Case Study

Chapter

 

11

Case Study: The Nuclear Security Summit Process and Its Outcomes* Kelsey Davenport1, Jenna Parker2 1Director

for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association, Washington, DC, United States; 2Nuclear Security Analyst, Partnership for Global Security, Washington, DC, United States

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Introduction 320

Communiqués 324

National Statements  328 The Benefits of Unilateral Action  329

Protection and Minimization of Nuclear Materials  330 Strengthening Nuclear Security Governance  334 Countering Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Smuggling  336 Improving Education and Training  337

Joint Statements  338 Materials 341

High-Density LEU Fuel Production (2012, 2014, and 2016)  341 Security of Radioactive Sources and Ensuring Radiological Security (2012, 2014, and 2016)  341 HEU Minimization and Medical Isotopes (2012)  342 Semipalatinsk (2012)  343 Countries Free of Highly Enriched Uranium (2014)  343 Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications (2016)  344 Cyber Security (2016)  344 LEU Fuel Bank (2016)  344

Smuggling 344

Counter Nuclear Smuggling (2012, 2014, and 2016)  344 Transport Security (2012, 2014, and 2016)  345 Maritime Supply Chain Security (2014 and 2016)  345 Nuclear Security Forensics (2014 and 2016)  346 National Nuclear Detection Architecture (2016)  347

*This work represents the views of the authors, and not necessarily the views of their employers past or present. Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-803271-8.00011-4 Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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320 CHAPTER 11  Case Study: The Nuclear Security Summit Process and Its Outcomes

Education 347

Nuclear Information Security (2012 and 2014)  347 Training and Support Centers (2012, 2014, and 2016)  347 Nuclear Security Summit Outreach Efforts (2012)  348 Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Security (2014 and 2016)  349 Certified Training (2016)  349 Mitigating Insider Threat (2016)  349

Governance 349

National Legislation Implementation Kit (2012 and 2014)  349 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (2012 and 2014)  350 Global Partnership (2012)  350 Nuclear Terrorism (2012)  351 Promoting the Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2014 and 2016)  351 Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (2014)  351 Consolidated Reporting (2016)  352 Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response (2016)  352 Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security (2016)  353

Value of Multilateral Action  353 Conclusion 354

INTRODUCTION Shortly after his inauguration, while visiting Prague in April 2009, US President Barack Obama outlined a bold vision for a world free of nuclear weapons. In detailing his vision, Obama proposed a four-year effort to lock down vulnerable nuclear materials. Obama noted that while nuclear weapons are a dangerous legacy of the Cold War, today they exist in a dynamic and changing threat environment, and their continued existence poses a threat to all citizens, whether they reside in “New York or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel Aviv, Paris or Prague.”1 Critically, Obama stated that the most immediate and extreme threat to global security is the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist group. He strongly iterated that this threat is substantially compounded by unsecured nuclear material across the globe, and “to protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay.”2 Obama proceeded to declare an international effort to secure all vulnerable civilian nuclear material around the world within  four years, and stated that the international community 1Remarks

by president Barack Obama in Prague as delivered: The White House; April 2009. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-praguedelivered. 2See footnote 1.

 Introduction 321

would begin to address this matter “by having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security that the United States will host within the next year.”3 The Prague speech initiated the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process, and a year later, on April 12, 2010, in Washington, DC the Obama Administration hosted world leaders from 46 countries and three international organizations.4 The objective of this summit was to bring “high-level attention to the global threat posed by nuclear terrorism and advance a common approach to strengthening nuclear security.”5 The summit represented the administration’s first large, high-profile gathering of world leaders—and the topic of discussion was unique in both its content and its specificity. In political forums, the issue of nuclear security had been historically shrouded by issues of nuclear safety and safeguards, and largely viewed as the responsibility of nuclear-weapons states. The high priority placed on nuclear security by Obama indicated his personal dedication to addressing the issue, and the significance of the threat posed by nuclear insecurity. The Washington Summit drew some criticism for its selective participation list, and some states were dissatisfied by their exclusion. However, the Obama Administration affirmed that by having a wide variety of geographically and politically diverse states represented while simultaneously keeping the number of participating states relatively small, it was easier to reach consensus on a communiqué to guide the process and have a more meaningful impact on the security of vulnerable nuclear material. Invitees included states with nuclear weapons, states with large civil nuclear power and research programs, states that operate major seaports, and those along important commercial land trade routes. Of the 46 states that participated in 2010, 38 were represented at the head-of-state level. The 2010 summit succeeded in highlighting that the threat of insecure nuclear material is a global concern, and produced concrete outcomes that strengthened nuclear security worldwide. The summit’s participants endorsed a broad-consensus communiqué that “affirmed their dedication to preventing nuclear terrorism and adopted the four-year timeline proposed 3See

footnote 2.

4Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech

Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, the European Union, the IAEA, and the United Nations. 52010 Washington, US State Department. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/nuclearsecurity summit/2010/.

322 CHAPTER 11  Case Study: The Nuclear Security Summit Process and Its Outcomes

by Obama,” while additionally agreeing to a more specific but voluntary work plan.6 Importantly, this work plan provided guidance on implementing the political commitments made at the summit.7 Prior to the summit’s commencement, participant states were asked to present national commitment documents which outlined what each state intended to do to improve its nuclear security. These statements were unilateral pledges, and became known as “house gifts.” Overall, countries were very responsive to this request for commitments, and at the summit’s conclusion over 60 national commitments were made by 30 countries and published in a “Washington Highlights” document.8 In 2012, the original NSS participant states were joined by Azerbaijan, Denmark, Gabon, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania in attending the second iteration of the summit in Seoul, Republic of Korea. The participants met to reaffirm the commitments pledged at the 2010 NSS, and to assess progress made since 2010 and outline additional goals to advance nuclear security.9 Approximately 80% of the national commitments made in Washington were completed by the second summit. The Seoul summit expanded the use of the “house gift” concept in commitment making. In addition to encouraging unilateral commitments, summit organizers encouraged states to submit multilateral statements which outlined joint projects, or important principles which states could voluntarily sign up to. These statements became known colloquially as “gift baskets,” and 13 were submitted at the 2012 NSS. Gift baskets focused on a wide range of issues, including technical, policy, governance, and education initiatives. While the 2012 summit remained focused on nuclear security, the agenda expanded to include the consideration of the security of radiological sources, and the interface between nuclear security and safety. This updated agenda was a reflection of the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi

6Diehl

S, Humphrey P. The April 2010 nuclear security summit: one more step toward the mountaintop: NTI; 2010. http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/april-2010-nuclear-securitysummit/. 7Cann M. 2010 Nuclear security summit national commitment implementation: steps in the fight against nuclear terrorism, partnership for global security; 2012. https://pgstest. files.wordpress.com/2013/05/reports_2012-nuclear-security-summit-national-commitment-implementation-steps-in-the-fight-against-nuclear-terrorism_3-1-12_cann.pdf. 8US State Department. Highlights of National Commitments; 2010. https://2009-2017. state.gov/documents/organization/237042.pdf. 9Davenport K. Nuclear security summit at a glance: Arms Control Association; 2012. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NuclearSecuritySummit.

 Introduction 323

accident in Japan.10 The Seoul summit also produced a communiqué, expanding on the Washington communiqué and work plan and identifying 11 key priority areas.11 The third NSS was held in The Hague, Netherlands in March 2014, and again comprised the same 53 state participants represented by high-level leaders. States identified domestic progress through the submission of national statements and progress reports. Several new gift baskets were offered, and updates on 2012 gift baskets were presented. Similar to the past two summits, the 2014 NSS produced a consensus communiqué, but “focused attention on objectives enunciated in the Seoul communiqué and Washington work plan that [had] not been met, and developed a clear way ahead to translate them from ambition to action.”12 Leaders also participated in a scenario-based policy exercise designed to encourage states to think creatively and cooperatively in their response to the use of a radioactive device. The NSS process experienced a substantial evolution of its agenda from 2010 to 2014. In Washington the agenda was focused largely on the security of fissile material, primarily civil highly enriched uranium (HEU). In Seoul this focus expanded to include radiological security and the interface between safety and security. In The Hague the agenda expanded its focus again to emphasize voluntary governance measures.13 One of the most popular gift baskets that came out of the NSS process was the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation initiative, which was introduced in 2014 and signed by 35 states. Under this initiative, states committed to integrate International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations into their domestic frameworks, host periodic peer reviews and to be able to show demonstrable competence of nuclear personnel. Subsequently, “even though this entire system is still voluntary, collaborating countries have made a public commitment from which it is harder to diverge.”14 This gift basket encapsulates how far the NSS agenda had advanced, with states committing to concrete, measurable actions, while simultaneously demonstrating how much work is left to be done. 10See

footnote 9. of Korea. Highlights of national commitments, nuclear security summit; 2012. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/237130.pdf. 12US State Department. 2014 The Hague; 2014. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/nuclearsecuritysummit/2014/index.htm. 13Cann M. Strengthening global nuclear security frameworks: Partnership for Global Security; 2014. 14Squassoni S. Outcomes from the 2014 NSS: Center for Strategic and International Studies; 2014. http://csis.org/publication/outcomes-2014-nuclear-security-summit. 11Republic

