Categorization is not enough: Intergroup discrimination in negative outcome allocation

JOURNAL

OF EXPERIMENTAL

SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY

28,

125-144 (1992)

Categorization Is Not Enough: Intergroup Discrimination in Negative Outcome Allocation AMI?LIE MUMMENDEY, BERND SIMON, CARSTEN DIETZE, MELANIE GR~NERT, GABI HAEGER, SABINE KESSLER, STEPHAN LETTGEN, AND STEFANIE SCHAFERHOFF WestjXsche Wilhelm.+Universitit, Psychologisches Institut IV, Sozialpsychologie, Fliednerstrasse 21, D-4400 Miinster, Federal Republic of Germany. Received August 29, 1990 Social psychological research concerned with ingroup favoritism in outcome allocation has primarily focused on group members’ distribution of positive outcomes (e.g., money). In this article, two studies are presented which examine ingroup favoritism and fairness in negative outcome allocations. Study 1 tested whether mere categorization into ingroup and outgroup is sufficient to elicit ingroup favoring behavior even when a negative outcome (i.e., noise) is distributed. We assumed that intergroup discrimination would be less defensible in the case of negative outcome allocation and therefore expected fairness to have a much stronger impact on subjects’ distribution choices than ingroup favoritism. As expected, fairness was the pervasive distribution strategy. But somewhat surprisingly no ingroup favoritism occurred at all. In the second study, it was predicted that group members would favor ingroup over outgroup even in negative outcome (i.e., unpleasant task) allocations, provided group members were particularly motivated to assure positive social identity. We manipulated relative group size and relative group status assuming that minority and low status group membership would confer an unsatisfactory social identity. As predicted, only minority and low status group members favored the ingroup over the outgroup. These studies should be read as a caveat against the silent generalization of research findings from the realm of positive to the realm of negative outcome allocations. Finally, we briefly discuss two orthogonal dimensions or axes along which various forms of intergroup discrimination can be distinguished. 6 1~ Academic press, IK.

About 20 years ago, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament (1971) presented the results of their by now classic “minimal group” experiments. They claimed that the mere categorization of people into ingroup and outgroup is a sufficient condition for ingroup favoritism, i.e., for the tendency to This research was made possible by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Mu 551/11-l). We are grateful to Markus Hagenbrock for his assistance during Experiment 1. Reprint requests should be sent to AmClie Mummendey at the above address. 125 0022-1031/92 $3.00 Copyright 0 1992 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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favor one’s own group or social category over an outgroup. Meanwhile, an impressive body of evidence supports that claim (for reviews, see Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Messick & Mackie, 1989). As a theoretical explanation of ingroup favoritism, Tajfel and Turner (1986) later proposed social identity theory (SIT). According to SIT, ingroup favoritism is an attempt to make the ingroup positively distinct, or, in other words, an outcome of group members’ search for positive social identity. There is, however, a striking imbalance in the body of experimental research on ingroup favoritism. By far the majority of the studies focuses on group members’ decisions as to how much of a positive outcome, e.g., money, should be given to ingroup and outgroup members. For example, although the study by Tajfel et al. (1971) also included penalty points, only one study (Hewstone, Fincham, & Jaspars, 1981) explicitly investigated group members’ decisions when they could take away money from both ingroup and outgroup members. A major concern for us in the present article, is that we know of no systematic investigation of ingroup favoritism in situations where group members could distribute negative outcomes (e.g., aversive stimulation) between ingroup and outgroup.’ Certainly, there are many real-life examples, as well as experimental demonstrations outside the minimal group paradigm (e.g. Jaffe & Yinon. 1983; Lodewijkx, 1989; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1982; Struch & Schwartz, 1989), of people’s willingness to allocate aversive stimulation to outgroup members. Yet, one might plausibly question whether categorization into minimal groups is equally efficient in eliciting ingroup favoritism in the case of negative outcomes as in the case of positive outcomes. Hewstone et al. (1981) observed reduced ingroup favoritism when group members had to decide how much money (positive outcome) should be taken away from, rather than allocated to, ingroup and outgroup members. They suggested that for minimal groups discriminatory subtraction of positive outcomes is less defensible than discriminatory allocution of such outcomes. We extend this reasoning and analogously assume a higher threshold for ingroup favoritism when negative, rather than positive, outcomes are to be distributed. Ingroup favoritism is according to Tajfel & Turner (1979, p. 38) “the laboratory analog of real-world ethnocentrism, . . . that is, the tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group in evaluation and behavior.” And it is ad hoc categorization which leads people to ingroup favoritism and discrimination against the outgroup. Several times, however, it is stressed that ingroup favoritism is primarily aimed at the positive dis’ Tiirnblom (1990) noted a similar imbalance regarding the interest in positive and negative outcome allocations in the research concerned with justice on the interpersonal level. (We are grateful to Gerold Mikula for drawing our attention to Tiirnblom’s work.)

