Chapter Ten Aging and Everyday Cognitive Abilities

Aging and Cognition: Knowledge Organization and Utilization Thomas M. Hess (Editor) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1990

CHAPTER TEN

AGING AND EVERYDAY COGNITNE ABILITIES Steven W.Cornelius Cornell University

SUMMARY

In this chapter, recent work on everyday cognitive abilities in adults and the elderly is reviewed. Despite substantial theory and data that have been generated in the study of intellectual aging, there has been a recurrent concern that traditional paradigms for assessing intellectual abilities are insensitive to cognitive skills adults use in adapting to the demands of everyday life. In the first section, we examine how this concern has been paralleled by recent studies of people's implicit theories of intelligence. Implicit theories refer to people's ideas and beliefs about intelligence and how it changes across the life span. Findings show that people have distinct concepts of everyday and academic intelligence, and they believe that facets of everyday intelligence become increasingly salient, especially in middle age and late adulthood. In the second section, research on adults' selfconceptions of intelligence and conceptions of ability tests is discussed. The findings underscore the multidimensional nature of everyday intelligence and highlight the distinct importance of practical and social cognitive abilities in conceptions of everyday intelligence. In the third section, two tasks recently developed to assess adults' strategic knowledge about solutions to problems in everyday and stressful situations are described. Results show differences and similarities between performance on everyday and traditional ability

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tests and suggest the potential for growth in everyday cognitive abilities during adulthood. Research on intelligence has been a focal point of scientific inquiry in the psychology of aging for more than 70 years (e.g., Dixon, Kramer, & Baltes, 1985:Woodruff, 1983). Initially, much of the research focused on age-related declines in functioning. However, more work has appeared during recent decades which qualifies conclusions about general and universal decline. Indeed, it now appears that whether intelligence declines, remains stable, or increases with age depends on which aspect of intelligence is examined. Findings that have emerged from research on intellectual aging suggest that intelligence is a multidimensional construct, and cognitive changes during adulthood involve a n interplay between decline. stability, and growth (e.g.. Denney. 1982; Labouvie-Vief, 1985;Staudinger. Cornelius, & Baltes, 1989). A number of researchers have argued that the characteristics of tests differ for measures that do and do not show age-related decrement (e.g., Cornelius, 1984). One common observation is that ability tests that show increments or are stable with age involve more familiar content or skills than ability tests that exhibit age decrements with increasing age. For example, Anastasi (1968) suggested that 'Whether intelligence test scores rise or decline with increasing age in adulthood depends largely on what experiences the individual undergoes during those years and on the relationships between these experiences and the functions covered by these tests" (p. 294). Likewise, Botwinick (1977)argued that verbal ability tests apparently measure "the manipulation of familiar material in familiar ways" whereas nonverbal or performance ability tests measure "the manipulation of unfamiliar materials, perhaps in unfamiliar ways" (p. 588). More recently, Denney (1982)proposed that abilities that are relevant to adults' experiences and "optimally exercised" may remain relatively constant in adulthood, whereas "unexercised abilities" may decline as a function of disuse and lack of practice. These perspectives raise fundamental questions about the nature of intelligence in adulthood and its assessment. More than thirty years ago, Demming and Pressey (1957)issued a critique of

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traditional methods of ability assessment in research on intellectual aging. They argued that tests commonly used in research were inappropriate for the assessment of intellectual functioning in adulthood because many tests were adapted to a large extent from instruments designed for children and youth to predict academic performance. They suggested that adult ability assessment should focus on the skills and knowledge that adults use to function in everyday living. Since their critique, other gerontologists (e.g., Schaie. 1978; Scheidt, 1981: Willis & Baltes, 1980) have reiterated concern about traditional measures with special attention devoted to issues of external and ecological validity. During the recent decade, there has been growing interest in everyday cognitive abilities a s evidenced by an increasing number of investigations examining everyday or practical problem solving, practical intelligence, a s well as cognitive skills in particular domains of everyday functioning (e.g., Cavanaugh, Kramer, Sinnott, Camp, & Markley, 1985: Frederiksen. 1986; Kuhn. Pennington, & Leadbeater. 1983; Poon, Rubin, & Wilson. in press; Sinnott, 1989a: Sternberg & Wagner, 1986). Much of the recent work h a s originated from contextual models of intellectual development (e.g., Berg & Sternberg. 1985: Ceci. 1990: Dixon & Baltes, 1986; Labouvie-Vief. 1985). Although there is some diversity in how contextual theorists define intelligence, contextual models seem to concur in viewing intelligence a s consisting of the mental activities that enable individuals to adapt successfully to their environment (e.g.. Berg, 1989; Labouvie-Vief. 1985: Staudinger et al.. 1989; Sternberg, 1985a). The purpose of the present chapter is to review some recent work in the study of everyday intelligence and cognition in adulthood and old age. As is the case for other domains of psychological inquiry, researchers have adopted both implicit and explicit approaches in the study of everyday intelligence. In the first section, we address the question of what intelligence is by examining people’s implicit theories or mental representations of the concept of intelligence. In doing so, our aim is to elucidate the attributes that people believe characterize intelligent functioning with special attention to such functioning in everyday contexts.

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Moreover, implicit theories of adult intellectual development highlight the central role of everyday intellectual competence in defining intelligence during the latter part of the life span. In the second section, research conducted in our laboratory examining everyday cognitive abilities in adulthood and old age from an implicit approach is reviewed. This research has focused on adults' self-conceptions of everyday intelligence and its relation to objective test performance, and the correspondence between people's ideas about the characteristics associated with exceptional performance on ability tests and their relation to psychologists' conception of everyday intelligence. In the third section. an explicit approach to the assessment of everyday cognitive abilities is described. Results from two experiments we have performed to examine everyday problem solving and adults' knowledge about adaptive responses to stressful situations are discussed as illustrative of two key facets of everyday intelligence. The findings demonstrate differences and similarities between everyday cognitive abilities and traditional measures of verbal and problem-solving abilities and emphasize the potential for growth in everyday cognitive abilities during adulthood. IMPLICIT THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

Implicit theories are concerned with people's ideas and beliefs about psychological functioning, and such theories reflect how people construct and mentally represent psychological concepts. Explicit theories, on the other hand. involve scientists' constructions of concepts to describe or explain psychological phenomena. Implicit and explicit theories differ in the type of data one views as the basis for examining psychological functioning. In implicit theories, the data of interest focus on people's communications about their beliefs regarding the psychological construct of interest. By contrast, explicit theories are based on people's performance on tasks or tests that are presumed to measure psychological functioning. Implicit theories are important for understanding psychological constructs because explicit theories frequently are derived from implicit theories of a construct. Particularly at

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initial points in inquiry, implicit theories provide a framework for the development of explicit theories because they aid in articulating some basic conceptual dimensions for investigation (e.g., Sternberg, 1985a). For example, in the domain of personality, people’s implicit theories have been useful in developing a taxonomy of dimensions (e.g.. McCrae & Costa, 1985). From a contextual perspective, implicit theories are significant because they help clarify how people in a given sociocultural context define a particular psychological construct. Prototypic Conceptions of Everyday and Academic Intelligence The concept of intelligence is frequently used in social discourse to describe a major component of human personality and functioning (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1985). Natural language provides a means for communication about intellectual characteristics with descriptors available for describing desirable (e.g., logical, knowledgeable. wise) and undesirable (e.g., confused, absentminded, forgetful) aspects of cognitive functioning (e.g., Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes. 1989). People’s judgments about intelligence can reflect different foci depending on whether a person evaluates one’s own or another person’s abilities (e.g.. Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984). In either case, the judgment one reaches about how intelligent an individual is may depend on the extent to which an individual’s behavior resembles an ideal or prototypic concept of an intelligent person (e.g.. Neisser. 1979). From this perspective, different individuals might be viewed to be of comparable intelligence but could resemble an ideal prototype along different dimensions. Despite the importance of the concept of intelligence in self and interpersonal evaluations, relatively little systematic research has been conducted on the content or structure of people’s prototypic conceptions of intelligence. Recently, Stemberg and his colleagues (Sternberg, 1985b: Sternberg & Berg, 1987; Sternberg, Conway. Ketron. & Bernstein. 1981) reported a series of investigations exploring people’s implicit theories of intelligence. In their initial work (Stemberg et al. 1981).people were surveyed about behaviors they thought were indicative of intelligence. Afterwards, experts

