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Canada-India nuclear cooperation: a rejoinder to a rebuttal
canada-india nuclear cooperation: a rejoinder to a rebuttal George
BINDON
Science and Human Quebec,
and Sitoo
Affairs
Programme,
Concordia
University,
Montreal,
Canada
MUKERJI
Department
of Liberal
Manchester,
UK
Studies in Science,
University
of Manchester,
The rebuttal to our article ‘Canada-India Nuclear Cooperation ’ by Morrison and Wonder, while forceful in tone, lacks clarity - it displays a ‘scattergun’ approach that makes it difficult to determine from where the fire is coming. Many of their assertions, although presented as contradictions to what was said in our article, simply reiterate positions we stated. In the end, they present no clear policy position other than to give the impression that whatever it was that Canada has done in relation to the development and export of nuclear technology is somehow exemplary. They seem to introduce three categories by which the relationship between the Canadian and Indian programmes could be characterized: partnership, customer-supplier, or aid. They initially seem to accept that, after the CIRUS experimental reactor, the relationship was not one of Canada giving ‘aid’ to the Indian nuclear industry. However, they are not prepared to accept the term ‘partnership’ as being descriptive of the cooperative agreement. Rather, they insist that India was simply a customer, purchasing the CANDU technology. Unfortunately, later in their response, they cannot resist demoting the Indian role to the final category: ‘India obtained from Canada an advanced nuclear technology which was developed at considerable cost . . . [and] . . was transferred for the purpose of aiding in India’s development’ (our emphasis). Well, was it a question of a customer-supplier relationship, or aid? We, of course, claim that cooperation and/or partnership is a much more accurate description of the relationship. And the evidence is quite clear. The acquisition of the two ‘turn key’ 190 MGW General Electric units from the Research Policy S(I979)
191-198
North-Holland
192
G. Bindon and S. ,lllukerji
United States involving soft loans, was aid, or at best, a purchase. The CIRUS reactor received from Canada was ‘aid’ (although the connotation ‘aid’ is quite questionable
of the term
even in this case). However, the case of the RAPP
reactors was quite another matter. CANDU. at the time of the purchase, was clearly not a developed system. The Indians entered into the cooperative programme (and that is what it was called) at a time at which Canada had only a few balky experimental reactors in operation. So did the Indians. The decision to commit to a heavy water, natural uranium commercial energy system was thus made at essentially the same time m both countries. A reading of the two agreements between the United States and India, and Canada and India, for the Tarapur and Rajasthan reactors respectively, signed only two months apart in 1963, is very instructive [I, 2, 31. While the U.S.India document is a highly restricted (with a 30 year term) and somewhat condescending one-sided ‘turn key’ sale, the Canada-India agreement is a fully reciprocal, open-ended cooperative industrial venture with only an eight year life, after which presumably, transfer of know-how to third parties would be permitted. The differences are striking. The Indians obtained a deal with Canada that spread the risks and reduced the time necessary to achieve a fully indigenous and independent nuclear industrial capability. The same was true for Canada. No doubt both countries had the intention and capability to proceed alone, but it was in both their interests to collaborate. What effects an alternative approach would have had on the two countries’ timetables and success is a matter of conjecture. That they were both advancing boldly from step to step is clear, and that by moving ‘in step,’ the likelihood of faltering was reduced. We do not suggest that the Canadian
decision to go ahead with CANDU was
not based on an assessment of indigenous criteria. In fact we elaborate on the reasons Canada, and in particular Ontario Hydro, supported the development of CANDU. We also identify the equally compelling, although somewhat dissimilar, reasons that India had for entering such an uncertain arrangement. Although the risks of the venture were high, the potential payoffs in terms of independence, lesser long term strain on hard currency reserves, and future potential, made rt attractive. There is good reason to now feel that the Indians were quite shrewd in their judgements. The RAPP reactors involved commercial hard currency loans with ‘strings’ attached (80% tied to purchases in Canada) and as such were not aid. By entering the programme before Canada had anything commercial to sell, and committing hard currency that likely made the cost and risk comparatively higher for India than for Canada, is something considerably different than purchasing a developed product. As such India was. at least, investing in the
193
A rejoinder to a rebuttal
Canadian
programme.
