Children's Clinical Syndromes and Generalized Expectations of Control

CHILDREN'S CLINICAL SYNDROMES AND GENERALIZED EXPECTATIONS OF CONTROL

Fred Rothbaum T U m S UNIVERSITY

I. OVERVIEW

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II. FACTOR ANALYTIC RESEARCH ON SYNDROMES IN CHILDREN..

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207 209

III. SUPPORT FOR THE HELPLESSNESS-REACTANCE MODEL ...............

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IV. TOWARD A HELPLESSNESS-REACTANCE EXPLANATION OF SYNDROMES

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A. LABORATORY STUDIES OF CLINICAL STATES ..................... B. NATURALISTIC STUDIES OF CLINICAL STAGES .................... C. CLARIFYING THE MODEL LOSS AND LACK OF CONTROL ..........

A. LOCUS OFCONTROL ............................................. B. EFFECI"FBS OF NONCONTRACTUAL METHODS ................ C. CHILDREARPJG PRACTICES: ANTWEDENTS OF GENERALIZED EXPECTATIONS ..................................................

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V. CONCLUSION.. ...................................................... A. THE ISSUE OF APPROPRIATENESS.. ............................... B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ...........................

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REFERENCES

I. Overview An attempt is made here to draw connections between generalized (or situationally and temporally stable) expectations of control and clinical syndromes (i.e., situationally and temporally stable behavioral clusters) in children. In supporting these connections, it is necessary to summarize several distinct literatures. An outline of these several literatures and a brief explanation of their ties to one another are provided below. Section Il contains a summary of factor analytic research on clinical syn207 ADVANCBS IN CHlLD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR. VOL. 15

Copyright 01980 by Academic P ~ MInc. , All rights of nprcduction in any form nacrved. ISBN 012-009715-X

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dromes in children. This research has repeatedly led to the identification of two clusters: outward (e.g., antisocial, hostile, aggressive) behavior and inward (e.g., passive, withdrawn, somaticizing) behavior. Unfortunately, there is little understanding of the causes and correlates of the outward and inward syndromes. In particular, there is little understanding of the relationship between these syndromes and covert phenomena. The helplessness-reactance model, which is capable of filling this conceptual void, is briefly reviewed in Section III. According to the helplessness-reactance model, helpless (inward-type) behaviors are due to perceptions of severe uncontrollability,and reactant (outwardtype) behaviors are due to perceptions of slight to moderate uncontrollability. Laboratory evidence regarding clinical states (reactions with little temporal or situational stability) and naturalistic evidence regarding clinical stages (reactions with moderate temporal and situational stability) are cited in support of the helplessness-reactance model. Section II1,B is devoted to a refinement of the helplessness-reactance model. According to the refinement, helpless behaviors are due to a perceived lack of control and reactant behaviors are due to a perceived loss of control. This clarification of the perceptionsunderlying the states of helplessness and reactance paves the way for the following section, in which generalized expectations underlying the inward and outward syndromes are identified. Section IV begins with a consideration of the connections between states (the reactions with little stability identified by helplessness-reactance theorists) and syndromes (the highly stable behaviors identified in factor analytic research). The research on stages (moderately stable reactions) helps bridge the gap between states and syndromes. However, in order to close this gap further, it is necessary to identify generalized expectations that repeatedly give rise to perceptions of loss and lack of control. It is the repeated perception of loss and lack that leads to the repeated occurrence of reactance and helplessness-that is, to the outward and inward syndromes. Two types of generalized expectations are considered here. The first is locus of control-the degree to which the individual expects outcomes to be caused by himself (internal.locus of control) as opposed to luck or outside forces (external locus of control). Previous research indicates that individuals with an external locus of control are predisposed to repeated perceptions of lack of control and thus to recurring helpless (i.e., inward) behavior. The second generalized expectation treated here is “effectiveness of contracts.” Contracts are defined as agreements and norms. Previous research indicates that individuals who expect noncontractual methods to be effective in producing outcomes are predisposed to perceptions of loss of control and thus to recurring reactant (i.e., outward) behavior. Following the section on generalized expectations is a summary of the literature on childrearing practices. It is argued that the relationships between childrearing practices and clinical syndromes are consistent with those predicted by the refined helplessness-reactance model.

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Since a major objective of most conceptual frameworks involving clinical syndromes is to determine why individuals engage in inappropriate behaviors, Section V,A is devoted to the issue of appropriateness. Viewed from the present perspective, the key issue is whether the generalized expectations (that give rise to the syndromes) are appropriate. It is suggested that the question of appropriateness is a misleading one. Rather than making global assessments of appropriateness, it is more meaningful to identify the several factors contributing to generalized expectations of control. Two factors that are highlighted are the temporal and contextual similarities between situations. The shift from characterizing syndromes as inappropriate to examining the factors giving rise to them helps liberate them from the shroud of mystery that surrounds them. Research that may contribute to the further demystification of children’s syndromes is outlined.

11. Factor Analytic Research on Syndromes in Children One of the first requirements for the successful study of a scientific domain is the establishment of a system of classification (Zigler & Phillips, 1961). In the field of children’s clinical behavior, attempts to fill this requirement have frequently taken the form of factor analytic investigations (Achenbach, 1966; Conners, 1970; Miller, 1967; Patterson, 1964; Peterson, 1961; Ross, Lacey, & Parton, 1965; Werry & Quay, 1971). The findings from this research yield a surprisingly clear picture. Two broad-band syndromes (second-orderfactors) that have been repeatedly identified are inward (e.g., passive, withdrawn, somaticizing) behavior and outward (e.g., antisocial, hostile, aggressive) behavior (cf. Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978). (The terms inward and outward are used here rather than Achenbach’s terms-internalizing and externalizing-to distinguish between the syndromes and other internalizing and externalizing constructs used later.) The inward and outward syndromes have emerged in studies of clinic and nonclinic children ranging in age from 3 to 18 years. The data, which have been analyzed with a variety of statistical methods (e.g., principal components and principal factor analysis with varimax rotation), have been derived from mental health workers’ reports, from direct observations by mental health workers, and from parents’ and teachers’ reports. Considering the variety of subject samples, of methods of data collection, and of data analysis that have been employed, the correspondence in findings is impressive. The term “syndromes” is used here to highlight the fact that the factor analytic findings identify behavioral complexes, Identification of such complexes is a necessary step in the derivation of a classification system. Also needed is evidence that the syndromes are reliable and stable entities, since the major criticism of traditional diagnostic systems is that they have weak reliability and

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stability (Freeman, 1971;Mischel, 1968;Peterson, 1961). Short-term (1 month) test-retest reliability ratings of syndromes for parents and teachers are high ( r = 32-.93), and longer term (1 month to 5 years) test-retest reliability ratings are only slightly lower ( r = .68-.89). Interrator reliabilities are of moderate to high magnitude for both teachers and parents (r = 50-.83),with six of seven studies finding correlations greater than or equal to r = .73.Perhaps the most important finding is that there are moderate correlations between raters even when they see the subjects in different situations ( r = .45-Sl).Although correlations between different types of raters (e.g., parents vs teachers) in different situations are low, these too are significant (see Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978,for a review of all of the preceding findings). Moreover, since individuals do not spend an equal amount of time in different situations, low cross-situation correlations do not necessarily imply low intraindividual consistency (Bowers, 1973). Thus, the inward and outward syndromes are worthy of inclusion in initial attempts at a classification system: They designate consistent individual differences in behavioral complexes, individual differences that have respectable stability over time and at least low to moderate stability across situations. The consistency across these empirical findings on clinical behavior syndromes stands in marked contrast to the lack of consistency among practitioners in their use of diagnostic categories. In a recent “Project on the classification of exceptional children” (Hobbs, 1975) there was little agreement as to the most appropriate distinctions. The general consensus among participating clinicians was that cment labels are of little use in dealing with the myriad problems faced in psychological service centers. How can we account for the reluctance to translate research into practice? In large part the reluctance arises because factor analytic investigators have not provided a conceptual framework within which to interpret the empirical findings. Factor analysis is, at bottom, an atheoretical approach. Advocates of factor analytic research maintain that in order to erect a scientific framework, we must begin by classifying the phenomena of interest. Upon this foundation, they argue, an understanding of the appropriate conceptual framework, including an understanding of etiology, can be built. The issue then is whether it is reasonable to use an empirically derived classification system as a foundation in building toward a theory of clinical behavior syndromes. The present author believes that the approach taken by factor analytic researchers has been a reasonable one-the first step should be the identification of meaningful categories. While theory will not flow spontaneously from the identification of categories, the latter plays a critical role in subsequent develop ments. Now that factor analytic work has produced a fairly broad consensus, a logical next step is a concerted attempt to relate the findings regarding clinical behavior syndromes to potentially relevant theoretical literature. The most prevalent interpretation of the inward-outward distinction is that

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provided by psychoanalysts. According to the psychoanalytic view, children with inward behaviors are distinguished by excessive self-control. Inward children are seen as suffering from extreme anxiety (either “objective” or “superego”) regarding their impulses (Freud, 1950). The internalization of societal norms and/or the fear of repercussions lead them to inhibit expression of impulses. Operation of these self-control mechanisms is manifested in the tendency toward self-blame and intrapunitiveness. Children with outward behavior, by contrast, are seen as unable to inhibit impulses. Psychoanalysts attribute manifestations of outward behavior, such as impulsivity and inability to delay, to deficiencies in internalized controls. Two important characteristics of the psychoanalytic approach should be noted. The first is that notions like impulsivity and internalized controls are difficult to operationalize and do not lend themselves easily to testable hypotheses. The second is that the traditional emphasis in analytic theory is on control over impulses. This emphasis contrasts with the more recent emphasis on control over environmental events, or mastery motives (White, 1959). While ego analysts have concerned themselves with this second notion of control, the fact remains that the major psychoanalytic contribution to clinical behavior has been to advance the first notion of control-control over impulses. In order to clarify the notion of control over environmental events, I will now turn to the helplessnessreactance model.