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tinction of ingroup from the outgroup that it is conceptually and empirically distinct from outgroup hostility (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and that it is an important issue for future research to investigate when it is that this competitive potential is actually manifested in a hostile form (Condor & Brown, 1988). Apart from hostile attitudes and behavior against outgroups, however, which might be called outgroup aggression, the simple necessity or possibility to distribute costs or negative outcomes between ingroup and outgroup members could be seen in terms of an evaluative dimension functional for comparative differentiations between the two groups. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) does not make different predictions regarding ingroup favoritism depending on the type or quality, positive vs negative, of the outcomes to be distributed. Before asking, however, what the conditions are for the transition from ingroup favoritism to outgroup hostility and aggression it would be of great interest to know what the conditions are for explicitly negative outcome allocation in an intergroup context. Moreover, it would be interesting to know whether experimental results from positive outcome allocation can, as it seems to have been done up to now, legitimately be extrapolated to the intergroup discrimination phenomenon of its whole range, i.e., including negative outcome allocation as well. The aim of the present article is to investigate how group members distribute negative, rather than positive, outcomes between ingroup and outgroup. Will members of minimal groups, when distributing negative outcomes, e.g., aversive stimulation, show the same pattern of ingroup favoritism as group members in the classic minimal group experiments, who distributed primarily positive outcomes (Tajfel et al., 1971; see also Turner, 1978; Turner, Brown & Tajfel, 1979)? It will be remembered that, aside from straightforward ingroup favoritism, Tajfel et al. (1971) reported that subjects were apparently more concerned to win than to gain. That is, subjects maximized the intergroup difference in favor of the ingroup at the sacrifice of the absolute level of reward for the ingroup. At the same time, there was no significant influence of the strategy maximizing joint payoff or profit, i.e., of “the economically rational strategy of giving as much of the experimenter’s money away as possible to fellow subjects (. . .)-which, ‘f1 reciprocated, might be expected to optimize each S’s personal rewards” (Turner, 1978, p. 102). In addition, Tajfel et al. (1971, pp. 173-174) pointed to the norm of fairness as an important determinant of subjects’ behavior. Consequently, we examine the influence of the following strategies on group members’ choices regarding the distribution of aversive stimulation: a) maximum ingroup profit 2 (MIP), * “Profit’‘-as we use the term here-denotes avoidance of aversive stimulation. Thus, maximum profit means minimum aversive stimulation.

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i.e., to give as little aversive stimulation as possible to other ingroup members; b) maximum difSerence in favor of the ingroup (MD), i.e., to give less aversive stimulation to the ingroup than to the outgroup accepting even high absolute levels for the ingroup; c) maximum joint profit (MJP), i.e., to give as little aversive stimulation to fellow subjects irrespective of their group membership; d) fairness (F), i.e., to give the same degree of aversive stimulation to ingroup and outgroup. Two studies are presented in this article. The first study analyzes negative outcome allocations under minimal intergroup conditions. The basic expectation is that ingroup favoritism will be less pervasive, because it is less defensible, and fairness more influential than an uncritical generalization from the classic minimal group paradigm (involving positive outcomes) would suggest. In the second study, differential effects of specified characteristics of intergroup relations namely relative group size and relative group status, in addition to the minimal intergroup situation, are tested. The question is whether predictions derived irom social identity theory concerning the impact of these variables on ingroup favoritism also hold true for negative outcome allocations. STUDY 1 In this study, we established a minimal intergroup situation in accordance with Tajfel et al’s (1971, pp. 153-154) criteria. Moreover, three additional conditions were designed by further “minimalization” of the intergroup situation. Remember that in the experiments by Tajfel et al. (1971) social categorization was confounded with similarity, because subjects were divided into groups on the basis of (dis)similar aesthetic preferences or (dis)similar results in a dot estimation task. Later, Billig and Tajfel(1973) could show that categorization, even on an explicitly random basis, is sufficient to engender ingroup favoritism. Yet, it was also apparent in that study that ingroup favoritism was less and fairness more pronounced when group categorization was purely random and not additionally based on some (dis)similarity criterion. In our first study, group categorization was, therefore, based on some (dis)similarity criterion for about half of the participants, while the other participants were divided into groups on an explicitly random basis. In addition, subjects distributed aversive stimulation between ingroup and outgroup members who were said to be participants either of the same session as the subjects themselves or of one of the following sessions. In the “random” and “following session” conditions, the ingroup-outgroup division was then less meaningful and consequently the intergroup nature of the experimental situation should be further reduced. To summarize: Following Tajfel et al. (1971) we assume group members’ behavior to be a compromise between fairness and ingroup favoritism. When people distribute negative, rather than positive, outcomes

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between artificial ad hoc groups, we expect fairness to override ingroup favoritism. In addition, ingroup favoritism should further decrease, and fairness increase, when the minimal group categorization is taken to an extreme. In other words, an explicitly random categorization, relative to a similarity-based categorization, should further intensify the preponderance of fairness. And, subjects should be less biased in the foZZowing than in the same session condition. Method Subjects Ninety-three male and female students from a college of social work3 in Mtinster, mean age 23 years, participated in the experiment. Each subject received DM 15 (about $9.00) for his/her participation.

Design The experimental design consisted of two between-subjects factors, with two levels on each factor, i.e., categorization (similarity based vs random) and session for which the negative stimuli had to be distributed (same vs following). Subjects’ allocations of negative stimuli (duration of noise) to ingroup and outgroup served as the dependent variable.

