clinically formulated principles of morality

New Ideas in Psychol. Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 237-256, 1996

© 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0732-118X/96 $15.00 + 0.(X)

Pergamon S0732-118X(96)00018-9

CLINICALLY FORMULATED

PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY

DOUGLAS R. RAMM 225 Humphrey Road, Greensburg, PA 15601-4571, U.S.A. Abstract---Starting with the classic philosophical notion that moral principles are a set of guidelines for making choices that have genuine happiness or emotional well-being as their effect, this study explores the relationship between volitional behavior and the quality of human life. Examining the case histories of 100 individuals drawn from a clinical population, the author identifies seven types of volitional behavior that undermine a person's happiness. Six basic principles for making choices that maximize the potential for becoming and remaining happy are described. The implications of clinically formulated principles of morality for prevention, education, and public policy are explored. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

INTRODUCTION The notion that moral principles--ideas about right and wrong--are a set of guidelines for making choices that have genuine happiness as their effect is rooted in the dawn of Western civilization. The ancient Jews lived by the Ten Commandments with the expectation that God would bless them with peace and prosperity. The Greeks referred to virtues and vices as patterns of behavior that contributed to or interfered with "true" or "lasting" happiness. The early Christians followed the teachings of Jesus in the belief that they would find happiness in the Kingdom of God. Medieval philosophers insisted that the reward of acting on moral principles was happiness in heaven. Even as recently as the eighteenth century, leaders of the Enlightenment assumed that morality provided the most effective means of pursuing personal happiness in this world and the next. Pioneers in the behavioral sciences believed that morality was central to a scientific theory of human nature. Benjamin Rush, the father of American psychiatry, was convinced that moral rehabilitation would cure those in the asylums of the newly formed United States (Kaplan & Sadock, 1985). Sigmund Freud (1923/1961a) maintained that moral principles were so significant that they occupied a fundamental position in his structural model of the mind. Jean Piaget t 1932/1965) recognized that moral ideation is an essential aspect of human cognition. Lawrence Kohlberg (1976) emphasized the relationship between moral reasoning and human development. By the time a scientific theory of human nature began to emerge, different ways of thinking about morality had begun to replace the traditional assumption about the relationship between moral principles and a person's quality of life. While theologians and religious leaders continued to insist that principled behavior is the most effective means of pursuing personal happiness, postEnlightenment philosophers began to abandon this classic assumption of Western thought. Under the influence of Immanuel Kant (1785/1952) many turned from an instrumental view of morality toward the deontological assumption that people ought to act on principles of morality simply because acting on moral principle is the proper or fight way to behave. Influenced by altruism (Comte, 1865/1971) and utilitarianism (Mill, 1861/1979), others began to assume that if moral principles had an instrumental value, the happiness of other people, society, or humanity in general ought to be the overarching concern. 237

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Emerging out of a philosophical Zeitgeist which held that acting on principle was inconsistent with the personal pursuit of happiness, modem psychiatry began with Freud's ( 1915-1917/1963) observation that rather than leading to happiness, attempting to act on some moral principles actually contributed to emotional disease. By the middle of the twentieth century G. Brock Chisholm (1946), the cofounder of the World Federation for Mental Health, referred to morality as "poison" and argued that psychiatry should engage in a campaign to eradicate the concept of right and wrong. This goal was eventually accomplished by redefining moral problems as disease (Menninger, 1973; Peel, 1989). For most of the twentieth century, while operating under the influence of behaviorism, mainstream American psychology assumed that "concepts" of right and wrong had no place in a scientific theory of human nature (Skinner, 1953). The notion that good and bad behavior could be determined by contingencies of reinforcement became widely accepted in the field (Skinner, 1971; Vogeltanz & Plaud, 1992). Even those who continued to believe that psychology should deal with affect, cognition and conation did not include moral principles in the model of decision-making that was widely popularized in the Untied States (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Despite the fact that William James (1890/1952) viewed the desire for happiness as basic to human motivation, scientific studies have only recently attempted to understand this emotional state. To date, this research either attempts to measure the degree to which people are happy, content, or satisfied in living (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Diener, Sandvik & Pavot, 1991; Pavot et al., 1991) or it identifies correlates of a felt sense of well-being (Argyle, 1986; Emmons & Diener, 1985; Myers, 1992). None of this research considers the relationship between acting on principle and the quality of a person's life, While organized psychology has developed a set of ethical principles that provide guidelines for making choices in the day-to-day practice of the profession (American Psychological Association, 1992), no comparable effort has been made to formulate a set of principles that can serve as guidelines for making choices in other aspects of daily life. Rather than pursuing this goal, contemporary research on morality tends to survey which principles of morality people hold (Darley, 1993; Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1991; Leafy, 1983; Quinn, Houts & Graesser, 1994; Waterman, 1988) or to identify the reasons that people engage in moral behavior (Bandura, 1991 ; Kohlberg, 1975; Vallegas dePosada, 1994). Many psychologists (Erickson, 1994; Kendler, 1993; Prilleltensky, 1994; Prilleltensky & Washbowers, 1993) assume that behavioral science must rely on religion or ethical philosophy to provide basic ideas about what is right and wrong. Frequently they follow Kohlberg (1987), in drawing on Immanuel Kant (1785/1952) and John Rawls (1972) for moral principles that psychology can use. Historically, the process of determining which moral principles are the proper moral principles has been the exclusive province of religion and philosophy. Even today, psychologists debate what, if anything, their discipline has to contribute to this concern (Kendler, 1993, 1994: Kurtines, Azmitjia & Alvarez, 1990; Pellegrin & Freueh, 1994; Plaud & Vogeltanz, 1994; Shweder & Haidt, 1993). Three assumptions operating within mainstream American psychology and philosophy account for the reluctance to use empirical methods to formulate principles tbr making basic choices in daily life. First, American psychology was founded on a deterministic theory of human nature (James, 1890/1952; Watson, 1930) and it continues to operate within this view (Hyman, 1994; Lefcourt, 1973; Sappington, 1994; Williams, 1992). Within this deterministic paradigm, the quality of a person's life is not a function of whether he or she acts on any moral principles at all. Rather, it is determined by instinctive drives, patterns of prior conditioning, imbalance in neurotransmitters, genetics or other phenomena which have nothing to do with choice.

