost effectiveness and controllability of German space programs. Unlike NASA, DARA is not intended to be an R&D agency, but rather a management agency. Toward that end, DARA is set up as a private company with all shares owned by the federal government. Although DARA will prepare a financing plan for the German space program, it will still receive its funds from the federal ministries. Similarly, DARA will draft a space agenda for Germany, subject to the approval of the federal government. It is important to get a relative idea of how much (or how little) of West Germany’s resources are actually directed to space. The 1988 space budget was approximately DM1.7 billion ($1 billion); DM1.2 billion from BMFT; and DM.5 billion from other governmental departments. In 1989 that increased to DM1.9 billion ($1.12 billion), an increase of 12%. Also, in 1989 the German Parliament approved a.DFvf400 million, five-year development program for the Sanger space plane (DM220 million from government sources, the rest from industry), a program which marks Germany’s return to the space transportation field. All told, however, total German expenditures on space were only .04% of the national budget. When compared with France, where .12% of their national budget was devoted to space, the relative German commitment is clearly minimal for a country with its economic prowess.
Industry The German economy since World War II has been used as an exemplary case study for many academic business programs. The Gross National Product (GNP) of the Federal Republic of Germany was approximately DM3,OOO bilhon in 1988. That figures reflects a 3.6% growth rate in 1988, with a 4% growth rate calculated for 1989, the highest growth rate in 10 years.9 Why then, some German indi\strialists ask, has French industry, with its lower GNP, been consistentlyable to lead the way in so many of the European space (and other) ventures. The answer to that question seems to stem from two sources: differences in government leadership attitudes and differences in government-industry relationships.
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After World War II, the French wanted to take a leadership role in Europe, and the Germans willingly stepped aside and allowed France to do so. With regard to the differences in government-industry relations, this is primarily related to differences in government structure. Whereas France is a highly centralized country, Germany is equally decentralized. Decentralization certainly allows industry more independence, but it also takes away the government as an assured customer for their products and services. DARA is intended to strengthen the role of German industry in policy making. It is also important to recognize, however, that BMFT is responsible for far more than space, so funding from BMFT is competitive among a variety of areas of research and technology. Because of centralization, French industry has little influence on government policy; the French national space agency, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, (CNES) is dominant. However, publicly owned industries are far more common in France than in Germany, giving the government a direct link to industry and providing industry the lw
Whereas space is a political power factor in France, such has not been the case in Germany. Political leaders who view space as an important factor in Germany’s political-or economic-future, have been the exception rather than the rule. This has given France the political will to be the European leader in space, something not shown heretofore in Germany. The Sanger spaceplane is the project with which German space leaders have planned to break out of the passive role Germany has assumed in space transportation. Eugene S anger, the man who first developed the spaceplane concept during World War II, was quoted in the 1950s as saying: ...the use of outer space will lead to a concentration of power, especially in the hands of those who are directly involved, which will be without precedence in the history of mankind.10
German politicians have disregarded that premise for many years. In the late eighties, however, that line of thought began slowly but surely reap pearing among policymakers.
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A majority of the German political parties are pro-space. Their support for space, however, has stemmed primarily from economic motivations. German analyst Stephan von Welck has pointed out that the foreign policy element of space is not a major factor for either liberals or conservatives, except that “A common European effort in the exploration and use of space is seen as a major contribution to West Europe’s political integration.“” With the strain on the German economic system that will accompany reunification, political support for space exploration becomes increasingly uncertain.