324 CHAPTER 11  Case Study: The Nuclear Security Summit Process and Its Outcomes

The fourth and final summit was held in Washington, DC in 2016. One of the primary purposes of the 2016 summit was to create sustainable measures to ensure the ongoing effectiveness of the global nuclear security regime. In addition to new house gifts and gift baskets, participants agreed on five action plans for international organizations and initiatives to carry on the work of the summits: the IAEA, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Global Partnership, Interpol, and the United Nations (UN). A group of summit participants also formed the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG) to maintain the relationships established during the summit process and facilitate opportunities for states to meet periodically to discuss evolving threats to nuclear security. While the NSS process significantly contributed to global security, Obama’s four-year effort remains unfinished. The threat of nuclear weapons and materials will persist as long as they exist, and the risk posed by nuclear terrorism continues to evolve. While the NSS has generated significant successes in the area of nuclear security, work remains to be done.

Communiqués The first NSS in Washington, DC in April 2010 instituted the adoption of a consensus communiqué at each summit. The communiqués demonstrated both the strength and the weakness of the summit process. On one hand, each is a dedicated document endorsed by participating world leaders which highlights the need to strengthen the global nuclear security regime, recommends actions to enhance security at the state level, and promotes international cooperation. However, as consensus documents, the communiqués reflect the lowest-common-dominator objectives that countries were willing to endorse. The statements also contain numerous caveats that allow participating countries to opt out of commitments if not “technically and economically feasible,” or take steps “as appropriate” given domestic contexts. The actions recommended in the 2010 communiqué largely encourage countries to comply with existing norms, mechanisms, and legal treaties that make up the patchwork nuclear security regime, and take steps to minimize and secure materials. For instance, the 2010 communiqué called upon states to “support the objectives of nuclear security instruments” such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), its 2005 Amendment (at the time the amended convention had not entered into force), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), and reaffirmed the central role

 Introduction 325

of the IAEA.15 It encouraged states to take “special precautions” to secure HEU and separated plutonium, and convert reactors to run on low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel “where technically and economically feasible.”16 While important, the centrality of the treaties, the role of the IAEA, and state responsibility for securing nuclear materials were already well-established international norms prior to the summit process. The CPPNM, for instance, although not universal, entered into force in 1987, followed by the entry into force of ICSANT in 2007. The summits did, however, spur additional states to ratify these treaties and accelerated entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM by emphasizing its importance and calling on states to accede to it. Efforts to convert nuclear reactors and minimize HEU were also already under way. By the time of the 2010 summit, Romania, Taiwan, Libya, and Turkey had given up their HEU stockpiles.17 Cooperative work to eliminate HEU in other countries was also in progress before the summit process began. However, the completion of these efforts has been hailed as successes of the summit process, such as the final removal of HEU from Chile in 2010.18 However, the benefit of head-of-state participation and collective endorsement of these goals should not be dismissed. It is evident that the summit acted as a political catalyzing force. Many states (as explained in greater detail in the next section) built upon the actions called for in the communiqués to make additional tangible efforts at the national level. The summits pushed states to move beyond the status quo, examine the efficacy of the existing nuclear security regime, and address its gaps. The Seoul summit continued the practice of producing a consensus communiqué. Leading up to the 2012 summit, the communiqué negotiated among the 53 participating states expanded upon the themes from 2010 and added new areas of focus: the nexus between nuclear security and safety and the security of radioactive sources.19 In total, the Seoul communiqué recommended actions in 11 key areas: the global nuclear security architecture; the role of the IAEA; nuclear materials minimization; radioactive source 15Communique

of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit; April 13, 2010. https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/237037.pdf. 16See footnote 15. 17Nuclear nonproliferation: DOE made progress to secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, but opportunities exist to improve its efforts: United States Government Accountability Office; September 2015. 18See footnote 17. 19Communiqué of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit; March 2012.

326 CHAPTER 11  Case Study: The Nuclear Security Summit Process and Its Outcomes

security; nuclear security and safety; transportation security; combating illicit trafficking; nuclear forensics; nuclear security culture; information security; and international cooperation.20 The addition of these new key areas was spurred by external events, such as the Fukushima accident and geopolitical developments, as well as an interest in making the summit process more relevant to a greater number of states. Occurring between the 2010 and 2012 summits, the Fukushima accident highlighted the importance of the intersection of nuclear security and nuclear safety. The March 2011 tsunami that devastated Japan demonstrated how a natural disaster (or potentially a terrorist attack) could affect the civil nuclear industry and have dramatic international consequences. The effects of Fukushima were felt strongly in the NSS forum and this was reflected in the 2012 communiqué, as participating states affirmed that “nuclear security and nuclear safety measures should be designed, implemented and managed in nuclear facilities in a coherent and synergistic manner.”21 Expanding the focus from HEU and plutonium to include radioactive sources highlighted the risks posed by radiological dispersal devices, known as “dirty bombs.” Focusing on radioactive sources increased the relevancy of the summit process to a greater number of states, as most states possess radiological sources (for medical and industrial purposes) that could be used in a dirty bomb, and the security of radioactive sources varies widely from state to state. The communiqué encouraged states to establish national registries of high-activity radioactive sources and implement the national best practices outlined in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.22 Unlike the 2010 summit communiqué, the Seoul communiqué strove to determine specific (albeit nonbinding) deadlines for the first time. It called for the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM to enter into force by the end of 2014 (this did not occur until 2016), and for all states to announce plans to minimize the uses of HEU by 2013. While deadlines can act as a catalyst for action, the communiqués were primarily statements detailing shared principles. Specifically calling for ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and plans for HEU minimization likely spurred states to take action in these areas, but there was no standardized reporting mechanism to gauge meaningful progress on these issues. There was no penalty for inaction, and neither goal was achieved 20See

footnote 19. footnote 20. 22See footnote 21. 21See

 Introduction 327

within the specified timeframe. By the 2013 deadline set by the communiqué, only 18 of the 22 participating states with HEU (at that time) had announced plans to convert research reactors to use LEU fuel, repatriate HEU stocks, and minimize use. Additionally, the CPPNM 2005 Amendment did not enter into force until shortly after the 2016 summit. As of September 2018, six of the NSS participating states have yet to complete ratification of the CPPNM 2005 Amendment, and two states withdrew their ratifications in 2016. The 2014 summit communiqué further expanded the scope of the summit process and focused additional attention on cyber security, the role of the nuclear industry, and the importance of voluntary measures. The communiqué called upon nuclear operators to put a “strong emphasis on an effective security culture, physical protection and material accountancy.”23 For the first time, the 2014 Hague communiqué called attention to the importance of review missions, especially the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions offered by the IAEA. The destigmatization of IPPAS missions is a key outcome of the summit process. Once viewed as a mechanism for remediation if security concerns arose about a state’s civil nuclear program, IPPAS missions are evolving into a standard mechanism to demonstrate the importance of continuous improvement by responsible states.24 The communiqué’s references to voluntary measures again highlighted the importance of IAEA review services, and listed a number of measures that serve to strengthen nuclear security, including transparency of regulations, personnel training, and exchanging best practices. The 2014 communiqué also expanded the focus on information security from 2012, and specifically mentioned the threats posed by cyber attacks. The document encouraged states to take steps to secure nuclear facility networks and systems against cyber threats. The 2016 summit communiqué differed from the three prior documents. Rather than recommend specific actions in key areas, it celebrated the accomplishments of the process and looked to the future of nuclear security. In the communiqué, states pledged to make nuclear security “an enduring priority” and acknowledged that sustaining improvements to the regime will require “constant vigilance.” States pledged support for the action plans, as well as continued engagement with the nuclear industry, civil society and states that did not participate in the summits, to realize the goals of the process.

23Communiqué

of The Hague Nuclear Security Summit; March 2014. Energy Agency. IPPAS review: 2013; December 2013.

