- Email: [email protected]
Cognition, emotion and the brain: a different view
Medical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362 © 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd Article No. mehy.1997.0654
Cognition, emotion and the brain: a different view A. Savitzky Department of Molecular Cell Biology, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rechovot, Israel
Summary This article contradicts the current paradigm of a brain which receives, processes, represents and stores information about objects and events. It considers the brain as an activating mechanism which is triggered by combinations and sequences of stimuli, modulates the intensities of neuronal arousals and relays them to particular combinations of organic effectors. Cognitive and affective events are created and expressed by the combinations and sequences of motor and autonomic effector arousals. The apperception of phenomena emerges by the integration of cognition, which is basically the expression of proprioceptive activities, with feelings, which are the expression of some autonomic system’s activities. The cognitive and the affective abilities and expressions are distorted or abolished, if deprived of this integration. Thus, the article proposes an efferent attitude toward the ‘psycho’-physiological process and a realistic attitude toward the brain’s task.
INTRODUCTION Neither the dualistic flesh–spirit, soul–body or mind– brain philosophies, nor Kant’s escapism into transcendental metaphysics, which is by definition beyond our capacity, explain the psycho-physiological phenomenon. Encouraged by modern technology, contemporary scientists developed a neuropsychological dualism. The mysterious entity, by account of which neuroscientists try in vain to explain psychophysiological events, is the brain. Current conjectures in neurosciences, psychology, biology, medicine and other related sciences are based on the correlation between instances of brain damage, stimuli, and electrical or chemical neurophysiological processes on the one hand, and ‘psychological’ or behavioral events on the other. Most contemporary works on these issues are grounded on the notion that we receive information about objects and events by sense organs. The information is coded and transmitted by neurons to the brain, where it is decoded, processed, represented and stored. ‘Psychological’ operations, such as perception, apperception, thoughts, emotion, learning, etc. are, according to this suggestion, performed by specific brain areas or centres, or by the brain as a whole. But what Received 2 July 1997 Accepted 8 September 1997 Correspondence to: Alexander Savitzky, c/o Professor Dov Zipori, Department of Molecular Cell Biology, Rechovot, Israel. E-mail: [email protected]
information is received by sense organs? And what is the code or process, by the means of which the ‘information’ is passed on to the brain or by which it is processed, represented or stored there? I have not found any answer to these crucial questions on which the argument about the current brain paradigm should be based. Does the lack of this basic evidence derive from the shortage of technological means? It is assumed by this article that it derives from a fallacious conception of the ‘psycho’physiological process and therefore of the brain’s task. Creutzfeld assigned a relativistic function to the cortex and wrote: ’… the fundamental distinction of the various cortical areas are the various connections with afferent projection systems and with efferent target structures … It is not the final place of ‘recognition’, ‘decision making’, ‘programming’… and other ‘highest functions’ of the nervous system …’ (1). Bickhard and Terveen write: ‘Some, or even many, projects may in fact fail because of the foundational flaws of the programme, but a project-level focus will always tend to attribute such failures to particulars and details of the individual projects, and will attempt to overcome their shortcomings in new projects that share exactly the same foundational programmatic flaws. Foundational problems can neither be discovered nor understood just by examining sequences of specific projects’ (2). This article presents a nonconventional frame or program which considers cognitive and affective activities as the expression of particular organic processes. I hope that 357
358
Savitzky
this attitude will open a new approach to ‘psycho’physiology and to the task of the brain in it. But we should be under no illusion – ‘psychological’ phenomena may be properly understood only by the unique personal experience of them. The prefix ‘psycho’ will be used in this article to mean ‘cognitive and affective activities’ and not in its ancient dualistic metaphysical sense! This work is based on the following assumptions: Sense organs and neurons are deprived of their survival value if they are not connected, via the brain, to responding organic effectors. The properties of objects cannot be received by sense organs and transmitted by neurons to the brain. Hence external and internal environmental events cannot be processed, represented and stored in the brain. Objects are cognized by learning the sequences and combinations of proprioceptive, meaning tactile, kinesthetic and vestibular sensations, which may, but need not necessarily be extended by additional sensory modalities. Affective events are the living organism’s expressions of certain autonomic system’s effects. According to these conceptions any theory or model of the psycho-physiological system should be based on five categories of combinations: stimulating agents, trigger mechanisms, activating agents, effectors and behavioral, or psychological effects. The physical environmental factors are the stimulating agents. The sense organs or so-called receptors are triggers. The neuronal and the hormonal systems are the intensity-modulating, relaying and -activating agents. The motor, and some visceral organs are the effectors. Psychological, meaning cognitive, intellectual, affective and other behavioral activities are the effects and expressions of some organic effector arousals. The postulate that cognitive and affective processes are performed and represented in the brain without explaining or proving how, cannot logically be accepted and is, in the author’s view, a fallacious inference. Psychological processes cannot be expressed by neurons or hormones, since we are not aware of neuronal or hormonal activities as long as they do not induce certain activities of motor, autonomic and other visceral effectors. Apperception is, in the author’s view, a process in which perception – the cognition of phenomena – becomes integrated with the affective activity, an event by which awareness of phenomena emerges. A sharp distinction will be made between the concepts sensation, perception, feeling and apperception. This is vital not only for the sake of semantics, but for an understanding of the psycho-physiological process. Although interdependent, each one of these processes derives from a different physiological system’s activity. This distinction also enables us to understand some pathological effects, such as those caused by the disconnection of the proMedical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362