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Second, although most philosophers assume that the quality of a person's life is determined by choice, many maintain that it is inappropriate to use empirical methods to identify which moral principles people ought to use. This view is frequently based on philosopher David Hume's (1740/1978) argument that universal moral obligations cannot be justified by appeal to moral facts. They interpret this to mean that although reasoning from observation to recommendation makes sense when formulating principles of nutrition or health, it is an inappropriate means of arriving at fundamental principles of morality (Moore, 1903/1960; Rorty, 1989). Third, many behavioral scientists (Freud, 1927/196 lb; Hahn, 1982; Vogeltanz & Plaud, 1992: Wright, 1994) and philosophers (Gauthier, 1986; Rawls, 1972; Rorty, 1989) operate on the assumption that moral principles are intrinsically subjective, relative to a given group, and arbitrary with respect to reality. Several members of both disciplines agree with Ayer's (1952) positivistic position that moral principles are merely expressions of emotion which, as such, never express objective truth. They conclude that there is no purpose in attempting to use empirical methods to develop moral principles because this is a domain of human existence where no truth can ever actually be found.

PRESUPPOSITIONS This study is based on the position that it is possible to identify moral principles by means of empirical observation and generalization. It is situated within the eudaemonic tradition (Creel, 1983). As such, it assumes that moral principles "should" indicate the means of achieving and maintaining genuine happiness. Its design incorporates five assumptions that this article does not attempt to prove or to defend. (1) Some human behavior is volitional. Volitional behavior is a function of choice. Although all behavior may be influenced by instinctive drives, patterns or prior conditioning, or bio-chemical processes, volitional behavior expresses the human capacity to choose between alternative courses of action. A cigarette smoker, for example, who enters a smoking cessation program is engaging in a volitional act. (2) Some volitional behaviors have consequences that affect the quality of human life. The consequences of some volitional behaviors enhance the quality of human life. The consequences of others have the opposite effect. Successfully completing a cigarette smoking cessation program contributes to a person's overall health. Continuing to smoke can cause emphysema, cancer, or disabling heart disease. (3) Happiness can be defined as a person's global evaluation of the quality of his or her life. People are happy when they have a felt sense of well-being that is associated with being contented or satisfied with their circumstances in living. They are unhappy, discontent, or dissatisfied when that they are not. (4) Empirical methods can be used to identijy whether a relationship exists between certain types of volitional behavior and the quality of a person's life. Just as empirical observation can be utilized to identify the effect that smoking cigarettes has on a person's health, it can be employed to detect the effect that volitional behavior has on whether a person is a happy human being. (5) B is possible to reason from the way people actually behave to what they ought to do in order to become and remain happy. Once the effect of volitional behavior has been identified, it is possible to formulate guidelines for making choices that are likely to enhance the quality of a person's life. Following this reasoning, clinically formulated principles of morality are like

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principles of good nutrition or health. They are all based on an understanding of the actual relationship between certain types of choices and their effect on human beings. In addition, this study presupposes that the relationship between volitional behavior and the quality of human life can be explored in the context of the psychotherapeutic relationship. There are two reasons that the psychotherapeutic relationship is appropriate lor this effort at empirical observation. First, since its inception the psychotherapeutic relationship has served as a unique setting or "laboratory" for the study of human nature. By means of systematically examining those who came to them for help, psychiatrists (Beck, 1976; Freud, 1915-1917/1963; Homey, 1937; Sullivan, 1953) and psychologists (Erikson, 1963; May, 1953; Rogers, 1961) were able to formulate theoretical insights into the ongoing interaction of behavior, emotion, and thought. The role of"participant-observer" (Sullivan, 1954) permits thepractitioner-scientist to examine and understand a variety of complicated cognitive, affective, and conative processes that do not easily lend themselves to experimental design. As such, the psychotherapeutic relationship is an ideal setting for the study of a phenomenon that is as complex and multifaceted as the relationship between volitional behavior and the quality of human life. Second, a clinical setting provides a ready-made sample of people who are in some sense unhappy or dissatisfied with their circumstances. Hence, a clinical population provides a unique opportunity to identify commonalities in behavior, which in some way undermines the quality of human life. Once those commonalities are identified, a set of alternatives can be specified. These alternatives can be used to formulate principles for making those choices that are likely to enable an individual to obtain or maintain a satisfying situation in living.

CRITERION This study was designed around an operating definition of happiness that was developed prior to the study and which served as a criterion by which volitional behavior could be evaluated in terms of whether and how it tends to influence the quality of a person's life. Conventional research on happiness begins by equating it with contentment, life satisfaction, and a felt sense of well-being. Researchers proceed by identifying the correlates of these emotional states (Argyle, 1986; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Diener et al., 1991 ; Emmons & Diener, 1985; Payor et al., 1991). Once these correlates are identified they can be brought together to form a general understanding of happiness (Myers, 1992). Although based on the practice of equating happiness with contentment, satisfaction, and a felt sense of well-being, the definition of happiness utilized in this study was developed by other means. Assuming that happiness is an emotion and that emotions are a function of how people are situated with respect to those things, people, and conditions that constitute the circumstances of their lives, this definition of happiness was developed from complaints of people who were discontent or dissatisfied with their situation in living. Influenced by the results of conventional research on happiness, traditional theories of personality, and family systems theory, the author reflected on years of clinical experience in an effort to identify the commonalities in those things, interpersonal processes, and conditions that are threatened or lost when people present for psychotherapy. Once those types of things, interpersonal processes, and conditions were identified, they were gathered together to form an operating definition of happiness that could be applied in a clinical setting. This process of developing an operating definition of happiness was based on reasoning that just as needs, which are defined as that without which a living entity cannot survive, become most