111. Support for the Helplessness-Reactance Model A.

LABORATORY STUDIES OF CLINICAL STATES

Seligman (1975) and his associates have amassed impressive evidence indicating that experiences with uncontrollableevents lead to helplessness in subsequent situations. In their studies, “uncontrollable” is defined as independence between the subjects’ responses and subsequent outcomes. Helplessness takes various forms but is most often expressed as passivity and withdrawal in situations in which activity and effort would lead to the desired outcome. Although Seligman dues not address himself to the inward-outward distinction, he does describe behaviors that are clearly of the inward type. Fearful, depressed, and somaticizing behaviors, all of which belong to the inward syndrome, are considered expressions of helplessness (Seligman, 1975; see also Pennebaker, Burnam, Schaeffer, & Harper, 1977). In contrast to helplessness theory, which posits a relationship between uncontrollable events and inward-type behavior, is reactance theory, which posits a relationship between uncontrollable events and outward-type behavior. Brehm (1966), a major spokesman of reactance theory, argues that if freedom to engage

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in behavior is threatened or removed, individuals will increase their attempts to engage in the behavior and/or exhibit hostile and aggressive behaviors. (Although Brehm emphasizes “freedom” rather than “control,” the two terms are substituted for one another within his theory.) The disobedient, antisocial behaviors exhibited in studies on reactance contrast with the apathetic, passive behaviors exhibited in studies on helplessness. To deal with the seeming paradox, a few authors (notably Wortman & Brehm, 1975, and Roth & Bootzin, 1974) have proposed a synthesis of the preceding models. Their synthesis, hereafter referred to as the helplessness-reactance model, maintains that slightly to moderately uncontrollable experiences lead to reactance, and that severely uncontrollable experiences lead to helplessness. Moreover, the model maintains that there are inappropriate manifestations of reactance and helplessness that arise from generalizations of the perceptions of uncontrollability to situations other than those in which they are induced. Wortman and Brehm (1975) and Roth and Bootzin ( 1974) cite several studies in both the helplessness and reactance literatures that can be interpreted as consistent with their model (e.g., Glass & Singer, 1972; Thornton & Jacobs, 1971). There have been two successful attempts to provide direct evidence for the helplessness-reactance model (Roth & Kubal, 1975; Tennen & Eller, 1977). These studies employed similar paradigms: Subjects in the slightly to moderately uncontrollable condition were administered a smaller number of unsolvable trials than subjects in the severely uncontrollable condition. Subsequently, all subjects were administered a solvable task. This new task was introduced as being unrelated to the prior task and was administered by a different experimenter. The findings supported the predictions that slightly to moderately uncontrollable events lead to reactance, as manifested by increased persistence, and that severely uncontrollable events lead to helplessness, as manifested by decreased persistence. In addition, both of these studies examined attitudinal and emotional consequences of the failure manipulations. The results suggest that slight to moderate uncontrollability leads to feelings of anger as well as to increased persistence (Tennen & Eller, 1977), and that severe uncontrollability leads to feelings of helplessness and incompetence as well as to decreased persistence (Roth & Kubal, 1975). In a third test of the model, Pittman and Pittman (1979) supported the findings for severe uncontrollability and found that partial uncontrollability led to anger but not to increased persistence. The partial inconsistency may be due to the use of subjects scoring at the extremes of the locus of control scale. There are a few laboratory-state studies involving reactance and helplessness in children. In one of the earliest demonstrations of the reactance phenomenon, Weiner (1963) found that involuntary restriction of toy choice alternatives led to efforts to overcome the restriction. A reactance interpretation can also be applied to many of the findings regarding children’s aggression (Feshbach, 1970). On the

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other hand, Dweck and Reppucci (1973) found that helplessness could be engendered in children by exposing them to continuous failure-the same manipulation that has been used in many helplessness studies with adults. In a subsequent study, Dweck (1975) found that causal attribution retraining (i.e., encouraging children to attribute outcomes to their own efforts), administered in the context of primarily successful experiences, led to diminished helplessness. A study by Aronfreed (1968), in which children were punished either before or after engaging in an activity can also be seen as consistent with the helplessness reactance model. The first group, which was never allowed to engage in the activity, subsequently manifested avoidance behavior; the second group, for whom punishment was preceded by a period of freedom,did not manifest avoidance behavior in a subsequent situation.’ Despite these studies, it is safe to say that the overwhelming majority of studies on reactance and on helplessness have employed adult subjects. Moreover, the three studies demonstrating that slightly to moderately uncontrollable events lead to reactance and that severely uncontrollable events lead to helplessness (Pittman & Pittman, 1979; Roth & Kubal, 1975; Tennen & Eller, 1977) have been conducted with adults. Before moving on, it is important to elaborate on the notion of control as it is employed in the helplessness-reactance literature. The concept that Seligman and his associates had in mind was perceived dependence vs independence between one’s actions and subsequent outcomes. This is very similar to the construct of internal vs external locus of control developed by Rotter, and, indeed, several advocates of the helplessness-reactance model have drawn this connection (Cohen, Rothbart, & Phillips, 1976; Hiroto, 1974; Tennen & Eller, 1977; Wortman & Brehm, 1975; but see also Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Within this broad definition of control, several variations can be encompassed. For example, Brehm emphasizes the individual’s loss of freedom to engage in activities and to make choices, whereas Seligman emphasizes lack of con‘Although the psychoanalytic position has been discussed earlier. its relevance to points raised in this section deserves special mention. There are several psychoanalytically oriented thinkers (Bibring, 1953; Blos, 1963; Fraiberg, 1950; Levy, 1955) who have adopted a model of children’s clinical behavior syndromes that is very similar to the present model. These authors maintain that inward (depressed) children suffer from perceptions of extreme helplessness and hopelessness. Their analysis of outward (acting-out) children also bears a striking similarity to the current formulation: Outward children are Seen as attempting to “control (their) destiny,” and “to counteract the regressive pull to passivity” (Blos, 1%3, pp. 270-271). Borrowing from the psychoanalytic literature, Dorpat (1977) has suggested that depression arises when aversive events are certain, whereas anxiety arises when aversive events are likely but uncertain. Since Dorpat associates anxiety with arousal and activity, and depression with helplessness. there are essential similarities between his model and the helplessness-reactance model. Though psychoanalytically oriented writers couch their formulations in different terms, there is agreement regarding the underlying dynamics.

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tingency between the individual's actions and subsequent outcomes. Although there is no incompatibility between these emphases, there are differences between them that should not be ignored. Adherents of the f ~ s notion t of control are more likely to employ loss of control manipulations in which subjects are led to believe that certain options exist that they later discover do not exist, whereas adherents of the second notion of control are more likely to employ manipulations in which there is a lack of contingency on complex tasks (e.g., random reinforcement on problem-solving tasks). These differencespoint to complexities that will be elaborated upon later in this paperZ(see Section I1,C). The laboratory studies cited in this section provide the most direct and rigorous tests of the helplessness-reactance model, particularly regarding the causal role of uncontrollable events. However, two major limitations of this research are that it focuses on clinical states (i.e., simple laboratory induced behavioral reactions that are restricted in time) and it focuses on adults. To find evidence that the helplessness-reactance model applies to behavioral syndromes (behavioral complexes with temporal stability) in children, it is necessary to move away from laboratory studies of states and toward naturalistically observed studies of clinical stages. B. NATURALISTIC STUDIES OF CLINICAL STAGES

There is an impressive body of research indicating that individuals' reactions to uncontrollable events occur in predictable stages. Though the terms "helplessness" and "reactance" are not typically employed in this literature, the similarity between the phenomena examined in the laboratory studies of states and the naturalistic studies of stages, and, therefore, the relevance of the helplessnessreactance model to the latter, is easily recognized.' Perhaps the best known of the There have been valuable refinements and modifications in the notion of control that will nor be treated in this article. Weiner (1974) has shown that an individual's behavior depends on whether he attributes an event to stable or variable causal factors. Rosenbaum (1972) distinguishes between intentional and unintentional causal factors. Glass and Singer (1972) have demonstrated that different consequences follow from attributions of events to difise as opposed tofocal causal factors (see also the distinction between global and specific causes made by Abramson et al., 1978). The most valuable distinction may be the one between universal and personal attributions-the perception that self's contingency is the same as otheis vs, that self's contingency is different from that of others (Abramson et al., 1978). However, it is important to note that the various concepts and operationalizations of control that are currently used by helplessness-reactance theorists are more similar to one another (and to the notion of control over environmental events) than any of them are to the impulse-control concepts and operationalizations. Moreover, there appears to be enough consensus to speak of a single coherent helplessness-nactance model construct of control. The definition adopted here is the one mentioned earlier: perceived contingency between one's actions and subsequent outcomes. This "contingency" defmition of control is the one that has been adopted in the direct experimental tests of the helplessness-reactance model (Piaman & Pittman. 1979; Roth & Kubal, 1975; Tennen & Eller, 1977). 3Nahualistic-stage reseamhers place at least as much emphasis on loss of incentives-important

