- Email: [email protected]
Cognitive processes in animal behavior
192
there is no reference to the work by E.R. Kandel on Aplysiu, by G. Hoyle on insects, by J.Z. Young on squid and the chapter on brain function by D.G. Stein is disappointing in its superficiality. The textbook character of the volume is stressed by the list of control questions concluding each chapter - some simply testing the reader’s short-term memory, others inviting the student to more creative activities (planning additional experiments, discussing alternative interpretations). Rich illustrations interspersed with several witty cartoons, over 1000 references and detailed author and subject indexes are clear assets of the book. OLGA BUREgOVA (Prague, Czechoslovakia) REFERENCE Hinde, R.A., 1966. Animal Behaviour. COGNITIVE
PROCESSES
McGraw-Hill,
New York, NY, 334 pp.
IN ANIMAL BEHAVIOR
S.H. Hulse, H. Fowler and W.K. Honig Associates, Publishers,‘Hillsdale, NJ, 1978, ISBN O-470-26484-5.
Cognitive Processes in Animal Behauior. (Editors). Lawrence Erlbaum 390 pp., US $ 26.40/E 12.60,
The front flap of the book jacket describes the book as “a cohesive and well-knit set of arguments” for “a new philosophy and outlook for research in cognitive psychology”. That description could easily be called a blatant misrepresentation. Such an advertisement could perhaps be made for Griffin’s Question of Animal Awareness which tries something new. The same cannot be said for the present book. Should we conclude that the book has no value? Absolutely not! Despite its shortcomings, this collection of papers has much historical and empirical value. First, let us examine the “historical” value of the book. W.H. Honig, the editor and coeditor of the two editions of Operant Behavior and Handbook of Operant Behavior contributes two chapters. The first one, a conceptual introduction, tries to show “a cognitive turn” in animal learning psychology. are used so ambiguously (but, see The terms “cognition” and “cognitive” Moroz, 1972), that we should not in this case consider them as more than a slogan. In fact many of the authors of this book open and close their chapters with justified complaints about the absence of satisfactory theories in animal learning and then speak of the pressing need (a much more debatable affirmation) for a cognitive reorientation (e.g. Fowler, Hearst). One is strongly reminded of the mandatory genuflexion to Marxist or dialectical thinking found in publications written not so long ago by East-European psychologists. Nevertheless, those psychologists successfully did their work which was often devoid of Marxist or dialectical influence. Some of the present authors seem
193 to show the same attitude toward the “cognitive reinterpretation”. They reject the classical behaviorist, associationist and S.R. theories (three terms that are in no way synonymous and which are as ambiguous as “cognitive” is). But what is truly fascinating in this book is much more its historical con tinuity with orthodox animal learning psychology than its supposed new outlook. The chapters offer a fascinating view of the evolution of “American” animal learning psychology. The authors are right in deploring the present state of theoretical thought. First, we can regret the absence of an all-embracing, imperial theory. Today we have an abundance of micro-theories and theoretical anarchy. Second, if we do not perhaps need a “cognitive turn”, we do need a cognitivist opposition, stimulation or counter balance. But does this book give it? Alas no! And it is not surprising when you realize who are its contributors. These are not young revolutionaries trying to make a place for themselves or trying to change the old order. In fact, the contributors list reads like a sampling from a “Who’s Who” in contemporary animal learning psychology. They are men with a past and, at that, an honorable and first rate past. You read their papers and it is good, solid stuff, of the kind which granting agencies and journal reviewers dream about, and surely not the kind that would be rejected as too unorthodox, as happened with Garcia’s first work. With whom do they identify? With Tolman. Who are their enemies? They are Hull, Guthrie, Skinner and the S.R. connectionists. Is that the new “cognitive” look? But what of contemporary human “cognitive” psychology? These papers show little concrete influence from that later current, other than verbal. Wagner refers to the “stores” concept of memory, which is controversial in human memory. Honig speaks of a “working memory”, an ambiguous concept even in human memory research. What is worse, the authors seem unaware that the theoretical anarchy