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Chapter 13 Comparison: the second negotiation step
Chapter 13 Comparison: the second negotiation step EB, FC, FP and RSS This chapter describes the second step in designing the alternatives and the negotiations that follow (Figure 13.1).
13.1
Designing the alternatives
The aim of the second design step (Section 5.4.2) is to generate new alternatives that could get a wider agreement than the reasonable alternatives identified so far; this will be ascertained through a second step of negotiations. The new alternatives (black dots in Figure 13.2) are sought in the neighbourhood of the reasonable alternatives Area that were identified in the first step (grey dots surrounded by a circle in Figure 13.2). Two types of alternatives are designed in the second step: • alternatives characterized by the same combination of structural and normative actions as Area ; • alternatives characterized by the same stage–discharge relation and regulation range as Area , but with a higher MEF value. When designing the first group of alternatives, we explore the same decision space that was explored in the first design step but with a higher resolution. Thereby these alternatives are obtained by solving the same (Optimal) Control Problem as the one used to design the alternatives of Area , except for the weights assigned to the objectives, which are slightly different. They will be chosen by taking account of information that has been acquired in the first negotiation step. Let us consider, for example, alternative A34, which is one of the reasonable alternatives identified in the first step and was designed with the weights λfl = 0.99
λirr = 0.01
λenv = 0
We know that the Ticino Parks and the Bolle di Magadino Foundation are opposed to it. In order to find an alternative in the neighbourhood of A34 that might be accepted by these opposers, the value of λenv must be increased, but this is only possible if the weight of another sector is reduced.1 To choose the new value for λenv , remember that in the first design step 1 The sum of the weights must always be equal to one.
301
302
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP
Figure 13.1: The steps for identifying the reasonable alternatives. The highlighted steps are the ones whose results are described in this chapter.
13.1 D ESIGNING THE ALTERNATIVES
303
Figure 13.2: The alternatives designed in the second step are indicated by black dots.
the same combination that characterizes A34, namely (SD+600 /RANGE ENL /13CON ) was also used to design alternative A36, with the following weights λfl = 0.98
λirr = 0.01
λenv = 0.01
Since the Irrigation Consortia (and ENEL) are opposed to it, we understand that, in order to maintain the agreement from the Consortia that was achieved with A34, the increase in λenv cannot be compensated with a reduction in λirr but only in λfl . As for the second group of alternatives, it might be surprising that they have to be characterized by a value of MEF higher than the one of Area even when that alternative does not arouse opposition from Downstream Environment. Observe, however, that the decision space that was not explored in the first design step is the very space that corresponds to the MEF values: an increase in the MEF value might make it possible to modify an alternative that pleases Downstream Environment in the direction required by the opposers, without loosing the agreement of the Ticino Parks. Alternatives of this type are designed by solving Control Problems that were not considered in the previous step and so, in contrast to what happens for the first group, we do not have explicit references for the choice of the weights. However, indications can still be derived from the information that we have already acquired. For example, considering once more the case of alternative A34, one can observe that since the Ticino Parks are opposed to it and they are in favour of an increase in the MEF, it might be reasonable to keep the same weights as the A34, or at the most to vary them very little. The validity of these guesses must still be checked with an analysis of the results obtained. Once the new alternatives have been designed, it is advisable to identify all the alternatives that, from the information in our possession, we know will not be interesting to the opposers, or will be such as to lose the supporters. These alternatives should be immediately eliminated and should not be subjected to the second negotiation step. From the results obtained in the first negotiation step we can, in fact, deduce several conditions for acceptability
304
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP
of the new alternatives. For example, in the neighbourhood of A34, a new alternative A can gain a wider agreement only if: (1) the value of the Downstream Environment sector index that it produces is higher than the one produced by A34, i.e. VEnv_D (A) > VEnv_D (A34) (2) the value of the Irrigation sector index that it produces is higher than the one produced by A0, i.e. VIrr_D (A) > VIrr_D (A0) If one or the other of these conditions were not respected, we are sure that the Stakeholders who are interested in those two sectors would oppose A. Just as we did in the previous chapters, we will describe this procedure in practice, considering the reasonable alternative A34 as an example. We chose it because it allows us to make some interesting observations. For didactic reasons, we will begin the presentation with the alternatives of the second group, starting with the alternatives with time-invariant MEF , and then passing to those with time-variant MEF . In the analysis attention will be paid mostly to the conflict between Irrigation and Downstream Environment, because this conflict must be solved or at least mitigated in order to get a wider agreement. Once this first analysis is concluded we will deal with the alternatives of the first group.
13.1.1
Alternatives with time-invariant MEF
The reader might wonder why it is necessary to design new policies in order to assess the effects of an increase in the MEF: it might seem sufficient that the policies that have already been designed be simulated with different MEF values. Such a procedure would not be correct, however, because the policy obtained as a solution to a Control Problem is efficient for the system subject to the constraints that appear in the formulation of the Problem, but it cannot be if the constraints are modified. Since the MEF is a parameter that defines one of the constraints, when it is varied the policy must be re-designed. Given the pair of actions (SD+600 /RANGE ENL ) with which alternative A34 was designed and the discretization that we adopted for the MEF (Section 5.3.3), we designed the six alternatives described in Table 13.1. Table 13.2 shows the sector index values they produce and, as a comparison, also those produced by the three reasonable alternatives A0, A34 and A36. The first is shown because it is the Stakeholders’ point of reference, the second because it is the alternative whose agreement we hope to broaden, and the third because it is associated to the same pair of actions as A34. Table 13.2 shows that, as we expected, all the new alternatives either increase the Downstream Environment index with respect to A34, or at least do not worsen it. None of the new alternatives is dominated by the others because as the MEF increases the Irrigation index decreases. Alternative A66 produces a value for Irrigation that is lower than the value produced by A0; thus A66 violates the second condition of accessibility and it must be discarded. Since A66 is characterized by a MEF value equal to 30CON and since, as we have just seen, the value for Irrigation decreases as the MEF increases, the unacceptability of A66 reveals that it would be useless to consider MEF values that are higher than 30CON .
