- Email: [email protected]
Class dealignment and the regional polarization of voting patterns in Great Britain, 1964–1987
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1992, 73-86
Class dealignment and the regional polarization of voting patterns in Great Britain, 1964-1987 R. J. JOHNSTON Department of Geography, University of Shefjeld, Shefjeld SlO 2TN, UK AND
C.J. PATTIE Department of Geography, Uniuexsiy of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
ABSTRACT. Survey data relating to each British general election over the period 1964-1987 are used to test the frequently-claimed assumption that regional polarization increased over the period. Use of log-linear modelling allows the hypothesis to be evaluated with the changing regional class composition held constant. The results indicate that class polarization remains strong in the north but has declined substantially in the south.
Much has been written in recent years about the perceived growing regional polarization of voting patterns in Great Britain since the 1950s. A great deal of it is descriptive, identifying the extent of the polarization and pointing to a problem for analysts (e.g. Denver, 1987; Johnston, 1985); some of it develops clear hypotheses that have yet to be subjected to conclusive tests (e.g. Curtice and Steed, 1982). In this brief paper we present the results of one such critical test, which looks at a longer period than any other study. Regional class dealignment One of the most important concepts introduced to electoral studies in recent years is that of dealignment. In its more general form, the hypothesis of dealignment is that members of the electorate are becoming less staunchly loyal to particular parties with which they identify, and in consequence are becoming more volatile in their electoral choices over time (see Crewe and Denver, 1985). Thispartisan dealignment involves the reduction of electoral cleavages within society, as portrayed in the classic Lipset-Rokkan model (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Johnston, 1990). In Great Britain, where a class cleavage has long dominated electoral behaviour, the particular consequence is thus a class dealignment, as the differences between the occupational classes in their voting behaviour become less (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985: on the existence of class dealignment, see Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985, 1987; Crewe, 1986; and Dunleavy, 1987). 0962.6298/92/01 0073-14 0
1992 Butterworth-Heinemann
Ltd
[email protected] mting patterm in Great Britain, 1964-1987
74
Class dealignment is a necessary but insufficient condition to account for the growing spatial polarization of the British electorate. What is needed in addition is a hypothesis that can account for regional variations in the form of that dealignment. Such a hypothesis is provided by the concepts of sociotropic and egocentric voting (Wea~erford, 1986). According to the former, people make voting decisions according to their perceptions of the national condition on selected criteria: in general, if they perceive the condition to be good, they will be more likely to vote to return the incumbent government than if they perceive it to be bad, whatever their personal political beliefs. According to the notion of egocentric voting, people act similarly except that they are evaluating their personal condition rather than that of society. The general relevance of this hypothesis to voting in Britain has been evaluated by Whiteley (e.g. Whiteley, 1986). In Great Britain over recent decades, the major criteria that have been used in processes of sociotropic and egocentric voting are the condition of the economy and each individual’s personal situation within it. During that period, the major process of economic change-which accelerated rapidly during the 198Os-was spatially very uneven, being usually represented as a no~h:sou~ divide (Lewis and Townsend, 1989). That being so, then people in the relatively prosperous regions (the ‘south) should be more predisposed to vote for the incumbent party whereas those in the less prosperous regions (the ‘north’) would be more likely to vote for the opposition; we have produced tentative evidence for the 1980s which supports this (Johnston and Pattie, 1989), and extend that analysis here to the longer time-span for the period 196447.
7%e bme for a statiktical amlysis If we begin with an electoral system in which a class cleavage predominates, then one would expect similar patterns of voting, by class, in every region; for example, the ratio of Conservative to Labour votes would be the same, within any one occupational class, in each region at a particular election. If, from that start, we then get spatial polarization, with an increasingly class-dealigned electorate, the ratios should change. According to the arguments above, the propensity to vote for the incumbent government party, within a defined class, should have declined in Great Britain’s northern regions relative to the propensity to vote for the opposition, whereas the reverse would be the case in the southern regions. As a result, the inter-regional ratios for any class should increasingly diverge. Formally we state this as follows:
(1) where C+ is the number of votes for the Conservative party by class 1 in region j at election k; Lqk is the number of votes for the Labour party by class i in regionj at election k; so that
RCLiik is the ratio of Conservative to Labour votes by class i in regionj If a class cleavage predominated,
at election k.
and was uniform across regions, then the expectation
is
that RCLiI$RCL,k
=
1.0
the ratio does not vary significantly between regions, for any class.
(2)
75
R. J. JOHNSTONAND C. J. PATTIE
If the thesis linking class dealignment to regional polarization is valid, however, then the expectation
given in equation
(2) would not hold. Instead, we would anticipate that, if
region 2 is the south of Great Britain and region 1 is in the north, then
such mat (RCL,,$R&&
<
I.0
Further, if the processes sequence
of elections,
of class dealignment
and regional polarization
continue
over a
then defining
RCLi,$RCLiQk =
RRmn
(5)
where RR”” is the ratio of Conservative:Labour
ratios contrasting region m to region n, for class i
at election /z then RR”” = f(t) where t represents
(6)
the sequence
Paralleling
these
of elections
increased
from 1 to k.
inter-regional
differentials
within
classes
should
be
decreased inter-class differentials within regions. For example, if, according to the class cleavage model, class 1 is more likely to support me Conservative party than is class 2, then we expect (RC+‘RCLaj/z) In any regionj,
>
(7)
I.0
the RCL ratio should be greater in class 1 than in class 2. However, if the
thesis of class dealignment and regional polarization is valid, then in any one region the difference between the classes should reduce over time. As people become less tied to class in determining their voting propensities and more sensitive to regional variations in prosperity, then people in a particular region are more likely to vote the same way whatever their class. Thus if we define
where CR”” is the ratio of Conservative to Labour ratios contrasting class m to class n, for regionj at election k then CRmn = f(t) The validity of the expectations here.
(9) set out in (6) and (9) is the focus of the empirical
tests
Data and ratios To evaluate the above expectations we have taken the longest available sequence of data which enables us to assess voting by class and region at British general elections. This sequence is provided by the successive waves of the British Election Study, which cover
76
k’e@onal uotin~ patterns in Great Britain, 1964-19887
the period from 1964 to 1987 inclusive (Butler and Stokes, 1974: Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983; Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985; Heath et al., 1991). In using these data we are constrained to the common definition of occupational class across all eight surveys, but have been able to use our own regional classification. Because of the relatively small samples, we have used a 4 (class) x 5 (region) x 4 (vote) categorization, as follows: Occupational
1 2 3 4
Professional and managerial Routine non-manual Skilled manual Semi-skilled and unskilled manual
Region
1 2 3 4 5
ScotlandWales North (of England) Midlands Greater London South (excluding Greater London)
Vote
1 2 3 4
Conservative Labour Liberal (Alliance in 1983 and 1987) Other and abstention
Thepattern
of ratios
With four parties, four classes, five regions and eight elections the number of ratios to be calculated and analysed is very large. In this section, we provide only a brief description of general patterns, before turning to more formal analyses, This is done using a sequence of graphs. Figure 1 shows the Conservative:Labour (RCL) ratios for each of the four occupational classes in each region, over the eight elections. The trends are not especially clear, especially in the earlier years, but there is a substantial distinction by the 1980s between regions 1 and 2 on the one hand (ScotlandWales and North) and regions 3, 4 and 5 (Midlands, Greater London and the South) on the other. (Classes 2, 3 and 4 provide the clearest examples.) In the latter regions-‘the south’-there is a general increase in the RCL ratio, especially since 1974, whereas in the former-‘the north’-there is little change over time. In all classes, it seems there has been a shift towards support for the Conservative party (a higher RCL ratio) in the south, but not in the north. Class polarization has remained strong in the north but has weakened substantially in the south. Figure 2 shifts from the intra-regional, intra-class depiction of formula (1) to the inter-regional, intra-class ratios of formula (5). In the two examples shown, the southern region (5) is contrasted with one of the northern regions (1-ScotlandWales; 2-North of England). The ratio in the left-hand graph is RCL,l$RCLi,B = RR15
(IO)
and that in the right is RCL&RCLisk = RR25
(II)
The expectation was that the values of RR would decline over time, as the RCL ratio in the northern regions fell relative to that in the south of England (i.e. in each class there would be a greater propensity to vote Conservative rather than Labour in the south rather than the north, and this relative propensity would increase over time).
R.J.JOHNSTON
AND
77
C. J, PATTIE -..-.. -.-._ ---
Region1 Region2 Regim3 Region4 Regi'm5
f-. f A' I I'
Ii 1'!
‘.
,/
“Y,
1,!
!;’ !i:....--. ‘..,
~~~
‘.
I '
I 1964
I 1966
I I I 1974Fl97401979
I
1970
ChSs3
-..-. -.-.---
i?.,
\
‘i
' !!
I
I 1966
,I./! /.’ I
I
I I I 1974F197401979
I 1970
-
-.-..
R-1 RqimP Rqim3 R-4
---
RegmS
I I I 1974F197401979
I 1963
I\ I'\ ,I
I 1987
\
,
‘\
‘.\
‘\
. . . .‘...
