Can individual land ownership reduce grassland degradation and favor socioeconomic sustainability on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau?

Environmental Science and Policy 89 (2018) 192–197

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Environmental Science and Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci

Can individual land ownership reduce grassland degradation and favor socioeconomic sustainability on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau? J.J. Caoa, N.M. Holdenb, J.F. Adamowskic, R.C. Deod, X.Y. Xua, Q. Fenge,

T

⁎

a

College of Geography and Environmental Science, Northwest Normal University, Lanzhou, 730070, China UCD School of Biosystems and Food Engineering, University College Dublin, Agriculture and Food Science Centre, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland c Department of Bioresource Engineering, Faculty of Agricultural and Environmental Science, McGill University, Quebec, H9X 3V9, QC, Canada d School of Agricultural, Computational and Environmental Sciences, International Centre for Applied Climate Sciences, Institute of Agriculture and Environment, University of Southern Queensland, Springfield, Qld, 4300, Australia e Key Laboratory of Ecohydrology of Inland River Basin, Alashan Desert Eco-Hydrology Experimental Research Station, Cold and Arid Regions Environmental Engineering Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Lanzhou, 73000, China b

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau Grassland contract Collective action Social-ecologic system Institutional arrangement

Land degradation neutrality (LDN) was introduced to provide a policy framework to achieve Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 15. Land use policy and management changes can alter the status of land-based natural capital, and exert an influence on ecosystem functioning and interactions with a socio-ecological system. Over the last 30 years, continued efforts to maintain the socioeconomic sustainability of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau (QTP) led to the implementation of a unique ownership policy of individual households that were contracted to use defined grassland properties rather than collective nomadic practices. Two distinct types of privately-owned grassland properties now exist: individual private property (IPP) and jointly managed private property (JPP). The influence of IPP (vs. JPP) on grassland degradation has been the subject of a limited number of studies that are reviewed in this paper to help estimate some baseline indicator values for LDN on the QTP. Grasslands under IPP were more degraded according to soil and vegetation measurements, which were indicative of excessive vegetation removal and trampling due to grazing pressure. This pressure occurred because livestock mobility was limited by the imposed restrictions of fencing. A review of the associated socioeconomic status of this practice suggests that the disruption of social networks by the imposition of property lines between individual households acted to limit cultural transmission and collective benefits, such as the sharing of labour, pasture and food. Moreover, IPP seemed to lack the necessary resilience that is required to support the communities and their livestock. Although studies in the QTP are relatively scarce, research suggests that the notion that grassland contracts would address the region’s social, economic and environmental problems should be revisited because there is a significant difference in LDN indicator values for IPP and JPP, and evidence of significant degradation in the decades before the 2015 baseline when the UNCCD adopted LDN and SDGs. Evidence suggests that JPP is a more resilient system, capturing the environmental benefits of nomadism and the socioeconomic benefits of land contracts. Given that some of the grasslands are already contracted to individual households, creative JPP property arrangements should be respected. A reconsideration of whether the not-yet-contracted grasslands should be contracted individually rather than jointly, is required if LDN is to be achieved on the QTP by 2030. If the current policy is maintained, research evidence suggests that JPP should be encouraged, and policy makers should seek better ways of ensuring long-term sustainability and that LDN is achieved to maintain the natural capital and associated ecosystem services of the QTP.

1. Introduction The concept of land degradation neutrality (LDN) (Cowie et al., 2018) was introduced to provide a framework for policies to achieve

⁎

the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 15 (“Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss”). LDN is defined as “a state whereby the

Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (Q. Feng).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2018.08.003 Received 28 March 2018; Received in revised form 19 July 2018; Accepted 6 August 2018 1462-9011/ © 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Environmental Science and Policy 89 (2018) 192–197

J.J. Cao et al.