13.1 D ESIGNING THE ALTERNATIVES
305
Table 13.1. Characteristics of the alternatives with time-invariant MEF higher than 13 m3 /s Alternative
SD
RANGE
MEF
Weight for Irrigation
A56
+600
ENL
20CON
A58
+600
ENL
20CON
λirr > λA34 irr λirr = λA34 irr
A60
+600
ENL
25CON
λirr > λA34 irr
A62
+600
ENL
25CON
A64
+600
ENL
30CON
λirr = λA34 irr λirr > λA34 irr
A66
+600
ENL
30CON
λirr = λA34 irr
Table 13.2. Sector indices associated to the alternatives with time-invariant MEFs Sector
MEF
13CON
Downstream Environment Irrigation ENEL Power Upstream Environment Upstream Flooding
[m3 /s]
20CON
25CON
30CON
20CON
25CON
30CON
A0
A34
A36
A58
A62
A66
A56
A60
A64
0.16 0.61 0.85 0.26 0.09
0.06 0.74 0.83 0.27 0.70
0.15 0.60 0.70 0.47 0.69
0.07 0.68 0.82 0.26 0.70
0.07 0.62 0.81 0.26 0.70
0.08 0.56 0.80 0.26 0.70
0.06 0.73 0.83 0.22 0.68
0.06 0.68 0.82 0.22 0.68
0.06 0.61 0.81 0.22 0.66
Alternatives A58 and A62 bring about a decrease in the Irrigation index with respect to A34. In particular, the value produced by A62 is just a little higher than the value produced by A0, despite the fact that A62 was designed giving Irrigation the same weight λirr that was used when designing A34. We inferred that if a lower weight were used, alternatives that violate the second condition of acceptability would be designed and so no attempts were made in this direction. The three remaining alternatives (A56, A60 and A64) were designed giving Irrigation a higher weight than in A34. All three are dominated by alternative A34 and so they are not interesting, as well as being unacceptable because they violate the first condition (the Downstream Environment index is not higher than that produced by A34). By observing the release trajectories produced by the new alternatives, we understood that an increase in the weight λirr causes an increase in the number of days that the flow in the Ticino is equal to the MEF. Since the latter is time-invariant, this means that the flow in the Ticino stays the same for long periods and the seasonal fluctuations that characterize the natural regime are absent. The distance between regulated and natural regime thus remains the same as for A34, even though the value of the MEF was increased. In conclusion, by adopting time-invariant MEFs, alternatives that increase the Downstream Environment index are obtained, but at the expense of the Irrigation index. Of the alternatives designed, only A58 and A62 are acceptable, even if the Downstream Environment index remains lower than that produced by A0 and its increase with respect to A34 is very small. As we have just noted, this might be due to the fact that the presence of a time-invariant MEF induces long periods of constant flow in the Ticino. A more significant
306
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP Table 13.3. Characteristics of the alternatives with time-variant (modulated) MEF Alternative
SD
RANGE
MEF
Weight for Irrigation
A72
+600
ENL
20MOD
A74
+600
ENL
20MOD
λirr > λA34 irr λirr = λA34 irr
A76
+600
ENL
25MOD
A78
+600
ENL
25MOD
λirr > λA34 irr λirr = λA34 irr
Table 13.4. Sector indices associated to the alternatives with time-variant (modulated) MEF Sector
MEF
13CON
Downstream Environment Irrigation ENEL Power Upstream Environment Upstream Flooding
[m3 /s]
20CON
20MOD
20CON
20MOD
A0
A34
A36
A58
A74
A62
A78
0.16 0.61 0.85 0.26 0.09
0.06 0.74 0.83 0.27 0.70
0.15 0.60 0.70 0.47 0.69
0.07 0.68 0.82 0.26 0.70
0.07 0.68 0.82 0.26 0.70
0.07 0.62 0.81 0.26 0.70
0.07 0.63 0.81 0.26 0.70
increase in the Downstream Environment index could possibly be obtained with time-variant MEF s, so it is time to put them to the test.
13.1.2
Alternatives with time-variant MEF
To assess the effects of a time-variant MEF (defined in Section 5.3.3 and which we will also term modulated MEF) we designed the four alternatives in Table 13.3. Alternatives A72 and A76 produce values for Downstream Environment that are lower than the value produced by A34 and so they are discarded. This is why they do not appear in Table 13.4, where the indices relative to the other two alternatives (A74 and A78) are reported, along with the indices produced by the two alternatives (A58 and A62) that were introduced in the previous section and the usual three reference alternatives (A0, A34 and A36). From the table it seems that the Downstream Environment index does not increase if we pass from time-invariant to modulated MEF and that the Irrigation index either increases slightly (A78) or does not change (A74). This is certainly not the result that we expected. Nevertheless, a moment’s thought shows why this can happen: if it is possible to increase environmental satisfaction without lowering irrigation satisfaction, then it must also be possible to increase irrigation satisfaction whilst maintaining the same level of environmental satisfaction. For some reason, which we will try to identify, we only found pairs of alternatives that produce the second effect. Alternatives that produce the first effect could certainly be found as well with further explorations. Nevertheless, since the increases in the index that we obtained up to now are very small, it seemed useless to continue the exploration. We will simply note that alternatives A58 and A74 are indistinguishable, while alternative A78 dominates A62. Thus A58 and A62, which are characterized by a time-invariant MEF , are discarded because the alternatives with a modulated MEF are preferable. The reason for this is simple. For each possible MEF value, the water volume that must be released
13.1 D ESIGNING THE ALTERNATIVES
307
Table 13.5. Sector indices associated to the alternatives with 13CON and different weights for Downstream Environment Sector
MEF
[m3 /s]
13CON
Downstream Environment Irrigation ENEL Power Upstream Environment Upstream Flooding
20MOD
25MOD
A0
A34
A36
A71
A81
A82
A74
A78
0.16 0.61 0.85 0.26 0.09
0.06 0.74 0.83 0.27 0.70
0.15 0.60 0.70 0.47 0.69
0.15 0.63 0.71 0.40 0.69
0.14 0.70 0.72 0.26 0.69
0.14 0.67 0.71 0.29 0.70
0.07 0.68 0.82 0.26 0.70
0.07 0.63 0.81 0.26 0.70
into the Ticino over the course of a year is, by construction, the same for both the timeinvariant and the modulated MEF values (see Section 5.3.3). It follows that the modulated MEF guarantees a performance for Downstream Environment that is no worse than the one that would be obtained with the corresponding time-invariant MEF. A time-variant MEF imposes higher releases in the very periods when, in natural regime conditions, more water would be available, which is advantageous with view to a compromise between irrigation and environmental needs. However, since the alternatives that we are considering were all designed giving zero weight to Downstream Environment and a high weight to Irrigation, the entire advantage is acquired by the latter sector. Now it is clear why we did not obtain the result that we expected: the surprising result is produced by the weights, which evidently play a very important role. Therefore, it is mandatory to explore the possibility of increasing the value for Downstream Environment by acting on the weights, i.e. we must explore the alternatives belonging to the first group that was defined in the introduction.