1970
I
1966
',
,I i/\,
~~~~.’
364
I 1964
-..-..
,.!
\
L
class4
:Ii ., .’
'
Region1 Region2 Rqm3 Rqm4 R&x15
-
t.:/
I 1967
I
1963
I 1963
‘..
I 1987
)-
I I! 364
I 1966
I 1970
I I I 1974F197401979
I 1983
I 1967
FIGURE1. The Conservative:Labour (RCL) ratios for each occupational class, by region,
The graphs in Figure 2 show that the expectations were in general realised. In the right-hand graph, for example, which contrasts the north and south of England, the values of RR fell very substantially, and consistently, after 1974, which is indicative of the growing regional polarization within classes. Relative to those in the south, north-of-England voters have become more pro-Labour and anti-Conservative, in each class. Figure 3 shows the trend in the values of RR according to formula (5) when the regions (m and n) are the North and the South of England (2 and 5) and the parties are Labour and the Alliance (Liberal, plus SDP in 1983 and 1987). There is a general trend showing that the LabourAliance (RLA) ratio was increasingly large in the north relative to its value in the south. There was regional polarization within each class in the anti-Conservative vote, especially from 1979 on, therefore, with the Alliance doing much better, in each class, in the south than in the north. Finally, Figure 4 looks at two of the inter-class comparisons identified in formula (8). The graph on the left contrasts the two extreme classes and indicates no secular trend in the CR ratio. Within region 5, for example, the ratio of the RCL ratios in the two classes
Kegiorual voting patterns in Great Britain, 1964-1987
78 3
Regions 1 and 5
-
-
1.2
class1 C!a?&P class3 class4
-..-.. -.-
-
RegkrlsPandS
class1 class2 C&S3 C&s4
-..-. -.-.-
1.0 b
I
\
rn
a-
ox-
a
~.k..,.
g .k= 0.6d
.z
d
I ! i i, :. ;, ! ..'.. ,, i'.i,_,_:.j.~ ....,
/' ,.'
... :.
i
."
:.:I1
..'.,,,
i
I-
0.4-
l.\,
_'
.?.. ‘..y
i _.-.j\
,'..,'...., .\ "-. '\ ,.' '"'
0.2
011 1964
’
1966
-._
1 I I 1974F197401979
’
1970
I 1963
001’
1967
1964
’
1966
’
1970
I I I 1974F197401979
YfBl
1963
I 1967
Year
FIGURE2. The RR ratios for RCL, comparing
5
(left) regions
Regiws2and5
-
:: : :
4t
1 and 5 and (right) regions 2 and 5.
class1 c!a.sS.2 c!ass3 C!aS4
.
-..-.. -.-‘-
.:’
:
..;i
3:: ‘Z= n” 2-
l-
01 1
1964
I 1970
I
1966
I I I 1974F197401979
I
1963
I 1967
Year
FIGURE 3. The RR ratios for RLA, comparing
loor\
-
Classesland
_..-.. -'-'---
60
Regal1 Renal2 R&l3 Regal4 Region5
7-
regions 2 and 5. -
CbssesPand3
_..-.. -.-.-
Region1 Region2 Region3 Region4
:\
201.~~~~~ '
,964
,966
1970
1974F197401979
1963
1967
Y&3
FIGURE4. The CR ratios for RCL, comparing
01 ’
1964
I 1966
I 1970
I 1 I 1974F197401979
I 1963
, 1967
Year
(left) classes 1 and 4 and (right) classes 2 and 3.
79
R J, JOHNSTONAND C. J. PATTIE
remained very constant, with the relative propensity of class 1 members
to vote C rather
than L being about ten times the similar figure in class 4. The comparison of classes 2 and 3 (right-hand graph) suggests some secular decline in four regions (1 is the exception) but the trend is weak.
Formalizing the analysis The patterns illustrated in the above paragraphs provide circumstantial
evidence
of the
existence of the expected trends-according to functions (6) and (9)-but the ratios depicted are also influenced by variations over time in: the number of votes cast at each election, nationally and by region, for each of the four parties (including abstention as voting for a party); and the class structure, both nationally and by region, These need to be standardized to allow a proper test of the hypotheses in (6) and (9). Such standardization has been undertaken using the methodology of log-linear analysis, which accounts for the differences in the values of RR and CR-the ratios defined in (5) and (8>--in terms of the number of votes cast (V), the number of people in each class (C), the number of people in each region (R), and the interactions among those variables. In the fully saturated form NPc = j-(V + C + R + V*C + V*R + C*R + V*C*R)
(12)
where NPek = the number of votes for partyp in region i by classj at election /z and p = 1-4; i = 1-4; j = l-5; and k = 1-8, but k is held constant (i.e. we fit the model separately for each election). In terms of the present analysis, we are particularly interested NPqh = J-(V + C + R + V*C+V*R + C*R)
in the following model (13)
V is the votes cast (for each party,p) C is the number in each class (for each class, i) R is the number in each region (for each region, j) If the V*R terms are significant, this means that there are significant voting differences between regions, with class structure and overall voting patterns held constant: if the V*C terms are significant, there are significant vote/class links when regional and voting totals are held constant. If both are significant, then there are inter-regional differences even when class is held constant. The models were fitted using the GLIM computing package. The summary output is given in Table 1; the goodness-of-fit variable given there is G’, the likelihood ratio test statistic. The smaller the value of G2, the better the fit. (With the fully saturated model-( 12)-G’ = 0.0.) The table shows that for all eight elections the model involving the V*C and V*R interactions (and hence the V + C + R terms as well) provides a substantially better fit than any above it (and hence with fewer terms) in the table. At the early elections in the sequence (notably 1964 and 1966) the improvement of (V*C + V*R) over (WC + R; this excludes the vote/region interactions) is relatively small; thenceforth it increases substantially, indicative of growing inter-regional variations in voting, independent of class structure. The improvement from (V*C + V*R) to V*C + V*R + C*R) is relatively small, suggesting that changes in regional class structures over time have had a
80
Regional
uoting putterns in Great Britain, TABLE
1221.1
Null
1. Goodness-of-fit
1223.9
19&f-19887
statistics (G2)
1970
Election f974F 19740
I.9 79
I983
1387
870.5
1177.7
936.6
1656.1
1631.9
1143.4
Terms included (with degrees of freedom and improvement on previous stage) V
(75) (4)
614.2 (606.9)
614.5 (609.4)
491.6 (378.9)
864.0 (313.7)
850.2 (293.2)
623.8 (312.8)
1399.5 (256.6)
1296.9 (335.0)
vi-c
(71) (4) (70) (5) (66) (9)
550.3 (64.1) 485.9 (228.3) 416.7 (197.5)
521.4 (93.1) 466.4 (;;4:;) (236.0)
371.0 (120.6) 270.3 (121.3) 224.8 (154.1)
691.2 (172.8) 603.6 (260.4) 430.7 (433.3)
787.6 (62.6) 563.1 (287.1) 421.7 (428.5)
511.4 (112.4) 386.2 (236.6) 273.7 (350.1)
840.1 (559.4) 1205.3 (194.2) 646.0 (7535)
778.7 (518.2) 1133.9 (193.0) 615.7 (681.2)
(55) (16) (50) (20)
250.9 (299.2) 450.0 (35.9)
243.2 (278.2) 437.4 (29.0)
237.8 (133.2) 228.7 (41.6)
514.2 (177.0) 468.4 (135.2)
566.2 (221.4) 468.4 (94.7)
3656 (145.8) 320.9 (65.3)
511.0 (329.1) 1010.6 (194.7)
505.7 (273.0) 886.0 (247.9)
(50) (5) (46) (4)
111.6 (139.3) 381.4 (68.6)
95.2 (;;$) (83.0)
84.0 (153.8) 186.1 (42.6)
253.8 (260.4) 295.4 (173.0)
186.6 (379.6) 329.0 (139.4)
128.0 (237.6) 208.4 (112.5)
316.9 (194.1) 450.6 (560.0)
342.6 (163.1) 367.8 (518.2)
66.2 (29.0)
47.4 (36.6)
118.4 (135.4)
95.5 (91.1)
62.7 (65.3)
121.6 (195.3)
94.7 (247.9)
33.2 (33.0)
36.8 (10.6)
71.1 (47.3)
40.2 (45.3)
23.0 (39.7)
48.8 (72.8)
38.7 (56.0)
V+R V+C+R v*c V*R V*C + R V*R + C V*C + V*R
(30) (20)
V*C +V*R+
C*R(lO) (20)
54.7 (56.9)
The results are presented in blocks, with each row in a block compared with the relevant row in the previous block. Thus V is compared with the Null model; V + C, V + R and V + C + R are compared with V; V*C with V + C and V*R with V + R, V*C + R and V*R + C are compared with V*C and V*R respectively; V*C + V*R is compared with V*C + R, and V*C + V*R + C*R is compared with V*C + V*R. The figures for degrees of freedom in the first row of each model are for the model itself; those in the second row are the difference between those for the model and those with which it is being compared.
small impact only, but it increases over time, suggesting greater regional variations in class structure at the later elections. The implication from the goodness-of-fit statistics, therefore, is that inter-regional differences in voting patterns, independent of class, increased over the eight-election period. The extent of that increase is illustrated in Table 2, which gives the (V*R) coefficients for 1964 and 1987, in the (V*R + V*C + C+R) model. For the former year, most of them are statistically insignificant (i.e. the coefficient is less than twice its standard error) whereas all but one was significant in 1987; for the latter they are all negative and therefore imply a clear nor&south divide. The vote-region interaction coefficients in Table 2 indicate differences in the probabili~ of voting for a particular party in a particular region, when regional class structures (GR) and vote by class (WC) relationships are held constant. (The coeffkients are the multiplicative terms in a log-linear model; the probabilities are their anti-logs.) Thus, for example, the significant coefficients for 1987 in the Labour column indicate a lower
81
R. J, JOHNSTON AND C. J. PAITIE
The (V*R)interaction terms in the (V*R+ V*C + C+R)models, 1964 and 1987
TABLE 2.