and inadequacy, which they rightly detect in animal learning psychology, exist also in human cognitive psychology (see Newell, 1974; Allport, 1975; Anon., 1978). Strangely, the researchers in human cognition seem now to be facing the same kinds of problems that the animal learning researchers are facing since the dismissal of the classical theories. Rather than seeing that as a bad omen or failure, we should perhaps interpret it as the symptom of the rapid empirical and procedural expansion of psychology. To use G. Kelly’s concepts, our data are now outside the “range of convenience” of our theoretical constructs. And from a “constructive altemativism” view, we can then empathize with the authors’ search for a more adequate system. So much for the “historical” value of the book. Now what can be said of the empirical value of this book? The papers presented are of high quality, which is not surprising, given their authors. The book is useful, and probably a must for the animal learning researcher because it gives a summary of many current research programs in the domain. Here is an overview of the empirical content of the chapters. Hearst presents his research on discrimination learning. Should we say more exactly, but less clear-
194
ly for the uninitiated, “feature selection” and “sign-tracking”? Here, as in several other chapters, are examples of the inadequacy of the old concepts and of the need for a conceptual and theoretical overhaul. Riley and Roitblat discuss their research on selective attention in pigeons. Fowler offers an overview of his personal theoretical evolution on the influence of “pavlovian” processes in instrumental learning. These chapters show clearly the theoretical importance that the phenomenon of “blocking” has assumed. Mackintosh tries to interpret that same phenomenon with a modified “selective attention” theory. Church analyses the capacity of rats to make temporal discrimination and presents a model of an internal clock to explain these discriminations. Hulse tells us where his research on serial patterning is leading him. In his conclusion he tells of a certain empathy with Griffin’s disillusionment over the state of animal psychology. Olton, in a laboratory situation (mazes) with rats and gerbils (the new “rat”!) and Menzel, in a more natural environment with chimpanzee, scrutinize spatial learning and memory (should we, with Menzel, speak of a “cognitive map”?). Bolles carries on with his now classic analysis of defensive behavior in laboratory situations. The three chapters written by Olton, Menzel and Bolles will probably be the more interesting ones for the readers of Behavioural Processes. They try to bind their work to ethological research and theories. However, we should note that the word “ethology” is not even indexed at the end of the book. This is a telling omission when we recall that some cognitivists (see notably Neisser, 1976) are now asking for a cognitive psychology that is ecologically relevant, Rescorla does his own thing, which is to continue to reshape our knowledge of Pavlovian conditioning. As mentioned above, Honig and Wagner try to apply the concept of human memory research to animal learning. With Olton, Menzel and Mackintosh, they are the only ones showing some influence from modern human cognitive psychology. Finally Premack presents an operational exploration of the concept of abstraction, using transfer tests. We should conclude by saying that there is no overall theoretical synthesis or integration between the chapters, even if many contributors do try to make connections between their respective chapters. JEAN (Montrlal,
BELANGER Que’., Canada)
REFERENCES Allport, D.A., 1975. Critical notice: the state of cognitive psychology. Q. J. Exp. Psychol., 27: 141-152. Anonymous, 1978. Special Review Feature: memory research. Br. J. Psychol., 69: 513520. Griffin, D.R., 1976. The Question of Animal Awareness. Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience. Rockefeller University Press, New York, NY, 135 pp. Moroz, M., 1972. The concept of cognition in contemporary psychology. In: J.R. Royce and W.W. Rozeboom (Editors), The Psychology of Knowing. Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, New York, NY, 177-214. Neisser, U., 1976. Cognition and Reality. W.H. Freeman 230 pp.
and Co., San Francisco,
CA,
195 Newell, A., 1974. You can’t play 20 questions with nature and win. In: W.G. Chase (Editor), Visual Information Processing. Academic Press, New York, NY, pp. 283-308. OPTICAL SIGNALS
Optical Signals: Animd
Communication
University Press, Bloomington, ISBN O-253-34254-6.
and Light. Jack P. Hailman. Indiana
IN and London,
1977.
