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Capital accumulation and urban land development in China: (Re)making Expo Park in Shanghai
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Capital accumulation and urban land development in China: (Re)making Expo Park in Shanghai Lingyue Li, Yang Xiao* Department of Urban Planning, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University, Shanghai, China
ARTICLE INFO
ABSTRACT
Keywords: Land banking Capital accumulation State entrepreneurialism Mega-Events Expo Park Shanghai
This study goes beyond the crisis-based understanding of spatial fix to consider a holistic exploration of capital accumulation and urban land development in association with a mega-event in China. Decoding the eventtriggered land banking (tudi chubei) process in the (re)making of Expo Park, it shifts the focus of this land-based accumulation to pre-event relocation and post-event investment attraction. The contributions of this study are twofold. First, this study contributes to the mainstream literature by incorporating the place-based mega-event into the study of spatial fix. Spatial fix through mega-events is enacted through pre-Expo primary land development, which reshapes the built environment to articulate a “higher and better use,” followed by a post-Expo land disposition, which fixes investment to accomplish capital restructuring. Second, this study indicates that state entrepreneurialism offers a more accurate interpretation of the governance of land processes led by megaevents than urban entrepreneurialism, and enriches the literature on state entrepreneurialism by illuminating the ways in which capital accumulation is achieved through land development under this governance paradigm. In the pre-Expo phase, a state-owned urban development corporation (UDC) was established to take charge of land finance. An ad hoc quasi-government in proximity to the central state and on behalf of the municipal official mobilized administrative resources to aid land resumption—tailoring space to squeeze out inefficient accumulation modes. In the post-Expo phase, a restructured municipal state-owned enterprise (SOE) took over responsibilities for land disposition from the state-owned UDC and prioritized central state SOEs over other investors.
1. Introduction The means by which capital is accumulated in cities to accomplish spatial fix has been a longstanding topic in capitalist society. Since thesis of urban entrepreneurialism emphasizing public–private partnership were first proposed (Harvey, 1989b), a significant amount of literature has showcased it as a valid theory to explain the governance approach of post-Fordist accumulation in the global North (Carrière and Demaziere, 2002; Codecasa and Ponzini, 2011; Coq-Huelva (2013); Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Urban China has also embarked on a rapid capital accumulation (Lin, 2009; Shen and Wu, 2017), an accumulation of unprecedented scale (Chien, 2013; Jiang et al., 2016b; Xu et al., 2009) and, crucially for this study, one that has land at its heart—it is, therefore, a spatial fix. This is largely due to the 1994 tax reform, which increased local government’s dependence on land finance as land conveyance income is free from sharing with central government under fiscal constraints (Huang and Chan, 2018). Various kinds of capital is, therefore, keen to open up new markets in the cities, seeking large
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payoffs made possible by land value appreciation. Most previous studies have focused on evidence of urban entrepreneurialism, centered on how the government forms partnerships with foreign or private developers in China’s accumulation (He and Wu, 2005, 2009; Qian, 2007; Yang and Chang, 2007). However, some recent studies have found that China’s capital accumulation, driven by large-scale urban land (re)development, has shown distinctive characteristics of state entrepreneurialism, by which the power of the state has been pervasive in the market (Jiang and Waley, 2018; Li and Chiu, 2018; Wang and Wu, 2019). Using mega-events as a vehicle, this paper aims to disentangle the governance mechanism of urban land development as a major means through which the Chinese government accumulates capital to serve its strategic objectives (Wang and Wu, 2019; Wu, 2018). Drawing on insights from Shanghai Expo Park, a project initiated by Expo 2010 to redevelop a run-down industrial area, this study suggests that the concept of state entrepreneurialism prioritizing state interests over others (Wang and Wu, 2019) can better explain the governance and
Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (Y. Xiao).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104472 Received 16 September 2019; Received in revised form 11 December 2019; Accepted 12 January 2020 0264-8377/ © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: Lingyue Li and Yang Xiao, Land Use Policy, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104472
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Fig. 1. Governance structure in the pre- and post-Expo phases.
financial operation of land processes led by mega-events than can the concept of urban entrepreneurialism, by which land redevelopment serves to produce exchange value for elite groups (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; He and Wu, 2005; Swyngedouw et al., 2002).
built environment or mobilize resources across wider areas (Sheppard, 2004). A spatial fix must be temporal (Jessop, 2006), given that temporal deferment is of equal significance as geospatial restructuring for capital accumulation. In other words, the time (or temporality) of capital accumulation should not be underestimated, because time measurement and command over time are sources of social power (Harvey, 1989a: 226, 252). Spatial fix via mega-events, denoted as mega-event spatial fix, has been favored by urban politicians across the globe since the 1970s (Paddison, 1993; Raco and Henderson, 2009; Roche, 2000). Fitting into the capitalist imaginary system, mega-events contribute to spatial fix through their unprecedented scale of capital investment, stakeholder participation and organizational requirements (Grabher and Thiel, 2015). Making space for event venues not only (re)produces the on-site built environment but also incurs off-site spatial reconfiguration in which social, economic, and cultural structures are recomposed (Shin, 2014; Trubina, 2014) for more efficient capital accumulation. The preand post-event time frames allow for the accomplishment of long-term accumulation agenda (Grabher and Thiel, 2015). The high-profile, world-renowned mega-events, different from those low-profile, ordinary actions, also have the potential to improve the image of the venue site to attract the flow of capital. Mega-events are often translated to large-scale projects by local policymakers for the purpose of capital accumulation. In the U.S. and Europe, the private sector has long dominated such large-scale accumulation in urban developments (Fainstein, 2008; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008; Swyngedouw et al., 2002), often in the form of public–private partnerships (Carrière and Demaziere, 2002; Codecasa and Ponzini, 2011). Yet in China, it is the state and state-owned agencies engaged in the market that accomplish
2. Conceptual framework 2.1. The mega-events spatial fix The idea of mega-event spatial fix is proposed to understand eventled capital accumulation. Spatial fix’s origin, in Harvey’s solidification of Marx’s theory, refers to a geographical reconfiguration or a newly extended geographical space—one that resolves the inner crisis resulting from overaccumulation of capital or labor (Harvey, 2001). Globalization, or the contemporaneous international industrial transfer and division of labor, neatly captures capitalism’s avaricious motives to resolve its chronic crises. Thus, in a broad sense, spatial fix is in association with “the new international division of labor”, “deindustrialization” and “capital mobility” (Fröbel et al., 2016). This research goes beyond the crisis-based cognition to treat spatial fix as a process of improving the efficiency of capital accumulation through spatial restructuring. The power of spatial fix is therefore to show how sociospatial restructuring (re)occupies and (re)functionalizes already occupied and functionalized spaces, assigning exchange value to serve productive and profitable imperatives (Axford et al., 2017). Spatial fix implies spatial (re)distribution of things and, thereby, a relocation: relocation of manufacturing in developed areas to low-wage, underdeveloped regions (Schoenberger, 2004). Torn between fixity and mobility, spatial fix means to “pin down” investment in the longstanding
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the accumulation. Moreover, launching mega-events in China is not only about economic gains—they also serve qualitative objectives of urban and national prosperity, ultimately acting to maintain state power. Governance of capital accumulation in China is, therefore, not confined to Logan and Molotch’s growth machine or Stone’s regime politics but is, rather, characterized by state entrepreneurialism (Wang and Wu, 2019; Wu, 2018). Transforming the state into an entrepreneurial market agency does not mean to weaken state power; rather, it is done to consolidate the role of the state in the market. Fig. 1. Mega-event spatial fix for capital accumulation.
seconded from the government. This set up offers a platform for the party-state officers to move between governments and enterprises, which obscures state activities in the market. A UDC alone cannot accomplish land-based accumulation as relocation takes significant time and effort and land disposition is full of uncertainties. What guarantees the success of the land-based accumulation is a flexible governance structure, capable of mobilizing administrative forces at all levels2 when needed. For efficient project delivery, UDCs financing compensation for municipal-level projects are usually exempt from the “dirty work” of relocation (Chan and Li, 2017; Jiang et al., 2016a; Li and Chiu, 2018; Wang and Wu, 2019). Responsibilities to mobilize the original owners to move are either devolved to original lower-level (e.g., district- or street-level governance bodies) or passed up to higher-level (e.g., provincial or central government) bodies, depending on the jibie of the negotiators. This down/upgrading of bargaining, benefiting from governance flexibility, expands the scope of administrative intervention in the land market for capital accumulation. In China’s mega-events, quasi-governmental organizations (QGOs) such as the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games, Shanghai Expo Coordination Bureau, and Guangzhou Organizing Committee for the Asian Games further aid the event-led land development. These QGOs are not only responsive to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) or Bureau International des Expositions (BIE) and the State Council but also hold the responsibility for local development3 (Chan and Li, 2017; Shin, 2014). In relation to land development, their task is to prepare the venues; in performing this function, they spare no effort in mobilizing political power—even from the central state (interview with a senior officer in Shanghai, 2009). Yet, they are ad hoc administrative organizations subject to disbandment or change when the mega-event ends. Once “immature” land is ready for development, the management responsibilities will be handed to (quasi-)government authorities by whom collective decisions are made to avoid risks in secondary land development (interview with a researcher involved in land development in Shanghai, 2017). Although local state-owned UDCs act as the landlord, they remain exempted from the work of investment attraction. Responsibilities to decide who can settle are assigned to a counterpart authority in collaboration with local government. In most cases, social services such as green maintenance, waste management and healthcare remain assigned to original lowerlevel government bodies (Li, 2015; Wang and Wu, 2019).
