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Choosing partners for a manned mission to Mars
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Choosing partners for a manned mission to Mars Michael A.G. Michaud
Who are the best partners for a US manned mission to Mars? Arguments have been made for a joint US-Soviet manned mission which would improve relations between the superpowers and prevent the weaponization of space. However, from the viewpoint of the US space advocate, the issue is which is the most expeditious way to get humans to Mars. Let's go to Mars, the author argues, but with allies and friends rather than the USA's primary competitor on Earth. The author is Director, Office of Advanced Technology, US Department of State, Washington, DC, USA. This article reflects the views of the author, and not necessarily the views of the Department of State. The article was originally presented in somewhat different form at the Case for Mars III Conference, 20-22 July 1987, Boulder, CO, USA. 1Wernher yon Braun, Das Marsprojekt, a special issue of Weltraumfahrt, Bechtle Verlag, Esslingen, Germany, 1952. Published in English as The Mars Project, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL, 1953. See also Willy Ley and Wernher von Braun, The Exploration of Mars, Viking, New York, 1956. A good modern survey of the subject can be found in James E. Oberg, Missions to Mars: Plans and Con. cepts for the First Manned Landing, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA, 1982. 2The Post-Apollo Space Program - Directions for the Future: Space Task Group Report to the President, NASA, Washington, DC, 1969. continued on p 13
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Four years after President Reagan's Space Station initiative, the USA still lacks a national consensus on its longrange goals in space beyond the Space Station. One school of thought advocates a manned mission to Mars. Like most other proposed space goals, this one has a long history. Wernher von Braun presented a fairly detailed proposal for a Mars mission as early as 1952. t We tend to forget that the Nixon administration's Space Task Group recommended in 1969 that the USA accept the long-range option or goal of manned planetary exploration, with a manned Mars mission before the end of the century as the first target. 2 In 1970, President Nixon publicly endorsed a Mars exp e d i t i o n as a l o n g - r a n g e goal. -x However, the momentum behind this advocacy was already ebbing, and the Mars goal was effectively abandoned. More recently, Mars advocacy has been revived in the USA, notably at the Case for Mars conferences of 1981, 1984 and 1987. 4 Thanks in part to the 'Mars Underground', the idea of sending humans to Mars is once again being studied seriously. The US National Commission on Space report of 1986 endorsed manned Mars missions as a long-range goal for the US space programme. 5 Fred Singer and Brian O'Leary have proposed a variation involving a manned mission to the Martian moons Phobos and D e i m o s ) Reports indicate that the USSR is also
interested in the long-term goal of landing humans on M a r s ] Several advocates of the manned mission to Mars have proposed that this mission be a joint project between the U SA and the USSR. The U S Soviet joint model has achieved enough public visibility to warrant a closer look.
Origins of the model The U S A and the USSR signed a space cooperation agreement in 1972 which provided for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project and cooperation in a variety of space science fields. ~ The Apollo-Soyuz linkup took place in July 1975.~ In 1977, this agreement was renewed for another five years, m There were discussions concerning a Shuttle-Salyut docking and even an international space station, though these did not lead to new projects, i i In the meantime, US-Soviet space science working groups continued their collaboration. After the imposition of marshal law in P o l a n d in 1981, t h e U S A announced a series of sanctions, including its intention not to renew the US-Soviet space cooperation agreement. That agreement then expired in May 1982. Informal co o p er at i o n among US and Soviet space scientists continued at a modest level, but any hopes for major cooperative projects were shelved.
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continued from p 12 3Statement by the President on Space Policy, issued by the White House on 7 March 1970. 4See Penelope J. Boston, ed, The Case for Mars, published for the American Astronautical Society by Univelt, San Diego, CA, 1984; and Christopher P. McKay, ed, The Case for Mars II, published for the American Astronautical Society by Univelt, San Diego, CA, 1985. Also see the special report on the Case for Mars II conference in the September 1984 issue of Discover, pp 12-26. 5National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier, Bantam Books, New York, May 1986. 6S. Fred Singer, 'The PhD project in perspective', in Boston, op cit, Ref 4, pp 221-225; and Brian O'Leary, 'Phobos and Deimos as resource and exploration centres', in Boston, op cit, Ref 4, pp 225244. 7See, for example, Thomas Y. Canby, 'Are the Soviets ahead in space?', National Geographic, October 1986, pp 420-459. 8Agreement on Space Cooperation between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow, 24 May 1972. The text is in Treaties and Other International Acts Series 7347, US Department of State, Washington, DC. 9See Edward C. Ezell and Linda N. Ezell, The Partnership: A History of the ApolloSoyuz Test Project, NASA SP-4209, Washington, DC, 1978. 1°The text of the agreement as renewed in 1977 is an appendix to Spark M. Matsunaga, The Mars Project: Journeys Beyond the Cold War, Hill and Wang, New York, 1986. 11See 'US and Russia announce talks on operating space station in 80's', New York Times, 18 May 1977. 12See Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier: A New National Strategy, High Frontier, Washington, DC, 1982; Richard Halloran, 'US plans weapon against satellites', New York Times, 7 June 1982; White House Fact Sheet on National Space Policy, 4 July 1982; UNISPACE 82: A Context for International Cooperation and Competition - A Technical Memorandum, US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC, March 1983; Richard Halloran, 'Buildup in space', a three-part series of articles in The New York Times, 17, 18 and 19 October 1982. 13For a brief survey, see Michael A.G. Michaud, Reaching for the High Frontier, Praeger, New York, 1986, pp 233-242. 14See Spark M. Matsunaga, op cit, Ref 10. The texts of his space cooperation resolutions are in an appendix. lSLouis Friedman, 'Society notes', The Planetary Report, July/August 1982, p 13.