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(i.e, psychologists conducting research on intelligence) and laypersons (Lealadults without formal training in psychology) rated the extent to which .each of these behaviors characterized their ideal concepts of "everyday intelligence" and "academic intelligence". Sternberg et al. (1981) found some important differences between these concepts of intelligence that appear to reflect a sensitivity or awareness to the context-specific nature of intelligent functioning, Experts and laypersons endorsed similar ideas about the behaviors characterizing these concepts, but both groups attributed different characteristics to everyday and academic intelligence. For example, when the profiles of attributes characterizing each of these concepts were examined. experts' and laypersons' judgments were quite similar about behaviors that were most and least characteristic of everyday intelligence (r = .81) as well as academic intelligence (r = .89).They also made a meaningful distinction between conceptions of intelligence in everyday and academic settings. The profiles for everyday and academic intelligence showed only a moderate degree of similarity within each group (for experts, r = .43: for laypersons, r = .45). Thus, the behaviors that people believe are most characteristic of a n intelligent person in everyday settings dif€er from those they think characterize exceptional intelligence in an academic context. Differences in the content of people's mental representations of everyday and academic intelligence were clarified by factor analyses of the ratings for these concepts. Analyses of experts' ratings for everyday intelligence revealed three dimensions involving Practical Problem-Solving Ability (e.g., "seeks explanations and causes", "sees individual elements in their overall context", "perceives implied assumptions and conclusions"), Practical Adaptive Behavior (e.g., "able to cope with crises", "acts in a practical manner", "sizes up situations well"), and Social Competence (e.g., "displays common sense". "able to cope with everyday environment", "has good intuitions"). By comparison, analyses of experts' ratings for academic intelligence indicated dimensions of Problem-Solving Ability (e.g., "solves problems well". "makes good decisions". "gets to the heart of problems"). Verbal Ability (e.g., "is verbally fluent", "reads widely".

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"communicates ideas well"), and Motivation (e.g., "displays dedication and motivation in chosen pursuits". "displays persistence", "studies hard'). These results suggest that the ability to solve problems is an important dimension that underlies concepts of both everyday and academic intelligence. The relative salience of other types of behaviors differs for these two concepts. In particular, experts believe that being able to adapt successfully to crises and to engage in competent interpersonal functioning are more characteristic of an ideally intelligent person in an everyday context, whereas verbal abilities and heightened motivation to acquire knowledge are more salient for intelligent functioning in academic settings. Implicit Theories of Adult Intellectual Development Because there is a shift in the contexts that adults encounter a s they complete their formal education in youth and then experience transitions in work and family roles, people's ideas about the nature and meaning of intelligence might be expected to change in ways that reflect such transitions. Thus, an important question is whether people believe that intelligence is manifest differently as individuals move through the life course. In the present section, three types of evidence are reviewed: (a) adults' beliefs about changes in psychological functioning during adulthood, (b) prototypic conceptions of intelligence across adulthood, and (c) adults' perceptions of changes in their own cognitive abilities. In general, findings from this research show that people believe that abilities reflective of everyday intelligence assume increasing importance, particularly in middle age and later life. Results emerging from research on people's conceptions of psychological change in adulthood indicate that adults perceive adult development to involve multidirectional changes in which both gains and losses in functioning coexist (e.g., Heckhausen & Baltes. 1989; Heckhausen et al.. 1989). Heckhausen et al. (1989) asked young, middle-aged, and older adults to rate an extensive set of psychological attributes on three dimensions: (a) the extent to which an attribute increased with age, (b) the desirability of the

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attribute, and (c)the ages at which change was expected to begin and end. The dominant finding was that people perceived an increasing number of losses (i.e.. increases in undesirable attributes) and a decreasing number of gains (Lee,an increase with age in desirable attributes) for most domains of psychological functioning across adulthood. For example. there was a strong negative correlation (r = -.68)between the perceived desirability of attributes and the expected age of onset. Thus. increasing mean ages for the beginning of developmental change were associated with fewer and less desirable changes and more and more undesirable changes. Moreover, results of this study showed substantial consensus among adults from different age groups especially about their expectations of the desirability and timing of change. Focusing only on the results for the intellectual characteristics examined in this study, the dominant flnding indicated that people believe that increases in undesirable attributes (e.g., forgetful, slow, overcautious) begin in later adulthood, whereas increases in desirable attributes (e.g., intelligent, logical, knowledgeable) begin in early adulthood. There were some clear exceptions to this general trend, however. Heckhausen et al. (1989)also found that people believe that some desirable intellectual attributes--for example, being experienced, knowledgeable about human nature, or wise--increase with age in adulthood. In addition, people expected increases on such attributes to be most likely to begin in middle age and to continue until some time in old age. Evidence from the investigation of implicit theories of adult intellectual development also shows that people think everyday intellectual abilities become more salient in adulthood. Sternberg and Berg (1987)examined people's prototypic concepts of intelligence for early adulthood, middle age, and late adulthood. In their study, adults. who ranged in age from 26 to 85. rated how likely it would be for individuals of average and exceptional intelligence at ages 30. 50, and 70 to display behavioral characteristics that had been nominated as indicative of adult intelligence. Data were factor analyzed for each target age. Results revealed three factors for each target age. The factors for target age 30 were: (a) Novelty in Problem Solving, (b) Crystallized

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Intelligence, and (c) Everyday Competence. The factors for target age 50 were: (a) Novelty in Problem Solving, (b) Everyday Competence, and (cl Social Competence. The factors for target age 70 were: (a) Composite Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence, (b) Everyday Competence, and (c) Cognitive Investment. The findings suggest that the behavioral attributes people use to characterize exceptional intelligence for middle-aged or older adults differ to some extent from those characterizing intellectual functioning for younger adults. In particular, Everyday Competence was a significant dimension underlying people's prototypic concepts for each target age, but the variance accounted for by this factor was greater for older than younger prototypes. Substantively, the dimension of Everyday Competence was identified by behaviors involving adapting well to the environment, being perceptive about people and things, and adjusting to difficult life situations (Sternberg & Berg. 1987). Everyday competence may assume increasing importance in people's ideas about intellectual functioning for older ages because of the overlap between people's concepts of intelligence and wisdom (e.g., Sternberg, 1985b). In particular, intelligent functioning in middle or late adulthood may be manifest by a person who has acquired from experience an elaborate system of knowledge about life. Such knowledge may be reflected in an appreciation of uncertainties that occur in life course development and a sensitivity to contextual influences that moderate and shape pathways during adult life Ie.g., Baltes & Smith, in press). If this knowledge is implemented, it may be reflected in sound, effective. or practical judgments about the conduct of life particularly during transitions involving normative or non-normative developmental tasks (e.g., Smith, Dixon. & Baltes. in press). In addition to ideal conceptions of adult intellectual development, research examining older adults' retrospective evaluations of changes in their own intellectual functioning suggests that people perceive an improvement in everyday cognitive abilities. Williams. Denney. and Schadler (1983)interviewed older adults and asked them whether they had experienced changes in their memory and problem-solving abilities. They found that the majority of adults believed that their memory abilities had

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declined with age. By contrast, they also found that most older adults believed that their abilities to think, reason, and solve problems had improved with age. The perceptions expressed by older adults contrast shaiply with much research on problem solving that has consistently indicated age-related declines in performance on a number of problem-solving tasks (e.g., Denney, 1982; Reese & Rodeheaver, 1985). Further probing, however, revealed that the majority of older adults referred to their ability to solve everyday and financial problems rather than to the types of problems used by researchers in traditional problem-solving tasks. Similar evidence was obtained by Birren (1969) in an interview study of adults about decision making. He found that adults perceived changes in the strategies they used in making decisions in their work lives (also see Streufert & Streufert, 1978). The interviews indicated that changes in solving everyday problems might occur because people defined their problems dLfferently resulting from the additional experience they had accumulated from early to middle adulthood. For example, many respondents noted that problems had become easier to deal with because the intensity of their emotional reactions to situations had diminshed. In addition, the internews revealed that people perceived that their goals had changed and might continue to change in the future. Furthermore, adults expressed the belief that their strategies in making decisions were influenced by efforts to compensate for psychological changes accompanying aging. In combination, research on people's implicit theories of intelligence reveals four key findings. First. adults with and without formal training in psychology hold similar ideas about the meaning of intelligence. Although there are some daerences in the content and structure of these concepts among various groups, there is also a rather striking degree of agreement about the attributes people believe are indicative of exceptional intellectual functioning. Second, people's conceptions of intelligence are multifaceted and reflect multiple dimensions of intellectual functioning. Problem-solving and verbal abilities emerge a s salient dimensions in experts' concept of academic intelligence, and these dimensions seem to correspond well to abilities that have been identified in several explicit psychological theories, such as