2.2. Governing land-based accumulation under state entrepreneurialism Understanding the mechanisms of mega-events spatial fix in China is almost impossible without disentangling the land process. Since the late 1980s, when non-gratuitous transfer of land use rights was introduced, land price has been increasing so rapidly that land has become the major form of state capital in China (Li, 2015). Land-based, property-led accumulation thus characterizes China’s urban development and the income from land leasing has become the main source of local revenue (Chien, 2013; He and Wu, 2009; Shen and Wu, 2017). In recent years, land leasing income has exceeded 60 % of local governments’ total revenue. Among the diverse approaches contributing to local land revenue, land banking is the most-favored by policymakers and is the most commonly enforced approach in large-scale projects. By launching mega-events, the state strategically incorporates the four stages of land banking—land resumption, land holding, site preparation, and land disposition—into the pre- and post-event time frames to squeeze out spaces of inefficient accumulation and appeal to new urban space for high-efficiency (high-accumulation) land uses. In other words, the governance of urban land development, in particular the role of the state in the politics of land, holds the key to understanding the operational logic of China’s contemporary accumulation regime (Chung et al., 2018). With regards to how land-based accumulation operates under state entrepreneurialism, mega-events open a window wherein the state dominates land development by its entrepreneurial variants—state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and flexible governance structures that prioritize the interests of the state. Through SOEs, the state’s involvement in market-related land processes to leverage and engineer economic growth is much more omnipresent than is generally recognized. The most critical form of involvement is the entrepreneurial establishment of an urban development corporation (UDC) as a project funder carrying out primary land development. In most cases, UDCs are local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) subordinate to local government (Jiang and Waley, 2018; Li and Chiu, 2018; Wang and Wu, 2019).1 The projects they fund are warranted by local government, they can mortgage land for loans from state-owned banks and are in charge of raising money for compensation of relocated families and firms, for the construction of infrastructure and resettlement, and for project management (Huang and Chan, 2018; Jiang and Waley, 2018; Li and Chiu, 2018; Wang and Wu, 2019). However, UDCs as such are often mutable, with flexible shareholding structures through which capital can easily flow between various state corporations (Milhaupt and Zheng, 2017), enabling conveyance income from land (re)development to be redistributed. In secondary land development, SOEs usually take precedence in the initial real estate and investment (Jiang and Waley, 2018) over private or foreign firms, obtaining land use rights through state allocation or by paying much less than the market price. Leaders of SOEs are commonly
3. Capital accumulation through the (re)making of Shanghai Expo Park This research embarks on a journey to probe into the local governance of capital restructuring in association with a mega-event. Shanghai illustrates the central state’s intentions for “molded, managed” capitalism for its emerging planned market and has always been progressive in China’s new growth model (Ramo, 1998). This is well echoed by Expo 2010, which (re)creates new scales for territorialization of local (re)investment. The (re)making of Expo Park would certainly become a flagship case—assimilating into the loop of global policy knowledge to arm Shanghai in the rivalry of world city competition (McCann, 2013). As with many mega urban projects in China, Shanghai Expo is not only about land value capture; rather, land finance is a means to serve more strategic objectives (Wang and Wu, 2019; Wu, 2018). The event was endued with a mission beyond economy and showcases how a short-term mega-event can play a role in a mega-city’s 2 China’s administrative divisions comprise five levels: central (zhongyang), provincial (sheng), municipal (shi), district/county (qu/xian), and street/township (jiedao/xiang). 3 Informed by data collation from official websites of China’s mega-events. The majority of the organization staff are from local government and a minority of them are from central government.
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UDCs could also be central SOEs in strategic collaboration with local government (Huang and Chan, 2018) or private- or foreign-funded partners with local government (He and Wu, 2005; Huang and Chan, 2018). Yet in this case, local government remain dominant with a high ratio of shareholdings and profit distribution (Huang and Chan, 2018). 3
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long-term agenda. Initially suggested in the 1950s and re-proposed by Mayor Wang Daohan in the 1980s, the World Exposition was one of Shanghai municipality’s two strategic visions4 as part of the continued drive for Shanghai’s development (Yu, 2010). In 1999, when the report “On Envisage for Shanghai to Hold the World Expo” was approved by the State Council, Shanghai was far from being a satisfactory global city. With an overcrowded central city area and stagnating suburbs, there was a call for spatial structure optimization for industrial upgrading and more efficient accumulation (interview with a local urban planner, 2010). To achieve this objective, the devalued land parcel and circulating capital became Shanghai Municipal Government’s attempt at a spatial fix: fixing up the inefficient accumulation of space by pinning down the flows of capital. This explains why the site of Expo Park was selected in a run-down, declining manufacturing dockland along the southern section of Huangpu River. Spatial fix—via Expo 2010—is realized through pre-event site preparation, which reshapes the built environment to offer “higher and better use” along with post-event reutilization that fixes investment to accomplish capital restructuring. Governance approaches toward this spatial fix are characterized by state entrepreneurialism and are incorporated into the pre- and postevent temporal framework. The following subsections delve into this governance effort toward land-based accumulation through the (re) making of Expo Park. The roles of the state and, in particular, its entrepreneurial variants—state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and flexible governance structures—are examined to enrich our understanding of China’s state entrepreneurialism.
comprising mixed residential (26.2 %) and industrial uses (62 %) was involved: up to 272 enterprises, ranging from central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to foreign or private corporations, and almost 18,000 households (encompassing almost 47,900 people), awaited relocation. Since land can be priced and leased as a commodity, land property rights become valuable for social wealth accumulation. The politics of relocation is therefore soaked in the struggle over this property-based activism alongside ubiquitous conflicts of interest between property owners and relocation executors. To minimize potential conflicts, Shanghai Expo Coordination Bureau (SECB), a QGO resembling ad hoc administrative committees, lent administrative support for negotiation in land resumption. With Hao Hong—the Deputy Secretary General of Shanghai Municipal Government—appointed as the director, SECB was at the departmental level (zhengting ji) in proximity to the central state and on behalf of the municipal official to oversee the land development. Branch offices of SECB were set up in involved districts to command relocation. They created the “sunshine policy” with improved compensation standards based on “Rules of Shanghai Municipality on Implementing the Administration of Urban Houses Demolished and Relocated (2001)”. In doing so, a disproportionate budget was allocated to the displaced families,8 who managed to move up the wealth ladders from the value appreciation of the compensated property: house prices in the two resettlement bases—Sanlin and Pujiang Expo Home—have surpassed 40,000 RMB per square meter and were available for sale after five years of ownership. Nevertheless, relocation of industrial SOEs is more arduous than relocating residents. Their bargaining power is proportional to the jibie (administrative levels) and their leading officers are usually seconded from government sectors, with high administrative rank. Central SOEs, whose bargaining power overwhelms that of other firms, account for 74 % of the industrial land. To persuade these SOEs to relocate, the governance structure of land development for Expo 2010 looked upwards to the Expo Organization Committee led by State Council, which opened a channel for SECB to negotiate with industrial enterprises affiliated to central ministries (interview with a senior officer in Shanghai, 2009). The supportive stance from the State Council leadership and the time limit for the mega-event feast were crucial to the compromise between the industrial firms and Shanghai. After rounds of bargaining, they agreed to move the factories to Luojing and Changxing placement bases, but kept part of their ownership of the original land parcels. The land for hosting Expo 2010 completed first-phase resumption in the middle of 2007. The time lag between land resumption and land leasing, plus the marketing effects of Expo, contributed to the value appreciation of the last piece of developable land in downtown Shanghai.