Procedure Each subject selected one out of eight experimental sessions for participation. Sessions were run on four consecutive days, with two sessions per day. Without subjects’ knowledge, two identical sessions were run for each of the four experimental conditions. Sessions were randomly assigned to conditions with the restraint that cell sizes should be approximately equal for all conditions. The number of participants in a session ranged from 10 to 13. At the beginning of each experimental session, the experimenter announced that the ongoing research project was concerned with the effects of people’s mood on their physiological reactions. For the current session, two experiments had been scheduled, one experiment would investigate the effects of mood on muscular tension, while the second would investigate the effects on pulse rate. Yet, each subject would participate only in one of the two experiments. For that purpose, the participants would be divided into two groups, the “muscular tension group” (group M) and the “pulse rate group” (group P). Then, all subjects filled in a short questionnaire containing 12 questions regarding own mood and habitual physiological reactions (e.g., “My mood changes frequently. ” “I rarely blush or grow pale.” yes/no). In the similarity-bused categorization condition, subjects were later assigned to group M and group P allegedly on the basis of their answers to these questions. It was claimed that members of the same group usually have something in common, and would differ from the members of the other group at the same time. No information was given as to the specific intragroup similarities and intergroup differences. In fact, however, group assignment in this condition was purely random. In the random categorization condition, subjects answered the same questionnaire, but their answers were not referred to again at any stage of the procedure. Rather, group assignment was said to be-and in fact was-purely random. ’ Other students from the same college had participated as subjects in previous studies on intergroup discrimination (see Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983; Mummendey & Simon, 1989) and they had not been reluctant to discriminate in favor of their own group. Thus, students from that college were by no means exceptional subjects.

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Each subject drew a slip of paper from a box, which determined his/her group membership. In both conditions, it was stressed that it would not be better to belong to one or the other of the two groups and that usually both groups were of the same size. In addition, care was taken that subjects did not exchange information concerning their group membership. The experimenter further explained that the experiments were concerned specifically with the effects of bud mood on muscular tension and pulse rate. At first, bad mood would be induced by noise and then either muscular tension or pulse rate would be measured depending on each subject’s group membership. A slide was presented showing an alleged subject who wore a headphone and was connected to various apparatuses. In addition, subjects were given a “taste” of the noise, a high pitched tone, and rated how unpleasant it was (‘l-point scale: 1 = not unpleasant to 7 = very unpleasant). Subjects were told that bad mood would be manipulated by varying the duration of the tone. To determine the duration of the tone for a particular subject, a procedure had been developed and successfully used in the past. The experimenter then introduced and explained the choice-matrices which were similar to those used in the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). In the present experiment, however, points stood for duration of the tone (in seconds). The two rows in a matrix referred to two other experimental subjects, whose anonymity was assured by the use of code numbers, and it was stressed that the matrices were prepared so that one could never allocate time for oneself. In the same session condition, subjects allegedly allocated time to-and were in turn allocated time by-other ingroup and outgroup members present in the same experimental session as themselves. In the following session condition, they allocated time to participants (ingroup and outgroup members) of one of the following sessions, while according to the cover story they had already been allocated time by group members who had participated in an earlier session. After subjects had completed the booklet with the matrices, they answered a postexperimental questionnaire. Then the experiment was terminated. Subjects were told that they had in fact been allocated to control conditions in which no further experimentation was necessary. They were paid and they signed a declaration of secrecy which required of them not to talk about the experiment with other potential participants for a week. After the whole experiment had been completed, subjects were contacted again and fully debriefed.

Dependent Measures Matrices. Our main dependent measures were subjects’ time allocations to ingroup and outgroup members. We adopted two matrices from Tajfel et al. (1971) and one matrix from Billig and Tajfel (1973) (see Fig. 1).

Matrix (MJP

A

Matrix (MD

+ MD)

B vs.

Matrix (F

MIP

VS.

vs.

MIP

+ WP)

C MIP

+ MD)

19 16 13

7 1

8 3

17 16 15 14 5 7 9 11

9 10 5 7

14

15

16

14

13

12

17 11

13 13

12 15

11 17

10 19

9 a 7 21 23 25

13 13

14 15

15 17

16 19

17 21

11 9

12 11

18 23

19 25

18 10

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

FIG. 1. Matrices used in the experiments. Points stand for duration of noise (in seconds). MIP + MD = FAV.

