VIEWPOINT
Can nuclear energy contribute to slowing global warming? Jan Murray
An important source of greenhouse gases, in particular C02, is fossil fuel combustion for energy applications. Since nuclear power is an energy source that does not produce C02, the question has been raised as to what part it may play in mitigating the greenhouse effect. This article examines that question. In doing so it recognizes, however, that we cannot deal with one environmental problem in isolation. The article, therefore, seeks to identify the range of factors which need to be assessed for a balanced evaluation of nuclear energy's potential role. Keywords: Nuclear energy; Global warming; Fossil fuel Jan Murray is Secretary-General, The Uranium Institute, 12th Floor, Bowater House, 68 Knightsbridge, London SWlX 7LT, UK. The views expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Uranium Institute.
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As the 1980s drew to a close much attention focussed on the potential warming of the earth's atmosphere by increased concentrations of so-called greenhouse gases. It is not the purpose of this article to reach a judgement on the complex and sometimes conflicting evidence for the warming effect. There is, however, sufficient consensus about its potential seriousness to ensure that the search for measures to deal with it will be a preoccupation of the 1990s.
The scale of the problem Analysis of possible solutions to global warming involves making many assumptions about the future in areas of great uncertainty. It is, therefore, helpful to identify assumptions of which we can be relatively certain. I shall venture two predictions of importance to the environmental impact of fossil fuel combustion which I believe to reflect the reality we face, irrespective of what might theoretically be possible. First, global use of energy, and more especially of electricity, will increase significantly in the next decade or two. This is not to overlook measures to achieve greater efficiency of energy use and energy conservation. Some simple sums, taking into account the rate of increase of the world's population and quite modest levels of per capita energy consumption, make it absolutely clear that energy efficiency and conservation are essential. By the same token, howev-
er, energy efficiency and conservation are unlikely to do more than slow down somewhat the rate of increase. Even in the industrialized countries, where there is certainly potential for conservation, there are limitations on both the speed and depth of possible cuts in energy use. Constraints include the rate at which energy consuming equipment is replaced, public acceptance of the necessary measures, the differing efficiency levels already achieved, the rising cost of achieving cuts beyond a certain point, and (regarding electricity) the tendency of energy efficiency to favour electricity use. In the developing countries the potential for constraining growth in energy use is much less. While there is unquestionably energy wastage in the developing countries, the potential for conservation is dwarfed by the implications of the expanding population and its present low average per capita energy consumption in absolute terms. Second, and over the same period, an increasing share of this expanding production of electricity will be by fossil fuel combustion, in particular, coal. This looks probable notwithstanding any policies to counteract this that may be put in place, for example, through international or regional initiatives. The present momentum of coal expansion and the need for the electricity is too great. Coal consumption in China and India is officially forecast to increase by 100% and 214% respectively by 2000, and the
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evidence for the likely increased use of coal goes far beyond these two countries. 1 The conclusion to be drawn from these predictions is that - if emissions of greenhouse gases from the combustion of fossil fuels are a problem - then we have not yet witnessed the full magnitude of that problem. This leads to a third prediction of which one can be very confident: there will be no one single way of alleviating this problem. Rather the solution must be sought in a sum of smaller contributions to it.