3.1. Preparing land for revitalization: making Expo Park in the pre-Expo phase To realize the municipality’s strategic vision to upgrade Shanghai as a global city, Shanghai Expo Land Holding Co. (SELHC) made best use of the last piece of land parcel—left out of former rounds of gentrification—in downtown Shanghai to make the Expo Park. SELHC is one of Shanghai’s large number of UDCs responsible for pre-Expo land resumption, primary land development, infrastructure and venues supporting facility construction, post-Expo land disposition and repayment of debts. As an SOE, SELHC is able to capitalize on state resources. Founded on December 25, 2003 (No.102 approval of Shanghai Municipal Government [2003]), SELHC was funded by three entrepreneurial establishments owned by the municipal government: Shanghai Expo Land Banking Center (SELRC)5 (invested 3.4 billion RMB), Shanghai Land (Group) Co., Ltd (SLGC) (invested 3 billion RMB) and Shanghai Municipal Investment (Group) Corporation (SMIGC) (invested 3 billion RMB). Guaranteed by both national and Shanghai’s municipal government, SELHC signed substantial loan agreements with state-owned banks,6 raising funds for relocation and construction of the Expo Park (Li, 2019). “Shanghai Expo 2010 Registration Report, China” reveals that investments in relocation far exceed the 18 billion RMB project construction investment and the 10.7 billion RMB exhibition operation investment in the pre-Expo phase. Like most UDCs, SELHC is free from the “dirty work” of relocation, which is energy and time consuming due to the sheer scale of the resettlement and because of the disputable compensation arrangements and bargaining. Major work was outsourced to Huangpu, Luwan and Pudong7 district governments and their subordinate street offices. Shanghai Expo master plan reports that a land parcel of 5.28 km2,
3.2. Revaluing land in disposition: remaking Expo Park in the post-Expo phase With the closing of Expo 2010, the governance structure for postExpo land development shrunk to municipal level, focusing on the attraction of corporate developers to invest in the secondary land market. A “five zones and one belt” spatial layout was planned for the reinvestment: Zones A and B were the main exhibition and business districts attracting investment, Zone C was a Houtan expansion area reserved for future land use, Zone D was a cultural and museum district, akin to Museumsinsel in Berlin, and Zone E was revamped to form a creative district (see Fig. 2). Major land parcels in Zones A and B will be leased in the secondary land market. Strategically, this remaking of Expo Park was integrated into Shanghai’s discourse of a post-industrial trajectory that underscores the transition from manufacturing to service industries, from dilapidated residences to luxury gated communities.
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The other one is the development and opening of Pudong. SELRC and SELHC operated under “two brands, one team”, interview with SECB officials, July 2010. 6 We are also informed that 2 billion bonds were also issued in 2007 for Expo project construction, interview with ESG managers, August 2017. 7 In June 2011, the proposal that incorporates the original Luwan district into Huangpu district was approved by the State Council. 5
8 Interviews with residents who were requested to relocate because of Expo 2010, July 2010.
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Fig. 2. Division of zones in the post-Expo legacy plan.
SELHC commenced new development in Expo Village and Pujiang Expo Home and handed over the work of initial investment attraction to Expo Shanghai Group (ESG), the successor reorganized from SECB. The secondary land market is left to other entrepreneurial entities to share risk as otherwise, SELHC is likely to be trapped in financial distress due to overdue payment by tenants (interview with a senior researcher in Shanghai, 2017). Though turned into an entrepreneurial variant, ESG remained part of the panoply of local government, not only because the former Deputy SECB Director Dailiu was reappointed as Chairman and Party Secretary of ESG, with many other ESG employees coming from SECB, but also because ESG gains financial support through local bureaucracy and is politically obliged to the municipal party leadership. One thing for sure is that connections to the central government are, at this stage, weaker; it is thus foreseeable that issues associated with the un-resumed industrial land may take considerable time to resolve. Given that the land for Expo was invaluable, being the last piece in downtown Shanghai, ESG therefore concerns itself more with creating rules to determine who can join. It cooperated with municipal government sectors to filter enterprises that fit into Shanghai’s “four centers” strategy and prioritized SOEs in this secondary land development campaign. In June 2011, the Municipal Economic and Information Commission, Municipal Planning, Land and Resources Administration, and ESG formed an investment team to dispose of land parcels in Zone B. To further state interests and lock profits of land value appreciation in to the state system, the team applied a principle of “selecting first,
leasing after (xian linxuan, hou churang),” reporting SOEs’ intent to invest to municipal government for approval. Until 2016, the land parcels in Zone B were all released to central SOEs with a base price (di jia)9 under state allocation of land resources, for which the rents barely enable margins (Schoenberger, 2004). In doing so, earnings from land value appreciation in the secondary market are redistributed among state SOEs and turned into state-owned assets. Central SOEs in China are institutional legacies, evolving from inefficient production units into profitable business entities. They are privileged by political support from the central state, thus capable of reaping profits in rounds of accumulation. Central SOEs obtaining land use rights in the initial round are powerful oligarchic groups, they include Baosteel, Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd. (COMAC), State Grid Corporation of China, China Huaneng Group, China Huadian Corporation and Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. In contrast to Zone B, where non-central SOEs were not allowed to enter, Zone A opened the market to diverse investors. Led by Shanghai Development and Reform Commission, the investment team was much larger than that of Zone B, and was composed of Economic and Information Commission, Commerce Commission, Finance Office, Municipal Planning, Land and Resources Administration, Shanghai Land Banking Center (SLBC), Pudong New Area District and ESG. To 9 Interview with ESG managers and researchers from Shanghai Academy of Development and Reform, August 2017.
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introduce a competitive mechanism, the team applied a principle of “shortlisted first, auction after (xian ruwei, hou jingpai),” allowing enterprises to obtain land use rights through bids. Land parcels in Zone A were available for sale at a premium. In May 2013, the State Power Investment Group firstly bid for a 1 billion RMB land parcel at a premium rate of 22.6 %. A private capital group, Shenzhen Liye Group Co., Ltd. came thereafter. Yet, attraction of foreign investors is far from satisfactory. With the support from central government weakened, resources for secondary land development in the post-Expo phase is incomparable to that of the pre-Expo phase. Scant financial resources plus political sensitivities lead to a prudent manner of ESG towards foreign investment attraction in post-Expo. They are mindful that the aim to build a world-class zone is too challenging to achieve.10 In the Expo Valley of Zone A, the plan to introduce Fortune 500 firms to eight land parcels by the investment team was unsuccessful. The land was finally co-bid by ESG and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank with a base price. Overseas investors bidding for land are limited to Asia: Far Eastern Group and Maxbase Holdings. Ltd. are both Taiwanese companies, while SK Holdings is a Korean company bidding for its headquarters site near the Expo Park site.11 By and large, ESG armed the government in land finance, prioritized central SOEs in investment, deferred non-state capital, and uplifted land values. Later investments became more diverse but were far from international. The world-class positioning of Expo Park is therefore questionable. As mentioned, SELHC was first invested by SELRC and the other two state corporations. Yet its shareholding structure was not fixed. In 2010, SLGC and SMIGC transferred 100 % and 31.9 % company equity to SLBC and SELRC respectively. In 2016, after 100 % and 74.1 % land parcels were leased in Zones B and A, SLBC returned the 31.9 % company equity to SLGC, with capital value increased by 213.5 %. SLGC reinvested 1.5 billion RMB to SELHC, sharing 41.28 % holdings of the company in 2018. Through the change of SELHC’s holding structure, capital was free to flow between state corporations and land value appreciation had been redistributed among these SOEs.