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apparent in situations where their objects (e.g. oxygen, food, and water) are not available, the essential aspects of happiness become most visible when people experience a threat to or loss of that which is essential to it. While conventional research on happiness has attempted to develop an understanding of happiness that includes all of those aspects of human existence which enhance the quality of life, the operating definition of happiness utilized in this study incorporates only those aspects of human existence that appear to constitute a minimum threshold for becoming and remaining a happy human being. This definition of happiness consists of two types of things, three types of relationships, and five general conditions of human life. These things, interpersonal processes, and conditions can be referred to as values because they have intrinsic worth. Although their relative priority within an individual's value systems varies from one person to another, this study presupposes that people are happy when they obtain or maintain all of the following values. It likewise presupposes that people are to some extent unhappy when one or more of these values is threatened or lost. (1) Meaningful material objects are the necessities of life as well as those objects that add to one's standard of living. While this category includes food, clothing, and shelter, it also incorporates a sense that a satisfying lifestyle is a function of an individual's expectations about the quality of each of these necessities. In addition, this category includes those material objects that have a value in interpersonal relationships and the conditions of a person's life. Wedding rings, for example, play an important role in marital relationships. Tools and athletic equipment figure significantly in occupation and recreation. (2) Money is cash, credit, or any other asset that can be used as a medium of exchange for other things, relationships, and conditions that enhance the quality of a person' s life. (3) Affirmation occurs in relationships where a person has the experience of being validated as an acceptable, competent, adequate, and/or lovable human being. Affirmation can be found in occupational, peer, family, and romantic relationships. It can be as basic as a child's sense that he or she is the object of unconditional parental love. It may be a function of complex expectations, as in the case of being recognized as a valued employee or a competent professional. It may be found in being affirmed as a friend, as a lover, or as a spouse. (4) Companionship is the experience of shared concern, interest, and activity. It occurs in relationships that are founded on mutual requirement, interest, or desire. It is experienced in the satisfaction of merely being together with a significant other. It is most obvious in peer and romantic relationships, but it can be an aspect of fulfilling occupational and family relations as well. (5) Intimacy is a quality of interpersonal experience that includes affirmation and companionship, but where the level of validation and sharing is most personal. It occurs when people share their most private thoughts, emotions, and experiences with another human being. Although intimacy is most intensely experienced in the context of romantic relationships, it can be an aspect of rewarding peer and family interactions as well. (6) Health is a state of mental and physical well-being. It is characterized by an absence of disease, disability, and pain. It includes the confidence that one will continue to be well. (7) Freedom is the ability to engage in activities that are personally meaningful and fulfilling. It includes physical liberty, as well as the ability to think freely and express one's own ideas. It is characterized by the absence of fear that engaging in personally fulfilling behavior which does not interfere with the basic rights of others will prompt some unjustified verbal or physical aggression. (8) Security is physical and emotional safety. It is a condition that is characterized by confidence that one can maintain those things, relationships, and conditions that enhance the quality of one's life.

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(9) Occupational satisfaction occurs when an individual enjoys and is competent at the tasks required and experiences a sense of accomplishment in a job well done. (10) Rewarding recreation occurs when an individual experiences a sense of renewal from behavior engaged in for the mere joy or pleasure that the behavior provides. This set of values does not include all of those aspects of human existence that are typically referred to as values because they contribute to the quality of human life. Rather, it is a set of values without which people appear to be unhappy. Emotions such as love, hope, and joy, are not part of the operating definition of happiness because it is intended to refer to one, and only one, emotional state. Personality or character traits such as temperance, generosity, humility, or generativity and virtues such as courage, compassion, or patience are not included because these attributes are based on observations about patterns of human behavior. Patterns of behavior are not part of this operating definition of happiness because the study was designed to identify which patterns of behavior are essential to achieving and/or maintaining a satisfying quality of life.

METHOD

Participants This study involved an examination of case histories provided by 100 individuals. They were selected from and represent a cross section of the author's outpatient general clinical psychology service. When the study was initiated, all of those clients who were in ongoing psychotherapy and provided informed consent were included. Thereafter, information about each individual who presented for clinical services and provided informed consent became part of the study until a total of 50 cases from each gender was represented. In situations where informed consent was not obtained, the author contacted former clients with similar symptom patterns and demographics, obtained informed consent, and substituted their case material. The individuals who provided information for this study ranged in age between 11 and 73. Ninety-nine were Caucasian. One was African-American. They were all Americans who lived in urban or suburban settings in or near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The frequency by gender, age, intelligence, education, and family income are displayed in Table 1. None of these individuals was psychotic. Eight-six were diagnosed with some type of Table I. Demographic characteristics of participant population

Range

11-20 21-30 31--40 41-50 51~50 61-70 71-80

Age Frequency M 18 3 8 15 2 3 1

F 9 9 13 12 3 2 1

M = Male; F = Female.