2. Methodologies

amount and quality of land resources necessary to support ecosystem functions and services and enhance food security remain stable or increase within specified temporal and spatial scales and ecosystems” (UNCCD, 2016). The concept is designed to maintain the world’s land resources in a healthy and productive state for future generations. The Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau (QTP) is a source of many of Asia’s major river systems and is a unique environment for a wide variety of alpine species that extends over an area of 2.27 × 106 km2 (Cai et al., 2015). As the largest high-altitude grazing region in the world (Cao et al., 2017a), the QTP also constitutes an immense carbon (C) pool (Wang et al., 2002; Yang et al., 2008), with a potential to provide feedback into the global climate system (Liu et al., 2014). Grasslands on the plateau, where pastoral practices date back at least 8800 years (Miehe et al., 2009), cover around 1.33 × 106 km2, accounting for almost 59% of the QTP and about 30% of grasslands in China. Over millennia, those who lived on the plateau played a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of its environment (Foggin, 2012). The global importance of the QTP ecosystem means it is critically important to understand the current state of its land resource and natural capital, modified by policy and social change in recent decades, relative to the historical baseline of pastoral nomadism that operated on the plateau for thousands of years. Socio-economic developments, as seen in many other countries (Török et al., 2016), have led scientists from China working in remote sensing and policy-making to believe that overgrazing, associated with communal property rights, was the major driver of grassland degradation (Yeh et al., 2017). Accordingly, grassland de-collectivization was advocated, and from the late 1980s through the 1990s, grassland use rights were assigned to individual households through a long-term leasing system (Yeh and Gaerrang, 2011; Yu and Farrell, 2016). Many Chinese researchers (e.g., Wuyunga and Mao, 2016; Sun et al., 2014; Ma and Qiao, 2015) still believe that individual private property is a powerful source of grassland protection, which promotes good vegetation and soil management and provides significant socioeconomic benefits to residents. Although the 1985 Grassland Law established a framework for the contracting of winter grasslands to individual households, many of those households were unwilling to operate in isolation because of their history of collective nomadism, and preferred to manage the rangelands as commons (Cao et al., 2011a, 2017a). Consequently, two private land ownership practices developed: individual private property (IPP) and jointly managed private property (JPP). Both are based on individual private property ownership (Wang et al., 2015a). This situation has provided a unique opportunity to explore whether an IPP system is a sustainable form of grassland management practice on the QTP, i.e., whether it can enable LDN. Prior to the year 2000, Western (vs. Chinese) studies largely focused on effects of the changes on socioeconomic systems and the alteration of land tenure arrangements on grassland degradation (Harris, 2010). This was primarily due to a belief that at both regional and global scales, socioeconomic drivers were more important than the forces of nature (Chen et al., 2014). Many of these studies only provided descriptions and lacked empirical evidence (Cao et al., 2017a). However, after 2000, Chinese investigators began to show a greater interest in the role of land tenure policy on the degradation of grasslands and socioeconomic sustainability, particularly those on the QTP. This work reviewed the progress made through case studies and field investigations to assess whether the IPP policy should be re-evaluated, and whether or not the IPP empowers land owners to support the various processes (biophysical and socio-economic aspects) required to deliver resilience and promote LDN with no net loss of natural capital (Cowie et al., 2018). The focus was on key ‘manageable properties’ of natural capital defined as a foundation for LDN (nutrient levels, pH, land cover, vegetation community structure and biodiversity; Figure 3 in Cowie et al., 2018), which could serve as indicators to determine the 2015 baseline when the UNCCD adopted LDN and SDGs were agreed.

The analysis compared the difference between qualitative assessment and quantitative LDN indicators for IPP and JPP management taken from studies on the QTP. The earliest studies (Cao et al., 2011a,b) compared social-ecological benefits of IPP and JPP on the QTP using qualitative and quantitative methods. More recent work has used different words to describe IPP and JPP in China. For example, IPP is also called individual-household management, single-household management, private property rights, grassland contract policy, and fences, while JPP is also called multi-household management, group management, collective action (management), cooperative management, joint management, community-based management, or public property rights. Papers for analysis were collected in two ways: (i) by using the ‘Baidu Scholar’ search engine (widely used in China) to identify papers similar to or citing Cao et al. (2011a,b); and (ii) authors were identified by attending meetings and conferences, and using their names as search criteria. To be included in this study, papers had to have a comparison between IPP and JPP, include the QTP, or other regions (Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia, and Gansu province), present qualitative or quantitative analysis by social survey methods or field experimentation and relate to social, cultural, economic, or ecological indicators in the context of LDN. Papers written in English were listed in the Science Citation Index, Social Sciences Citation Index, or Arts and Humanities Citation Index, while papers written in Chinese were listed in the Chinese Science Citation Database or Chinese Social Science Citation Information database (Shao and Shen, 2011). Work not from the QTP was used to assess whether results from the QTP were similar to other regions or not. Overall, 18 papers met these criteria, of which 12 were from the QTP, and the others were from other regions. The hypothesis tested was that the social-ecological system under JPP is more likely to be sustainable and permit LDN than under IPP. 3. Results Due to including both qualitative and quantitative comparisons between JPP and IPP across the studies, the results are divided into two parts, first a qualitative comparison (Table 1) to provide context for the quantitative results that include indicators for LDN and other relevant factors. Indicators for almost all social-ecological characters of JPP and IPP were found. Table 1 Qualitative ecological and socioeconomic indicators for individual private property (IPP) and jointly managed private property (JPP). Indicators

JPP

IPP

Ecological Transhumance Vegetation condition Soil nutrient status Water sources Pasture-use efficiency Pasture quality

Yes Good Good Poor High High

No Poor Poor Good Low Low

Socioeconomic Income Cost Equality Livestock mortality Milk production Livestock limit agreement Monitoring mechanism Assistance from outside Social relations Cultural heritage

Higher Lower Yes Lower No change Yes Yes Yes Good Better

Lower Higher No Higher Decrease No No No Average Worse

Note: qualitative data mainly from Cao et al. (2011a); Chen and Zhu (2015); Gongbuzeren and Li (2016); Wang et al., (2016) and Cao et al. (2018a). 193

Environmental Science and Policy 89 (2018) 192–197

J.J. Cao et al.

QTP, forage production and quality would likely improve. However, most Chinese researchers still believe that overgrazing and climate change are the key factors that have induced grassland degradation on the QTP (Cao et al., 2013b).