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dmerential theories of intelligence (e.g., Cattell, 1971; Horn. 1982; Thurstone, 1935). Third, people's conceptions of intelligence also appear to be richer in scope than the domains of abilities represented in most explicit theories of intelligence (however. see Gardner, 1983; Sternberg. 1985a). In particular, adults accord greater recognition to practical and social cognitive abilities especially in their beliefs about everyday intelligence. Practical intelligence is marked by a n interest and awareness in the immediate environment and world at large, the ability to appraise situations well, and skill in devising means to attain one's goals. Social competence is associated with effective interpersonal behavior, acknowledgment of one's errors, engaging in socially appropriate behavior. and displaying concern about social issues. Finally, practical and social cognitive abilities appear to be central to people's ideas about changes in adult intellectual competence, especially changes in functioning during middle age and later adulthood. These ideas are reflected in the expectation that there is a potential for growth extending into old age in everyday intellectual abilities, and older adults' perception of improvements in their ability to solve practical problems and make decisions. EVERYDAY COGNITIVE ABILITIES: AN IMPLICIT APPROACH Implicit theories of intelligence. especially findings concerning people's prototypic conceptions (Sternberg et al.. 1981).influenced our initial efforts to examine everyday cognitive abilities. This research was directed toward two major issues. One issue has focused on the possible growth of everyday cognitive abilities in adulthood suggested by people's implicit theories a s well a s theoretical models of adult cognitive development (e.g., Dixon & Baltes. 1986: Labouvie-Vief, 1982; Schaie. 1977/ 1978). The second issue centered on the question of similarities and dflerences between everyday cognitive abilities and traditional abilities. In the following sections, we describe the results of two experiments investigating everyday intelligence from an implicit approach. In the first study, we examined adults' self-conceptions of intelligence

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and their relation to performance on standard ability tests. In the second experiment, an investigation of the kinds of ability tests people believe are indicative of everyday intelligence is reported. Experiment 1: Self-conceptions of Intelligence Neisser (1979) argued that a person may be considered intelligent to the degree that his or her behavior corresponds to attributes that characterize a prototypic or ideal concept of intelligence. Following this orientation, Sternberg et al. (198 1) examined the relation between adults' self-conception of behavior and experts' prototypes of everyday and academic intelligence. They found that people's self-conceptions resembled both prototypes. but they were more similar to experts' characterization of everyday than academic intelligence. In addition, performance on a verbal measure of intelligence was more highly related to people's self-conception of academic intelligence (r = .56) than to their self-conception of everyday intelligence ( r = .45). The prototype resemblance paradigm was adopted in our work (Cornelius et al., 1989) to explore adults' self-conceptions of intelligence. The experiment had two major objectives. The first was to determine whether the correspondence between adults' beliefs about their abilities and prototypic concepts of academic and everyday intelligence were related to age and education-two factors that have shown considerable importance in the analysis of objective test performance. The second objective was to investigate relations between performance on standard ability tests and adults' self-conceptions of their intellectual functioning. Based on arguments (e.g., Willis & Baltes. 1980)that traditional tests are less representative of everyday than academic kinds of cognitive abilities. it was expected that objectively measured performance would be less related to adults' self-conception of everyday intelligence. In the study, young, middle-aged, and elderly adults between the ages of 20 and 89 were administered an abridged version of the questionnaire compiled by Sternberg et al. (1981). Participants rated how characteristic each behavior was of themselves on a seven-point scale (1 = highly uncharacteristic, 7 = highly

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characteristic). Self-concept measures of everyday and academic intelligence were then obtained by computing correlations between each individual's response pattern and experts' profile of ratings for prototypes of everyday and academic intelligence. The possible range of scores was from - 1.OO to + 1.OO with higher positive scores indicating closer resemblance between an individual's self-concept and the pattern of qualities characterizing an ideal prototype. In general, participants' self-conceptions were more similar to experts' concept of everyday intelligence (M= .31.SD = .2 1) than academic intelligence (M= .18, SD = .21). Individual differences in self-conceptions of intelligence were quite large. however: For everyday intelligence, scores ranged from -.21 to .71.and for academic intelligence, scores ranged from -.22 to .62.

Relations between self-conceptionsof intelligence, age, and education. To address the first objective of the experiment. analyses were conducted to examine the relation between age, education, and the self-concept measures of everyday and academic intelligence. The findings are depicted in Figure 1. Mean scares on the prototype similarity measures of everyday and academic intelligence are shown for three age groups (Young adults, M age = 25.6 years; Middle-aged adults, M age = 49.4 years: Old adults, M age = 70.7 years) and for adults with lower (High school diploma or less education) vs. higher (More than a high school diploma) levels of education. The findings shown in Figure 1 emphasize that the extent to which age and education are related to self-conceptions of intelligence differs for self-concept measures of everyday and academic intelligence. In particular, age was not related to selfconceptions of everyday intelligence, whereas self-conceptions of academic intelligence declined with increasing age. In addition, self-conceptions of everyday intelligence were somewhat higher for adults with higher levels of education, but self-conceptions of academic intelligence were much higher for adults with higher levels of education.

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0.4,

IYOUNG MIDDLGAGEI)

HOLD

EVERYDAY ACADEMIC SELF- CONCEPTION OF INTELLIGENCE

1 LOW EDUCATION 1 HIGH EDUCATION

EVERYDAY ACADEMIC SELF- CONCEPTION OF INTELLIGENCE

Figure 1. Self-conceptions of everyday and academic intelligence by age and educational background.

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Regression analyses performed with age and education as predictors of self-conceptions of intelligence clarified these findings. Results showed that these variables accounted for less variance in self-conceptions of everyday intelligence (R2=.12) than academic intelligence (R2= .34).For everyday intelligence, age was not a signlficant predictor [D = .02) but education was significant [D = .34,p < .01). For academic intelligence, both age CD = -.30.p < .01) and education (D = .54,p < .01) were significant predictors. In addition to the prototypic resemblance measures, a factor analysis was conducted to examine dimensions underlying people's self-conceptions of intelligence. Four factors were extracted with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor was indicative of problem-soluing ability. It included high loadings on items associated with objectivity, quality of problem solving, and task persistence. The second factor was associated with uerbal intelligence and knowledge. It was loaded highly by behaviors indicative of communicative competence, verbal facility, and curiosity. The third factor comprised behavioral qualities associated with practical intelligence and social competence. It was loaded highly by variables indicative of common sense, acceptance of social conventions, ethical judgment, and interpersonal competence. The fourth factor represented facets of motivation It was loaded highly by variables such as self-appraisal. goalorientation, and achievement. The relationship between age and self-conceptions of intellectual functioning differed depending on the dimension examined. Figure 2 displays the main results. There was an increase with age in self-assessments of practical intelligence ( r = .32). By contrast, participants' age displayed negative but insignificant relationships with self-concept measures of problem solving (r = -.08), verbal intelligence (r = -.04), and motivation ( r = .02). Self-assessments on these dimensions also showed differential relationships with participants' educational background. Education was positively correlated with self-assessed problem solving (r = .25) and verbal intelligence (r = .32).but it was not related to self-assessed practical intelligence (r = -.04)or motivation ( r = .06).

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0

i - . -.14

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SOLVING

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INTELLIGENCE YObG

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PRACIlCAL INTELLIGENCE

8 MOTIVATlON

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FYgure 2. Assessments of problem solving, verbal intelligence, practical

intelligence, and motivation by age.

These findings are partially consistent with previous literature suggesting that people perceive an increase in everyday cognitive abilities during adulthood. Self-assessments on the dimension of practical intelligence showed an increase with age. However, age was not related to the prototype similarity measure of everyday intelligence. These findings may occur because prototypes of intelligence are multifaceted and reflect several dimensions. Correlations between prototypic measures and self-ratings (i.e., factor scores) on specific dimensions showed that self-conceptions of everyday intelligence were positively correlated not only with self-ratings of practical intelligence and social competence ( r = .60) but also self-ratings of problem solving ability ( r = .54). verbal intelligence and knowledge ( r = .50),and motivation ( r = .38).By comparison, self-conceptions of academic intelligence were unrelated to self-ratings of practical intelligence (r = -.lo), but positively related to ratings on the dimensions of problem solving ( r = .64). verbal intelligence ( r = .61)and motivation (r = -21).