Level of intelligence IQ Frequency

80-89 90-99 100-109 110-119 120-129 130-139

M 1 3 16 21 4 5

F 0 2 15 19 13 1

Level of education Grade Frequency

1-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20

M 1 11 20 12 6

F 0 1 23 19 7

Level of annual family income Income Frequency

0-19k 20-39k 40-59k 60-79k 80-99k 100-119k 120-139k 140-159k 160-17% 180-199k

M 6 20 9 3 5 4 2 0 0 1

F 3 18 14 9 2 1 2 I 0 0

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emotional disorder: e.g. adjustment disorder with anxiety and depression; anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified; post-traumatic stress disorder; dysthymic disorder; depression, not otherwise specified; or major depressive disorder, severe, without psychotic features. Fourteen were diagnosed with some type of behavioral problems: e.g. attention deficit disorder; oppositional defiant disorder; or adjustment disorder with disturbance of conduct. Twenty-six also carried a secondary substance-related disorder: e.g. alcohol abuse; cannabis abuse; or cocaine abuse. Procedure Each individual was examined by the author. The examination involved a standard diagnostic interview. This included family, education, vocational, health, and criminal histories, as well as an assessment for use of drugs and alcohol and a mental status exam. It also involved a description of the individual's symptoms and the precipitating situation; i.e. those events and behaviors on the part of the individual and other people that initiated symptom formation and motivated the individual to seek treatment. For example, one man's depressive symptom was precipitated by his wife announcing that she wanted a divorce. One woman developed symptoms of anxiety and sought treatment when she was told that she might lose her job. A third individual presented for clinical services when she became depressed after her daughter's suicide. Based on the information obtained in these diagnostic interviews, the author assigned each individual a serial number and developed a case profile. This profile included gender, race, age, marital status, level of education, annual family income, estimated IQ, and DSM-IV Axis I primary diagnosis. Non-essential details in the description of the precipitating situation were altered in order to protect the individual's anonymity. Next, the author categorized the precipitating situation in terms of those values that were threatened or lost. The man whose wife announced that she wanted a divorce stood to lose his home, a substantial amount of money, and the companionship, intimacy, and security that his marriage provided. The woman who was told that she might lose her job was threatened with the loss of money, security, and occupational satisfaction. The woman whose daughter committed suicide lost the affirmation and companionship that she experienced in relationship to her. Once these values were ascertained, the volitional behaviors that contributed to the threat to or loss of values in the precipitating situation were identified. The man described in the previous paragraph contributed to his wife's desire to get a divorce by verbally abusing her and continuing to drink excessively despite her repeated threats to divorce him if he continued to abuse alcohol. The woman in the second example was warned that she might lose her job because of failure to follow appropriate procedure while at work. No contributing volitional behavior could be detected in the case of the woman whose daughter committed suicide. The author next searched for commonalities in those cases in which volitional behavior contributed to the threat to or loss of values. This search involved several passes through the participant profiles aimed at identifying two or more descriptions of contributing volitional behavior that were alike or, in some sense, the same. Once a similarity between behaviors was identified, that similarity became a type of dysfunctional volitional behavior. For example, a similarity existed between the behavior of the man in the previous paragraph and another man who became involved in an extramarital affair. The first man failed to fulfill his promise to "honor" his wife by verbally abusing her and the second man failed to fulfill his promise to "forsake all others" by participating in an extramarital affair. As such, both men failed to fulfill agreements that they entered into on their wedding day. Sometimes subsequent similarities between cases of contributing volitional behavior resulted in further refining a type of dysfunctional volitional behavior. For example, as the search for

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commonalities proceeded, it became apparent that there was a similarity between the contributing behavior of the two men just described and a third man who spent a good deal of his time making personal phone calls and playing computer games while he was on the job. Although he was not failing to fulfill a marital agreement, his behavior was similar to the others in that he was not honoring an agreement with his employer to provide a d a y ' s work for a d a y ' s pay. Based on this similarity, the type of dysfunctional volitional behavior that captured the similarity between all three cases was reformulated as a failure to honor agreements entered into at an earlier point in time. In several cases, more than one similarity to other cases of contributing volitional behavior occurred. For example, the man who verbally abused his wife also continued to drink excessively despite her repeated threats to divorce him if he continued to abuse alcohol. In this case, he engaged in behavior that was similar to the man who was involved in an extramarital affair and he also engaged in behavior that was similar to the behavior of another participant who neglected to heed a supervisor's warning that he needed to be more productive on the job. When an individual's contributing volitional behavior was in more than one way similar to the contributing volitional behavior of other participants, his or her contributing volitional behavior was classified in terms of more than one type of dysfunctional volitional behavior. Consequently, the man who verbally abused his wife and continued to drink excessively became an instance of failing to fulfill agreements and an instance o f failing to act on information that suggests that a given course of action poses a threat to that which has a value to oneself. Once the types o f dysfunctional behavior were identified, their frequency was tabulated. A point biserial correlation co-efficient was computed in relation to level of intelligence, education, and family income. Given the massive amount of case material and the limited opportunities for in-depth case review available to a solo practitioner, a second rater was not utilized.

RESULTS The frequencies with which each value was threatened or lost in the precipitating situation are displayed in Table 2. The totals exceed 100 because many participants experienced a threat to or loss of more than one value. In 94 cases some sort of volitional activity that contributed to the threat to or loss o f one or more of these values in the precipitating situation could be identified. In those cases where no contributing volitional behavior could be discerned, it appeared that values were threatened or lost as a result of conditions beyond the individual's control. One case involved the woman who was depressed over her daughter's suicide. Another was a woman who was injured when a truck crashed into her legally parked car in which she was sitting at the time. A third involved a boy who was the victim o f sexual assault. Table 2. Frequency with which values were threatened or lost in the precipitating situation Value Meaningful material objects Money Affirmation Companionship Intimacy

Frequency 14 36 70 51 41

Value Health Freedom Security Occupational satisfaction Rewarding recreation

Frequency 9 27 36 34 16

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In those cases where volitional behavior contributed to the precipitating situation, the following seven types of dysfunctional volitional behavior were identified. (1) Heedless behavior. Fifty percent of the individuals found themselves in a situation where there was a threat to or loss of values as a result of following a course of action that had predictable negative consequences. These people knew that doing what they did threatened some thing, relationship, or condition that they valued. In each case they pursued a course of action

while ignoring what they knew about its potential hazard to that which they valued. One woman became pregnant as a result of unprotected sexual intercourse. A man was permanently disabled in an industrial accident after he ignored safety regulations. Other individuals continued to abuse drugs and alcohol while knowing that they were jeopardizing their jobs, marriages, or health. Still others were warned by a spouse or supervisors that their behavior was unacceptable. All of these people knew that they could have done something to prevent their own unhappiness but failed to act on that information before it was too late. That these individuals had the ability and opportunity to have acted on information that could have let them avoid their unhappiness and that they ignored, is reflected in how they referred to what they did. One woman described herself as "stupid" in reference to the sexual encounter in which she became infected with a sexually transmitted disease. A man described himself as "dumb" when he recalled how he neglected to heed his supervisor's warning about the need to be more productive on the job. Many individuals used the phrase "I knew better" or "I knew I was making a mistake" when lamenting a course of action that resulted in a threat to or loss of values in their lives. Heedless behavior is typically motivated by a desire for some sort of immediate satisfaction or gratification. In many cases people explained their heedless behavior by reference to emotion, intuition, or the hope that its predictable undesirable consequence could somehow be avoided. Frequently they made statements like "I knew it wasn't a good idea but I felt like doing it anyway," "I thought it was better to follow my feelings than what my head was telling me to do," or "I knew I could have gotten hurt but I really didn't think it would happen to me." This behavior pattern is not marked by limited intelligence or education. The point biserial correlation coefficient between heedless behavior and level of intelligence was 0.07. The correlation between heedless behavior and level of education resulted in an rpb of 4).06. Rather than being a function of limited intelligence or information, heedless behavior is characterized by a failure to make use of one's intelligence and knowledge in deciding what to do. (2) Non-productive behavior. Some values such as meaningful material objects, money, and occupational satisfaction require obvious productive activity in formal work settings such as a school, a factory, or an office. Affirmation, companionship, and intimacy require working at relationships. Health, freedom, and security often require working on one's self. Thirty-four percent of the individuals in this study experienced some threat to or loss of values as a result of an