SPACE POLICY F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 8
Meanwhile, interest in the military uses of space heightened in 1982. The High Frontier organization released its report on space-based missile defences in March; plans for US antisatellite system deployment were reported in June; the US space policy document released on 4 July 1982 appeared to many to emphasize the military uses of space, which were a major subject of debate at the UNISPACE conference in Vienna that August; the US Air Force Space C o m m a n d was e s t a b l i s h e d in September. 12 Meanwhile, the USSR, though making extensive military use of space itself, proposed space arms control initiatives in the United Nations. It was against this background that a number of space arms control initiatives were launched in the USA. 13 This was also the background for Senator Spark Matsunaga's efforts to revive US-Soviet space cooperation. ~4 On 29 September 1982, Matsunaga introduced Senate Resolution 488, calling for a joint US-Soviet initiative. The resolution, warning that the USA and the USSR were headed for an arms race in space, argued that the opportunities offered by space for prodigious achievements in virtually every field of human endeavour, leading ultimately to the colonization of space, probably would be lost irretrievably were space to be made into another East-West battleground. The resolution proposed that the President initiate talks with the USSR and other space powers to explore the possibilities for a weapon-free international space station as an alternative to competing armed space stations. Clearly, the author of the resolution was concerned primarily with improving US-Soviet relations and preventing the weaponization of space; the international space station was to be a means to those ends, and not an end in itself. Though Matsunaga's first resolution was not enacted, he persisted with a series of related resolutions whose substance evolved over the next three years. After a complex legislative history involving contributions by other members of Congress, a revised form of Matsunaga's resolution 236 was
passed and was signed into law by President Reagan oll 3(I October 1984. Though it supported a simulated space rescue mission, there still was no specific mention of a joint US-Soviet mission to Mars. On 7 February 1985 Matsunaga introduced Senate Joint Resolution 46, relating to cooperative Mars exploration. This resolution stated that, while Mars exploration is of immense scientific and social significance, it is without significance in terms of space weapons development. Stating that a US-USSR race to Mars would involve massive and wasteful expenditures and redundancies that would be contrary to the best interest of all parties involved, the resolution noted that both nations had scheduled unmanned scientific missions to Mars but that these missions had not been coordinated. It called on the President to explore the opportunities for cooperation in those missions, to report on opportunities for East-West Marsrelated activities, including an unmanned Mars sample return and all activities that might contribute to an international manned mission to Mars. There w a s . a parallel track of advocacy led by Carl Sagan and other leaders of the Planetary Society. During its early years, the Planetary Society focused its advocacy on unmanned missions of planetary exploration and gave little support for manned missions to any destination. Not until the July/August 1982 issue of The Planetary Report did Society Executive Director Louis Friedman report that the Society had decided to work on Mars studies leading in the direction of human colonization. 15 The Society c r e a t e d an i n f o r m a l system of graduate-level courses, projects and seminars known as the Mars Institute. While the Society favoured international cooperation and was in close contact with Soviet space scientists, it did not promote a US Soviet mission to Mars during its early years. From 1982 on, the Society became increasingly critical of the administration's emphasis on the military uses of space. In autumn 1982 each of the Society's officers endorsed a resolution introduced by Congressman Moakley calling for the USA and the
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16'To prevent the militarization of the Solar System', The Planetary Report, January/ February 1983, p 13. ~7See Anti-Satellite Weapons: Arms Control or Arms Race, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, 1983; SpaceBased Missile Defence, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, 1984; and The Fallacy of Star Wars, Vintage Books, New York, 1984. 18Carl Sagan, 'Peopling other worlds', The Planetary Report, March/April 1985, p 2. ~gSpark M. Matsunaga, 'Manned space exploration: make it international', The Planetary Report, March/April 1985, p 3. 2°Louis D. Friedman, 'Visions of 2010: human missions to Mars', The Planetary Report, March/April 1985, pp 4-6, 22. mCarl Sagan, 'The Case for Mars', Discover, September 1984, p 26. 22'Society notes', The Planetary Report, November/December 1984, p 15. 23See Matsunaga, The Mars Project, op cit, Ref 14, p 143. 24Louis D. Friedman, 'Five years: successes and failures', The Planetary Report, January/February 1986, pp 10-11. 2SCarl Sagan, 'Let's go to Mars together', Parade, 2 February 1986, pp 47. Planetary Society Vice President Bruce Murray published an article on the same theme at about the same time: Bruce Murray, 'Civilian space: in search of presidential goals', Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 1986, pp 25-37.
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U S S R to negotiate a b a n on w e a p o n s in space. 1¢' Society President Carl Sagan b e c a m e a p r o m i n e n t critic of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s policy. A f t e r P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s 'Star W a r s ' speech of 23 M a r c h 1983, Sagan escalated his criticism, notably t h r o u g h the U n i o n of C o n c e r n e d Scientists. 17 A t u r n i n g point for the Society's position on m a n n e d missions to Mars a p p e a r s to have o c c u r r e d in 1984. T h e Society c o m m i s s i o n e d studies by the consulting firm Science Applications I n c o r p o r a t e d of missions to the M o o n , Mars and the asteroids. Sagan wrote in early 1985 that, "Today, the climate is changing. A palpable feeling that it is again feasible to m u s t e r h u m a n m i s s i o n s to o t h e r w o r l d s . . . is sweeping through the technical c o m m u n i t y ' , ts T h e M a r c h / A p r i l 1985 issue of The Planetary Report was d e v o t e d to "Humans on o t h e r worlds'• T h e issue f e a t u r e d an article by Spark M a t s u n a ga, who argued for a special initial e m p h a s i s on Mars. M a t s u n a g a n o t e d that space scientists had lined up against his p r o p o s a l for an i n t e r n a t i o n al m a n n e d space station, c o m m e n t i n g that "Apparently, the t h r e a t of war held a s e c o n d a r y position to the t h r e a t of N A S A ' • M a t s u n a g a a d v o c a t e d a n e g o t i a t e d , step-by-step i n t e r n a t i o n a lization of U S and Soviet space station activities• i,~ T h e magazine also r e p o r t e d the findings of the Science A p p l i c a t i o n s I n c o r p o r a t e d studies of missions to the Moon, a near-Earth asteroid and Mars, with the Mars mission said to cost $40 billion. Louis F r i e d m a n wrote that: The advantages of international cooperation became greater and more obvious with the growing realization that, if the US and USSR worked together on an ambitious space project, both countries could redirect some of their most advanced capabilities from military competitiveness to peaceful cooperation. 2° M e a n w h i l e , Planetary Society President Carl Sagan had b e g u n writing for the p o p u l a r m e d i a o n the same theme• In the S e p t e m b e r 1984 issue of D/scover, which r e p o r t e d on the second Case for Mars c o n f e r e n c e , he discussed the h u m a n e x p l o r a t i o n of the Solar System as a possible U S - S o v i e t activity. 2~ Sagan and Louis F r i e d m a n