Cao et al. (2011a,b) found households under IPP spend about 3100 RMB y−1 more than under JPP for additional fencing and sheepdog breeding costs. The potential economic benefits were greater and risks smaller under JPP. For example, losses due to animal theft were reported to be less likely because the JPP arrangement provides a network of contacts to identify stolen animals, while IPP reduces such supports. Gongbuzeren and Li (2016) noted that 24% of the householders from 60 households in 2012 and 59% in 2014 said that milk production had declined under IPP, while about 30% of respondents in 2012 and in 2014 said it increased under JPP. The average household income under JPP was 4.84 × 104 RMB but only 3.31 × 104 RMB under IPP in 2014. Between 2012 and 2014, the average livestock mortality under JPP was nearly 10%, while under IPP it was around 14%. Similar results were also found by Cai and Li (2016), who found that the gap between the rich and the poor, and the livestock mortality under JPP were smaller than under IPP. From 2009 to 2012, although the livestock mortality decreased under both types of management, the rate under JPP was −10.7%, but under IPP it was only −5.2%. At the same time, 32% of the poor families under JPP became better off, but < 10% under IPP. Considering indicators relevant to LDN, Cao et al. (2013a) found that the mean above-ground grassland dry biomass, coverage and species richness sampled in 0.50 m × 0.50 m quadrats under IPP (24.4 g, 89.2%, 21.0, respectively) were all lower than those measured under JPP (32.4 g, 92.5%, 22.3, respectively). Abuman et al. (2012) found that before and after grassland contracts, the average above ground biomass, coverage, vegetation height, and the number of plant species was reduced by 47.0%, 15.8%, 44.1%, 33.2%, respectively. From field experiments comparing soil fertility and C losses between JPP and IPP managed grasslands, Cao et al. (2018b) determined that soil organic C, total N and total P to a depth of 0.30 m were significantly lower under IPP (43.0 g kg−1, 4.3 g kg−1, and 0.73 g kg−1, respectively), than under JPP (47.3 g kg−1, 4.6 g kg−1, and 0.77 g kg−1), but that soil pH showed the opposite trend (pH = 7.1 under IPP, and pH = 6.8 under JPP). Moreover, Cao et al. (2017b) found that the grasslands lost 0.41 Mg C ha−1 y−1 more under IPP than under JPP. Based on the number of households under IPP, they estimated that C losses could range from 3.10 to 61.5 Tg C y−1 across the QTP. These empirical data support community understanding. Abuman et al. (2012) reported that from 145 respondent-herders, 42% had opposed grassland contracts and 55% expressed their preference for the JPP system, while approximately 33% believed in direct causation between grassland contracts and grassland degradation. Hopping et al. (2016) reported that although some interviewees (total 48) acknowledged the risk of overgrazing due to increasing human population and herd sizes, the local population was more concerned about the effects of mandatory fencing on interpersonal relationships and livestock health. This suggests that current policies are harmful to pastoral livelihoods and well-being, and would benefit from incorporation of herders’ local knowledge of sustainable rangeland management practices. Evidence from other qualitative and quantitative studies in other regions of China, such as the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (Yu and Yi, 2012; Yu and Farrell, 2013, 2016), Inner Mongolia (Hua and Squires, 2015; Yu and Farrell, 2016), and Gansu province (Hua et al., 2015) support the finding that qualitative and quantitative indicators suggested greater active degradation under IPP compared to JPP. This supports the idea that grassland degradation on the QTP is influenced by the land ownership regime. In support of the fact that overgrazing and climate change were not solely responsible for recent grassland degradation on the QTP, Chen et al. (2015) and Lehnert et al. (2016) pointed to positive trends in vegetation cover in the eastern portion of the QTP region since 2000 due to warmer and wetter weather conditions, and a government policy-driven decline in the number of livestock on the QTP from 2001 to 2011 (Chen et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2016). Using field experiment simulations, Xu et al. (2018) also reported that with warmer and wetter conditions over most of the

4. Discussion 4.1. Why does JPP contribute to achieving LDN? Two major reasons could explain why the social-ecological system under JPP might contribute to achieving LDN: the grazing case, based on the evidence from pastoral ecosystem scientists, and the institutional case based on the evidence from social scientists. 4.1.1. Grazing case A synthesis of the qualitative and quantitative studies of grassland degradation, indicated that livestock mobility under IPP was limited to a smaller geographical range than under JPP (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002; Yeh and Gaerrang, 2011; Cao et al., 2013a; Yeh et al., 2014; Li et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017), and the movement between seasonal grasslands was more difficult under IPP than JPP (Shang et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2017). This meant that soil compaction from livestock trampling played a key role inducing grassland degradation under IPP (Ao et al., 2008; Dlamini et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2011). Trampling could also decrease plant regeneration and seed propagation, resulting in a decline in biomass and species richness (Briske et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2003; Klimeš et al., 2013). Lower biomass could then result in decreased soil organic carbon (SOC), total N and total P and reduced amounts of stored and available soil nutrients (Grosse et al., 2011; Hirsch et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2016; You et al., 2014; Dong et al., 2012; Hirsch et al., 2017). Moreover, smaller amounts of C inputs to the soil could limit organic matter formation (Wang et al., 2015b; Lu et al., 2017), potentially leading to further C losses through the removal of nutrient-rich silt/clay particles from the topsoil by wind erosion (Zhou et al., 2016). Continuous grazing activity likely accelerated depletion of available soil P because it caused more rapid plant growth and regrowth and favored the secondary productivity of small herbivorous mammal communities (Niu et al., 2016). As nutrient levels declined, the population of noxious plants capable of tolerating nutrient-limited soil conditions would likely increase, leading to further grassland degradation (Li et al., 2014). Indeed, Wang et al. (2017) confirmed that trampling caused by excessive grazing (i.e., in terms of animals per unit area and duration) had adverse effects on plants and soil. Therefore, best management practices for livestock grazing intensity need to be tailored to local bioclimatic conditions to avoid losses of soil nutrients (Abdalla et al., 2018) and decreasing soil quality. With the limited livestock mobility under IPP, inbreeding could reduce the rate of mating, conception and full-term birthing (Cai and Min, 2003; Chen and Zhu, 2015). Furthermore, with less access to additional resources and alternative sites, herders under IPP had to forgo a number of traditional disaster relief mechanisms, which were available to herders under JPP (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002; Robinett et al., 2008; Tang and Gavin, 2015; Yeh, 2013). Individual (vs. collective) pastoralists suffered a lack of equity and efficiency in grassland management (Cai and Li, 2016), and had a limited ability to move away from disaster-affected areas (Yu and Farrell, 2016; Næss, 2013). A reduction in grazing scope and space therefore might not only lead to grassland degradation, but also to increased risk from extreme weather events (Fu et al., 2012). 4.1.2. Institutional case To explain the institutional reasons, we considered the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin, 1966), which discussed the collective dilemma (Elsenbroich and Verhagen, 2016) that arose when stakeholders forgot historical strategies for resource utilization, did not adopt proper selfgoverning institutions, or had little incentive to conserve, resulting in 194