insufficient investment of time and energy in those things, relationships, and conditions which had value in their lives. In some cases the level of effort required to acquire or maintain a value was relatively clear. The non-productive use of time and energy was a fully conscious and deliberate choice. Several students acknowledged that they decided to spend their free time watching television, listening to music, or getting high rather than doing homework and studying for exams. Some adults who round themselves in trouble at work acknowledged spending a good deal of time in nonproductive activity while at their jobs. In cases where the level of effort required was more ambiguous, the decision not to invest sufficient time and energy was also fairly clear. A man whose wife filed for divorce recognized

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in retrospect that he refused to work on important issues or to go through the eftbrt of developing effective communication and negotiation skills. A woman who knew that she needed to provide more structure and supervision for her child, instead spent her time socializing at a local bar. While most of these individuals recognized that acquiring and maintaining what they needed and wanted required effort, they typically assumed that someone else would do the work. Many adolescents and young adults presumed that they could indefinitely depend on their parents for food, clothing, and shelter. Several married people expected their spouses to do whatever was necessary to make them happy. Typically, these people became anxious or depressed when those upon whom they depended refused to continue to support their non-productive style of life. (3) Self-effacing behavior. Fifteen percent of the individuals in this study experienced a threat to or loss of values as a consequence of pursuing a course of action that was intended to satisfy the needs, interests, and desires of others while neglecting that which had value to themselves. They operated on the assumption that they should be more concerned with the needs, interests, and desires of other people than they should be with their own. In one case, a 58-year-old homemaker became depressed when she and her husband found themselves in significant financial stress after he suddenly became disabled. Although he had earned an adequate income, the couple had no savings and was actually deeply in debt as a result of having provided ongoing financial support to adult children who continued to depend on them. Now, with limited disability income, the couple stood a chance of losing their home. In another case, a man discovered that his depression stemmed from a situation in which he supported his live-in girlfriend and did most of the housework while she provided almost nothing that he valued in return. These individuals typically experienced guilt when they engaged in any course of action that was clearly intended to provide an obvious benefit to themselves. Being characterized as "selfish" was extremely uncomfortable for them. Their sense that it is wrong to explicitly pursue goals that are personally fulfilling seemed to be rooted in an inability to distinguish between selfishness and legitimate self-interest. This self-effacing orientation typically began in childhood, often as the result of attempting to please parents. It was reinforced by admonitions of preachers, teachers, and other figures of authority who advised them that organizing their behavior around the needs, interests, and desires of others is the proper way to live. These people sought treatment only when they were confronted with painful evidence that the result of their self-effacing behavioral style was toss of that which had value to themselves. While some of the individuals in this study experienced a threat to or loss of values because they pursued a course of action focused almost exclusively on the needs, interests, and desires of other people, others found themselves unhappy due to a pattern of volitional behavior that focused excessively on self. Although this behavior pattern is typically associated with antisocial and narcissistic personality disorders, it was observed in several cases where the individual carried neither diagnosis. Two types of excessively self-centered behavior emerged. (4) Disrespec(ful behavior. Seventeen percent of the individuals in this study experienced a threat to or loss of values as a result of violating the basic rights of other people. Some stole property. Others committed some type of assault. Often this led to legal difficulties. In other cases, problems with employers, lovers, or family members ensued. Many of these people recognized that their behavior was morally wrong. They contemplated the consequences of their behavior and the potential risks involved in getting caught. They behaved with the belief that they could benefit by violating another person's rights without jeopardizing their own happiness.

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Those individuals who committed crimes lost their freedom as a result. Those who violated the basic rights of other people without actually breaking the law found themselves subsequently threatened with the loss of affirmation, companionship, intimacy, money, and/or occupational satisfaction. Several adolescents lost one or more of these values because they stole from their parents or their peers. One man's wife decided to divorce him because of his repeated physical assaults. Another man lost his job because he was padding his expense account. (5) Unfaithful behavior. Nineteen percent of the individuals in this study experienced a threat to or loss of values as a result of failing to fulfill obligations to others which the3, had freely assumed at an earlier point in time. While disrespectful behavior violates those obligations that people have to one another based on the concept of human rights, this behavior pattern involved failing to fulfill agreements into which the person had voluntarily entered. In many cases the breach of agreement was explicit. Several adolescents knowingly violated curfew and other agreements that they entered into with their parents. Some adults became involved in extramarital affairs. One man refused to adopt his wife's child from a previous marriage despite the fact that he had agreed to do so before he married her. Other individuals failed to fulfill commitments in more subtle ways. One man spent half the workday making personal phone calls and playing computer games while he was on the job. In so doing, he did not live up to his agreement with his employer to provide a day's work lot a day's pay. Another broke his promise to honor and cherish his wife when he humiliated her and called her names. A woman who chose to keep her son rather than give him up for adoption, breached her obligation to the child when she then failed to provide the basic care and supervision he required. In each instance the person was operating with the impression that in reneging on a commitment he or she would benefit in some way. Most believed that if anybody would suffer as a result, it would be the person to whom they had been untrue. Typically, these individuals were surprised to discover that they themselves suffered the threat to or loss of those values which eventually occurred. (6) Deceptive behavior. Sixteen percent of the individuals in this study found themselves in crisis as a result of intentionally misrepresenting realio~. Sometimes this pattern took the form of a direct lie. Some people routinely lied to their spouses concerning their whereabouts and activities while they were having extramarital affairs. Many adolescents lied to their parents about what they did and with whom they did it. Some individuals experienced a threat to or loss of values as a result of deceptive behavior on the job. In other cases deception was more subtle. One woman whose husband sensed that she was dissatisfied with their marriage kept denying that anything was wrong when he attempted to identify her complaint. One man concealed his frustration with his wife until he became enraged. Typically, deceptive behavior took its greatest toll on the quality of an individual's interpersonal relationships. When it was detected, his or her credibility dissolved. When significant others in occupational, peer, romantic, and family relationships lost faith in that individual, he or she experienced a threat to or loss of affirmation, companionship, and intimacy. In many cases, deceptive behavior affected an individual's security. Aware of the possibility of being detected, they often became anxious and sometimes paranoid. Moreover, they lost some degree of freedom due to the time and energy required to keep the deception alive. All of these people considered the consequences of their deceptive behavior. They acted with the belief that deception was an effective means of obtaining or maintaining that which they