Perhaps the sensitivity
on the part of Morrison
and
Wonder results from the possibility that we might be suggesting that the transfer of ‘know-how’ from India to Canada was equal to the knowledge India gained from Canada. We do not say this. The ‘know-how’ was largely generated in Canadian laboratories and fabricating plants. Yet there is some evidence that the unprecedented improvement in operating effectiveness seen between the Douglas Point reactor, and the first Pickering units, was in part a result-ofthe maintenance of workloads in the industry as a consequence of the Indian contracts. The original plans for Douglas Point called for two reactors rather than the one which was eventually built. The contracts from India for two Douglas Point type reactors assisted the Canadian industry in acquiring the crucial fabricating experience necessary to turn a technical concept into a commercially viable system, in part at someone else’s expense. In addition, the existence of an outside investor, and the obligations that this implied, were undoubtedly important to AECL during its formative years. The degree to which there was a reverse flow of information (from India to Canada), and its significance, is largely inaccessible and would be very difficult to measure. But it did occur. With the CIRUS reactor, for instance, problems with bacterial growth due to local conditions in the water and ambient temperature resulted in the choking of the cooling channels. This stumped the Canadians but was later solved by Indian personnel [7]. The technical and commercial value of the knowledge gained from the Indians in deploying CANDU systems under conditions quite different to those in Canada were undoubtedly useful to AECL in being able to give performance assurances to future customers in developing countries. During the period in question, the future of CANDU was anything but a certainty in Canada. ‘What if’ speculations about what might have happened if the Indian contracts had not existed are of limited value. We do not claim that the Canadian programme would have failed without Indian involvement ~ just that, as full risk-sharing partners and financial investors at a crucial point in the CANDU programme, the Indians contributed to the possibility of successfully moving To quote AECL: The expansions
from a technical
demonstration
to a commercial
reality.
of interest in the Canadian nuclear power reactor system
(resulting from the agreement with India) meant a larger and more diverse role for the Nuclear Power Plant division. To carry out this role, the division was reorganized as Power Projects . . . With the start of the design for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project and the engineering studies for other proposed plants under way, Power Projects was, . . . evolving into a large consulting engineering organization [4].
G Bindon and S. Mukerji
194
It is unclear why Morrison and Wonder spend a paragraph presenting
the view
taken by ‘. . . every serious analyst’ about the meaninglessness of distinguishing between peaceful and military nuclear explosions, since they agree that we agree with this view. We do not say that Canada should have necessarily taken action against India before the explosion, just that if Canada were to take action, it should have been before the explosion. We clearly demonstrate that Canada had no reason to be surprised about the Indian decision, that the agreements with India permitted the explosion without any violation, and that in fact, Canada unilaterally broke a signed agreement with India. We do not consider it moderate to break contracts and claim shock and indignation about a development Canada had no reason to be unaware of. We suggest that this indignation is all the more hollow considering the fact that Canada deploys nuclear weapons. is secure under an American nuclear umbrella, and seems to ignore (as do Morrison and Wonder) the grotesque failure of NPT with its ‘vertical’ proliferation, the development of the Chinese bomb, the ‘nuclearization’ of the Indian Ocean by the ‘great powers’ and their demonstrated unreliability as allies. We do not attempt to ‘. . . deny or rationalize the consequences’. They are quite foreboding. We do suggest, however, that the Indian action was consistent with its long-stated policy, and perhaps precipitated by odious external developments. For instance, the Indian Foreign Minister, speaking before the Lok Sabha, 27 March 1967 said: When the draft [of NPT] is given to us, we will carefully consider it, and the primary consideration, I ought to assure this House, is our national security. India stands in a unique position . . . [W]e are a non-aligned country and we are not under anybody’s political or any other umbrella. Therefore. there is no military pact under which we can be protected, if we are attacked by any nuclear power . . . We have the nuclear capability and we can explode the bomb . and we are under a continuing menace of a country which has already exploded the bomb . . . [W]e have also been insisting character . . . [6]
that
this treaty
should
be reciprocal
in
It may not have been a wise decision to detonate the device, but it does not seem that wisdom is a word that can describe the character of the ‘great strategic’ forces. Morrison and Wonder proclaim that, with Argentina and other purchasers of CANDU ‘[t]he pattern of the Indian loophole will not be repeated’ (and the admission that what they are discussing is a legal ‘loophole’ rather than hard realities is significant). But what does this mean? That instead of Canada breaking signed agreements when a nucltar explosion takes place, it will be
A rejoinder
195
to a rebuttal