362 pp., f11.25,
In his book Jack Hailman describes the analysis of animal communication as an interdisciplinary endeavor, which involves physics, ethology, cybernetics, semiotics, sensory physiology, psychophysics and a lot of other disciplines in the natural and social sciences. A complete understanding of communicative behavior necessitates study of control, ontogeny, preservation and phylogeny, integrating these determinants in a coherent framework. The primary concern of this book is to predict characteristics of optical signals, related to behavior (why have optical signals the characteristics they do?). The volume is divided into 9 chapters starting with an introduction. The overall strategy is straightforward and charted in such a way that its outline could be followed in scrutinizing chemical, acoustical or other signals having nothing to do with light. In the second chapter (Communication) a synthetic framework of social communication, ethology, mathematical information theory and semiotics is presented. In chapters 3 (The Channel), 4 (The Sender), 5 (The Receiver) the characteristics of the communication channel, the sender and the receiver are scrutinized for factors that constrain the design of optical signals. In chapter 6 (Deception) the communication of misinformation, in the traditional sense of concealment and mimicry is reinvestigated from the viewpoint of optical principles employed in visual deception. In chapter 7 (Noise) the design of optical signals to minimize the effects of environmental noise then places communication in the ethological context. Chapter 8 (Information) considers how the different types of information are transferred and the way in which they are encoded to yield predictions about the characteristics of optical signals. Chapter 9 (Conclusion) concludes the volume with comments on the problems and prospects of studying optical signals. The book is structured clearly. Various aids are used to facilitate referencing back to earlier chapters. Each chapter follows a similar plan. Many relationships are structured in words rather than in equations and symbols. Equations are listed in the contents for reading reference and the symbols themselves appear in the index. Overall this is an excellent book embodying a multidisciplinary approach and is likely to be a useful reference for those interested in animal communication and light. H.-W. BORCHERS (Kassel, Federal Republic
of Germany)
there is no reference to the work by E.R. Kandel on Aplysiu, by G. Hoyle on insects, by J.Z. Young on squid and the chapter on brain function by D.G. Stein is disappointing in its superficiality. The textbook character of the volume is stressed by the list of control questions concluding each chapter - some simply testing the reader’s short-term memory, others inviting the student to more creative activities (planning additional experiments, discussing alternative interpretations). Rich illustrations interspersed with several witty cartoons, over 1000 references and detailed author and subject indexes are clear assets of the book. OLGA BUREgOVA (Prague, Czechoslovakia) REFERENCE Hinde, R.A., 1966. Animal Behaviour. COGNITIVE
PROCESSES
McGraw-Hill,
New York, NY, 334 pp.
IN ANIMAL BEHAVIOR
S.H. Hulse, H. Fowler and W.K. Honig Associates, Publishers,‘Hillsdale, NJ, 1978, ISBN O-470-26484-5.