Environmental Science and Policy 89 (2018) 192–197

J.J. Cao et al.

modern developments for pastoralists (e.g., mobile medical facilities and schools using modern telecommunication technology (Gongbuzeren et al., 2015)).

collective benefits being lost and the common good abrogated (Dutta and Sundaram, 1993; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Milinski et al., 2002; Dietz et al., 2008). This type of social dilemma has been studied extensively by political and social scientists, economists and evolutionary theorists (Ostrom, 1990; Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999; Rothstein, 2000; Runge, 1986; Milinski et al., 2002). While there is no single solution to collective dilemmas, potential resolutions include voluntary small group cooperation through rules and institutions ensuring a shared management of resources (Moritz, 2016). Culture-cognitive elements that involve the creation of shared understandings that are taken for granted (Schermer et al., 2016) are very important for driving environmental change and shaping social behavior and outcomes of natural resource management (Franzén et al., 2015). The common-interest group is a collective governance mechanism, through which multiple landowners can come together to manage common resources such as labor, pasture and food, and then decide upon the allocation of those resources in a way that transcends the geographic lines between their properties (Schutz, 2010; Wang et al., 2016). Cooperation is promoted by many mechanisms that human society depends on (Ohtsuki et al., 2006). JPP is a voluntary cooperative action and reflects the influence of cultural norms developed long before privatization. In this case, it is particularly important that all households have equal rights of access to use the communal property resources and have the same probability of receiving benefits or sharing losses (Yu and Farrell, 2016), i.e., cooperation is symmetrical (He et al., 2015). It is also important that there are no ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ members of the JPP, because such asymmetrical cooperation would result in ‘strong’ households gaining more than ‘weak’ households, which might ruin the cooperative effort (Schutz, 2010). Furthermore, households under JPP are considerably better at sharing knowledge based on trial and error management practices within the community by cultural transmission, which is a key to many successful resource management decisions (Flanagan and Laituri, 2004; Franco and Luiselli, 2014).

4.3. LDN baseline status in 2015 on the QTP The 2015 baseline status (when the UNCCD adopted LDN and SDGs were agreed) of the QTP can be described with the indicators reported reflecting a mix of both IPP and JPP. Grassland biomass ranges from 96 g m−2 to 128 g m−2, vegetation coverage from 89% to 93%, species richness from 21.0 to 22.3, total (to 0.3 m depth) soil C from 43 g kg−1 to 47 g kg−1, total soil N from 4.3 g kg−1 to 4.6 g kg−1, total soil P from 0.73 g kg−1 to 0.77 g kg−1, and pH from 7.1 to 6.8 (with the first number always representing IPP and second number JPP). The data indicate that it is necessary to undertake representative surveys of key indicators considering the ownership model to map distributions from now until 2030 to properly assess whether LDN has been achieved, and to ensure the best possible ownership model to minimize or reverse degradation that has occurred. Given that Abuman et al. (2012) reported decreases in biomass, coverage, vegetation height and number of plant species, such action is essential. In addition, as Cao et al. (2017a) found that the C loss from grasslands was more under IPP than under JPP, it will be important for SDG15, in the context of the QTP, that a comprehensive survey and policy review be put in place. 5. Conclusions It is too late to accurately quantify indicators for the 2015 baseline to assess LDN on the QTP, but based on the data summarized here, it is clear that 2015 represented a significant lower status condition than a few decades earlier, and the individual ownership of land is not likely to promote LDN by 2030. Based on the few reliable qualitative and quantitative studies, it seems the grassland contract policy originally designed to counter grassland degradation on the QTP was not successful. Grasslands under IPP are not sustainable in the face of social and economic development when compared to those under JPP, due to its limited grazing areas and disrupted social networks by the imposition of property lines between individual households. Therefore, JPP should be protected by policy-makers through ceasing to implement grassland contracts for individual households, or by formal construction of JPP arrangements, and IPP families should be encouraged to merge into JPP with external support by government. Loss caused by IPP should be counterbalanced by various social-ecological measures to achieve the minimum objective of no net loss due to land management. The monitoring, assessment and verification of LDN status are needed to ensure sustainable socio-economic development of this environmentally-sensitive region.