the other party that will be breaking the agreement. And then, only if they have used the Canadian technology to do it. This is an example of ‘wink wink’ diplomacy -- as in: ‘We assume that you intend to remain a peaceful nuclear power “wink wink” (even if you refuse to sign NPT, openly discuss the military option and, like India. refrain from doing the deed until you have developed an independent capability and would thus not be purchasing any significant number of further nuclear items from Canada), and we will break off cooperation ifyou use our technology to produce nuclear explosives “wink wink” (even if you have cooperative agreements. as in the case of Argentina with India, that permit you to acquire assistance from another NPT non-signatory)’ [ 51. The legal technicalities. that like Pontius Pilate, will permit Canada to declare itself untainted, do not negate the facts. As in the Canadian domestic scene, the native skill at legalistic compromise is being overtaken by political realities. The policy is too smart by half and will, in the end, appear ineffective to our powerful neighbour who seeks to maintain the nuclear status quo, while to developing countries it may be seen as an awkward attempt to voice the values of the dominant western power while at the same time selling to all comers. We were reminded by Prime Minister Trudeau in his first speech before the United Nations General Assembly. on 16 May 1978. that Canada still deploys nuclear weapons. He then repeated the oft heard, but contradictory cliche, that Canada was the only country with the capability to develop nuclear weapons but chose not to do so. Of course, this is no longer true. The list of potential nuclear weapons states might include virtually all the members of the General Assembly if they were to really put their minds to it. He did go on to announce that Canada intended to end the deployment of nuclear weapons in the future. However, Canada continues to be a partner in alliances (NATO and NORAD) that depend on nuclear weaponry. We will carefully request non-nuclear responsibilities in military systems involving joint commands
and
‘deep’ integration
and that also have primarily
nuclear-based
strategies. The country will thus have its military nuclear ‘cake,’ while at the same time being able to ‘eat’ its peaceful and commercial nuclear frosting. Undoubtedly, the less than enthusiastic response to the Trudeau announcement is a consequence of a general awareness of these facts, particularly among countries of the Third World. And Morrison and Wonder chose to ignore the fact that throughout the period discussed, Canada deployed nuclear weapons in its armed forces. What, then, is meant by the peaceful ‘spirit’ that India was somehow expected to perceive and emulate in its dealings with Canada? Morrison and Wonder commend our position on the relationships between
G. Bindon and S. Mukerji
196 commercial
nuclear
power and the incentive
for a military
nuclear counter-
force as highly creative, although here they seem to have missed the point. The Western countries already have nuclear weapons based on their territories, or are ‘securely’ under a nuclear umbrella. We do not say that the expansion of the number of nuclear stations in these countries will increase the deployment of nuclear weapons. We do suggest that legal niceties aside, it may simply be dreaming in technicolour to expect those nations that do not have, either their own or by proxy, a nuclear counterforce, but are building, or plan to build, nuclear generating stations near their population centres, to risk the security implications. There is not a single country in which CANDU reactors are, or are likely to be placed, that does not have real or imagined military threats. Morrison and Wonder claim that Germany, Japan, France, and Italy ‘have the need and capacity’ to use nuclear power effectively, (considering the history of this century this is a curious list of countries to hold up as examples of responsible and effective use of technology). From the viewpoint of the LDCs this ‘need’ might seem less than urgent. For developed countries it is a ‘need’ to sustain and increase high levels of wealth. For the LDCs. ‘need’ has a more basic meaning. There are powerful arguments being made in the developed countries that the ‘need’ for nuclear power does not justify the risks and costs. and as such, the appropriateness of the nuclear option for Western nations is questionable. The harsher realities of certain developing countries present a different balance sheet that might better justify the risks of nuclear power. We not only agree that nuclear energy is appropriate for only some LDCs, but we offer a minimum criteria that should be employed before countries undertake the development of nuclear generation. If the decision to become involved in nuclear technology were to be judged by standards of full absorption of the industrial process, then the problem of proliferation would be considerably less severe than it now is. We acknowledge that ‘[tlhere are real inherent dangers that a nuclear programme may bias development unduly toward capital-intensive, elitist, centralized and bureaucratized structures.’ We do not have the space here to fully discuss the small vs. large technology debate. Suffice to say that we are not completely enamored with the ‘small is beautiful’ philosophy for LDCs. One must wonder (no pun intended) whether the recent fashionability of ‘appropriate’ technology might not be just the latest manifestation of Western arrogance or the ‘white man’s burden.’ When it reaches the point of refusing to sell items sought by LDCs ‘for their own good.’ then we arz claiming the right to make domestic policy for these countries. To assist m the development of only what we may be seen by LDCs as an attempt to 111 the West judge to be ‘appropriate,’
A rejoinder to a rebuttal
institutionalize
the backwardness
197
of their economies.