testified before the S e n a t e Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e on 13 September 1984, a b o u t the renewal of the U S - S o v i e t space c o o p e r a t i o n agreement. F u t u r e Mars e x p l o r a t i o n was a d v o c a t e d as 'a creative and positive p r o g r a m to bring nations t o g e t h e r a n d a d v a n c e b o t h scientific goals a n d a b e n i g n h u m a n future'. 22 T h e two s t r e a m s of advocacy led by Sagan and M a t s u n a g a a p p e a r to have m e r g e d by late 1984. T h e P l a n e t a r y S o c i e t y p l a n n e d a c o n f e r e n c e in W a s h i n g t o n , D e , in July 1985 called 'Steps to M a r s ' , c o - s p o n s o r e d by the A m e r i c a n Institute of A e r o n a u t i c s a n d Astronautics. T h e date of the c o n f e r e n c e was a d j u s t e d to coincide with the t e n t h a n n i v e r s a r y of the • ~3 A p o l l o - S o y u z Test Project.-The c o n f e r e n c e , which e m p h a s i z e d future U S - S o v i e t c o o p e r a t i o n and which included a p p e a r a n c e s by U S a s t r o n a u t s a n d S o v i e t c o s m o n a u t s f r o m the A p o l l o - S o y u z Test Project, was a symbolic t u r n i n g point in this advocacy. A t the c o n f e r e n c e , S e n a t o r Matsunaga m a d e his proposal for an I n t e r n a tional Space Y e a r in 1992. In the J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y 1986 issue of The Planetary Report, Louis Friedm a n wrote that, 'In 1986, we will m a k e a mighty effort to get a commitm e n t to Mars e x p l o r a t i o n by the U n i ted States a n d the Soviet U n i o n ' . 24 T h e 2 F e b r u a r y 1986 issue of Parade magazine f e a t u r e d an article by Sagan titled ~Let's go to Mars together' which b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r m a n y of the a r g u m e n t s in f a v o u r of a j o i n t U S Soviet mission to Mars. 25 Sagan's a r g u m e n t s were primarily political: But imagine a different sort of Apollo program, in which cooperation, not compctition, was the objective . . . . A major cooperative success in space can serve as an inspiration and spearhead for joint enterprises on Earth . . . . Moreover, space missions . . . use precisely the same aerospace, electronics, rocket and even nuclear technologies as does the nuclear arms race . . . . For the whole of the voyage to Mars and back, the lives of the American crew members will depend on their Soviet counterparts and vice versa, a microcosm of the actual situation down here on Earth . . . . In the long run, the binding up of the wounds on Earth and the exploration of Mars might go hand in hand, each activity aiding the other. Sagan's point of view was s u m m e d up
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Viewpoint in his editorial 'To Mars' in the 8 December 1986 issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology, where he listed the reasons justifying human exploration of Mars (most of which do not require US-Soviet cooperation): 26 •
As providing a focus and a sense of purpose to a dispirited NASA, and on an appropriate timescale. • As a human adventure of high order, able to excite and inspire the most promising young people. • As a potential scientific bonanza
'The proposal has an emotional appeal and a superficial plausibility'
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26Carl Sagan, 'To Mars', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 8 December 1986, pp 11 ; and Bruce Murray, 'Civilian space in search of presidential goals', Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 1986, pp 25-37. 2rBruce Murray, 'NASA, the presidency, and international leadership', The Planetary Report, July/August 1986, pp 4-5.
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As a means, through robotic precursor and support missions to Mars and elsewhere, of reviving a moribund US planetary programme. As giving a crisp and unambiguous purpose to the US Space Station needed for in-orbit assembly of the interplanetary transfer vehicle or vehicles. As an aperture to enhanced national prestige and technological development. As a realistic and possibly unique opportunity for the USA and the USSR to work together in the spotlight of world public opinion, and with other nations, on behalf of the human species. As a model and stimulant for mutually advantageous US-Soviet cooperation here on Earth. As a means for economic reconversion of the aerospace industry if and when massive reductions in strategic weapons - long promised by the USA and the USSR - are implemented. As a worthy continuation of the traditional application of the military virtues of organization and valour to great expeditions of discovery. Or simply as the obvious response to a deeply felt perception of the future calling.
Planetary Society Vice President Bruce Murray had published an article in the July/August 1986 Planetary Report which emphasized similar themes. He wrote: Moreover, a joint mission might appeal to the leaders of both superpowers because it would allow each nation to share and defer
the huge expenditure involved ]emphasis added]. It would also help them to manage the domestic groups and bureaucracies that have developed a vested interest in manned spaceflight7"7 ~ n analysis of the Matsunaga and Sagan arguments suggests the following basic elements: (1) the only way a manned mission to Mars could be justified is as a political initiative to promote US-Soviet cooperation; (2) the mission would be intended primarily to achieve political objectives here on Earth, and space goals would be secondary; (3) the ideal model is a joint US-Soviet mission with a mixed crew and common spacecraft, with each country dependent on the cooperation of the other.
Arguments to the contrary The proposal for a joint US-Soviet mission to Mars has both an emotional appeal and a superficial plausibility. It appeals to those deeply concerned about the state of US-Soviet relations. These two nations are the world's greatest space powers, and would appear to have the financial and technological resources necessary to carry out such an expensive and complex mission. Inplicitly, a joint mission would mean less cost for each than two separate, competitive missions. But those who favour a US-Soviet mission ignore the significant difficulties of developing and carrying it out, and the potential disadvantages of making the first human landing dependent on US-Soviet cooperation. In fact, the Matsunaga-Sagan model could make the timely realization of the first human mission to Mars less likely. Since their earliest years, the US and Soviet space programmes have been evolving separately. They have developed different technologies in every sector of space activity - launch vehicles, space stations, satellites, robotic probes and others. To make the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project possible, the USA had to develop a docking module, and the two sides had to work out an 'androgynous' docking mechanism which has never been used since• The $0.25 billion the USA spent was for a relatively simple mission, far
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28US-Soviet Cooperation in Space: A Technical Memorandum, US Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC, July 1985, p 3.