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Relations between self-conceptionsof tntellfgence and ability test performance In order to examine the relation between self-concept measures of intelligence and objective test performance, seven ability tests were administered to participants. Nonverbal tests included measures of inductive reasoning (Letter Series. Blieszner et al., 1981; and Letter Sets. Blieszner et al., 1981) and logical classification (Figural Relations Matrices, Plemons, Willis & Baltes. 1978). Verbal measures of analogical reasoning (Verbal Analogies: Guilford, 19691, vocabulary [Verbal Meaning: Thurstone, 1962). practical judgment (Comprehension subtest of the WAIS, Wechsler, 1955). and social judgment (Social Situations test, Horn & Cattell. 1966)were also administered. Table 1 lists correlations between objective test performance and self-concept measures of intelligence. The first two columns show that objectively measured abilities are significantly related to self-concept measures of everyday and academic intelligence, but the correlations are consistently higher with academic intelligence, The only exception to this general pattern occurs for the Social Situations test which shows a higher correlation with self-conceptions of everyday intelligence than it does with academic intelligence. The correlations between objective performance and self-conceptions are comparable with those reported in other research (e.g.. Cornelius & Caspi. 1986: McCrae & Costa, 1985; Sternberg. 1985b; Sternberg et al., 1981; Willis & Schaie, 1986). In the third through sixth columns of Table 1, correlations between ability performance and self-ratings on specific ability dimensions are listed. As expected, self-rated problem-solving ability was positively related to performance on each test. Likewise, self-rated verbal intelligence was significantly related to performance on five of the seven ability tests. Objectively measured performance, however, was not related to self-ratings of practical intelligence or motivation. Many of the ability tests included in this study were not designed to assess practical abilities or social competence. It was surprising, however, that self-assessments of practical intelligence

Table 1 Correlations Between Self-conceptions of intelligence and Ability Performance Ability Test performance

Self-Concept Variable Everyday Academic Problem Verbal Practical intelligence intelligence solving intelligence intelligence motivation

Letter Series

.28**

.46**

.22*

-18

-.16

-.12

Letter Sets

.w*

,42**

.26**

.22*

-.08

-.03

Matrices

.42**

.52**

.37**

.27**

- .07

Verbal Analogies

.37**

-55.'

.37**

.30**

-.15

-.0f3

Verbal Meaning

.41**

.49**

.39*

.36**

.o1

-.10

Comprehension

.36**

.a**

.37**

.30**

.05

-.01

Social Situations

.29**

.18

.19*

.06

-01

-.04

**

pc.01

* pc.05

-08

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were unrelated to performance on either the Comprehension or Social Situations test. In the Comprehension test, an examinee is required to respond to a question (e.g.. Why are child labor laws needed?), including in the response all information that is needed to answer it adequately. Wechsler (1958) suggested that the Comprehension test assesses practical judgment, common sense, and the ability to evaluate past experience. In the Social Situations test, an examinee is presented with an interpersonal dilemma and chooses from among four alternative responses the one that provides the best solution. The Social Situations test has been described a s an indicator of the ability "experiential evaluation". which is characterized by maktng good judgments and using social conventions in making decisions (e.g.. Horn & Donaldson. 1980). If these interpretations of the tests are correct, the negligible relations between performance and self-rated practical intelligence could result because adults do not accurately assess their practical intelligence. Perhaps the feedback a person receives about performance in everyday situations is too ambiguous for a n individual to form accurate estimates of their practical abilities. It is also possible, however, that these tests tap only some attributes identified with adults' self-conceptions of their practical intelligence. Therefore, we conducted an experiment to examine people's conceptions of the qualities assessed by ability tests and their relation to implicit theories of intelligence. Experiment 2: Implicit Theories of Intelligence and Ability Tests Neisser (1979)proposed that omnibus scales of intelligence (e.g.. Stanford-Binet, WAIS) may be relatively successful in the assessment of intelligence because different tests included in the battery capture different facets of intelligence. Any ability test, by itself, is unlikely to be a n adequate indicator of intelligence. Intelligence is a multidimensional construct, and a single ability test is likely to assess only some of the qualities associated with the construct. For example, the prototypic conception of academic intelligence emphasizes both verbal and problem-solving abilities. Performance on tests of both kinds of abilities may provide a reasonable approximation to academic intelligence. Indeed, in

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research on adult intelligence (Schde. 1979).a composite index of educational aptitude has been formed from performance on verbal comprehension (i.e.. Verbal Meaning) and inductive reasoning tests (Lea,Letter Series). The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate people's beliefs about the qualities characterizing exceptional performance on ability tests designed from an explicit approach and their relation to experts' prototypic conceptions of everyday and academic intelligence. Based on findings from research examining the relations between objective test performance and self-conceptions of intelligence, it was expected that people's characterizations of most ability tests would display greater correspondence to a prototypic conception of academic intelligence, because most ability tests emphasize problem-solving or verbal abilities rather than practical intelligence or social competence. Therefore, in addition to traditional tests of fluid (i.e.. problem solving) and crystallized abilities, tests we have developed to assess everyday cognitive abilities were also included a s stimuli in the study. Tests of fluid abilities included Letter Series (Blieszner et al.. 1981).Letter Sets (Blieszner et al., 1981) and Figural Relations Matrices tests (Plemons et al.. 1978). Two tests involved verbal reasoning (Verbal Analogies: Guilford. 1969) and verbal comprehension (Verbal Meaning; Thurstone. 1962). Finally, four tests included content relevant to practical intellectual abilities: the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory (Cornelius & Caspi. 1987), Stressful Situations Questionnaire (Cornelius & Rose. 1987).Social Situations test (Horn & Cattell. 1966),and Comprehension subtest of the WAIS (Wechsler. 1955). The format of these tests is described in more detail elsewhere (Cornelius et al., 1989). A sample of college students was randomly assigned to rate one of the nine ability tests. They were told to read the instructions for a test and were allowed t o examine practice and test problems included in it. Identifying information about the test (e.g.. the title) was removed. After inspecting the test, participants were instructed to characterize the qualities they believed would be displayed by a person performing extremely well on the test using items from an abridged version of the questionnaire developed by Sternberg et al. (1981)on people's conceptions of intelligence. Subjects rated

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exceptional performance for a test on these items using a sevenpoint scale (1 = Very Uncharacteristic. 7 = Very Characteristic). Three major findings emerged from analyses of these data. First, contrary to our expectations, ratings for most of the ability tests displayed greater similarity to the prototype of everyday than academic intelligence. Prototypicality measures were computed to assess the degree of similarity between ratings of the ability tests and prototypes of everyday and academic intelligence. Prototypicality measures were obtained by correlating each participant's ratings of a test with the pattern of ratings characterizing experts' concepts of these two types of intelligence. Figure 3 displays mean scores on the prototype similarity measure for each test. The prototype of everyday intelligence showed its largest correspondence with two tests developed in our work to assess practical and social abilities (i.e., Everyday Problem Solving Inventory, Stressful Situations), followed by traditional measures of practical and social judgement (Le.. Social Situations, Comprehension) and fluid ability tests (Letter Series, Letter Sets, Matrices), and least correspondence with verbal ability tests (e.g., Verbal Analogies. Verbal Meaning). By contrast, attributes associated with academic intelligence showed the greatest resemblance to ratings of tests of verbal ability, followed by ratings of fluid ability tests, and the least resemblance to ratings of tests involving practical abilities. A second key finding was that different characteristics of intellectual functioning were attributed to exceptional performance on different ability tests. The data were first factor analyzed to identify a parsimonious set of dimensions underlying judges' evaluations of exceptional performance on the test stimuli. Four factors were extracted with eigenvalues greater than 1. The factor solution that we obtained was similar to results of factor analyses of people's prototypic conceptions of intelligence (Sternberg et al., 1981) and people's self-conceptions of intelligence described in the previous section. The first factor was associated with attributes indicative of practtcal problem-solufng ability. It included high loadings on items associated with decision making, reasoning, and quality of

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EVERYDAY INTELLIGENCE

0 ACADEKIC INTELLIGENCE

-.1 EPSI

STRS SOCS COW LSER LSET MAT VANL VMNG T E S T

S T I M U L U S

F'fgure3. Resemblance between prototypes of intelligence and test rating profiles. Test titles are abbreviated EPSI (Everyday Problem Solving Intentory), STRS (Stressful Situations), SOCS (Social Situations), COMP WAIS Comprehension), LSER (Letter Series), LSET (Letter Sets), MAT (Matrices),VANL (Verbal Analogies), and VMNG ('Verbal Meaning).

problem solving.