We recognize that the advocacy of small technology has opened up the range of possibilities to be considered when dealing with the problems of development. As such it is an important contribution. What is needed are sensitive mechanisms, or decision-making models, that make explicit the choices available. The most likely approach will be a balance between ‘large’ and ‘small’ technologies. How to decide what the balance should be and how the two levels of development can be integrated is the challenge that is facing developing countries. Western intellectuals can make a useful contribution to this discussion only if they avoid the tendency to divide the options into two disconnected and warring factions, and recognize that the degree of egalitarianism of development policies does not necessarily conform to the spectrum of small vs. large science and technology. As Canadians we are proud of the technical virtuosity displayed by AECL. We are concerned, however, that the commercial straight-jacket placed on the Crown Corporation has limited the extrapolation of the capability, and that it is an ‘all or nothing’ mandate they work under. If nuclear proves to be not the most (or perhaps it will simply require demonstrating that it is not the only) appropriate future source of commercial electrial energy, will the benefits of the investment in CANDU be lost? This has happened in the past in Canada - particularly in the aircraft industry. We are concerned to see such a lack of new brave initiatives of the kind that CANDU represents, or even clear attempts at covering our bets. We do not claim any certainty about the future of the Indian nuclear programme. Rather we demonstrate that the more diversified and open structure of DAE makes that organization more flexible, and assures that the benefits of advanced technological activity are more broadly disseminated. Further, the ‘monocular mandate’ of AECL puts it, and the Canadian government as owners, in a position in which there is a tendency to ‘go for broke.’ It makes it difficult for the policy-makers to take a disinterested view of all the alternate energy options. The nuclear game is ‘hardball,’ and Canada must recognize this if it wants to play. This country cannot pretend that the strategic and economic implications for LDCs are other than what they are, and should hesitate before applying standards to developing countries that it is not prepared to apply to itself. At home, the importance of the nuclear industry for the hopeful potential for energy independence and technological competiveness is crucial, and must be clearly recognized, including the real possibility that fission technology may turn out to be an idea whose time has passed even before it has come. This rejoinder, and the earlier article that sparked the debate [8], are an
198
G. Rindori and S. Mukerli
attempt
to redress the balance m a policy area that has suffered from what
might be called a comfortable
and unwitting
conspiracy
of the like-minded.
REFERENCES [ I] Agrcenxnt for Cooperation
[2]
13)
[4] [5] [6] [7]
(81
Between In&a and U S.A Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. 8 August 1963, U.S. Treaties and Other International Ageemwts, TIAS 5446. vol. 14 (Washington, 1964) 1484- 92. Agreement Between Canada and India Relatmg to the RaJasthan Atomic Power Station and the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, 16 December 1963, Canadian Treaty Series, no. 10 (1963). Agreement Between the Atormc Energy of Canada Ltd. (AWL) dnd the Government of India, 16 December 1963, m: J. P. Jain. Nuclear India, vol. II (Radiant Publishers. New Delhi, 1974) 136--l 39. Atomic Energy of Canada LImited. Pioneering Canada’s Newest Energy Source. AECL Review 12. no. 3-4 (March-April 1977) 14. N. Gall. Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1976). Lok Sabha,Debates 1 (27 March 1967) Colls 185-90. R. Ramanna (Director BARC), Development of Nuclear Energy in India. 1947--73. Talk at Nehru Memorial Museum, 29 July 1974 (Government of India Press Information Bureau. Press Release, Document 76. 18 August 1974) 396-97. G. Uindon and S. MukerJi, Canada India Nuclear Cooperation, Research Z’ohcy 7 (1978) 220-238.