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stage research is the work of Bowlby (1973), Robertson and Bowlby (1952), Spitz and Wolff (1946), and Yarrow (1963). According to these authors, children who have been separated from their parents exhibit a typical sequence of stages of reaction. Two of the most important of these stages, protest and despair, closely parallel reactance and helplessness. Moreover, the order of the reactions is the same in both instances: Bowlby and others have noted that a stage of anger, increased activity, and general protest typically precedes a stage of withdrawal, decreased activity, and general despair. The observations of Bowlby and others regarding children’s separation from parents are relatively informal and do not involve manipulations for obvious reasons. However, similar investigations have been conducted with primates in which separation from parents was experimentally manipulated, and in a few of which adequate controls were included. This research has generally supported the findings from the naturalistic studies-that is, the research with primates indicates that relatively distinct stages of protest and despair follow the loss of parents (Hinde, Spencer-Booth, & Bruce, 1966; Kaufinan & Rosenblum, 1967; Sackett, 1970). Hence, there is at least partial experimental corroboration of the stage findings. Findings similar to those reported above have emerged in studies of reactions to news of one’s own impending death-research popularized by Kubler-Ross (1969)-and in studies of reactions to the death of loved ones (Marris, 1958; Parkes, 1972). Other situations in which naturalistic observations of the protest-despair behavioral sequence have been recorded include (a) studies on blindness (Fitzgerald, 1970) and other disabilities interfering with the pursuit of enjoyment of valued incentives (Orbach & Sutherland, 1954; Talbott, 1970); (b) studies on losses of significant objects, important roles, and reputations (Averill, 1968); (c) studies on alienation that indicate that the difference between aggression and estrangement is greater before the period of appraisal than after it (Stokols, 1975); and (d) studies on group processes that lead to the conclusion that group members typically increase their communication to deviant individuals, but, if the deviant behavior continues, this is followed by a stage of d e persons, activities and objects-as on loss of control per se (cf. Klinger, 1975). Advocates of the helplessness-reactance model, by contrast. maintain that it is not the avenive experiences per se but aversive experiences in conjunction with uncontrollability that induces clinical behavior. The laboratory-state research has generally supported this distinction: Groups receiving uncontrollable avenive outcomes subsequently manifest more clinical behavior than groups receiving the same amount and kind,of aversive outcomes but not the element of uncontrollability (cf. B r e h , 1966; Seligman, 1975). Similar Frndings have been obtained when the outcomes are nonaversive (Cohen, RothM, & Phillips, 1976). Studies employing noncontingent positive stimuli have yielded mixed results; the findings appear to depend on the dependent variables, but even then the results are contradictory (Abramson er al.. 1978; Benson & Kennelly, 1976). Throughout this article it is assumed that the consequences of the uncontrollability are most pronounced in the case of aversive outcomes. (See Abramson er al., 1978, for a more extensive review of this literature.)

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creased communication (Riecken & Homans, 1954). These stages clearly resemble the reactance-helplessness pattern described earlier. A final area of stage research is the work of Selye (1956), who demonstrated that the body typically undergoes physiological stages of “resistance” and “exhaustion” in response to a variety of stressors. While strict comparisons between these physiological findings and the preceding behavioral findings are difficult to draw, the similarity between them suggests that the phenomenon in question may be manifested at different levels of functioning. The stage findings reviewed to this point involve cases in which decreasing controllability is accompanied by a sequence of outward-type and inward-type behavior. In addition to these findings, there is evidence that the stages occur in the opposite order when there is a shift from severely uncontrollable events to slightly to moderately uncontrollable events. Brinton (1952), in The Anatomy of Revolution, observes that the lower strata of society respond to rising expectations by shifting from submissive, acquiescent behavior to rebellious behavior. Therefore, the riots of the blacks in the late 1960s, for example, could be seen as resulting in part from perceiving an increase in their personal control. Similarly, in the clinical literature on children, a shift from inward-type behavior to outward-type behavior is attributed to improvement in therapy, and more directly, to the child’s increasing sense of control (Bornstein, 1949;Freud, 1950). C. CLARIFYING THE MODEL LOSS AND LACK OF CONTROL

The expressions loss of control and lack of control are frequently employed in the helplessness-reactance literature. Loss of control typically refers to the perception of contrast between expectations of control and subsequent perceptions of uncontrollability. Lack of control typically refers to the perception of uncontrollability in the present situation. While different authors typically rely on one of these constructs more than the other, few authors employ them in a wholly consistent manner. Therefore, before considering how loss and lack relate to clinical behavior, it is important to clarify how they relate to one another. The differences between loss and lack of control can best be understood by considering how each relates to expectations of control. As defined in the last paragraph, loss of control refers to the perception of contrast between expectations of control and subsequent perceptions of uncontrollability. Two factors contributing to the salience of this contrast are (a) high expectations of control and (b) abrupt transitions from expectations of control to perceptions of uncontrollability. These factors make unlikely an exclusive focus on present perceptions. Therefore, they make unlikely perception of a lack of control. The differences between loss and lack described in the preceding paragraph help account for differences in methodology employed by investigators interested in each. Those who are particularly concerned with loss of control design studies

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in which subjects are led to adopt very high expectations of control, and in which the contingencies between responses and outcomes are very clear. For example, individuals who have been led to believe that they will be granted the behavioral option they prefer and who have selected an option are subsequently told that the option they selected is not available. Brehm (1966) and Wicklund (1974), who have designed many studies of this type, emphasize the individual’s “loss of freedom. ” It is difficult to analyze the construct of freedom without acknowledging the role of expectations. Things that we come to think of as freedoms are things over which we expect control. (These expectations may arise from implicit or explicit messages indicating that control is likely, from repeated experiences in which the individual has control, or from the fact that one’s comparison group has control.) Clearly, in the study described above, subjects are led to adopt a high expectation of control. Furthermore, because the contingencies are unambiguous, there is an abrupt transition between the expected attainability of the desired outcome and the subsequent perception of unattainability. Such abrupt shifts in perception are possible only when the individual can readily assess whether his responses lead to the desired outcome (i.e., when the contingencies are unambiguous). Very different paradigms are employed by investigators who emphasize lack of control. Typically, in studies designed by these investigators, subjects are not led to adopt high expectations of control. Moreover, the transition from expectations of control to subsequent perceptions of uncontrollability is generally gradual. This is accomplished by employing tasks in which contingencies are ambiguous. A common practice is to use complex tasks on which the degree of uncontrollability is not immediately evident because of the number of possible strategies that can be adopted in the solution of the task and because failure is random rather than absolute. Since contingencies are ambiguous, expectations of control and subsequent perceptions of uncontrollability are not temporally contiguous, and the contrast between them is not brought into focus. When expectations of control are not high and when perceptions of uncontrollability are gradually introduced, individuals are not likely to focus on their expectations or to perceive a contrast. As a consequence, they are more likely to perceive a lack of control than a loss of control. Armed with the distinction between loss and lack of control, it is possible to reconsider the relationship between uncontrollability and clinical behavior. Those investigators who tend to emphasize the role of loss of control and who have employed paradigms consistent with this emphasis (see Table I) have most frequently found reactance effects. Brehm (1966) and Wicklund (1974), leading spokesmen of this research tradition, maintain that there is a linear relationship between loss of control and reactance. Presumably, the high expectations of control accompanying severe loss provide a reminder of the way things can be and make the individual unlikely to accept his uncontrollability. Then too, the

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TABLE I Summary of Conditions Giving Rise to Loss and Lack Rior expectation of control

Present perception of control

Transition from prior expectation to present perception

High"