particular, in the pre-Expo phase, the relocation of dilapidated manufacturing and housing to underdeveloped areas for land resumption formed the main goal for the local bureau as it sought to empty the downtown golden section along the Huangpu River. This action, tailoring space to squeeze out inefficient accumulation, was the main trigger for capital (alongside population and industrial) mobility—mobilizing from the city center to outer suburbs. In the post-Expo phase, new investments were pinned down in the reconfigured Expo Park through land disposition and the rebuilt environment achieves a “higher and better use” (Sheppard, 2004), thus qualifying as more efficient capital accumulation. Overall, mega-events reconfigure the built environments, refactoring inefficient accumulation and sparking off citywide spatial restructuring to improve the pace and volume of accumulation before the event. The tailored space in Expo Park makes it possible to pin down the capital in the post-Expo phase. The fixed opening time of a mega-event catalyzes the local agenda of the host cities to encourage the arrival of a new round of capital accumulation on a much faster timescale. Hosting Expo, Shanghai propelled its spatial restructuring strategy12 ahead by ten years. Mega-events are also highprofile, enhancing the host city’s image and raising the political influence of the city government. This did great favors to Shanghai Expo as local industrial relics become endued with global significance and the bargaining between the original landowners and city government was forced to come to a conclusion Table 1. Second, this study enriches the literature on state entrepreneurialism by further looking into how the aforementioned capital accumulation is achieved through land development under this governance paradigm. Table 2 compares governance mechanisms of land development under the traditional urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989b) and state entrepreneurialism (Wang and Wu, 2019; Wu, 2018). In primary land development, traditional entrepreneurial governance stresses the seeking out of strategic partners to ease financial distress of local government (Huang and Chan, 2018), yet state entrepreneurialism seeks to establish local state-owned UDCs and uses land as collateral to raise funds from state banks. The established SELHC manages to borrow money from banks, something which local government itself is not allowed to do. In secondary land development, while profit-oriented growth machines made up of government and enterprises are the main form of urban entrepreneurialism (He and Wu, 2005), SOEs usually take precedence over private or foreign firms through state allocation or lower-than-market rates in state entrepreneurialism. In our case, all the enterprises obtaining land use rights in the initial round are powerful oligarchic corporations owned by the central state, which have not contributed significantly to the local economy previously. The distinction results from the different purposes of the two types of governance. Unlike the traditional entrepreneurial governance, which takes economic profits from the exchange value in land development and increased tax basis as its ultimate objective, state entrepreneurialism focuses on higher-level strategic objectives such as industrial upgrading or national strength and prioritizes the interests of the state over those of others (Wang and Wu, 2019). Therefore, although land value capture remains crucial to capital accumulation in Shanghai Expo, land finance is of greater importance to city upgrading and national strength. Though improved compensation standards such as the “sunshine policy” can be made to allay initial resistance, state entrepreneurialism does not mean that tensions and contradictions observed in neoliberal large-scale projects (Swyngedouw et al., 2002) can be eliminated; instead, the increasingly complicated composition of entrepreneurial entities create new tensions and conflicts among themselves. This has already been discernible in the redevelopment of former state-owned industrial land in the Expo Park, leaving uncertainties in future development. Irrespective, state
4. Conclusion This study affords a holistic exploration of capital accumulation and urban land development in association with a mega-event in China. Moving beyond the crisis-based cognition, the idea of mega-event spatial fix demonstrates how mega-event land use—freeing up previously occupied space for an unprecedented scale of investment—is critical to the improvement of capital accumulation efficiency, and hence spatial fix. One step further, this research extends the focal point of this land-based accumulation through detailed examination of governance toward pre-event relocation and post-event investment attraction. Though many studies have stressed the role of the state as an omnipotent giant leveraging this large-scale, land-based accumulation (Chan and Li, 2017; He and Wu, 2009; Wu, 2018), our case of Shanghai Expo discloses that the state power has been distributed among its diverse administrative and entrepreneurial variants. This effect is also reported in some updated literature (Jiang and Waley, 2018; Wang and Wu, 2019). The complex composition of state power consolidates the role of the state and magnifies government control over the market but also creates tensions between different state-owned entities as well as uncertainties in urban land development. This is well exemplified in the (re)making of Expo Park, from which the contributions of this study are twofold. First, this study contributes to the mainstream literature by incorporating the place-based mega-event into the study of spatial fix. In 10 Interview with ESG managers and researchers from Shanghai Academy of Development and Reform, August 2017. 11 Interview with ESG managers, August 2017.
12 The spatial restructuring strategy aims to tailor space in the central city and decentralize industry and population to suburban areas.
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Table 1 The three aspects of mega-event spatial fix for capital accumulation. Phase and flow direction Three aspects
Pre-Expo: capital mobility from city center to outer suburbs
Post-Expo: capital fixity to pin down investment on-site
Spatiality
Tailoring space for and accelerating capital mobilization. Relocating firms and residents to resettlement bases, inducing social segregation. Time span of preparation sets time limit to accelerate long-run restructuring of capital.
Offering space to pin down diverse investment.
Temporality Globality
Elevating host superiority in negotiation for capital restructuring and guaranteeing the compensation standard.
Time lag slows down but leaves room for land value appreciation. Added value for capital attraction is limited.
Table 2 Land development under urban entrepreneurialism and state entrepreneurialism.
Governance purposes Governance means in primary land development Governance means in secondary land development Tensions and conflicts
Land-based accumulation under urban entrepreneurialism
Land-based accumulation under state entrepreneurialism
Making profits from exchange value in land development and increase of tax basis. Seeking alliance with strategic partners to ease financial distress of local government. Forming growth machines or coalitions with enterprises to participate in the initial real estate development. Struggles and conflicts result from social polarization, gentrification and displacement.
Focuses on strategic objectives such as industrial upgrading or national strength and prioritizes the interests of the state over those of others. Establishing local state-owned urban development corporations and mortgage land for loans from state banks. Prioritizing SOEs over private or foreign firms through state allocation or paying far less than market price in the initial real estate development. Tensions and conflicts are not only generated in massive relocation and forced evictions but also created among state-owned entities.
entrepreneurialism is effective and efficient in delivering large-scale projects such as Expo Park. Not only because the governance structure is flexible enough to expand and shrink between social and economic affairs, but also because the entrepreneurial variants leave flexibility for party-state officials to move between government and corporations and for capital to flow between state corporations under changeable holding structures.
a mega-event (the London 2012 case). Geoforum 65, 328–337. Harvey, D., 1989a. The Condition of Post-Modernity. Blackwell, Oxford. Harvey, D., 1989b. From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. Geogr. Ann. 71 (1), 3–17. Harvey, D., 2001. Globalization and the spatial fix. Article. He, S., Wu, F., 2005. Property-led redevelopment in post-reform China: a case study of Xintiandi redevelopment project in Shanghai. J. Urban Aff. 27 (1), 1–23. He, S., Wu, F., 2009. China’s emerging neoliberal urbanism: perspectives from urban redevelopment. Antipode 41 (2), 282–304. Huang, D., Chan, R.C., 2018. On ‘land Finance’in urban China: theory and practice. Habitat Int. 75, 96–104. Jessop, B., 2006. Spatial fixes, temporal fixes, and spatio-temporal fixes. David Harvey A Critical Reader. Jiang, Y., Waley, P., 2018. Shenhong: the anatomy of an urban investment and development company in the context of china’s state corporatist urbanism. J. Contemp. China 27 (112), 596–610. Jiang, Y., Waley, P., Gonzalez, S., 2016a. Shanghai swings: the Hongqiao project and competitive urbanism in the Yangtze River Delta. Environ. Plan. A 48 (10), 1928–1947. Jiang, Y., Waley, P., Gonzalez, S., 2016b. Shifting land-based coalitions in Shanghai’s second hub. Cities 52, 30–38. Lehrer, U., Laidley, J., 2008. Old mega-pojects newly packaged? Waterfront redevelopment in Toronto. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 32 (4), 786–803. Li, J., Chiu, L.H.R., 2018. Urban investment and development corporations, new town development and China’s local state restructuring – the case of Songjiang new town. Shanghai. Urban Geography 39 (5), 687–705. Li, L., 2015. State rescaling and national new area development in China: the case of Chongqing Liangjiang. Habitat Int. 50, 80–89. Li, L., 2019. A mega-event approach to glurbanization: insights from Expo 2010, Shanghai. Am. J. Geogr. Res. Rev. 2 (1), 1–12. Lin, G.C.S., 2009. Scaling-up regional development in Globalizing China: local capital accumulation, land-centred politics, and reproduction of space. Reg. Stud. 43 (3), 429–447. McCann, E., 2013. Urban policy mobilities and global circuits of knowledge: toward a research agenda. Urban Insight 101 (1), 107–130. Milhaupt, C.J., Zheng, W., 2017. Reforming China’s state-owned enterprises: institutions, not ownership. In: Liebman, Milhaupt (Eds.), Regulating the Visible Hand? Caixin 28 August 2017. Paddison, R., 1993. City marketing, image-reconstruction and urban regeneration. Urban Stud. 30 (2), 339–350. Qian, Z., 2007. Institutions and local growth coalitions in China’s urban land reform: the case of Hangzhou High-Technology Zone. Asia Pac. Viewp. 48 (2), 219–233. Raco, M., Henderson, S., 2009. Flagship regeneration in a global city: the Re-making of Paddington Basin. Urban Policy Res. 27 (3), 301–314. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 08111140902968737. Ramo, J.C., 1998. The shanghai bubble. Foreign Policy, Summer 64–75. Roche, M., 2000. Mega-events and Modernity : Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture. Routledge, London ; New York. Schoenberger, E., 2004. The spatial fix revisited. Antipode 36 (3), 427–433. Shen, J., Wu, F., 2017. The suburb as a space of capital accumulation: the development of new towns in Shanghai. China. Antipode 49 (3), 761–780. Sheppard, E., 2004. The spatiality of the limits to capital. Antipode 36 (3), 470–479.