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valued. They did not foresee the disastrous effect which their deceptive behavior would eventually have on those things, relationships, and conditions that significantly contributed to the quality of their lives. (7) Ill-considered interpersonal interactions. Sixteen percent of the individuals in this study found themselves in crisis as a result of something that someone else did or failed to do. Each of them experienced a threat to or loss of values as a result of being exploited, betrayed, or deceived by another person in an occupational, peer, family, or romantic relationship. They contributed to their own victimization by failing to act on available information concerning the other person's

potential deleterious intentions toward themselves. One man lost a substantial amount of money after becoming business partners with someone whom he knew had defrauded other people. A woman knew that her boyfriend was cheating on her; yet, when he promised to be true, she continued to have unprotected sexual relations with him. Eventually he infected her with AIDS. Continued trust of those who had demonstrated that they posed a threat to one or more of the individual's values was frequently rooted in a global reluctance to make critical judgments about other people. The individuals in this study typically operated on the assumption that other people are basically well-intentioned. Many believed that there was virtue in forgiving and trusting other people whose behavior had already done them some harm. Other individuals rationalized away the possibility that another person posed a threat. Typically, they explained another person's exploitative, unfaithful, or deceptive behavior in a manner that permitted them to continue to trust the person who eventually betrayed them in some way. One woman refused to believe evidence that her boyfriend was sexually exploiting her, observing that he attended church. She believed that people who go to church do not do that sort of thing. Eventually, she learned that church attendance in itself was not a reliable means of deciding whether to trust another human being. The frequency of each type of dysfunctional volitional behavior that contributed to a threat to or loss of values in the cases of this study are listed in Table 3. The frequency totals more than 100% because several participants engaged in more than one type. Table 4 displays the point biserial correlation coefficient for each type of dysfunctional behavior in relationship to level of intelligence, education, and family income.

DISCUSSION The results of this study should be considered a first step in an attempt to identify which types of volitional behavior interfere with a person's ability to become and remain happy. Further

Table 3. Frequencywith which each type of dysfunctional volitional behavior was observed Type of dysfunctionalvolitionalbehavior Heedless behavior Non-productivebehavior Self-effacingbehavior Disrespectful behavior Unfaithful behavior Deceptive behavior Ill-considered interpersonal interaction

Frequency of occurrence 50 34 15 17 19 16 16

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Clinically formulated principles of morality Table 4. Correlation between types of dysfunctional volitional behavior and intelligence, education, and socio-economicstatus Type of dysfunctional volitional behavior Heedless behavior Non-productivebehavior Self-effacingbehavior Disrespectful behavior Unfaithful behavior Deceptive behavior Ill-considered interpersonal interactions

Level of intelligence

Level of education

Level of family income

0.07 ~).32"* 0.18 0.32** 0.12 0.09 0.21 *

~).06 ~0.32"* 0.16 -0.41 ** 0.17 0.02 0.19

0.08 -0.03 0.10 -0.08 0. I I 0. t I ~).01

*P < 0.05; **P < 0.01. research with larger random stratified samples that include subjects from other cultures, regions, and races would be useful in exploring whether gender, ethnicity, or race play a significant role in the frequency and types of volitional behavior that undermine a person's quality of life. A research setting with the resources for reviewing the massive amount of case material developed by this type of study would provide opportunities for multiple raters. Multiple raters would strengthen the validity of the results of this approach by reducing the bias that the author may have brought to this study when categorizing the values that were threatened or lost in the precipitating situation, identifying the volitional behavior that contributed to it, and discerning the commonalities in those behavior patterns. Despite these methodological limitations of this study, there is a value in speculating on the obtained results. First, the results identified only seven types of volitional behavior that led to a threat to or loss of values in the lives of those individuals whose cases were studied. All of these occurred in at least 15% of the cases reviewed. This finding suggests that there are relatively few types of volitional behavior that interfere with a person's capacity to become and remain happy. Second, no statistical significance is found in any of the correlations between the dysfunctional volitional behaviors identified in this study and levels of family income displayed in Table 4. The statistical significance that does occur suggests that higher levels of intelligence are associated with a tendency to be more productive, while they are also associated with a tendency to behave in a disrespectful manner. Moreover, the statistical significance suggests that higher levels of education are associated with lower levels of non-productive and disrespectful behavior. This finding implies that education is a more significant factor in deterring dysfunctional volitional behavior than either level of intelligence or socioeconomic status. Finally, the relatively low correlations between each of these dysfunctional behavior patterns and levels of intelligence, education, and family income imply that none of these variables determine any of the dysfunctional volitional behaviors that this study has identified.

Formulating alternatives Since the types of dysfunctional behavior identified in this study are presumed to be volitional, it is also presumed that the people in it could have pursued an alternative course of action. It is therefore possible to infer that if they had engaged in alternative behavior they would have avoided the threat to or loss of things, relationships, and conditions that eventually occurred. A specification of these alternatives provides a framework for understanding how the individuals in this study could have avoided their dissatisfaction in living and maintained a felt sense of wellbeing.