LOW

Abruptb

Low

LOW

GradUal

Loss of control

Focus is on contrast between prior expectation and present perception

Lack of control Focus is on present perception ~

~~~~~~~

Expectation of control is high when there are implicit or explicit messages indicating that control is likely, when there are previous experiences in which the individual has control, or when the individual's comparison group has control. * Abmpt transitions are likely to occur when contingencies are unambiguous.

more severe the loss, the more effort is needed to regain control. These dynamics can account for the connection between perceptions of loss and reactance. The association hypothesized between loss and reactance builds on a venerable tradition: It is closely aligned with the Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939) frustration-aggression hypothesis. While Dollard ef af. did not explicitly emphasize the role of expectations, the importance of expectations is implicit in their model. One of the earliest tests of their model was to assess the effect of removing a bottle (an event for which expectations of control are presumably high) from a child (Dollard et af., 1939). As a result of the frustrationaggression hypothesis and its derivatives, expectations of options and barriers to those options (i.e., clear violations of expectations) are nearly universal features of the research on aggression in children (cf. Feshbach, 1970). Examples include the Miller and Bugelski (1948) study of children's being deprived of a movie that they eagerly expected, the Otis and McCandless (1955) study of the occasional introduction of obstacles into children's play, and the Mallick and McCandless (1966) study of interference with completion of a task for which children were to receive a reward. In each case an unexpected frustration led to aggression. Not surprisingly, several authors have qualified the frustration-aggression hypothesis in such a manner as to make the role of expectations more explicit (Bateson, 1941; Berkowitz, 1962; Cohen, 1955; Haner & Brown, 1955; Kregerman & Worchel, 1961; Pastore, 1950, 1952; Wicklund, 1974; Zander, 1944). Those investigators who have emphasized the role of lack of control and who have employed paradigms consistent with this emphasis (see Table I) have most frequently found helplessness effects (see reviews by Abramson et al., 1978;

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Roth, 1980; Seligman, 1975; Wortman & Brehm, 1975). Also falling within this camp are those investigators who have examined both helplessness and reactance effects (Pittman & Pittman, 1979; Roth & Kubal, 1975; Tennen & Eller, 1977). Results from these studies are consistent with findings from the helplessness literature in their implication that severe uncontrollability leads to helplessness. However, an equally important finding from these studies is that slight to moderate uncontrollability leads to reactance. The relationship between the latter findings, which do not involve a lack of control (i.e., severe uncontrollability), and the findings involving helplessness will be discussed shortly. The naturalistic-stage research also points to the value of the loss-lack distinction and supports the preceding claims regarding how each relates to clinical behavior. Stage researchers investigate events like maternal separation, death of loved ones, and blindness-events with unambiguous contingencies. Moreover, in each of these cases there should be high expectations of control Individuals assume that they can approach or call for loved ones, particularly when the individuals who have their sight assume that they can see things if they focus on them. Control of each of these outcomes is removed by the events in question. The fact that stage researchers emphasize the role of loss of control and typically find an initial response of protest (prolonged reactance) is consistent with the present position. The later response observed in these stage studies, despair (prolonged helplessness), is also consistent with the present explanation: As the time from onset of the uncontrollable event increases, individuals tend to "lose sight of" their earlier expectations of control. As this happens, loss of control (which stem from a focus on the contrast between expectations of control and present perceptions) gives way to severe lack of control (which stems from a focus on expectations for uncontrollability and/or present perceptions of uncontrollability). Therefore, the loss-lack distinction facilitates understanding of both clinical states and stages. The loss-lack distinction suggests that severely uncontrollable events can (a) lead to reactance or helplessness depending on the paradigm used to induce uncontrollability (see Table I) and (b) lead to protest or despair, depending on the time that has elapsed since the onset of the uncontrollable event. In summary, findings indicate that loss and lack are not identical constructs and that they should not be used interchangeably. Loss and lack relate in different ways to clinical behavior: Loss leads to reactance and protest, whereas lack leads to helplessness and despair. The fact that slight to moderate uncontrollability has a similar effect as loss of control suggests that the underlying dynamic in reactance is the perception that control can be regained; the fact that helplessness is induced by lack of control suggests that the underlying dynamic in helplessness is the perception that control cannot be regained (cf. Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 1979; Wortman & Bmhm, 1975). The distinction between loss and lack of control will play a significant role in the remainder of this article, particularly

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when evidence regarding the relationship between generalized expectations of control and syndromes is reviewed (Section IV,A).

IV. Toward a Helplessness-Reactance Explanation of Syndromes It is my belief that the helplessness-reactance model is capable of shedding light on the inward and outward syndromes (i.e., the temporally and situationally stable behavioral clusters in children that were reviewed in Section II). To prove the relevance of the helplessness-reactance model, it will be necessary to link the clinical states of helplessness and reactance with which the model is directly concerned, and the inward and outward syndromes. The stage research is of value because it can act as a bridge in making this connection. As already noted, the stage research relates in essential ways to the state research. The ties between the stage research and the factor analytic research on syndromes constitute the other half of the bridge. This will be the next topic for consideration. The factor analytic research cited earlier was designed to provide a classification system for children’s clinical syndromes. This research has led to the identification of behavioral complexes that have at least moderate stability over time. There are several obvious similarities between the factor analytic research and the naturalistic studies of stages described earlier. First, there is overlap in the age levels studied. Unlike the laboratory-state studies, which are almost exclusively concerned with adults, several of the naturalistic-stage studies are concerned with children (cf. Klinger, 1975). Since the ultimate goal is to understand clinical syndromes of children, it is imperative that research focus on this population. A second similarity between the factor analytic and naturalistic-stageresearch is that they both address behavioral complexes. One of the benefits of naturalistic-stagestudies is that they permit the observation of numerous manifestations of clinical behavior, (Lea, of “protest” and “despair”). Instances of protest observed in the naturalistic-stage research include disobedience, hostility, and aggression; and instances of despair include depressed affect, loss of appetite, and somaticization. The resemblance between these behavioral complexes and the outward and inward syndromes derived from factor analytic research is readily apparent. Subjects are less likely to manifest clinical complexes (i.e., multiple clinical behaviors) in laboratory-state studies than in naturalistic-stage studies because the antecedents investigated in the former are less stressful. Indirect evidence of complexes could be obtained by comparing findings from several laboratory-state studies in each of the studies examined different clinical behaviors. However, the indirect approach has been impeded by the tendency of laboratory-state researchers to focus on only a few dependent variables, such as

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persistence. Though increases and decreases in persistence relate in obvious ways to outward and inward behavior, respectively, the focus on this or any other single manifestation of clinical behavior makes it difficult to draw conclusions regarding behavior complexes. A third similarity between the factor analytic and the naturalistic-stage research is that they both address behaviors extended in time. Stage researchers have indicated that both the protest and despair phases can last weeks to months. By contrast, an implication that m a y be drawn from the laboratory studies of states is that clinical behaviors last a matter of minutes. While state researchers assume that the mechanisms they are investigating can produce enduring effects, the specific behaviors that they have examined are of brief duration. Hence, the stage research is unlike the state research in that it indicates that clinical behavior reactions are extended in time. In this important respect, the stages resemble the syndromes identified in factor analytic research. The preceding analysis indicates the critical role of the naturalistic-stage research in linking the laboratory-state research to the syndromes derived from factor analytic research. On the one hand, the stage research resembles the state research in that both demonstrate that outward-type behavior and inward-type behavior relate to differences in perceived control. On the other hand, the stage research relates in essential respects to the factor analytic research on syndromes: Both of these bodies of research involve children and they both involve behavioral complexes that are extended in time. The laboratory research on states is dissimilar to the two other bodies of research in each of these respects-it involves adults and it addresses simple behaviors that are limited in time. A summary of the ties between naturalistic-stage research and laboratory-state research, and between naturalistic-stage research and factor analystic research, is provided in Fig. 1. The summary highlights the fact that the stage research serves as a bridge between the two other bodies of research. In so doing, it indicates the potential applicability of the helplessness-reactance model for understanding syndromes. The evidence reviewed to this point suggests that states and stages function in ways consistent with the helplessness-reactance model and that there are similarities between states and stages on the one hand and syndromes on the other. This evidence provides partial support for the claim that the helplessness-reactance model is relevant to the study of syndromes. In order to gain increased confidence in the relevance of the model, it will be necessary to provide direct evidence of the model’s implications. Since the helplessnessreactance model assumes a connection between clinical behaviors and perceptions of uncontrollability, the major implication for clinical syndromes (i.e., clinical behaviors extended in time) is that they relate to recurring perceptions of loss and lack of control. The question therefore arises as to whether there are generalized expectations that predispose the individual to recurring perceptions

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I

Factor Analytic Studies of Syndromes Identification of' Outward and Inward Behavior in Children

I

investigations of Children

Behaviors Extended in Time

Behavioral Complexes

1

Naturalistic Studies of Stages Identification of Prolest and Despair Behavior in Children and Adults

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Investigations of Adults

Outward-type behavior caused by perception of' loss of control or slight to moderate uncontrollability; inward-type behavior caused by perception of lack of control

Laboratory Studies of States Identification of Reactance and Heljltessness Behavior in Adults Helplessness-Reactance Model Fig. 1 . Similarities between clinical behavior states, stages, and syndromes.

of loss and lack of control. Evidence regarding this matter is the next topic to be reviewed. A.

LOCUS OF CONTROL

This subsection addresses four issues: (1) the similarity between the locus of control construct and the construct of control employed by helplessnessreactance theorists, (2) the generalizability of locus of control, (3) the relationships between locus of control and loss and lack of control, and (4) the relationships between locus of control and inward and outward behavior. Consideration of each of these issues is helpful in establishing a link between locus of control and the inward syndrome.