Vote 1 Consemative
1. ScotlandiWales
1.00
2. North
1.00
3. Midlands 4. Greater London 5. south
1.00 1.00 1.oo
2
3
4
Labour
Alliance
Other/abstentions
1.00 *l-O.49 *l-1.14 *I- 1.49 -0.61/-1.61
1.00 e/-o.51 */-0.92 */-0.51 */-0.39
The figure on the left of the / is the term for 1964, that on the right for 1987. Insignificant
1.00 */-1.04 *I-O.94 */- 1.01 *I- 1.23 terms are shown by *
probability of voting Labour relative to voting Conservative in each of the other regions than in ScotlandWales, with that relative probability being lowest in the south of England and highest in the north. Similarly, relative to the situation in Scotland/Wales, there was a lower probability of either abstaining or voting ‘other’ in the south of England, where neither SNP nor PC put up candidates. Table 3 gives all of the (V*R) coefficients for every election, and clearly indicates the growing inter-regional polarization over time, with all other factors held constant. Thus whereas in 1964 only two of the 12 coefficients were statistically significant (i.e. twice their standard error) all 12 were in 1983 and 11 were in 1987. From the October 1974 election on, all of the significant coefficients were negative. The main shift towards a regionally-polarized electorate came with the two contests of 1974. Before then, there was only one consistent pattern, the lower probability of voting Liberal than Conservative in region 3; this reflects the relative strength of the Liberal party in Scotland and Wales prior to 1974 and its weakness in the Midlands. The rows for Party 2 show that from the October 1974 general election on, the relative probability of voting Labour rather than Conservative was significantly greater in Scotland TABLE 3.
Region
paq
The (V*R)interaction terms in the (V*R+ V*C + C*R) model
1964 ‘:,;:m;
1970
1974F
(0.55) (-0.07)
(-0.23) (-0.63) -0.57
(-0.31) (0.39) -0.74
1966
1979
1983
1987
0.64 (-0.30) -0.84
-0.51 -0.34 -0.56
-0.49 -0.51 -1.04
2
2
2 2
3 4
3 3 3
2 3 4
(-0.35) -0.92 (0.09)
(-0.22) -1.16 (-0.29)
(-0.36) -1.70 (-0.34)
-0.61 (-0.02) -1.23
-0.49 (-0.03) -1.03
-0.66 (-0.46) (-0.44)
-1.13 -0.63 -0.55
-1.14 (-0.32) -0.94
4 4 4
2 3 4
(-0.06) (0.21) (0.26)
(0.15) (-0.32) (-0.07)
(-0.10) (-0.69) (-0.63)
(-;:;;) -1.19
(Ig:;;) -1.23
(I;:;‘:) (-0.12)
-1.22 -0.49 -0.79
-1.49 -0.51 -1.01
5 5 5
2 3 4
-0.61 0.44 (-0.43)
(-0.42) (-0.52) -0.51
-0.66 (-0.52) -0.78
-1.18 (-0.29) -0.94
-1.56 -0.39 -1.04
-1.61 -0.39 -1.23
0.07
(-0.01)
19740
Insignificant coefficients are in brackets. The key to region and party is in Table 2.
-0.78 1.04 -0.96
-0.63 (0.07) -0.97
-1.07 (0.24) -1.32
82
Regional rioting patterns in Great Britain, 1964-1987
and Wales than in any other part of the country. With regard to regions 3, 4 and 5--‘the south’-the increasing size of the coefficients indicates the growing northsouth divide, whereas the smaller decline for region 2-North of Englandindicates some increased convergence in ‘the north’, though Scotland and Wales remained significantly more pro-Labour than the North of England. The rows for Party 4 combine two trends. First, there was the greater support for the two nationalist parties from 1974 on, which was focused entirely on Scotland and Wales. Secondly, there was a greater likelihood of abstention in the north than in the south. The rows for Party 3 have the smallest number of significant coefficients, indicative of the relative uniformity of support for the Liberal party (plus the SDP after 1979) across Great Britain. Almost all of the significant coefficients indicate a lower probability of voting Alliance in other regions, relative to Conservative, than in ScotlandWales, indicative of the Conservative party’s weakness in the British periphery. Trends over time Equations (6) and (9) postulate statistically significant secular trends in the values of RR and CR respectively, which imply similar trends in the RCL, RCA and RLA ratios for each class x region combination. To test the validity of those hypotheses, we use correlations of the trends in the predicted ratios derived from fitting the (V*R + V+C + C*R) models. Correlations were computed with the elections: (a) ranked from 1 (1964) to 8 (1987) thereby implying a similar shift between each pair of elections; and (b) allocated their time-distance in months from the first election in October 1964. The results were very similar, and only those for (a) are reported here. With just eight observations, only values of r exceeding 0.71 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Class, region and vote Table 4 presents the correlations for the RCL, RCA and RLAratios for each region and class. Of the 60 values, 26 are statistically significant, so that overall there is more evidence against the hypothesis of increased polarization within each regional class than for it. There are, however, substantial differences among the various parts of the table. The biggest differences are inter-regional, with the Midlands (3) having nine of its 12 correlations significant and ScotlandWales (1) having eight, on the one hand, and the North of England (2) having but one on the other. Thus Scotland, Wales and the English Midlands are the regions with the clearest trends in party-support ratios over the eight elections. All but one of the correlations (for RCL in Midlands) is negative, indicating a fall in the value of the predicted ratio over time; Labour has improved its performance relative to that of the Tories in those regions, and the Alliance has improved its performance relative to both of the other parties. Among the four classes, the number of significant coefficients is substantially larger for the manual occupational groups (3 and 4) than for the non-manual. Among the latter, the clearest overall trends indicate, first, the growing relative strength of the Alliance in regions 1 and 3 and, secondly, the growing strength of the Conservative secular trend in the relative size of the RCL ratios in each pair except one-2 and 3 (North and Midlands). All but one of those significant coefficients are negative, which was the relationship anticipated above-especially with regard to differences across the north:south divide. (In the correlations, the region numbered on the left formed the numerator for the RR calculation and that on the right was the denominator.) Thus in the northern regions the
83
R. J, JOHNSTON AND C. J. PATXE
TABLE 4.
Correlations
of the vote ratios against time Class 2
1
3
4
Region1 RCL RCA RLA
-0.76 -0.73 (-0.18)
-0.74 -0.86 (-0.48)
(-0.36) -0.81 -0.75
(-0.23) -0.91 -0.88
(-0.41) (-0.61) (-0.43)
(-0.13) (-0.58) (-0.55)
(0.25) (-0.62) (-0.63)
(0.61) (-0.63) -0.78
(0.54) -0.80 -0.91
0.79 -0.75 -0.86
Region2 RCL RCA RLA
Region3 RCL RCA RLA
(0.10) -0.82 -0.94
(0.35) -0.79 -0.82
Region4 RCL RCA RLA
(0.68) (-0.46) (-0.61)
0.71 (-0.50) (-0.68)
0.81 (-0.60) -0.79
0.89 (-0.61) -0.87
(0.46) (-0.59) (-0.68)
(0.60) (-0.57) (-0.66)
0.75 (-0.60) (-0.68)
0.90 (-0.64) -0.80
Region5 RCL RCA RLA
Statistically insignificant correlations
at the 0.05 level are in brackets.