24International Atomic

328 CHAPTER 11  Case Study: The Nuclear Security Summit Process and Its Outcomes

It is difficult to assess to what extent each state took action to implement the recommendations laid out in the communiqués, as the commitments contained in them were nonbinding and involved the free-form self-reporting which characterized the summit process. While states were encouraged to submit progress reports, the reports were not systemic and nor did they cover all areas of the communiqué. States could select what they chose to report on. Subsequently, reports usually highlighted achievements, not remaining gaps, and did not necessarily distinguish existing elements from new initiatives. Despite the nonbinding, lowest-common-denominator language of the communiqués, their impact extends beyond the recommendations contained within each document. By highlighting the global nature of the nuclear terrorism threat and important international norms, and focusing on areas of nuclear security where global improvement was mutually desirable, the communiqués highlighted areas where states could consider action at the national level and paved the way for groups of states to target key issues of concern.

NATIONAL STATEMENTS Ahead of the 2010 summit, Obama requested that each participating state arrive in Washington prepared to pledge to accomplish specific commitments that would strengthen nuclear security. These national actions, the “house gifts,” are responsible for some of the most tangible improvements in nuclear security resulting from the summit process. At the 2010 summit, the United States released a document highlighting what each country had pledged to accomplish to strengthen nuclear security. The list included more than 60 specific actions from 30 states. Similar to the communiqués, however, these were nonbinding commitments with no system for tracking implementation and reporting progress. Additionally, the majority of the commitments did not set specific deadlines for completion. Given the sensitive nature of nuclear security, open-source tracking of the progress of every commitment—both to affirm state assessment and to evaluate progress on commitments not referenced in the national reports—is difficult. Yet evidence indicates that states took the commitments seriously: ahead of the 2012 summit, open-source tracking demonstrated that progress was made on nearly every 2010 commitment, and over 80% of the commitments were completed by the Seoul summit.25 25Cann

M, Davenport K, Balza M. The nuclear security summit: assessment of national commitments: An Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security Report; March 2012.

  The Benefits of Unilateral Action 329

In Seoul in 2012, countries were encouraged to issue national progress reports to highlight steps taken to strengthen nuclear security, and utilize the opportunity to make further commitments. While these national statements showcased completed commitments and outlined new initiatives, they varied widely in substance and form. Some states used the free-form reporting method as an opportunity to highlight nuclear security activities prior to the summit process, while others focused on new commitments without adequately reviewing past pledges. While the 2014 Hague summit continued the tradition of progress reports, it did not collate and highlight new national commitments in a single document as was done in Seoul and Washington. However, states did continue the custom of reporting on past actions and making new pledges in the 2014 reports. At the final summit in Washington in 2016, states continued the tradition of reporting on implementation of past commitments, and despite the definitive ending of the summit process at the 2016 summit, nearly every state made new pledges. In total, over the course of the four summits states made more than 935 distinct national commitments.26 Given that some commitments evolved over the course of the process and the ad hoc nature of reporting, it is difficult to determine exactly what percentage of the national commitments were fulfilled. However, more in-depth analyses of the national commitments indicate that nearly all were completed, or progress was made toward completion, by early 2018.27

THE BENEFITS OF UNILATERAL ACTION State-centered national actions fell largely within four categories: protection and minimization of materials, strengthening nuclear security governance, countering nuclear smuggling, and improving education and training. The four categories generally include the following actions:   

1.  Protection and minimization of materials and facilities. This category encompasses activities that states have undertaken to secure, minimize, and remove nuclear materials and radioactive sources. It includes security upgrades at facilities that store materials and security reviews of these areas. 26Kutchesfahani

S, Davenport K, Connolly E. The nuclear security summits: an overview of state actions to curb nuclear terrorism: An Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security Report; July 2018. 27See footnote 26.

330 CHAPTER 11  Case Study: The Nuclear Security Summit Process and Its Outcomes

2.  Strengthening nuclear security governance. In addition to implementing and ratifying the CPPNM, the CPPNM 2005 Amendment, and ICSANT, this category includes strengthening domestic legislation and regulations and developing emergency response strategies and designbasis threat models, which utilize threat assessments to inform physical protection decisions. 3.  Countering illicit trafficking and nuclear smuggling. This category comprises actions that strengthen interstate and intrastate strategies to combat illicit trafficking, strengthen border monitoring and export controls, and enhance security of materials in transit. 4.  Improving education and training. The summit process highlighted the human element of nuclear security. This category encompasses actions that strengthen culture through training, workshops, and academic programs dedicated to nuclear security. It includes establishing nuclear security centers of excellence (COEs) and exchanging best practices. Some workshops and training were held unilaterally, while others involved organizations like the IAEA or Interpol or were conducted at the regional level.

Protection and Minimization of Nuclear Materials Of the 53 participating countries, all but four undertook voluntary commitments to secure, minimize, and/or remove nuclear materials, and/or increase the security of facilities.28 Material removals are touted as one of the most significant contributions of the summit process. Removals tangibly reduce the risk posed by nuclear terrorism by decreasing the number of facilities that house weapons-usable material and the number of states that possess it. At the 2016 summit, the Obama Administration announced that since the summit process began, 30 states had repatriated or down blended enough HEU and plutonium for more than 150 nuclear weapons and 14 states plus Taiwan had eliminated all nuclear materials from their territories.29 Between 2009 and 2017, 19 states were declared “HEU free,” including 12 summit participants: Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam (see Box 11.1). Another HEU cleanout, that of Ghana in August

28Cann

M, Davenport K, Parker J. Nuclear security summit: Final Report: An Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security Report; 2016. 29Fact sheet: the nuclear security summits: securing the World from nuclear terrorism: The White House; April 6, 2016. http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/3/31/ fact-sheet-the-nuclear-security-summits-securing-the-world-from-nuclear-terrorism.

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BOX 11.1  COUNTRIES THAT ELIMINATED HEU, 2009–2017 HEU Free-Countries Romania Taiwan Libya Turkey Chile Serbia Mexico Ukraine Austria Czech Republic Vietnam Hungary Switzerland Jamaica Uzbekistan Argentina Indonesia Poland Ghana

Removal Announcement June 2009 September 2009 December 2009 January 2010 March 2010 December 2010 March 2012 March 2012 December 2012 April 2013 July 2013 November 2013 September 2015 September 2015 September 2015 April 2016 August 2016 September 2016 August 2017

NSS Participant State Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No

Source: National Nuclear Security Administration, US Department of Energy.

2017, fulfilled a national commitment made by China to remove HEU from Chinese-origin miniature-source neutron reactors (MSNRs). Particularly significant are the removals that involved more than enough material for a nuclear weapon (so-called significant quantities of weaponsgrade material), and those that led to technical innovations which paved the way for future material removals. Sweden, for instance, repatriated plutonium back to the United States in 2012, demonstrating the viability of the disposition pathway for future removals. Belgium and Italy subsequently expressed their intent to repatriate separated plutonium prior to the 2014 summit, with Italy completing its commitment in March 2014. The Italian repatriation required the development of specialized glove boxes for packaging and a new process for converting HEU to an oxide form for shipment to the United States.30 These technologies have significant ramifications for material removals in the future.

30Italy

highly enriched uranium and plutonium removals: National Nuclear Security Administration; March 24, 2014. http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/italyremovals.

332 CHAPTER 11  Case Study: The Nuclear Security Summit Process and Its Outcomes

While the elimination and consolidation of nuclear material are a significant accomplishment, work on many of these removals began behind the scenes prior to the summit process. Subsequently, the extent to which the summit process incited removals, particularly in the early years of the process, is questionable. In a longer-term commitment to phasing out HEU, a number of countries committed to convert reactors using HEU fuel to utilize LEU fuel instead. Since the summit process was announced in 2009, the United States has worked with China on a technical solution to convert the MSNRs. China specifically committed in 2014 to convert its own MSNR reactors and those it sold abroad.31 This cooperation led to conversion of a reactor in Ghana and the 2017 repatriation of this HEU to China, while planning to convert a reactor in Nigeria is under way in 2018.32 Kazakhstan and Japan committed to reactor conversions, which are in progress, and the United States and Russia studied the feasibility of converting six HEU-fuelled research reactors in Russia. In total, from 2009 to 2016, 28 HEU-fuelled reactors were either shut down or converted to use LEU fuel sources.33 Facility security is another area where the summit process spurred action. Until the CPPNM 2005 Amendment entered into force in 2016 there were no internationally binding security standards for storage and domestic transport of nuclear materials. South Africa, with US assistance, substantially upgraded security at its Pelindaba site. South Africa has enough weapons-grade HEU stored at Pelindaba for several nuclear warheads, and the facility has been broken into multiple times. While no HEU has been reported stolen, security upgrades were completed in 2015. Between 2009 and 2016, the United States reported that it had cooperated with more than 34 states around the world to upgrade physical security at storage sites.34 While a number of countries committed to upgrade security at nuclear facilities based on IAEA recommendations and the standards called for in the CPPNM 2005 Amendment, other states are less transparent about steps to ensure that nuclear material is adequately protected. Again, the summit process’s lack of standardized reporting and accountability allows 31NSS