13.1.3
Alternatives oriented to Downstream Environment
The interesting alternatives from the first group are characterized by values of the Downstream Environment weight between the one used for A34 and the one used for A36. In Table 13.5 we show the indices produced by three alternatives (A71, A81 and A82) with these characteristics. In the same table the indices produced by alternatives A74 and A78 are also reported (these are the only acceptable alternatives that have been designed so far), as well as the usual three reference alternatives. The table reveals that if we considered only the Irrigation and Downstream Environment sectors, alternatives A74 and A78 would be dominated by A81 and A82, but such dominance no longer exists if we consider all five sectors. This result definitively confirms that in order to diminish the conflict between Downstream Environment and Irrigation it is more fruitful to act upon the regulation policy (by carefully selecting the weights), rather than introducing normative actions (i.e. imposing a particular MEF). In fact, on the one hand the adoption of a time-invariant MEF imposes an increase in the release at the most critical times for irrigation, and on the other the adoption of a time-variant MEF reduces the conflict but does not completely eliminate it.2 Instead, acting on the regulation policy makes it possible to increase the flow in the Ticino especially in the autumn and winter months, as demonstrated, for example, by Figure 13.3, which compares 2 In the summer period a time-variant MEF imposes lower releases than the corresponding time-invariant MEF, but in the period when the rice paddies are being flooded the time-variant MEF imposes higher releases.
308
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP
Figure 13.3: Release trajectories produced by A34 and A81 and natural outflow trajectory over one year (1984).
the release trajectories produced by A34 and A81 with the natural outflow trajectory over one year (1984). Thus, acting on the regulation policy design through the weights is the best way to mitigate the conflict. Note, however, that the weights should not be modified too much, lest a new conflict with ENEL be generated: the winter period is, in fact, the most critical one for ENEL, because in these months the value of hydropower is higher. Table 13.5 shows that both A81 and A82 produce a value for ENEL Power that is clearly inferior to the ones produced by A74 and A78. In conclusion: starting from the reasonable alternative A34, we obtained five new alternatives (A71, A74, A78, A81 and A82), which will be presented to the second negotiation step. The set of new alternatives is completed by repeating the procedure for all the other reasonable alternatives.
13.1.4
A comment
In this section we have seen that the conflict between Downstream Environment and Irrigation is structural and cannot be solved by increasing the MEF or by modifying the weights in the regulation policy design. The five alternatives that were designed starting from A34 increase the Downstream Environment index a little, but without bringing it up to the value produced by A0. Moreover, these small increments bring about a decrease in the index values for Irrigation and ENEL Power. The space for further compromise is reduced to the slight margin among these five alternatives. The advent of irrigation and hydropower production in an era when very little attention was paid to environmental problems relegated Downstream Environment to a condition of poor satisfaction, from which it is unlikely to
13.2 T HE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP
309
Table 13.6. The reasonable alternatives identified in the second negotiation step Alternative
A0 A119 A54 A34 A36
SD
ACT ACT
+600 +600 +600
RANGE
ACT ACT ACT ENL ENL
Weights
MEF
13CON 25MOD 13CON 13CON 13CON
λfl
λirr
λenv
– 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.98
– 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.01
– 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
escape without lowering the levels of satisfaction to which the Stakeholders interested in Irrigation and ENEL Power have by now become accustomed. The only way to increase the satisfaction of Downstream Environment without disturbing Irrigation and ENEL Power would be to include a modification of irrigation techniques among the actions considered in the Project. For example, it would be interesting to explore the effects of changing from submersion to sprinklers (or to drip irrigation where possible). Alternatives with these characteristics might make it possible to satisfy the Stakeholders interested in Irrigation and, at the same time, to allow for more water to be available to increase the Downstream Environment index, but it is unlikely that they would satisfy ENEL. Clearly, the cost of the transformation would be included among the indicators for Irrigation, and we should also take into account the impact on the landscape that an alternative of this type would provoke, since it would reduce the flow in the canals and in the irrigation ditches. However, the study of these actions exceeds the limits imposed on the Verbano Project and so we will not consider it.
13.2
The second negotiation step
Just as in the first step, negotiations are carried out according to the ENP (page 247). The only difference is that the procedure is no longer re-started as many times as there are Stakeholders, each time beginning from the alternative that one of them prefers, but it is carried out as many times as there are reasonable alternatives identified in the first negotiation step, each time beginning with a different one. In this way the set of alternatives in Table 13.6 is obtained, with respect to which the Stakeholders assume the positions presented in Table 13.7. By comparing these two tables with Tables 12.4 and 12.5, which describe the reasonable alternatives identified in the first negotiation step, one notes that they differ only in the fact that alternative A9 is replaced by alternative A119, which is still supported by the Ticino Parks but, unlike the first, is supported also by the Bolle di Magadino Foundation and accepted by the GRAIA Society (Upstream Fishing sector). This replacement is thus a step forward towards a compromise.