4.2. Social-ecological sustainability on the QTP Based on the reviewed studies, we can conclude that IPP is not socio-economically and environmentally sustainable because it depletes and degrades the natural resource base at the local level (Biggs et al., 2015). However, a variety of available resources under JPP provide greater socioeconomic equality, effectiveness and resilience than under IPP, because it simultaneously considers the grasslands’ biophysical complexity, existing herder knowledge, management practices, cultural context and goals rather than continuing to act as if these do not exist (Yu and Farrell, 2016; Yeh et al., 2017). However, with the advancement of industrialization and urbanization, a larger proportion of herders who are living in the QTP take advantage of better education for their children and improve the quality of their own lives, and they can conveniently lease their grasslands, thus causing a JPP arrangement to disintegrate into an IPP arrangement (Cao et al., 2018b). Three measures could be adopted to protect JPP. Policies could encourage households with larger grassland holdings but small family size to join those with less grassland holdings but larger family size through a compensation mechanism based on grazing capacity supervised by local government and market prices of livestock. Next, households under JPP could strengthen their institutional arrangement with a livestock limit agreement and agreed rules for transfer of rights between families within JPP. Finally, based on the recent theory of land degradation neutrality (LDN) developed by Cowie et al. (2018), counterbalance measures for loss caused by IPP should be taken, to achieve no net loss, which is the minimum objective of land management. For example, loss from ecological aspects could be balanced by returning grazing land to grassland, resting from grazing, prohibiting grazing, or reducing livestock numbers by economic compensation as illustrated by Cao et al. (2013a,b) Social-economic losses could be counterbalanced by providing social services and access to

Acknowledgements The authors thank to the reviewers and the editor for their comments that helped to improve this paper. The study was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (41461109), the Gansu Provincial Sci & Tech. Department (1506RJZA124), and the Key Laboratory of Ecohydrology of Inland River Basin (KLEIRB-ZS-16-01), Chinese Academy of Science. We confirm that there is no conflict of interest. References Abdalla, M., Hastings, A., Chadwick, D.R., Jones, D.L., Evans, C.D., Jones, M.B., Rees, R.M., Smitha, P., 2018. Critical review of the impacts of grazing intensity on soil organic carbon storage and other soil quality indicators in extensively managed grasslands. Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. Appl. Soil Ecol. 253, 62–81. Abuman, Zhang, W.G., Chang, M., 2012. Present situation investigation after grassland contracted by individual households in Gannan pastoral area, Gansu province. Pratacult. Sci. 29 (12), 1945–1950 (in Chinese).

195

Environmental Science and Policy 89 (2018) 192–197

J.J. Cao et al.

adaptation among Tibetan pastoralists: challenges in enhancing local adaptation through policy support. Environ. Manage. 50 (4), 607–621. Gongbuzeren, Li, J., 2016. The role of market mechanisms and customary institutions in rangeland management: a case study in Qinghai Tibetan Plateau. J. Nat. Resour. 31 (10), 1637–1647 (in Chinese). Gongbuzeren, Li, Y., Li, W., 2015. China’s rangeland management policy debates: what have we learned? Rangeland Ecol. Manag. 68, 305–314. Grosse, G., Harden, J., Turetsky, M., McGuire, A.D., Camill, P., Tarnocai, C., Frolking, S., Schuur, E.A.G., Jorgenson, T., Marchenko, S., Romanovsky, V., Wickland, K.P., French, N., Waldrop, M., Bourgeau-Chavez, L., Striegl, R.G., 2011. Vulnerability of high-latitude soil organic carbon in North America to disturbance. J. Geophys. Res.Atmos. 116 G00K06. Hardin, G., 1966. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162 (3859), 1243–1248. Harris, R.B., 2010. Rangeland degradation on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau: a review of the evidence of its magnitude and causes. J. Arid Environ. 74, 112. He, J.Z., Wang, R.W., Jensen, C.X., Li, Y.T., 2015. Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation. Sci. Rep-UK 5 (X), 7715. Heller, M.A., Eisenberg, R.S., 1998. Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical research. Science 280 (5364), 698–701. Hirsch, P.R., Jhurreea, D., Williams, J.K., Murray, P.J., Scott, T., Misselbrook, T.H., Keith, W.T., Clark, I.M., 2017. Soil resilience and recovery: rapid community responses to management changes. Plant Soil 412 (1–2), 283–297. Hopping, K.A., Yangzong, C., Klein, J.A., 2016. Local knowledge production, transmission, and the importance of village leaders in a network of Tibetan pastoralists coping with environmental change. Ecol. Soc. 21 (1), 25. Hua, L., Squires, V.R., 2015. Managing China’s pastoral lands: current problems and future prospects. Land Use Policy 43, 129–137. Hua, L., Yang, S., Squires, V., Wang, G., 2015. An alternative rangeland management strategy in an agro-pastoral area in western china. Rangeland Ecol. Manag. 68 (2), 109–118. Klein, J.A., Yeh, E., Bump, J., Nyima, Y., Hopping, K., 2011. Coordinating environmental protection and climate change adaptation policy in resource-dependent communities: a case study from the Tibetan Plateau. Climate Change Adaptation in Developed Nations: from Theory to Practice 42. Springer Netherlands, pp. 423–438. Klimeš, L., Hájek, M., Mudrák, O., Dančák, M., Preislerová, Z., Hájková, P., Jongepierová, I., Klimešová, J., 2013. Effects of changes in management on resistance and resilience in three grassland communities. Appl. Veg. Sci. 16, 640–649. Lehnert, L.W., Wesche, K., Trachte, K., Reudenbach, C., Bendix, J., 2016. Climate variability rather than overstocking causes recent large scale cover changes of Tibetan pastures. Sci. Rep.–UK 6, 24367. Li, Y.Y., Dong, S.K., Wen, L., Wang, X.X., Wu, Y., 2014. Soil carbon and nitrogen pools and their relationship to plant and soil dynamics of degraded and artificially restored grasslands of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. Geoderma 213, 178–184. Li, L., Fassnacht, F.E., Storch, I., Bürgi, M., 2017. Land-use regime shift triggered the recent degradation of alpine pastures in Nyanpo Yutse of the eastern Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. Landscape Ecol. 32 (11), 2187–2203. Liu, L.M., Zhao, Y.W., Xie, H., 2003. Study on regional characteristics of rangeland degradation of China and its control strategies for sustainable use and management. China Popul. Resour. Environ. 13 (4), 46–50 (in Chinese). Liu, W., Chen, S., Zhao, Q., Sun, Z., Ren, J., Qin, D., 2014. Variation and control of soil organic carbon and other nutrients in permafrost regions on central Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. Environ. Res. Lett. 9, 11. Lu, X., Kelsey, K.C., Yan, Y., Sun, J., Wang, X., Cheng, G., Neff, J.C., 2017. Effects of grazing on ecosystem structure and function of alpine grasslands in Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau: a synthesis. Ecosphere 8 (1), e01656. Ma, M., Qiao, G.H., 2015. Correlation analysis between the institutional changes and grassland study of Xilinguole. Res. Agric. Moder. 35 (5), 803–810 (in Chinese). Ma, W.M., Ding, K.Y., Li, Z.W., 2016. Comparison of soil carbon and nitrogen stocks at grazing-excluded and yak grazed alpine meadow sites in Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, China. Ecol. Eng. 87 203211. Miehe, G., Miehe, S., Kaiser, K., Reudenbach, C., Behrendes, L., Duo, L., Schlutz, F., 2009. How old is pastoralism in Tibet? An ecological approach to the making of a Tibetan landscape. Palaeogeogr. Palaeoclimatol. Palaeoecol. 276, 130–147. Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Krambeck, H., 2002. Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Nature 415, 424–426. Moritz, M., 2016. Open property regimes. Int. J. Commons 10 (2), 688–708. Næss, M.W., 2013. Climate change, risk management and the end of, nomadic pastoralism. Int. J. Sustain. Dev. World 20 (2), 123–133. Niu, K., He, J.S., Zhang, S., Lechowicz, M.J., 2016. Tradeoffs between forage quality and soil fertility: lessons from Himalayan rangelands. Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 234, 31–39. Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., Nowak, M.A., 2006. A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks. Nature 441 (7092), 502. Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C.B., Norgaard, R.B., Policansky, D., 1999. Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges. Science 284 (5412), 278–282. Robinett, D., Miller, D., Bedunah, D., 2008. Central Afghanistan rangelands: a history of tribal rule, grazing, war, and rebuilding. Rangelands 30 (4), 2–12. Rothstein, B., 2000. Trust, social dilemmas and collective memories. J. Theor. Polit. 12 (4), 477–501. Runge, C.F., 1986. Common property and collective action in economic development. World Dev. 14 (5), 623–635. Schermer, M., Darnhofer, I., Daugstad, K., Gabillet, M., Lavorel, S., Steinbacher, M., 2016. Institutional impacts on the resilience of mountain grasslands: an analysis based on