The second factor was indicative of verbal intelligence and knowledge. It was loaded highly by behaviors involving reading, verbal facility, and achievement. The third factor comprised behavioral qualities associated with social Competence and practical Intelligence. It was loaded highly by variables indicative of interpersonal competence, ethical judgment, and giving advice. The fourth factor represented several indicators of cognitfue style. It was loaded positively by variables such as curiosity, thoughtfulness, and style of problem solving. Comparisons between tests rated on these four dimensions revealed three major patterns (see Figure 4). Tests of practical abilities (Lee, Everyday Problem Solving Inventory. Stressful Situations, Social Situations, Comprehension) were evaluated highly on behaviors indicative of practical problem solving a s well a s social competence. Fluid ability tests (i.e.. Letter Series, Letter Sets, Matrices) were judged most highly on characteristics associated with practical problem solving ability. Finally, verbal ability tests (Verbal Analogies, Verbal Meaning) were rated highly

Everyday Cognitive Abilities

i ii f f

6.0.

5.5.

5.0.

4.5.

4.0.

L

1.o

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PRACIICAI, PROBLEM SOLVING A VERBAL INTELLIGENCE I

EPSI

eCOGNITIVE STYLE

I

I

STRS

SOCIAL COMPETENCE

SOCS COMP LSER LSET T E S T

1

MAT

I

VANL VMNG

S T I M U L U S

Flgure 4. Ratings of test stimuli on dimensions of intelligence (after Cornelius et d.,1989). Test titles are abbreviated: EPSI (Everyday Problem Solving Inventory). STRS (Stressful Situations), SOCS (Social Situations), COMP ( WAIS Comprehension), LSER (Letter Series), LSET (Letter Sets), MAT (Matrices),VANL (Verbal Analogies),and VMNG (Verbal Meaning).

on facets of verbal intelligence and knowledge. Overall. the pattern of ratings appears to coincide with researchers' interpretations of the tests and suggest that different tests may tap different features of intellectual functioning. Finally, a third major finding was that a combination of tests yielded a better prediction of experts' prototypic concepts of intelligence than any single test. A profile was computed for each test by averaging judges' ratings on each item in the questionnaire. Intraclass correlation coefficients were computed to obtain a n index of the reliability of these profiles. There was a high degree of interjudge similarity in ratings (M intraclass coefficient = .85) with intraclass correlations ranging from .79 to .92 for the different tests. Regression analyses were then performed using the profiles of ratings for the ability tests as predictor variables. Criterion

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variables in these analyses were the proffles of ratings for experts' conceptions of everyday and academic intelligence. Results showed that the pattern of characteristics associated with everyday intelligence was best predicted by the rating proffles of four tests: Everyday Problem Solving Inventory 1p = .37). Stressful Situations 1p = .25). Letter Series Cp = .28), and Verbal Meaning [D = .24, all p's c .Ol). Ratings on these four tests accounted for 73 percent of the variance (R = .85. p < .001). Academic intelligence was predicted best by ratings of the Verbal Meaning ID = .67) and Letter Series tests (J.3 = .25. p's c .001). and together these tests accounted for 61 percent of the variance (R = -78.p c .OOl). In summary, the findings of this experiment highlight similarities and differences between concepts of everyday and academic intelligence and their relation to people's perceptions of ability tests. These conceptions of intelligence are distinguishable because different facets of intellectual behavior are weighted differently in people's ideas about these concepts. Experts emphasize both verbal and problem-solving abilities in their concept of academic intelligence. and people's conceptions of tests of these abilities provide good predictors of this prototype. These abilities are also significant in the prediction of experts' concept of everyday intelligence. However, independent of these, tests of everyday problem solving and coping with stressful situations also contribute to the prediction of the prototype of everyday intelligence. In line with Neisser's (1979) argument, the results suggest that a combination of ability tests may be required to assess adequately the multifaceted attributes that people believe are characteristic of intelligence. Similar to our findings examining self-conceptions of intelligence and ability test performance, these results suggest that verbal and problem-solving abilities are important aspects of both everyday and academic intelligence. These abilities provide only a partial account of everyday intelligence, however, and need to be supplemented by measures that specifically tap features of social competence and practical intelligence (cf. Willis & Schaie. 19861. The lack of attention to these dimensions in explicit approaches to the study of intelligence may have resulted from the focus on

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academic performance as the primary criterion for evaluating the validity of ability tests. EVERYDAY COGNITIVE ABILITIES: AN EXPLICIT APPROACH In this section, two experiments that were conducted to examine performance on measures of everyday cognitive abilities are discussed. Based on findings concerning experts' prototypic conceptions of everyday intelligence (Sternberg et al., 1981).these measures were designed to assess two major facets of practical and social cognitive abilities-everyday problem solving and knowledge about adaptive behavior.

Experiment 3: Everyday Problem Solving in Adulthood and Old Age

Phase 1 The first phase of our research was devoted to the development of an instrument to assess everyday problem solving. The Everyday Problem Solving Inventory (Cornelius & Caspi. 1987) was constructed using a behavior-analytic model for assessing competence (Goldfried & D'Zurilla, 1969;also see, D'Zurilla & Nezu. 1982). The basic elements consisted of specifying problematic situations, enumerating possible responses to them, and evaluating the perceived efficacy of the responses. The Everyday Problem Solving Inventory consists of 48 hypothetical problem situations sampling six content domains- problems an adult might experience as an economic consumer, in deaIing with complex or technical informatfon. in managing a home, in resolving interpersonal conflicts with one's family members, in resolving conflicts with friends, or in conflict resolution with coworkers. The majority of situations in the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory are similar to ones included in situational taxonomies (Scheidt & Schaie, 1978).inventories of unpleasant events (Lewinsohn & Talkington, 19791,and hassles in everyday living (Kanner. Coyne, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1981). A

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sample problem from the information domain and alternative responses to it follow.

was returned because you misinterpreted the instructions on how tofill it out. A. Obtain more information on how to complete the form correctly. B. Try to figure out on your own what was wrong. C. Ask someone to fill out the form for you. D. Blame the company for not making the instructions more clear.

A complicated form you completed

For each situation, four possible response modes were devised based on previous studies of practical problem solving and coping with real-life stressors (e.g.. Billings & Moos, 1981; Denney & Palmer, 1981; Lazarus & Folkman. 1984). h-oblem-focused action (Response A to the sample problem) involves self-initiated overt behaviors to deal directly with a problem and its effects. Cognitive problem analysis (Response B) refers to intrapsychic or cognitive efforts to manage one's subjective appraisal of a situation, to understand it better, to solve the problem through logical analysis, or to reinterpret the situation from a dmerent perspective. Passfvedependent behavior (Response C) includes attempts to avoid or withdraw from a situation, the absence of self-initiated behavior to alter a situation. or actions involving dependence on another person to solve the problem. Finally, auoldant thinking and denial (Response D) includes attempts to control the meaning of a situation through cognitive avoidance, denial of the situation or of one's personal responsibility in it, selective attention to things other than the situation itself, or attempts to manage one's affective reaction through the suppression of one's emotions. Because contextual models of competence (e.g., Goldfried & D'Zurilla, 1969; Scheidt & Schaie. 1978: Sternberg. 1985a) suggest that particular modes of response are likely to be more effective in some situations than in others, we wanted to examine people's judgments about the quality of the responses for each of the problems in the inventory, Thus, in the initial phase of research, a sample of judges rated how effective they believed responses would