Reunification’s
Economic Impact
The day after the wartime allies announced reunification plans in Ottawa, Bonn approved a supplementary budget of $4.1 billion in aid to East Germany until reunification can be achieved. There was also another $1.2 billion earmarked for specific uses, ranging from business credits to currency exchanges. Although this was not as much as then East German Rime Minister Hans Modrow had hoped for ($9 billion), it certainly indicated Bonn’s support for the Ottawa decision. 12 More critically, it indicates the kind of near-term financial commitment that will be necessary for reunification to be achieved. As much as $300 billion will be necessary in order to overhaul the East German economy. 13 Other European countries such as France and Britain are already worrying that in the long term reunification could make the already economically dominant West Germany rich and powerful enough to comprehensively dominate European affairs. That German reunification will affect European affairs is already clear. Converting Ostmarks to D-Marks will impact not only the German economy but have European and international implications as well. In a surprise move in April, Bonn announced it would give a l-1 conversion rate for wages, pensions, and savings accounts up to $2,300. A 2-l rate would be used for personal savings over that amount and for East German private and corporate debts. In response to the conversion rate announcement prices on the Frankfurt stock exchange plunged 2.5%, alarming some financial analysts about more potential problems in the times to come. These exchange-rate negotiations have been going on at the same time as discussions concerning the European Monetary Union (EMU), a union Bonn is committed to as part of the planned moves toward increased European political integration. If German interest rates rise as expected during reunification, the value of the D-Mark will also likely rise. This could make the EMU process far more difficult, as well as complicate calculations for German contributions to joint European ventures. All in all, some European leaders have worried that German reunification could complicate-and subsequently delay-European integration plans. West German Chancellor Kohl has tried to assure other European leaders otherwise. At a March 1990
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visit to the European Commission in Brussels, he even suggested that plans for European integration be accelerated, in an attempt to show that German reunification will not be a hindrance to broader European goals. Most Germans seem to feel that reunification is culturally and politically desirable, and with as many as 1,800 East Germans relocating in West Germany every day, it is now apparently inevitable. Edzard Reuter, the head of Daimler Benz, was quoted as saying, “What does economics count in times like these? It’s a political decision. I think it’s politically correct, and we all have to support it.“14 But reunification may indeed be economically very painful for West Germans. With unemployment as West Germany’s single largest social and economic problem even before reunification, the situation is likely to be exacerbated by the rejoining of the two governments. Experts have predicted that unemployment could jump to as much as 13% of the work force within a year of reunification. 1s Although 2 July 1990 was set as the official date for economic and societal union of the two Germanys, with political union to follow, complete integration will be an extended process. Until complete integration occurs, Bonn will clearly be responsible for all German citizens. Although the vast majority of West Germans want to be united again with East Germany, they cannot help but wonder who is going to pay for everything (the answer to which is obvious, but avoided) and how will it be done. Some West Germans have already been complaining that East German refugees are treated better than the poor of West Germany. Although the rate of migration from East to West has slowed since the East German elections in March 1990, Bonn decided on a 1 July 1990 deadline for aid to East Germans moving West. After that time the special reception centers that have been set up will be closed and most benefits programs stopped. Resentments among West Germans.toward East Germans may well increase rather than decrease before all are simply “Germans” again. Extrapolating the questions and concerns about social welfare programs, the broader issue for West Germans is whether taxes must rise to maintain social programs and pay for reunification, too. If that is the case, the German budget will certainly be carefully trimmed of programs considered expendable.
Reunification
Impacts On The Space Program
European Space Agency (ESA) The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) is a member of the European Space Agency. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) is not. The legal status of a newly reunited, single nation of Germany in the European Space Agency is unclear. Certainly there will be many legal ques-
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tions like this that will need to be examined in connection with reunification, and some, including the ESA issue, have financial aspects. The West German space budget from BMFT has almost consistently allocated approximately 60% of its funds to ESA and 40% to bilateral and national programs. This strong German commitment to ESA has made it ESA’s second largest contributor (providing approximately 25% of the ESA budget in 1986, behind France’s 28%). The ESA budget is broken down into mandatory programs and optional programs. All members must contribute to the mandatory program, determined for a period of five years in advance by a unanimous vote of all Member States, with revision after three years to account for special circumstances. The.percentage each member must contribute to the unanimously agreed upon mandatory program is proportionate to the member’s GNP, averaged over a three year-period. It is estimated that in the first year after reunification East Germany will contribute about $140 billion (or 11% of the combined total) to the German GNP.16 That could well make Germany liable for a larger ESA contribution, if the German GNP is not leveled off at the time of the third year-revision. The increased GNP figures will be misleading since the per capita GNP would certainly go down. Special circumstances were anticipated in the ESA charter, but how they would be applied in this extraordinary case becomes a critical question. With regard to ESA optional programs, reunification costs may well cut into German ability to participate. Thisoccurs at exactly the time when those involved in aerospace had hoped for an