prioceptive from the autonomic system’s effectors, and thereby the disconnection of cognitive from affective activities. SENSATIONS, PERCEPTION AND FEELING A slight pressure on the trigger of a rifle causes an explosion in the cartridge and the ejection of the bullet. Can we regard the pressure of the finger on the trigger as the input of information about the finger? Is this information transferred to, processed by, or represented in the mechanism of the rifle? Do the various stages of the process belong to the same category? Is every stage a coded version or a representation of the previous stage? These questions are odd. But aren’t they similar to those currently asked and considered appropriate in the description of psychophysiological processes? The conventional postulate that information is received by sense-organs and passed by neurons to the brain disregards the possibility of a simpler account: that (as with the rifle) each stage is not one of receiving or passing information about our environment, but is only triggered by the previous activity and triggers the following one, until a combination of organic responses is evoked. In other words, in this process, stimulated sensory cells trigger neurons which in turn induce motor and autonomic effectors, which stimulate afferent neurons and vice versa in feedback loops. Although sensitive to particular physical stimulants, sense organs or cells may be stimulated by other physical agents. Hence ‘receptors’ and ‘neurotransmitters’ seem to be misleading terms. Receptors do not receive and transmitters cannot transmit features or other properties of environmental phenomena to the brain. Neither the physical stimulants, such as photons, vibrating particles or airwaves, nor their psychological expressions, such as sensations of light, scent, taste, voices or pain can be transferred by neurons to the brain and processed there. Sense organs are triggers and not receivers of objects, or of their properties. And again, the survival value and the specificity of sense organs can be understood by their contact with reacting effectors, to which they are connected via particular neuronal pathways. The particular combinations of stimuli evoking specific combinations of neurons and particular combinations of effectors, are obviously different from object to object, from event to event. Due to their physiological properties, sense organs and neurons (including brain-neurons) may sum up or moderate the intensities of excitations, relay the course of excitations to the specific combinations of effectors and consequently affect, among countless other events, the cognitive and affective effects. We do not sense, feel or perceive the activities of neurons or of hormones. Sensations, feelings and cognition may © 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd
Cognition, emotion and the brain
emerge, also in a sleeping person, if they evoke organic effector’s responses, such as, for example, the muscle, or visceral constrictions, the changes in body heat, in the intensity and frequency of breath and heartbeat, movements, the erection or constrictions of sex-organs, etc. Voices are heard, while specific cells in the ears are stimulated by air waves, light or phenomena are seen, while particular cells in the eyes are stimulated by photons, etc. But this does certainly not explain the emergence of a psycho-physiological reality. In order to see, retinal sensory cells must trigger neurons which consequently induce sequences of specific combinations of effectors, which trigger sensory cells, afferent neurons and vice versa in feedback loops. The arousal of organic effectors may be expressed as vision. If one link of this feedback loop is missing, no vision of phenomena will emerge. In other words, if the efferent neurons are not triggered and do not activate any effectors, the whole process will cease in the sense organs or in the brain without being experienced. John B. Watson considered ‘consciousness’ as an epiphenomenon of motor activity and regarded the activity of muscles and glands as the genuine reality. In his ‘motor theory of consciousness’, he postulates that what we sense or perceive depends on how we respond. Piaget regarded sensory–motor operations as the basis of perception, the cognition of objects and the creation of cognitive schemata (3). Touching the surface of a table is not sufficient to identify, or to distinguish it from other phenomena. The cognition, the perception of phenomena is learned by means of reafferent palpation and locomotion evoking combinations and sequences of proprioceptive, i.e. muscle stretch, vestibular and tactile sensations and not by the activity of specific brain-neurons. This is the process by which objects and their properties, such as the length, weight, hardness, thickness, etc. are learned. Tactile sensations may express the smoothness or roughness, pressure, temperature, etc. The vestibular sensations express the orientation, the position and locomotion of the organism toward other phenomena. Thus the consequent arousals of combinations of proprioceptive sensations, and not a specific combination of brain neurons, are the representations of phenomena. They do not represent objects or environmental events, but rather the perception of them. The latter is not a combination of physical properties, but a cognitive, i.e. a psychological, effect of particular organic effectors’ arousals. Hubel and Wiesel detected, among many other discoveries, cells which are excited when we see a bar at a specific orientation (4). But, according to the assumptions propounded in these pages, they virtually might have found cells which relay arousals to the relevant motor-vestibular effectors and not ‘orientation-sensitive’, ‘motion-sensitive’ or other ‘phenomena-sensitive’ cells. © 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd
359
Searching for a representation of features or other properties of objects in the central neural system or in some codes of its activity seems strange, as explained by Bickhard and Terveen (2). Cognition cannot be considered as the derivative of retinal stimuli only, or of the appearence of retinal images, or retinotopic correlations in the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus, or in ‘visual’ cortices. For properties of phenomena, such as hard, soft, heavy, thick, long, hot, distant, rough, wet, deep, etc. cannot be perceived by optic means only. Vision may become meaningful only if the optic stimuli have been learned in correlation with tactile, vestibular and kinesthetic sensations. After being learned, vision may often guide motor activities. But, for example, a wall cannot be seen by virtue of retinal stimuli, by the excitation of rods and cones only, because vision is not a sensation, but a perception, a cognitive effect of a multimodal process. This means vision, – ‘seeing’ – a wall, is anticipating, knowing that it is concrete, high, impassible. In other words, vision means seeing what has been learned by proprioceptive effectors’ activities. Neisser writes that we do not hear sounds but events and do not see light but objects (5). A blind-born child may learn to cognize an object by palpation only. But neonates deprived of proprioceptive sensations cannot cognize phenomena (6). Proprioceptive sensations may, but need not necessarily