RCL ratio fell over time (holding class constant) relative to its change in the regions further south-a relationship which also held when the Midlands (region 3) was compared with Greater London and with the South (4 and 5). This is clear evidence of long-term differential shifts in the propensity of voters in different regions to support the two main parties. The only exception to this generalization occurs with the RR ratio comparing Greater London (4) and South (5) in their RCL ratios. In that case, the positive correlation indicates an increasing RCL ratio in Greater London relative to the South. Although this implies that, relative to the South, London has become more pro-Tory, it does not mean that the latter region has shifted towards Labour in an absolute sense. Rather, it is an indicator of a shift away from Labour in its London heartlands, which was especially marked in the late 1980s (Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp, 1988). There are many fewer significant correlations in the RCA and RLA columns of Table 5. Three of the regional comparisons have significant coefficients in both columns, and with the same signs. The positive correlations for the North:Midlands comparison (2:3) indicate that relative to the situation in the Midlands both Conservative and Labour performed better over time in their contests with the Alliance. This was a consequence of the weak Alliance (Liberal) base in the Midlands (East and West), which meant that its increase there, especially in the 198Os, was more substantial than it was in the North, where the Alliance (Liberal) roots were generally deeper and stronger. The negative correlations for the contrasts between the Midlands and both Greater London and the South are further
84
Regional
uotingpatterns
TABLE5. Correlations
Regions
compared
1
2
1 1
3 4
1 2 2 2
5 3 4 5 4
3 3 4
5 5
in Great Britain,
1964-1987
of the RR ratios against time
Ratio RCL
RCA
RLA
-0.84 -0.92
(-0.44) (0.48)
-0.95 -0.95 (-0.33) -0.81 -0.78 -0.85 -0.71 0.76
(-0.35) (-0.26) 0.89 (-0.17) (0.00) -0.88 -0.83 (0.15)
(-0.05) 0.83 (-0.59) (0.30) 0.86 (0.67) (0.69) -0.75 -0.85 (0.22)
Statistically insignificant correlations
at the 0.05 level are in brackets.
indications of this; the relative growth of the Alliance in the Midlands in the 1980s was greater than in the regions further south where its base was also stronger. (The difference in sign reflects that region 3 was the denominator in the 2 :3 comparison-and also the 1:3 comparison for RLA-but the numerator in the other two.) Inter-class compurisons The CR ratios-formula (8)-for the inter-class comparisons holding region constant produced only five significant correlations out of 18 (Table 6). Overall, the clearest pattern was for the RLA ratios. If we take the four occupational classes as occupying a vertical continuum from the highest (1) to the lowest (4), then the higher the class the better the performance of the Alliance relative to Labour. The positive correlations (all but one insignificant) in the RCA column similarly indicate a better relative performance by the Alliance in the higher occupational class groups, whereas the negative correlations (again, all but one statistically insignificant) in the RCL column indicate Labour’s better performance relative to that of the Conservative party in the lower-status occupational class groups.
TABLE6.
Correlations of the CR ratios against time
Classes compared
1
1 1 2 2 3
2 3 4 3 4 4
Ratio RCL
(-0.39) (-0.68) -0.82 (-0.48)
(-0.69) (-0.39)
Statistically insignificant correlations
RCA
RLA
(0.17) (0.47) (0.64) (0.20) 0.80 (0.44)
(0.46) 0.73 0.80 (0.55) 0.86 (0.59)
at the 0.05 level are in brackets
R. J. JOHNSTONAND C. J. PATTIE
85
In summary This paper is the first to present the results of analyses of the changing geography of voting in Great Britain, by occupational class groups, over several general elections. It is thus the first to provide not only substantial evidence of a growth in regional polarization in voting since the 1960s but also to link those trends to the thesis of class dealignment. Most psephological analyses of British voting behaviour have failed to link the two, and thus cannot account for the patterns that they describe. What the results presented here unequivocally demonstrate is that: 1. Over the period of eight general elections from 1964 to 1987 the regional variable gained in importance in the statistical analysis of voting by class and region; 2. Regional variability was especially marked in the relative performance of the Conservative and Labour parties; and 3. Within each occupational class, there has been an increasing tendency to support Labour rather than Conservative in the relatively deprived regions, but Conservative rather than Labour in the relatively affluent. Together, these findings account for the apparent paradox of class dealignment at the national level and polarization at the regional level (see also Miller, 1977, 1984; Warde, 1986). People in the same class have responded differently to the economic circumstances of the period in the different regions. The growing regional polarization since 1974 was only partly a consequence of changing occupational class structures in the five regions over the period. The main reason for the trend, as clearly demonstrated here, was changing class polarization in different regions. In the north, the class cleavage remained much stronger than in the south-in part, though not entirely (during the 1980s at least), because of the growing popularity of the Alliance in the south relative to that of Labour. Overall, therefore, the findings sustain the argument that relative economic prosperity in the south relative to that of the north stimulated sociotropic and egocentric voting across all classes, with the consequent decline in class polarization there (see also Pattie and Johnston, 1990). This analysis, because of the constraints of the data (which are by far the best available for such a long period), has focused on occupational class only. Other writers (such as McAllister, 1987) have argued that a model which looks at class and region only is under-specified, and that both a wider definition of class and, more importantly, incorporation of variables related to political attitudes provide a more fully-specified model and reduce the regional variation to near insignificance. What results such as those presented here make clear is that such arguments are both right and wrong; right because class is a multi-dimensional concept but wrong because the changing patterns of voting must reflect increasing regional variations in attitudes, when class is held constant. In brief, what our results imply is that the class-vote link now varies much more in its direction across British regions than it did two decades ago. Occupational class was once believed not only to be the crucial determinant of voting behaviour in Great Britain but also consistent in the strength and direction of its influence throughout the country. That is no longer the case. Increasingly since 1964, and especially since 1974, people’s regional context has come to influence how they vote as well as their class, because the processes of combined and uneven redevelopment operating in the country then affected classes differentially by region. Acknowledgement The research
acknowledged.
repotted
here was supported
by the ESRC (Grant RE 00232292);
that support
is gratefully
86
Re&v’tu~ toting pattetxs
in Greut Britain, 1 c)(;4-152387
References ANDSTOKES,D. E. (1974). Political Change in Britain, 2nd edn. London: Macmillan. &EWE, I. (1986). On the death and resurrection of class voting. Political St&es 34,620-638. CR~SE, I. ANDDEER, D. T., EDS (1985). EZectoval Cbarzge in Western Democra&s. London: Groom Helm. CURTICE, J. mu %EED, M. (1982). Electoral choice and the production of ~ove~ment. ~~.~o~~~~ ofPoZ~c~ Science 12, 249-298. DENVER, D. T. (1987). The British general election of 1987: some preliminary reflections. Parltiamentulygffaivs 40,
BUTLER, D.
451-457. DIINLF.A\Y, P. (1987). Class dealignment in Britain revisited. Wesr European Politics 10, 400-419. DUNLEA\%‘, P. ANDHUSBANDS, C. T. 11985). &it&b Democvacy al the C?O~SKX?U?London: George Allen and Unwin. HEATH,A., JOWEU, R ANDCURTICE, J. (1985). HOWB&&Z Vo&.%Oxford: Per@mon. HEATH,A., Jo-, R. A-D CURTKX,J. (1987). Trendless fluctuation; a reply to Crave. Politica Stud&s 35,25&277. HEATH,A.. m AL (1991). Understanding Political Change. Oxford: Pergamon JOHNSTON,R. J, (1985). The Geqqru@y ofE~~,@z%Pofttics. London: Croom Helm. JOHNSTON, R. J, (1990). Lipset and Rokkan revisited: electoral cleavages, electoral geography and electoral strategy in Great Britain. In Deuelopments in Electoral Geogrup@ (R. J. Johnston, F. M. Shelley and P. J. Taylor eds) pp. 121-142. London: Routledge. JOHNSTON, R. J. AND PKITIE, C. J. (1989). A nation dividing? Economic well-being, voter response and the changing electoral geography of Great Britain. P~~l~rn~t~~y A$%rs 42, 37-57. JOHNSTON, R. J., PAIT‘E, C. J. ANDAUSOPP,J. G. (1988). A Nfftios LWd~?zg??&e Electoral Muj~ of Great Brirai?z 1979-1987. London: Longman. LEWIS,J. ANI, TOWNSEND, A, EDS (1989). The North-South Divide. London: Paul Chapman Publishing. LIPSET, S. M. ANDROKKAN, S. E. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments. In ParZy Systemsand Voter Alignments (S. M. Lipset and S. E. Rokkan eds) pp. 3-64. New York: The Free Press. MCAUISTER, 1. (1987). Social context, turnout and the vote: Australian and British comparisons. PO&&~ Geogra$?~ Qr~arterly 6, 17-30 MULER, W. L. (1977). Electoral D~.~~rnic.% London: Macmillan. MILLER, W. L. (1984). There was no alternative: the British general election of 1983. Parliamentary .A&zirs 37,
364-384. Pm-m,
C. J, AND JOHNSTON, R. J.
attitudes
(1990). Embellishment and detail? The changing relationship berween voting, class and the core-periphery division of Great Britain 1979-1987. TransacTions,Instirute of Bririsb
GeognapbetsNS 15, SAIILVIK, B, ANDCREWE,I. (1983). Decade of~~l~gn~~t. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press WARDE,A. (1986). Electoral mysteries. InternationalJournaI of Urban and Re&mal Research 10, 289-294. WEATHERFOKD, M. S. (1986). Economic determinants of voting. In Research in Micropolitics, vol. 1 (S. Long ed.) pp. 219-269. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Wnr~nm’, P. (1986). Predicting the Labour vote in 1983. Political Studies 34, 32-98.