Cognitive Processes in Animal Behauior. (Editors). Lawrence Erlbaum 390 pp., US $ 26.40/E 12.60,
The front flap of the book jacket describes the book as “a cohesive and well-knit set of arguments” for “a new philosophy and outlook for research in cognitive psychology”. That description could easily be called a blatant misrepresentation. Such an advertisement could perhaps be made for Griffin’s Question of Animal Awareness which tries something new. The same cannot be said for the present book. Should we conclude that the book has no value? Absolutely not! Despite its shortcomings, this collection of papers has much historical and empirical value. First, let us examine the “historical” value of the book. W.H. Honig, the editor and coeditor of the two editions of Operant Behavior and Handbook of Operant Behavior contributes two chapters. The first one, a conceptual introduction, tries to show “a cognitive turn” in animal learning psychology. are used so ambiguously (but, see The terms “cognition” and “cognitive” Moroz, 1972), that we should not in this case consider them as more than a slogan. In fact many of the authors of this book open and close their chapters with justified complaints about the absence of satisfactory theories in animal learning and then speak of the pressing need (a much more debatable affirmation) for a cognitive reorientation (e.g. Fowler, Hearst). One is strongly reminded of the mandatory genuflexion to Marxist or dialectical thinking found in publications written not so long ago by East-European psychologists. Nevertheless, those psychologists successfully did their work which was often devoid of Marxist or dialectical influence. Some of the present authors seem
193 to show the same attitude toward the “cognitive reinterpretation”. They reject the classical behaviorist, associationist and S.R. theories (three terms that are in no way synonymous and which are as ambiguous as “cognitive” is). But what is truly fascinating in this book is much more its historical con tinuity with orthodox animal learning psychology than its supposed new outlook. The chapters offer a fascinating view of the evolution of “American” animal learning psychology. The authors are right in deploring the present state of theoretical thought. First, we can regret the absence of an all-embracing, imperial theory. Today we have an abundance of micro-theories and theoretical anarchy. Second, if we do not perhaps need a “cognitive turn”, we do need a cognitivist opposition, stimulation or counter balance. But does this book give it? Alas no! And it is not surprising when you realize who are its contributors. These are not young revolutionaries trying to make a place for themselves or trying to change the old order. In fact, the contributors list reads like a sampling from a “Who’s Who” in contemporary animal learning psychology. They are men with a past and, at that, an honorable and first rate past. You read their papers and it is good, solid stuff, of the kind which granting agencies and journal reviewers dream about, and surely not the kind that would be rejected as too unorthodox, as happened with Garcia’s first work. With whom do they identify? With Tolman. Who are their enemies? They are Hull, Guthrie, Skinner and the S.R. connectionists. Is that the new “cognitive” look? But what of contemporary human “cognitive” psychology? These papers show little concrete influence from that later current, other than verbal. Wagner refers to the “stores” concept of memory, which is controversial in human memory. Honig speaks of a “working memory”, an ambiguous concept even in human memory research. What is worse, the authors seem unaware that the theoretical anarchy and inadequacy, which they rightly detect in animal learning psychology, exist also in human cognitive psychology (see Newell, 1974; Allport, 1975; Anon., 1978). Strangely, the researchers in human cognition seem now to be facing the same kinds of problems that the animal learning researchers are facing since the dismissal of the classical theories. Rather than seeing that as a bad omen or failure, we should perhaps interpret it as the symptom of the rapid empirical and procedural expansion of psychology. To use G. Kelly’s concepts, our data are now outside the “range of convenience” of our theoretical constructs. And from a “constructive altemativism” view, we can then empathize with the authors’ search for a more adequate system. So much for the “historical” value of the book. Now what can be said of the empirical value of this book? The papers presented are of high quality, which is not surprising, given their authors. The book is useful, and probably a must for the animal learning researcher because it gives a summary of many current research programs in the domain. Here is an overview of the empirical content of the chapters. Hearst presents his research on discrimination learning. Should we say more exactly, but less clear-
194
