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Cognitive-style differences in belief persistence after evidential discrediting
COGNITIVE-STYLE DIFFERENCES IN BELIEF PERSISTENCE AFTER EVIDENTIAL DISCREDITING MARTIN Department
of Psychology.
F.
DAVIES
Goldsmiths’ College. liniversity London SE14 hNW. England
01‘ London.
New Cross.
Summary-Cognitive-style differences in belief persistence were investigated in a debriefing pdrddigm by comparing the reactions of field-dependent and held-independent persons to the total evidential discrediting of their beliefs. Ss were exposed to apparent success or failure experiences via false performance feedback on a novel discrimination task. Following a debriefing procedure which revealed the bogus nature of the feedback. Ss estimated their actual performance and ability at the task. The results showed that belief persistence after evidential discrediting was greater for field dependents than for field independents. Explanations of the findings based on dissonance-reduction mechanisms and disbelief in the discrediting were discussed. but the preferred interpretation of the results involved differences in cognitive re-structuring as a function of cognitive style.
INTRODUCTION
Research with the field-dependence construct has provided a large body of evidence linking individual differences in cognitive style with individual differences in self-functioning across a and social-interpersonal variety of domains including perception. memory, personality behaviour-see Witkin and Goodenough (1981) for a review. According to Witkin and Goodenough (198 l), field dependence-independence (also referred to as cognitive style) is a component of general psychological differentiation, specifically that part associated with degree of self-nonself segregation. Whereas field independents rely on internal frames of reference in cognitive functioning, field dependents rely more on external referents. Although conceptualized as a cognitive style, the field-dependence construct is most clearly embodied in cognitive abilities. particularly cognitive re-structuring abilities. Field dependence is typically measured by one of two tests of perceptual disembedding. either the Embedded-figures Test (EFT). which requires Ss to pick out a simple figure hidden in an organized stimulus field. or the Rod-and-frame Test (RFT). which requires that the distracting effects of a background frame be overcome in order to align a rod with true vertical. In addition to studies of perceptual re-structuring, field independence has been found to be related to more cognitive skills such as adaptive flexibility and analytical tests of intelligence (Witkin. Dyk. Faterson. Goodenough and Karp, 1962). Recently, Goodenough (1976) and Davis and Frank (1979) provided reviews of the evidence linking field dependence with learning and memory. The cognitive re-structuring ability of field independents is exhibited most clearly in those tasks that require the breaking up of an organized stimulus complex into individual elements, and/or the re-arrangement of elements to provide a new structure. Thus, field independents perform better than field dependents in concept learning tasks involving the combination of different stimulus dimensions. Related to this. Witkin (1964) cites a number of studies showing the superiority of field independents on Einstellung problems where correct solution requires breaking the set (embedding context) provided by the initial problems. Research on inferential processes and strategies in intuitive judgements (Nisbett and Ross. 1980) represents an area of cognitive functioning that has not yet been studied with reference to individual differences in cognitive style. Of particular relevance to cognitive style is the phenomenon of belief persistence. Four centuries ago. Francis Bacon (1621 ‘1855) noted that humans have a tendency to persist in their beliefs despite the presence of strong contradictory evidence. Similarly, the tendency of scientists to adhere to theories in the face of compelling contrary evidence has been
well-documented (Kuhn. 1962). Often. however. there are no clear rules for suggesting to the layperson or the scientist how much a belief. impression or theory should be rc\,issd in the light of new evidence. Except perhaps in the case where ‘new’ evidence consists of the total in\alidatinn of the original evidence for the belief. As long as there are no grounds for doubting the in\,alldation. the normatively appropriate strategy is to revise one’s belief to a neutral or baseline position. Ross and colleagues-for a review see Ross and Lepper (1980)-have investigated the estent to \\ hich people’s beliefs or theories persist after evidential discrediting. and the results show that beliefs are often remarkably resistant to logical or empirical attack. In the debriefing paradigm ( Ross. Lepper and Hubbard. 1975), Ss were presented with a novel task requiring them to discriminate bet\vsen pairs of genuine and fictitious suicide notes. Bogus performance feedback was supplied on II trial-by-trial basis such that Ss were led to believe they had done much better or much ivorse than average. After performing the discrimination task (which provided the evidential basis for a belief in ability at the task), Ss were given a debriefing that revealed the bogus nature of the feedback and its arbitrary relation to Ss’ real performance. Despite this total invalidation of their ostensible ability and performance at the task, Ss given the bogus success feedback still believed they had done much better than average and Ss given the bogus failure feedback continued to believe the> had done much worse than average. The basis of this belief persistence is that the evidence giving rise to the belief is embellished and bolstered via a number of cognitive mechanisms. For example, unexpectedly good performance on the suicide-note task might evoke recollection of successful performance on other tasks. Conversely. poor performance might lead the performer to recall those previous occasions and