13.3
The least-bad alternatives
As Figure 13.1 shows, the second negotiation step foresees identifying not only the reasonable alternatives but also, if necessary, the least-bad alternatives.
310
Table 13.7. The positions of the Stakeholders with respect to the reasonable alternatives identified in the second negotiation step SD
MEF
Alternative
13CON
A0
Support GRAIA Society ENEL Company
Stakeholders Accept
CUR
25MOD
CUR
+600
GRAIA
Society
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company
GRAIA Society East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company GRAIA Society ENEL Company
A119
13CON
A54
13CON
A34
ENL
13CON
Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks
A36
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company Bolle di Magadino Foundation
GRAIA
Society
Oppose Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company Bolle di Magadino Foundation East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium Ticino Parks Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks
Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks
East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company Ticino Parks
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP
CUR
RANGE
13.3 T HE LEAST- BAD ALTERNATIVES
311
Table 13.8. The acceptability thresholds expressed by the Stakeholders when identifying the least-bad alternatives for the Ticino Parks. The search starts from the reasonable alternatives characterized by the pair (SD+600 /RANGE ENL ) Sectors
Acceptability threshold
Upstream Environment Upstream Fishing Upstream Flooding Mosquitoes Navigation Upstream Tourism Downstream Environment ENEL Power East Sesia Power Irrigation Downstream Tourism
0.40 0.80 0.60 0.55 0.80 0.60 0.00 0.83 0.40 0.70 0.00
More precisely, for each class of alternatives, defined by the same pair (stage–discharge relation/regulation range), we must ascertain whether there are Stakeholders who are opposed to all the alternatives in that class. If there are, the procedure described on page 250 is used to search for an alternative that might be ‘tolerated’, even reluctantly, by the opponent(s). This least-bad alternative will be included among those submitted to the Final Decision phase. As a practical example of how to proceed, we consider the pair (SD+600 / RANGE ENL ), for which two reasonable alternatives were identified: A34 and A36. Each of them is opposed by several Stakeholders, but only the Ticino Parks are opposed to both, and so it is for these Stakeholders that least-bad alternatives must be identified. Following the procedure, first the Stakeholders that support these two alternatives are asked to define their acceptability thresholds (Step 1). In response, the values reported in Table 13.8 are obtained. On the basis of these thresholds, the set As of the alternatives that satisfy them is identified: it proves to be empty. To identify the least-bad alternatives it is thus necessary to enlarge the set As ; this is done by not considering in turn one or more of the most critical acceptability thresholds, which are those for the Upstream Environment, Irrigation and ENEL Power sector. The aim is to identify at least one set As that is not empty (Step 2). When only one of the three thresholds is not considered, the set As remains empty. Thus it is necessary not to consider at least two of them and the following cases are obtained: • When the Upstream Environment and ENEL Power thresholds are not considered, the set As contains the alternative A81. After examining its performances, the Ticino Parks declare that they would tolerate this alternative (Step 3). This alternative is supported by the Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno and the Lake Navigation Company; accepted by the Irrigation Consortiums and the GRAIA Society; and opposed by the Bolle di Magadino Foundation and ENEL (Step 4). • When the Irrigation and ENEL Power thresholds are not considered, the set As contains several alternatives, all of which are characterized by a regulation policy obtained with the same weights as A36 and by MEF values higher than 13 m3 /s. Of these alternatives, the Parks prefer A112 (Step 3). This alternative is supported by the Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno, the Lake Navigation Company and the
312
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP Table 13.9. The characteristics of the least-bad alternatives Alternative
A7 A18 A168 A81 A122 A110 A112
SD
ACT ACT
+600 +600 +600 +600 +600
RANGE
ACT ACT ACT ENL ENL ENL ENL
Weights
MEF
13CON 13CON 25MOD 13CON 20MOD 25MOD 25MOD
λfl
λirr
λenv
0.00 0.01 0.99 0.60 0.60 0.55 0.98
0.99 0.98 0.01 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.01
Bolle di Magadino Foundation; accepted by the GRAIA Society, and is opposed by the Irrigation Consortiums and ENEL (Step 4). • When the Irrigation and Upstream Environment thresholds are not considered, the set As is empty. • When all three of the thresholds are not considered, the set As contains various alternatives, among which the Parks prefer A110 and A122. Both these alternatives are supported by the Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno and the Lake Navigation Company; accepted by the GRAIA Society; and opposed by the Bolle di Magadino Foundation and ENEL. The Irrigation Consortia are opposed to the first and accept the second (Step 4). We proceeded in a similar way for the other two classes of reasonable alternatives, obtaining the alternatives A7, A18 and A168. The least-bad alternatives are those listed in Table 13.9 and the Stakeholders position themselves with respect to them as described in Table 13.10. These alternatives will be subjected to the phase of Mitigation, described in the next chapter, along with the reasonable alternatives listed in Table 13.6.