Declaration of Competing Interest We have no conflict of interest to declare, and all authors have seen and approved the manuscript being submitted. Acknowledgements This work was supported by The National Natural Science Foundation of China [No. 51808391], Chinese National Funding of Social Sciences [No. 19BSH035], Open Projects Fund of Key Laboratory of Ecology and Energy-saving Study of Dense Habitat (Tongji University), Ministry of Education [2019020202, 2019020203] References Axford, B., Buhari-Gulmez, D., Gulmez, S.B., 2017. Rethinking Ideology in the Age of Global Discontent: Bridging Divides. Routledge. Brenner, N., Theodore, N., 2002. Cities and the geographies of “Actually existing neoliberalism”. Antipode 34 (3), 349–379. Carrière, J.-P., Demaziere, C., 2002. Urban planning and flagship development projects: lessons from EXPO 98. Lisbon. Planning Practice and Research 17 (1), 69–79. Chan, R.C.K., Li, L., 2017. Entrepreneurial city and the restructuring of urban space in Shanghai Expo. Urban Geogr. 38 (5), 666–686. Chien, S., 2013. Chinese eco-cities: a perspective of land-speculation-oriented local entrepreneurialism. China Inf. 27 (2), 173–196. Chung, C., Zhang, F., Wu, F., 2018. Negotiating green space with landed interests: the urban political ecology of Greenway in the Pearl River Delta. China. Antipode 50 (4), 891–909. Codecasa, G., Ponzini, D., 2011. Public–private partnership: a delusion for urban regeneration? Evidence from Italy. Eur. Plan. Stud. 19 (4), 647–667. Coq-Huelva, D., 2013. Urbanisation and financialisation in the context of a rescaling state: the case of Spain. Antipode 45 (5), 1213–1231. Fainstein, S.S., 2008. Mega-projects in New York, London and Amsterdam. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 32 (4), 768–785. Fröbel, F., Heinrichs, J., Kreye, O., 2016. The new international division of labour. Soc. Sci. Inf. 17 (1), 123–142. Grabher, G., Thiel, J., 2015. Projects, people, professions: trajectories of learning through
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L. Li and Y. Xiao Shin, H.B., 2014. Urban spatial restructuring, event-led development and scalar politics. Urban Stud. 51 (14), 2961–2978. Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F., Rodriguez, A., 2002. Neoliberal urbanization in Europe: large–scale urban development projects and the new urban policy. Antipode 34 (3), 542–577. Trubina, E., 2014. Mega-events in the context of capitalist modernity: the case of 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. Eurasian Geogr. Econ. 55 (6), 610–627. Wang, Z., Wu, F., 2019. In-situ marginalisation: social impact of chinese mega-projects. Antipode 51 (5), 1640–1663.
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Capital accumulation and urban land development in China: (Re)making Expo Park in Shanghai Lingyue Li, Yang Xiao* Department of Urban Planning, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University, Shanghai, China
ARTICLE INFO
ABSTRACT
Keywords: Land banking Capital accumulation State entrepreneurialism Mega-Events Expo Park Shanghai
This study goes beyond the crisis-based understanding of spatial fix to consider a holistic exploration of capital accumulation and urban land development in association with a mega-event in China. Decoding the eventtriggered land banking (tudi chubei) process in the (re)making of Expo Park, it shifts the focus of this land-based accumulation to pre-event relocation and post-event investment attraction. The contributions of this study are twofold. First, this study contributes to the mainstream literature by incorporating the place-based mega-event into the study of spatial fix. Spatial fix through mega-events is enacted through pre-Expo primary land development, which reshapes the built environment to articulate a “higher and better use,” followed by a post-Expo land disposition, which fixes investment to accomplish capital restructuring. Second, this study indicates that state entrepreneurialism offers a more accurate interpretation of the governance of land processes led by megaevents than urban entrepreneurialism, and enriches the literature on state entrepreneurialism by illuminating the ways in which capital accumulation is achieved through land development under this governance paradigm. In the pre-Expo phase, a state-owned urban development corporation (UDC) was established to take charge of land finance. An ad hoc quasi-government in proximity to the central state and on behalf of the municipal official mobilized administrative resources to aid land resumption—tailoring space to squeeze out inefficient accumulation modes. In the post-Expo phase, a restructured municipal state-owned enterprise (SOE) took over responsibilities for land disposition from the state-owned UDC and prioritized central state SOEs over other investors.
1. Introduction The means by which capital is accumulated in cities to accomplish spatial fix has been a longstanding topic in capitalist society. Since thesis of urban entrepreneurialism emphasizing public–private partnership were first proposed (Harvey, 1989b), a significant amount of literature has showcased it as a valid theory to explain the governance approach of post-Fordist accumulation in the global North (Carrière and Demaziere, 2002; Codecasa and Ponzini, 2011; Coq-Huelva (2013); Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Urban China has also embarked on a rapid capital accumulation (Lin, 2009; Shen and Wu, 2017), an accumulation of unprecedented scale (Chien, 2013; Jiang et al., 2016b; Xu et al., 2009) and, crucially for this study, one that has land at its heart—it is, therefore, a spatial fix. This is largely due to the 1994 tax reform, which increased local government’s dependence on land finance as land conveyance income is free from sharing with central government under fiscal constraints (Huang and Chan, 2018). Various kinds of capital is, therefore, keen to open up new markets in the cities, seeking large
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payoffs made possible by land value appreciation. Most previous studies have focused on evidence of urban entrepreneurialism, centered on how the government forms partnerships with foreign or private developers in China’s accumulation (He and Wu, 2005, 2009; Qian, 2007; Yang and Chang, 2007). However, some recent studies have found that China’s capital accumulation, driven by large-scale urban land (re)development, has shown distinctive characteristics of state entrepreneurialism, by which the power of the state has been pervasive in the market (Jiang and Waley, 2018; Li and Chiu, 2018; Wang and Wu, 2019). Using mega-events as a vehicle, this paper aims to disentangle the governance mechanism of urban land development as a major means through which the Chinese government accumulates capital to serve its strategic objectives (Wang and Wu, 2019; Wu, 2018). Drawing on insights from Shanghai Expo Park, a project initiated by Expo 2010 to redevelop a run-down industrial area, this study suggests that the concept of state entrepreneurialism prioritizing state interests over others (Wang and Wu, 2019) can better explain the governance and
Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (Y. Xiao).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104472 Received 16 September 2019; Received in revised form 11 December 2019; Accepted 12 January 2020 0264-8377/ © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: Lingyue Li and Yang Xiao, Land Use Policy, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104472
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Fig. 1. Governance structure in the pre- and post-Expo phases.
financial operation of land processes led by mega-events than can the concept of urban entrepreneurialism, by which land redevelopment serves to produce exchange value for elite groups (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; He and Wu, 2005; Swyngedouw et al., 2002).