The potential contribution of nuclear energy The first point to be made is that nuclear energy is already playing a role in containing the emissions of fossil fuel combustion. There are currently some 430 operating nuclear plants in the world with total capacity of nearly 320 GWe, producing about 17% of the world's electricity and a higher percentage in the industrialized countries. 2 Generation of this electricity by coal would have required the burning of some 650 million tonnes of coal resulting in emissions of some 1.6 billion tonnes of CO2. This 'greenhouse gas'-free electricity source is already the second largest in the industrialized countries and third worldwide. Some further expansion in the short term, based on plants under construction or substantially planned, is judged likely by the Uranium Institute, principally in countries with established nuclear programmes. In its most recent report on uranium demand, 3 nuclear capacity in Western countries is forecast to expand by nearly 60 G W e by 2000. Nonetheless, compared with total fossil fuel combustion, and still more with its likely 1E. Iansiti and F. Niehaus, 'Impact of energy production on atmospheric concen- scale in the future, this contribution is tration of greenhouse gases', IAEA Bulle- relatively modest. The question we tin, 2/1989. must, therefore, ask is: what greater 2IAEA Newsbrief~, January/February contribution could nuclear energy 1990. 3Uranium Market Issues: 1989--2005, The potentially make? Since the dominant use of nuclear Uranium Institute, London, July 1989. 4Iansiti and Niehaus, op cit, Ref 1. energy is electricity generation, the ST. Wigley, 'The greenhouse effect: scien- basic constraint on its capacity to retific assessment of climate change', Ura- duce greenhouse gas emissions is the nium and Nuclear Energy: 1989, Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Symposium, extent of fossil fired electricity. Coal, oil and natural gas currently supply The Uranium Institute, London.
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about 63% of the world's electricity, resulting in the emission of approximately 6-7 billion tonnes CO2. This is a small fraction of total CO2 emissions, but is significant in terms of the imbalance between CO2 production and absorption, which is producing the net increase in concentrations. It is also significant in terms of what may be amenable to corrective action, being some quarter of the man-made CO2 emissions. 4 In addition to CO2 emissions from combustion, natural gas transport also gives rise to methane leaks. While methane is estimated to play a smaller part in global warming than CO2, use of gas for electricity production is increasing and increments in methane concentration are significant given that methane's efficiency as a greenhouse gas is some 27 times that of CO2 .5 The potential scope for curtailing greenhouse gas emissions through nuclear electricity is therefore significant and, with the expansion of fossil fired electricity already postulated, will grow still more so. In addition, opportunities for substitution beyond electricity applications may open up. Nuclear energy is already used in a very minor way for process heat and district heating purposes. Expanded heat applications, either via combined heat and power, or dedicated heating reactors, would increase nuclear energy's scope to substitute for fossil fuel combustion. In addition, several developments are possible which would extend the use of electricity. For example, electricity's role in transport is currently largely restricted to public transport (trains, trams and trolley buses). Greater use of public transport would tend to enhance electricity's role. Meanwhile more environmentally benign cars are being sought - the successful development of electric cars would greatly increase nuclear energy's ability to be substituted for fossil fuels in the transport sector. Technical advances in the storage of electricity, or in the production of hydrogen as an energy fuel, would likewise offer new potential for expanding the use of electricity, and hence the use of nuclear electricity.
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Factors affecting nuclear expansion If the foregoing considerations represent a theoretical outer limit to the potential nuclear contribution, we must then ask: what factors directly affect the expansion of nuclear generation beyond its present level? Uranium resources
6Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the IAEA, Paris, France, March 1988. 7Bp Statistical Review of World Energy, The British Petroleum Company pie, London, 1989. 8D.H. Meadows, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers and W.W. Behrens. The Limits to Growth: A Report of the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind, Earth Island Limited, London, 1972. 9World Nuclear Industry Handbook, Nuclear Engineering International, London, 1990.