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In moving from the helplessness-reactance model construct of control, which is operationalized through situational manipulations, to a generalized construct of control, which is operationalized through attitudinal measures, a primary concern is whether the two constructs are comparable. A strong case for comparability can be made if the generalized construct selected is locus of control. The locus of control construct consists of a bipolar dimension of internality vs externality. Individuals at the internal end attribute outcomes to factors inside the self, and individualsat the external end attribute events to external factors or to chance. Stated otherwise, internal locus of control relates to an expectation of contingency between one's own actions and subsequent outcomes, whereas external locus of control relates to an expectation of noncontingencybetween one's actions and outcomes. The nearly total overlap between this conception of control and the conception of control employed in helplessness-reactance theory is not accidental. Investigators of helplessness have openly borrowed from and contributed to the locus of control literature (Seligman, 1975) and investigators of locus of control point to the essential similarities between their work and the work on helplessness (Lefcourt, 1976).4 In addition, several studies have demonstrated a relationship between external locus of control and manipulations of uncontrollable outcomes (Cohen et al., 1976; Dweck & Reppucci, 1973; Gregory, Chartier, & Wright, 1979; &to, 1974; Pittman & Pittman, 1979). To relate locus of control to clinical syndromes, it is necessary to document the generalizability of locus of control; since the syndromes that the locus of control construct are intended to explain have only limited cross-situational generalizability, it is necessary to show only that locus of control has limited crosssituational generalizability. Mischel, Zeiss , and Zeiss (1 974) have investigated this issue by employing a scale that assesses perceptions of control in different situations. Their findings indicate that there are statistically significant but small correlations ( r C .20) across items (across situations). However, it should be noted that Mischel et al. intentionally selected descriptions of specific, heterogeneoussituations. Had they selected descriptionsof broad situations and/or situations that bore greater similarity to one another, the cross-situation correlations might have been substantially higher. Consistent with this interpretation, higher correlations between items (situations) have been found with locus of conwl questionnaires that employ less heterogeneous situations. For example, 'Recently Abramson and her collaborators (Abramson er al., 1978) have maintained that locus of control and mmntingency are independent dimensions. These authors maintain that personal noncontingency (i.e., self is the only one who lacks contingency) implies an internal locus of control and that universal noncontingency (i.e., self and others lack contingency) implies an external locus of control. This follows from Abramson's definition of internal locus of control as a discrepancy between the contingency of self and others, and from her definition of external locus of control as the absence of such a discrepancy. By contrast, in the present paper, internalityis d e f i i as contingency between actions and outcomes and externality is defined as the absence of contingency. It is believed that these definitions are more consistent with the operationalizations of locus of control that have been employed in the past.

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the split-half reliabilities for the children’s Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Scale range from .54 to .60 (Crandall, Katkovsky, & Crandall, 1965). Further evidence of cross-situational generalization comes from studies that have related locus of control questionnaire responses to contingency-based behavior in situations that were not specifically addressed in the questionnaires. Children with internal locus of control score higher on reading, math, spelling, language, and total achievement tests (Chance, 1965; Crandall et al., 1965; Crandall, Katkovsky, & Preston, 1962; McGhee & Crandall, 1968), as well as on intelligence tests (Chance, 1965; Crandall et al., 1962) and grades (Crandall et al., 1965). Naditch (1973) found correlations between internal locus of control and achievement in areas that were important to the child, be they in the realm of school, social life, or athletics. Internal locus of control also relates to children’s persistence-in activities required to obtain attractive goals and to avoid aversive outcomes (Mischel et al., 1974), in attempts to solve complex logical puzzles (James, 1965), in time spent doing homework (Franklin, 1963), and in waiting for deferred goals (Walls & Smith, 1970). The preceding findings are by no means without exceptions; they vary with the sex and age of the children, the valence of the reinforcements, and other factors. (For a more extensive review see Lefcourt, 1976.) However, there is enough consensus to conclude that perceptions of contingency between actions and outcomes are at least slightly generalizable across situations. Temporal generalizability of the locus of control dimension has also been demonstrated. Findings from several studies of locus of control in children indicate that there are respectable degrees of consistency across time (Crandall et al., 1965; Nowicki & Duke, 1974; Mischel et al., 1974; Nowicki & Strickland, 1973; Rothbaum, Wolfer, & Visintainer, 1979). In these studies, retest intervals have ranged from approximately 1.5 to 8 months, and correlations in scores have ranged from .62 to .79. Hence, it appears that children’s perceptions of intemalexternal locus of control have moderate temporal stability over a period of months. The evidence that locus of control has at least slight stability across situations and moderate stability across time adds to earlier indications that this construct is well suited to account for children’s clinical syndromes. An essential next question is whether locus of control relates to the recurring perception of loss or lack of control. There is little reason to believe that locus of control relates to loss of control. It is true that internal locus of control is likely to lead to high expectations and that high expectations predispose children to perceptions of loss. However, two factors make unlikely a connection between internal locus of control and loss. First, since children with an internal locus of control adopt the perception that actions lead to outcomes, they are more likely to take steps to obtain the desired outcome and, in so doing, to lessen the chance of loss. Second, even when they enter into objectively uncontrollable situations, they are protected

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against abrupt perceptions of loss because of their initial perceptions that these situations are controllable. Only gradually do they recognize the existence of uncontrollability. Since locus of control has a similar effect on expectations and subsequent perception, locus of control should not relate to perceptions of loss. There is, however, ample reason to believe in a relationship between locus of control and lack of control. First, external locus of control should give rise to expectations of uncontrollability . Second, these expectations are likely to translate into perceptions, since the individual is unlikely to take action that will remedy the situation (that is, the expectation of uncontrollability is likely to function as a self-fulfilling prophecy). It is probably not fortuitous that locus of control theorists depict externality as entailing a lack of control more often than they depict it as entailing a loss of control. The claim here is that external locus of control predisposes individuals to perceive a lack of control and consequently, to manifest inward-type behavior. In support of the preceding predictions, a number of studies have found a correlation between external locus of control and inward-type behavior, such as passivity, withdrawal, and anxiety (cf. Lefcourt, 1976; Phares, 1976). In his review of the locus of control literature, Lefcourt concludes that externality has been related most often to depressive kinds of behaviors-behaviors that belong to the inward syndrome. These findings emerge in both self and observer reports. Harrow and Ferrante (1969) found that, in contrast to other psychiatric groups, patients with depressive symptoms showed more significant change toward greater internality following a 6-week period at a clinical facility. Schizophrenia, another disorder commonly associated with the inward syndrome because of the predominance of helplessness (White, 1965), has been related to external locus of control in several studies (cf. Lefcourt, 1976, p. 90). Data from laboratory-state research also indicate a connection between external locus of control and inward behavior. Compared to individuals with an internal locus of control, individuals with an external locus of control are more likely to respond to uncontrollable experiences with manifestations of helplessness (Cohen et al., 1976; Hiroto, 1974). Hiroto (1974) reports that externals perform more poorly on tasks than intemals, whether their pretreatments consist of contingent or noncontingent reinforcement. Even during the pretreatment task itself, externals were slower to escape, required more trials to reach an avoidance criterion, and made fewer avoidance responses. Cohen et al. (1976) also report greater inward-type behavior among externals than internals following noncontingent pretreatments but not following contingent pretreatments. The latter findings and subsequent findings by Gregory er af. (1979) and Pittman and Pittman (1979) indicate that externals do not manifest greater inward behavior following experiences that are extremely controllable (due to increases in externals’ perceptions of control) or extremely uncontrollable (due to decreases in internals’ perceptions of control). However, the finding that externals respond with more

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inward behavior than do internals following less extreme experiences (i.e., neutral or slightly uncontrollable experiences) has been obtained in all of the preceding studies. Research by Dweck and her colleagues indicates that the preceding dynamics are applicable with children as well as adults. Dweck and Reppucci (1973) found that the greatest performance decrements following laboratory-induced failure were evident in children who were assessed as having an external locus of control. In a later study, Dweck (1975) found significantly more externality in a sample of fifth grade students with a history of extreme helplessness than in a comparable sample of persistent students. More recently, Diener and Dweck (1978) found that external children respond to failure with fewer task relevant instructions, more statements of negative affect, more Statements irrelevant to task solution, and less persistence than do internals. These findings indicate that external locus of control in children relates to longstanding patterns of helplessness as well as to susceptibility to helplessness in failure situations. In contrast to the evidence linking external locus of control and inward-type behavior, there is an absence of laboratory-state evidence that external locus of control relates to outward-type behavior (but see Cherulnik & Citrin, 1974, for a possible exception). Moreover, only a few correlational studies have indicated a relationship between longstanding patterns of outward-type behavior and external locus of control, and these have serious methodological shortcomings. Williams and Vantress ( 1969) report a small but significant Correlation ( r = .27) between externality and self-reports of “aggression,” but include in the latter measure resentment and indirect aggression. That “aggression” as meant here is a measure of outward as opposed to inward behavior is unclear. Similarly, Duke and Fenhagen (1975) conclude that there is a relationship between externality and delinquency on the basis of findings that a delinquent sample had a more external locus of control than a normal “control” sample. However, the relationship between delinquency and externality may be due to the fact that the delinquents were incarcerated at the time of the study. Finally, it should be noted that mania and alcoholism-adult disorders that in several respects resemble the outward syndromes of children-have been shown to relate in an inconsistent manner to locus of control (cf. Lefcourt, 1976). Hence, the evidence linking external locus of control with outward behavior is less substantial than the evidence linking it with inward behavior. A direct test of the relationship between locus of control and clinical behavior was recently completed (Rothbaum et al., 1979). The study employed children aged 4-12 who were hospitalized for tonsillectomies. Two locus of control instruments were administered, the Nowicki-Strickland (Nowicki & Duke, 1974; Nowicki & Strickland, 1973) and the Desirable and Undesirable EventLocus of Control (DUE-LOC) scale. The new measure was considered to have greater face validity as a measure of locus of control in that it requires the child to

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make an internal or external attribution for each item. The Nowicki-Strickland, by contrast, confounds the issue of locus of control with related but distinguishable issues such as self-confidence. Both scales have respectable degrees of criterion validity and reliability. The measure of clinical behavior employed in this study was a 24-item scale fashioned after instruments devised by Achenbach (1966) and Peterson (1961). This measure was completed by the children’s mothers. (For a fuller description of the measures and their rationale see Rothbaum et al., 1979.) Results indicated that the DUE-LOC score related to type of clinical behavior. A significant positive correlation was found between inward behavior and externality [r(24) = 38, p. < .01] but not between outward behavior and externality [r(24) = -.lo, p > .lo]. The difference between these correlations was significant (t = 2.71, p < .01). In addition, externality related to the proportion of inward behavior [the number of inward behaviors divided by the total number of clinical behaviors; r(24) = .52, p < .01]. Replication of these findings was obtained in a subsequent study (Rothbaum et af., 1979). These findings constitute support for the hypothesis that the helplessness-reactance model is relevant to the study of syndromes. Consistent with the model, the findings demonstrate that external locus of control relates in a linear manner to inward behavior 6ut not to outward behavior. B. EFFECTIVENESS OF NONCONTRACTUAL METHODS