be enriched by optic, auditory and other sensations, in order to cognize objects. Although some phenomena, such as sounds, scent, colors, drawings, etc. can obviously not be cognized by proprioceptive sensations, they may evoke the cognition of objects and events if (in most cases subliminally) inducing the learned combinations of sensory–motor activities, by which cognition is expressed even in severely paralized living beings. Damage to brain-neurons interconnecting the motor system with other modality effectors may distort or even deprive an organism of cognitive abilities, as will be described below. One hundred years ago Stratton wore goggles with inverting prismas (7). Thereby he virtually changed the combinations of retinal loci stimulated by the environmental stimulants. Nevertheless he adapted to his new ‘visual environment’ not by changing the ‘retinal images’, which are normally converted, distorted, small, of two dimensions, etc. but by learning the new correlations between the motor–kinesthetic and the vestibular sensations with the sensations evoked by the stimulation of retinal loci. In other words, it is not important which area of the retina is stimulated. If the psycho-physiological system has learned that a hand must be raised to reach an object, the latter will be seen above and not below. The conjecture that the brain converts the upside-down, distorted ‘strange’ features of the ‘retinal images’, decodes, processes and interprets them, is pure imagination. Medical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362
360
Savitzky
Lesions of basal ganglia may be accompanied by akinesia, by disorders of movement-initiation. The conjecture that movements or other behavioral activities are initiated and induced by the brain, or, as dualistic philosophers might infer, by the ‘mind’, does not contribute to an explanation of these psychophysiological phenomena either. Some excitations of neurons seem to be evoked spontaneously. But the brain should not, in the author’s view, be considered as an entity which initiates spontaneous, unique activities. Neurons fire if stimulated. Creutzfeldt writes, that the spontaneous activity of cortical neurons is essentially a driven activity and disappears after deafferentiation (1). Neisser stated that frequently evoked loops are good neuronal candidates for accumulating and firing spontaneously when close to the state of excitation. Also, most cells never fire although stimulated to a subliminal state (5). Various experiments indicate that initiative, as also thoughts, expectations and other psychological processes, are characterized by the motor and autonomic system’s activities. For example, some specific minor changes in muscular activities characterize particular psychological processes, such as imagining, ‘silent language processing’ and others (8). And Pavlov’s experiments leave no doubt that salivation and other physiological activities characterize the dog’s expectation for food. Although these responses to the conditioned stimuli are mere reflexes, they virtually express an experience of the expected, imagined event, which is usually evoked by the scent of food. ‘Emotions’ have been identified by William James with certain activities of the autonomic system. James claimed, that ‘we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike or tremble because we are sorry, angry or fearful…’ (9). In other words, contrary to Cannon (10) James considered emotions as effects of physiological processes, but remained loyal to the convention that cognition is the brain’s task. Olds and Millner discovered groups of brain-cells, the stimulation of which, (by pressing a pedal) seemed to cause pleasure to the mouse (11). They actually must have found neuronal relay junctions connected to the autonomic system’s activators, which induce particular visceral constrictions or other reactions evoking pleasure in the mouse. A conclusion that pleasure-centres have been discovered in the brain would not explain the psycho-physiological process. On the contrary, it might in the view of this article be considered as an overstatement based on an imaginary conception which seems to be logically unacceptable. Physiological processes may be dissociated from their cognitive or affective effects, but psychological experiences do not exist without their physiological basis. The Medical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362
psycho-physiological mechanism functions as a feedback system. Hence, the psychological and behavioral effects may also influence or determine some of the physiological effector’s activities. APPERCEPTION The term ‘apperception’ was considered by Leibniz as a state in which we cognize, identify and understand perceived phenomena. Wundt regarded it as a process by which any psychical content is brought to a clear understanding and into consciousness. Since the autonomic system is involved in the metabolism, the conversion, accumulation and use of energy and in maintaining homeostasis, stimuli, if strong enough, must induce the autonomic system (via the limbic system and the hypothalamus). And since some of the autonomic system’s activities evoke in us feelings, we may infer that every stimulus, if strong enough, may evoke feelings, which are considered in this article as affective, meaning pleasant or unpleasant effects. Unlike feelings, emotions, such as envy, hatred, grief, love, etc. are apperception, since they contain not only the affective, but also the cognitive dimension. Feelings become psychologically meaningful when integrated with cognitive processes. On the other hand, we cannot cognize phenomena if the perception of them is not integrated with feelings, which award the cognition of objects and events with some vital qualitative properties. This integration is necessary f’or the creation of what is considered by this article as apperception, a process by which cognitive and affective processes become integrated, and by which we become aware of phenomena (12,13). The current inference from countless experiments and observations of psychophysiological experiences is based on the assumption that these activities are performed in, and by brain areas. Although the author’s disagrees with this inference, he considers many of the discoveries as supporting the conjectures propounded in this article. But the conclusion is that brain damages or malfunctions may disconnect the proprioceptive from the autonomic system and thereby deprive the patient of the ability to apperceive. Surplus of inhibitory ‘neurotransmitters’ or neurohormones, atrophy of nerve-cells in the brain, some tumors and other kinds of damage or the pharmacological intervention of anesthetists or scientists in certain brain areas disconnecting or distorting the connections between the physiological systems may create anesthesia, analgesia, amnesia, the various agnosias and other psychological distortions and insufficiencies. To cite a few of many examples: Superfluous quantities of dopamine (an inhibitory ‘neurotransmitter’) in the nigrostriatic pathway may result in delirium in schizophrenic patients. By a decreased activity of GABA and cholinergic striatal © 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd
Cognition, emotion and the brain