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be as solutions to the problems described in the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory. In making their judgments, judges were instructed to consider factors such a s the likelihood that the response would solve the problem, that it would prevent or minimize future problems, and that it would enhance the person's self-esteem (see Fisher-Beckfield & McFall, 1982). Judges were given the inventory and rated each response on a 5-point scale ( 1 = Extremely ineffective or poor solution, 5 = Extremely effective or good solution). Analyses were performed examining the effects of situation and modes of response on judgments of response efficacy. In general, problem-focused action and cognitive problem analysis were judged to be more effective than either passive-dependent behavior or avoidant thinking and denial. These analyses, however, also revealed significant interactions between situation and mode of response for each domain of problems. In fact, the pattern of ratings among the four response modes diaered depending on the situation examined. For example, in one consumer problem in which a person did not have enough money to buy a gift for a friend's birthday, problem-focused action (M= 4.6) was rated as most effective, followed by passive-dependent behavior (M = 2.6) and cognitive probIem analysis (M = 2.4), and avoidant thinkfng and denial (M = 1.1) was rated as least effective. In another consumer problem describing a person who did not have sufficient time to purchase items prior to a vacation trip, however, cognitive problem analysis (M = 4.6) was fudged to be the most effective response, followed by avoidant thinking and denial (M= 3.9)and passive-dependent behavior (M= 3.7).and problem-focused action (M= 2.6)was rated as least effective. In line with contextual models of competence, these findings suggest that an important skill in solving everyday problems may be an individual's sensitivity to situational differences and flexibility in responding to situational nuances. A heuristic strategy for solving everyday problems that involves reliance on a general response mode (e.g., problem-focused action) may prove optimal in many situations, but it may be maladaptive in particular situations. Given the heterogeneity of problems that occur in any domain of everyday life, it seems unlikely that a

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particular response mode would be uniformly effective across diverse situations (cf. Baltes & Smith,in press: Berg, 1989;Feifel & Strack, 1989;Mischel, 1984). Phase 2

In the second phase of the research, the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory was administered to young, middle-aged, and older adults. The second phase was conducted to examine age differences in everyday problem solving performance and relationships between performance o n the inventory and traditional tests of verbal and problem-solving abilities. In administering the inventory, participants were instructed to imagine themselves in the situations described and to rate the likelihood that they would act in each of the four response modes listed after each situation. Ratings were made on a 5-point scale (1 = Definitely would not do, 5 = Definitely would do). It is important to emphasize that in this format, participants did not simply select one response to describe how they would respond. Rather. because solutions to everyday problems often involve multiple actions, participants rated each possible response. Thus,for each problem domain, participants made four ratings for each of eight situations, yielding a total of 32 responses. Scores on the inventory were then derived by computing a correlation between each participant's ratings and judges' average ratings of response efficacy obtained in the first phase of the research. Separate correlations were obtained for each domain of problems, and an overall problem-solving score was computed across all problem domains. In addition, participants were given tests of verbal comprehension (i.e., Verbal Meaning; Thurstone. 1962)and inductive reasoning (i.e.. Letter Series; Blieszner et al., 1981). Table 2 shows correlations between performance on traditional verbal and problem-solving tests and the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory. Several aspects of these data are notable. First, the overall score on the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory was signiflcantly correlated with performance on Verbal Meaning and Letter Series tests. These correlations are similar to each other and

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Table 2

Correlations Among Verbal Meaning. Letter Series, and Everyday Problem Solving Performance ~~

Test variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1. Verbal Meaning ---.37 ---2. Letter Series 3. Everday Problem Solving .27 .29 ---Total Score .30 .34 .86 ---4. I d o r m at io n .30 .26 .80 .57 --5. Family .24 .22 .86 -70 .62 ---6. Work .18 .30 .87 .68 .65 .72 ---7. Friend .16 .12 .82 .63 .64 .67 .68 ---8. Consumer 9 ~. . Home .12 .18 .81 .64 .63 .66 .6!5 .59 ---Note: Correlations are significant with a value of .18 (p < .05)and .23 (p < .01).

to the correlation between scores on the Verbal Meaning and Letter Series tests. Second, performance on the Verbal Meaning and Letter Series tests show similar patterns of correlations with scores for each problem domain. The highest correlation is with performance on problems involving information, and the lowest correlations are with consumer or home management problems. Third, correlations among scores from different problem domains are moderate to large. These correlations indicate that individual differences in performance are fairly consistent across the different domains of problems examined. Moreover. correlations among scores for the diMerent domains of everyday problem solving are much larger in magnitude than are their correlations with traditional ability tests. Similar to the results we obtained for people's conceptions of exceptional performance on ability tests, these findings suggest that the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory may assess facets of intellectual functioning

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that are somewhat independent from traditional measures of verbal and problem-solving abilities. Regression analyses with age, education, and sex as predictors of performance on these measures provided further support for a differentiation among them. The findings showed that these demographic characteristics were less highly related to performance on the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory ( R = .24) than on the Verbal Meaning (R = .55) or Letter Series tests ( R = 50). For the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory, only the linear component of age was a significant predictor U3 = .19. p < .05). For the Verbal Meaning test, significant predictors included the linear component of age @ = .16, p c .05) and education @ = .53, p c .001). For the Letter Series test, the linear @ = -.31) and quadratic components of age 10 = -.32) and education U3 = .30,all p's c .001) were significant predictors. The regression lines displayed in Figure 5 show the predicted values of performance on the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory, Verbal Meaning, and Letter Series tests as a function of age. Scores on the three dependent variables were transformed to T scores to facilitate a graphic display of the results. The regression lines show similar developmental functions for the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory and Verbal Meaning test. Both functions show a modest increase with age. By contrast, the function for the Letter Series test shows an increase from ages 20 to 30.relative stability from ages 30 to 50, and then a decrease from ages 50 to 70. One explanation for multidirectional age differences in cognitive abilities has centered on the differential familiarity of different ability dimensions (e.g.. Cornelius. 1984). A similar hypothesis has been proposed to account for age differences on different measures of practical abilities. For example, Cardner and Monge (1977) found that maximal performance on a test of knowledge of modes of transportation was achieved by 30 year olds. whereas peak performance on a test involving knowledge about death and disease was achieved by 60 year olds. Changes in everyday cognitive abilities may be dependent on a person's present or prior experience with similar problems or on a person's degree of interest in a particular domain of everyday life (e.g.. Camp,

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EVERYDAY PROBLEM SOLVINGINVENTORY VEREALMEANJNGTEST

1 LElTER SERIES TEST

42 40

20

30

40

50

CHRONOLOGICAL

60

70

A G E

Flgure 5. Developmental functions for different ability tests (after Cornelius & Caspt, 1987). (Regression lines display predicted levels of performance as a function of chronological age. Predicted performance is measured in standardized Tscores.)

Doherty. Moody-Thomas. & Denney, 1989; Denney. in press: Gardner & Monge, 1977). In a separate Everyday Situations Questionnaire, participants rated how frequently they experienced the situations described in the Everyday FYoblem Solving Inventory using a 5-point scale (1 = Never, 5 = Frequently). Separate problem familiarity ratings were computed for each domain, and a total score was obtained across all problems. Analyses of age differences in problem familiarity showed that young adults (M = 2.82)reported experiencing the problems a s frequently as middle-aged adults (M= 2.76). but older adults (M= 2.59) reported less familiarity with them than younger age groups. Thus, although there was a n increase with age In performance on the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory, selfreported familiarity with the problems decreased with increasing age. Likewise, analyses examining age differences in problem familiarity and problem-solving performance for each of the six domains showed little convergence. Moreover, correlations between familiarity ratings and problem-solving scores for the

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separate domains displayed little correspondence ( f s ranged from -.22 to .08). These results and those of other studies (e.g., Berg, 1989;Camp et al., 1989) indicate that familiarity with everyday problems is unrelated to people's skill or preference in solving them. There may be several explanations for these findings including the possibility that the indices of problem familiarity that have been examined may be insensitive to the characteristics of people's experiences that are most influential in everyday problem solving (see Cornelius & Caspi. 1987). Further research that distinguishes between different aspects of experience (i.e.. recent familiarity. vicarious experience, cumulative experience) will be required to clarify the role that each of them may play in accounting for changes in everyday problem solving abilities during adulthood. Experiment 4: Conceptions of Coping Although research on everyday problem solving is an important step in gerontological research on everyday intelligence, the problems investigated have typically sampled "hassles" adults experience in everyday life rather than problematic situations that seriously tax a person's adaptive capabilities. However, research on prototypic conceptions of intelligence suggests that a n ability to "cope with crises" (Sternberg et al., 1981) or "disastrous situations" (Sternberg & Berg, 1987)is an important characteristic associated with everyday intellectual competence in adulthood (cf. Flavell, 1970). Likewise, recent work emphasizes the importance of examining everyday cognitive abilities in situations involving a n integration of emotion and cognition (e.g.. Baltes & Smith, in press: Blanchard-Fields, 1986: Kramer. 1989: Labouvie-Vief, HakimLarson, & Hobart, 1987;Staudinger, 1988).Thus,we initiated work (Cornelius & Rose, 1987) on the development of a Stressful Situations Questionnaire to investigate the facet of practical adaptive behavior. The specific objective in this experiment was to examlne people's knowledge about strategies they thought would be adaptive in resolving stressful situations. Research relevant to this inquiry h a s emphasized both normative and individual difference perspectives in people's