Report; 2016. S, Davenport K, Connolly E. The nuclear security summits: an overview of state actions to curb nuclear terrorism: An Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security Report; July 2018. 33Reducing the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian research reactors. Washington, DC: Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, National Academies Press; 2016. 34See footnote 32. 32Kutchesfahani

  The Benefits of Unilateral Action 333

less-motivated states to move slowly on this issue, without taking meaningful steps to improve security. The 2012 summit also spurred countries to take additional steps to secure and dispose of excess radioactive sources. The quality of radioactive source security varies widely, as sources are present in most countries. While the IAEA has a code of conduct to govern the security and handling of such sources, it is not a universal or legally binding document. Of the summit participants, only Saudi Arabia has yet to notify the IAEA of its intent to adhere to the code of conduct.35 During the summit process, some states, like Armenia, Indonesia, Romania, and Hungary, took significant steps to identify and consolidate “orphan sources” outside regulatory control and to strengthen security at industrial and medical facilities. France also worked to recover French-origin sources worldwide. Challenges to material consolidation, however, remain. Several countries, including South Africa, have resisted giving up residual HEU stockpiles. Several countries with stockpiles were not included in the summit process. Belarus was extended a conditional invitation to attend the 2012 summit if it gave up its HEU, but refused and continues to resist efforts to eliminate its stockpile. The summit process did not produce a mechanism for addressing these hard cases. Additionally, the summit’s focus on civilian materials limits the ability of participant states to address the challenge of securing the vast military and naval stockpiles that exist around the world—about 83% of the total global holdings as of 2015.36 In 2014, civilian HEU holdings, for instance, were estimated at 61 tons; comparatively, global stockpiles of HEU designated for naval reactors were estimated at 290 tons, and military stockpiles were estimated at approximately 936 tons.37 The vast majority of these holdings—96% of the naval stockpiles and 93% of weapons stockpiles—are in the United States and Russia.38 Evidently, while the civilian focus of the summits was beneficial in drawing attention to the need for elimination and enhanced security for this specific 35International

Atomic Energy Agency, Status of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radiological Sources. http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/imp-export/ status-list.pdf. 36Bridging the military nuclear materials gap: Nuclear Threat Initiative; November 2015. https://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/bridging-military-nuclear-materials-gap/. 37International panel on fissile materials: Global Stockpiles; 2015. http://fissilematerials. org/library/ipfm15.pdf. 38See footnote 37.

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category of material, it represents only one element of the larger threat. Despite this, attempts to expand the 2014 summit communiqué to include consideration of the minimization of military material stockpiles failed to achieve consensus. However, both the 2014 and the 2016 communiqués did note that states are obligated to maintain effective security for nuclear materials and facilities used in weapons programs. The summit process has also proved an inadequate forum for addressing the growing stockpiles of plutonium in some states. While the 2014 communiqué encouraged countries to “keep their stockpile of separated plutonium to the minimum level … as consistent with national requirements,” the global stockpiles of civilian plutonium are continuously increasing. As of 2014, stocks of plutonium exceeded 260 tons.39 In particular, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Japan have increasing civilian stockpiles, while India, Pakistan, and Israel continue plutonium production for nuclear weapons. Geopolitical events largely contributed to Russia’s decision to not participate in the 2016 summit and substantially reduce its cooperation with the United States. This decision raises serious concerns about the future of several projects initiated under the summit process. One such project, which involved upgrading the security at Russia nuclear sites, was concluded in December 2014 with work at eight identified facilities remaining unfinished. While Russia continued to cooperate on some projects—such as the efforts to declare Uzbekistan HEU free in 2015—its withdrawal from cooperative efforts to reduce nuclear material is unfortunate and detrimental to the overall global agenda.

Strengthening Nuclear Security Governance The summit process has motivated all 53 participating states to take action to strengthen nuclear security at the national and/or international level by passing new laws, strengthening regulations, and ratifying relevant treaties. While some states have implemented comprehensive nuclear security legislation over the course of the summit process, others have taken small, incremental steps in niche areas—such as revising export control laws or developing national strategies to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. Three international documents underpin the primary global nuclear security architecture. While these instruments do not constitute a comprehensive nuclear security treaty, they are legally binding mechanisms that aim to enhance nuclear material security and prevent nuclear terrorism. 39See

footnote 38.

  The Benefits of Unilateral Action 335

The CPPNM entered into force in 1987 and sets legally binding standards for the security of nuclear material in transit. Ahead of the 2010 summit, the CPPNM had already achieved near-universal status among the participating NSS states. Only five countries had not ratified the treaty at the beginning of the summit process, andas at September 2018 that number is now down to two: Egypt and Malaysia. The CPPNM’s 2005 Amendment extends the protection requirements outlined in the treaty to incorporate domestic use, storage, and transit and sets legal consequences for sabotage and misuse of nuclear materials. It is the first international mechanism to impose standards on nuclear security for signatory states. While nearly a third of summit participants had ratified the amendment prior to the summits, 30 participating states completed ratification during the NSS process (although Azerbaijan and Armenia both withdrew in late 2016) to meet national commitments and the intent of the communiqués. Motivated to announce at the 2016 NSS that the requisite number of states had ratified the amendment for it to enter into force (two thirds of the parties to the CPPNM), a number of summit participants accelerated ratification or worked with states outside of the summit process to encourage them to ratify the amendment. These efforts paid off and Obama was able to announce at the final summit that the 2005 Amendment was entering into force. As of mid-2018, the only summit participants not party to the treaty are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Brazil, Egypt, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand. The summit process also appears to have catalyzed action on the 2005 Amendment for states outside the process as well. In the six years after the first summit, an additional 52 nonparticipant states completed ratification— as compared with 16 that ratified from 2005 to 2010. ICSANT provides a definition of nuclear terrorism and details how offenders and illicit materials should be handled when seized or arrested. Drafted in 2005, the treaty entered into force in 2007. Six of the summit participants (Egypt, Israel, Malaysia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand) have yet to ratify the treaty. To meet the compliance standards of international treaties, and as a result of the summit process’s focus on national responsibility, 40 states reported that they took steps to pass new laws, update existing regulations, or strengthen nuclear security. These national commitments considered key areas like cyber security, spent fuel management, export controls, establishing independent regulators to oversee nuclear industry, and updating security requirements at facilities housing nuclear material. Although these efforts are often ad hoc, the summit process encouraged states to review, update, and strengthen domestic nuclear security laws and norms.

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In the area of governance, however, there is still an issue of comprehensiveness. Globally, many states remain outside the treaty regime and do not have national standards for nuclear material security and regulation. Another key outcome of the summit process has been raising the profile and acceptance of IAEA IPPAS missions. At the request of a member state, the IAEA will evaluate the physical protection of a facility, compare it to standards outlined in the CPPNM/A and IAEA best practices, and provide recommendations. Prior to the summit process, IPPAS missions were perceived as being reserved for states which were seemingly failing to provide adequate physical security, but the summit process has transformed the image of these missions. Now, an IPPAS review is seen as an action that responsible nations should take in the spirit of pursuing continuous improvement: 28 of the summit participants received or requested an IPPAS mission over the course of the summit process. Several countries, including the United Kingdom, have requested more than one mission, and Finland requested a follow-up mission for the IAEA to assess steps that the country took to implement recommendations from its initial mission. It is hoped that the value of IPPAS missions, peer reviews, and notions of continuous improvement will remain as enduring mechanisms to assess and improve global nuclear security.

Countering Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Smuggling Nearly every summit participant took steps to increase capacity to track and detect nuclear materials in interstate and intrastate situations. Summit participants reaffirmed that while nuclear security remains primarily a national responsibility, the movement of materials across state lines poses a serious risk and requires greater collaboration and cooperation to detect and prevent it. The threat posed by illicit trafficking is evident by repeated and documented attempts by traffickers to smuggle materials across state lines. Between 1993 and 2016, there were 270 incidents reported to the IAEA involving unauthorized possession of nuclear materials for malicious use and 18 incidents that involved HEU, plutonium, or plutonium beryllium neutron sources.40 These figures do not account for incidents which invariably occurred and were not reported. While every summit participant has the option to share information with the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), reporting remains voluntary, and is not always completed in a timely manner. 40IAEA

Incident and Trafficking Database; Incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material outside of regulatory control; 2017. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/12/ itdb-factsheet-2017.pdf.