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easier and cheaper than a joint Mars mission would be. Since then, basic technologies have diverged further. The 'Mir' space station follows the development path of the Salyut, and the space complexes it makes possible are similar to some proposed in the USA in the 1960s. By contrast, the US Space Station will be based on technologies developed explicitly for compatibility with the Space Shuttle, notably the Spacelab modules built in Europe. Soviet and US launch vehicles have also evolved along different paths. Achieving convergence in space technologies for a manned Mars mission would require major investments on both sides and long lead times for design, development, coordination and testing of the hardware and the systems necessary to manage it. It also would require major transfers of technology, particularly from the USA to the USSR. Many of the technologies central to the achievement of a Mars mission, such as propulsion, sensors, computers, communication, guidance and navigation technologies, have both civilian and military uses. This could cause the side more advanced in a particular technology to have serious reservations about transferring it to the other. Whatever administration is in power in the USA, it will remain sensitive to the transfer of technologies which can be used for military purposes. For their own reasons, the Soviets may fence off some of their space technologies from cooperative projects, particularly in view of the powerful role the Soviet military plays in the Soviet manned space programme. Experience has shown the USA that cooperation in space projects is complex enough with allies. They too are independent states defending their own interests and subject to internal political change. But at least the USA enjoys some commonality with Western countries in shared geopolitical interests, cultural backgrounds, and political and social values, and common experience in other major space enterprises, including Spacelab and the Space Station. Perhaps we could bridge such gaps with the USSR by sustained effort, but it clearly would
take longer. International cooperation has proved useful for projects in space science and space applications, where there are practical or measurable interests involved. The USA has already made useful advances in space science through cooperation with the Soviets, for example, by taking advantage of the Soviet biosatellite programme. There also are useful forms of cooperation in space applications, as in the COSPAS/SARSAT search and rescue satellite system. However, the USA's one experience with a transcendental space project - landing humans on the Moon - suggests that competition in the peaceful uses of space technology is a more effective spur to great deeds. There simply is no historical evidence showing that such goals can be achieved more effectively or more quickly through cooperation with our primary geopolitical competitor. The proposed joint US-Soviet mission would make realization of a central goal of the future US civil space programme - landing humans on Mars - dependent on the state of US-Soviet relations. History clearly shows that cooperative efforts between the superpowers have been subject to ups and downs as the state of relations improved or deteriorated. There is no evidence to suggest that this is going to change. The state of political relations will come first, and space cooperation will be a distant second in terms of priorities on both sides. Making a major component of the USA's civil space programme and a major component of the space vision - dependent on the flux of US-Soviet relations would invite interruptions and delays. It also could invite the manipulation of the space agenda to pursue changing political ends. In its July 1985 report on USSoviet space cooperation, the US Office of Technology Assessment warned that, in view of 'strained, unpredictable, and ambiguous relations', policy makers must proceed with care in determining what foreign policy goals would be achieved by cooperation and in weighing the risks of giving Soviet scientists militarily sensitive technology. 2s Like Apollo, a joint US-Soviet
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Viewpoint
'Which is the quicker way to get humans to Mars?'
manned mission to Mars might be cancelled once its political goal was achieved. This might advance a political agenda. However, a project which left no infrastructure in place would not be the best way to advance the space agenda. There is also the question of timeliness. Which is the quicker way to get humans to Mars? Bruce Murray has made it clear that the early realization of a mission to Mars is less important to him than the political agenda of US-Soviet cooperation. In The Planetary Report, he wrote that: 'A joint US-Soviet mission . . . could proceed on a much more leisurely and affordable schedule, perhaps aimed at a landing during the 2015-20 time period'. 29
Allies and friends
29Murray, op cit, Ref 27, p 5.
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By contrast, going to Mars with its allies and friends offers advantages for the USA. Both Western Europe and Japan are showing increasing dynamism in their civilian space programmes, developing sophisticated new technologies and demonstrating determination and vision. Both the Europeans and the Japanese are projecting spaceplanes and space stations of their own. Canada has also achieved success in specific areas of space technology. The space technologies of these countries have been influenced significantly by those of the USA, notably in the case of European manned module development and Japanese launch vehicles, and have evolved much more in parallel with the USA's than have Soviet space technologies. These countries are accustomed to working with the USA, and to working out arrangements for sharing costs and roles. These were among the reasons for inviting the Western Europeans, the Japanese and the Canadians to join the USA in developing, operating and using a permanently manned Space Station. While negotiations for international participation in the Space Station have moved slowly, they have been conducted within a framework of clearly shared interests, and have been made easier by shared cultural backgrounds and experiences in working
together. At this writing, the negotiations seem likely to succeed. If they do, the Space Station project will establish a powerful new model for working together on joint space projects. If they fail, one may fairly ask how much more difficult a negotiation for Soviet participation in a manned Space Station would have been. The Space Station also could provide an assembly and launch point for the Mars mission. Would the USA rather rely on the much more limited capabilities of the Soviet Mir space station, or on a different Soviet or joint US-Soviet space station which is not yet an approved project? There are good reasons for Mars advocates to support a US space station with European, Japanese and Canadian participation. Transfers of technologies between the USA and its allies are far easier than between the USA and the USSR. There is long experience in working together in NATO and other frameworks in which sensitive information and technologies are exchanged. In the end, the most important fact may be that the state of relations between the USA and its allies is much more stable than US relations with the USSR. The USA has worked together closely with its allies since World War II. Despite occasional frictions, they still work together remarkably well. If the USA concludes that a mission to Mars requires international cooperation, a joint venture with its allies is much more likely to provide a sound political foundation than a joint venture with the USSR. It also is likely to get the job done faster.
Cooperation with the USSR This argument by no means excludes cooperation with the USSR in space. The Soviets have impressive capabilities, experience, and plans in some fields, notably in long-duration manned spaceflight. There are valid arguments for the coordination of similar missions and the exchange of scientists and data. The new agreement on US-Soviet space cooperation, signed in Moscow on 15 April 1987, provides a framework for cooperation in space
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Viewpoint science, and lists 16 initial projects. 3° Those projects emphasize coordinated planning, exchanges of data, and direct collaboration between scientists rather than the joint development of hardware or significant exchanges of technology. Depending on the future course of US-Soviet relations, a more expansive agenda may prove possible. But the cooperative agenda presently envisaged is very far from a joint US-Soviet manned mission to Mars.
Conclusion
3°Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, signed at Moscow, 15 April 1987. 31See, for example, National Commission on Space, op cit, Ref, 5, p 162.
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The Matsunaga/Sagan model poses serious questions for those advocating sending humans to Mars. It raises the issue of which is more important improving relations with the USSR or getting to Mars. The answer depends on whether one is more interested in international politics, or in human expansion into space. Improving U S Soviet relations is perfectly valid as a high priority item on a political agenda, but it is not a necessary part of a space agenda. Conversely, getting humans to Mars is a perfectly legitimate entry on the space agenda, but the USA can do it without the Soviets on board. From the point of view of the US space advocate, the issue is which is the best and most expeditious way to
get humans to Mars - with the Soviets, with allies and other friendly countries, or alone. Experience suggests that making the achievement of that goal dependent on US-Soviet cooperation may delay its realization. It would be unwise for the USA to put all its space eggs in the Soviet basket. Some of these problems would be eased if the joint model were replaced with the complementary model, in which the Soviet manned Mars mission would be essentially parallel to the USA's. In the complementary model, technologies would be developed separately, and the exchange of information would concern such things as mission plans, scientific data, mutual support on the Martian surface, and rescue capability. If either nation pulled out of the project, the other could continue. The proposal for a cooperative Mars rover/surface sample return, which would involve bringing the separate unamnned missions together briefly on the surface of Mars, might provide a useful precedent for complementary manned Mars missions. 31 But if the complementary model proves insufficient to achieve political goals, and if the USA needs financial and technological resources in addition to its own, working with its friends is the better way to get humans to Mars.