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knowledge about adaptive behavior. On the one hand, several studies suggest that there is a normative concept of adaptation. This is reflected in a rather high degree of consensual agreement among people about strategies that would be more or less effective in solving problem situations. For example, Sternberg and Soriano (1984) presented subjects with stories describing conflict situations arising in three domains: interpersonal. interorganizational. and international relations. Subjects rated how effective seven different strategies would be in resolving each conflict situation. Their findings showed consistent profiles of efficacy ratings for these strategies both within and across the domains examined. Likewise, McCrae and Costa (1986) investigated the perceived effectiveness of 27 coping mechanisms for stressful situations involving losses, threats, or challenges. Subjects rated whether the mechanisms had been effective for solving the problem or for reducing distress. Their results showed similar patterns of ratings for both of these criteria as well as consistent patterns across different categories of stressors. On the other hand, evidence also shows that there are systematic individual differences among people in their knowledge about effective strategies. Sternberg and Soriano (1984) reported that individual differences in personality and intellectual characteristics were predictive of differences among people's judgments about conflict resolution strategies. For instance, need for deference and inductive reasoning were negatively related to judgments about the efficacy of using physical coercion or economic pressure to resolve conflicts, but these variables were positively related to judgments about the efficacy of responses involving waiting to see whether the situation would improve or accepting and making the best of a situation. Likewise, McCrae and Costa (1986)examined the relation between personality and adults' use of coping mechanisms that were judged to be more or less effective. They found that neuroticism was correlated with the use of less effective coping strategies, whereas extraversion was correlated with the use of more effective strategies. The initial phase of our research with the Stressful Situations Questionnaire was conducted to examine whether adults' conceptions of effective coping may differ across adulthood and the

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possible role of cognitive and personality variables in accounting for individual variability in their prototypical judgments about effective responding to stressful situations. Young (Mage = 30.5 years), middle-aged (Mage = 49.1 years), and older (M age = 68.9 years) adults were administered the Stressful Situations Questionnaire. and traditional tests of intellectual abilities and personality. The Stressful Situations Questionnaire includes 16 hypothetical situations involving losses, threats, and challenges. For each situation, responses modelled after strategies in the Ways of Coping checklist (Lazarus h Folkman, 1984) were listed as possible ways the character in the situation might respond to it. Subjects judged the effectiveness of each coping response as a solution to the problem using a five-point rating scale (1 = Very ineffective, 5 = Very effective). An example of a problem from the Stressful Situations Questionnaire and its associated response items follow.

Helen ONeUl went to the Department of Motor Vehicles to renew her driver's license. Much to her dismay, she failed the required eye examination even when wearing her corrective lenses. Helen became very upset at not being allowed to drive anymore. S h e was afiaid that she would lose a lot of the independence she was accustomed to due to the necessity of having to rely on other people for transportation to andfiorn places.

A. B. C. D.

Helen could feel badly that nothing can be done to improve her vision. Helen could wish that she could get over her fear of becoming dependent on others for transportation. Helen could phone her sister, Phyllis. and talk to her about her concerns about losing independence. Helen could try to accept her fear of becoming dependent but not let it prevent her from keeping up with her daily activities.

If adults' knowledge about coping is organized around a dominant conceptual prototype, profiles of ratings between

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different judges should be highly similar. When we compared profiles of ratings averaged across various subgroups of judges in the sample, the findings showed a high degree of congruence. Simple correlations were computed between the patterns of ratings by subgroups to explore consistency in judgments a s a function of the age, educational background, and sex of judges. Comparisons between the pattern of ratings by young and middle-aged judges (r = .97), young and old judges (r = .93), and middle-aged and old judges (r =.95) revealed high consistency. Likewise. there was high correspondence between ratings by judges who had a high school diploma or less education and judges who had received more education beyond a high school diploma ( r = .97). Moreover, comparison of ratings by male and female judges displayed high similarity (r = .97). Finally, an alpha coefficient was computed to obtain an estimate of the reliability of judges' ratings across all possible split halves of judges. This coefficient was also extremely high (a = .99) suggesting that the profiles of ratings were quite similar even for arbitrarily formed subgroups of judges. Even though various subgroups in the sample displayed high consistency in their prototypicality judgments about coping. judgments of individuals did not uniformly correspond to the prototype of the group as a whole. A prototype similarity score was obtained by computing a correlation between each individual's profile of ratings and the profile of ratings averaged across all other judges in the sample. These scores could range between -1.00 and + 1 .OO with larger positive values indicating greater similarity between an individual's judgments and those of the rest of the group. The average prototypicality score was relatively high (M= .69). but there was also a wide range of individual daerences (SO = ,171. Analyses were performed to determine whether individual differences in adults' knowledge about coping were systematically related to intellectual and personality variables. Participants were administered standard tests of social intelligence (George Washington Social Intelligence Test: Moss, Hunt, Omwake, & Woodward, 19491, inductive reasoning (Letter Series: Blieszner et al., 1981).and verbal comprehension (Verbal Meaning; Thurstone. 1962). a s well as measures of Extraversion and Neuroticism

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(Eysenck Personality Inventory; Eysenck & Eysenck. 1968). Relations between prototypicality judgments, intellectual performance, and personality are shown in Table 3. Simple correlations presented in the first column of Table 3 indicate that prototypicality judgments were positively correlated with performance on intellectual ability tests. As expected, the largest correlation occurred with the measure! of social intelligence, and judgments were associated to a lesser extent with performance on traditional tests of problem-solving and verbal abilities. In addition, prototypicality judgments about coping were negatively correlated with personality dimensions, in particular neuroticism. Because one might suspect that judgments about effective coping simply reflect a tendency toward socially desirable responding, the correlation between prototypicality judgments and responses to the Lie Scale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory was also examined. The correlation was negative but not significant. A regression analysis was performed with scores on the intellectual and personality measures as predictor variables, and the prototype similarity score a s the criterion variable. In combination, the intellectual and personality variables accounted for 46% of the variance in prototypicality judgments about coping ( R = .68, p c .OOl). Standardized regression coefficients from this analysis are listed in the second column of Table 3. Significant predictors included performance on the social intelligence and inductive reasoning tests and self-reported neuroticism and extraversion. Thus, individuals whose judgments about effective coping resembled the judgments of the group as a whole tended to display better performance on measures of social intelligence and problem solving and reported themselves to be more emotionally stable and introverted. These findings are compatible with both normative and individual difference approaches to the study of people's knowledge (i.e., beliefs and ideas) about adaptive behavior. Adults' judgments about effective solutions in resolving stressful situations appear to reflect a system of strategic or procedural knowledge that is quite similar across various social groups. In accord with other research (e.g., McCrae & Costa. 1986; Sternberg & Soriano, 1984). these findings suggest that people's conceptions of effective coping are

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Table 3

Relations between Prototypicality Judgments and Intellectual and Personality Tests Test Variable

Social Intelligence Letter Series Verbal Meaning Neuroticism Extraversion Lie Scale

n

*

Simple correlation (r) .59***

.35***

a***

-.27**

-.12 -.14

Standardized regression coefficient (p) .47***

.18* .09 16*

-.