increase, particularly through the European space infrastructure program, including the multi-aspect Columbus project as the European contribution to the US Space Station, the European mini-shuttle Hermes, and the Ariane V launcher. Of immediate concern to ESA as a whole, is the Hermes space plane. In February 1990, ESA announced that it would delay the decision on Phase 2 of the program, for full-scale development, until July 1991 due to technical and political considerations. The technical considerations relate primarily to redefinition of the NASA international space station: The political considerations relate to German national elections. Development costs for Hermes are estimated at about $4.5 billion. With German attention currently focused on reunification and the associated costs, ESA officials did not want Hermes to become an election issue. The political issues raised by reunification and the German role in ESA are also important. If a reunited Germany is forced in the short term to delay their plans for expanding their role and influence in ESA, could other countries, particularly France, use that opportunity to aggrandize their own positions, perhaps at Germany’s expense? Realistically, France is probably the only country that could or would seek to expand its role in ESA. Britain has been financially reluctant to maintain its current level of space activity, mating expansion unlikely. Although Italy might politically want to expand its role, realistically it too would be financially unable to assume the role Germany has played in ESA. None of the
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other ESA countries individually have the resources or the industrial base to support an expanded role. This, in fact, has already been a problem for ESA. The ESA system of national jusfe retour for optional program commitments and the subsequent awarding of industrial contracts has already caused problems. Most European countries do not have the level of industrial facilities and capabilities commensurate with their desires for contracts; contracts have had to be awarded according to geography rather than qualifications. A weak economy and limited industrial resources would likely be the inhibiting factor against France’s gaining further dominance within ESA also. There is only so much their industry can handle. Under current conditions, German industry is a requisite part of a strong ESA. Questions also arise whether changes in East-West bloc relations will affect ESA. The broad cooperative agreement signed on 25 April 1990 between ESA and the Soviet Union opens the door for more joint ventures, but financial pressures that have accompanied peresfroika in the Soviet Union have also impacted their space program. Soviet space launches for 1989 numbered only 74, the lowest number of launches for that country since 1972. The decrease has been attributed to longer-lived satellites and budget restraints.18 Those budget restraints make it unlikely that large-scale space plans will develop with the Soviets, but rather that work will initially be kept to space science experiments and data exchanges. It is likely, however, that there will be an increased number of Soviet and East European scientists seeking to work with ESA, again due to the cutbacks in Soviet space spending. Whereas the Soviets have in the past offered free rides for East European equipment aboard Soviet launchers, satellites, and space stations, those giveaways appear to be ending as the Soviets seek ways to make their program more profitable.19 Space science, however, would be the last area of German space activity to be affected by reunification economics, because of tradition and because the scientists’ lobby is very strong through organizations such as the Max Planck Society. Therefore, East European participation in ESA programs will likely affect Germany no more than any other ESA country. High-tech
Versus Consumer Goods
Although among those best off of the eastern bloc countries, East Germans have suffered for years from shortages of consumer goods. Thus, with the reunification of the two Germanys, East Germans are likely to consume German products that would have otherwise been targeted for overseas. Germany may have to import certain goods to keep up with initial demand, again affecting their heretofore enviable balance-of-trade statistics. In the short term, the high demand for consumer goods could well necessitate at least a short-term reorientation of West German industrial priorities. Whereas the German aerospace industries viewed the creation of DARA and the specially approved (due to antitrust concerns) formation of
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Deutsche Aerospace as indicators of increased government support for aerospace projects, it simply may not be politically or economically possible over the next several years. Political and economic support for the Singer program, for example, could be jeopardized. In fact, the 1988 increase in the German allotment for space research may become an anomaly unable to be repeated until reunification is complete. Although the Ministry for Research and Technology will certainly still be receiving funds, its budgetary allotment may well be cut in favor of short-term domestic needs. Within the ministry, competition for funds will remain as intense as ever, especially to fund projects and fields which generate immediate jobs.
Political Support Keeping in mind that potential economic benefits have been the primary reason for partisan support for German space efforts, immediate economic concerns-indeed crises-will likely be the reason that politicians will feel compelled to pull back on support for increasing space activities; support that seemed more likely in 1989 than at any previous time. Whereas public support for high-ticket, high-tech programs has always been lukewarm at best, politicians will feel little compulsion to protect the space program, or more specifically the budget, based on constituent demand. In that respect, Germany and the United States are very much alike. Both of their programs are hindered not by capabilities, but by the lack of political will, which is reflected in their budgets. Reunification will magnify that situation. Space, however, has been one of the most unifying forces in Europe. ESA has successfully risen in the past 20 years to become not only a partner to other major space programs, but in some cases, a competitor as well. In a time when German reunification is being viewed cautiously, if not skeptically, throughout the rest of Europe as potentially interfering with European integration plans, acknowledgement should be given in Bonn to the positive role that continued and steady German participation in ESA could play.