SPACE POLICY February 1988
Choosing partners for a manned mission to Mars Michael A.G. Michaud
Who are the best partners for a US manned mission to Mars? Arguments have been made for a joint US-Soviet manned mission which would improve relations between the superpowers and prevent the weaponization of space. However, from the viewpoint of the US space advocate, the issue is which is the most expeditious way to get humans to Mars. Let's go to Mars, the author argues, but with allies and friends rather than the USA's primary competitor on Earth. The author is Director, Office of Advanced Technology, US Department of State, Washington, DC, USA. This article reflects the views of the author, and not necessarily the views of the Department of State. The article was originally presented in somewhat different form at the Case for Mars III Conference, 20-22 July 1987, Boulder, CO, USA. 1Wernher yon Braun, Das Marsprojekt, a special issue of Weltraumfahrt, Bechtle Verlag, Esslingen, Germany, 1952. Published in English as The Mars Project, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL, 1953. See also Willy Ley and Wernher von Braun, The Exploration of Mars, Viking, New York, 1956. A good modern survey of the subject can be found in James E. Oberg, Missions to Mars: Plans and Con. cepts for the First Manned Landing, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA, 1982. 2The Post-Apollo Space Program - Directions for the Future: Space Task Group Report to the President, NASA, Washington, DC, 1969. continued on p 13
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Four years after President Reagan's Space Station initiative, the USA still lacks a national consensus on its longrange goals in space beyond the Space Station. One school of thought advocates a manned mission to Mars. Like most other proposed space goals, this one has a long history. Wernher von Braun presented a fairly detailed proposal for a Mars mission as early as 1952. t We tend to forget that the Nixon administration's Space Task Group recommended in 1969 that the USA accept the long-range option or goal of manned planetary exploration, with a manned Mars mission before the end of the century as the first target. 2 In 1970, President Nixon publicly endorsed a Mars exp e d i t i o n as a l o n g - r a n g e goal. -x However, the momentum behind this advocacy was already ebbing, and the Mars goal was effectively abandoned. More recently, Mars advocacy has been revived in the USA, notably at the Case for Mars conferences of 1981, 1984 and 1987. 4 Thanks in part to the 'Mars Underground', the idea of sending humans to Mars is once again being studied seriously. The US National Commission on Space report of 1986 endorsed manned Mars missions as a long-range goal for the US space programme. 5 Fred Singer and Brian O'Leary have proposed a variation involving a manned mission to the Martian moons Phobos and D e i m o s ) Reports indicate that the USSR is also
interested in the long-term goal of landing humans on M a r s ] Several advocates of the manned mission to Mars have proposed that this mission be a joint project between the U SA and the USSR. The U S Soviet joint model has achieved enough public visibility to warrant a closer look.
Origins of the model The U S A and the USSR signed a space cooperation agreement in 1972 which provided for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project and cooperation in a variety of space science fields. ~ The Apollo-Soyuz linkup took place in July 1975.~ In 1977, this agreement was renewed for another five years, m There were discussions concerning a Shuttle-Salyut docking and even an international space station, though these did not lead to new projects, i i In the meantime, US-Soviet space science working groups continued their collaboration. After the imposition of marshal law in P o l a n d in 1981, t h e U S A announced a series of sanctions, including its intention not to renew the US-Soviet space cooperation agreement. That agreement then expired in May 1982. Informal co o p er at i o n among US and Soviet space scientists continued at a modest level, but any hopes for major cooperative projects were shelved.
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POLICY
February 1988
Viewpoint
continued from p 12 3Statement by the President on Space Policy, issued by the White House on 7 March 1970. 4See Penelope J. Boston, ed, The Case for Mars, published for the American Astronautical Society by Univelt, San Diego, CA, 1984; and Christopher P. McKay, ed, The Case for Mars II, published for the American Astronautical Society by Univelt, San Diego, CA, 1985. Also see the special report on the Case for Mars II conference in the September 1984 issue of Discover, pp 12-26. 5National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier, Bantam Books, New York, May 1986. 6S. Fred Singer, 'The PhD project in perspective', in Boston, op cit, Ref 4, pp 221-225; and Brian O'Leary, 'Phobos and Deimos as resource and exploration centres', in Boston, op cit, Ref 4, pp 225244. 7See, for example, Thomas Y. Canby, 'Are the Soviets ahead in space?', National Geographic, October 1986, pp 420-459. 8Agreement on Space Cooperation between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow, 24 May 1972. The text is in Treaties and Other International Acts Series 7347, US Department of State, Washington, DC. 9See Edward C. Ezell and Linda N. Ezell, The Partnership: A History of the ApolloSoyuz Test Project, NASA SP-4209, Washington, DC, 1978. 1°The text of the agreement as renewed in 1977 is an appendix to Spark M. Matsunaga, The Mars Project: Journeys Beyond the Cold War, Hill and Wang, New York, 1986. 11See 'US and Russia announce talks on operating space station in 80's', New York Times, 18 May 1977. 12See Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier: A New National Strategy, High Frontier, Washington, DC, 1982; Richard Halloran, 'US plans weapon against satellites', New York Times, 7 June 1982; White House Fact Sheet on National Space Policy, 4 July 1982; UNISPACE 82: A Context for International Cooperation and Competition - A Technical Memorandum, US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC, March 1983; Richard Halloran, 'Buildup in space', a three-part series of articles in The New York Times, 17, 18 and 19 October 1982. 13For a brief survey, see Michael A.G. Michaud, Reaching for the High Frontier, Praeger, New York, 1986, pp 233-242. 14See Spark M. Matsunaga, op cit, Ref 10. The texts of his space cooperation resolutions are in an appendix. lSLouis Friedman, 'Society notes', The Planetary Report, July/August 1982, p 13.