Class dealignment and the regional polarization of voting patterns in Great Britain, 1964-1987 R. J. JOHNSTON Department of Geography, University of Shefjeld, Shefjeld SlO 2TN, UK AND
C.J. PATTIE Department of Geography, Uniuexsiy of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
ABSTRACT. Survey data relating to each British general election over the period 1964-1987 are used to test the frequently-claimed assumption that regional polarization increased over the period. Use of log-linear modelling allows the hypothesis to be evaluated with the changing regional class composition held constant. The results indicate that class polarization remains strong in the north but has declined substantially in the south.
Much has been written in recent years about the perceived growing regional polarization of voting patterns in Great Britain since the 1950s. A great deal of it is descriptive, identifying the extent of the polarization and pointing to a problem for analysts (e.g. Denver, 1987; Johnston, 1985); some of it develops clear hypotheses that have yet to be subjected to conclusive tests (e.g. Curtice and Steed, 1982). In this brief paper we present the results of one such critical test, which looks at a longer period than any other study. Regional class dealignment One of the most important concepts introduced to electoral studies in recent years is that of dealignment. In its more general form, the hypothesis of dealignment is that members of the electorate are becoming less staunchly loyal to particular parties with which they identify, and in consequence are becoming more volatile in their electoral choices over time (see Crewe and Denver, 1985). Thispartisan dealignment involves the reduction of electoral cleavages within society, as portrayed in the classic Lipset-Rokkan model (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Johnston, 1990). In Great Britain, where a class cleavage has long dominated electoral behaviour, the particular consequence is thus a class dealignment, as the differences between the occupational classes in their voting behaviour become less (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985: on the existence of class dealignment, see Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985, 1987; Crewe, 1986; and Dunleavy, 1987). 0962.6298/92/01 0073-14 0
1992 Butterworth-Heinemann
Ltd
[email protected] mting patterm in Great Britain, 1964-1987
74
Class dealignment is a necessary but insufficient condition to account for the growing spatial polarization of the British electorate. What is needed in addition is a hypothesis that can account for regional variations in the form of that dealignment. Such a hypothesis is provided by the concepts of sociotropic and egocentric voting (Wea~erford, 1986). According to the former, people make voting decisions according to their perceptions of the national condition on selected criteria: in general, if they perceive the condition to be good, they will be more likely to vote to return the incumbent government than if they perceive it to be bad, whatever their personal political beliefs. According to the notion of egocentric voting, people act similarly except that they are evaluating their personal condition rather than that of society. The general relevance of this hypothesis to voting in Britain has been evaluated by Whiteley (e.g. Whiteley, 1986). In Great Britain over recent decades, the major criteria that have been used in processes of sociotropic and egocentric voting are the condition of the economy and each individual’s personal situation within it. During that period, the major process of economic change-which accelerated rapidly during the 198Os-was spatially very uneven, being usually represented as a no~h:sou~ divide (Lewis and Townsend, 1989). That being so, then people in the relatively prosperous regions (the ‘south) should be more predisposed to vote for the incumbent party whereas those in the less prosperous regions (the ‘north’) would be more likely to vote for the opposition; we have produced tentative evidence for the 1980s which supports this (Johnston and Pattie, 1989), and extend that analysis here to the longer time-span for the period 196447.
7%e bme for a statiktical amlysis If we begin with an electoral system in which a class cleavage predominates, then one would expect similar patterns of voting, by class, in every region; for example, the ratio of Conservative to Labour votes would be the same, within any one occupational class, in each region at a particular election. If, from that start, we then get spatial polarization, with an increasingly class-dealigned electorate, the ratios should change. According to the arguments above, the propensity to vote for the incumbent government party, within a defined class, should have declined in Great Britain’s northern regions relative to the propensity to vote for the opposition, whereas the reverse would be the case in the southern regions. As a result, the inter-regional ratios for any class should increasingly diverge. Formally we state this as follows:
(1) where C+ is the number of votes for the Conservative party by class 1 in region j at election k; Lqk is the number of votes for the Labour party by class i in regionj at election k; so that
RCLiik is the ratio of Conservative to Labour votes by class i in regionj If a class cleavage predominated,
at election k.
and was uniform across regions, then the expectation
is
that RCLiI$RCL,k
=
1.0
the ratio does not vary significantly between regions, for any class.
(2)
75
R. J. JOHNSTONAND C. J. PATTIE
If the thesis linking class dealignment to regional polarization is valid, however, then the expectation
given in equation
(2) would not hold. Instead, we would anticipate that, if
region 2 is the south of Great Britain and region 1 is in the north, then
such mat (RCL,,$R&&
<
I.0
Further, if the processes sequence
of elections,
of class dealignment
and regional polarization
continue
over a
then defining
RCLi,$RCLiQk =
RRmn
(5)
where RR”” is the ratio of Conservative:Labour
ratios contrasting region m to region n, for class i
at election /z then RR”” = f(t) where t represents
(6)
the sequence
Paralleling
these
of elections
increased
from 1 to k.
inter-regional
differentials
within
classes
should
be
decreased inter-class differentials within regions. For example, if, according to the class cleavage model, class 1 is more likely to support me Conservative party than is class 2, then we expect (RC+‘RCLaj/z) In any regionj,
>
(7)
I.0
the RCL ratio should be greater in class 1 than in class 2. However, if the
thesis of class dealignment and regional polarization is valid, then in any one region the difference between the classes should reduce over time. As people become less tied to class in determining their voting propensities and more sensitive to regional variations in prosperity, then people in a particular region are more likely to vote the same way whatever their class. Thus if we define
where CR”” is the ratio of Conservative to Labour ratios contrasting class m to class n, for regionj at election k then CRmn = f(t) The validity of the expectations here.
(9) set out in (6) and (9) is the focus of the empirical
tests
Data and ratios To evaluate the above expectations we have taken the longest available sequence of data which enables us to assess voting by class and region at British general elections. This sequence is provided by the successive waves of the British Election Study, which cover
76
k’e@onal uotin~ patterns in Great Britain, 1964-19887
the period from 1964 to 1987 inclusive (Butler and Stokes, 1974: Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983; Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985; Heath et al., 1991). In using these data we are constrained to the common definition of occupational class across all eight surveys, but have been able to use our own regional classification. Because of the relatively small samples, we have used a 4 (class) x 5 (region) x 4 (vote) categorization, as follows: Occupational
1 2 3 4
Professional and managerial Routine non-manual Skilled manual Semi-skilled and unskilled manual
Region
1 2 3 4 5
ScotlandWales North (of England) Midlands Greater London South (excluding Greater London)
Vote
1 2 3 4
Conservative Labour Liberal (Alliance in 1983 and 1987) Other and abstention
Thepattern
of ratios
With four parties, four classes, five regions and eight elections the number of ratios to be calculated and analysed is very large. In this section, we provide only a brief description of general patterns, before turning to more formal analyses, This is done using a sequence of graphs. Figure 1 shows the Conservative:Labour (RCL) ratios for each of the four occupational classes in each region, over the eight elections. The trends are not especially clear, especially in the earlier years, but there is a substantial distinction by the 1980s between regions 1 and 2 on the one hand (ScotlandWales and North) and regions 3, 4 and 5 (Midlands, Greater London and the South) on the other. (Classes 2, 3 and 4 provide the clearest examples.) In the latter regions-‘the south’-there is a general increase in the RCL ratio, especially since 1974, whereas in the former-‘the north’-there is little change over time. In all classes, it seems there has been a shift towards support for the Conservative party (a higher RCL ratio) in the south, but not in the north. Class polarization has remained strong in the north but has weakened substantially in the south. Figure 2 shifts from the intra-regional, intra-class depiction of formula (1) to the inter-regional, intra-class ratios of formula (5). In the two examples shown, the southern region (5) is contrasted with one of the northern regions (1-ScotlandWales; 2-North of England). The ratio in the left-hand graph is RCL,l$RCLi,B = RR15
(IO)
and that in the right is RCL&RCLisk = RR25
(II)
The expectation was that the values of RR would decline over time, as the RCL ratio in the northern regions fell relative to that in the south of England (i.e. in each class there would be a greater propensity to vote Conservative rather than Labour in the south rather than the north, and this relative propensity would increase over time).
R.J.JOHNSTON
AND
77
C. J, PATTIE -..-.. -.-._ ---
Region1 Region2 Regim3 Region4 Regi'm5
f-. f A' I I'
Ii 1'!
‘.
,/
“Y,
1,!
!;’ !i:....--. ‘..,
~~~
‘.
I '
I 1964
I 1966
I I I 1974Fl97401979
I
1970
ChSs3
-..-. -.-.---
i?.,
\
‘i
' !!
I
I 1966
,I./! /.’ I
I
I I I 1974F197401979
I 1970
-
-.-..
R-1 RqimP Rqim3 R-4
---
RegmS
I I I 1974F197401979
I 1963
I\ I'\ ,I
I 1987
\
,
‘\
‘.\
‘\
. . . .‘...