SD
CUR
RANGE
MEF
Alternative
13CON
A7
CUR
CUR
+600
Support Bolle di Magadino Foundation
Bolle di Magadino Foundation 13CON
A18
25MOD
A168
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company
13CON
A81
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company
20MOD
A122
25MOD
A110
25MOD
A112
ENL
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company Bolle di Magadino Foundation
Stakeholders Oppose Tolerate GRAIA Society Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno East Sesia Consortium Ticino Parks Lake Navigation Company East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company GRAIA Society East Sesia Consortium Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Ticino Parks East Ticino Consortium Lake Navigation Company ENEL Company GRAIA Society Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks ENEL Company East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium GRAIA Society Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks East Sesia Consortium ENEL Company East Ticino Consortium GRAIA Society Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company GRAIA Society Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company GRAIA Society East Sesia Consortium Ticino Parks East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company Accept
13.3 T HE LEAST- BAD ALTERNATIVES
Table 13.10. The positions of the Stakeholders with respect to the least-bad alternatives
313
13.1
Designing the alternatives
The aim of the second design step (Section 5.4.2) is to generate new alternatives that could get a wider agreement than the reasonable alternatives identified so far; this will be ascertained through a second step of negotiations. The new alternatives (black dots in Figure 13.2) are sought in the neighbourhood of the reasonable alternatives Area that were identified in the first step (grey dots surrounded by a circle in Figure 13.2). Two types of alternatives are designed in the second step: • alternatives characterized by the same combination of structural and normative actions as Area ; • alternatives characterized by the same stage–discharge relation and regulation range as Area , but with a higher MEF value. When designing the first group of alternatives, we explore the same decision space that was explored in the first design step but with a higher resolution. Thereby these alternatives are obtained by solving the same (Optimal) Control Problem as the one used to design the alternatives of Area , except for the weights assigned to the objectives, which are slightly different. They will be chosen by taking account of information that has been acquired in the first negotiation step. Let us consider, for example, alternative A34, which is one of the reasonable alternatives identified in the first step and was designed with the weights λfl = 0.99
λirr = 0.01
λenv = 0
We know that the Ticino Parks and the Bolle di Magadino Foundation are opposed to it. In order to find an alternative in the neighbourhood of A34 that might be accepted by these opposers, the value of λenv must be increased, but this is only possible if the weight of another sector is reduced.1 To choose the new value for λenv , remember that in the first design step 1 The sum of the weights must always be equal to one.
301
302
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP
Figure 13.1: The steps for identifying the reasonable alternatives. The highlighted steps are the ones whose results are described in this chapter.
13.1 D ESIGNING THE ALTERNATIVES
303
Figure 13.2: The alternatives designed in the second step are indicated by black dots.
the same combination that characterizes A34, namely (SD+600 /RANGE ENL /13CON ) was also used to design alternative A36, with the following weights λfl = 0.98
λirr = 0.01
λenv = 0.01
Since the Irrigation Consortia (and ENEL) are opposed to it, we understand that, in order to maintain the agreement from the Consortia that was achieved with A34, the increase in λenv cannot be compensated with a reduction in λirr but only in λfl . As for the second group of alternatives, it might be surprising that they have to be characterized by a value of MEF higher than the one of Area even when that alternative does not arouse opposition from Downstream Environment. Observe, however, that the decision space that was not explored in the first design step is the very space that corresponds to the MEF values: an increase in the MEF value might make it possible to modify an alternative that pleases Downstream Environment in the direction required by the opposers, without loosing the agreement of the Ticino Parks. Alternatives of this type are designed by solving Control Problems that were not considered in the previous step and so, in contrast to what happens for the first group, we do not have explicit references for the choice of the weights. However, indications can still be derived from the information that we have already acquired. For example, considering once more the case of alternative A34, one can observe that since the Ticino Parks are opposed to it and they are in favour of an increase in the MEF, it might be reasonable to keep the same weights as the A34, or at the most to vary them very little. The validity of these guesses must still be checked with an analysis of the results obtained. Once the new alternatives have been designed, it is advisable to identify all the alternatives that, from the information in our possession, we know will not be interesting to the opposers, or will be such as to lose the supporters. These alternatives should be immediately eliminated and should not be subjected to the second negotiation step. From the results obtained in the first negotiation step we can, in fact, deduce several conditions for acceptability
304
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP
of the new alternatives. For example, in the neighbourhood of A34, a new alternative A can gain a wider agreement only if: (1) the value of the Downstream Environment sector index that it produces is higher than the one produced by A34, i.e. VEnv_D (A) > VEnv_D (A34) (2) the value of the Irrigation sector index that it produces is higher than the one produced by A0, i.e. VIrr_D (A) > VIrr_D (A0) If one or the other of these conditions were not respected, we are sure that the Stakeholders who are interested in those two sectors would oppose A. Just as we did in the previous chapters, we will describe this procedure in practice, considering the reasonable alternative A34 as an example. We chose it because it allows us to make some interesting observations. For didactic reasons, we will begin the presentation with the alternatives of the second group, starting with the alternatives with time-invariant MEF , and then passing to those with time-variant MEF . In the analysis attention will be paid mostly to the conflict between Irrigation and Downstream Environment, because this conflict must be solved or at least mitigated in order to get a wider agreement. Once this first analysis is concluded we will deal with the alternatives of the first group.
13.1.1
Alternatives with time-invariant MEF
The reader might wonder why it is necessary to design new policies in order to assess the effects of an increase in the MEF: it might seem sufficient that the policies that have already been designed be simulated with different MEF values. Such a procedure would not be correct, however, because the policy obtained as a solution to a Control Problem is efficient for the system subject to the constraints that appear in the formulation of the Problem, but it cannot be if the constraints are modified. Since the MEF is a parameter that defines one of the constraints, when it is varied the policy must be re-designed. Given the pair of actions (SD+600 /RANGE ENL ) with which alternative A34 was designed and the discretization that we adopted for the MEF (Section 5.3.3), we designed the six alternatives described in Table 13.1. Table 13.2 shows the sector index values they produce and, as a comparison, also those produced by the three reasonable alternatives A0, A34 and A36. The first is shown because it is the Stakeholders’ point of reference, the second because it is the alternative whose agreement we hope to broaden, and the third because it is associated to the same pair of actions as A34. Table 13.2 shows that, as we expected, all the new alternatives either increase the Downstream Environment index with respect to A34, or at least do not worsen it. None of the new alternatives is dominated by the others because as the MEF increases the Irrigation index decreases. Alternative A66 produces a value for Irrigation that is lower than the value produced by A0; thus A66 violates the second condition of accessibility and it must be discarded. Since A66 is characterized by a MEF value equal to 30CON and since, as we have just seen, the value for Irrigation decreases as the MEF increases, the unacceptability of A66 reveals that it would be useless to consider MEF values that are higher than 30CON .