built environment or mobilize resources across wider areas (Sheppard, 2004). A spatial fix must be temporal (Jessop, 2006), given that temporal deferment is of equal significance as geospatial restructuring for capital accumulation. In other words, the time (or temporality) of capital accumulation should not be underestimated, because time measurement and command over time are sources of social power (Harvey, 1989a: 226, 252). Spatial fix via mega-events, denoted as mega-event spatial fix, has been favored by urban politicians across the globe since the 1970s (Paddison, 1993; Raco and Henderson, 2009; Roche, 2000). Fitting into the capitalist imaginary system, mega-events contribute to spatial fix through their unprecedented scale of capital investment, stakeholder participation and organizational requirements (Grabher and Thiel, 2015). Making space for event venues not only (re)produces the on-site built environment but also incurs off-site spatial reconfiguration in which social, economic, and cultural structures are recomposed (Shin, 2014; Trubina, 2014) for more efficient capital accumulation. The preand post-event time frames allow for the accomplishment of long-term accumulation agenda (Grabher and Thiel, 2015). The high-profile, world-renowned mega-events, different from those low-profile, ordinary actions, also have the potential to improve the image of the venue site to attract the flow of capital. Mega-events are often translated to large-scale projects by local policymakers for the purpose of capital accumulation. In the U.S. and Europe, the private sector has long dominated such large-scale accumulation in urban developments (Fainstein, 2008; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008; Swyngedouw et al., 2002), often in the form of public–private partnerships (Carrière and Demaziere, 2002; Codecasa and Ponzini, 2011). Yet in China, it is the state and state-owned agencies engaged in the market that accomplish
2. Conceptual framework 2.1. The mega-events spatial fix The idea of mega-event spatial fix is proposed to understand eventled capital accumulation. Spatial fix’s origin, in Harvey’s solidification of Marx’s theory, refers to a geographical reconfiguration or a newly extended geographical space—one that resolves the inner crisis resulting from overaccumulation of capital or labor (Harvey, 2001). Globalization, or the contemporaneous international industrial transfer and division of labor, neatly captures capitalism’s avaricious motives to resolve its chronic crises. Thus, in a broad sense, spatial fix is in association with “the new international division of labor”, “deindustrialization” and “capital mobility” (Fröbel et al., 2016). This research goes beyond the crisis-based cognition to treat spatial fix as a process of improving the efficiency of capital accumulation through spatial restructuring. The power of spatial fix is therefore to show how sociospatial restructuring (re)occupies and (re)functionalizes already occupied and functionalized spaces, assigning exchange value to serve productive and profitable imperatives (Axford et al., 2017). Spatial fix implies spatial (re)distribution of things and, thereby, a relocation: relocation of manufacturing in developed areas to low-wage, underdeveloped regions (Schoenberger, 2004). Torn between fixity and mobility, spatial fix means to “pin down” investment in the longstanding
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the accumulation. Moreover, launching mega-events in China is not only about economic gains—they also serve qualitative objectives of urban and national prosperity, ultimately acting to maintain state power. Governance of capital accumulation in China is, therefore, not confined to Logan and Molotch’s growth machine or Stone’s regime politics but is, rather, characterized by state entrepreneurialism (Wang and Wu, 2019; Wu, 2018). Transforming the state into an entrepreneurial market agency does not mean to weaken state power; rather, it is done to consolidate the role of the state in the market. Fig. 1. Mega-event spatial fix for capital accumulation.
seconded from the government. This set up offers a platform for the party-state officers to move between governments and enterprises, which obscures state activities in the market. A UDC alone cannot accomplish land-based accumulation as relocation takes significant time and effort and land disposition is full of uncertainties. What guarantees the success of the land-based accumulation is a flexible governance structure, capable of mobilizing administrative forces at all levels2 when needed. For efficient project delivery, UDCs financing compensation for municipal-level projects are usually exempt from the “dirty work” of relocation (Chan and Li, 2017; Jiang et al., 2016a; Li and Chiu, 2018; Wang and Wu, 2019). Responsibilities to mobilize the original owners to move are either devolved to original lower-level (e.g., district- or street-level governance bodies) or passed up to higher-level (e.g., provincial or central government) bodies, depending on the jibie of the negotiators. This down/upgrading of bargaining, benefiting from governance flexibility, expands the scope of administrative intervention in the land market for capital accumulation. In China’s mega-events, quasi-governmental organizations (QGOs) such as the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games, Shanghai Expo Coordination Bureau, and Guangzhou Organizing Committee for the Asian Games further aid the event-led land development. These QGOs are not only responsive to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) or Bureau International des Expositions (BIE) and the State Council but also hold the responsibility for local development3 (Chan and Li, 2017; Shin, 2014). In relation to land development, their task is to prepare the venues; in performing this function, they spare no effort in mobilizing political power—even from the central state (interview with a senior officer in Shanghai, 2009). Yet, they are ad hoc administrative organizations subject to disbandment or change when the mega-event ends. Once “immature” land is ready for development, the management responsibilities will be handed to (quasi-)government authorities by whom collective decisions are made to avoid risks in secondary land development (interview with a researcher involved in land development in Shanghai, 2017). Although local state-owned UDCs act as the landlord, they remain exempted from the work of investment attraction. Responsibilities to decide who can settle are assigned to a counterpart authority in collaboration with local government. In most cases, social services such as green maintenance, waste management and healthcare remain assigned to original lowerlevel government bodies (Li, 2015; Wang and Wu, 2019).
2.2. Governing land-based accumulation under state entrepreneurialism Understanding the mechanisms of mega-events spatial fix in China is almost impossible without disentangling the land process. Since the late 1980s, when non-gratuitous transfer of land use rights was introduced, land price has been increasing so rapidly that land has become the major form of state capital in China (Li, 2015). Land-based, property-led accumulation thus characterizes China’s urban development and the income from land leasing has become the main source of local revenue (Chien, 2013; He and Wu, 2009; Shen and Wu, 2017). In recent years, land leasing income has exceeded 60 % of local governments’ total revenue. Among the diverse approaches contributing to local land revenue, land banking is the most-favored by policymakers and is the most commonly enforced approach in large-scale projects. By launching mega-events, the state strategically incorporates the four stages of land banking—land resumption, land holding, site preparation, and land disposition—into the pre- and post-event time frames to squeeze out spaces of inefficient accumulation and appeal to new urban space for high-efficiency (high-accumulation) land uses. In other words, the governance of urban land development, in particular the role of the state in the politics of land, holds the key to understanding the operational logic of China’s contemporary accumulation regime (Chung et al., 2018). With regards to how land-based accumulation operates under state entrepreneurialism, mega-events open a window wherein the state dominates land development by its entrepreneurial variants—state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and flexible governance structures that prioritize the interests of the state. Through SOEs, the state’s involvement in market-related land processes to leverage and engineer economic growth is much more omnipresent than is generally recognized. The most critical form of involvement is the entrepreneurial establishment of an urban development corporation (UDC) as a project funder carrying out primary land development. In most cases, UDCs are local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) subordinate to local government (Jiang and Waley, 2018; Li and Chiu, 2018; Wang and Wu, 2019).1 The projects they fund are warranted by local government, they can mortgage land for loans from state-owned banks and are in charge of raising money for compensation of relocated families and firms, for the construction of infrastructure and resettlement, and for project management (Huang and Chan, 2018; Jiang and Waley, 2018; Li and Chiu, 2018; Wang and Wu, 2019). However, UDCs as such are often mutable, with flexible shareholding structures through which capital can easily flow between various state corporations (Milhaupt and Zheng, 2017), enabling conveyance income from land (re)development to be redistributed. In secondary land development, SOEs usually take precedence in the initial real estate and investment (Jiang and Waley, 2018) over private or foreign firms, obtaining land use rights through state allocation or by paying much less than the market price. Leaders of SOEs are commonly
3. Capital accumulation through the (re)making of Shanghai Expo Park This research embarks on a journey to probe into the local governance of capital restructuring in association with a mega-event. Shanghai illustrates the central state’s intentions for “molded, managed” capitalism for its emerging planned market and has always been progressive in China’s new growth model (Ramo, 1998). This is well echoed by Expo 2010, which (re)creates new scales for territorialization of local (re)investment. The (re)making of Expo Park would certainly become a flagship case—assimilating into the loop of global policy knowledge to arm Shanghai in the rivalry of world city competition (McCann, 2013). As with many mega urban projects in China, Shanghai Expo is not only about land value capture; rather, land finance is a means to serve more strategic objectives (Wang and Wu, 2019; Wu, 2018). The event was endued with a mission beyond economy and showcases how a short-term mega-event can play a role in a mega-city’s 2 China’s administrative divisions comprise five levels: central (zhongyang), provincial (sheng), municipal (shi), district/county (qu/xian), and street/township (jiedao/xiang). 3 Informed by data collation from official websites of China’s mega-events. The majority of the organization staff are from local government and a minority of them are from central government.