The evidence just provided indicates that external locus of control predisposes children to repeated perceptions of luck of control, and, consequently, to manifestations of inward behavior. From this evidence the question arises as to whether there are generalized expectations of control that predispose children to repeated perceptions of loss of control, and consequently, to manifestations of outward behavior. The relative deprivation hypothesis of social psychology is relevant to this issue. According to this hypothesis, it is not success or failure in absolute terms that shapes outward-typebehavior, but success and failure relative to that which is expected (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). A particularly compelling example of the relative deprivation hypothesis is provided by Pettigrew (1964) in his analysis of the protest and action of black Americans following World War II. According to Pettigrew, exclusive attention to absolute criteria of well-being leads to the expectation that black Americans should be more content during the post-war period than during any previous period in American history. This clearly is not the case. Discontent is evident in t,heu restiveness, in their anger, and in their impatience for further gains. Pettigrew persuasively reasoned that discontent manifested itself strongly when black Americans’aspirations rose at a faster pace than their actual gains. To understand

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protest and action, one must consider the relative magnitude of aspirations and actual circumstances. A similar position is adopted by Merton (1957) in his now classic “anomie” explanation of juvenile delinquency. According to Merton, the “conflict” or “disjunction” between “culturally accepted values and the socially structured difficulties in living up to these values. . . exerts pressure toward deviant behavior and disruption of the normative system” (p. 191). Merton’s anomie theory is supported by a vast sociological literature (Aubert, 1952; Barron, 1951; Glaser, 1956; Kobrin, 1951; Mannheim, 1956; Spencer, 1955; Sprott, 1954, Turner, 1954). While Pettigrew and Merton are more concerned with aspirations and motives than with expectations per se, their claims are generally consistent with the earlier hypothesis of a connection between loss of control and outward behavior. Even clearer evidence of a link between unrealistically high expectations and outward behavior comes from other theories and research on delinquency. Borrowing from the relative deprivation hypothesis, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) maintain that gang delinquency emanates from blockages in the attainment of anticipated goals. Such discrepancies, they argue, are common in the lower classes: “Since discrepancies between aspiration and opportunity are likely to be experienced most intensely at some positions along the socioeconomic scale then along others, ” there should be a greater “sense of indignation and withdrawal of supports for established norms” at these positions (p. 108). The Cohen (1955) theory of delinquency differs from that of Cloward and Ohlin in that the former emphasizes inability to conform due to failure to master necessary skills, and the latter emphasizes unjust availability of opportunity. Nevertheless, the theories have in common an emphasis on the contrast between expectations of control and subsequent preceptions. According to Cohen’s theory, the delinquency of the lower class child can be related to the discrepancy between (a) middle class pressures and “expectations” to succeed due to contacts with teachers, playground directors, ministers, and other middle class agents and (b) the inability to conform to these expectations. Reiss and Rhodes (1963) also emphasize discrepancies between expectations and subsequent outcomes. Based on their extensive study of delinquent boys, these authors conclude that delinquency arises when children compare their lives unfavorably with those of higher classes. Miller’s theory of delinquency-that lower class norms and values are conducive to behavior that is considered antisocial in middle class context+is strikingly different from the theories described above. Therefore it is particularly interesting that Miller, too, emphasizes the role of unanticipated losses: “The lower class younster who is ‘stalled’in regard to achievement aspiration is. . . likely to become delinquent” (Kvaraceus C Miller, 1959, p. 136). The link between unrealistic expectations of options and outward behavior can

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be found in the literature on normal development as well as in the literature on delinquency. Berkowitz ( 1969) observes that “excessively indulged children probably expect to be gratified most of the time, so that inevitable occasional frustrations they encounter are actually relatively strong thwartings for them. There is little doubt that these frustrations can produce aggression” (p. 379). Similarly, Jersild (1969) notes that children of overindulgent parents “are due for some hard jolts. . . their vague notions of omnipotence and illusions concerning their own rights will clash with the realities of life” (p. 139). In the theories on delinquency and explanations for “spoiled” children there is considerable support for the present formulation regarding outward behavior. First, there is a consistent emphasis on high expectations. Second and more importantly, there is a consistent emphasis on notions of “discrepancy,” “conflict,” and “disjunction” between expectations and subsequent perceptions (the terms vary but the concept does not). One limitation of the preceding analysis is that it fails to account for the ongoing occurrence of outward behavior. Repeated perceptions of loss should lead to a lowering of expectations and an eventual decrease in perceptions of loss. Moreover, if outward children have uniformly high expectations of control, this should be reflected in higher scores on internal locus of control, a finding that has not been obtained. The question therefore arises: What are the generalized expectations that predispose the individual to repeated perceptions of loss of control? In my opinion, expectations of the “effectiveness of noncontractual methods” help explain the Occurrence and nonoccurrence of repeated perceptions of loss. Contracts are defined as either (a) agreements between individuals (or between an individual and himself) in which the duties of each party and the stipulations involving the duties (e.g., when, where, and how they are to be performed) are mutually agreed upon or (b) the adherence to norms. [The association between agreements and norms should be credited to Elkind (1979) and Lemer (1977), who also employ the superordinate construct “contracts. ”1 Delinquents, sociopaths, “spoiled” children, and other groups characterized by antisocial acts have in common the expectation that noncontractual methods are more effective than contractual methods in obtaining outcomes. It is primarily because they do not rely on contracts that these individuals repeatedly experience perceptions of loss of control. Instead of relying on contracts, they proceed along an independent course with no assurance as to when, where, and how they will encounter interference from outside forces. Closely related to the expectation that noncontractual methods are effective in producing outcomes is egocentrism4he failure to adopt perspectives other than one’s own immediate ones. Descriptions of perspective-taking skills provided in the cognitive developmental literature readily call to mind the notion of contracts. For example, mutual perspective taking, the ability of two persons to

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understand that each can take both his own and the other’s perspective, is an obvious aid in the formation of contracts. Consistent with the hypothesized connection between the expectation that noncontractual methods are effective and outward behavior, several studies have indicated a relationship between egocentrism (i.e., lack of perspective taking) and outward behavior (Blumenfeld 8c Kinghom, 1979; Chandler, 1973). A common explanation for this relationship is that empathy diminishes aggression. However, the rationale provided above suggests another possibility: that an absence of contracts and, thus, perceptions of loss, mediates the relationship between egocentrism and outward behavior. Recently the notion of contracts has found a home in social psychology, in the literature on “just world phenomena.” According to Lerner (1977), people form contracts to maximize gains and minimize losses. Lerner maintains that there are two types of contracts-those the individual forms with himself (personal) and those formed with other individuals and with social institutions (social). Individuals form personal contracts to accommodate to reality restraints and their own conflicting needs. For example, in delay of gratification, one abandons an immediate goal in favor of a more realistic or preferred goal. Individuals form social contracts to accommodate to the needs of others. Without contracts, one’s expectations of control are likely to approximate one’s desire for control. Moreover, an absence of contracts implies that there are no safeguards against potential obstacles. Since steps have not been taken to appease potentially antagonistic forces, the individual who disregards contracts is very susceptible to perceptions of loss. The preceding points suggest that individuals adopt contracts to mitigate anxiety regarding future losses of control. It is interesting to note in this connection that delinquent and sociopathic individuals are characterized by high repression and low anxiety (Kilpatrick, Cauthen, & Roitzsch, 1971; Lykken, 1957). Thus, it is possible that outward children believe that noncontractual methods are effective partly because they are not particularly susceptible to anxiety regarding the potential losses associated with such methods. The hypothesized relationship between expectations regarding contracts and outward behavior has been shown to be consistent with research on egocentrism, just world phenomena, and repression. Most importantly, the literature on contracts is consistent with the earlier literature on juvenile delinquency. The two literatures agree on the essential point that children manifest outward behavior when their expectations are higher than their subsequent perceptions. The notion of contracts is particularly valuable in that it helps explain the susceptibility to recurring perceptions of loss. In a recently completed study, partial support for the relationship between expectations of the effectiveness of noncontractual procedures and outward behavior was provided. Rothbaum and Snieska (1979) administered measures of expectations, inward and outward behavior, and delay of gratification to 32

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upper-middle-class males, aged 8-11 years. Expectations were assessed by a questionnaire in which children selected either a contractual or noncontractual strategy as the most effective one for obtaining an outcome. Contractual strategies were defined as ones in which an agreement is formed or in which norms are adhered to. An example of the first kind is: The way to get to be happy is: (Contract) do something you and others have agreed you should do? or (No contract) do somethingyou think will make you happy? An example of the second kind is:

The way to keep from getting hurt is to: (Contract) do things people usually do so they don’t get hurt? or (No contract) be careful in your own way? The measure of inward and outward behavior, Achenbach’s Child Behavior Checklist, was completed by parents. The third measure, delay of gratification, consisted of two trials on each of which the child could select either a smallimmediate or a largedelayed reward. Findings indicated a significant positive relationship between expectations that noncontractual methods are effective in obtaining outcomes and outward behavior [r(30)= .39, p < .05] and a significant negative relationship between expectations that noncontractual methods are effective and delay of gratification [r(30)= -2.20, p < .05]. The mean expectations score for children who delayed on both trials was 15.1 and the mean score for children who did not delay on one or both trials was 17.1 (since only two children did not delay on both trials, they were combined with the children who did not delay on only one trial). Whereas the contracts measure related to both measures of outward behavior, it did not relate to the parent’s reports of inward behavior [r(30) = .01]. Therefore, the findings cannot be attributed to a general relationship between the expectation that noncontractual methods are effective and all clinical behavior. These findings provide direct support for the hypothesized relationship between the expectation that noncontractual methods are effective and outward behavior. C. CHILDREARING PRACTICES: ANTECEDENTS OF GENERALIZED EXPECTATIONS

The evidence in the preceding subsection indicates that clinical syndromes relate to differences in generalized expectations of control (i.e., to locus of control and effectiveness of contracts). The evidence to be cited now suggests that childrearing practices may be particularly important antecedents of these