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(a) Matrix A: FAV vs MJP. Tajfel et al.‘s (1971) Matrix 1 from their second experiment was used. It assessesthe pull of ingroup favoritism (FAV) on maximum joint profit (MJP), i.e., minimum joint time, as well as the pull of MJP on FAV. Here, FAV combines maximum ingroup profit (MIP), i.e., minimum ingroup time, and maximum difference in favor of the ingroup (MD). To illustrate, when the row 19 . .. 7 (top row of matrix A in Fig. 1) refers to an ingroup member and the row 1 . . . 25 to an outgroup member, MJP decreases and FAV increases from the left to the right extreme of the matrix. Thus on these choices, MJP contlicts with FAV. However, when the positions of ingroup and outgroup members are reversed MJP and FAV coincide. Then, MJP and FAV can be both optimized by the same choice. The strategies of MJP and FAV are assessed by comparing the choices where the strategies coincide with the choices where the strategies conflict. (b) Matrix B: MD vs MIP + MJP. We used Tajfel et al.% (1971) Matrix 3 from their second experiment. It assesses the pull of MIP + MJP on MD, as well as the pull of MD on MIP + MJP. (c) Matrix C: F vs FAV. Finally, we used Billig and Tajfel’s (1973) Matrix 3. This matrix assessesthe pull of fairness (F), i.e., same time for ingroup and outgroup, on FAV, as well as the pull of FAV on F. Here again, FAV combines MIP and MD. All matrices were presented once with the top row referring to an ingroup member and the bottom row referring to an outgroup member and vice versa (i.e., 6 matrices). In addition, for the purpose of replication of responses, all matrices were also presented with columns and rows reversed (i.e., another 6 matrices). The order of the 12 matrices was randomized for each subject and subjects were asked to indicate their group membership on each page of the booklet. Postexperimental questionnaire. Subjects estimated the intragroup similarity within ingroup and outgroup (“How similar to each other are members of group M/P?“) and the intergroup difference (“To what extent differ members of group M from members of group P?“). They also estimated the similarity between self and other ingroup members and between self and other outgroup members and indicated how much they would like to get to know members of the ingroup and members of the outgroup. All ratings were made on 7-point scales (1 = not at all to 7 = very). Ratings regarding ingroup and outgroup were made on separate scales and the respective order was randomized across subjects. Finally, subjects indicated their gender and age.

Results and Discussion In the similarity-based, same session condition, one subject refused to fill in the matrices and to continue the experiment, and another subject determined that the experiment was concerned with intergroup behavior. In the random, same session condition, one subject ignored (covered with the hand) the information that was contained in the matrices about the targets’ group membership. Finally, one subject in the random, following session condition did not understand how to use the matrices. The data of those four subjects were excluded from the analyses. The final sample size was 89, with cell sizes ranging from 21 to 25. Manipulation Checks When group categorization was similarity based, rather than purely random, subjects should ascribe more intragroup similarity to both ingroup and outgroup, should assume more (less) similarity between self and other ingroup (outgroup) members, and should perceive a greater intergroup

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difference. On the whole, these expectations were not confirmed. There was only one (nonsignificant) trend in the expected direction. Subjects perceived a somewhat greater intergroup difference in the similarity-based than in the random condition (M(SIM) = 4.13, M(RAN) = 3.56, F(1, 85) = 3.33, p = .07). However, social categorization as such was not ineffective.4 Subjects perceived, irrespective of experimental condition, more similarity between themselves and other ingroup members than between themselves and outgroup members (M(IN) = 3.97, M(OUT) = 3.44, F(1, 83) = 16.62, p < .OOl) and they were generally more interested in getting to know ingroup than outgroup members (M(IN) = 5.14, M(OUT) = 4.85, F(1, 84) = 8.09, p < .Ol). Thus, categorization per se was sufficient to induce some sense of group identity. Finally, subjects’ ratings of the noise revealed that it was indeed perceived as unpleasant (M = 5.79, SD = 1.19). The ratings in all experimental conditions differed significantly from 4, i.e., from the midpoint of the 7-point scale (ps < .OOl). Matrices

In both studies presented in this paper, higher numbers in the boxes of the matrices stood for more aversive stimulation and not for more positive rewards (e.g., money) as in the original studies by Tajfel et al. (1971). Hence, the meaning of the boxes of the matrices changed accordingly. For example, for Matrix A with the row 19 . . . 7 (top row of Matrix A in Fig. 1) referring to an ingroup member and the row 1 . . . 25 referring to an outgroup member, MJP was on the extreme left-hand side and FAV on the extreme right-hand side. In other words, MJP then conflicted with FAV. The two strategies were optimized at opposite poles. However, when the positions of the ingroup and outgroup member were reversed, with row 19 . . . 7 referring to an outgroup member and row 1 . . . 25 referring to an ingroup member, MJP coincided with FAV. Then, both strategies decreased from the left to the right extreme of the matrix. Both strategies could be optimized by the same choice. The pull of each strategy was calculated by comparing the choices where the strategies MJP and FAV coincided with those where the two strategies conflicted. If neither ’ Results reported in this paragraph are based on 2 x 2 x 2 analyses of variance with two between-subjects factors (Categorization and Session) and one within-subjects factor (ingroup rating vs outgroup rating). Reduced degrees of freedom are due to missing data. Besides the effects reported in the text, one other effect reached statistical significance. That is, subjects were more interested in meeting other fellow subjects, irrespective of group membership, when group categorization was similarity based, rather than random (M(SIM) = 5.31, M(RAN) = 4.67, F(1, 84) = 5.77, p < .05). On perceived intragroup similarity, no significant effects were observed in the ANOVA (M(IN) = 3.66, M(OUT) = 3.61).