Ao, M., Ito, M., Ito, K., 2008. Floristic compositions of Inner Mongolian grasslands under different land-use conditions. Grassl. Sci. 54, 173–178. Biggs, E.M., Bruce, E., Boruff, B., Duncan, J.M.A., Horsley, J., Pauli, N., McNeill, K., Neef, A., Ogtrop, F.V., Curnow, J., Haworth, B., Duce, S., Imanari, Y., 2015. Sustainable development and the water–energy–food nexus: a perspective on livelihoods. Environ. Sci. Policy 54, 389–397. Briske, D.D., Bestelmeyer, B.T., Stringham, T.K., Shaver, P.L., 2008. Recommendations for development of resilience-based state-and-transition models. Rangel. Ecol. Manag. 61 (4), 359–367. Cai, H., Li, W.J., 2016. A Study on efficiency and equity of rangeland management on Qinghai-Tibet Plateau in different property right systems. J. Nat. Resour. 31 (8), 1302–1309 (in Chinese). Cai, R.J., Min, W.Y., 2003. Thoughts on the problem of the present breeding in fence and its solution. J. Northwestern Nat. Univ.: Philos. Soc. Sci. Ed. 5, 41–44 (in Chinese). Cai, H., Yang, X., Xu, X., 2015. Human-induced grassland degradation/restoration in the central Tibetan Plateau: the effects of ecological protection and restoration projects. Ecol. Eng. 83, 112–119. Cao, J.J., Xiong, Y.J., Sun, J., Xiong, W.F., Du, G.Z., 2011a. Differential benefits of multiand single- household grassland management patterns in the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau of China. Hum. Ecol. 39 (2), 217–227. Cao, J.J., Holden, N.M., Lu, X.T., Du, G.Z., 2011b. The effect of grazing management on plant species richness on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. Grass Forage Sci. 66 (3), 333–336. Cao, J.J., Yeh, E.T., Holden, N.M., Yang, Y., Du, G.Z., 2013a. The effects of enclosures and land-use contracts on rangeland degradation on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. J. Arid Environ. 97 (10), 3–8. Cao, J.J., Yeh, E.T., Holden, N.M., Qin, Y.Y., Ren, Z.W., 2013b. The roles of overgrazing, climate change and policy as drivers of degradation of China’s grasslands. Nomad. People. 17 (2), 82–101. Cao, J.J., Xu, X.Y., Yang, S.R., Li, M.T., Gong, Y.F., Zhou, J.J., 2017a. Advance in the reasons for two different grassland use patterns formed and their each effects on the socio-ecological system on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. J. Nat. Resour. 32 (12), 2149–2159 (in Chinese). Cao, J.J., Gong, Y.F., Yeh, E.T., Holden, N.M., Adamowski, J.F., 2017b. Impact of grassland contract policy on soil organic carbon losses from alpine grassland on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. Soil Use Manage. 33, 663–671. Cao, J.J., Li, M.T., Deo, R.C., Adamowski, J.F., Cerdà, A., Feng, Q., Liu, M.X., Zhang, J., Zhu, G.F., Zhang, X.B., Xu, X.Y., Yang, S.R., Gong, Y.F., 2018a. Comparison of socialecological resilience between two grassland management patterns driven by grassland land contract policy in the Maqu, Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. Land Use Policy 74, 88–96. Cao, J.J., Xu, X.Y., Deo, R.C., Holden, N.M., Adamowski, J.F., Gong, Y.F., Feng, Q., Yang, S.R., Li, M.T., Zhou, J.J., Zhang, J., Liu, M.X., 2018b. Multi-household grazing management pattern maintains better soil fertility. Agron. Sustain. Dev. 38 (1), 6. Chen, B., Zhang, X., Tao, J., Wu, J., Wang, J., Shi, P., Zhang, Y., Yu, C., 2014. The impact of climate change and anthropogenic activities on alpine grassland over the QinghaiTibet Plateau. Agric. Forest Meteorol. 189–190, 11–18. Chen, D., Xu, B., Yao, T., Guo, Z., Cui, P., Chen, F., Zhang, T., 2015. Assessment of past, present and future environmental changes on the Tibetan Plateau. Chin. Sci. Bull. (Chinese Version) 60, 3025–3035. Chen, H.Y., Zhu, T., 2015. The dilemma of property rights and indigenous institutional arrangements for common resources governance in China. Land Use Policy 42, 800–805. Cowie, A., Orr, B., Sanchez, V.M.C., Chasek, P.S., Crossman, N.D., Erlewein, A., Louwagie, G., Maronh, M., Metternichti, G.I., Minellic, S., Tengbergj, A.E., Walterk, S., Welton, S., 2018. Land in balance: the scientific conceptual framework for land degradation neutrality. Environ. Sci. Policy 79, 25–35. Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., Stern, P.C., 2008. The struggle to govern the commons. In: Shulenberger, E., Endlicher, W., Alberti, M., Bradley, G., Ryan, C., ZumBrunnen, C., Simon, U. (Eds.), Urban Ecology. Springer, Boston MA, pp. 611–622. Dlamini, P., Chivenge, P., Manson, A., Chaplot, V., 2014. Land degradation impact on soil organic carbon and nitrogen stocks of sub-tropical humid grasslands in South Africa. Geoderma 235–236, 372–381. Dong, Q.M., Zhao, X.Q., Wu, G.L., Shi, J.J., Wang, Y.L., Sheng, L., 2012. Response of soil properties to yak grazing intensity in a Kobresia parva-meadow on the QinghaiTibetan Plateau, China. J. Soil Sci. Plant Nut. 12 (3), 535–546. Dutta, P.K., Sundaram, R.K., 1993. The tragedy of the commons? Econ. Theory 3 (3), 413–426. Elsenbroich, C., Verhagen, H., 2016. The simplicity of complex agents: a contextual action framework for computational agents. Mind Soc. 15 (1), 131–143. Feeny, D., Berkes, F., McCay, B.J., Acheson, J.M., 1990. The tragedy of the commons: twenty-two years later. Hum. Ecol. 18 (1), 1–19. Fernandez-Gimenez, M.F., 2002. Spatial and social boundaries and the paradox of pastoral land tenure: a case study from post-socialist Mongolia. Hum. Ecol. 30 (1), 49–78. Flanagan, C., Laituri, M., 2004. Local cultural knowledge and water resource management: the wind river Indian reservation. Environ. Manage. 33 (2), 262–277. Foggin, M., 2012. Pastoralists and wildlife conservation in western China: collaborative management within protected areas on the Tibetan Plateau. Pastor. Res. Policy Pract. 2, 17. Franco, D., Luiselli, L., 2014. Shared ecological knowledge and wetland values: a case study. Land Use Policy 41 (4), 526–532. Franzén, F., Hammer, M., Balfors, B., 2015. Institutional development for stakeholder participation in local water management-an analysis of two Swedish catchments. Land Use Policy 43, 217–227. Fu, Y., Grumbine, R.E., Wilkes, A., Wang, Y., Xu, J.C., Yang, Y.P., 2012. Climate change