neurons in Huntington’s disease, some patients become euphoric, others are irascible and violent. Damage to the cingula of the limbic system, inferotemporal loss (14), removal of both temporal lobes or any other kind of disconnection of the optic system from the proprioceptive or from the autonomic system may cause ‘psychic blindness’ (15) or ‘visual agnosia’ (16). The destruction of particular areas or even particular cells in the inferior or the superior temporal cortex, the striate, or the associative cortices may also cause various specific visual deficiencies (17–20). All these and many other correlations tempt us indeed to regard defined brain areas as centres that are responsible for specific psychological functions and the motor, the autonomic and other organic systems as mere peripheral physiological servants of the brain. But the brain does not feel, sense, perceive, think, and does not represent or perform any other psychological or behavioral processes. The brain is a physiological intensitymodulating and -relaying unit and not a psychologicalinformation processor (21). The so-called ‘brain centres’ are groups of neuronal relay junctions. Brain-neurons are living cells. These cells and the brain are not autarkies, organisms, living creatures. Braincells are components and the brain is an organ, fulfilling particular tasks in the living organism. But, unlike some other organs, it is not an effector, but a mechanism which relays arousals and activates effectors. This may seem a banal description, but it seemed to be necessary. In other words, it is not easy to refute a dogma, a belief, a brain-paradigm which succeeded to prevail for so many centuries. The philogenetic development of growing numbers of neurons and of neuronal connections opened the opportunity to increase the number and the sophistication of interconnections between peripheral sensory cells and tactile, motor, vestibular and other effectors. This development promoted the creation of more and more refined and improved responses and more and more abstracted intellectual, imaginary and other processes which are for us real experiences, real apperceptions. All these could not be developed without the additional development of a super-sophisticated modulating and relaying brain. Hence, the status of the brain is not at all degraded by dismissing it from its imaginary task in the metaphysical realm. So again, psychological processes may be distorted or abolished, because the relevant physiological effector systems are damaged or disconnected from each other and not because some mysterious functionally specific mental and affective brain centres are damaged. There is nothing psychologically specific in the so-called visual, auditory and other cortices except their connections with particular ‘receptors’ and effectors. So, for example, if a neonate is deprived of optic stimulation, the ‘visual cortex’ will turn into an ‘auditory cortex’ (22). © 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd
361
The author hopes that the inferences presented in this article will not be assimilated by the current ‘brainparadigm’, but will be considered as the basis for a heuristic attitude toward psychophysiology and related disciplines. It may then be considered as a realistic and rather simpler approach toward the brain’s function in the psychophysiological process. The assumptions expounded in this epitomized article are accomplished in the article ‘Learning and Memory’, which is in the last stages of preparation and will be published soon. SUMMARY 1. We do not absorb the physical properties of objects and events, but are stimulated by them. 2. Hence, searching for the representation of objects or environmental events in the brain seems strange. 3. Sensations and perceptions are created by evoking combinations and sequences of motor, autonomic and other visceral effectors’ activities. 4. The brain modulates, processes and relays neuronal arousals to organic effectors by virtue of the neuronal interconnections and properties. ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my dear friends Dr Eli Shezen, Dr Eli Daryn, Professor Daniel Algom, Professor Joseph Taglicht, Professor Dov Zipori and Professor Uri Lavi for their generosity in supporting and encouraging me along the ‘via dolorosa’ of accomplishing and publishing this work.
REFERENCES 1. Creutzfeld O. D. The neocortical link: thoughts on the generality of structure and function of the neocortex. In: Brazier M.A.B., Petsche H. (eds) Architectonics of the Cerebral Cortex. New York: Raven Press 1978: 357–383. 2. Bickhard M. H., Terveen L. Foundational Issues in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1995. 3. Piaget J., Inhelder B. The Psychology of the Child. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969. 4. Hubel D. H., Wiesel T. N. Receptive fields, binocular interaction and functional architecture in the cat’s visual cortex. J Psychology 1962; 160: 106–154. 5. Neisser U. Cognition and Reality. New York: Freeman, 1976. 6. Held R., Hein A. Movement-produced stimulation in the development of visually guided behavior. J Compr Physiol Psychology 1963; 56(5): 872–876. 7. Straton G. Some preliminary experiments in vision without inversion of the retinal image. Psychol Rev 1896; 3: 611–617. 8. Cacioppo J. T., Petty R. E. Electromyograms and measures of extent and affectivity of information processing. Am Psychologist 1981; 36(5): 441–456. 9. James W. The Principles of Psychology vol.2. New York: Dover Publications, 1890. 10. Cannon W. B. The James–Lange theory of emotion: a critical examination and an alternative theory. Am J Psychol 1927; 39: 106–124.
Medical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362
362
Savitzky
11. Olds J., Milner P. Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of the septal area and other regions of the rat brain. J Compr Physiol Psychol 1954; 47: 419–427. 12. Savitzky A. Brain and Psychophysiology of Experience. Tel Aviv: Barakan, 1989. 13. Savitzky A. Brain and experience. Psychologia 1991; 2(2): 171–185. 14. Wilson M. Effects of circumscribed cortical lesions upon somesthetic and visual discrimination in the monkey. J Compr physiol Psychol 1957; 50: 630–635. 15. Kluver H., Bucy P. C. ‘Psychic Blindness’ and other symptoms following bilateral temporal lobectomy in Rhesus monkeys. Am J Psychol 1937; 119: 352–353. 16. Kolb B., Whishow I. O. Fundamentals of Human Neurophysiology, 2nd edn. New York: Freeman, 1985. 17. Desimone R., Gross C. G. Visual areas in the temporal cortex of
Medical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362
the macaque. Brain Res 1979; 178: 363–380. 18. Kendrick K. M., Baldwin B. A. Cells in the temporal cortex of conscious sheep can respond preferentially to the sight of faces. Science 1987; 236: 448–450. 19. Livingstone M., Hubel D. Segregation of form, color, movement and depth: anatomy, physiology and perception. Science 1988; 240: 740–749. 20. Phillips C. G., Zeki S., Barlow H. B. Localization of function in the cerebral cortex. Brain 1984; 107: 328–360. 21. Savitzky A. Brain and Experience. The book of abstracts. The 24th congress of the Israel Psychological Associations, 1993: 327. 22. Sur M., Pallas S. L., Roe A. W. Crossmodal plasticity in cortical development: differentiation and specification of sensory neocortex. TINS 1990; 13(6).