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strategy was used, choices should be the same on the matrices where the strategies conflicted as on those matrices where they coincided. If FAV was used, choices should be closer to MJP when FAV coincided with MJP than when they conflicted. If MJP was used, choices should be closer to FAV when MJP coincided with FAV than when they conflicted (for further details see Tajfel et al., 1971; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Turner et al., 1979). As in the original minimal group experiments, therefore, a high (positive) pull score of a particular strategy indicates a strong influence of that strategy. Pull scores of each strategy (FAV, MJP, MD, F, MIP + MJP) were tested for statistical significance by comparing the ingroup/outgroup with the outgroup/ingroup versions of the respective matrices (see Turner et al., 1979). Unless otherwise noted, we used two-tailed t-tests to determine statistical significance. Table 1 summarizes the results. Fairness (F) was the most influential single strategy. Its influence is significant in all experimental conditions. MJP had a significant impact on subjects’ choices in all conditions, except in the random, same session condition. And its impact was further increased, when it was combined with MIP, i.e., when subjects could minimize ingroup time (maximize ingroup profit) at the same time. But there was no significant influence of absolute (FAV = MIP + MD) or relative (MD) ingroup favoritism. These results clearly confirm the expected preponderance of fairness relative to ingroup favoritism. Contrary to our expectations, however, there were no significant effects of the independent variables, Categorization and Session. None of the six 2 x 2 ANOVAs on the pull scores yielded significant results. Remember that the intergroup situation in the similarity-based, same session condition most closely corresponded to the intergroup situation in the original minimal group experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971). And even in that condition, pull scores indicate that group members were almost perfectly fair and showed no substantial ingroup favoritism. Not surprisingly then, the manipulation of the independent variables failed to increase fairness and to reduce (nonexistent) ingroup favoritism any further. A clear picture then emerges from subjects’ distribution of the negative outcome. Contrary to the original minimal group experiments which used positive outcomes (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner et al., 1979), subjects in the present study did not favor the ingroup over the outgroup. Rather, fairness was the pervasive distribution strategy. Although we had predicted that fairness would override ingroup favoritism, we are admittedly somewhat surprised that subjects showed no ingroup favoritism at all. One might possibly argue that group membership was simply irrelevant to subjects and that, therefore, they did not behave in terms of their group membership. However, several results testify to the effectiveness of the

n:

3.83** (5.63)” 3.36* (6.16) 2.36” (3.50) .88 (2.15) .79 (4.20) 1.40 (4.01)

Same 21

PULL

5.32*** (4.56) 2.96*’ (5.12) 1.94” (4.33) .24 (3.48) .lO (2.57) - .48 (3.78)

Following 25

1

MATRIX

TABLE OF SUBJECTS’

Similarity

SCORES

.86 (3.27) -.67 (4.00)

w34)

4.69*** (5.21) 3.52** (4.97) .76 (2.81) .12

Same 21

DISTRIBUTION

Random

STRATEGIES

(2.80)

4.20*** (5.37) 5.39*** (4.48) 1.25’ (2.79) .70 (1.65) .02 (2.47) .43

Following 22

4.54*** (5.12) 3.79*** (5.20) 1.59*** (3.45) .48 (2.63) .42 (3.14) .15 (3.70)

Entire sample 89

Note. Mean pull scores for each distribution strategy can range from - 12 to + 12. MIP, Maximum ingroup profit; MJP, Maximum joint profit; MD, Maximum difference in favor of the ingroup; F, Fairness; FAV, ingroup favoritism (MD + MIP). * Standard deviations. All ANOVA effects were nonsignificant. * p s .05, ** p s .Ol. *** p G ,001; two-tailed t tests.

FAV on F

FAV on MJP

MD on MIP + MJP

MJP on FAV

F on FAV

Matrix strategy MIP + MJP on MD

Session:

Categorization:

MEAN

F

$ s w a24 . 22

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social categorization into ingroup and outgroup. First, the strategy, which maximized joint profit for all participants (MJP), further increased in attractiveness when ingroup profit (MIP) could be maximized at the same time (see Table 1). Second, subjects perceived more similarity between themselves and other ingroup members than between themselves and outgroup members, and they were more interested in getting to know ingroup members than outgroup members. Obviously, social categorization did have some systematic effects on subjects’ perception and behavior. In conclusion, the absence of ingroup favoritism in subjects’ distribution choices cannot be attributed to a failure to establish a salient ingroupoutgroup division. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) traces ingroup favoritism back to group members’ motivation to assure positive social identity and thus positive self-esteem (see also Turner, 1975). However, there appears to be an interesting asymmetry as to the minimal conditions for ingroup favoritism. On the one hand, the classic minimal group experiments have demonstrated that mere categorization into minimal groups induces group members to assure positive social identity by favoring ingroup over outgroup in positive outcome allocations. On the other hand, the results presented here suggest a higher threshold for ingroup favoritism when the allocation of negative or aversive outcomes is concerned. Apparently, mere categorization triggers a motive strong enough to elicit ingroup favoritism in the case of positive outcome allocations, whereas in the case of negative outcome allocations it is not sufficient to elicit ingroup favoritism. Social identity theory further assumes that the desire for positive social identity, and hence the motive for ingroup favoritism, will be stronger the more unsatisfactory one’s social identity is (provided one cannot leave the ingroup or join the outgroup; see Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 16). Accordingly, membership in a group which, unlike a minimal group, confers a negative social identity may then be sufficient to elicit discriminatory behavior, even when negative outcomes are to be distributed. This idea is tested in the second study. STUDY 2