ly for the uninitiated, “feature selection” and “sign-tracking”? Here, as in several other chapters, are examples of the inadequacy of the old concepts and of the need for a conceptual and theoretical overhaul. Riley and Roitblat discuss their research on selective attention in pigeons. Fowler offers an overview of his personal theoretical evolution on the influence of “pavlovian” processes in instrumental learning. These chapters show clearly the theoretical importance that the phenomenon of “blocking” has assumed. Mackintosh tries to interpret that same phenomenon with a modified “selective attention” theory. Church analyses the capacity of rats to make temporal discrimination and presents a model of an internal clock to explain these discriminations. Hulse tells us where his research on serial patterning is leading him. In his conclusion he tells of a certain empathy with Griffin’s disillusionment over the state of animal psychology. Olton, in a laboratory situation (mazes) with rats and gerbils (the new “rat”!) and Menzel, in a more natural environment with chimpanzee, scrutinize spatial learning and memory (should we, with Menzel, speak of a “cognitive map”?). Bolles carries on with his now classic analysis of defensive behavior in laboratory situations. The three chapters written by Olton, Menzel and Bolles will probably be the more interesting ones for the readers of Behavioural Processes. They try to bind their work to ethological research and theories. However, we should note that the word “ethology” is not even indexed at the end of the book. This is a telling omission when we recall that some cognitivists (see notably Neisser, 1976) are now asking for a cognitive psychology that is ecologically relevant, Rescorla does his own thing, which is to continue to reshape our knowledge of Pavlovian conditioning. As mentioned above, Honig and Wagner try to apply the concept of human memory research to animal learning. With Olton, Menzel and Mackintosh, they are the only ones showing some influence from modern human cognitive psychology. Finally Premack presents an operational exploration of the concept of abstraction, using transfer tests. We should conclude by saying that there is no overall theoretical synthesis or integration between the chapters, even if many contributors do try to make connections between their respective chapters. JEAN (Montrlal,
BELANGER Que’., Canada)
REFERENCES Allport, D.A., 1975. Critical notice: the state of cognitive psychology. Q. J. Exp. Psychol., 27: 141-152. Anonymous, 1978. Special Review Feature: memory research. Br. J. Psychol., 69: 513520. Griffin, D.R., 1976. The Question of Animal Awareness. Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience. Rockefeller University Press, New York, NY, 135 pp. Moroz, M., 1972. The concept of cognition in contemporary psychology. In: J.R. Royce and W.W. Rozeboom (Editors), The Psychology of Knowing. Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, New York, NY, 177-214. Neisser, U., 1976. Cognition and Reality. W.H. Freeman 230 pp.
and Co., San Francisco,
CA,
195 Newell, A., 1974. You can’t play 20 questions with nature and win. In: W.G. Chase (Editor), Visual Information Processing. Academic Press, New York, NY, pp. 283-308. OPTICAL SIGNALS
Optical Signals: Animd
Communication
University Press, Bloomington, ISBN O-253-34254-6.
and Light. Jack P. Hailman. Indiana
IN and London,
1977.
362 pp., f11.25,
In his book Jack Hailman describes the analysis of animal communication as an interdisciplinary endeavor, which involves physics, ethology, cybernetics, semiotics, sensory physiology, psychophysics and a lot of other disciplines in the natural and social sciences. A complete understanding of communicative behavior necessitates study of control, ontogeny, preservation and phylogeny, integrating these determinants in a coherent framework. The primary concern of this book is to predict characteristics of optical signals, related to behavior (why have optical signals the characteristics they do?). The volume is divided into 9 chapters starting with an introduction. The overall strategy is straightforward and charted in such a way that its outline could be followed in scrutinizing chemical, acoustical or other signals having nothing to do with light. In the second chapter (Communication) a synthetic framework of social communication, ethology, mathematical information theory and semiotics is presented. In chapters 3 (The Channel), 4 (The Sender), 5 (The Receiver) the characteristics of the communication channel, the sender and the receiver are scrutinized for factors that constrain the design of optical signals. In chapter 6 (Deception) the communication of misinformation, in the traditional sense of concealment and mimicry is reinvestigated from the viewpoint of optical principles employed in visual deception. In chapter 7 (Noise) the design of optical signals to minimize the effects of environmental noise then places communication in the ethological context. Chapter 8 (Information) considers how the different types of information are transferred and the way in which they are encoded to yield predictions about the characteristics of optical signals. Chapter 9 (Conclusion) concludes the volume with comments on the problems and prospects of studying optical signals. The book is structured clearly. Various aids are used to facilitate referencing back to earlier chapters. Each chapter follows a similar plan. Many relationships are structured in words rather than in equations and symbols. Equations are listed in the contents for reading reference and the symbols themselves appear in the index. Overall this is an excellent book embodying a multidisciplinary approach and is likely to be a useful reference for those interested in animal communication and light. H.-W. BORCHERS (Kassel, Federal Republic
of Germany)