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What follows is a set of alternatives to the types of dysfunctional behavior identified in this study. Although the formulation of these alternatives is based on clinical observation and generalization, terminology that has meaning in both behavioral science and philosophical discourse is employed. While these terms are often imprecisely defined, their meaning here is clearly specified. (1) Rational behavior. The heedless behavior pattern identified in this study reveals a clear connection between failing to act on available information and the subsequent quality of a person's life. The importance of acting on knowledge of the consequences of an individual's behavior is central to psychoanalysis (Freud, 1923/1961a), rational emotive therapy (Ellis, 1962), reality therapy (Glasser, 1965), cognitive therapy (Beck, 1976), and the psychology of selfesteem (Branden, 1969). Each of these schools of psychology has encouraged people to consider the consequences of their behavior before they actually engage in it. Beginning with Aristotle's definition of "man" as the "rational animal", Western philosophy has always maintained that the ability to discern cause and effect relationships is the essential feature of human nature. The notion that quality of life is a function of thought was central to the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Recognizing that making use of knowledge requires choice is a fundamental theme of a popular school of contemporary philosophy (Piekoff, 1992). The alternative to heedless behavior can be defined as acting according to information about how a person's behavior affects those things, relationships, and conditions that enhance the quality of that person's life. (2) Industrious behavior. The results of this study confirm a relationship between a willingness to work and the quality of an individual's life. They show that when people tail to invest sufficient time and energy in acquiring or maintaining a value, it is threatened or lost as a result. The importance of work is implicit in Freud' s ( 1923/1961 a) concept of the "reality principle." Eric Erikson (1963, 1968) recognized that a sense of industry plays a central role in human development and the formation of identity. Recent studies demonstrate a clear connection between attitudes toward work and a person's overall well-being (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Traditional moral theory has referred to productive behavior in terms of "the work ethic." The alternative to non-productive behavior can be defined as investing the time and energy required to obtain and maintain those things, relationships, and conditions that enhance the quality of one's own life. (3) Self-respecting behavior. This study validates the observation that those who pursue a course of action that is intended to satisfy the needs, interests, and desires of others while neglecting that which has value to themselves, end up becoming unhappy in some way. The alternative to this type of behavior is consideration for how behavior intended to meet the needs, interests, and desires of others affects those things, relationships and conditions that determine the quality of one's own life. The notion that people should consider their own interests in interpersonal interaction is a central theme of psychoanalysis (Homey, 1937, 1950), reality therapy (Glasser, 1965), rational emotive therapy (Ellis & Becker, 1980), cognitive therapy (Bums, 1980), and the psychology of self-esteem (Branden, 1969). The notion that a person's mental health depends on protecting self-interest within the interpersonal field is the basis of assertiveness training (Branden, 1983, 1987; Smith, 1975; Fensterheim & Baer, 1975). The idea that a person is morally entitled to pursue personal happiness has its roots in the Judeo--Christian tradition. This notion was a hallmark of Enlightenment philosophy and it was the moral foundation of the Constitution of the United States. In the modem world, the idea that

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it is proper for people to pursue those things, relationships, and conditions that enhance the quality of their own lives is implicit in the political concept of human rights. (4) Equitable behavior. This study demonstrates that pursuing that which has value to self while violating the rights of other people or failing to fulfill obligations to others undermines a person's happiness in some way. The fact that people suffer a loss of money, security, or freedom when they violate the rights of others is well documented in the study of criminal behavior (Bartol, 1991). The impact that disrespectful and unfaithful behavior has on family and romantic relationships has been explored in family systems theory (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Spark, 1973; Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986). The idea that happiness is a function of how people treat others is rooted in the Ten Commandments and the teachings of Jesus. It is central to contemporary religious (Kennedy, 1994; Robertson, 1993) and philosophical thought (Bennett, 1993; Kidder, 1994; Murchison. 1994; Wilson, 1993). Equitable behavior can be defined as a person .fulfilling his or her

obligations to others. (5) Honest behavior. This study reaffirms the insight that deceptive behavior undermines the quality of an individual's life. Although behavioral scientists have focused a good deal of attention on self-deception (Fenichel, 1945; Freud, 1937), little has been addressed to interpersonal deceit. The notion that lying compromises a person's happiness has a long history in religion and moral philosophy. The alternative to dishonesty can be defined as providing at~ accurate description of reali~. (6) Appropriately considered interpersonal interaction. The fact that many of the individuals in this study experienced a threat to or loss of values as a result of trusting interaction with someone who in some way injured them, reflects the importance of evaluating other people's behavior and developing a course of action based on what is learned. Religion and moral philosophy have always maintained that it is important to evaluate other people on the basis of their behavior. This has been accomplished by reference to moral principles that serve as standards for distinguishing whether another person's behavior is right or wrong. This type of evaluation enables a person to distinguish between whether another person is likely to contribute to one's own happiness or poses a threat to it. The results of this study suggest that the alternatives already identified can serve as standards by which to evaluate other people. Those individuals in this study who were injured by other people suffered a threat to or loss of values when those other people engaged in heedless, nonproductive, disrespectful, unfaithful, and/or dishonest behavior that in one way or another had an impact on that which had value in their lives. These people would not have become unhappy if they had been more cautious in dealing with those other people or had been interacting with people whose behavior was rational, industrious, equitable, and honest. Clinically formulated principles of morality It is possible to speculate that if the individuals in this study had been aware of and behaved according to these alternatives, they would have been able to avoid the threat to or loss of values that ensued. Assuming that people other than those in this study could benefit from a knowledge of the dysfunctional volitional behaviors and their alternatives for making choices in daily living, it is possible to formulate a set of guidelines for making choices that increase the likelihood that a person will become and remain happy. In the following set of principles, the term "ought" has an instrumental rather than the deontological meaning. It is intended to convey the sense that these principles are imperative if a person hopes to become and remain happy.