Conclusion: The Long Term Versus The Short Term Clearly, elimination of the entire German space effort from the federal budget would not begin to cover the estimated costs of reunification. Space expenditures for the year 1988 were less than the supplementary funds approved in February 1990 after the Ottawa decision. Therefore, the question for Bonn should become: what would be the long-term cost of eliminating the program, or making cuts so substantial-as might seem initially attractive-that, in effect, programs die a lingering death rather than a fast one. In the short term, all German programs, like space, that are highly dependent on government contracts, will most certainly suffer during the reunification transitional process. As Germany has long taken a subdued
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role in space affairs, reunification will most likely mean simply that this role will continue longer than anticipated. This will certainly be disappointing and frustrating for those Germans who saw 1989 as a year of space reinvigoration, but once again, that is probably inevitable. It will be interesting to see how other European countries respond during the lag-time that is inevitable during reunification. With Britain and France especially worried about how a reunited Germany will politically and economically fit into European affairs, they might well consider adopting preemptive economic and political protectionist attitudes, much out of line with the planned integration efforts in Europe that culminate in 1993. On the other hand, responding to “anticipated” German strength may cost other countries more money than they are willing, or able, to spend. Certainly, any move by others in this direction would thwart efforts for Europe to be more internationally competitive. Again, continued cooperative European space efforts through ESA might alleviate European fears somewhat and act as a stabilizing factor. In the longer term, it is interesting to consider what could happen to a reunified Germany if it decides to pursue space activities with increased vigor and commitment. As perhaps the one European country with the industrial and technological base that could support an expanded program, the added technical expertise provided by the integrated East Germans will further bolster their capabilities. National pride was reemerging prior to reunification, and has been fed further by reunification. Space could be an outlet for the national pride. Yet it is difficult to imagine that the basic German attitude toward protection of social welfare programs will change to any significant degree, or that unemployment problems, which skilled space jobs do not significantly impact, will abate. Rather, it is far more likely that there will be a return to the plans of 1989, including: Germany playing an expanded role in ESA, perhaps through space transportation, and German industry becoming more internationally competitive, along with European industry in general. The recognition that Europe suffers when Germany and France do not cooperate cannot be overlooked by either country. German reunification is one of many extraordinary political changes that have occurred in 1989-90. The pieces that made up the puzzle of world affairs prior to the breakup of the eastern bloc, events in South Africa and elections in Nicaragua, are changing at an accelerating pace. The effect of the changes in the larger picture could also impact space in more doctrinal ways. Conceivably, it could make cooperation easier and more politically and economically attractive. Or it could result in countries turning inward to solve more immediate national problems. For those countries with space programs, that might well mean a subsequent decline in civil space ventures and with military programs far more protected if they are considered an aspect of national security. If that is the case, those countries willing to stick with their civil space efforts, even at high short-term costs, may be able to assume a leadership position by default of the other players.
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Space is not expendable. The technology alone that is derived from space projects is an economic driver that cannot be ignored. German policy-makers would do well not to forget that this was their initial motivation for going into space in the first place, and the dire consequences that were anticipated-being left behind in the worldwide technology race-without space as a high-tech driver. In the long term, a reunited Germany can be an even greater economic giant than it is now. But technology leads can be quickly lost, and although the short-term costs might be viewed as high, cuts in high-tech, R&D intensive programs such as space should not be too deep or they may be irrecoverable.
References The American ChaIlenge (New York: Avon Books, 1967); Roger Williams, Europem Technology: The Politics ofCollaboration (London: Croom Helm, Ltd., 1973).
1. J.J. Servan-Schreiber,
2. Socialpolitsche Umschuu, Presse- und Infonnationsamt der Bundesregienmg, No. 193 (16 May 1989). 3. “Raumfahrt: Gegen diese Lobby kommt keiner an,” Der Spiegel (9 November 1987), p. 41. 4. W. Thompson, ‘West Germany’s Space Effort and the European Effort,” in W. C. Thompson and S. W. Guerrier, eds., Space: National Programs and International Cooperation, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 57. 5. Thompson, p. 58. 6.Translation from J. Ruttgers, Europe’s Way into The Universe, (Frankfurt am Main: Umschau Verlag, 1989), p. 106. 7. Thompson, p. 57. 8. German Aervspce Research Establishment, pamphlet, PR 3/89 C:DLR 1./l. 9. “1989: An Excellent Year,” The Week in Germany (12 January 1990), p. 4. 10. Eugene Sanger, “Aeronautics - Some Policy Aspects,” Aussenpolitik (9 June 1957). 11. S. von Welck, ‘West Germany and European Space Policy: Foreign and Security Policy Aspects,” paper presented at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, D.C., 13 December 1988, p. 4. 12. S. Schmemann, “Billions in Help for East Germany Approved by Bonn,” New York Times (15 February 1990), p. 1. 13. R. Knight, ‘The Arithmetic of Unifying Germany,” US News b World Report (5 March 1990), p. 42. 14. Schememann, p. Al8. 15. Knight, p. 43. 16. Knight, p. 43. 17. J. M. Lenorovitz, “ESA Delays Development Decision For Hermes Manned Spaceplane,” Aviation We& b Space Technology (26 February 1990), p. 25. 18. D@nse Daily, Special Supplement (17 January 1990), Sl. 19. I? B. de Selding, “Eastern Europeans Seek Closer ‘Iies with West in Space,” Space News (23-29 April 1990), p. 1.