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According to official figures, uranium resources in the Western world today stand at around 2.2 million tonnes of reasonably assured resources and 1.3 million tonnes of additional estimated resources, using the O E C D / I A E A resource category of extraction cost up to $130/kg. 6 At today's rate of utilizat i o n in the W e s t e r n w o r l d this amounts to 51 and 28 years consumption for the two categories respectively. However, these figures have only limited practical significance. We have rather little idea of how much economically retrievable uranium there is. Resource estimation is an art not a science. Its most solid basis is the physical exploration that happens to have taken place. Compared to coal and oil, there has been relatively little exploration for uranium. Known resources have comfortably exceeded anticipated demand for most of the history of commercial nuclear power. When concern arose about the adequacy of supply in the 1970s, the exploration activity this prompted uncovered so much uranium that there has been little commercial incentive to spend money on exploration since. There are a number of reasons to believe that, when the commercial conditions exist for a renewal of exploration activity, considerable new quantities of uranium will be found. This has been the case for other resources - oil reserves were reported at 123 billion tonnes in 1989. 7 In 1972 the Club of Rome reported oil reserves at 62 billion tonnes. 8 In practice, oil reserves have stood at around 30--40 years of current consumption for several decades - discovery has at least equalled consumption. As mentioned, the earth's crust has been far less thoroughly scoured for uranium than it has for oil. In addi-
tion, we do not yet know what resources lie in the Comecon area. There have been some suggestions, however, that Soviet u r a n i u m resources are really quite substantial. There is, therefore, no reason to believe that uranium reserves will constrain any likely expansion of nuclear energy in the coming decades. Ultimately uranium, like the fossil fuels, is a depletable resource. However, the longer-term possibility of commercializing the breeder reactor, assuming it is realized, would make uranium an almost infinite resource. Lead-times
If uranium resources and the possibility of the breeder would permit substantial expansion of nuclear energy, the lead-times involved constitute a very practical constraint on the rate at which it can be developed. The critical lead-time is that for constructing a nuclear power plant. The record on this is varied. Leadtimes of seven years or less from start of construction to commercial operation are quite typical in a number of countries, while, for example, Belgium, F r a n c e , South Korea, and Sweden have all achieved construction times of five years on certain plants. Some plants in the USA have also achieved short construction periods, for example, in the 1960s many plants took only four years to construct and more recently the St Lucie 2 plant in Florida was constructed in six years. However, the average in the USA for reactors entering operation in the 1980s was 11.5 years, while the Dungeness B2 plant in the UK took 22 years. 9 Lead-times are subject to many influences, of which the most important are probably regulatory predictability and whether the plant uses an established design and is part of a standardized series. In the absence of notable progress in respect to these points, a realistic estimate of typical lead-time is probably about eight years. A contribution from nuclear energy beyond the plants already under construction or at an advanced stage of planning will thus await at least the passage of this time. Some questions have been raised as
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Viewpoint to whether the reactor manufacturing and fuel processing plant needed for a significant expansion of nuclear capacity could be made available. In practice, there is excess capacity for most of these steps today. Moreover, as was seen in the 1970s when estimates of rapid growth in electricity demand led to large-scale ordering of plant, manufacturing capacity can be developed quite rapidly. For example, in the five years from 1973, France went from having five to 30 plants under construction simultaneously. It is likely that manufacturing and processing capacity could keep pace with any probable increase in demand.
Capital requirements and comparative costs The economics of nuclear energy are characterized by relatively high capital costs. A significant constraint on a major expansion is the financing of the initial capital requirements of the plants. A recent study gives estimates of capital cost of about US$1.5-2 billion for a 1 G W e plant. This compares to capital costs for similar sized coal plants of US$.8-1.6 billion according to the same study. 1° Some developing countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan, with healthy foreign exchange balances can deal with the capital investment for nuclear plant. Others, such as India, have developed indigenous reactor construction capacity, which at least avoids the foreign exchange burden. For most developing countries, the capital requirements pose real difficulty - the main reason why China scaled back the number of nuclear plants to be ordered from foreign suppliers was almost certainly balance of payments considerations related to the capital investment. The 'build/operate/transfer' (BOT) approach may offer one way to respond to this problem. Under this arrangement, a foreign supplier, probably from an industrialized country, l°Projected Costs of Generating Electricity from Power Stations for Commissioning in finances the construction and is grathe Period 1995-2000, OECD Nuclear dually repaid through electricity sales. Energy Agency/International Energy Countries in Eastern Europe may well Agency, Paris, France, 1989. turn to this approach as a way of liThe Financial Times, 3 February 1989. obtaining Western technology. Tur12L. Howles, 'Nuclear station achievement 1988', Nuclear Engineering International, key has also proposed this model for constructing a nuclear power plant, April 1989, pp 22-23.