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A number of states took steps to increase their own border security or develop cooperative mechanisms to share information about the potential for cross-border illicit trafficking. One popular mechanism was the development of national registrars for radioactive sources, which Georgia, Japan, Switzerland, and the Philippines implemented. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Poland, Pakistan, and Indonesia installed monitors at key ports, airports, and/or border crossings. The Republic of Korea and Vietnam initiated a pilot project designed to track radioactive sources in real time utilizing GPS technology—a program which could have significant implications for strengthening nuclear security in the future. The summit process also catalyzed expansion of the Megaports Initiative, a U.S. project started in 2003 that assists states in deploying radiation detection monitoring equipment to scan cargo at key seaports. The Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, a US-based program, works with partner countries on developing joint action plans specifying priority steps to improve capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to incidents of nuclear smuggling. Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan completed and are implementing joint action plans as a result of summit commitments. As part of the effort to combat nuclear smuggling, individual countries are also working to create nuclear material databases and forensics tools. For example, the Netherlands is pioneering forensic methods to analyze crime scenes in the event of a nuclear incident and to catalog materials worldwide. These efforts have important implications for determining the origin of materials outside regulatory control and tracking them. Yet coordination efforts could be improved and applied in a more universal manner. The United States and the European Union (EU) have worked on portal monitoring projects to protect the same border crossings and ports. Increased coordination could ensure a more efficient allocation of resources, as key ports and crossings remain unprotected.

Improving Education and Training The summit process highlighted the human element of nuclear security and safety. This was particularly evident in the 2014 communiqué, which emphasized the necessity of an effective security culture at relevant facilities. This applies not only to personnel with responsibilities for material and sites, but includes a broader array of related, intertwining areas of expertise such as export control officers, emergency response personnel, and transport security.

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All 53 summit participants have taken steps to improve nuclear security culture through training, education, and workshops. While many of these are nationally based initiatives, countries have explored regional cooperation on nuclear security, which is a significant outcome from the summit process. The trainings and workshops have covered a range of issues, from power plant security to emergency preparedness and efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. Some workshops and training are independent state-based initiatives, but the majority of work occurs in partnership with other states or international organizations like the IAEA, GICNT, or the 1540 Committee. The 1540 Committee supports the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, passed in 2004, which obligates states to enact legislation to prevent the proliferation and illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and their means of production. While training and workshops are not governed by specific predetermined criteria, capacity building is an important outcome of the summit. The summit process has drawn critical attention to the need for well-trained personnel, interstate coordination, and international cooperation. One of the more significant and long-lasting outcomes of the summit process has been a growth in countries establishing nuclear security centers. These centers—often referred to as COEs or nuclear security training and support centers—typically support human resource development and personnel capability. Some centers focus on a particular set of issues, such as training personnel working at nuclear facilities, while others have broader, more comprehensive curricula. While the IAEA has issued guidelines for establishing centers and is involved with a network to promote resources sharing between centers, the standards and practices vary significantly from state to state. Some, such as Pakistan, Chile, Brazil, and Nigeria, are working with the IAEA to establish centers based on agency best practices. Other states (Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, the Philippines, and Georgia) are working with the EU and host regional secretariats for the EU CBRN centers. It is difficult to assess the ongoing contribution and effectiveness of training and workshops in this field. Highlighting the threat posed by inadequately trained personnel, and the consequent need for competent personnel, is critical to ensuring the sustainability of nuclear security culture.

JOINT STATEMENTS At the 2012 Seoul NSS, participant states expanded the unique form of commitment making. The unilateral house gift mechanism evolved, as groups of countries produced multilateral joint statements which outlined areas of

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mutual interest and cooperative projects. These joint statements became known as “gift baskets.” These multilateral political commitments covered a wide range of technical, educational, and legislative issues and often emphasized the importance of regional and international cooperation in pursuing effective global nuclear security.41 Joining a gift basket initiative was voluntary, which afforded flexibility to states to determine which projects or concepts they supported. The option to participate in gift basket initiatives injected an element of enthusiasm and interest into the summit process, as it diverted from standard methods of international diplomacy. Arguably, this novelty increased the level of engagement and willingness to participate among summit participants. In 2012, 13 gift baskets were offered and approximately 80% of summit participants signed at least one gift basket. These gift baskets garnered as few as three signatories and as many as 35.42 In 2014, 14 gift baskets were offered, and 87% of countries were signatories to at least one of these—a solid increase from the Seoul summit participation rate. It is important to note that nearly half the 2014 gift baskets were updates to gift baskets issued in 2012, as the projects or issues that they referred to were either ongoing or still pertinent. In 2016, 18 gift baskets were offered, of which nine were updates to gift baskets offered in 2012 or 2014. Several of the gift baskets were specific technical projects, whose progress was influenced by technological developments or delays. These followon gift baskets outlined the necessary additional steps to be completed by the next summit. Gift baskets that were not updated, however, should not necessarily be interpreted as “completed,” as work to accomplish the objectives of each may still be ongoing. Several gift baskets are now IAEA Information Circulars (INFCIRCs), allowing states outside the summit process to subscribe to suggested actions. Lastly, it is significant to note that the list of signatories for each gift basket occasionally oscillated from 2012 to 2016. Some countries which registered support in 2012 did not reaffirm their support in 2014; and some countries which did not indicate support for a gift basket in 2012 decided to sign in 2014. This iterates the flexibility provided by the gift basket model, and allows states to specify explicitly the extent and durability of their support. However, this flexibility can also act as a double-edged

41Cann

M, Davenport K, Parker J. Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report on Joint Statements: Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security Report (2015 NSS Report); 2015. https://pgstest.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/aca_nss_report_2015.pdf. 42Cann M. Strengthening the global nuclear security framework.

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sword, as commitments can be revoked or pursued with varying levels of enthusiasm. The number of joint statements each country supports can be an indicator in assessing how genuinely that state wishes to participate in the summit process and collaborate in the pursuit of effective global nuclear security. Only three states did not sign on to any gift baskets: Azerbaijan, Gabon, and Saudi Arabia. The next section gives a comprehensive outline of the gift baskets submitted at the 2012, 2014, and 2016 summits. By arranging them thematically, in the categories of materials, smuggling, education, and governance, it is easier to see where states prioritized action for improving global nuclear security. The number of subscribing states included in the description of each gift basket is based on participation when the statement was first issued and may not reflect subsequent changes (see Box 11.2).

 

BOX 11.2  JOINT STATEMENTS (GIFT BASKETS) 2012 NSS Nuclear information security National legislation implementation kit Training and support centers Counter nuclear smuggling Transport security Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism High-Density LEU fuel production Security of radioactive sources HEU minimization and medical isotopes NSS outreach efforts Global Partnership Semipalatinsk Nuclear terrorism

2014 NSS Nuclear information security National legislation implementation kit Training and support centers Counter nuclear smuggling Transport security Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism High-density LEU fuel development Enhancing radiological security Maritime supply chain security Comprehensive approach to nuclear security Nuclear security forensics HEU removals Implementation of UNSCR 1540 Strengthening nuclear security implementation

2016 NSS Certified training Consolidated reporting Training and support centers Countering nuclear smuggling Transport security Cyber security High-density LEU fuel development Security of radioactive sources Maritime supply chain security Comprehensive approach to nuclear security Nuclear security forensics Minimizing and eliminating the use of HEU in civilian applications Implementation of UNSCR 1540 Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response Insider threat mitigation LEU fuel bank National nuclear detection architecture Sustaining action to strengthen nuclear security architecture

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MATERIALS High-Density LEU Fuel Production (2012, 2014, and 2016) This gift basket originated at the 2012 summit, and was initially signed by Belgium, France, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. In 2014, the four original states were joined by Germany. This cooperation is focused on a specific technical project to develop high-density LEU fuel to contribute to the ongoing effort to reduce civil use of HEU. The 2012 statement outlined a specific four-step action plan in the process of developing, qualifying, and fabricating the LEU fuel. The signatories aimed to achieve this by basing the development of the LEU fuel on uranium molybdenum (U–Mo) as a monolithic fuel foil, and as powder dispersed in an aluminum matrix.43 Each state was assigned a specific function within the four-step plan, and it was specified that the results of the final project would be shared with the international community. In 2014, participating states said that testing of the U–Mo fuel would continue utilizing miniplates, before increasing to midsize and full-size test plates.44 Due to an unsuccessful fuel test, the project experienced some delays, but in the 2016 update the states announced that the powder U–Mo had been developed for fabricating LEU test fuels. The states pledged in 2016 to complete the project and make the fuel available as soon as possible.