© 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd
Cognition, emotion and the brain: a different view A. Savitzky Department of Molecular Cell Biology, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rechovot, Israel
Summary This article contradicts the current paradigm of a brain which receives, processes, represents and stores information about objects and events. It considers the brain as an activating mechanism which is triggered by combinations and sequences of stimuli, modulates the intensities of neuronal arousals and relays them to particular combinations of organic effectors. Cognitive and affective events are created and expressed by the combinations and sequences of motor and autonomic effector arousals. The apperception of phenomena emerges by the integration of cognition, which is basically the expression of proprioceptive activities, with feelings, which are the expression of some autonomic system’s activities. The cognitive and the affective abilities and expressions are distorted or abolished, if deprived of this integration. Thus, the article proposes an efferent attitude toward the ‘psycho’-physiological process and a realistic attitude toward the brain’s task.
INTRODUCTION Neither the dualistic flesh–spirit, soul–body or mind– brain philosophies, nor Kant’s escapism into transcendental metaphysics, which is by definition beyond our capacity, explain the psycho-physiological phenomenon. Encouraged by modern technology, contemporary scientists developed a neuropsychological dualism. The mysterious entity, by account of which neuroscientists try in vain to explain psychophysiological events, is the brain. Current conjectures in neurosciences, psychology, biology, medicine and other related sciences are based on the correlation between instances of brain damage, stimuli, and electrical or chemical neurophysiological processes on the one hand, and ‘psychological’ or behavioral events on the other. Most contemporary works on these issues are grounded on the notion that we receive information about objects and events by sense organs. The information is coded and transmitted by neurons to the brain, where it is decoded, processed, represented and stored. ‘Psychological’ operations, such as perception, apperception, thoughts, emotion, learning, etc. are, according to this suggestion, performed by specific brain areas or centres, or by the brain as a whole. But what Received 2 July 1997 Accepted 8 September 1997 Correspondence to: Alexander Savitzky, c/o Professor Dov Zipori, Department of Molecular Cell Biology, Rechovot, Israel. E-mail: [email protected]
information is received by sense organs? And what is the code or process, by the means of which the ‘information’ is passed on to the brain or by which it is processed, represented or stored there? I have not found any answer to these crucial questions on which the argument about the current brain paradigm should be based. Does the lack of this basic evidence derive from the shortage of technological means? It is assumed by this article that it derives from a fallacious conception of the ‘psycho’physiological process and therefore of the brain’s task. Creutzfeld assigned a relativistic function to the cortex and wrote: ’… the fundamental distinction of the various cortical areas are the various connections with afferent projection systems and with efferent target structures … It is not the final place of ‘recognition’, ‘decision making’, ‘programming’… and other ‘highest functions’ of the nervous system …’ (1). Bickhard and Terveen write: ‘Some, or even many, projects may in fact fail because of the foundational flaws of the programme, but a project-level focus will always tend to attribute such failures to particulars and details of the individual projects, and will attempt to overcome their shortcomings in new projects that share exactly the same foundational programmatic flaws. Foundational problems can neither be discovered nor understood just by examining sequences of specific projects’ (2). This article presents a nonconventional frame or program which considers cognitive and affective activities as the expression of particular organic processes. I hope that 357
358
Savitzky
this attitude will open a new approach to ‘psycho’physiology and to the task of the brain in it. But we should be under no illusion – ‘psychological’ phenomena may be properly understood only by the unique personal experience of them. The prefix ‘psycho’ will be used in this article to mean ‘cognitive and affective activities’ and not in its ancient dualistic metaphysical sense! This work is based on the following assumptions: Sense organs and neurons are deprived of their survival value if they are not connected, via the brain, to responding organic effectors. The properties of objects cannot be received by sense organs and transmitted by neurons to the brain. Hence external and internal environmental events cannot be processed, represented and stored in the brain. Objects are cognized by learning the sequences and combinations of proprioceptive, meaning tactile, kinesthetic and vestibular sensations, which may, but need not necessarily be extended by additional sensory modalities. Affective events are the living organism’s expressions of certain autonomic system’s effects. According to these conceptions any theory or model of the psycho-physiological system should be based on five categories of combinations: stimulating agents, trigger mechanisms, activating agents, effectors and behavioral, or psychological effects. The physical environmental factors are the stimulating agents. The sense organs or so-called receptors are triggers. The neuronal and the hormonal systems are the intensity-modulating, relaying and -activating agents. The motor, and some visceral organs are the effectors. Psychological, meaning cognitive, intellectual, affective and other behavioral activities are the effects and expressions of some organic effector arousals. The postulate that cognitive and affective processes are performed and represented in the brain without explaining or proving how, cannot logically be accepted and is, in the author’s view, a fallacious inference. Psychological processes cannot be expressed by neurons or hormones, since we are not aware of neuronal or hormonal activities as long as they do not induce certain activities of motor, autonomic and other visceral effectors. Apperception is, in the author’s view, a process in which perception – the cognition of phenomena – becomes integrated with the affective activity, an event by which awareness of phenomena emerges. A sharp distinction will be made between the concepts sensation, perception, feeling and apperception. This is vital not only for the sake of semantics, but for an understanding of the psycho-physiological process. Although interdependent, each one of these processes derives from a different physiological system’s activity. This distinction also enables us to understand some pathological effects, such as those caused by the disconnection of the proMedical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362