13.1 D ESIGNING THE ALTERNATIVES
305
Table 13.1. Characteristics of the alternatives with time-invariant MEF higher than 13 m3 /s Alternative
SD
RANGE
MEF
Weight for Irrigation
A56
+600
ENL
20CON
A58
+600
ENL
20CON
λirr > λA34 irr λirr = λA34 irr
A60
+600
ENL
25CON
λirr > λA34 irr
A62
+600
ENL
25CON
A64
+600
ENL
30CON
λirr = λA34 irr λirr > λA34 irr
A66
+600
ENL
30CON
λirr = λA34 irr
Table 13.2. Sector indices associated to the alternatives with time-invariant MEFs Sector
MEF
13CON
Downstream Environment Irrigation ENEL Power Upstream Environment Upstream Flooding
[m3 /s]
20CON
25CON
30CON
20CON
25CON
30CON
A0
A34
A36
A58
A62
A66
A56
A60
A64
0.16 0.61 0.85 0.26 0.09
0.06 0.74 0.83 0.27 0.70
0.15 0.60 0.70 0.47 0.69
0.07 0.68 0.82 0.26 0.70
0.07 0.62 0.81 0.26 0.70
0.08 0.56 0.80 0.26 0.70
0.06 0.73 0.83 0.22 0.68
0.06 0.68 0.82 0.22 0.68
0.06 0.61 0.81 0.22 0.66
Alternatives A58 and A62 bring about a decrease in the Irrigation index with respect to A34. In particular, the value produced by A62 is just a little higher than the value produced by A0, despite the fact that A62 was designed giving Irrigation the same weight λirr that was used when designing A34. We inferred that if a lower weight were used, alternatives that violate the second condition of acceptability would be designed and so no attempts were made in this direction. The three remaining alternatives (A56, A60 and A64) were designed giving Irrigation a higher weight than in A34. All three are dominated by alternative A34 and so they are not interesting, as well as being unacceptable because they violate the first condition (the Downstream Environment index is not higher than that produced by A34). By observing the release trajectories produced by the new alternatives, we understood that an increase in the weight λirr causes an increase in the number of days that the flow in the Ticino is equal to the MEF. Since the latter is time-invariant, this means that the flow in the Ticino stays the same for long periods and the seasonal fluctuations that characterize the natural regime are absent. The distance between regulated and natural regime thus remains the same as for A34, even though the value of the MEF was increased. In conclusion, by adopting time-invariant MEFs, alternatives that increase the Downstream Environment index are obtained, but at the expense of the Irrigation index. Of the alternatives designed, only A58 and A62 are acceptable, even if the Downstream Environment index remains lower than that produced by A0 and its increase with respect to A34 is very small. As we have just noted, this might be due to the fact that the presence of a time-invariant MEF induces long periods of constant flow in the Ticino. A more significant
306
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP Table 13.3. Characteristics of the alternatives with time-variant (modulated) MEF Alternative
SD
RANGE
MEF
Weight for Irrigation
A72
+600
ENL
20MOD
A74
+600
ENL
20MOD
λirr > λA34 irr λirr = λA34 irr
A76
+600
ENL
25MOD
A78
+600
ENL
25MOD
λirr > λA34 irr λirr = λA34 irr
Table 13.4. Sector indices associated to the alternatives with time-variant (modulated) MEF Sector
MEF
13CON
Downstream Environment Irrigation ENEL Power Upstream Environment Upstream Flooding
[m3 /s]
20CON
20MOD
20CON
20MOD
A0
A34
A36
A58
A74
A62
A78
0.16 0.61 0.85 0.26 0.09
0.06 0.74 0.83 0.27 0.70
0.15 0.60 0.70 0.47 0.69
0.07 0.68 0.82 0.26 0.70
0.07 0.68 0.82 0.26 0.70
0.07 0.62 0.81 0.26 0.70
0.07 0.63 0.81 0.26 0.70
increase in the Downstream Environment index could possibly be obtained with time-variant MEF s, so it is time to put them to the test.
13.1.2
Alternatives with time-variant MEF
To assess the effects of a time-variant MEF (defined in Section 5.3.3 and which we will also term modulated MEF) we designed the four alternatives in Table 13.3. Alternatives A72 and A76 produce values for Downstream Environment that are lower than the value produced by A34 and so they are discarded. This is why they do not appear in Table 13.4, where the indices relative to the other two alternatives (A74 and A78) are reported, along with the indices produced by the two alternatives (A58 and A62) that were introduced in the previous section and the usual three reference alternatives (A0, A34 and A36). From the table it seems that the Downstream Environment index does not increase if we pass from time-invariant to modulated MEF and that the Irrigation index either increases slightly (A78) or does not change (A74). This is certainly not the result that we expected. Nevertheless, a moment’s thought shows why this can happen: if it is possible to increase environmental satisfaction without lowering irrigation satisfaction, then it must also be possible to increase irrigation satisfaction whilst maintaining the same level of environmental satisfaction. For some reason, which we will try to identify, we only found pairs of alternatives that produce the second effect. Alternatives that produce the first effect could certainly be found as well with further explorations. Nevertheless, since the increases in the index that we obtained up to now are very small, it seemed useless to continue the exploration. We will simply note that alternatives A58 and A74 are indistinguishable, while alternative A78 dominates A62. Thus A58 and A62, which are characterized by a time-invariant MEF , are discarded because the alternatives with a modulated MEF are preferable. The reason for this is simple. For each possible MEF value, the water volume that must be released
13.1 D ESIGNING THE ALTERNATIVES
307
Table 13.5. Sector indices associated to the alternatives with 13CON and different weights for Downstream Environment Sector
MEF
[m3 /s]
13CON
Downstream Environment Irrigation ENEL Power Upstream Environment Upstream Flooding
20MOD
25MOD
A0
A34
A36
A71
A81
A82
A74
A78
0.16 0.61 0.85 0.26 0.09
0.06 0.74 0.83 0.27 0.70
0.15 0.60 0.70 0.47 0.69
0.15 0.63 0.71 0.40 0.69
0.14 0.70 0.72 0.26 0.69
0.14 0.67 0.71 0.29 0.70
0.07 0.68 0.82 0.26 0.70
0.07 0.63 0.81 0.26 0.70
into the Ticino over the course of a year is, by construction, the same for both the timeinvariant and the modulated MEF values (see Section 5.3.3). It follows that the modulated MEF guarantees a performance for Downstream Environment that is no worse than the one that would be obtained with the corresponding time-invariant MEF. A time-variant MEF imposes higher releases in the very periods when, in natural regime conditions, more water would be available, which is advantageous with view to a compromise between irrigation and environmental needs. However, since the alternatives that we are considering were all designed giving zero weight to Downstream Environment and a high weight to Irrigation, the entire advantage is acquired by the latter sector. Now it is clear why we did not obtain the result that we expected: the surprising result is produced by the weights, which evidently play a very important role. Therefore, it is mandatory to explore the possibility of increasing the value for Downstream Environment by acting on the weights, i.e. we must explore the alternatives belonging to the first group that was defined in the introduction.