Security of Radioactive Sources and Ensuring Radiological Security (2012, 2014, and 2016) These joint statements had different titles, leaders, and signatories from 2012 to 2016. However, they are thematically focused on a similar objective: ensuring the effective security of radiological sources which are widely utilized in industrial, medical, and research applications. In 2012 the statement was led by Germany, and encouraged signatories to ratify ICSANT, establish national registers of high-activity radioactive sources, and participate in operations to repatriate and recover orphan sources.45 The statement also placed a high value on the IAEA’s regional training courses, and a wide variety of the participant states 43Joint

statement on multilateral cooperation on high-density LEU fuel development. The Hague; March 2014. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/568be36505f8e2af8023adf7/ t/5705100ae321408a63162ed8/1459949578454/Joint+Statement+on+High+Density+Fu el+Development.pdf. 442014 Communication with the US Sherpa team. 45Cann M, Davenport K, Williams S. Nuclear security summit: assessment of joint statements: Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security Report (2014 NSS Report); 2014.

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hosted or attended training and workshops focused on radiological security best practices. From 2012 to 2014, attention to radiological security drastically increased within the summit process. Consequently, the 2014 joint statement evolved to include a specific and concrete action— securing all IAEA Category 1 radiological sources under their jurisdiction consistent with IAEA recommendations—which signatories pledged to achieve by the 2016 summit.46 The signatory states would implement the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and recommendations outlined in Nuclear Security Series Nos. 14 and 15.47 The transition to requiring states to undertake more concrete action in the 2014 statement may explain the substantially different list of countries which chose to participate in the update. Algeria, Armenia, Georgia, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States were new signatories in 2014. Finland, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, and Thailand were signatories in 2012, and chose not to endorse the statement in 2014.48 In all, 28 states subscribed to the 2016 version of the statement, which encourages the IAEA to assess if the existing framework for radiological source security is adequate, calls for information and best practice sharing, and encourages states to develop alternatives to high-activity radioactive sources and guidelines for long-term management of disused sources.

HEU Minimization and Medical Isotopes (2012) The central objective of this 2012 joint statement was the minimization of civil HEU, while simultaneously ensuring that the manufacturing and distribution of medical isotopes would not be interrupted. The four signatories (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United States) committed to “supporting the conversion of medical isotope production industries in Europe to non-HEU based processes by 2015.”49 Ensuring a smooth transition process is critical, due to the importance of medical isotopes in diagnostic medical procedures. As such, the United States committed to provide its European counterparts reliably with sufficient stocks of HEU to ensure uninterrupted production of isotopes while the development program was

46Joint

Statement on Enhancing Radiological Security: The Hague Nuclear Security Summit; 2014. 47See footnote 47. 48NSS Report; 2015. 49NSS Report; 2014.

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under way. The four signatories did not provide an update to this project at the 2014 or 2016 summits. However, the US Department of Energy noted in 2016 that LEU conversion efforts were under way at facilities that produce medical isotopes in Belgium and the Netherlands.50

Semipalatinsk (2012) Semipalatinsk is a former Soviet nuclear test site which now lies in the sovereign territory of Kazakhstan. Hundreds of nuclear tests took place at Semipalatinsk over several decades during the Cold War. After the fall of the Soviet Union, newly marked borders meant the site fell under Kazakh jurisdiction. It became evident that there was a substantial quantity of residual plutonium located there, which was at risk of being stolen.51 Trilateral cooperation between the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan on efforts to secure the vulnerable site commenced in the early 1990s, and was formalized in an agreement in 1999. At the 2010 summit, it was announced that the effort to secure Semipalatinsk would be completed by the 2012 summit. Subsequently, with the summit process acting as a motivating mechanism, the project was declared complete at the Seoul summit. While it is evident that the initiation of this project predated the summit process, the NSS process provided reinvigorated political will to ensure its conclusion and highlighted the threat posed by residual nuclear materials at former test sites.

Countries Free of Highly Enriched Uranium (2014) The consolidation, reduction, and elimination of nuclear material was a key objective of the summits. This statement acknowledged the efforts of those countries which have managed to achieve progress toward this objective, and encouraged others to follow suit. The 12 states that organized the statement eliminated their stockpiles of HEU prior to the 2014 NSS, although several were HEU free before the summit process began. They also committed to support HEU minimization efforts in other states. This statement was not updated in 2016, despite several states fulfilling commitments to eliminate HEU. For a full list of states that became HEU free over the course of the summit process see Box 11.1. 50National

Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Conversion, DOE Workshop of Federal Isotope Supply and Demand; November 2016. https://science.energy.gov/~ /media/np/pdf/workshops/workshop%20on%20isotope%20federal%20supply%20 and%20demand%202016/Afternoon/Chamberlin_Convert_Program_Update_20161109. pdf. 51NSS Report; 2014.

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Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications (2016) This gift basket built on efforts in the 2012 and 2014 communiqués encouraging states to announce plans to minimize use of HEU. The 22 states that subscribed to this statement committed to convert or shut down any remaining research rectors still running on HEU and share the development of LEU alternatives. Additionally, states committed to repatriate or down blend HEU and support the efforts of other states engaged in similar processes. The participating states agreed to use LEU alternatives to produce medical isotopes by the end of 2017, where technically possible. Unlike some gift baskets which contain no mechanisms for follow-up or reporting, this gift basket committed states to work with the IAEA to develop a voluntary reporting mechanism on HEU stocks by the end of 2016 and to meet in 2018 to review progress. Several states that participated in this gift basket, including the United States, still operate reactors that use HEU, making their participation and implementation all the more critical.

Cyber Security (2016) This gift basket reflected the increased recognition at the 2014 and 2016 summits that inadequate cyber security poses a serious risk for nuclear security. The 29 states that signed on to this statement agreed to participate in two international workshops designed to assess threats and vulnerabilities, discuss options for incident response and recovery, and explore the impact of different types of cyber incidents on facilities.

LEU Fuel Bank (2016) The IAEA signed an agreement with Kazakhstan in August 2015 to open an LEU fuel bank, the purpose of which is to assure nuclear fuel supply for countries with nuclear power plants. The 18 states that signed the gift basket noted the significance of the fuel bank in preventing supply disruptions and stated that it should operate in a safe and secure manner. The gift basket did not commit the participating states to any action, but highlighted that several subscribing states made financial contributions for the development of the fuel bank.

SMUGGLING Counter Nuclear Smuggling (2012, 2014, and 2016) The counter nuclear smuggling gift basket was both comprehensive in its approach and popular among participants—garnering 19 signatories in

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2012 and 37 by 2016. The Jordanian-led gift basket organized action on nuclear smuggling thematically by increasing information sharing, building national capacities, and strengthening relevant national legislation.52 Uniquely, this gift basket required signatories to determine what action they had taken in the past regarding countering nuclear smuggling, and what they intended to achieve before the next summit. Additionally, the structure of the published statement clearly specifies (in list form) which countries had taken what specific actions. Examples of these activities include reviewing existing relevant laws, regulation, and guidance, sharing lessons learned, introducing new domestic laws, and hosting workshops or training on this topic.53 The 2016 iteration did not include reporting on specific actions, but instead contained additional voluntary steps that states could take to continue strengthening nuclear security, including strengthening multilateral information-sharing practices, designating national teams to investigate nuclear trafficking, and strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities.

Transport Security (2012, 2014, and 2016) The transport security statement provoked the five signatories (France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to establish a multilateral working group focusing on enhancing the security of radioactive materials in transit. The working group hosted a tabletop exercise in Japan in 2013, in which several international agencies (the International Maritime Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the IAEA) were invited to participate. In 2014, the working group agreed to extend its mandate until at least 2016, and additional states joined the gift basket. Its expansive agenda focuses on the implementation of the IAEA’s recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear and radiological material and the CPPNM/A, increased utilization of the COEs and Nuclear Security Support Centers (NSSCs) networks, information security, and increased research and development efforts toward the improvement of global transport security. At the 2016 summit, the participants shared good practice guides for transport by air, rail, road, and sea. The states committed to work with the GICNT, the IAEA, and the Global Partnership on further strengthening transport security.

Maritime Supply Chain Security (2014 and 2016) This new statement in 2014 was led by the United States and signed by an additional 12 states. The gift basket notes the importance of strong 52Counter 53See

nuclear smuggling gift basket: The Hague Nuclear Security Summit; 2014. footnote 52.