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but to date no supplier has been able to agree on the terms of a B O T offer. If the international community becomes serious about stabilizing fossil fuel combustion in the developing world, financial assistance mechanisms will almost certainly be needed. Nuclear power is not the only nonfossil energy source which calls for high advance capital expenditure hydroelectricity has particularly high capital costs, as do tidal barriers (by way of example, the capital cost of the 7.2 MWe Severn barrage in the UK is reported to be UK£8.5 billion)J 1 The issue will have to be tackled. While capital cost constitutes a direct challenge to expansion, the overall comparative costs (including operating costs) of the options available matter, as there is an opportunity cost to using an unnecessarily expensive one. H i s t o r i c a l l y nuclear costs have varied considerably. As mentioned, construction times have been as short as five and as long as 22 years, with a significant corresponding variation in the impact of the interest burden on costs. A second factor which is important where capital costs are high, and which has contributed to the range of cost results, is the load factor achieved by plants in operation. In 1988 load factors were generally 60-80%, but ranged from 91.2% for Finland to 52% for India. 12 The study of relative nuclear and coal costs in O E C D countries cited earlier found that nuclear energy was cheaper than coal-fired electricity except in parts of Canada, the west and mid-west of the USA, the Netherlands and Spain based on estimates of plants being commissioned in the mid-1990s. However, the finding was very sensitive to the underlying assumptions used, particularly for future coal costs and the discount rate. Low coal prices have reduced the margin everywhere and in some places, as mentioned, have tipped the balance in favour of coal. Significantly the figures used in the study did not reflect consistent assumptions about the environmental costs of coal generated electricity, which are far from being fully defined as yet. All the countries covered include allowances for waste manage-
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Viewpoint merit and decommissioning in the nuclear kWe costs) 3 For the future, it will be important to achieve shorter average construction times and more consistently high plant performance records for nuclear energy to regain a clear economic advantage. It is also likely that fossil fuels will increasingly be required to bear the environmental costs related to them.
West in a continuous process of exchange of operating experience. The Western nuclear industry has long operated before an audience of vocal critics and this is an important safety factor. In the wake of Chernobyl, some commentators expressed the view that the accident would have been less likely in a country in which critics were more free to voice their challenges. With the political changes taking place, the Soviet nuclear indusSafety requirements try now has its own domestic critics Nuclear energy is a demanding tech- too. I believe that ultimately this will nology in terms of safety standards be in the interests of safety. and quality control. A t all stages it The demands of nuclear safety calls for well trained personnel, ex- pose, however, a further constraint on perienced, dedicated management the rate at which nuclear energy can and what is now called a 'safety cul- be expanded. It takes time to develop ture'. Clearly we would not wish to appropriately trained and experienced avoid one set of environmental prob- people and, in the earlier stages of lems associated with fossil fuel com- industrial development, the pool of bustion, only to suffer another result- skilled personnel that exists is needed ing from inadequate nuclear safety. for many tasks. Inevitably there have been errors Safe nuclear energy must include and incidents, but the mechanisms de- the safe management of radioactive signed to ensure that the radioactive waste. Two questions need to be fuel remains contained have normally asked. One is 'can it be done?' and the proved effective. Even at Three Mile other is 'will it be done?' Nuclear Island, where operator errors led to scientists are confident that nuclear over half of the fuel melting, the con- waste can be managed safely. They tainment vessel was not breached and have an obligation to show people that performed its protective function. 14 this is so, and politicians looking to This was not so at Chernobyl in 1986, nuclear energy to help mitigate the however. If nuclear power is to contri- greenhouse effect must provide the bute to solving environmental prob- political will to permit the necessary lems, we must be confident that there steps to be taken. While there are will not be further accidents that re- sound technical reasons to delay the lease significant amounts of radiation final disposal of the most radioactive to the environment as happened at waste for some 40 or 50 years, efforts Chernobyl. to date to take the desirable preparaWe do learn from experience and tory steps and to deal with low level there are good reasons to believe that radioactive waste have been inadequthis condition can be met. The West- ate in many cases. The public will ern countries initiated many changes reasonably demand more evidence after the (much less serious) Three that what can be done will be done, Mile Island accident. A n organization before it supports a significant further - the Institute for Nuclear Power Op- expansion of nuclear energy. erations (INPO) - was founded to ensure that this and other relevant Public confidence experience was available to all US In practical terms, nuclear energy can utilities, as well as many European only be developed with a reasonable and Japanese ones. In 1989 another degree of public confidence. I shall very important step was taken with the mention just two of many reasons: the launching of the World Association of nuclear industry needs sites and it Nuclear Operators ( W A N O ) in re- needs to attract high quality people to 130p cit, Ref 10. ~4j. Varley, 'End to clean-up programme in sponse to Chernobyl. The organiza- its workforce. Both of these things sight', Nuclear Engineering International, tion brings together nuclear power become extremely difficult in a hostile March 1989, pp 27-33. station operators in the East and the climate of opinion.