BINDON
Science and Human Quebec,
and Sitoo
Affairs
Programme,
Concordia
University,
Montreal,
Canada
MUKERJI
Department
of Liberal
Manchester,
UK
Studies in Science,
University
of Manchester,
The rebuttal to our article ‘Canada-India Nuclear Cooperation ’ by Morrison and Wonder, while forceful in tone, lacks clarity - it displays a ‘scattergun’ approach that makes it difficult to determine from where the fire is coming. Many of their assertions, although presented as contradictions to what was said in our article, simply reiterate positions we stated. In the end, they present no clear policy position other than to give the impression that whatever it was that Canada has done in relation to the development and export of nuclear technology is somehow exemplary. They seem to introduce three categories by which the relationship between the Canadian and Indian programmes could be characterized: partnership, customer-supplier, or aid. They initially seem to accept that, after the CIRUS experimental reactor, the relationship was not one of Canada giving ‘aid’ to the Indian nuclear industry. However, they are not prepared to accept the term ‘partnership’ as being descriptive of the cooperative agreement. Rather, they insist that India was simply a customer, purchasing the CANDU technology. Unfortunately, later in their response, they cannot resist demoting the Indian role to the final category: ‘India obtained from Canada an advanced nuclear technology which was developed at considerable cost . . . [and] . . was transferred for the purpose of aiding in India’s development’ (our emphasis). Well, was it a question of a customer-supplier relationship, or aid? We, of course, claim that cooperation and/or partnership is a much more accurate description of the relationship. And the evidence is quite clear. The acquisition of the two ‘turn key’ 190 MGW General Electric units from the Research Policy S(I979)
191-198
North-Holland
192
G. Bindon and S. ,lllukerji
United States involving soft loans, was aid, or at best, a purchase. The CIRUS reactor received from Canada was ‘aid’ (although the connotation ‘aid’ is quite questionable
of the term
even in this case). However, the case of the RAPP
reactors was quite another matter. CANDU. at the time of the purchase, was clearly not a developed system. The Indians entered into the cooperative programme (and that is what it was called) at a time at which Canada had only a few balky experimental reactors in operation. So did the Indians. The decision to commit to a heavy water, natural uranium commercial energy system was thus made at essentially the same time m both countries. A reading of the two agreements between the United States and India, and Canada and India, for the Tarapur and Rajasthan reactors respectively, signed only two months apart in 1963, is very instructive [I, 2, 31. While the U.S.India document is a highly restricted (with a 30 year term) and somewhat condescending one-sided ‘turn key’ sale, the Canada-India agreement is a fully reciprocal, open-ended cooperative industrial venture with only an eight year life, after which presumably, transfer of know-how to third parties would be permitted. The differences are striking. The Indians obtained a deal with Canada that spread the risks and reduced the time necessary to achieve a fully indigenous and independent nuclear industrial capability. The same was true for Canada. No doubt both countries had the intention and capability to proceed alone, but it was in both their interests to collaborate. What effects an alternative approach would have had on the two countries’ timetables and success is a matter of conjecture. That they were both advancing boldly from step to step is clear, and that by moving ‘in step,’ the likelihood of faltering was reduced. We do not suggest that the Canadian
decision to go ahead with CANDU was
not based on an assessment of indigenous criteria. In fact we elaborate on the reasons Canada, and in particular Ontario Hydro, supported the development of CANDU. We also identify the equally compelling, although somewhat dissimilar, reasons that India had for entering such an uncertain arrangement. Although the risks of the venture were high, the potential payoffs in terms of independence, lesser long term strain on hard currency reserves, and future potential, made rt attractive. There is good reason to now feel that the Indians were quite shrewd in their judgements. The RAPP reactors involved commercial hard currency loans with ‘strings’ attached (80% tied to purchases in Canada) and as such were not aid. By entering the programme before Canada had anything commercial to sell, and committing hard currency that likely made the cost and risk comparatively higher for India than for Canada, is something considerably different than purchasing a developed product. As such India was. at least, investing in the
193
A rejoinder to a rebuttal
Canadian
programme.