SPACE POLICY F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 8
Meanwhile, interest in the military uses of space heightened in 1982. The High Frontier organization released its report on space-based missile defences in March; plans for US antisatellite system deployment were reported in June; the US space policy document released on 4 July 1982 appeared to many to emphasize the military uses of space, which were a major subject of debate at the UNISPACE conference in Vienna that August; the US Air Force Space C o m m a n d was e s t a b l i s h e d in September. 12 Meanwhile, the USSR, though making extensive military use of space itself, proposed space arms control initiatives in the United Nations. It was against this background that a number of space arms control initiatives were launched in the USA. 13 This was also the background for Senator Spark Matsunaga's efforts to revive US-Soviet space cooperation. ~4 On 29 September 1982, Matsunaga introduced Senate Resolution 488, calling for a joint US-Soviet initiative. The resolution, warning that the USA and the USSR were headed for an arms race in space, argued that the opportunities offered by space for prodigious achievements in virtually every field of human endeavour, leading ultimately to the colonization of space, probably would be lost irretrievably were space to be made into another East-West battleground. The resolution proposed that the President initiate talks with the USSR and other space powers to explore the possibilities for a weapon-free international space station as an alternative to competing armed space stations. Clearly, the author of the resolution was concerned primarily with improving US-Soviet relations and preventing the weaponization of space; the international space station was to be a means to those ends, and not an end in itself. Though Matsunaga's first resolution was not enacted, he persisted with a series of related resolutions whose substance evolved over the next three years. After a complex legislative history involving contributions by other members of Congress, a revised form of Matsunaga's resolution 236 was
passed and was signed into law by President Reagan oll 3(I October 1984. Though it supported a simulated space rescue mission, there still was no specific mention of a joint US-Soviet mission to Mars. On 7 February 1985 Matsunaga introduced Senate Joint Resolution 46, relating to cooperative Mars exploration. This resolution stated that, while Mars exploration is of immense scientific and social significance, it is without significance in terms of space weapons development. Stating that a US-USSR race to Mars would involve massive and wasteful expenditures and redundancies that would be contrary to the best interest of all parties involved, the resolution noted that both nations had scheduled unmanned scientific missions to Mars but that these missions had not been coordinated. It called on the President to explore the opportunities for cooperation in those missions, to report on opportunities for East-West Marsrelated activities, including an unmanned Mars sample return and all activities that might contribute to an international manned mission to Mars. There w a s . a parallel track of advocacy led by Carl Sagan and other leaders of the Planetary Society. During its early years, the Planetary Society focused its advocacy on unmanned missions of planetary exploration and gave little support for manned missions to any destination. Not until the July/August 1982 issue of The Planetary Report did Society Executive Director Louis Friedman report that the Society had decided to work on Mars studies leading in the direction of human colonization. 15 The Society c r e a t e d an i n f o r m a l system of graduate-level courses, projects and seminars known as the Mars Institute. While the Society favoured international cooperation and was in close contact with Soviet space scientists, it did not promote a US Soviet mission to Mars during its early years. From 1982 on, the Society became increasingly critical of the administration's emphasis on the military uses of space. In autumn 1982 each of the Society's officers endorsed a resolution introduced by Congressman Moakley calling for the USA and the
13
Viewpoint
16'To prevent the militarization of the Solar System', The Planetary Report, January/ February 1983, p 13. ~7See Anti-Satellite Weapons: Arms Control or Arms Race, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, 1983; SpaceBased Missile Defence, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, 1984; and The Fallacy of Star Wars, Vintage Books, New York, 1984. 18Carl Sagan, 'Peopling other worlds', The Planetary Report, March/April 1985, p 2. ~gSpark M. Matsunaga, 'Manned space exploration: make it international', The Planetary Report, March/April 1985, p 3. 2°Louis D. Friedman, 'Visions of 2010: human missions to Mars', The Planetary Report, March/April 1985, pp 4-6, 22. mCarl Sagan, 'The Case for Mars', Discover, September 1984, p 26. 22'Society notes', The Planetary Report, November/December 1984, p 15. 23See Matsunaga, The Mars Project, op cit, Ref 14, p 143. 24Louis D. Friedman, 'Five years: successes and failures', The Planetary Report, January/February 1986, pp 10-11. 2SCarl Sagan, 'Let's go to Mars together', Parade, 2 February 1986, pp 47. Planetary Society Vice President Bruce Murray published an article on the same theme at about the same time: Bruce Murray, 'Civilian space: in search of presidential goals', Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 1986, pp 25-37.
14
U S S R to negotiate a b a n on w e a p o n s in space. 1¢' Society President Carl Sagan b e c a m e a p r o m i n e n t critic of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s policy. A f t e r P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s 'Star W a r s ' speech of 23 M a r c h 1983, Sagan escalated his criticism, notably t h r o u g h the U n i o n of C o n c e r n e d Scientists. 17 A t u r n i n g point for the Society's position on m a n n e d missions to Mars a p p e a r s to have o c c u r r e d in 1984. T h e Society c o m m i s s i o n e d studies by the consulting firm Science Applications I n c o r p o r a t e d of missions to the M o o n , Mars and the asteroids. Sagan wrote in early 1985 that, "Today, the climate is changing. A palpable feeling that it is again feasible to m u s t e r h u m a n m i s s i o n s to o t h e r w o r l d s . . . is sweeping through the technical c o m m u n i t y ' , ts T h e M a r c h / A p r i l 1985 issue of The Planetary Report was d e v o t e d to "Humans on o t h e r worlds'• T h e issue f e a t u r e d an article by Spark M a t s u n a ga, who argued for a special initial e m p h a s i s on Mars. M a t s u n a g a n o t e d that space scientists had lined up against his p r o p o s a l for an i n t e r n a t i o n al m a n n e d space station, c o m m e n t i n g that "Apparently, the t h r e a t of war held a s e c o n d a r y position to the t h r e a t of N A S A ' • M a t s u n a g a a d v o c a t e d a n e g o t i a t e d , step-by-step i n t e r n a t i o n a lization of U S and Soviet space station activities• i,~ T h e magazine also r e p o r t e d the findings of the Science A p p l i c a t i o n s I n c o r p o r a t e d studies of missions to the Moon, a near-Earth asteroid and Mars, with the Mars mission said to cost $40 billion. Louis F r i e d m a n wrote that: The advantages of international cooperation became greater and more obvious with the growing realization that, if the US and USSR worked together on an ambitious space project, both countries could redirect some of their most advanced capabilities from military competitiveness to peaceful cooperation. 2° M e a n w h i l e , Planetary Society President Carl Sagan had b e g u n writing for the p o p u l a r m e d i a o n the same theme• In the S e p t e m b e r 1984 issue of D/scover, which r e p o r t e d on the second Case for Mars c o n f e r e n c e , he discussed the h u m a n e x p l o r a t i o n of the Solar System as a possible U S - S o v i e t activity. 2~ Sagan and Louis F r i e d m a n