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Viewpoint Public attitudes were deeply affected by the accident at Chernobyl, especially in Europe. Opinion polls show a trend back towards preChernobyl attitudes, but the effect remains, and more recently Chernobyl has sparked more debate over nuclear energy in Japan. 15 As with other aspects, the picture is varied. In the U S A , which was not directly affected by Chernobyl, and where publicity in 1988 about the greenhouse effect was more intense, opinion has shown a trend towards cautious support for nuclear power. In a poll conducted in July 1989 some 81% of Americans agreed that nuclear energy should play a 'very' or 'somewhat important' role in the new national energy strategy being developed by the Bush administration. 16 But generally much remains to be done to win a higher degree of public confidence in, and support for, nuclear power.
the plant to be prefabricated at the factory, should reduce capital costs and, with some of the designs, permit capacity to be added in smaller increments as demand requires. Standardization of designs reduces capital costs through the economies of replication and shortening regulatory procedures. Fuel cycle innovations, including novel fuel design, are expected to contribute to safety and favourable economics. These measures should lead to increased safety, reduced lead-times and capital costs, and improved load factors and economics. With improved economics and, above all, enhanced safety through simpler designs, public confidence can be strengthened. This work is not a 'technical fix' that will rapidly remove all the constraints. It will be some time before a realistic evaluation of these projects can be made. However, there is evidence of a new willingness to think afresh which should produce valuable progress.
Current developments
XSSee for example the opinion research quoted in; Energy and the Public, Report Vol 1, 1989, World Energy Conference, London, 1989. a6poll by TeleNation-Market Facts, Inc, conducted 29-30 July 1989. 17j. Griffith, 'New fission reactor designs', op cit, Ref 5.
Substantial efforts are being undertaken to tackle the challenges facing the nuclear industry. One aspect is the systematic exchange of operating and s a f e t y i n f o r m a t i o n . A n o t h e r increasingly important aspect is the various initiatives being taken to reevaluate reactor design. The present generation of nuclear reactors has developed directly from designs which were first built in the 1950s and 1960s, even though unit sizes and safety requirements have increased considerably since then. Essentially the basic designs and assumptions remained the same and additional safety features were added. Now, particularly, although not only in the USA, companies and governments are spending money on developing and testing fresh approaches to reactor design. 17 Efforts are focussed on four concepts. Increased emphasis on passive safety mechanisms - based on natural p h y s i c a l p h e n o m o n a r a t h e r than mechanical devices - is expected to simplify designs and reduce reliance on operator actions. Modular construction, which will permit more of
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Conclusions
1. The scale of fossil fuel combustion will increase as will, therefore, any environmental problems, such as the greenhouse effect, produced by it. Numerous measures will be needed to respond effectively to this problem. 2. Nuclear energy is already making a contribution to restraining greenhouse gas emissions. Experience shows that, if well managed, nuclear energy is economic and safe. 3. Expansion of the nuclear contribution in the short term can only be relatively modest. Energy efficiency measures, particularly in the industrialized countries, may well offer more immediate potential to contain greenhouse gas emissions. 4. The 'greenhouse' effect and the other environmental problems arising from fossil fuel combustion are global and long-term. 5. In the longer term, nuclear energy can make a significant contribution both in the industrialized countries and in the more populous developing countries, provided that the momentum of nuclear development is maintained.
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