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UDCs could also be central SOEs in strategic collaboration with local government (Huang and Chan, 2018) or private- or foreign-funded partners with local government (He and Wu, 2005; Huang and Chan, 2018). Yet in this case, local government remain dominant with a high ratio of shareholdings and profit distribution (Huang and Chan, 2018). 3
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long-term agenda. Initially suggested in the 1950s and re-proposed by Mayor Wang Daohan in the 1980s, the World Exposition was one of Shanghai municipality’s two strategic visions4 as part of the continued drive for Shanghai’s development (Yu, 2010). In 1999, when the report “On Envisage for Shanghai to Hold the World Expo” was approved by the State Council, Shanghai was far from being a satisfactory global city. With an overcrowded central city area and stagnating suburbs, there was a call for spatial structure optimization for industrial upgrading and more efficient accumulation (interview with a local urban planner, 2010). To achieve this objective, the devalued land parcel and circulating capital became Shanghai Municipal Government’s attempt at a spatial fix: fixing up the inefficient accumulation of space by pinning down the flows of capital. This explains why the site of Expo Park was selected in a run-down, declining manufacturing dockland along the southern section of Huangpu River. Spatial fix—via Expo 2010—is realized through pre-event site preparation, which reshapes the built environment to offer “higher and better use” along with post-event reutilization that fixes investment to accomplish capital restructuring. Governance approaches toward this spatial fix are characterized by state entrepreneurialism and are incorporated into the pre- and postevent temporal framework. The following subsections delve into this governance effort toward land-based accumulation through the (re) making of Expo Park. The roles of the state and, in particular, its entrepreneurial variants—state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and flexible governance structures—are examined to enrich our understanding of China’s state entrepreneurialism.
comprising mixed residential (26.2 %) and industrial uses (62 %) was involved: up to 272 enterprises, ranging from central state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to foreign or private corporations, and almost 18,000 households (encompassing almost 47,900 people), awaited relocation. Since land can be priced and leased as a commodity, land property rights become valuable for social wealth accumulation. The politics of relocation is therefore soaked in the struggle over this property-based activism alongside ubiquitous conflicts of interest between property owners and relocation executors. To minimize potential conflicts, Shanghai Expo Coordination Bureau (SECB), a QGO resembling ad hoc administrative committees, lent administrative support for negotiation in land resumption. With Hao Hong—the Deputy Secretary General of Shanghai Municipal Government—appointed as the director, SECB was at the departmental level (zhengting ji) in proximity to the central state and on behalf of the municipal official to oversee the land development. Branch offices of SECB were set up in involved districts to command relocation. They created the “sunshine policy” with improved compensation standards based on “Rules of Shanghai Municipality on Implementing the Administration of Urban Houses Demolished and Relocated (2001)”. In doing so, a disproportionate budget was allocated to the displaced families,8 who managed to move up the wealth ladders from the value appreciation of the compensated property: house prices in the two resettlement bases—Sanlin and Pujiang Expo Home—have surpassed 40,000 RMB per square meter and were available for sale after five years of ownership. Nevertheless, relocation of industrial SOEs is more arduous than relocating residents. Their bargaining power is proportional to the jibie (administrative levels) and their leading officers are usually seconded from government sectors, with high administrative rank. Central SOEs, whose bargaining power overwhelms that of other firms, account for 74 % of the industrial land. To persuade these SOEs to relocate, the governance structure of land development for Expo 2010 looked upwards to the Expo Organization Committee led by State Council, which opened a channel for SECB to negotiate with industrial enterprises affiliated to central ministries (interview with a senior officer in Shanghai, 2009). The supportive stance from the State Council leadership and the time limit for the mega-event feast were crucial to the compromise between the industrial firms and Shanghai. After rounds of bargaining, they agreed to move the factories to Luojing and Changxing placement bases, but kept part of their ownership of the original land parcels. The land for hosting Expo 2010 completed first-phase resumption in the middle of 2007. The time lag between land resumption and land leasing, plus the marketing effects of Expo, contributed to the value appreciation of the last piece of developable land in downtown Shanghai.
3.1. Preparing land for revitalization: making Expo Park in the pre-Expo phase To realize the municipality’s strategic vision to upgrade Shanghai as a global city, Shanghai Expo Land Holding Co. (SELHC) made best use of the last piece of land parcel—left out of former rounds of gentrification—in downtown Shanghai to make the Expo Park. SELHC is one of Shanghai’s large number of UDCs responsible for pre-Expo land resumption, primary land development, infrastructure and venues supporting facility construction, post-Expo land disposition and repayment of debts. As an SOE, SELHC is able to capitalize on state resources. Founded on December 25, 2003 (No.102 approval of Shanghai Municipal Government [2003]), SELHC was funded by three entrepreneurial establishments owned by the municipal government: Shanghai Expo Land Banking Center (SELRC)5 (invested 3.4 billion RMB), Shanghai Land (Group) Co., Ltd (SLGC) (invested 3 billion RMB) and Shanghai Municipal Investment (Group) Corporation (SMIGC) (invested 3 billion RMB). Guaranteed by both national and Shanghai’s municipal government, SELHC signed substantial loan agreements with state-owned banks,6 raising funds for relocation and construction of the Expo Park (Li, 2019). “Shanghai Expo 2010 Registration Report, China” reveals that investments in relocation far exceed the 18 billion RMB project construction investment and the 10.7 billion RMB exhibition operation investment in the pre-Expo phase. Like most UDCs, SELHC is free from the “dirty work” of relocation, which is energy and time consuming due to the sheer scale of the resettlement and because of the disputable compensation arrangements and bargaining. Major work was outsourced to Huangpu, Luwan and Pudong7 district governments and their subordinate street offices. Shanghai Expo master plan reports that a land parcel of 5.28 km2,
3.2. Revaluing land in disposition: remaking Expo Park in the post-Expo phase With the closing of Expo 2010, the governance structure for postExpo land development shrunk to municipal level, focusing on the attraction of corporate developers to invest in the secondary land market. A “five zones and one belt” spatial layout was planned for the reinvestment: Zones A and B were the main exhibition and business districts attracting investment, Zone C was a Houtan expansion area reserved for future land use, Zone D was a cultural and museum district, akin to Museumsinsel in Berlin, and Zone E was revamped to form a creative district (see Fig. 2). Major land parcels in Zones A and B will be leased in the secondary land market. Strategically, this remaking of Expo Park was integrated into Shanghai’s discourse of a post-industrial trajectory that underscores the transition from manufacturing to service industries, from dilapidated residences to luxury gated communities.
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The other one is the development and opening of Pudong. SELRC and SELHC operated under “two brands, one team”, interview with SECB officials, July 2010. 6 We are also informed that 2 billion bonds were also issued in 2007 for Expo project construction, interview with ESG managers, August 2017. 7 In June 2011, the proposal that incorporates the original Luwan district into Huangpu district was approved by the State Council. 5
8 Interviews with residents who were requested to relocate because of Expo 2010, July 2010.
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Fig. 2. Division of zones in the post-Expo legacy plan.
SELHC commenced new development in Expo Village and Pujiang Expo Home and handed over the work of initial investment attraction to Expo Shanghai Group (ESG), the successor reorganized from SECB. The secondary land market is left to other entrepreneurial entities to share risk as otherwise, SELHC is likely to be trapped in financial distress due to overdue payment by tenants (interview with a senior researcher in Shanghai, 2017). Though turned into an entrepreneurial variant, ESG remained part of the panoply of local government, not only because the former Deputy SECB Director Dailiu was reappointed as Chairman and Party Secretary of ESG, with many other ESG employees coming from SECB, but also because ESG gains financial support through local bureaucracy and is politically obliged to the municipal party leadership. One thing for sure is that connections to the central government are, at this stage, weaker; it is thus foreseeable that issues associated with the un-resumed industrial land may take considerable time to resolve. Given that the land for Expo was invaluable, being the last piece in downtown Shanghai, ESG therefore concerns itself more with creating rules to determine who can join. It cooperated with municipal government sectors to filter enterprises that fit into Shanghai’s “four centers” strategy and prioritized SOEs in this secondary land development campaign. In June 2011, the Municipal Economic and Information Commission, Municipal Planning, Land and Resources Administration, and ESG formed an investment team to dispose of land parcels in Zone B. To further state interests and lock profits of land value appreciation in to the state system, the team applied a principle of “selecting first,
leasing after (xian linxuan, hou churang),” reporting SOEs’ intent to invest to municipal government for approval. Until 2016, the land parcels in Zone B were all released to central SOEs with a base price (di jia)9 under state allocation of land resources, for which the rents barely enable margins (Schoenberger, 2004). In doing so, earnings from land value appreciation in the secondary market are redistributed among state SOEs and turned into state-owned assets. Central SOEs in China are institutional legacies, evolving from inefficient production units into profitable business entities. They are privileged by political support from the central state, thus capable of reaping profits in rounds of accumulation. Central SOEs obtaining land use rights in the initial round are powerful oligarchic groups, they include Baosteel, Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd. (COMAC), State Grid Corporation of China, China Huaneng Group, China Huadian Corporation and Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. In contrast to Zone B, where non-central SOEs were not allowed to enter, Zone A opened the market to diverse investors. Led by Shanghai Development and Reform Commission, the investment team was much larger than that of Zone B, and was composed of Economic and Information Commission, Commerce Commission, Finance Office, Municipal Planning, Land and Resources Administration, Shanghai Land Banking Center (SLBC), Pudong New Area District and ESG. To 9 Interview with ESG managers and researchers from Shanghai Academy of Development and Reform, August 2017.