Perhaps the sensitivity
on the part of Morrison
and
Wonder results from the possibility that we might be suggesting that the transfer of ‘know-how’ from India to Canada was equal to the knowledge India gained from Canada. We do not say this. The ‘know-how’ was largely generated in Canadian laboratories and fabricating plants. Yet there is some evidence that the unprecedented improvement in operating effectiveness seen between the Douglas Point reactor, and the first Pickering units, was in part a result-ofthe maintenance of workloads in the industry as a consequence of the Indian contracts. The original plans for Douglas Point called for two reactors rather than the one which was eventually built. The contracts from India for two Douglas Point type reactors assisted the Canadian industry in acquiring the crucial fabricating experience necessary to turn a technical concept into a commercially viable system, in part at someone else’s expense. In addition, the existence of an outside investor, and the obligations that this implied, were undoubtedly important to AECL during its formative years. The degree to which there was a reverse flow of information (from India to Canada), and its significance, is largely inaccessible and would be very difficult to measure. But it did occur. With the CIRUS reactor, for instance, problems with bacterial growth due to local conditions in the water and ambient temperature resulted in the choking of the cooling channels. This stumped the Canadians but was later solved by Indian personnel [7]. The technical and commercial value of the knowledge gained from the Indians in deploying CANDU systems under conditions quite different to those in Canada were undoubtedly useful to AECL in being able to give performance assurances to future customers in developing countries. During the period in question, the future of CANDU was anything but a certainty in Canada. ‘What if’ speculations about what might have happened if the Indian contracts had not existed are of limited value. We do not claim that the Canadian programme would have failed without Indian involvement ~ just that, as full risk-sharing partners and financial investors at a crucial point in the CANDU programme, the Indians contributed to the possibility of successfully moving To quote AECL: The expansions
from a technical
demonstration
to a commercial
reality.
of interest in the Canadian nuclear power reactor system
(resulting from the agreement with India) meant a larger and more diverse role for the Nuclear Power Plant division. To carry out this role, the division was reorganized as Power Projects . . . With the start of the design for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project and the engineering studies for other proposed plants under way, Power Projects was, . . . evolving into a large consulting engineering organization [4].
G Bindon and S. Mukerji
194
It is unclear why Morrison and Wonder spend a paragraph presenting
the view
taken by ‘. . . every serious analyst’ about the meaninglessness of distinguishing between peaceful and military nuclear explosions, since they agree that we agree with this view. We do not say that Canada should have necessarily taken action against India before the explosion, just that if Canada were to take action, it should have been before the explosion. We clearly demonstrate that Canada had no reason to be surprised about the Indian decision, that the agreements with India permitted the explosion without any violation, and that in fact, Canada unilaterally broke a signed agreement with India. We do not consider it moderate to break contracts and claim shock and indignation about a development Canada had no reason to be unaware of. We suggest that this indignation is all the more hollow considering the fact that Canada deploys nuclear weapons. is secure under an American nuclear umbrella, and seems to ignore (as do Morrison and Wonder) the grotesque failure of NPT with its ‘vertical’ proliferation, the development of the Chinese bomb, the ‘nuclearization’ of the Indian Ocean by the ‘great powers’ and their demonstrated unreliability as allies. We do not attempt to ‘. . . deny or rationalize the consequences’. They are quite foreboding. We do suggest, however, that the Indian action was consistent with its long-stated policy, and perhaps precipitated by odious external developments. For instance, the Indian Foreign Minister, speaking before the Lok Sabha, 27 March 1967 said: When the draft [of NPT] is given to us, we will carefully consider it, and the primary consideration, I ought to assure this House, is our national security. India stands in a unique position . . . [W]e are a non-aligned country and we are not under anybody’s political or any other umbrella. Therefore. there is no military pact under which we can be protected, if we are attacked by any nuclear power . . . We have the nuclear capability and we can explode the bomb . and we are under a continuing menace of a country which has already exploded the bomb . . . [W]e have also been insisting character . . . [6]
that
this treaty
should
be reciprocal
in
It may not have been a wise decision to detonate the device, but it does not seem that wisdom is a word that can describe the character of the ‘great strategic’ forces. Morrison and Wonder proclaim that, with Argentina and other purchasers of CANDU ‘[t]he pattern of the Indian loophole will not be repeated’ (and the admission that what they are discussing is a legal ‘loophole’ rather than hard realities is significant). But what does this mean? That instead of Canada breaking signed agreements when a nucltar explosion takes place, it will be
A rejoinder
195
to a rebuttal