instances which suggested a self-assessment of C - in social sensitivity. empathy or insight. The initial belief or impression will tend to produce biased search and recollection of collateral evidence which not only buttresses the belief but can sustain it even when the original evidential base is removed. The framework of supporting cognitions may remain relatively intact after the debriefing, discrediting and thus continue to generate erroneous inferences and predictions about good or bad performance. The relevance of this to the cognitive re-structuring aspect of cognitive style is that field independents should be more likely than field dependents to overcome the influence of the background field (the supporting cognitions) in revising their estimates of task ability and performance. Upon receipt of the discrediting information, beliefs about one’s task ability need to be considered separate from the previously-generated cognitions in the light of the new evidence that the performance feedback was invalid. Field independents do better than field dependents at this sort of symbolic disembedding task (just as they do better at more perceptual disembedding tasks) and they should therefore show less belief persistence. METHOD
The Group Embedded-figures Test (GEFT; Witkin. Oltman. Raskin and Karp. 1971) and the AH2 Group Test of General Reasoning (Heim. Watts and Simmonds, 1975) were administered to were selected as the college students in mass-testing sessions. From this sample. 24 students field-independent group from those scoring in the top third of the distribution of GEFT scores l> 16) and 24 selected as the field-dependent group from those scoring in the bottom third of the distribution of GEFT scores (< IO), such that the two groups were matched on reasoning ability (field independents = 73.4; field dependents = 72.5). The field-independent group comprised 10 males and 14 females. The field-dependent group comprised 9 males and 15 females. (Sex of .S did not affect the pattern of results and is not mentioned further.)
Subjects were run individually on the belief persistence task. They were randomly assigned to conditions such that equal numbers in the field dependent/independent groups were given bogus success/failure feedback. Td. The experimenter explained that the experiment. was a study of physiological reactions during decision making which required the S to discriminate between pairs of genuine and
Bcl~el’ pcrslstcncc
343
simulated suicide notes. Feedback would be given on each trial so as to provide controlled conditions for assessing performance, and physiological reactions would be measured during the experiment. Electrodes were then attached to the S’s non-dominant hand and the workings of the galvanic skin response (GSR) equipment were briefly explained so as to allay any fears. It was explained that the genuine suicide notes had been obtained some years earlier in a large-scale U.S. study of suicide (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957). The simulated notes had been obtained in the same study by getting a sample of people (matched with actual suicide-victims on characteristics such as age. sex, religion and occupational status) to write a note as if they were going to commit suicide. Ss would be given 15 cards on each of which was a pair of typewritten notes. one genuine and one simulated. and the task was to decide which was the genuine one. The experimenter would give immediate feedback and Ss would note down whether their decision was right or wrong. In order to establish a baseline of performance, Ss were informed that students typically obtained 8 correct out of 15 with these particular notes. Outcome manipulation. Ss were given performance feedback according to a predetermined Ss were ‘correct’ 13 times out of 15; in the schedule. In the apparent-Success condition, apparent-Failure condition. Ss were ‘correct’ only 3 times out of 15. (Subsequent analysis of true performances did not indicate any significant differences across conditions.) At the conclusion of the 15 trials, the experimenter checked the GSR equipment briefly and then administered a short questionnaire asking Ss to rate on 1I-point scales how satisfied they were with their performance and how difficult they had found the task. These questions served as checks on the effectiveness of the success/faiiure manipulation and on the equivalence of field dependents’ and field independents’ reactions to their performance. Feedback discrediting. Ss were then informed of the bogus nature of the performance feedback. It was explained that the experiment was concerned with the effects of success and failure on physiological reactions, and that in order to produce differential perceptions of success and failure it had been necessary to give false feedback. It was emphasized that the feedback had been determined before the S had arrived such that those in the Success condition would be told they were right 13 times out of 15 while those in the Failure condition would be told they were right only 3 times out of 15 regardless of what the S’s actual responses were. The experimenter reinforced this point by showing Ss the predetermined feedback schedule. Following this debriefing/discrediting, Ss were given a second questionnaire containing the main dependent measures. On the pretext that the experimenter was interested in the relation between physiological reactions and Ss’ actual performance and perceptions, Ss estimated (a) how many of their responses had actually been correct, (b) how many the average student would get correct and (c) their ability at the task. In addition, Ss rated their feelings of confusion and discomfort in order to collect data on differential reactions of field dependents and field independents to the discrediting manipulation. Finally. Ss were thoroughly (and properly) debriefed. The experimenter mentioned that there was something more to the experiment and asked Ss what they thought it was. No S expressed doubt concerning the authenticity of the feedback discrediting.