prioceptive from the autonomic system’s effectors, and thereby the disconnection of cognitive from affective activities. SENSATIONS, PERCEPTION AND FEELING A slight pressure on the trigger of a rifle causes an explosion in the cartridge and the ejection of the bullet. Can we regard the pressure of the finger on the trigger as the input of information about the finger? Is this information transferred to, processed by, or represented in the mechanism of the rifle? Do the various stages of the process belong to the same category? Is every stage a coded version or a representation of the previous stage? These questions are odd. But aren’t they similar to those currently asked and considered appropriate in the description of psychophysiological processes? The conventional postulate that information is received by sense-organs and passed by neurons to the brain disregards the possibility of a simpler account: that (as with the rifle) each stage is not one of receiving or passing information about our environment, but is only triggered by the previous activity and triggers the following one, until a combination of organic responses is evoked. In other words, in this process, stimulated sensory cells trigger neurons which in turn induce motor and autonomic effectors, which stimulate afferent neurons and vice versa in feedback loops. Although sensitive to particular physical stimulants, sense organs or cells may be stimulated by other physical agents. Hence ‘receptors’ and ‘neurotransmitters’ seem to be misleading terms. Receptors do not receive and transmitters cannot transmit features or other properties of environmental phenomena to the brain. Neither the physical stimulants, such as photons, vibrating particles or airwaves, nor their psychological expressions, such as sensations of light, scent, taste, voices or pain can be transferred by neurons to the brain and processed there. Sense organs are triggers and not receivers of objects, or of their properties. And again, the survival value and the specificity of sense organs can be understood by their contact with reacting effectors, to which they are connected via particular neuronal pathways. The particular combinations of stimuli evoking specific combinations of neurons and particular combinations of effectors, are obviously different from object to object, from event to event. Due to their physiological properties, sense organs and neurons (including brain-neurons) may sum up or moderate the intensities of excitations, relay the course of excitations to the specific combinations of effectors and consequently affect, among countless other events, the cognitive and affective effects. We do not sense, feel or perceive the activities of neurons or of hormones. Sensations, feelings and cognition may © 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd
Cognition, emotion and the brain
emerge, also in a sleeping person, if they evoke organic effector’s responses, such as, for example, the muscle, or visceral constrictions, the changes in body heat, in the intensity and frequency of breath and heartbeat, movements, the erection or constrictions of sex-organs, etc. Voices are heard, while specific cells in the ears are stimulated by air waves, light or phenomena are seen, while particular cells in the eyes are stimulated by photons, etc. But this does certainly not explain the emergence of a psycho-physiological reality. In order to see, retinal sensory cells must trigger neurons which consequently induce sequences of specific combinations of effectors, which trigger sensory cells, afferent neurons and vice versa in feedback loops. The arousal of organic effectors may be expressed as vision. If one link of this feedback loop is missing, no vision of phenomena will emerge. In other words, if the efferent neurons are not triggered and do not activate any effectors, the whole process will cease in the sense organs or in the brain without being experienced. John B. Watson considered ‘consciousness’ as an epiphenomenon of motor activity and regarded the activity of muscles and glands as the genuine reality. In his ‘motor theory of consciousness’, he postulates that what we sense or perceive depends on how we respond. Piaget regarded sensory–motor operations as the basis of perception, the cognition of objects and the creation of cognitive schemata (3). Touching the surface of a table is not sufficient to identify, or to distinguish it from other phenomena. The cognition, the perception of phenomena is learned by means of reafferent palpation and locomotion evoking combinations and sequences of proprioceptive, i.e. muscle stretch, vestibular and tactile sensations and not by the activity of specific brain-neurons. This is the process by which objects and their properties, such as the length, weight, hardness, thickness, etc. are learned. Tactile sensations may express the smoothness or roughness, pressure, temperature, etc. The vestibular sensations express the orientation, the position and locomotion of the organism toward other phenomena. Thus the consequent arousals of combinations of proprioceptive sensations, and not a specific combination of brain neurons, are the representations of phenomena. They do not represent objects or environmental events, but rather the perception of them. The latter is not a combination of physical properties, but a cognitive, i.e. a psychological, effect of particular organic effectors’ arousals. Hubel and Wiesel detected, among many other discoveries, cells which are excited when we see a bar at a specific orientation (4). But, according to the assumptions propounded in these pages, they virtually might have found cells which relay arousals to the relevant motor-vestibular effectors and not ‘orientation-sensitive’, ‘motion-sensitive’ or other ‘phenomena-sensitive’ cells. © 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd
359
Searching for a representation of features or other properties of objects in the central neural system or in some codes of its activity seems strange, as explained by Bickhard and Terveen (2). Cognition cannot be considered as the derivative of retinal stimuli only, or of the appearence of retinal images, or retinotopic correlations in the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus, or in ‘visual’ cortices. For properties of phenomena, such as hard, soft, heavy, thick, long, hot, distant, rough, wet, deep, etc. cannot be perceived by optic means only. Vision may become meaningful only if the optic stimuli have been learned in correlation with tactile, vestibular and kinesthetic sensations. After being learned, vision may often guide motor activities. But, for example, a wall cannot be seen by virtue of retinal stimuli, by the excitation of rods and cones only, because vision is not a sensation, but a perception, a cognitive effect of a multimodal process. This means vision, – ‘seeing’ – a wall, is anticipating, knowing that it is concrete, high, impassible. In other words, vision means seeing what has been learned by proprioceptive effectors’ activities. Neisser writes that we do not hear sounds but events and do not see light but objects (5). A blind-born child may learn to cognize an object by palpation only. But neonates deprived of proprioceptive sensations cannot cognize phenomena (6). Proprioceptive sensations may, but need not necessarily be enriched by optic, auditory and other sensations, in order to cognize objects. Although