the other party that will be breaking the agreement. And then, only if they have used the Canadian technology to do it. This is an example of ‘wink wink’ diplomacy -- as in: ‘We assume that you intend to remain a peaceful nuclear power “wink wink” (even if you refuse to sign NPT, openly discuss the military option and, like India. refrain from doing the deed until you have developed an independent capability and would thus not be purchasing any significant number of further nuclear items from Canada), and we will break off cooperation ifyou use our technology to produce nuclear explosives “wink wink” (even if you have cooperative agreements. as in the case of Argentina with India, that permit you to acquire assistance from another NPT non-signatory)’ [ 51. The legal technicalities. that like Pontius Pilate, will permit Canada to declare itself untainted, do not negate the facts. As in the Canadian domestic scene, the native skill at legalistic compromise is being overtaken by political realities. The policy is too smart by half and will, in the end, appear ineffective to our powerful neighbour who seeks to maintain the nuclear status quo, while to developing countries it may be seen as an awkward attempt to voice the values of the dominant western power while at the same time selling to all comers. We were reminded by Prime Minister Trudeau in his first speech before the United Nations General Assembly. on 16 May 1978. that Canada still deploys nuclear weapons. He then repeated the oft heard, but contradictory cliche, that Canada was the only country with the capability to develop nuclear weapons but chose not to do so. Of course, this is no longer true. The list of potential nuclear weapons states might include virtually all the members of the General Assembly if they were to really put their minds to it. He did go on to announce that Canada intended to end the deployment of nuclear weapons in the future. However, Canada continues to be a partner in alliances (NATO and NORAD) that depend on nuclear weaponry. We will carefully request non-nuclear responsibilities in military systems involving joint commands
and
‘deep’ integration
and that also have primarily
nuclear-based
strategies. The country will thus have its military nuclear ‘cake,’ while at the same time being able to ‘eat’ its peaceful and commercial nuclear frosting. Undoubtedly, the less than enthusiastic response to the Trudeau announcement is a consequence of a general awareness of these facts, particularly among countries of the Third World. And Morrison and Wonder chose to ignore the fact that throughout the period discussed, Canada deployed nuclear weapons in its armed forces. What, then, is meant by the peaceful ‘spirit’ that India was somehow expected to perceive and emulate in its dealings with Canada? Morrison and Wonder commend our position on the relationships between
G. Bindon and S. Mukerji
196 commercial
nuclear
power and the incentive
for a military
nuclear counter-
force as highly creative, although here they seem to have missed the point. The Western countries already have nuclear weapons based on their territories, or are ‘securely’ under a nuclear umbrella. We do not say that the expansion of the number of nuclear stations in these countries will increase the deployment of nuclear weapons. We do suggest that legal niceties aside, it may simply be dreaming in technicolour to expect those nations that do not have, either their own or by proxy, a nuclear counterforce, but are building, or plan to build, nuclear generating stations near their population centres, to risk the security implications. There is not a single country in which CANDU reactors are, or are likely to be placed, that does not have real or imagined military threats. Morrison and Wonder claim that Germany, Japan, France, and Italy ‘have the need and capacity’ to use nuclear power effectively, (considering the history of this century this is a curious list of countries to hold up as examples of responsible and effective use of technology). From the viewpoint of the LDCs this ‘need’ might seem less than urgent. For developed countries it is a ‘need’ to sustain and increase high levels of wealth. For the LDCs. ‘need’ has a more basic meaning. There are powerful arguments being made in the developed countries that the ‘need’ for nuclear power does not justify the risks and costs. and as such, the appropriateness of the nuclear option for Western nations is questionable. The harsher realities of certain developing countries present a different balance sheet that might better justify the risks of nuclear power. We not only agree that nuclear energy is appropriate for only some LDCs, but we offer a minimum criteria that should be employed before countries undertake the development of nuclear generation. If the decision to become involved in nuclear technology were to be judged by standards of full absorption of the industrial process, then the problem of proliferation would be considerably less severe than it now is. We acknowledge that ‘[tlhere are real inherent dangers that a nuclear programme may bias development unduly toward capital-intensive, elitist, centralized and bureaucratized structures.’ We do not have the space here to fully discuss the small vs. large technology debate. Suffice to say that we are not completely enamored with the ‘small is beautiful’ philosophy for LDCs. One must wonder (no pun intended) whether the recent fashionability of ‘appropriate’ technology might not be just the latest manifestation of Western arrogance or the ‘white man’s burden.’ When it reaches the point of refusing to sell items sought by LDCs ‘for their own good.’ then we arz claiming the right to make domestic policy for these countries. To assist m the development of only what we may be seen by LDCs as an attempt to 111 the West judge to be ‘appropriate,’
A rejoinder to a rebuttal
institutionalize
the backwardness
197
of their economies.