13.1.3
Alternatives oriented to Downstream Environment
The interesting alternatives from the first group are characterized by values of the Downstream Environment weight between the one used for A34 and the one used for A36. In Table 13.5 we show the indices produced by three alternatives (A71, A81 and A82) with these characteristics. In the same table the indices produced by alternatives A74 and A78 are also reported (these are the only acceptable alternatives that have been designed so far), as well as the usual three reference alternatives. The table reveals that if we considered only the Irrigation and Downstream Environment sectors, alternatives A74 and A78 would be dominated by A81 and A82, but such dominance no longer exists if we consider all five sectors. This result definitively confirms that in order to diminish the conflict between Downstream Environment and Irrigation it is more fruitful to act upon the regulation policy (by carefully selecting the weights), rather than introducing normative actions (i.e. imposing a particular MEF). In fact, on the one hand the adoption of a time-invariant MEF imposes an increase in the release at the most critical times for irrigation, and on the other the adoption of a time-variant MEF reduces the conflict but does not completely eliminate it.2 Instead, acting on the regulation policy makes it possible to increase the flow in the Ticino especially in the autumn and winter months, as demonstrated, for example, by Figure 13.3, which compares 2 In the summer period a time-variant MEF imposes lower releases than the corresponding time-invariant MEF, but in the period when the rice paddies are being flooded the time-variant MEF imposes higher releases.
308
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP
Figure 13.3: Release trajectories produced by A34 and A81 and natural outflow trajectory over one year (1984).
the release trajectories produced by A34 and A81 with the natural outflow trajectory over one year (1984). Thus, acting on the regulation policy design through the weights is the best way to mitigate the conflict. Note, however, that the weights should not be modified too much, lest a new conflict with ENEL be generated: the winter period is, in fact, the most critical one for ENEL, because in these months the value of hydropower is higher. Table 13.5 shows that both A81 and A82 produce a value for ENEL Power that is clearly inferior to the ones produced by A74 and A78. In conclusion: starting from the reasonable alternative A34, we obtained five new alternatives (A71, A74, A78, A81 and A82), which will be presented to the second negotiation step. The set of new alternatives is completed by repeating the procedure for all the other reasonable alternatives.
13.1.4
A comment
In this section we have seen that the conflict between Downstream Environment and Irrigation is structural and cannot be solved by increasing the MEF or by modifying the weights in the regulation policy design. The five alternatives that were designed starting from A34 increase the Downstream Environment index a little, but without bringing it up to the value produced by A0. Moreover, these small increments bring about a decrease in the index values for Irrigation and ENEL Power. The space for further compromise is reduced to the slight margin among these five alternatives. The advent of irrigation and hydropower production in an era when very little attention was paid to environmental problems relegated Downstream Environment to a condition of poor satisfaction, from which it is unlikely to
13.2 T HE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP
309
Table 13.6. The reasonable alternatives identified in the second negotiation step Alternative
A0 A119 A54 A34 A36
SD
ACT ACT
+600 +600 +600
RANGE
ACT ACT ACT ENL ENL
Weights
MEF
13CON 25MOD 13CON 13CON 13CON
λfl
λirr
λenv
– 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.98
– 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.01
– 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
escape without lowering the levels of satisfaction to which the Stakeholders interested in Irrigation and ENEL Power have by now become accustomed. The only way to increase the satisfaction of Downstream Environment without disturbing Irrigation and ENEL Power would be to include a modification of irrigation techniques among the actions considered in the Project. For example, it would be interesting to explore the effects of changing from submersion to sprinklers (or to drip irrigation where possible). Alternatives with these characteristics might make it possible to satisfy the Stakeholders interested in Irrigation and, at the same time, to allow for more water to be available to increase the Downstream Environment index, but it is unlikely that they would satisfy ENEL. Clearly, the cost of the transformation would be included among the indicators for Irrigation, and we should also take into account the impact on the landscape that an alternative of this type would provoke, since it would reduce the flow in the canals and in the irrigation ditches. However, the study of these actions exceeds the limits imposed on the Verbano Project and so we will not consider it.
13.2
The second negotiation step
Just as in the first step, negotiations are carried out according to the ENP (page 247). The only difference is that the procedure is no longer re-started as many times as there are Stakeholders, each time beginning from the alternative that one of them prefers, but it is carried out as many times as there are reasonable alternatives identified in the first negotiation step, each time beginning with a different one. In this way the set of alternatives in Table 13.6 is obtained, with respect to which the Stakeholders assume the positions presented in Table 13.7. By comparing these two tables with Tables 12.4 and 12.5, which describe the reasonable alternatives identified in the first negotiation step, one notes that they differ only in the fact that alternative A9 is replaced by alternative A119, which is still supported by the Ticino Parks but, unlike the first, is supported also by the Bolle di Magadino Foundation and accepted by the GRAIA Society (Upstream Fishing sector). This replacement is thus a step forward towards a compromise.
13.3
The least-bad alternatives
As Figure 13.1 shows, the second negotiation step foresees identifying not only the reasonable alternatives but also, if necessary, the least-bad alternatives.