some phenomena, such as sounds, scent, colors, drawings, etc. can obviously not be cognized by proprioceptive sensations, they may evoke the cognition of objects and events if (in most cases subliminally) inducing the learned combinations of sensory–motor activities, by which cognition is expressed even in severely paralized living beings. Damage to brain-neurons interconnecting the motor system with other modality effectors may distort or even deprive an organism of cognitive abilities, as will be described below. One hundred years ago Stratton wore goggles with inverting prismas (7). Thereby he virtually changed the combinations of retinal loci stimulated by the environmental stimulants. Nevertheless he adapted to his new ‘visual environment’ not by changing the ‘retinal images’, which are normally converted, distorted, small, of two dimensions, etc. but by learning the new correlations between the motor–kinesthetic and the vestibular sensations with the sensations evoked by the stimulation of retinal loci. In other words, it is not important which area of the retina is stimulated. If the psycho-physiological system has learned that a hand must be raised to reach an object, the latter will be seen above and not below. The conjecture that the brain converts the upside-down, distorted ‘strange’ features of the ‘retinal images’, decodes, processes and interprets them, is pure imagination. Medical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362
360
Savitzky
Lesions of basal ganglia may be accompanied by akinesia, by disorders of movement-initiation. The conjecture that movements or other behavioral activities are initiated and induced by the brain, or, as dualistic philosophers might infer, by the ‘mind’, does not contribute to an explanation of these psychophysiological phenomena either. Some excitations of neurons seem to be evoked spontaneously. But the brain should not, in the author’s view, be considered as an entity which initiates spontaneous, unique activities. Neurons fire if stimulated. Creutzfeldt writes, that the spontaneous activity of cortical neurons is essentially a driven activity and disappears after deafferentiation (1). Neisser stated that frequently evoked loops are good neuronal candidates for accumulating and firing spontaneously when close to the state of excitation. Also, most cells never fire although stimulated to a subliminal state (5). Various experiments indicate that initiative, as also thoughts, expectations and other psychological processes, are characterized by the motor and autonomic system’s activities. For example, some specific minor changes in muscular activities characterize particular psychological processes, such as imagining, ‘silent language processing’ and others (8). And Pavlov’s experiments leave no doubt that salivation and other physiological activities characterize the dog’s expectation for food. Although these responses to the conditioned stimuli are mere reflexes, they virtually express an experience of the expected, imagined event, which is usually evoked by the scent of food. ‘Emotions’ have been identified by William James with certain activities of the autonomic system. James claimed, that ‘we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike or tremble because we are sorry, angry or fearful…’ (9). In other words, contrary to Cannon (10) James considered emotions as effects of physiological processes, but remained loyal to the convention that cognition is the brain’s task. Olds and Millner discovered groups of brain-cells, the stimulation of which, (by pressing a pedal) seemed to cause pleasure to the mouse (11). They actually must have found neuronal relay junctions connected to the autonomic system’s activators, which induce particular visceral constrictions or other reactions evoking pleasure in the mouse. A conclusion that pleasure-centres have been discovered in the brain would not explain the psycho-physiological process. On the contrary, it might in the view of this article be considered as an overstatement based on an imaginary conception which seems to be logically unacceptable. Physiological processes may be dissociated from their cognitive or affective effects, but psychological experiences do not exist without their physiological basis. The Medical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362
psycho-physiological mechanism functions as a feedback system. Hence, the psychological and behavioral effects may also influence or determine some of the physiological effector’s activities. APPERCEPTION The term ‘apperception’ was considered by Leibniz as a state in which we cognize, identify and understand perceived phenomena. Wundt regarded it as a process by which any psychical content is brought to a clear understanding and into consciousness. Since the autonomic system is involved in the metabolism, the conversion, accumulation and use of energy and in maintaining homeostasis, stimuli, if strong enough, must induce the autonomic system (via the limbic system and the hypothalamus). And since some of the autonomic system’s activities evoke in us feelings, we may infer that every stimulus, if strong enough, may evoke feelings, which are considered in this article as affective, meaning pleasant or unpleasant effects. Unlike feelings, emotions, such as envy, hatred, grief, love, etc. are apperception, since they contain not only the affective, but also the cognitive dimension. Feelings become psychologically meaningful when integrated with cognitive processes. On the other hand, we cannot cognize phenomena if the perception of them is not integrated with feelings, which award the cognition of objects and events with some vital qualitative properties. This integration is necessary f’or the creation of what is considered by this article as apperception, a process by which cognitive and affective processes become integrated, and by which we become aware of phenomena (12,13). The current inference from countless experiments and observations of psychophysiological experiences is based on the assumption that these activities are performed in, and by brain areas. Although the author’s disagrees with this inference, he considers many of the discoveries as supporting the conjectures propounded in this article. But the conclusion is that brain damages or malfunctions may disconnect the proprioceptive from the autonomic system and thereby deprive the patient of the ability to apperceive. Surplus of inhibitory ‘neurotransmitters’ or neurohormones, atrophy of nerve-cells in the brain, some tumors and other kinds of damage or the pharmacological intervention of anesthetists or scientists in certain brain areas disconnecting or distorting the connections between the physiological systems may create anesthesia, analgesia, amnesia, the various agnosias and other psychological distortions and insufficiencies. To cite a few of many examples: Superfluous quantities of dopamine (an inhibitory ‘neurotransmitter’) in the nigrostriatic pathway may result in delirium in schizophrenic patients. By a decreased activity of GABA and cholinergic striatal © 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd
Cognition, emotion and the brain