testified before the S e n a t e Foreign Relations C o m m i t t e e on 13 September 1984, a b o u t the renewal of the U S - S o v i e t space c o o p e r a t i o n agreement. F u t u r e Mars e x p l o r a t i o n was a d v o c a t e d as 'a creative and positive p r o g r a m to bring nations t o g e t h e r a n d a d v a n c e b o t h scientific goals a n d a b e n i g n h u m a n future'. 22 T h e two s t r e a m s of advocacy led by Sagan and M a t s u n a g a a p p e a r to have m e r g e d by late 1984. T h e P l a n e t a r y S o c i e t y p l a n n e d a c o n f e r e n c e in W a s h i n g t o n , D e , in July 1985 called 'Steps to M a r s ' , c o - s p o n s o r e d by the A m e r i c a n Institute of A e r o n a u t i c s a n d Astronautics. T h e date of the c o n f e r e n c e was a d j u s t e d to coincide with the t e n t h a n n i v e r s a r y of the • ~3 A p o l l o - S o y u z Test Project.-The c o n f e r e n c e , which e m p h a s i z e d future U S - S o v i e t c o o p e r a t i o n and which included a p p e a r a n c e s by U S a s t r o n a u t s a n d S o v i e t c o s m o n a u t s f r o m the A p o l l o - S o y u z Test Project, was a symbolic t u r n i n g point in this advocacy. A t the c o n f e r e n c e , S e n a t o r Matsunaga m a d e his proposal for an I n t e r n a tional Space Y e a r in 1992. In the J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y 1986 issue of The Planetary Report, Louis Friedm a n wrote that, 'In 1986, we will m a k e a mighty effort to get a commitm e n t to Mars e x p l o r a t i o n by the U n i ted States a n d the Soviet U n i o n ' . 24 T h e 2 F e b r u a r y 1986 issue of Parade magazine f e a t u r e d an article by Sagan titled ~Let's go to Mars together' which b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r m a n y of the a r g u m e n t s in f a v o u r of a j o i n t U S Soviet mission to Mars. 25 Sagan's a r g u m e n t s were primarily political: But imagine a different sort of Apollo program, in which cooperation, not compctition, was the objective . . . . A major cooperative success in space can serve as an inspiration and spearhead for joint enterprises on Earth . . . . Moreover, space missions . . . use precisely the same aerospace, electronics, rocket and even nuclear technologies as does the nuclear arms race . . . . For the whole of the voyage to Mars and back, the lives of the American crew members will depend on their Soviet counterparts and vice versa, a microcosm of the actual situation down here on Earth . . . . In the long run, the binding up of the wounds on Earth and the exploration of Mars might go hand in hand, each activity aiding the other. Sagan's point of view was s u m m e d up
SPACE POLICY February 1988
Viewpoint in his editorial 'To Mars' in the 8 December 1986 issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology, where he listed the reasons justifying human exploration of Mars (most of which do not require US-Soviet cooperation): 26 •
As providing a focus and a sense of purpose to a dispirited NASA, and on an appropriate timescale. • As a human adventure of high order, able to excite and inspire the most promising young people. • As a potential scientific bonanza
'The proposal has an emotional appeal and a superficial plausibility'
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
26Carl Sagan, 'To Mars', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 8 December 1986, pp 11 ; and Bruce Murray, 'Civilian space in search of presidential goals', Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 1986, pp 25-37. 2rBruce Murray, 'NASA, the presidency, and international leadership', The Planetary Report, July/August 1986, pp 4-5.
S P A C E POLICY February 1988
As a means, through robotic precursor and support missions to Mars and elsewhere, of reviving a moribund US planetary programme. As giving a crisp and unambiguous purpose to the US Space Station needed for in-orbit assembly of the interplanetary transfer vehicle or vehicles. As an aperture to enhanced national prestige and technological development. As a realistic and possibly unique opportunity for the USA and the USSR to work together in the spotlight of world public opinion, and with other nations, on behalf of the human species. As a model and stimulant for mutually advantageous US-Soviet cooperation here on Earth. As a means for economic reconversion of the aerospace industry if and when massive reductions in strategic weapons - long promised by the USA and the USSR - are implemented. As a worthy continuation of the traditional application of the military virtues of organization and valour to great expeditions of discovery. Or simply as the obvious response to a deeply felt perception of the future calling.
Planetary Society Vice President Bruce Murray had published an article in the July/August 1986 Planetary Report which emphasized similar themes. He wrote: Moreover, a joint mission might appeal to the leaders of both superpowers because it would allow each nation to share and defer
the huge expenditure involved ]emphasis added]. It would also help them to manage the domestic groups and bureaucracies that have developed a vested interest in manned spaceflight7"7 ~ n analysis of the Matsunaga and Sagan arguments suggests the following basic elements: (1) the only way a manned mission to Mars could be justified is as a political initiative to promote US-Soviet cooperation; (2) the mission would be intended primarily to achieve political objectives here on Earth, and space goals would be secondary; (3) the ideal model is a joint US-Soviet mission with a mixed crew and common spacecraft, with each country dependent on the cooperation of the other.
Arguments to the contrary The proposal for a joint US-Soviet mission to Mars has both an emotional appeal and a superficial plausibility. It appeals to those deeply concerned about the state of US-Soviet relations. These two nations are the world's greatest space powers, and would appear to have the financial and technological resources necessary to carry out such an expensive and complex mission. Inplicitly, a joint mission would mean less cost for each than two separate, competitive missions. But those who favour a US-Soviet mission ignore the significant difficulties of developing and carrying it out, and the potential disadvantages of making the first human landing dependent on US-Soviet cooperation. In fact, the Matsunaga-Sagan model could make the timely realization of the first human mission to Mars less likely. Since their earliest years, the US and Soviet space programmes have been evolving separately. They have developed different technologies in every sector of space activity - launch vehicles, space stations, satellites, robotic probes and others. To make the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project possible, the USA had to develop a docking module, and the two sides had to work out an 'androgynous' docking mechanism which has never been used since• The $0.25 billion the USA spent was for a relatively simple mission, far
15
Viewpoint
28US-Soviet Cooperation in Space: A Technical Memorandum, US Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC, July 1985, p 3.