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maritime security in detecting and responding to the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials inside the international supply chain, and the need to eradicate permanently harmful radioactive materials which may exist outside regulatory control.54 Signatories “committed to maintaining existing radiation detection systems at their large container seaports and to assisting others that are pursuing similar capabilities.”55 The objectives of this statement strongly complement the work of the Megaports Initiative, and it has been noted that the United States and its partners have strengthened radiation detection capabilities at more than 500 sites and ports around the world.56 The follow-up statement at the 2016 NSS included a list of best practices and a commitment to continue sharing technical advice and lessons learned. It also included additional recommendations for international organizations such as Interpol and the World Customs Organization to enhance collaboration and communications between customs officials in different states to facilitate detection of radioactive materials outside regulatory control.

Nuclear Security Forensics (2014 and 2016) At the 2010 summit, states declared that enhancing nuclear forensics was a high-priority issue. In the event of a nuclear or radiological incident, it is imperative that accurate attribution can occur efficiently to determine the origin of the material and potential perpetrators. In response to this prioritization, the Netherlands Forensics Institute developed a white paper which incorporated a set of deliverables for states to work toward in this area. This white paper focused on introducing an online knowledge platform and the development of a lexicon, a compendium of methods, and a training curriculum.57 This white paper was incorporated into the nuclear security forensics gift basket in 2014, and these four elements were designed as a mechanism to enhance investigative capabilities and promote information sharing between states. The 2016 statement built on the prior iteration and further committed states to actions such as national cross-disciplinary training of traditional and nuclear security forensics and adapting national response frameworks to include nuclear forensics. By 2016 this gift basket had 30 signatories.

54Maritime

supply chain statement: The Hague Nuclear Security Summit; 2014. Report; 2015. 56Enhancing the security of the maritime supply chain gift basket: National Nuclear Security Administration, Fact Sheet; March 2014. 57Enhancing nuclear forensics joint statement: The Hague Nuclear Security Summit; 2014. 55NSS

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National Nuclear Detection Architecture (2016) The 24 states that joined the national nuclear detection architecture group recognized that this architecture plays a critical role in combating illicit trafficking. The states committed to develop and implement effective nuclear security detection strategies, including a nuclear security culture component.58 The states further pledged to avoid duplicating the work of the IAEA and GICNT, and to contribute to the nuclear detection work of those two organizations. In particular, the states affirmed their intention to continue contributing to the IAEA’s work in developing a guidance document on nuclear detection and the IAEA’s workshops on this topic.

EDUCATION Nuclear Information Security (2012 and 2014) Led by the United Kingdom, this gift basket was one of the most popular produced by the summit process, garnering 31 signatories when it was introduced in 2012. It aims to promote and develop international guidance and best practices on information security as it relates to nuclear issues. The statement was specific in its language and the obligations it expected signatories to meet. It encouraged further work in strengthening national measures, enhancing national security culture, engaging stakeholders to develop best practices, and engaging with key international organizations.59 Additionally, the statement outlined 13 voluntary actions that participants could pursue to assist in strengthening information security. In the 2014 iteration of this gift basket there were five new signatories: Belgium, Israel, Morocco, Romania, and Ukraine. Thailand was a signatory in 2012, but chose not to sign again in 2014—meaning this joint statement had 35 signatories in 2014.60 The statement included a unique reporting mechanism whereby an annex was published which specified ongoing and completed actions that signatory states pursued under this effort.

Training and Support Centers (2012, 2014, and 2016) A significant outcome of the summit process was the establishment of COEs which focus specifically on issues related to nuclear security. Envisioned as crucial pillars in the effort to institutionalize nuclear security initiatives,

58National

nuclear detection architecture. Washington, DC: Nuclear Security Summit; 2016. http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-national-nucleardetection-architecture. 59NSS Report; 2014. 60NSS Report; 2015.

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COEs represent a unique opportunity for educating, training, and connecting nuclear personnel and policy professionals. This joint statement outlines plans to promote a network of centers across borders, provide opportunities for cross-boundary communication, and ensure streamlined coordination between the centers.61 In 2012, this gift basket was led by Italy, and the 24 states which signed were all pursuing the establishment of an NSSC or a COE— albeit at varying stages of development.62 The effort initiated three working groups, respectively focused on coordination and collaboration, best practices, and information management. In 2014, there was a substantial increase in participation, with a total of 31 states declaring their commitment. Interestingly, there was considerable movement in which states signed in 2014 compared to 2012. States that supported the concept in 2012 and chose not to sign again were the Czech Republic, Jordan, Malaysia, and Ukraine, while new signatories were Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, France, Georgia, Israel, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Vietnam.63 The 2014 statement indicated that the NSSC network had over 100 members from 39 states, and 12 countries had successfully established national centers since the start of the summit process.64 The number of signatories decreased to 28 in 2016, as Armenia, Belgium, France, and Turkey did not sign on to the updated gift basket. The 2016 statement reiterated many of the same themes as the past two iterations, but added an increased focus on sustainability of nuclear security centers. It also contained provisions committing states to collaborate and share resources with the Global Partnership and IAEA.

Nuclear Security Summit Outreach Efforts (2012) The 2010 NSS received some criticism due to the perceived selective nature of the summit participant list. This gift basket, signed by Chile, Morocco, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the United States, explicitly set out to engage countries outside the summit process in the principles and responsibilities of nuclear security. To achieve this, several states conducted information-sharing sessions on the NSS with nonsummit states, and outreach meetings were held on several continents and through the IAEA.

61Training

and support centers statement: Seoul Nuclear Security Summit; 2012. Report; 2014. 63NSS Report; 2015. 64Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence Statement; The Hague Nuclear Security Summit; 2014. 62NSS

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Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Security (2014 and 2016) This gift basket collected 15 signatures when it was introduced into the summit process in 2014, and 16 in 2016. The statement calls for greater transparency regarding military nuclear material, and for the NSS process to be considerate of international obligations of disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Additionally, the statement requested that security procedures for nuclear weapon arsenals be made increasingly transparent and states possessing nuclear weapons take further steps toward disarmament. This statement drew a number of participants which had otherwise participated in a limited extent, specifically Algeria and Egypt, but did not require the states to take specific actions.

Certified Training (2016) Twelve states offered this gift basket at the 2016 summit; it aims to ensure demonstrable competency for management and personnel responsible for nuclear security. The motivation behind this gift basket was to realize a commitment in a gift basket offered in 2014 on strengthening nuclear security implementation, which called for effective management and personnel training. As part of the gift basket, the states supported the creation of the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) Academy nuclear security certification program in 2014. The states further committed to promote collaboration between WINS and other organizations, including the IAEA Nuclear Security Education Network.

Mitigating Insider Threat (2016) The 27 states that signed on to this gift basket committed to put in place measures for rigorously assessing and continually monitoring human reliability to deter insider threat. The states agreed to work with the IAEA to develop a training course on preventive and protective measures. Participating states also agreed to take national steps, such as establishing trustworthiness programs, material accounting and control programs, and procedures for security and transport that are designed to protect against insider threat.

GOVERNANCE National Legislation Implementation Kit (2012 and 2014) This gift basket was led by Indonesia and introduced in 2012. The national legislation implementation kit rests on the understanding that nuclear

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security is primarily a sovereign concern, and an effective way to address it is by strengthening national legislative and regulatory guidelines. Initially supported by 18 states, the kit outlines guidance for how countries can embed IAEA recommendations into their domestic legislation structures and provides a comprehensive “model law.” It is “intended to simplify and streamline this process by presenting information on all international treaties, agreements, ad-hoc instruments and technical guidance together in a single package.”65 Participation increased significantly in 2014, with 29 states declaring their support.66 New signatories were Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Morocco, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates.67

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (2012 and 2014) The GICNT is a voluntary multilateral partnership which predates the summit process; it is cochaired by the United States and Russia, and as of October 2018 comprised 88 partner countries and six international organizations.68 Participants in GICNT have committed to implementing the group’s statement of principles, which aim to increase global nuclear security through measures such as deterrence, prevention, detection, and response.69 In 2012, the six states that held leadership positions in the GICNT (Australia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United States) supported the gift basket, which outlined the complementary nature of the GICNT mandate with the NSS process, and encouraged other states to join voluntarily. The Republic of Korea was an additional signatory in 2014, after assuming the role of chair of the GICNT Implementation and Assessment Working Group in 2013. The GICNT complements the NSS agenda, and was one of the organizations selected to continue the NSS’s work after the summit process concluded in 2016.

Global Partnership (2012) Established by the G8 in 2002, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction committed to raising $20 billion

65NSS

Report; 2012. CP. After the summit: investing in nuclear materials security: NBR Analysis Brief; 2012. http://www.nbr.org/publications/nbranalysis/pdf/Brief/040312_Twomey_ NuclearMaterialsSecurity.pdf. 67NSS Report; 2015. 68Global Threat Initiative. Overview; 2015. http://www.gicnt.org/. 69See footnote 68.