We recognize that the advocacy of small technology has opened up the range of possibilities to be considered when dealing with the problems of development. As such it is an important contribution. What is needed are sensitive mechanisms, or decision-making models, that make explicit the choices available. The most likely approach will be a balance between ‘large’ and ‘small’ technologies. How to decide what the balance should be and how the two levels of development can be integrated is the challenge that is facing developing countries. Western intellectuals can make a useful contribution to this discussion only if they avoid the tendency to divide the options into two disconnected and warring factions, and recognize that the degree of egalitarianism of development policies does not necessarily conform to the spectrum of small vs. large science and technology. As Canadians we are proud of the technical virtuosity displayed by AECL. We are concerned, however, that the commercial straight-jacket placed on the Crown Corporation has limited the extrapolation of the capability, and that it is an ‘all or nothing’ mandate they work under. If nuclear proves to be not the most (or perhaps it will simply require demonstrating that it is not the only) appropriate future source of commercial electrial energy, will the benefits of the investment in CANDU be lost? This has happened in the past in Canada - particularly in the aircraft industry. We are concerned to see such a lack of new brave initiatives of the kind that CANDU represents, or even clear attempts at covering our bets. We do not claim any certainty about the future of the Indian nuclear programme. Rather we demonstrate that the more diversified and open structure of DAE makes that organization more flexible, and assures that the benefits of advanced technological activity are more broadly disseminated. Further, the ‘monocular mandate’ of AECL puts it, and the Canadian government as owners, in a position in which there is a tendency to ‘go for broke.’ It makes it difficult for the policy-makers to take a disinterested view of all the alternate energy options. The nuclear game is ‘hardball,’ and Canada must recognize this if it wants to play. This country cannot pretend that the strategic and economic implications for LDCs are other than what they are, and should hesitate before applying standards to developing countries that it is not prepared to apply to itself. At home, the importance of the nuclear industry for the hopeful potential for energy independence and technological competiveness is crucial, and must be clearly recognized, including the real possibility that fission technology may turn out to be an idea whose time has passed even before it has come. This rejoinder, and the earlier article that sparked the debate [8], are an
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attempt
to redress the balance m a policy area that has suffered from what
might be called a comfortable
and unwitting
conspiracy
of the like-minded.
REFERENCES [ I] Agrcenxnt for Cooperation
[2]
13)
[4] [5] [6] [7]
(81
Between In&a and U S.A Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. 8 August 1963, U.S. Treaties and Other International Ageemwts, TIAS 5446. vol. 14 (Washington, 1964) 1484- 92. Agreement Between Canada and India Relatmg to the RaJasthan Atomic Power Station and the Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, 16 December 1963, Canadian Treaty Series, no. 10 (1963). Agreement Between the Atormc Energy of Canada Ltd. (AWL) dnd the Government of India, 16 December 1963, m: J. P. Jain. Nuclear India, vol. II (Radiant Publishers. New Delhi, 1974) 136--l 39. Atomic Energy of Canada LImited. Pioneering Canada’s Newest Energy Source. AECL Review 12. no. 3-4 (March-April 1977) 14. N. Gall. Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1976). Lok Sabha,Debates 1 (27 March 1967) Colls 185-90. R. Ramanna (Director BARC), Development of Nuclear Energy in India. 1947--73. Talk at Nehru Memorial Museum, 29 July 1974 (Government of India Press Information Bureau. Press Release, Document 76. 18 August 1974) 396-97. G. Uindon and S. MukerJi, Canada India Nuclear Cooperation, Research Z’ohcy 7 (1978) 220-238.