The sociostructural variables relative group size and relative group status are important characteristics of many real-life intergroup situations (e.g., Farley, 1982; Giles, Bourhis, & Taylor, 1977). To the extent that social relations determine group members’ social identities (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) these sociostructural variables should mediate group members’ search for positive social identities and, therefore, influence ingroup favoritism. In fact, research shows that both relative group size (e.g., Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; Mummendey & Simon, 1989; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984) and relative group status (e.g., Brown

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& Abrams, 1986; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987) have an impact on intergroup discrimination. Yet, previous research has never systematically investigated this impact on (discriminatory) allocations of negative outcomes. We assume that membership in a minority, i.e., in a numerically inferior group (Festinger, 1954, pp. 136-137; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; Sherif, 1966, p. ill), as well as membership in a low status group (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987) confers an unsatisfactory or negative social identity. Accordingly, it is expected that minority as well as low status group members will be particularly motivated to achieve a positive social identity. Hence, when they-as in the present study-cannot leave their ingroup and join the outgroup, minority and low status group members will make their ingroup positively distinct by favoring the ingroup over the outgroup. On the other hand, majority and high status group members should have a satisfactory or positive social identity, at least when-as in the present study-status differentials appear stable and legitimate. Thus, these group members should feel less need to favor the ingroup over the outgroup. With regard to relative group size, our analysis is supported by previous research (e.g., Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; Mummendey & Simon, 1989). In particular, a recent metaanalysis by Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1990) revealed that minority groups favored the ingroup over the outgroup, while majority groups showed outgroup favoritism. As to the effects of relative group status on intergroup discrimination, Sachdev & Bourhis (1987) criticized “the equivocal nature of laboratory research on intergroup status differentials.” Based on that critique, they conducted an experiment and found that while high status group members favored the ingroup over the outgroup, low status group members showed the opposite effect. Apparently, low status group members did not strive for a positive social identity. Rather, they-as well as the high status group membersacknowledged the superiority of the high status group. Yet, whereas Sachdev and Bourhis (1987) had measured ingroup favoritism on status-refuted comparison dimensions, the allocation task in the present study is not directly related to the status differential. Consequently, subjects should not simply reproduce this differential, but rather behave in accordance with their need for a satisfactory or positive social identity. In sum, the aim of the present study is to investigate the impact of relative group size and relative group status on the allocation of negative outcomes to ingroup and outgroup; a research question, which has been neglected thus far. Due to their enhanced motivation to achieve a positive social identity, minority and low status group members are expected to favor the ingroup over the outgroup, even though ingroup favoritism involves discriminatory allocations of negative outcomes. On the other hand, majority and high status group members should show no ingroup favoritism, because their group membership confers a satisfactory social identity.

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Method Subjects Eighty-four male and female pupils (ages 14 to 17) from a grammar school in Lage, West Germany, participated in the experiment on a voluntary basis.

Design The experimental design consisted of two between-subjects factors, with two levels on each factor, i.e., relative (in)group size (majority vs minority) and relative (in)group status (high vs low). Subjects’ allocations of negative stimuli (number of meaningless syllables to be memorized) to ingroup and outgroup served as the dependent variable.

Procedure The experiment was run in the school. Altogether there were four sessions. The number of the subjects in each session ranged from 19 to 24. Allegedly, the experiment was concerned with basic cognitive abilities. At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects were administered a dot estimation task. On the basis of their answers, subjects were categorized into “subestimators” (“th ose of you who underestimated the number of dots”) and ‘Chyperestimators”5 (“those of you who overestimated the number of dots”). In fact, of course, group assignment was purely random and care was taken that subjects did not exchange information about group membership. Relative group size and relative group status were manipulated orthogonally. First, subjects were told that usually about 80% of the population belong to the ingroup and 20% to the outgroup or vice versa (majority vs minority condition). Then, it was stated that in general the own category (ingroup) or the other category (outgroup) is superior in detail perception. That is, although both categories of people (subestimators and hyperestimators) would usually fail to estimate the exact number of dots, subjects’ own category would usually make less mistakes than the other category or vice versa (high vs low status condition). Another brief test was then administered which allegedly confirmed the status differential as to detail perception. Note that within each session, half the subjects were assigned to the minority and the other half to the majority. And, in two of the four sessions, the minority was ascribed low status and the majority high status, while the status differential was reversed in the other two sessions. Thus, experimental condition also varied within sessions. Moreover, category label, i.e., subestimator vs hyperestimator, was counterbalanced. The next stage of the experiment was allegedly concerned with subjects’ memory for pairs of meaningless syllables. Though the experimenter was allegedly interested in the relationship between detail perception and memory for meaningless syllables, it was explicitly stated that, thus far, the exact nature of that relationship was unclear. In other words, the cover story did not suggest a particular relationship between the status differential and the memory task. Then, subjects were told that the number of pairs to be memorized by a particular subject would be determined by means of choice matrices. The same matrices were used as in Study 1, except that points stood for number of lists of meaningless syllables. Each list contained 10 pairs of meaningless syllables. Before subjects tilled in the matrices, they had to memorize one list of meaningless syllables to get familiar with the “unpleasant” memory task. To emphasize the negativity of the task further, it was stressed that the more 5 In order to get different group letters specifying the two different groups (i.e., H and S) we matched Latin language with Greek language prepositions in creating the two group labels.