66Twomey

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over 10 years to fund nonproliferation projects in Russia and other nations.70 The Global Partnership’s objectives are largely parallel with those of the NSS. As such, 24 NSS states which were also members of the Global Partnership in 2012 presented a gift basket expressing support for the NSS process and highlighting the iniative’s role in supporting projects that contribute to nuclear security. An updated statement was not provided in 2014 due to geopolitical developments involving Russia. The Global Partnership was another institution selected to continue the NSS’s work after the summit process ended in 2016.

Nuclear Terrorism (2012) Introduced only in 2012, and signed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the gift basket on nuclear terrorism reaffirms that the central mandate of the NSS is to strengthen global nuclear security to prevent any act of nuclear or radiological terrorism.

Promoting the Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2014 and 2016) In 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540. This resolution “affirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”71 At the 2014 NSS, 32 states declared their support for the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, and implored signatories to consider supplementary actions to strengthen this process. Several signatory states have since submitted new national updates to the 1540 Committee, while others hosted capacity-building events or contributed best practice guides for states.72 The number of participating states grew to 36 in 2016, and states committed to work with the 1540 Committee and its group of experts ahead of the 2016 comprehensive review of the resolution.

Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (2014) The Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation initiative was introduced by the NSS host countries—the United States, the Republic of Korea, 70Global

partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction (“10 Plus 10 Over 10 Program”). http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/global-partnership-against-spread-weapons-and-materials-mass-destruction-10-plus-10-over-10-program/. 71United Nations. 1540 Committee, 1540 Fact Sheet. http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/1540fact-sheet.shtml. 72NSS Report; 2015.

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and the Netherlands. It was signed by 35 states, which represents over twothirds of the summit participants. This initiative committed states to concrete steps “aimed at enhancing the legal and regulatory framework, with a view to ensuring sustainability of nuclear security efforts.”73 This gift basket encouraged states to integrate the IAEA Nuclear Security Fundamentals and relevant recommendations into domestic legislative and regulatory structures, to host peer reviews periodically, and to ensure demonstrable competence of personnel.74 The initiative shifts commitments from a voluntary nature to a political pledge, underscores that nuclear security is an international responsibility, and encourages signatories to “assess new ideas to improve nuclear security regimes.”75 In October 2014, the Netherlands submitted the initiative to the IAEA and requested it be published for all IAEA member states as an information circular (INFCIRC). This aimed to increase the number of signatories outside the NSS process. The joint statement became INFCIRC/869, and several states committed to join the initiative through the IAEA notification process. Additional states joined at the 2016 summit, notably China and India.

Consolidated Reporting (2016) The consolidated reporting gift basket sought to streamline and simplify the process of providing voluntary and required information set forth by the treaties and international legal obligations, such as UNSCR 1540, the CPPNM/A, and the IAEA Code of Conduct. The 17 states that collaborated on this gift basket produced a template for meeting reporting requirements in a simplified, consolidated document. The template was released at the 2016 summit.

Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response (2016) This gift basket focused on preparations to respond to an act of nuclear terrorism. The 24 subscribing states drew attention to the devastating consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism and called for states to meet the 2014 communiqué pledge to “maintain effective emergency preparedness, response, and mitigation capabilities.” To work toward that goal, the states committed to develop national response plans and mechanisms to provide international assistance, share best practices to strengthen global response capabilities, and work with organizations that are developing international 73Herbach

J. The nuclear security implementation initiative: a catalyst for needed action: Arms Control Today; 2014. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_06/Features/ The-Nuclear-Security-Implementation-Initiative-A-Catalyst-fo-%20Needed-Action. 74NSS Report; 2015. 75Luongo K. A race to the top in nuclear security strategy: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; 2014. http://thebulletin.org/race-top-nuclear-security-strategy7090.

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preparedness and resilience objectives. The states committed to share lessons learned from incidents and conduct tabletop exercises to simulate responses. The statement drew attention to the work of the GICNT on response and mitigation, and the states committed to host and support further GICNT activities in this area.

Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security (2016) In the lead-up to the 2016 NSS states recognized that while continuing head-of-state level summits to address nuclear security was not feasible, the nuclear terrorism threat would continue to evolve and sustained action would be necessary to address future challenges and maintain the global nuclear security architecture. To that end, 40 of the participating states agreed to establish national point people for nuclear security and form a contact group. The NSCG convenes at least once a year to review the current state of global nuclear security and identify emerging trends that might require more focus. The contact group states also committed to review progress made on the summit documents and promote the five action plans.

VALUE OF MULTILATERAL ACTION The development of gift basket diplomacy through the NSS process has been innovative, and allowed flexibility beyond what might exist in a standard international forum. The evolution from unilateral house gifts to multilateral gift baskets has been watched closely by experts and policymakers. A form of gift basket diplomacy was used at the Conference of the Parties 21 climate change negotiations, held in Paris in December 2015. In this forum, commitments are known as intended nationally determined contributions. This approach is indicative of a shift in the way that states choose to participate in international diplomacy. It represents a potential transition away from the traditional, top-down, imposed mandate (which has historically been represented in international treaties, conventions, and resolutions) toward a more voluntary, bottom-up approach whereby states can exercise their sovereign decision-making and determine what initiatives are relevant to them. By allowing smaller groups of states to make additional agreements without the consensus of all partied involved, there is greater room for innovation and action.76 This flexibility has allowed states which are 76Cann

M, Davenport K, Parker J. Keeping tabs on nuclear security commitments: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist; 2015. https://thebulletin.org/2015/03/keeping-tabs-onnuclear-security-commitments/.

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traditionally not centrally involved in issues of nuclear security and nonproliferation to demonstrate their leadership and willingness to contribute to a global issue. While standardized reporting is not a component of most NSS joint statements, the act of a state joining a gift basket is representative of political will to fulfill the principles captured in that gift basket. A promise of political will can be a strong incentive for action—particularly when the results of such a commitment will be declared in front of 53 world leaders in a biennial summit forum. In this way, the NSS process itself and the multilateral nature of gift baskets acted as an informal enforcing mechanism. An upcoming summit acted as an incentive to carry out what had been previously pledged. The value of gift basket diplomacy has been apparent since its introduction at the 2012 NSS. The model of voluntary, flexible, and creative commitment making allowed NSS participant states to engage, cooperate, and produce tangible results within the parameters of the mandate. At the 2016 summit, states issued a gift basket creating the NSCG, which aims to sustain and carry forward the valuable concept of gift basket diplomacy and the objectives of the NSS.

CONCLUSION Prior to 2010, nuclear security was primarily viewed as a domestic responsibility for sovereign states. However, that approach oversimplified the global threat posed by insecure civil nuclear materials and radioactive sources, overlooked the growing illicit trafficking networks, and underestimated the potential consequences of nuclear terrorism. The NSS process rectified critical misconceptions, substantially elevated the issue of nuclear security, and helped narrow the threat perception gap. It has motivated a number of states to take significant steps to improve nuclear security and spurred collaborative actions among groups of like-minded states. The actions spurred by the summit process undoubtedly contributed to strengthening nuclear security across a number of key areas. However, measuring improvements at a global level is complicated by the sensitive nature of nuclear security, the lack of uniform reporting, and the voluntary nature of the summit commitments. At the Seoul summit, countries took an important step towards confidence building by issuing progress reports. However, these efforts are somewhat

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limited by a lack of transparency and consistency. Timelines for action were often also absent, making it more difficult to hold states accountable to their commitments. The Seoul summit also heralded the introduction of joint statements, a natural evolution of national commitments. Yet the success of these initiatives also varied widely, and they were often subject to the same limitations as the national commitments—namely a lack of organized reporting and timelines for completion. Despite the collaborative nature of the joint statements, the nationally focused nature of nuclear security regimes stymies efforts to challenge comprehensively a system which lacks universal standards, information-sharing requirements, and regular peer review mechanisms. The self-selecting method of the joint statements and the voluntary nature of national commitments allowed less-motivated countries to fall behind. Given the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, more consideration must be given to sustainability and regime cohesion, and how best to motivate more reluctant states to take additional steps to strengthen the regime. With the conclusion of the summit process in 2016, a potential loss of momentum and a return to the status quo are real concerns. The nuclear security regime remains a patchwork of ad hoc initiatives, institutions, and treaties. It relies heavily on voluntary actions and willing coalitions to effect change. While this is an effective way of addressing specific aspects of nuclear security, it will not build a comprehensive regime and will continue to leave less-willing states behind. While the six-year summit process was an innovative effort that significantly strengthened nuclear security, the threat of nuclear terrorism remains a global challenge that requires continuous improvements from all states.