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Rationality--one ought to act according to all available information about how a possible course o f action might pose a threat to those things, relationships, and conditions that are essential to one's happiness as opposed to pursuing a course ()faction that ignores a predictable threat to it. Industry--one ought to invest the time and energy required to obtain and maintain those things, relationships, and conditions that are essential to one's happiness as opposed to relying on others to simply provide what one wants and needs. Self-respect--in pursing a course of action intended to satisfy the needs, interests, and desires o f others, one ought to consider rather than neglect how that course of action affects those things. relationships and conditions that are essential to one's own happiness. Equity--one ought to fulfill one's obligations to others as opposed to breaking agreements or violating the basic rights o f other people. Honesty--one ought to strive to develop and communicate an accurate description of reality as opposed to describing it in a manner that is untrue. Appropriate interpersonal interaction--one ought to pursue a course of action that is based on an estimate o f the likelihood that those people involved in it will behave in a rational industrious, equitable and honest manner, as opposed to pursuing a course of action that does not take this information into account. Given the fact that these principles were developed by generalizing from the results of this study, their validity is limited by its design, its sample, and its procedure. Their application is also limited by the fact that all of the participants in this study were Americans who were living in a free society, which is characterized by the protection of individual rights. Moreover, they were all above the age of 10 and had at least an average IQ and a fourth grade education. These principles should be viewed as a tentative set of clinically formulated principles of morality. Further research with larger samples and more rigorous methodology may reveal other patterns of dysfunctional volitional behavior, an improved means of describing their alternatives, and a better articulation of guidelines for making basic choices that increase the likelihood of becoming and remaining a happy human being. Recognizing that these principles are only a first attempt at developing clinically formulated principles of morality, it is possible to speculate on the value that a set of clinically formulated principles may have for prevention, education, and social policy.

Implications f o r prevention

Although this study explored a clinical population as a means of developing a set of guidelines for making choices that enhance the quality of a person's life, it also sheds light on the relationship between volitional behavior and certain types of mental and emotional disorders. Although an understanding of this relationship may have some value in dealing with people who have developed emotional, behavioral, or substance abuse disorders, it could have even greater value to those who have not yet experienced these types of crises in life. Since these guidelines emerge out of a clinical population, a set of clinically formulated principles of morality may also represent basic "principles for mental health." It is reasonable to infer that if children and adolescents were taught a set of clinically formulated guidelines for making basic choices in living, they would be in a better position for making healthier decisions as they mature. Used in this way, a set of clinically formulated principles of morality might do for emotional disorders what fluoride did for tooth decay.

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Implications for education Whether presented as principles of mental health, or a scientific formula for happiness, a set of clinically formulated principles of morality could be incorporated into public school curricula for classes on health, self-awareness, and self-esteem. They could be articulated at various levels of vocabulary so that they would be accessible to children at progressive stages of cognitive development. Age-appropriate stories could be used to illustrate how each principle can be applied to making choices in daily life. Since clinically formulated principles of morality are the product of scientific research they circumvent the controversy over the separation of church and state.

Implications for public policy Recently, several influential Americans (Bennett, 1992; Robertson, 1993; Murchison, 1994; Wilson, 1993) have argued that many contemporary social problems result from the fact that greater numbers of people are acting less frequently on the moral principles of the Judeo-Christian tradition. They maintain that increasing levels of drug abuse, crime, sexually transmitted diseases, out-of-wedlock births, divorce, domestic abuse, and family dysfunction can be traced to poor choices in daily living. Given the fact that many people in a clinical population present with complaints that have to do with one or more of these concerns, it is possible to speculate bow a set of clinically formulated principles of morality may contribute to resolving this epidemic of unhappiness. Until the latter half of the twentieth century, most Americans assumed that morality was a matter of religion. They operated on the assumption that the moral principles provided by the Judeo--Christian tradition were an effective means of pursuing happiness in this life and the next. These principles of morality were rooted in a theory of knowledge and a system of contingencies that had its origin in ancient and medieval theories of reality. As long as people believed that these principles were provided by the Creator of the universe who would reward them for acting in harmony with these principles and punish them for failing to do so, people had a powerful motivation for making use of moral principles in daily living. This motivation for acting on the moral principles of the Judeo~Christian tradition began to wane as widespread belief in God was gradually replaced by a scientific world view. Science holds that revelation is not a reliable source of knowledge. Yet, to date, science has offered no system of contingencies for acting on moral principles that appeal to personal fulfillment. Accordingly, many people today view moral principles as obstructions to, rather than guidelines for, the pursuit of personal happiness. Responding to the epidemic of unhappiness, several of those concerned with social policy in the United States (Bennett, 1992; Kidder, 1994; Wilson, 1993) have initiated a secular attempt to inspire people to act on moral principle by calling attention to the social benefits of moral behavior. Unfortunately, they do not consider the research on moral behavior which demonstrates that people are typically motivated to behave in a moral manner when they perceive a personal benefit as a result (Bandura, 1991; Kohlberg, 1976; Vallegas dePosada, 1994). They do not appreciate the significance of the fact that moral theory based on duty to others is fundamentally incompatible with the political and economic principles that are at the heart of the American way of life. They fail to recognize that the notion that one should act on principle for the sake of others has limited relevance to people who are living in this or any democratic, market-oriented society where self-interest is esteemed. In contrast to this socio-centric approach, a set of clinically formulated principles of morality is more likely to motivate people to act on principle because it offers a tangible payoff and a

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d e m o n s t r a b l e benefit to self. The person who is acting on clinically formulated principles of morality advances his or her self-interest while also b e h a v i n g in a socially responsible manner. B e c a u s e clinically f o r m u l a t e d moral principles are c o m p a t i b l e with a scientific world view, d e m o c r a c y , and capitalism, they could m o t i v a t e moral b e h a v i o r in those people w h o are marginally religious as well as those w h o do not believe in God. This suggests that incorporating clinically formulated principles o f morality into public policy could contribute to a reduction in crime, drug abuse, sexually transmitted diseases, o u t - o f - w e d l o c k births, divorce, domestic abuse, and f a m i l y dysfunction thereby assisting in a resolution to the current crisis in the A m e r i c a n way o f life.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author thanks Drs Constance T. Fischer, Duquesne University, and Diane T. Marsh, University of Pittsburgh lor their comments and suggestions in the preparation of this article for publication. He also gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Dr Debra Evans-Rhodes, University of Pittsburgh, for her assistance with the statistical aspects of this study.

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