-.17* -.11

p<.Ool p < .01

p < -05

organized around a conceptual prototype. In general, responses involving approach strategies were judged to be more effective than responses involving avoidance strategies (cf. Roth & Cohen. 1986). For example, responses involving rational action, taking things one step at a time, or changing oneself to deal with the situation were rated a s being quite effective solutions in the situations presented, whereas responses involving intellectual denial, withdrawal, and passivity were rated a s being quite ineffective solutions. These judgments, of course, are likely to be speciflc to the problem situations examined. Further research is underway to explore differences in judgments as a function of both situation and response modes. The findings of this experiment also reveal significant individual differences among adults in the extent to which their judgments resembled a prototypical concept. Moreover, both intellectual and personality variables were significant in predicting individual variability. Additional evidence demonstrating the importance of individual differences in people's knowledge has been reported in research examining prototypicality

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judgments about categories of personality traits and concrete objects (Beck, McCauley, Segal, & Hershey. 1988) Thus, the findings of this experiment and other research (e.g., Ceci & Liker. 1986; Hoyer. 1987; Wagner & Sternberg. 1986) underscore the importance of individual variability in adults' knowledge about various domains of everyday life. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In cognitive aging research, issues of ecological and external validity have been a recurrent concern reflecting skepticism about the appropriateness of traditional ability tests for the assessment of adult intelligence. Despite criticisms that traditional tests are inappropriate for assessing adult intelligence, little progress was made until recent years in addressing the more basic issue of the meaning of everyday intelligence and differentiating it from traditional or academic conceptions of intelligence. By linking implicit and explicit approaches, the research reviewed in this chapter clarifies the distinction between these concepts and presents some initial advances toward the assessment of everyday cognitive abilities. Implicit and explicit approaches are complementary means for understanding intellectual functioning. Some similarities emerge in comparisons of implicit and explicit approaches. Research based on an implicit approach has consistently identified problemsolving ability, verbal intelligence, and practical intelligence or social competence as salient dimensions. These dimensions emerge in analyses of people's prototypic conceptions of intelligence, their self-conceptions of intelligence, and their conceptions of exceptional performance on various ability tests. Problem-solving and verbal abilitles also seem to correspond well to ability dimensions that have been identlfied in research from an explicit approach. such as differential theories of intelligence (e.g., Cattell, 1971: Horn, 1978, 1982;Thurstone, 1935). Everyday and academic intelligence are multifaceted constructs encompassing a number of dimensions of intellectual functioning. Differences between these concepts occur because various dimensions of functioning are differentially associated with them.

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In examining self-conceptions of intelligence. our findings revealed that people's self-assessments on dimensions of problem solving and verbal intelligence were positively related to prototypic resemblance measures of everyday and academic intelligence. However, self-ratings on a dimension indicative of practical intelligence and social competence were positively related to everyday intelligence but unrelated to academic intelligence. Similar results emerged from our analyses of people's conceptions of exceptional performance on ability tests. Ratings of problemsolving (i.e.. Letter Series) and verbal ability (i.e.. Verbal Meaning) tests emerged a s significant predictors of experts' prototypes for both everyday and academic intelligence. In addition to these, however, tests of practical abilities involved in solving everyday and stressful problems were significant predictors of everyday intelligence. These results suggest that although problem solving and verbal abilities are important for both kinds of intelligence, they are not the whole story. They provide only a partial account of everyday intelligence and need to be supplemented by measures that specifically tap features of practical intelligence and social competence. Differences also emerge in comparing implicit and explicit theories of intelligence. Practical and social cognitive abilities are important facets of everyday intelligence, but such abilities have received far less attention than verbal or problem-solving abilities in most explicit psychological theories of intelligence. Nevertheless, practical and social cognitive abilities have been recognized as salient features of intelligence in some recent explicit theories (e.g.. Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987: Gardner. 1983; Sternberg. 1985a). Moreover, these abilities have been at the center of theoretical propositions about aspects of intelligence that may be acquired in adulthood. For example, Schaie (1977/1978)proposed three stages of adult cognitive development involving the application of one's intelligence to real-life decisions: Baltes and his colleagues (e.g.. Dixon & Baltes. 1985; Staudinger et al., 1989) explored the potential for growth in the pragmatics of intelligence with special attention to adults' knowledge about the pragmatics of life (Baltes & Smith, in press); and, Labouvie-Vief (1982, 1'985) outlined structural transformations in cognition that are sensitive

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to pragmatic and contextual constraints on logical thinking (also see, Kramer, 1983:Sinnott. 1984,1989b). Findings from our research are generally consistent with these propositions. One finding clearly emerging from Experiment 1 as well a s research on implicit theories of adult intellectual development is the belief that practical abilities increase with age. In addition, our data showed that performance on the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory increased with age with older adults performing better than younger adults. Other research (e.g.. Camp et al., 1989:Capon, Kuhn. & Carretero, 1989;Demming & Pressey, 1957: Denney & Palmer, 1981;Denney. Pearce & Palmer, 1982; Gardner & Monge, 1977;Labouvie-Vief, et al., 1987)has found a variety of developmental trajectories for performance on measures of practical abilities with most studies indicating an improvement in performance from early adulthood through middle age. Dtfferences among studies do occur in the age at which maximal performance is attained and in the direction and magnitude of changes after middle age. Although evidence from our research and other studies (e.g., Berg, 1989:Camp et al.. 1989)has been unable to demonstrate clearly that differential familiarity or experience with problems accounts for age differences, further research using more refined assessments of adults' experience with practical problems is necessary before firm conclusions can be reached. An additional focal issue in our research and other studies has been the question of the relationship between performance on problem s o w , verbal, and practical ability measures. In general, correlations between performance on measures of practical and other intellectual abilities tends to be moderate to low (e.g., Camp et al.. 1989;Ceci & Liker. 1986 Ford & Tisak. 1983;Frederiksen. 1986 Wagner & Sternberg, 1986:see however, Willis & Schaie. 1986).In our studies, correlations of practical ability scores with a n inductive reasoning test have ranged between .12 and .35.and correlations with a verbal comprehension test have ranged between .12and .43. In addition, there is also evidence supporting the convergent validity of different assessments of practical abilities. For example, correlations among scores for different domains of problems sampled in the Everyday Problem Solving Inventory

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ranged between .57and .72(see Table 2). Likewise, prototypicality judgments about coping were most highly correlated with performance on a test of social intelligence (r = .59).Thus, these initial findings provide empirical support for a differentiation among practical, verbal, and problem-solving abilities. They suggest that practical ability tasks developed in our research assess different aspects of intellectual behavior and functioning than traditional ability tests. Further research using multiple indicators of practical, verbal, and problem-solving abilities is required to investigate the multidimensional structure of these abilities. The correlational evidence we have obtained provides limited support for a view of practical intelligence and social competence as aspects of crystallized intelligence (e.g., Dittmann-Kohli 81 Baltes. in press). However, there are some similarities between everyday cognitive abilities and traditional measures of crystallized intelligence. Both tend to show increases with age (see e.g., Figure 5) or remain relatively stable during much of the adult life span. In addition, there is some conceptual similarity between the characterization of crystallized intelligence as knowledge of one's culture and findings showing substantial consensus among judges about the effectiveness of different strategies in solving everyday problems (Cornelius & Caspi, 1987) and stressful situations (Experiment 4; also see. McCrae & Costa, 1986; Sternberg & Soriano, 1984).Judgments of response efficacy do not appear to be highly idiosyncratic but seem to reflect widely-shared beliefs. In this sense. strategic or procedural knowledge about effective resolutions to everyday problems may be similar to the declarative or factual knowledge assessed by many traditional tests of crystallized abilities. Even so, different factors may influence the acquisition of practical knowledge about everyday life and the declarative knowledge sampled in Crystallized ability tests (e.g.. Hoyer, 1987). For example, in our research with the Everyday h-oblem Solving Inventory. formal education showed a substantial relation to performance on the Verbal Meaning test but was not related to everyday problem solving. Thus, it is possible that the knowledge required for everyday problem solving is not part of the

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acculturation process that is fostered in academic settings and typically associated with superior performance on ability tests identified with crystallized intelligence (cf. Wagner & Sternberg. 1986). In conclusion, contextual models of adult intellectual development and concern about the ecological and external validity of ability tests have provided an impetus for reexamining traditional conceptions of intelligence. Traditional conceptions have focused on abstract problem-solving and verbal abilities. These abilities appear to be fundamental to successful performance in academic settings, and they also may be important to effective functionlng in everyday contexts. However, research on everyday intelligence requires a broader scope that extends beyond these abilities. Further attention needs to be devoted to the questions of how adults acquire. represent. and utilize knowledge about the pragmatics of everyday life. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Preparation of this chapter was conducted while the author was a Visiting Scientist at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education, Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany. Generous support by the Institute and discussions with colleagues are gratefully acknowledged. REFERENCES Anastasi, A. (1968). Psychologfcal testing (3rd ed.). New York Macmillan. Baltes, P. B., & Smith. J. (in press). Toward a psychology of wisdom and its ontogenesis. In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.), Wisdom Its nature. orfgins, and deueloprnent. New York Cambridge University Press. Beck, L.. McCauley. C., Segal, M..& Hershey. L. (1988).Individual differences in prototypicality judgments about trait categories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55,286-292. Berg, C.A. (1989). Knowledge of strategies for dealing with everyday problems from childhood through adolescence. DeueZopmentaZ P~y~hotOgy, 25,607-6 18. Berg, C. A , , & Sternberg, R. J. (1985). A triarchic theory of intellectual development during adulthood. Developmental Review, 5.334370.

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