1970
I
1966
',
,I i/\,
~~~~.’
364
I 1964
-..-..
,.!
\
L
class4
:Ii ., .’
'
Region1 Region2 Rqm3 Rqm4 R&x15
-
t.:/
I 1967
I
1963
I 1963
‘..
I 1987
)-
I I! 364
I 1966
I 1970
I I I 1974F197401979
I 1983
I 1967
FIGURE1. The Conservative:Labour (RCL) ratios for each occupational class, by region,
The graphs in Figure 2 show that the expectations were in general realised. In the right-hand graph, for example, which contrasts the north and south of England, the values of RR fell very substantially, and consistently, after 1974, which is indicative of the growing regional polarization within classes. Relative to those in the south, north-of-England voters have become more pro-Labour and anti-Conservative, in each class. Figure 3 shows the trend in the values of RR according to formula (5) when the regions (m and n) are the North and the South of England (2 and 5) and the parties are Labour and the Alliance (Liberal, plus SDP in 1983 and 1987). There is a general trend showing that the LabourAliance (RLA) ratio was increasingly large in the north relative to its value in the south. There was regional polarization within each class in the anti-Conservative vote, especially from 1979 on, therefore, with the Alliance doing much better, in each class, in the south than in the north. Finally, Figure 4 looks at two of the inter-class comparisons identified in formula (8). The graph on the left contrasts the two extreme classes and indicates no secular trend in the CR ratio. Within region 5, for example, the ratio of the RCL ratios in the two classes
Kegiorual voting patterns in Great Britain, 1964-1987
78 3
Regions 1 and 5
-
-
1.2
class1 C!a?&P class3 class4
-..-.. -.-
-
RegkrlsPandS
class1 class2 C&S3 C&s4
-..-. -.-.-
1.0 b
I
\
rn
a-
ox-
a
~.k..,.
g .k= 0.6d
.z
d
I ! i i, :. ;, ! ..'.. ,, i'.i,_,_:.j.~ ....,
/' ,.'
... :.
i
."
:.:I1
..'.,,,
i
I-
0.4-
l.\,
_'
.?.. ‘..y
i _.-.j\
,'..,'...., .\ "-. '\ ,.' '"'
0.2
011 1964
’
1966
-._
1 I I 1974F197401979
’
1970
I 1963
001’
1967
1964
’
1966
’
1970
I I I 1974F197401979
YfBl
1963
I 1967
Year
FIGURE2. The RR ratios for RCL, comparing
5
(left) regions
Regiws2and5
-
:: : :
4t
1 and 5 and (right) regions 2 and 5.
class1 c!a.sS.2 c!ass3 C!aS4
.
-..-.. -.-‘-
.:’
:
..;i
3:: ‘Z= n” 2-
l-
01 1
1964
I 1970
I
1966
I I I 1974F197401979
I
1963
I 1967
Year
FIGURE 3. The RR ratios for RLA, comparing
loor\
-
Classesland
_..-.. -'-'---
60
Regal1 Renal2 R&l3 Regal4 Region5
7-
regions 2 and 5. -
CbssesPand3
_..-.. -.-.-
Region1 Region2 Region3 Region4
:\
201.~~~~~ '
,964
,966
1970
1974F197401979
1963
1967
Y&3
FIGURE4. The CR ratios for RCL, comparing
01 ’
1964
I 1966
I 1970
I 1 I 1974F197401979
I 1963
, 1967
Year
(left) classes 1 and 4 and (right) classes 2 and 3.
79
R J, JOHNSTONAND C. J. PATTIE
remained very constant, with the relative propensity of class 1 members
to vote C rather
than L being about ten times the similar figure in class 4. The comparison of classes 2 and 3 (right-hand graph) suggests some secular decline in four regions (1 is the exception) but the trend is weak.
Formalizing the analysis The patterns illustrated in the above paragraphs provide circumstantial
evidence
of the
existence of the expected trends-according to functions (6) and (9)-but the ratios depicted are also influenced by variations over time in: the number of votes cast at each election, nationally and by region, for each of the four parties (including abstention as voting for a party); and the class structure, both nationally and by region, These need to be standardized to allow a proper test of the hypotheses in (6) and (9). Such standardization has been undertaken using the methodology of log-linear analysis, which accounts for the differences in the values of RR and CR-the ratios defined in (5) and (8>--in terms of the number of votes cast (V), the number of people in each class (C), the number of people in each region (R), and the interactions among those variables. In the fully saturated form NPc = j-(V + C + R + V*C + V*R + C*R + V*C*R)
(12)
where NPek = the number of votes for partyp in region i by classj at election /z and p = 1-4; i = 1-4; j = l-5; and k = 1-8, but k is held constant (i.e. we fit the model separately for each election). In terms of the present analysis, we are particularly interested NPqh = J-(V + C + R + V*C+V*R + C*R)
in the following model (13)
V is the votes cast (for each party,p) C is the number in each class (for each class, i) R is the number in each region (for each region, j) If the V*R terms are significant, this means that there are significant voting differences between regions, with class structure and overall voting patterns held constant: if the V*C terms are significant, there are significant vote/class links when regional and voting totals are held constant. If both are significant, then there are inter-regional differences even when class is held constant. The models were fitted using the GLIM computing package. The summary output is given in Table 1; the goodness-of-fit variable given there is G’, the likelihood ratio test statistic. The smaller the value of G2, the better the fit. (With the fully saturated model-( 12)-G’ = 0.0.) The table shows that for all eight elections the model involving the V*C and V*R interactions (and hence the V + C + R terms as well) provides a substantially better fit than any above it (and hence with fewer terms) in the table. At the early elections in the sequence (notably 1964 and 1966) the improvement of (V*C + V*R) over (WC + R; this excludes the vote/region interactions) is relatively small; thenceforth it increases substantially, indicative of growing inter-regional variations in voting, independent of class structure. The improvement from (V*C + V*R) to V*C + V*R + C*R) is relatively small, suggesting that changes in regional class structures over time have had a
80
Regional
uoting putterns in Great Britain, TABLE
1221.1
Null
1. Goodness-of-fit
1223.9
19&f-19887
statistics (G2)
1970
Election f974F 19740
I.9 79
I983
1387
870.5
1177.7
936.6
1656.1
1631.9
1143.4
Terms included (with degrees of freedom and improvement on previous stage) V
(75) (4)
614.2 (606.9)
614.5 (609.4)
491.6 (378.9)
864.0 (313.7)
850.2 (293.2)
623.8 (312.8)
1399.5 (256.6)
1296.9 (335.0)
vi-c
(71) (4) (70) (5) (66) (9)
550.3 (64.1) 485.9 (228.3) 416.7 (197.5)
521.4 (93.1) 466.4 (;;4:;) (236.0)
371.0 (120.6) 270.3 (121.3) 224.8 (154.1)
691.2 (172.8) 603.6 (260.4) 430.7 (433.3)
787.6 (62.6) 563.1 (287.1) 421.7 (428.5)
511.4 (112.4) 386.2 (236.6) 273.7 (350.1)
840.1 (559.4) 1205.3 (194.2) 646.0 (7535)
778.7 (518.2) 1133.9 (193.0) 615.7 (681.2)
(55) (16) (50) (20)
250.9 (299.2) 450.0 (35.9)
243.2 (278.2) 437.4 (29.0)
237.8 (133.2) 228.7 (41.6)
514.2 (177.0) 468.4 (135.2)
566.2 (221.4) 468.4 (94.7)
3656 (145.8) 320.9 (65.3)
511.0 (329.1) 1010.6 (194.7)
505.7 (273.0) 886.0 (247.9)
(50) (5) (46) (4)
111.6 (139.3) 381.4 (68.6)
95.2 (;;$) (83.0)
84.0 (153.8) 186.1 (42.6)
253.8 (260.4) 295.4 (173.0)
186.6 (379.6) 329.0 (139.4)
128.0 (237.6) 208.4 (112.5)
316.9 (194.1) 450.6 (560.0)
342.6 (163.1) 367.8 (518.2)
66.2 (29.0)
47.4 (36.6)
118.4 (135.4)
95.5 (91.1)
62.7 (65.3)
121.6 (195.3)
94.7 (247.9)
33.2 (33.0)
36.8 (10.6)
71.1 (47.3)
40.2 (45.3)
23.0 (39.7)
48.8 (72.8)
38.7 (56.0)
V+R V+C+R v*c V*R V*C + R V*R + C V*C + V*R
(30) (20)
V*C +V*R+
C*R(lO) (20)
54.7 (56.9)
The results are presented in blocks, with each row in a block compared with the relevant row in the previous block. Thus V is compared with the Null model; V + C, V + R and V + C + R are compared with V; V*C with V + C and V*R with V + R, V*C + R and V*R + C are compared with V*C and V*R respectively; V*C + V*R is compared with V*C + R, and V*C + V*R + C*R is compared with V*C + V*R. The figures for degrees of freedom in the first row of each model are for the model itself; those in the second row are the difference between those for the model and those with which it is being compared.
small impact only, but it increases over time, suggesting greater regional variations in class structure at the later elections. The implication from the goodness-of-fit statistics, therefore, is that inter-regional differences in voting patterns, independent of class, increased over the eight-election period. The extent of that increase is illustrated in Table 2, which gives the (V*R) coefficients for 1964 and 1987, in the (V*R + V*C + C+R) model. For the former year, most of them are statistically insignificant (i.e. the coefficient is less than twice its standard error) whereas all but one was significant in 1987; for the latter they are all negative and therefore imply a clear nor&south divide. The vote-region interaction coefficients in Table 2 indicate differences in the probabili~ of voting for a particular party in a particular region, when regional class structures (GR) and vote by class (WC) relationships are held constant. (The coeffkients are the multiplicative terms in a log-linear model; the probabilities are their anti-logs.) Thus, for example, the significant coefficients for 1987 in the Labour column indicate a lower
81
R. J, JOHNSTON AND C. J. PAITIE
The (V*R)interaction terms in the (V*R+ V*C + C+R)models, 1964 and 1987
TABLE 2.