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lists a subject had to memorize, the longer, of course, he or she had to stay in the classroom, whereas subjects with fewer lists could leave earlier. After subjects had completed the booklet with the matrices, they answered a postexperimental questionnaire. Then, the experiment was terminated and subjects were fully debriefed.

Dependent Measures Matrices. Our main dependent measures were subjects’ allocations of lists of meaningless syllables to ingroup and outgroup members. The same matrices were used as in Study 1 (see Fig. 1). Postexperimental questionnaire. Subjects rated how much they liked to belong to their own group (1 = not at all to 5 = very much) and whether they preferred to belong to their own or to the other group (S-point bipolar scale: 1 = other group vs 5 = own group). They also indicated how important it was to them to be good at detail perception and how unpleasant it was to memorize syllables (1 = not at all to 5 = very much). Moreover, they had to recall the percentage of people belonging to ingroup and outgroup (relative group size) and which group was superior in detail perception (relative group status). Finally, subjects indicated their age and gender.

Results and Discussion The data from 8 subjects were excluded from the analysis because those subjects doubted the cover story and/or did not correctly endorse the manipulation regarding relative group size or relative group status. Exclusions ranged from 1 to 4 per cell. The final sample size was 76 (19 per cell). Manipulation Checks

High status group members liked own group membership better than did low status group members (M(HIGH) = 3.79, M(LOW) = 2.71, F(1, 72) = 21.22, p < .OOl). And a similar difference was found when subjects indicated preference for own relative to other group membership (M(HIGH) = 4.24, M(LOW) = 2.45, F(1,72) = 71.14,~ < .OOl). These results confirm that the manipulation of relative group status was successful. Also, all subjects indicated that it was important to them to be good at memorizing meaningless syllables (M = 3.64) and that the memory task was unpleasant (M = 3.87; both means differ significantly from 3.0, i.e., from the midpoint of the scale, p < .Ol). There were no significant differences between conditions. Matrices

Pull scores of each strategy (FAV, MD, MJP, F, MIP + MJP) were calculated and tested for statistical significance by comparing the ingroup/outgroup with the outgroup/ingroup versions of the respective matrices. In addition, 2 (relative ingroup size) x 2 (relative ingroup status)

3.25’* (4.59) 2.13 (4.62) 0.89 (3.58) - 1.08 (3.97) -1.05 (4.26) 0.50 (3.79)

High 19

Majority

SCORES

2.08 (6.19) 1.92 (5.34) 0.61 (4.44) 1.82 (4.12) 1.18 (3.16) -0.66 (3.09)

19

LOW

1.88* (3.24)

(2.44)

::g 1.36 (5.39) -0.31 (2.83) - 1.25*

5.81*** (4.39)

High 19

Minority

TABLE 2 OF SUBJECTS’MATRIX DISTRIBUTIONSTRATEGIES

3.03** (4.18) 2.05* (3.53)

(2.V

(36::) -0.80 (3.95) 1.76***

2.24 (6.48)

Low 19

3.31*** (5.60) 2.04** (5.68) 0.52 (4.36) 0.58 (3.51) 0.47 (3.93) 0.92* (3.54)

Entire sample 76

Note. Mean pull scores for each distribution strategy can range from - 12 to + 12. Due to the missing data cell numbers vary from 16 to 19. MIP, Maximum ingroup profit; MJP. Maximum joint profit; MD, Maximum difference in favor of the ingroup; F, Fairness; FAV, Ingroup favoritism (MD + MIP). ’ Standard deviations. ANOVA results for relative ingroup status-FAV on MJP: F(1, 70) = 15.16, p c .OOl; MD on MIP + MJP: F(1, 70) = 10.20, p s .Ol. ANOVA results for relative ingroup size-FAV on F: F(1, 70) = 6.58, p < .Ol. All other effects were nonsignificant. * p s .05, ** p S .Ol, *** p C X01; two-tailed I tests.

FAV on F

FAV on MJP

MD on MIP + MJP

MJP on FAV

F on FAV

Matrix strategy MIP + MJP on MD

Relative ingroup status: n:

Relative ingroup size:

MEAN PULL

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Pull scores

25

20

B----B

FAV on MJP MD on MIP + MJP

1.5 1.0 OS 0.0 - 0.5 - 1.0 - 1.5

- 2.0 FIG. 2. Main effect of relative ingroup status on ingroup favoritism.