196

Environmental Science and Policy 89 (2018) 192–197

J.J. Cao et al.

Land Degrad. Dev. 28 (4), 1311–1319. Wuyunga, Mao, X., 2016. Economic performance of grassland contracting system evolution: an empirical analysis of Inner Mongolia. Chin. Agricult. Sci. Bull. 32 (11), 194–198 in Chinese. Xu, W., Zhu, M., Zhang, Z., Ma, Z., Liu, H., Chen, L., Cao, G., Zhao, X., Schmid, B., He, J.S., 2018. Experimentally simulating warmer and wetter climate additively improves rangeland quality on the Tibetan Plateau. J. Appl. Ecol. 1–12. Yang, Y.H., Fang, J.Y., Tang, Y.H., Ji, C.J., Zheng, C.Y., He, J.S., Zhu, B., 2008. Storage, patterns and controls of soil organic carbon in the Tibetan grasslands. Glob. Change Biol. Bioenergy 14, 1592–1599. Yang, G.C., Peng, H., Chen, F., Dong, W., Ning, Y., Yang, Y., Zhang, D., Zhu, Y., He, S., Shi, X., Zeng, T., Xi, T.T., Meng, Q., Zhu, Q., 2017. Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau peatland sustainable utilization under anthropogenic disturbances and climate change. Ecosyst. Health Sustain. 3 (3), e01263. Yeh, E.T., 2013. The politics of conservation in contemporary rural China. J. Peasant Stud. 40 (6), 1165–1188. Yeh, E.T., Gaerrang, 2011. Tibetan pastoralism in Neoliberalising China: continuity and change in Gouli. Area 43 (2), 165–172. Yeh, E.T., Nyima, Y., Hopping, K., Klein, J.A., 2014. Tibetan pastoralists’ vulnerability to climate change: a political ecology analysis of snowstorm coping capacity. Hum. Ecol. 42 (1), 61–74. Yeh, E.T., Samberg, L.H., Gaerrang, Volkmar, E., Harris, R.B., 2017. Pastoralist decisionmaking on the Tibetan Plateau. Hum. Ecol. 45 (3), 333–343. You, Q.G., Xue, X., Peng, F., Xu, M.H., Duan, H.C., Dong, S.Y., 2014. Comparison of ecosystem characteristics between degraded and intact alpine meadow in the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, China. Ecol. Eng. 71, 133–143. Yu, L., Farrell, K.N., 2013. Individualized pastureland use: responses of herders to institutional arrangements in pastoral china. Hum. Ecol. 41 (5), 759–771. Yu, L., Farrell, K.N., 2016. The Chinese perspective on pastoral resource economics: a vision of the future in a context of socio-ecological vulnerability. Revue scientifique et technique 35 (2), 523–531 (in Chinese). Yu, L., Yi, J., 2012. Pastureland governance form a perspective of property right. Practacult. Sci. 29 (12), 1920–1925 in Chinese. Zhou, G., Zhou, X., He, Y., Shao, J., Hu, Z., Liu, R., Zhou, H., Hosseini-Bai, S., 2016. Grazing intensity significantly affects belowground carbon and nitrogen cycling in grassland ecosystems: a meta-analysis. Glob. Change Biol. Bioenergy 23 (3), 1167.

three European case studies. Land Use Policy 52, 382–391. Schutz, A.B., 2010. Grassland governance and common-interest communities. Sustainability 2 (7), 2320–2348. Shang, Z.H., Cao, J.J., Guo, R.Y., Long, R.J., Deng, B., 2014. The response of soil organic carbon and nitrogen 10years after returning cultivated alpine steppe to grassland by abandonment or reseeding. Catena 119 (1), 28–35. Shao, J.F., Shen, H.Y., 2011. The outflow of academic papers from China: why is it happening and can it be stemmed? Learn. Publ. 24 (2), 95–97. Sun, Q.L., Sun, Z.B., Liu, T.P., 2014. The herdsmen’s cognition and behavior about grassland ecological protection—based on the eepirical analysis on 75 villages in Tibet. J. Arid Land Resour. Environ. 28 (8), 26–31 (in Chinese). Tang, R.F., Gavin, M.C., 2015. Degradation and re-emergence of the commons: the impacts of government policies on traditional resource management institutions in China. Environ. Sci. Policy 52, 89–98. Török, P., Hölzel, N., Diggelen, R.V., Tischew, S., 2016. Grazing in European open landscapes: how to reconcile sustainable land management and biodiversity conservation? Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. 234, 1–4. UNCCD, 2016. Report of the Conference of the parties on its twelfth session, held in Ankara from 12 to 23 October 2015. Part two: Actions. ICCD/COP(12)/20/ Add.1.United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. UNCCD, Bonn. Wang, G.X., Qian, J., Cheng, G.D., Lai, Y.M., 2002. Soil organic carbon pool of grassland soils on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau and its global implication. Sci. Total Environ. 291, 207–217. Wang, P., Lassoie, J.P., Morreale, S.J., Dong, S.K., 2015a. A critical review of socioeconomic and natural factors in ecological degradation on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, China. Rangeland J. 37 (1), 1–9. Wang, D., Wu, G.L., Liu, Y., Yang, Z., Hao, H.M., 2015b. Effects of grazing exclusion on CO2, fluxes in a steppe grassland on the Loess Plateau (China). Ecol. Eng. 83, 169–175. Wang, Z., Zhang, Y., Yang, Y., Zhou, W., Gang, C., Zhang, Y., 2016. Quantitative assess the driving forces on the grassland degradation in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, in China. Ecol. Inform. 33, 32–44. Wang, H., Liu, H., Wang, Y., Xu, W., Liu, A., Ma, Z., Mi, Z., Zhang, Z., Wang, S., He, J., 2017. Warm- and cold- season grazing affect soil respiration differently in alpine grasslands. Agric. Ecosyst. Environ. Appl. Soil Ecol. 248, 136–143. Wu, G.L., Dong, W., Yu, L., Ding, L.M., Liu, Z.H., 2017. Warm-season grazing benefits species diversity conservation and topsoil nutrient sequestration in alpine meadow.

197