neurons in Huntington’s disease, some patients become euphoric, others are irascible and violent. Damage to the cingula of the limbic system, inferotemporal loss (14), removal of both temporal lobes or any other kind of disconnection of the optic system from the proprioceptive or from the autonomic system may cause ‘psychic blindness’ (15) or ‘visual agnosia’ (16). The destruction of particular areas or even particular cells in the inferior or the superior temporal cortex, the striate, or the associative cortices may also cause various specific visual deficiencies (17–20). All these and many other correlations tempt us indeed to regard defined brain areas as centres that are responsible for specific psychological functions and the motor, the autonomic and other organic systems as mere peripheral physiological servants of the brain. But the brain does not feel, sense, perceive, think, and does not represent or perform any other psychological or behavioral processes. The brain is a physiological intensitymodulating and -relaying unit and not a psychologicalinformation processor (21). The so-called ‘brain centres’ are groups of neuronal relay junctions. Brain-neurons are living cells. These cells and the brain are not autarkies, organisms, living creatures. Braincells are components and the brain is an organ, fulfilling particular tasks in the living organism. But, unlike some other organs, it is not an effector, but a mechanism which relays arousals and activates effectors. This may seem a banal description, but it seemed to be necessary. In other words, it is not easy to refute a dogma, a belief, a brain-paradigm which succeeded to prevail for so many centuries. The philogenetic development of growing numbers of neurons and of neuronal connections opened the opportunity to increase the number and the sophistication of interconnections between peripheral sensory cells and tactile, motor, vestibular and other effectors. This development promoted the creation of more and more refined and improved responses and more and more abstracted intellectual, imaginary and other processes which are for us real experiences, real apperceptions. All these could not be developed without the additional development of a super-sophisticated modulating and relaying brain. Hence, the status of the brain is not at all degraded by dismissing it from its imaginary task in the metaphysical realm. So again, psychological processes may be distorted or abolished, because the relevant physiological effector systems are damaged or disconnected from each other and not because some mysterious functionally specific mental and affective brain centres are damaged. There is nothing psychologically specific in the so-called visual, auditory and other cortices except their connections with particular ‘receptors’ and effectors. So, for example, if a neonate is deprived of optic stimulation, the ‘visual cortex’ will turn into an ‘auditory cortex’ (22). © 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd
361
The author hopes that the inferences presented in this article will not be assimilated by the current ‘brainparadigm’, but will be considered as the basis for a heuristic attitude toward psychophysiology and related disciplines. It may then be considered as a realistic and rather simpler approach toward the brain’s function in the psychophysiological process. The assumptions expounded in this epitomized article are accomplished in the article ‘Learning and Memory’, which is in the last stages of preparation and will be published soon. SUMMARY 1. We do not absorb the physical properties of objects and events, but are stimulated by them. 2. Hence, searching for the representation of objects or environmental events in the brain seems strange. 3. Sensations and perceptions are created by evoking combinations and sequences of motor, autonomic and other visceral effectors’ activities. 4. The brain modulates, processes and relays neuronal arousals to organic effectors by virtue of the neuronal interconnections and properties. ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my dear friends Dr Eli Shezen, Dr Eli Daryn, Professor Daniel Algom, Professor Joseph Taglicht, Professor Dov Zipori and Professor Uri Lavi for their generosity in supporting and encouraging me along the ‘via dolorosa’ of accomplishing and publishing this work.
REFERENCES 1. Creutzfeld O. D. The neocortical link: thoughts on the generality of structure and function of the neocortex. In: Brazier M.A.B., Petsche H. (eds) Architectonics of the Cerebral Cortex. New York: Raven Press 1978: 357–383. 2. Bickhard M. H., Terveen L. Foundational Issues in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1995. 3. Piaget J., Inhelder B. The Psychology of the Child. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969. 4. Hubel D. H., Wiesel T. N. Receptive fields, binocular interaction and functional architecture in the cat’s visual cortex. J Psychology 1962; 160: 106–154. 5. Neisser U. Cognition and Reality. New York: Freeman, 1976. 6. Held R., Hein A. Movement-produced stimulation in the development of visually guided behavior. J Compr Physiol Psychology 1963; 56(5): 872–876. 7. Straton G. Some preliminary experiments in vision without inversion of the retinal image. Psychol Rev 1896; 3: 611–617. 8. Cacioppo J. T., Petty R. E. Electromyograms and measures of extent and affectivity of information processing. Am Psychologist 1981; 36(5): 441–456. 9. James W. The Principles of Psychology vol.2. New York: Dover Publications, 1890. 10. Cannon W. B. The James–Lange theory of emotion: a critical examination and an alternative theory. Am J Psychol 1927; 39: 106–124.
Medical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362
362
Savitzky
11. Olds J., Milner P. Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation of the septal area and other regions of the rat brain. J Compr Physiol Psychol 1954; 47: 419–427. 12. Savitzky A. Brain and Psychophysiology of Experience. Tel Aviv: Barakan, 1989. 13. Savitzky A. Brain and experience. Psychologia 1991; 2(2): 171–185. 14. Wilson M. Effects of circumscribed cortical lesions upon somesthetic and visual discrimination in the monkey. J Compr physiol Psychol 1957; 50: 630–635. 15. Kluver H., Bucy P. C. ‘Psychic Blindness’ and other symptoms following bilateral temporal lobectomy in Rhesus monkeys. Am J Psychol 1937; 119: 352–353. 16. Kolb B., Whishow I. O. Fundamentals of Human Neurophysiology, 2nd edn. New York: Freeman, 1985. 17. Desimone R., Gross C. G. Visual areas in the temporal cortex of
Medical Hypotheses (1999) 52(5), 357–362
the macaque. Brain Res 1979; 178: 363–380. 18. Kendrick K. M., Baldwin B. A. Cells in the temporal cortex of conscious sheep can respond preferentially to the sight of faces. Science 1987; 236: 448–450. 19. Livingstone M., Hubel D. Segregation of form, color, movement and depth: anatomy, physiology and perception. Science 1988; 240: 740–749. 20. Phillips C. G., Zeki S., Barlow H. B. Localization of function in the cerebral cortex. Brain 1984; 107: 328–360. 21. Savitzky A. Brain and Experience. The book of abstracts. The 24th congress of the Israel Psychological Associations, 1993: 327. 22. Sur M., Pallas S. L., Roe A. W. Crossmodal plasticity in cortical development: differentiation and specification of sensory neocortex. TINS 1990; 13(6).
© 1999 Harcourt Brace & Co. Ltd