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introduce a competitive mechanism, the team applied a principle of “shortlisted first, auction after (xian ruwei, hou jingpai),” allowing enterprises to obtain land use rights through bids. Land parcels in Zone A were available for sale at a premium. In May 2013, the State Power Investment Group firstly bid for a 1 billion RMB land parcel at a premium rate of 22.6 %. A private capital group, Shenzhen Liye Group Co., Ltd. came thereafter. Yet, attraction of foreign investors is far from satisfactory. With the support from central government weakened, resources for secondary land development in the post-Expo phase is incomparable to that of the pre-Expo phase. Scant financial resources plus political sensitivities lead to a prudent manner of ESG towards foreign investment attraction in post-Expo. They are mindful that the aim to build a world-class zone is too challenging to achieve.10 In the Expo Valley of Zone A, the plan to introduce Fortune 500 firms to eight land parcels by the investment team was unsuccessful. The land was finally co-bid by ESG and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank with a base price. Overseas investors bidding for land are limited to Asia: Far Eastern Group and Maxbase Holdings. Ltd. are both Taiwanese companies, while SK Holdings is a Korean company bidding for its headquarters site near the Expo Park site.11 By and large, ESG armed the government in land finance, prioritized central SOEs in investment, deferred non-state capital, and uplifted land values. Later investments became more diverse but were far from international. The world-class positioning of Expo Park is therefore questionable. As mentioned, SELHC was first invested by SELRC and the other two state corporations. Yet its shareholding structure was not fixed. In 2010, SLGC and SMIGC transferred 100 % and 31.9 % company equity to SLBC and SELRC respectively. In 2016, after 100 % and 74.1 % land parcels were leased in Zones B and A, SLBC returned the 31.9 % company equity to SLGC, with capital value increased by 213.5 %. SLGC reinvested 1.5 billion RMB to SELHC, sharing 41.28 % holdings of the company in 2018. Through the change of SELHC’s holding structure, capital was free to flow between state corporations and land value appreciation had been redistributed among these SOEs.
particular, in the pre-Expo phase, the relocation of dilapidated manufacturing and housing to underdeveloped areas for land resumption formed the main goal for the local bureau as it sought to empty the downtown golden section along the Huangpu River. This action, tailoring space to squeeze out inefficient accumulation, was the main trigger for capital (alongside population and industrial) mobility—mobilizing from the city center to outer suburbs. In the post-Expo phase, new investments were pinned down in the reconfigured Expo Park through land disposition and the rebuilt environment achieves a “higher and better use” (Sheppard, 2004), thus qualifying as more efficient capital accumulation. Overall, mega-events reconfigure the built environments, refactoring inefficient accumulation and sparking off citywide spatial restructuring to improve the pace and volume of accumulation before the event. The tailored space in Expo Park makes it possible to pin down the capital in the post-Expo phase. The fixed opening time of a mega-event catalyzes the local agenda of the host cities to encourage the arrival of a new round of capital accumulation on a much faster timescale. Hosting Expo, Shanghai propelled its spatial restructuring strategy12 ahead by ten years. Mega-events are also highprofile, enhancing the host city’s image and raising the political influence of the city government. This did great favors to Shanghai Expo as local industrial relics become endued with global significance and the bargaining between the original landowners and city government was forced to come to a conclusion Table 1. Second, this study enriches the literature on state entrepreneurialism by further looking into how the aforementioned capital accumulation is achieved through land development under this governance paradigm. Table 2 compares governance mechanisms of land development under the traditional urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989b) and state entrepreneurialism (Wang and Wu, 2019; Wu, 2018). In primary land development, traditional entrepreneurial governance stresses the seeking out of strategic partners to ease financial distress of local government (Huang and Chan, 2018), yet state entrepreneurialism seeks to establish local state-owned UDCs and uses land as collateral to raise funds from state banks. The established SELHC manages to borrow money from banks, something which local government itself is not allowed to do. In secondary land development, while profit-oriented growth machines made up of government and enterprises are the main form of urban entrepreneurialism (He and Wu, 2005), SOEs usually take precedence over private or foreign firms through state allocation or lower-than-market rates in state entrepreneurialism. In our case, all the enterprises obtaining land use rights in the initial round are powerful oligarchic corporations owned by the central state, which have not contributed significantly to the local economy previously. The distinction results from the different purposes of the two types of governance. Unlike the traditional entrepreneurial governance, which takes economic profits from the exchange value in land development and increased tax basis as its ultimate objective, state entrepreneurialism focuses on higher-level strategic objectives such as industrial upgrading or national strength and prioritizes the interests of the state over those of others (Wang and Wu, 2019). Therefore, although land value capture remains crucial to capital accumulation in Shanghai Expo, land finance is of greater importance to city upgrading and national strength. Though improved compensation standards such as the “sunshine policy” can be made to allay initial resistance, state entrepreneurialism does not mean that tensions and contradictions observed in neoliberal large-scale projects (Swyngedouw et al., 2002) can be eliminated; instead, the increasingly complicated composition of entrepreneurial entities create new tensions and conflicts among themselves. This has already been discernible in the redevelopment of former state-owned industrial land in the Expo Park, leaving uncertainties in future development. Irrespective, state
4. Conclusion This study affords a holistic exploration of capital accumulation and urban land development in association with a mega-event in China. Moving beyond the crisis-based cognition, the idea of mega-event spatial fix demonstrates how mega-event land use—freeing up previously occupied space for an unprecedented scale of investment—is critical to the improvement of capital accumulation efficiency, and hence spatial fix. One step further, this research extends the focal point of this land-based accumulation through detailed examination of governance toward pre-event relocation and post-event investment attraction. Though many studies have stressed the role of the state as an omnipotent giant leveraging this large-scale, land-based accumulation (Chan and Li, 2017; He and Wu, 2009; Wu, 2018), our case of Shanghai Expo discloses that the state power has been distributed among its diverse administrative and entrepreneurial variants. This effect is also reported in some updated literature (Jiang and Waley, 2018; Wang and Wu, 2019). The complex composition of state power consolidates the role of the state and magnifies government control over the market but also creates tensions between different state-owned entities as well as uncertainties in urban land development. This is well exemplified in the (re)making of Expo Park, from which the contributions of this study are twofold. First, this study contributes to the mainstream literature by incorporating the place-based mega-event into the study of spatial fix. In 10 Interview with ESG managers and researchers from Shanghai Academy of Development and Reform, August 2017. 11 Interview with ESG managers, August 2017.
12 The spatial restructuring strategy aims to tailor space in the central city and decentralize industry and population to suburban areas.
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Table 1 The three aspects of mega-event spatial fix for capital accumulation. Phase and flow direction Three aspects
Pre-Expo: capital mobility from city center to outer suburbs
Post-Expo: capital fixity to pin down investment on-site
Spatiality
Tailoring space for and accelerating capital mobilization. Relocating firms and residents to resettlement bases, inducing social segregation. Time span of preparation sets time limit to accelerate long-run restructuring of capital.
Offering space to pin down diverse investment.
Temporality Globality
Elevating host superiority in negotiation for capital restructuring and guaranteeing the compensation standard.
Time lag slows down but leaves room for land value appreciation. Added value for capital attraction is limited.
Table 2 Land development under urban entrepreneurialism and state entrepreneurialism.
Governance purposes Governance means in primary land development Governance means in secondary land development Tensions and conflicts
Land-based accumulation under urban entrepreneurialism
Land-based accumulation under state entrepreneurialism
Making profits from exchange value in land development and increase of tax basis. Seeking alliance with strategic partners to ease financial distress of local government. Forming growth machines or coalitions with enterprises to participate in the initial real estate development. Struggles and conflicts result from social polarization, gentrification and displacement.
Focuses on strategic objectives such as industrial upgrading or national strength and prioritizes the interests of the state over those of others. Establishing local state-owned urban development corporations and mortgage land for loans from state banks. Prioritizing SOEs over private or foreign firms through state allocation or paying far less than market price in the initial real estate development. Tensions and conflicts are not only generated in massive relocation and forced evictions but also created among state-owned entities.
entrepreneurialism is effective and efficient in delivering large-scale projects such as Expo Park. Not only because the governance structure is flexible enough to expand and shrink between social and economic affairs, but also because the entrepreneurial variants leave flexibility for party-state officials to move between government and corporations and for capital to flow between state corporations under changeable holding structures.
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