310
Table 13.7. The positions of the Stakeholders with respect to the reasonable alternatives identified in the second negotiation step SD
MEF
Alternative
13CON
A0
Support GRAIA Society ENEL Company
Stakeholders Accept
CUR
25MOD
CUR
+600
GRAIA
Society
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company
GRAIA Society East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company GRAIA Society ENEL Company
A119
13CON
A54
13CON
A34
ENL
13CON
Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks
A36
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company Bolle di Magadino Foundation
GRAIA
Society
Oppose Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company Bolle di Magadino Foundation East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium Ticino Parks Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks
Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks
East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company Ticino Parks
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP
CUR
RANGE
13.3 T HE LEAST- BAD ALTERNATIVES
311
Table 13.8. The acceptability thresholds expressed by the Stakeholders when identifying the least-bad alternatives for the Ticino Parks. The search starts from the reasonable alternatives characterized by the pair (SD+600 /RANGE ENL ) Sectors
Acceptability threshold
Upstream Environment Upstream Fishing Upstream Flooding Mosquitoes Navigation Upstream Tourism Downstream Environment ENEL Power East Sesia Power Irrigation Downstream Tourism
0.40 0.80 0.60 0.55 0.80 0.60 0.00 0.83 0.40 0.70 0.00
More precisely, for each class of alternatives, defined by the same pair (stage–discharge relation/regulation range), we must ascertain whether there are Stakeholders who are opposed to all the alternatives in that class. If there are, the procedure described on page 250 is used to search for an alternative that might be ‘tolerated’, even reluctantly, by the opponent(s). This least-bad alternative will be included among those submitted to the Final Decision phase. As a practical example of how to proceed, we consider the pair (SD+600 / RANGE ENL ), for which two reasonable alternatives were identified: A34 and A36. Each of them is opposed by several Stakeholders, but only the Ticino Parks are opposed to both, and so it is for these Stakeholders that least-bad alternatives must be identified. Following the procedure, first the Stakeholders that support these two alternatives are asked to define their acceptability thresholds (Step 1). In response, the values reported in Table 13.8 are obtained. On the basis of these thresholds, the set As of the alternatives that satisfy them is identified: it proves to be empty. To identify the least-bad alternatives it is thus necessary to enlarge the set As ; this is done by not considering in turn one or more of the most critical acceptability thresholds, which are those for the Upstream Environment, Irrigation and ENEL Power sector. The aim is to identify at least one set As that is not empty (Step 2). When only one of the three thresholds is not considered, the set As remains empty. Thus it is necessary not to consider at least two of them and the following cases are obtained: • When the Upstream Environment and ENEL Power thresholds are not considered, the set As contains the alternative A81. After examining its performances, the Ticino Parks declare that they would tolerate this alternative (Step 3). This alternative is supported by the Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno and the Lake Navigation Company; accepted by the Irrigation Consortiums and the GRAIA Society; and opposed by the Bolle di Magadino Foundation and ENEL (Step 4). • When the Irrigation and ENEL Power thresholds are not considered, the set As contains several alternatives, all of which are characterized by a regulation policy obtained with the same weights as A36 and by MEF values higher than 13 m3 /s. Of these alternatives, the Parks prefer A112 (Step 3). This alternative is supported by the Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno, the Lake Navigation Company and the
312
C HAPTER 13. C OMPARISON : THE SECOND NEGOTIATION STEP Table 13.9. The characteristics of the least-bad alternatives Alternative
A7 A18 A168 A81 A122 A110 A112
SD
ACT ACT
+600 +600 +600 +600 +600
RANGE
ACT ACT ACT ENL ENL ENL ENL
Weights
MEF
13CON 13CON 25MOD 13CON 20MOD 25MOD 25MOD
λfl
λirr
λenv
0.00 0.01 0.99 0.60 0.60 0.55 0.98
0.99 0.98 0.01 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.01
Bolle di Magadino Foundation; accepted by the GRAIA Society, and is opposed by the Irrigation Consortiums and ENEL (Step 4). • When the Irrigation and Upstream Environment thresholds are not considered, the set As is empty. • When all three of the thresholds are not considered, the set As contains various alternatives, among which the Parks prefer A110 and A122. Both these alternatives are supported by the Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno and the Lake Navigation Company; accepted by the GRAIA Society; and opposed by the Bolle di Magadino Foundation and ENEL. The Irrigation Consortia are opposed to the first and accept the second (Step 4). We proceeded in a similar way for the other two classes of reasonable alternatives, obtaining the alternatives A7, A18 and A168. The least-bad alternatives are those listed in Table 13.9 and the Stakeholders position themselves with respect to them as described in Table 13.10. These alternatives will be subjected to the phase of Mitigation, described in the next chapter, along with the reasonable alternatives listed in Table 13.6.
SD
CUR
RANGE
MEF
Alternative
13CON
A7
CUR
CUR
+600
Support Bolle di Magadino Foundation
Bolle di Magadino Foundation 13CON
A18
25MOD
A168
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company
13CON
A81
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company
20MOD
A122
25MOD
A110
25MOD
A112
ENL
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company
Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Lake Navigation Company Bolle di Magadino Foundation
Stakeholders Oppose Tolerate GRAIA Society Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno East Sesia Consortium Ticino Parks Lake Navigation Company East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company GRAIA Society East Sesia Consortium Municipalities of Verbania and Locarno Ticino Parks East Ticino Consortium Lake Navigation Company ENEL Company GRAIA Society Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks ENEL Company East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium GRAIA Society Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks East Sesia Consortium ENEL Company East Ticino Consortium GRAIA Society Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company GRAIA Society Bolle di Magadino Foundation Ticino Parks East Sesia Consortium East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company GRAIA Society East Sesia Consortium Ticino Parks East Ticino Consortium ENEL Company Accept
13.3 T HE LEAST- BAD ALTERNATIVES
Table 13.10. The positions of the Stakeholders with respect to the least-bad alternatives
313