Vote 1 Consemative
1. ScotlandiWales
1.00
2. North
1.00
3. Midlands 4. Greater London 5. south
1.00 1.00 1.oo
2
3
4
Labour
Alliance
Other/abstentions
1.00 *l-O.49 *l-1.14 *I- 1.49 -0.61/-1.61
1.00 e/-o.51 */-0.92 */-0.51 */-0.39
The figure on the left of the / is the term for 1964, that on the right for 1987. Insignificant
1.00 */-1.04 *I-O.94 */- 1.01 *I- 1.23 terms are shown by *
probability of voting Labour relative to voting Conservative in each of the other regions than in ScotlandWales, with that relative probability being lowest in the south of England and highest in the north. Similarly, relative to the situation in Scotland/Wales, there was a lower probability of either abstaining or voting ‘other’ in the south of England, where neither SNP nor PC put up candidates. Table 3 gives all of the (V*R) coefficients for every election, and clearly indicates the growing inter-regional polarization over time, with all other factors held constant. Thus whereas in 1964 only two of the 12 coefficients were statistically significant (i.e. twice their standard error) all 12 were in 1983 and 11 were in 1987. From the October 1974 election on, all of the significant coefficients were negative. The main shift towards a regionally-polarized electorate came with the two contests of 1974. Before then, there was only one consistent pattern, the lower probability of voting Liberal than Conservative in region 3; this reflects the relative strength of the Liberal party in Scotland and Wales prior to 1974 and its weakness in the Midlands. The rows for Party 2 show that from the October 1974 general election on, the relative probability of voting Labour rather than Conservative was significantly greater in Scotland TABLE 3.
Region
paq
The (V*R)interaction terms in the (V*R+ V*C + C*R) model
1964 ‘:,;:m;
1970
1974F
(0.55) (-0.07)
(-0.23) (-0.63) -0.57
(-0.31) (0.39) -0.74
1966
1979
1983
1987
0.64 (-0.30) -0.84
-0.51 -0.34 -0.56
-0.49 -0.51 -1.04
2
2
2 2
3 4
3 3 3
2 3 4
(-0.35) -0.92 (0.09)
(-0.22) -1.16 (-0.29)
(-0.36) -1.70 (-0.34)
-0.61 (-0.02) -1.23
-0.49 (-0.03) -1.03
-0.66 (-0.46) (-0.44)
-1.13 -0.63 -0.55
-1.14 (-0.32) -0.94
4 4 4
2 3 4
(-0.06) (0.21) (0.26)
(0.15) (-0.32) (-0.07)
(-0.10) (-0.69) (-0.63)
(-;:;;) -1.19
(Ig:;;) -1.23
(I;:;‘:) (-0.12)
-1.22 -0.49 -0.79
-1.49 -0.51 -1.01
5 5 5
2 3 4
-0.61 0.44 (-0.43)
(-0.42) (-0.52) -0.51
-0.66 (-0.52) -0.78
-1.18 (-0.29) -0.94
-1.56 -0.39 -1.04
-1.61 -0.39 -1.23
0.07
(-0.01)
19740
Insignificant coefficients are in brackets. The key to region and party is in Table 2.
-0.78 1.04 -0.96
-0.63 (0.07) -0.97
-1.07 (0.24) -1.32
82
Regional rioting patterns in Great Britain, 1964-1987
and Wales than in any other part of the country. With regard to regions 3, 4 and 5--‘the south’-the increasing size of the coefficients indicates the growing northsouth divide, whereas the smaller decline for region 2-North of Englandindicates some increased convergence in ‘the north’, though Scotland and Wales remained significantly more pro-Labour than the North of England. The rows for Party 4 combine two trends. First, there was the greater support for the two nationalist parties from 1974 on, which was focused entirely on Scotland and Wales. Secondly, there was a greater likelihood of abstention in the north than in the south. The rows for Party 3 have the smallest number of significant coefficients, indicative of the relative uniformity of support for the Liberal party (plus the SDP after 1979) across Great Britain. Almost all of the significant coefficients indicate a lower probability of voting Alliance in other regions, relative to Conservative, than in ScotlandWales, indicative of the Conservative party’s weakness in the British periphery. Trends over time Equations (6) and (9) postulate statistically significant secular trends in the values of RR and CR respectively, which imply similar trends in the RCL, RCA and RLA ratios for each class x region combination. To test the validity of those hypotheses, we use correlations of the trends in the predicted ratios derived from fitting the (V*R + V+C + C*R) models. Correlations were computed with the elections: (a) ranked from 1 (1964) to 8 (1987) thereby implying a similar shift between each pair of elections; and (b) allocated their time-distance in months from the first election in October 1964. The results were very similar, and only those for (a) are reported here. With just eight observations, only values of r exceeding 0.71 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Class, region and vote Table 4 presents the correlations for the RCL, RCA and RLAratios for each region and class. Of the 60 values, 26 are statistically significant, so that overall there is more evidence against the hypothesis of increased polarization within each regional class than for it. There are, however, substantial differences among the various parts of the table. The biggest differences are inter-regional, with the Midlands (3) having nine of its 12 correlations significant and ScotlandWales (1) having eight, on the one hand, and the North of England (2) having but one on the other. Thus Scotland, Wales and the English Midlands are the regions with the clearest trends in party-support ratios over the eight elections. All but one of the correlations (for RCL in Midlands) is negative, indicating a fall in the value of the predicted ratio over time; Labour has improved its performance relative to that of the Tories in those regions, and the Alliance has improved its performance relative to both of the other parties. Among the four classes, the number of significant coefficients is substantially larger for the manual occupational groups (3 and 4) than for the non-manual. Among the latter, the clearest overall trends indicate, first, the growing relative strength of the Alliance in regions 1 and 3 and, secondly, the growing strength of the Conservative secular trend in the relative size of the RCL ratios in each pair except one-2 and 3 (North and Midlands). All but one of those significant coefficients are negative, which was the relationship anticipated above-especially with regard to differences across the north:south divide. (In the correlations, the region numbered on the left formed the numerator for the RR calculation and that on the right was the denominator.) Thus in the northern regions the
83
R. J, JOHNSTON AND C. J. PATXE
TABLE 4.
Correlations
of the vote ratios against time Class 2
1
3
4
Region1 RCL RCA RLA
-0.76 -0.73 (-0.18)
-0.74 -0.86 (-0.48)
(-0.36) -0.81 -0.75
(-0.23) -0.91 -0.88
(-0.41) (-0.61) (-0.43)
(-0.13) (-0.58) (-0.55)
(0.25) (-0.62) (-0.63)
(0.61) (-0.63) -0.78
(0.54) -0.80 -0.91
0.79 -0.75 -0.86
Region2 RCL RCA RLA
Region3 RCL RCA RLA
(0.10) -0.82 -0.94
(0.35) -0.79 -0.82
Region4 RCL RCA RLA
(0.68) (-0.46) (-0.61)
0.71 (-0.50) (-0.68)
0.81 (-0.60) -0.79
0.89 (-0.61) -0.87
(0.46) (-0.59) (-0.68)
(0.60) (-0.57) (-0.66)
0.75 (-0.60) (-0.68)
0.90 (-0.64) -0.80
Region5 RCL RCA RLA
Statistically insignificant correlations
at the 0.05 level are in brackets.