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generalized expectations. Moreover, the present evidence is consistent with the helplessness-reactance model in that the childrearing practices relate in the predicted manner to clinical syndromes. The clinical literature is quite consistent in portraying the inhibited child as coming from a home in which the parents exercise too much control [that is, the parents determine what the child will do, and they ensure that it is done (Kessler, 1966; Freud, 1965)l. The prefix “over” is often found in conjunction with adjectives like controlling, dominant, directive, and enmeshed in describing these parents. Research has generally supported the conventional clinical wisdom that children characterized by inhibited behavior, extreme conformity, rigidity, restricted curiosity, and feelings of worthlessness (as compared to aggressive, acting out children) have parents who exercise a high degree of control (Busse, 1969; Lewis 1954; Rosenthal, Finkelstein, & Berkwits, 1962). This holds whether control is embedded in a covertly hostile childrearing context (Becker, 1964; Kessler, 1966; Rosenthal et al., 1962) or a warm and loving one (Becker, 1964; Kagan & Moss, 1962; Sears, 1961). While inward behavior relates to extreme parental control, there is evidence that outward behavior relates to insufficient or lax control. Several indices of lax control, including indulgence (Levy, 1943), failure to exercise control (Baumrind, 1966), and lack of concern (Achenbach, 1966), have been found to relate to outward behavior in children. Research on delinquency indicates a similar pattern. Glueck and Glueck (1959) found delinquency to relate to parental indifference and lack of demands. McCord, McCord, and Howard (1961) report a correlation between delinquency and parental laxness and lack of demands. Results from a longitudinal study indicate that lack of supervision in childhood is a major predictor of criminal behavior in adult men (McCord, 1979). As with the relationship between overcontrol and inward behavior, the relationship between lax control and outward behavior emerges in both covertly hostile childrearing contexts (Becker, 1964; Craig & Glick, 1963; Tait & Hodges, 1962) and warm and loving ones (Baldwin, 1949; Becker, 1964; Elder, 1971; Kagan & Moss, 1962; Sears, 1961). Besides laxness, another childrearing practice that has been related to outward behavior is inconsistency (cf. Becker, 1964; Herbert, 1978). The most common operationalization of inconsistency is a predominatly lax environment with occasional and unpredictable directiveness. Therefore, the findings regarding laxness can be seen as related to those regarding inconsistency. Although the focus in one case is on the baseline (of laxness) and in the other case on the contrast between the baseline and instances of directiveness, there is an obvious commonality between the two. The helplessness-reactance model prediction regarding inward behavior is that it should relate to perceptions of severe uncontrollability. The childrearing evidence is consistent with this prediction: Since very directive parenting is likely to lead to a suppression of children’s self-directed activities and consequently, to

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failure to perceive contingencies between one’s own actions and subsequent outcomes, it is likely to lead to expectations of uncontrollability. Loeb (1975) provides evidence of a connection between directive parenting and external locus of control. Similarly, Crandall (1973) provides evidence that children whose parents (mothers) take too much charge of them and who do not let them learn for themselves fail to develop an internal locus of control. Independent functioning leads to “more opportunity for the child to observe the effect of his own behavior, the contingency between his own actions and ensuing events, unmediated by maternal intervention” (Crandall, 1973, p. 13). Hence, there is reason to believe that the relationship between directive parenting and inward behavior is mediated by external locus of control. The helplessness-reactance model prediction regarding outward behavior is that it should relate to the expectation that noncontractual methods are effective. This is consistent with the childrearing findings. Parents who are lax and place few demands on their children are likely to have children who seek independent (noncontractual) paths to goals; the children do not learn that the formation of agreements (e.g., compromises) and the following of norms are valuable means of accomplishing goals. Parental inconsistency is even more likely to relate to an avoidance of contracts. If the child cannot depend on adults to carry through their end of an agreement or to respond appropriately to normative behavior, he has little motivation to rely on contracts. In support of the hypothesized connection between laxness and expectations that contracts are ineffective is the finding by Byrne (1 964) that children from lax homes are characterized by greater repression and less anxiety than children from restrictive homes. As noted earlier, anxiety is a major incentive for the formation of contracts. Since laxness also inhibits perspective-taking (Hurlock, 1974; Jersild, 1969), there is yet another reason to suspect that children from lax homes do not recognize the effectiveness of contracts. A summary of the relationships between childrearing practices and clinical behaviors is shown in Table II. Two major qualifications of points raised earlier in this subsection are needed. First, the connections between directiveness and inward behavior and between laxness and outward behavior are much stronger in hostile and rejecting homes than in warm and accepting homes (Anthony, 1970; see also footnote 3). Second, it can be questioned whether evidence in this section supports the prediction that the childrearing practices cause clinical syndromes. The childrearing literature, which is correlational, does not speak to the question of causality; it merely affirms the existence of a connecti~n.~ It would appear, then, that further support 5Ssince the childrearing research is carelatid, it is possible that the findings are due to differences in preference for childrearingpractices as well as to effects of the childrearing practices (cf. Bell, 1%8). For example, children with outward behavior, who have high expectationsof control according to the helplessness-reactance model. may prefer lax to directive practices. That is, they may prefex those practices which allow for their exercise of control. By contrast, children with inward

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TABLE Il Relationship between Childrearing Practices and Behavioral Syndromes“ ~

Childrearing practice

Generalized expectancy

Redisposition to perception of

Directiveness

External locus of control (“undercontrol”) Noncontractual methods are effective (“overcontrol ”)

Lack of control

Inward

Loss of control

outward

Laxness

Behavioral syndrome

In the past, the only difference between expectations and perceptions of control has been that the former referred to future events and the latter to past or present events (Abramson ef al., 1978; Wortman & Brehm, 1975). However, in the present model, it can be seen that expectations and perceptions differ in kind as well as in temporality.

for the relationships posited in this section is needed. However, the evidence cited and the associated theoretical rationale are suggestive of these particular relationships.

V. Conclusion A. THE ISSUE OF APPROPRIATENESS

As mentioned at the outset, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the helplessness-reactance model provides a viable explanation for clinical syndromes in children. A number of approaches have been adopted in attempting to support the value of this model. First, the link between clinical states (which provide the clearest support for the helplessness-reactance model) and clinical syndromes was strengthened by drawing from evidence regarding clinical stages. Next, it was demonstrated that syndromes relate to generalized expectations of control in a manner consistent with the helplessness-reactance model. Finally, it oehavior, who according to the model have an external locus of control, may prefer directive to lax practices. Since they see little possibility of exercising their own control, they may look to others’ guidance and direction as a substitute. Findings from research on therapeutic outcomes in adults can be wen as consistent with these predictions. Abramowitz, Abramowitz, Roback, and Jackson (1974) found individual differences in preference for and reported benefit from directive vs nondirective group therapy leaders: External locus of control clients were more likely than internal locus of control clients to prefer and benefit from the dinctive leaders (see also Helweg & Gaines, 1977). In a similar vein. it is suggested that inward children, who expect very little control, and outward children, who anticipate very much control, will prefer and select adults who act in accordance with their expectations.

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was shown that the evidence regarding childrearing practices is consistent with

the hypothesized relationships between generalized expectations of control and

syndromes. In demonstrating the applicability of the helplessness-reactance model to syndromes, the preceding findings raise the perplexing issue of “appropriateness. ” Almost all helplessness-reactance theorists mentioned in this article maintain that the truly difficult-to-explain clinical behaviors are those that are inappropriate (i.e., not warranted by the present situation). According to these theorists, it is easy to understand why someone whose expectations of control are violated (who loses control) tries harder and/or lashes out, and why someone who completely lacks control gives up. What is difficult to explain is the manifestation of reactance and helplessness in situations different from those in which the individual’s control has been manipulated. Tennen and Eller (1977) go so far as to claim that the “uniqueness” of the helplessness model is the presumption that perceptions of uncontrollability generalize to situations in which they are inappropriate. However, the definition of ‘‘inappropriate” adopted by helplessnessreactance theorists is somewhat ambiguous. Two important criteria of inappropriateness are the maladaptiveness of the behavior and the unjustifiability of the reasons for the behavior. Helplessness-reactance theorists seem to rely more on the latter criterion than the former; they would not label as inappropriate a lack of persistence if the subject had a justifiable reason to believe that persistence would not lead to the desired outcome, even if persistence would in actuality have led to the desired outcome. The question thus shifts to what constitutes an unjustifiable reason. According to most helplessness-reactance theorists, a justifiable reason for the generalization of perceptions across situations is the similarity (or overlap) between the situations with respect to the experimenters, tasks, and rooms involved. In one of the best designed laboratory studies, Tennen and Eller (1977) found reactant and helpless clinical behaviors in a test session, even though the test session differed from the manipulation session with respect to each of the preceding factors. Tennen and Eller criticize other helplessness-reactance theorists’ use of the term “inappropriate” because they do not consider all of these factors. For example, they reprove Roth and Kubal (1975) for employing similar tasks in their manipulation and test sessions, even though these tasks were administered by different experimenters in different rooms. Presumably they would also reprove Dweck and Reppucci (1973), who employed different tasks but the same experimenter in the manipulation and test sessions. This repoval would fail to take into consideration a critical feature of Dweck and Reppucci’s findings: The children manifest helpIess behaviors on problems that were almost identical to problems that they had shortly before solved with another expenmenter. Although the designs in these studies do not meet Tennen and Eller’s strict criteria of inappropriateness, it is difficult to conceive of the behaviors manifested or the perceptions underlying them as wholly approMate.

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In the opinion of the present author, the attempt to distinguish between “appropriate” and “inappropriate” behaviors is misguided. It would be preferable to specify those criteria with respect to which a given behavior is inappropriate or appropriate. Tennen and Eller have identified essential dimensions of cross-situation similarity-experimenter, task, and room, but this list is by no means exhaustive. Wortman and Brehm (1975) suggest that generalization may arise from similarity in the reinforcements received. To this might be added similarity in the type of behavior required; even on different tasks, similar behaviors (e.g., reading, using a pencil, gross motor activity) may be required. The question then becomes whether similarity along these dimensions provides us justifiable a reason for generalization of behavior as does similarity along the dimensions emphasized by Tennen and Eller. One dimension contributing to cross-situation generalization that has been all but ignored by helplessness-reactance theorists is the “psychological distance” between the manipulation and test sessions. In their laboratory state studies, the opportunity for “inappropriate” reactions occurs soon if not immediately after the manipulation period, and there are no salient intervening events. It would seem that this temporal contiguity of manipulation and test sessions is at least partially responsible for inappropriategeneralizationsin that it facilitates a “spillover” of perceptions. Indeed, if it takes time for individuals to alter their existing perceptions, it would be difficult to understand how “inappropriate” perceptions could fail to occur in the new situation. The claim that temporal contiguity contributes to the appropriatenessof crosssituation generalization is consistent with the two criteria of appropriateness mentioned earlier: It seems both adaptive and justifmble that subjects should attribute uncontrollability to handicaps that will extend into the short-term future (e.g., “I’m not too alert right now. ”; “This isn’t my day. ”). These attributions can account for both reactant and helpless clinical behaviors on subsequent controllable tasks. If the prior event is seen to involve a loss of control or slight to moderate uncontrollability, subjects may become reactant “to make sure” that they overcome this short-term handicap. If the prior uncontrollable event is seen to involve a lack of control, subjects may become helpless, as they may feel that the short-term handicap is too difficult or not worth the bother to overcome. A major difference between inappropriate perceptions in state studies and inappropriate perceptions in studies of syndromes is that time, or rather Iack of time, is not a reasonable explanation of the latter. To the extent that the time from the induction of perceptions of uncontrollability to subsequent inappropriate perceptions increases, a temporal contiguity/“spillover” explanation becomes decreasingly viable. The most viable alternative appears to be a situationsimilarity explanation, the very explanation that the better designed laboratorystate studies were intended to exclude. There are several lines of evidence that help to substantiate as well as clarify this view.