16
easier and cheaper than a joint Mars mission would be. Since then, basic technologies have diverged further. The 'Mir' space station follows the development path of the Salyut, and the space complexes it makes possible are similar to some proposed in the USA in the 1960s. By contrast, the US Space Station will be based on technologies developed explicitly for compatibility with the Space Shuttle, notably the Spacelab modules built in Europe. Soviet and US launch vehicles have also evolved along different paths. Achieving convergence in space technologies for a manned Mars mission would require major investments on both sides and long lead times for design, development, coordination and testing of the hardware and the systems necessary to manage it. It also would require major transfers of technology, particularly from the USA to the USSR. Many of the technologies central to the achievement of a Mars mission, such as propulsion, sensors, computers, communication, guidance and navigation technologies, have both civilian and military uses. This could cause the side more advanced in a particular technology to have serious reservations about transferring it to the other. Whatever administration is in power in the USA, it will remain sensitive to the transfer of technologies which can be used for military purposes. For their own reasons, the Soviets may fence off some of their space technologies from cooperative projects, particularly in view of the powerful role the Soviet military plays in the Soviet manned space programme. Experience has shown the USA that cooperation in space projects is complex enough with allies. They too are independent states defending their own interests and subject to internal political change. But at least the USA enjoys some commonality with Western countries in shared geopolitical interests, cultural backgrounds, and political and social values, and common experience in other major space enterprises, including Spacelab and the Space Station. Perhaps we could bridge such gaps with the USSR by sustained effort, but it clearly would
take longer. International cooperation has proved useful for projects in space science and space applications, where there are practical or measurable interests involved. The USA has already made useful advances in space science through cooperation with the Soviets, for example, by taking advantage of the Soviet biosatellite programme. There also are useful forms of cooperation in space applications, as in the COSPAS/SARSAT search and rescue satellite system. However, the USA's one experience with a transcendental space project - landing humans on the Moon - suggests that competition in the peaceful uses of space technology is a more effective spur to great deeds. There simply is no historical evidence showing that such goals can be achieved more effectively or more quickly through cooperation with our primary geopolitical competitor. The proposed joint US-Soviet mission would make realization of a central goal of the future US civil space programme - landing humans on Mars - dependent on the state of US-Soviet relations. History clearly shows that cooperative efforts between the superpowers have been subject to ups and downs as the state of relations improved or deteriorated. There is no evidence to suggest that this is going to change. The state of political relations will come first, and space cooperation will be a distant second in terms of priorities on both sides. Making a major component of the USA's civil space programme and a major component of the space vision - dependent on the flux of US-Soviet relations would invite interruptions and delays. It also could invite the manipulation of the space agenda to pursue changing political ends. In its July 1985 report on USSoviet space cooperation, the US Office of Technology Assessment warned that, in view of 'strained, unpredictable, and ambiguous relations', policy makers must proceed with care in determining what foreign policy goals would be achieved by cooperation and in weighing the risks of giving Soviet scientists militarily sensitive technology. 2s Like Apollo, a joint US-Soviet
SPACE POLICY February 1988
Viewpoint
'Which is the quicker way to get humans to Mars?'
manned mission to Mars might be cancelled once its political goal was achieved. This might advance a political agenda. However, a project which left no infrastructure in place would not be the best way to advance the space agenda. There is also the question of timeliness. Which is the quicker way to get humans to Mars? Bruce Murray has made it clear that the early realization of a mission to Mars is less important to him than the political agenda of US-Soviet cooperation. In The Planetary Report, he wrote that: 'A joint US-Soviet mission . . . could proceed on a much more leisurely and affordable schedule, perhaps aimed at a landing during the 2015-20 time period'. 29
Allies and friends
29Murray, op cit, Ref 27, p 5.
SPACE POLICY February 1988
By contrast, going to Mars with its allies and friends offers advantages for the USA. Both Western Europe and Japan are showing increasing dynamism in their civilian space programmes, developing sophisticated new technologies and demonstrating determination and vision. Both the Europeans and the Japanese are projecting spaceplanes and space stations of their own. Canada has also achieved success in specific areas of space technology. The space technologies of these countries have been influenced significantly by those of the USA, notably in the case of European manned module development and Japanese launch vehicles, and have evolved much more in parallel with the USA's than have Soviet space technologies. These countries are accustomed to working with the USA, and to working out arrangements for sharing costs and roles. These were among the reasons for inviting the Western Europeans, the Japanese and the Canadians to join the USA in developing, operating and using a permanently manned Space Station. While negotiations for international participation in the Space Station have moved slowly, they have been conducted within a framework of clearly shared interests, and have been made easier by shared cultural backgrounds and experiences in working
together. At this writing, the negotiations seem likely to succeed. If they do, the Space Station project will establish a powerful new model for working together on joint space projects. If they fail, one may fairly ask how much more difficult a negotiation for Soviet participation in a manned Space Station would have been. The Space Station also could provide an assembly and launch point for the Mars mission. Would the USA rather rely on the much more limited capabilities of the Soviet Mir space station, or on a different Soviet or joint US-Soviet space station which is not yet an approved project? There are good reasons for Mars advocates to support a US space station with European, Japanese and Canadian participation. Transfers of technologies between the USA and its allies are far easier than between the USA and the USSR. There is long experience in working together in NATO and other frameworks in which sensitive information and technologies are exchanged. In the end, the most important fact may be that the state of relations between the USA and its allies is much more stable than US relations with the USSR. The USA has worked together closely with its allies since World War II. Despite occasional frictions, they still work together remarkably well. If the USA concludes that a mission to Mars requires international cooperation, a joint venture with its allies is much more likely to provide a sound political foundation than a joint venture with the USSR. It also is likely to get the job done faster.
Cooperation with the USSR This argument by no means excludes cooperation with the USSR in space. The Soviets have impressive capabilities, experience, and plans in some fields, notably in long-duration manned spaceflight. There are valid arguments for the coordination of similar missions and the exchange of scientists and data. The new agreement on US-Soviet space cooperation, signed in Moscow on 15 April 1987, provides a framework for cooperation in space
17
Viewpoint science, and lists 16 initial projects. 3° Those projects emphasize coordinated planning, exchanges of data, and direct collaboration between scientists rather than the joint development of hardware or significant exchanges of technology. Depending on the future course of US-Soviet relations, a more expansive agenda may prove possible. But the cooperative agenda presently envisaged is very far from a joint US-Soviet manned mission to Mars.
Conclusion
3°Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, signed at Moscow, 15 April 1987. 31See, for example, National Commission on Space, op cit, Ref, 5, p 162.
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The Matsunaga/Sagan model poses serious questions for those advocating sending humans to Mars. It raises the issue of which is more important improving relations with the USSR or getting to Mars. The answer depends on whether one is more interested in international politics, or in human expansion into space. Improving U S Soviet relations is perfectly valid as a high priority item on a political agenda, but it is not a necessary part of a space agenda. Conversely, getting humans to Mars is a perfectly legitimate entry on the space agenda, but the USA can do it without the Soviets on board. From the point of view of the US space advocate, the issue is which is the best and most expeditious way to
get humans to Mars - with the Soviets, with allies and other friendly countries, or alone. Experience suggests that making the achievement of that goal dependent on US-Soviet cooperation may delay its realization. It would be unwise for the USA to put all its space eggs in the Soviet basket. Some of these problems would be eased if the joint model were replaced with the complementary model, in which the Soviet manned Mars mission would be essentially parallel to the USA's. In the complementary model, technologies would be developed separately, and the exchange of information would concern such things as mission plans, scientific data, mutual support on the Martian surface, and rescue capability. If either nation pulled out of the project, the other could continue. The proposal for a cooperative Mars rover/surface sample return, which would involve bringing the separate unamnned missions together briefly on the surface of Mars, might provide a useful precedent for complementary manned Mars missions. 31 But if the complementary model proves insufficient to achieve political goals, and if the USA needs financial and technological resources in addition to its own, working with its friends is the better way to get humans to Mars.
SPACE POLICY February 1988