ANOVAs were performed on these pull scores. Table 2 summarizes the results. Significant ANOVA effects were observed only with regard to ingroup favoritism. We found a status main effect for FAV on MJP (M(HIGH) = -1.15, M(LOW) = 2.08; F(1, 70) = 15.16, p < 401) and for MD on MIP + MJP (M(HIGH) = -0.69, M(LOW) = 1.79; F(1, 70) = 10.20, p < .Ol). In line with our prediction, low status groups were more likely to discriminate in favor of the ingroup than high status groups (see Fig. 2). Although interaction effects were nonsignificant (p > .22), cell means reveal that it was mainly the low status minority that showed both absolute (FAV = MIP + MD) and relative (MD) ingroup favoritism. Again as expected, we found a group size main effect for FAV on F (M(MAJ) = -0.08, M(MIN) = 1.97; F(1, 70) = 6.58, p < .Ol). Only minority groups showed ingroup favoritism (see Fig. 3). As to the remaining strategies, it can be seen in Table 2 that fairness (F on FAV) had some overall influence, but its influence did not reach statistical significance in any of the individual cells. Finally, the combined pull of MIP + MJP was significant in the entire sample and specifically in the high status groups. One interpretation of the results could refer to considerations of differential justification of allocating an unpleasant task to high versus low status groups: The fact that low status groups are willing to follow ingroup favoring strategies may be due to the consideration that high status groups are more capable of fulfilling the learning task. So it might appear to be

INGROUP

141

FAVORITISM

Pull scores

25

a-m

FAVon

F

20 1.5 1.0 0.5 i

FIG.

3. Main effect of relative ingroup size on ingroup favoritism.

fair to assign more tasks to a high than a low status groups. This alternative explanation, however, does not fit the fact that for low status groups when they are in the majority the influence of ingroup favoring strategies is clearly less reliable. We argued that mere categorization into ingroup and outgroup is nof sufficient to elicit ingroup favoritism when negative outcomes are to be distributed. Yet we further assumed that group members, who are particularly motivated to achieve a positive social identity, will in fact favor the ingroup even in negative outcome allocations. The results of the present study confirm that assumption. As expected, only members with a presumably unsatisfactory social identity favored the ingroup over the outgroup. That is, minority and low status group members-in contrast to majority and high status group members--burdened the outgroup with an unpleasant task to a greater extent than the ingroup. And due to the compound effects of minority position and low status, it was the low status minority group that most consistently showed ingroup favoritism (see Table 2). GENERAL DISCUSSION In the introduction we asked the question whether members of minimal groups, when distributing negative outcomes will show the same pattern of ingroup favoritism as group members in the classic minimal group experiments, who distributed primarily positive outcomes. On the basis of the results presented here, the answer must be in the negative. Specifically, mere categorization into minimal groups was not sufficient to elicit ingroup favoritism in negative outcome allocations. In the minimal intergroup situations designed in Study 1, group members acted in terms

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of fairness and maximum utilitarian advantages to all. Certainly, subjects also acted in terms of their group membership in that utilitarian decisions were most attractive when common interest coincided with the particular interest of the ingroup (i.e., MJP + MIP strategy). Yet, subjects never favored ingroup members directly over outgroup members. On the other hand, Study 2 demonstrates that discriminatory allocation of negative outcomes will occur as well, provided group members are particularly motivated to assure positive social identity. In fact, low status minority members showed a pattern of ingroup favoritism very similar to that observed in the classic minimal group experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1978; Turner et al., 1979). Taken together, these results then confirm the assumed asymmetry as to the minimal conditions for ingroup favoritism in positive and negative outcome allocations. In the case of negative outcomes, categorization into ingroup and outgroup apparently needs to be supplemented by further specification of the intergroup relation (e.g., with regard to group size or status) before it elicits discriminatory behavior. Thus, the present piece of research should be read as a caveat against the silent generalization from the realm of positive to the realm of negative outcome allocations. This caveat is in line with Messick and Mackie’s (1989, pp. 63-66) critique of the experimental study of intergroup discrimination. Those authors point out the insufficient theoretical elaboration of that research. Specifically, they call for “a comprehensive theory of its dependent variables.” We should like to suggest two orthogonal dimensions or axes that may help to systematize the dependent variables, or more precisely, the various forms of intergroup discrimination they stand for. One axis concerns the value of the outcome to be distributed. Outcomes can be positive, e.g., money as in the classic minimal group experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971), or negative, e.g., noise or an unpleasant task as in the present studies. Following Hewstone et al. (1981), the second axis describes whether the outcomes are allocated to ingroup and outgroup members, or whether they are taken away from them. A 2 x 2 taxonomy of intergroup discrimination or ingroup favoritism results from the combination of these axes. The ingroup is favored over the outgroup when the ingroup receives a) more of a positive or b) less of a negative outcome, or when c) less of positive or d) more of a negative outcome is taken away from the ingroup. The classic minimal group experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971) fit in the first category, the present studies in the second, and the Hewstone et al. (1981) study belongs to the third category, while the fourth category is still to be filled. The research presented in this article indicates that assumptions valid for one category of intergroup discrimination may not be valid for another. Thus, though this taxonomy is certainly not complete, it may be a fruitful starting point for a more differentiated analysis of a complex phenomenon.

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