RCL ratio fell over time (holding class constant) relative to its change in the regions further south-a relationship which also held when the Midlands (region 3) was compared with Greater London and with the South (4 and 5). This is clear evidence of long-term differential shifts in the propensity of voters in different regions to support the two main parties. The only exception to this generalization occurs with the RR ratio comparing Greater London (4) and South (5) in their RCL ratios. In that case, the positive correlation indicates an increasing RCL ratio in Greater London relative to the South. Although this implies that, relative to the South, London has become more pro-Tory, it does not mean that the latter region has shifted towards Labour in an absolute sense. Rather, it is an indicator of a shift away from Labour in its London heartlands, which was especially marked in the late 1980s (Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp, 1988). There are many fewer significant correlations in the RCA and RLA columns of Table 5. Three of the regional comparisons have significant coefficients in both columns, and with the same signs. The positive correlations for the North:Midlands comparison (2:3) indicate that relative to the situation in the Midlands both Conservative and Labour performed better over time in their contests with the Alliance. This was a consequence of the weak Alliance (Liberal) base in the Midlands (East and West), which meant that its increase there, especially in the 198Os, was more substantial than it was in the North, where the Alliance (Liberal) roots were generally deeper and stronger. The negative correlations for the contrasts between the Midlands and both Greater London and the South are further
84
Regional
uotingpatterns
TABLE5. Correlations
Regions
compared
1
2
1 1
3 4
1 2 2 2
5 3 4 5 4
3 3 4
5 5
in Great Britain,
1964-1987
of the RR ratios against time
Ratio RCL
RCA
RLA
-0.84 -0.92
(-0.44) (0.48)
-0.95 -0.95 (-0.33) -0.81 -0.78 -0.85 -0.71 0.76
(-0.35) (-0.26) 0.89 (-0.17) (0.00) -0.88 -0.83 (0.15)
(-0.05) 0.83 (-0.59) (0.30) 0.86 (0.67) (0.69) -0.75 -0.85 (0.22)
Statistically insignificant correlations
at the 0.05 level are in brackets.
indications of this; the relative growth of the Alliance in the Midlands in the 1980s was greater than in the regions further south where its base was also stronger. (The difference in sign reflects that region 3 was the denominator in the 2 :3 comparison-and also the 1:3 comparison for RLA-but the numerator in the other two.) Inter-class compurisons The CR ratios-formula (8)-for the inter-class comparisons holding region constant produced only five significant correlations out of 18 (Table 6). Overall, the clearest pattern was for the RLA ratios. If we take the four occupational classes as occupying a vertical continuum from the highest (1) to the lowest (4), then the higher the class the better the performance of the Alliance relative to Labour. The positive correlations (all but one insignificant) in the RCA column similarly indicate a better relative performance by the Alliance in the higher occupational class groups, whereas the negative correlations (again, all but one statistically insignificant) in the RCL column indicate Labour’s better performance relative to that of the Conservative party in the lower-status occupational class groups.
TABLE6.
Correlations of the CR ratios against time
Classes compared
1
1 1 2 2 3
2 3 4 3 4 4
Ratio RCL
(-0.39) (-0.68) -0.82 (-0.48)
(-0.69) (-0.39)
Statistically insignificant correlations
RCA
RLA
(0.17) (0.47) (0.64) (0.20) 0.80 (0.44)
(0.46) 0.73 0.80 (0.55) 0.86 (0.59)
at the 0.05 level are in brackets
R. J. JOHNSTONAND C. J. PATTIE
85
In summary This paper is the first to present the results of analyses of the changing geography of voting in Great Britain, by occupational class groups, over several general elections. It is thus the first to provide not only substantial evidence of a growth in regional polarization in voting since the 1960s but also to link those trends to the thesis of class dealignment. Most psephological analyses of British voting behaviour have failed to link the two, and thus cannot account for the patterns that they describe. What the results presented here unequivocally demonstrate is that: 1. Over the period of eight general elections from 1964 to 1987 the regional variable gained in importance in the statistical analysis of voting by class and region; 2. Regional variability was especially marked in the relative performance of the Conservative and Labour parties; and 3. Within each occupational class, there has been an increasing tendency to support Labour rather than Conservative in the relatively deprived regions, but Conservative rather than Labour in the relatively affluent. Together, these findings account for the apparent paradox of class dealignment at the national level and polarization at the regional level (see also Miller, 1977, 1984; Warde, 1986). People in the same class have responded differently to the economic circumstances of the period in the different regions. The growing regional polarization since 1974 was only partly a consequence of changing occupational class structures in the five regions over the period. The main reason for the trend, as clearly demonstrated here, was changing class polarization in different regions. In the north, the class cleavage remained much stronger than in the south-in part, though not entirely (during the 1980s at least), because of the growing popularity of the Alliance in the south relative to that of Labour. Overall, therefore, the findings sustain the argument that relative economic prosperity in the south relative to that of the north stimulated sociotropic and egocentric voting across all classes, with the consequent decline in class polarization there (see also Pattie and Johnston, 1990). This analysis, because of the constraints of the data (which are by far the best available for such a long period), has focused on occupational class only. Other writers (such as McAllister, 1987) have argued that a model which looks at class and region only is under-specified, and that both a wider definition of class and, more importantly, incorporation of variables related to political attitudes provide a more fully-specified model and reduce the regional variation to near insignificance. What results such as those presented here make clear is that such arguments are both right and wrong; right because class is a multi-dimensional concept but wrong because the changing patterns of voting must reflect increasing regional variations in attitudes, when class is held constant. In brief, what our results imply is that the class-vote link now varies much more in its direction across British regions than it did two decades ago. Occupational class was once believed not only to be the crucial determinant of voting behaviour in Great Britain but also consistent in the strength and direction of its influence throughout the country. That is no longer the case. Increasingly since 1964, and especially since 1974, people’s regional context has come to influence how they vote as well as their class, because the processes of combined and uneven redevelopment operating in the country then affected classes differentially by region. Acknowledgement The research
acknowledged.
repotted
here was supported
by the ESRC (Grant RE 00232292);
that support
is gratefully
86
Re&v’tu~ toting pattetxs
in Greut Britain, 1 c)(;4-152387
References ANDSTOKES,D. E. (1974). Political Change in Britain, 2nd edn. London: Macmillan. &EWE, I. (1986). On the death and resurrection of class voting. Political St&es 34,620-638. CR~SE, I. ANDDEER, D. T., EDS (1985). EZectoval Cbarzge in Western Democra&s. London: Groom Helm. CURTICE, J. mu %EED, M. (1982). Electoral choice and the production of ~ove~ment. ~~.~o~~~~ ofPoZ~c~ Science 12, 249-298. DENVER, D. T. (1987). The British general election of 1987: some preliminary reflections. Parltiamentulygffaivs 40,
BUTLER, D.
451-457. DIINLF.A\Y, P. (1987). Class dealignment in Britain revisited. Wesr European Politics 10, 400-419. DUNLEA\%‘, P. ANDHUSBANDS, C. T. 11985). &it&b Democvacy al the C?O~SKX?U?London: George Allen and Unwin. HEATH,A., JOWEU, R ANDCURTICE, J. (1985). HOWB&&Z Vo&.%Oxford: Per@mon. HEATH,A., Jo-, R. A-D CURTKX,J. (1987). Trendless fluctuation; a reply to Crave. Politica Stud&s 35,25&277. HEATH,A.. m AL (1991). Understanding Political Change. Oxford: Pergamon JOHNSTON,R. J, (1985). The Geqqru@y ofE~~,@z%Pofttics. London: Croom Helm. JOHNSTON, R. J, (1990). Lipset and Rokkan revisited: electoral cleavages, electoral geography and electoral strategy in Great Britain. In Deuelopments in Electoral Geogrup@ (R. J. Johnston, F. M. Shelley and P. J. Taylor eds) pp. 121-142. London: Routledge. JOHNSTON, R. J. AND PKITIE, C. J. (1989). A nation dividing? Economic well-being, voter response and the changing electoral geography of Great Britain. P~~l~rn~t~~y A$%rs 42, 37-57. JOHNSTON, R. J., PAIT‘E, C. J. ANDAUSOPP,J. G. (1988). A Nfftios LWd~?zg??&e Electoral Muj~ of Great Brirai?z 1979-1987. London: Longman. LEWIS,J. ANI, TOWNSEND, A, EDS (1989). The North-South Divide. London: Paul Chapman Publishing. LIPSET, S. M. ANDROKKAN, S. E. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments. In ParZy Systemsand Voter Alignments (S. M. Lipset and S. E. Rokkan eds) pp. 3-64. New York: The Free Press. MCAUISTER, 1. (1987). Social context, turnout and the vote: Australian and British comparisons. PO&&~ Geogra$?~ Qr~arterly 6, 17-30 MULER, W. L. (1977). Electoral D~.~~rnic.% London: Macmillan. MILLER, W. L. (1984). There was no alternative: the British general election of 1983. Parliamentary .A&zirs 37,
364-384. Pm-m,
C. J, AND JOHNSTON, R. J.
attitudes
(1990). Embellishment and detail? The changing relationship berween voting, class and the core-periphery division of Great Britain 1979-1987. TransacTions,Instirute of Bririsb
GeognapbetsNS 15, SAIILVIK, B, ANDCREWE,I. (1983). Decade of~~l~gn~~t. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press WARDE,A. (1986). Electoral mysteries. InternationalJournaI of Urban and Re&mal Research 10, 289-294. WEATHERFOKD, M. S. (1986). Economic determinants of voting. In Research in Micropolitics, vol. 1 (S. Long ed.) pp. 219-269. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Wnr~nm’, P. (1986). Predicting the Labour vote in 1983. Political Studies 34, 32-98.