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Theorists and researchers interested in the locus of control construct are very much concerned with the issue of long-term “inappropriate” generalizations. In a sense, the thrust of this literature is to use the construct of control to account for the tenacity of behaviors that are maladaptive and that are not based on wholly justifiable reamns. Therefore, it is significant that locus of control theorists maintain that similarity between situations in which uncontrollable events occur and subsequent situations is a primary determinant of the generalizationof expectations. Much effort is devoted to the attempt to identify dimensions along which situations can be compared. According to Crandall et al. (1965), the homeschool distinction is crucial: Generalization of children’s Iocus of control across situations is likely to be greatest when the situations are embedded in the same context. Mischel et al. (1974) maintain that generalization of children’s locus of control is greatest across situations whose outcomes have the same evaluative connotation (positive or negative). Locus of control theorists seem to agree that a variety of dimensions are relevant in determining similarity, and hence generalization, across Situations. Just as there is reason to believe that expectations involving locus of control are appropriate, there is reason to believe that expectations involving the effectiveness of contracts are appropriate. Outward behavior is most common among delinquents-children who have repeatedly experienced violations of contracts. Delinquents are led to accept mass media messages regarding equality of opportunity and the availability of options, only to find subsequently that these messages are inaccurate. Similarly, delinquents are frequently subjected to inconsistent and capricious childrearing practices that further destroy their confidence in contracts. That these children should in later life expect contracts to be ineffective is hardly inappropriate. Testimony to the appropriateness of their expectations is provided by the oft cited finding that when they are not interacting with teachers, police, or other authority figures (e.g., when they are among fellow gang members), contracts are sometimes rigidly adhered to and are expected to be very effective. Again, the findings indicate that the greater the dissimilarity between situations, the less the generalization of expectations. One example of the influence of long-term inappropriate expectations is provided in the now classic study of “Albert” (Watson & Rayner, 1920). Watson and Rayner conditioned an 11-month-old child to fear a white rat that previously the child had spontaneously approached, by associating the appearance of and reaching for the rat with loud bursts of noise. Though these authors systematically excluded any mention of constructs such as expectations of control, their findings could easily be incorporated within the present model. The loud noise is similar to the severely uncontrollable events used in several helplessness studies, and the fear response is part of the inward behavior syndrome. Watson and Rayner found that the conditioned fear lasted weeks and it may well have continued longer (there were no follow-ups). For present purposes, the most impor-

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tant feature of this study is the demonstration that the effect generalized to new objects: Albert feared a white rabbit, a dog, a fur coat, a ball of cotton, and a Santa Claus mask. No fear was shown to blocks or objects that did not share the apparently controlling stimulus dimension of “furriness. ” As in the case with the childrearing literature, the evidence indicates that situational similarity is a key factor in long-term generalizations of clinical behaviors. Another study in which long-term inappropriate generalizations have been demonstrated, and that had not previously been approached from a helplessness-reactance model perspective, is the study by Hetherington (1972) on the effects of father absence on adolescent girls. Hetherington’s findings indicate that loss of the father influences relatedness to other males even when the loss occurs years before the relatedness to males is assessed. Moreover, the findings indicate that the type of clinical behavior relates to the uncontrollability (or regainability) of the loss: Girls who lost their fathers through death were more likely to exhibit avoidance and withdrawal from other males (behaviors associated with the inward syndrome) as compared to girls from intact families; girls who lost their fathers through divorce were more likely to exhibit aggressiveness and approach toward other males (behaviors associated with the outward syndrome) as compared to girls from intact families. Because death is a severely uncontrollable event, it may give rise to a generalized expectation of lack of control-that is, to an external locus of control. As noted earlier, external locus of control predisposes children to inward behavior. A salient characteristic of divorce is the violation of a contract. Since the divorced fathers in the Hetherington study maintained little contact with their daughters, the contract binding father and daughter as well as the contract binding husband and wife were likely to be seen as ineffective. This could give rise to a generalized expectation that noncontractual methods are more effective than contractual methods, an expectation that, as noted earlier, predisposes children to outward behavior. Hetherington’s findings and the helplessness-reactance model are complementary. On the one hand, the helplessness-reactance model provides an explanation of Hetherington’s very intriguing but otherwise difficult-to-explain results. (Hetherington candidly referred to her own interpretations as highly speculative.) On the other hand, the findings provide perhaps the clearest example of the induction of generalized expectations of control and clinical syndromes. The temporal stability of these effects is testified to by the differences in clinical behavior ye& after the occurrence of the precipitating events. Finally, the Hetherington study is noteworthy here because it indicates that the expectations generalize to situations bearing an essential similarity to the situation in which the uncontrollable event occurred: There was more deviation in the daughters’ relationships with males than in their relationships with females. Consequently, these findings illustrate the point, repeatedly emphasized throughout this section,

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that situational similarity is critical in the formation of generalized expectations. The locus of control and delinquency literatures as well as the Watson and Rayner and the Hetherington studies suggest that, when expectations of uncontrollability occur long after the uncontrollable event(@ that induce them, it is likely that the situations to which the expectations have generalized resemble the earlier uncontrollable situation(s) . These findings raise serious questions regarding the notion of inappropriateness. The mechanism giving rise to long lusting efects (i.e., the organism’s tendency to respond to situational similarity) is essential to the organism’s capacity to adapt, even ifspecific applications of this mechanism are not. Similarly, the state studies am not providing evidence of inappropriate behaviors. As has been argued, the lack of a time delay between the manipulation and test sessions makes it difficult to label subsequent clinical behaviors “inappropriate.” For these reasons, the present author recommends against continued assessments of appropriateness and inappropriateness. A more fruitful approach would be first to identify the temporal and/or contextual factors contributing to generalization, and second to determine why subjects rely on these factors. It is only through an awareness of these factors and their origins that we will contribute to the demystification of clinical syndromes. B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

There are several ways in which the empirical gaps in the model developed here might be filled. It might be recommended that future research pay particular attention to the instruments with which generalized perceptions of control are assessed. Steps should be taken to refine further the internal-external locus of control scales. Previous research has shown that those locus of control questionnaires that focus on expectations pertaining to a particular realm of functioning (e.g., intellectual achievement) yield the most clearcut findings (Lefcourt, 1976). Therefore, future research should employ scales of this type. Another improvement would be to devise scales that distinguish between different types of internal attributions of causality (e.g., effort vs ability). If refined in these respects, greater clarity regarding the relationship between external locus of control and inward behavior may be obtained. Finally, attempts should be made to devise additional measures of the expected effectiveness of contracts. It would be particularly helpful if parallel measures of locus of control and effectiveness of contracts could be developed to test the differing predictions regarding them. Developmental considerations should be kept in mind in devising future questionnaires. Expectations involving locus of control and the effectiveness of contracts are probably heavily influenced by the child’s level of cognitive functioning. For example, since preoperational children do not understand the nature of chance, they are more likely to believe that they control chance outcomes (i.e.,

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they are more likely to attribute chance events to internal factors). Similarly, younger children who are not capable of mutual perspective taking are less likely to appreciate the significance of contracts. Developmental studies of children’s understanding of contingency and contracts should shed considerable light on the development of the two measures considered here (locus of control and effectiveness of contracts). Accompanying attempts to develop measures of generalized expectations of control should be a closer examination of behavioral syndromes. Achenbach and Edelbmck (1978) have presented substantial evidence regarding the existence of subsyndromes. They have shown also that these subsyndromes depend on the age and sex of the children. It may be helpful at this juncture to examine the relationship between subsyndromesand generalized expectations of control and to compare findings for children who differ in age and sex. In so doing, it should become clearer how specific expectations become linked with specific behaviors. The value of the factor analytic research in building toward a conceptual model has been substantiated. Therefore, in attempting to refine the model, it seems appropriate to return temporarily to that body of research. Another type of research worth pursuing is that which employs manipulations of perceptions of control. In light of the evidence that childrearing practices relate to clinical behaviors and that this relationship may be mediated by perceptions of control, it seems reasonable to focus on manipulations of childrearing practices. The childrearing research should center on two predictions: (1) that laxness (which gives rise to high anticipations of control), followed by directiveness leads to perceptions of loss of control and consequently to outward behavior; and (2) that constant directiveness leads to perceptions of lack of control and consequently to inward behavior. Studies involving short-term manipulations of these variables should be preceded by studies involving long-term manipulations. With regard to the latter, it may be necessary to rely on studies employing quasi-naturalistic designs. One possibility is to assess the effects of prolonged exposure to lax vs directive teachers on clinical behaviors in subsequent test situations. By manipulating the temporal proximity and contextual (task, situation, and person) similarity between the classroom and test situations, it should be possible to obtain a fuller understanding of the dynamics of generalization. To investigate the existence of behavioral “complexes, ” studies must be compared in which different types of clinical behaviors are assessed. These studies should lead to a more robust understanding of the essence of the inward and outward syndromes. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author wishes to thank John Weisz, Vickie Babbin, Helen Graham, Rick McCauley, Sam Synder. and Tom Achenbach for their valuable assistance.

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