RESULTS Manipulation
cAecks
A check on the effectiveness of the outcome manipulation revealed that Ss in the Success condition rated themselves significantly more satisfied with their performance (1 = 6.79) than Ss in the Failure condition (x’ = 3.33; F = 48.48. ?f= 1.44, P < 0.001). In addition, the task was judged more difficult after failure feedback (2 = 8.42) than after success feedback (J? = 6.63: F = 8.99. #= 1.44. P < 0.01). There were no significant main effects or interactions of the cognitive-style factor on these pre-debriefing ratings.
Table 1 she\+-s Ss’ post-discrediting beliefs in their own actual and their estimates of the av’erage student’s performance.
performance.
their task ability.
\l.\KTI\
F. Da\~ts
There was a significant main effect ofinitial feedback for both estimated own actual performance (F = 27.62. L!/‘= 1.44. P < 0.001) and rated ability (F = 17.60. t(f’= 1.34. P < 0.001) indicating that Ss’ initial beliefs in their performance persisted after feedback discrediting. Thus. estimates ofactual performance were higher for Ss in the Success condition (X = 9.54) than for Ss in the Failure condition (x = 6.00); similarly. Ss in the Success condition rated their ability higher (X = 6.33) than did Ss in the Failure condition (w = 3.88). Estimates of the performance of the average student given by Success condition Ss (_? = 8.08) were not however significantly higher (F = 2.64) than estimates given by Ss in the Failure condition (a = 7.33) indicating that the attempt to establish baseline beliefs about average performance (by supplying such information beforehand) had been successful. There was a significant interaction between feedback condition and cognitive style for belief in own actual performance (F = 7.07, CJ!~= 1,44, P < 0.02) and for rated task ability (F = 3.69. d! = 1,44, P < 0.07) but not for estimates of the average student’s performance (F = 0.52). As can be seen from Table 1, for estimated own actual performance. the difference between the Success and Failure conditions is smaller for field independents (d = 1.75) than for field dependents (d = 5.33); and similarly. for rated ability, the difference between the Success and Failure conditions is smaller for field independents (ri = 1.34) than for field dependents (n = 3.58). An index of belief persistence obtained by subtracting the estimate of the average student’s performance from the estimate of own actual performance confirms the above findings. Overall. there was a significant main effect of initial feedback on this index (F = 37.84. Q‘= 1.44. P < 0.001) such that Ss in the Success condition continued to believe they had done better than average (f 1.46). whereas Ss in the Failure condition continued to believe they had done worse than average ( - 1.33). The significant interaction between feedback condition and cognitive style on the belief persistence index (F = 10.33. I//' = I,44. P < 0.01)showed that belief persistence was lower for field independents ( +0.58) than for field dependents ( + 2.33) in the Success condition (f = 3.86. tll’= 44, P < 0.001), and similarly for field independents ( -0.75) compared with field dependents ( - 1.91) in the Failure condition (t = 2.57. rlf’= 44, P < 0.02). Finally. analysis of Ss’ feelings of confusion and discomfort after the discrediting manipulation did not reveal any significant differences as a function of feedback condition and/or cognitive style.
DISCUSSION
Apart from replicating the finding of Ross CI (I/. (1975). the results of the present study show that belief persistence is modifiable by cognitive style. In the debriefing paradigm. field dependents persisted in erroneous beliefs about themselves following evidential discrediting more than field independents. The preferred explanation for this is in line with current thinking on belief persistence phenomena (Ross and Lepper. I%()). Exposure to the original or initial event gives rise to a number of cognitive processes including a search for confirmatory. collateral evidence (such as evidence for one’s soci&interpersonal sensitivity or insensitivity) and constructing plausible explanations for the event. such that the event-information is bolstered by a set of supporting cognitions. Upon learning that the original evidence is completely worthless. this supporting framework nevertheless may remain intact and may come to be rclicd on in making any judgements or predictions related to the original event. The tendency of field dependents’ judgements and perceptions of a stimulus cvcnt to bc dominated by the surrounding ‘licld’ means that field dependents will rely on the
supporting cognitions more than field independents who are able to consider their judgements and perceptions independent of the embedding context. Despite the plausibility of this cognitive explanation, there was little direct evidence in the present study for such mechanisms. For example. it is not clear whether field independents were more aware than field dependents after the discrediting that their thoughts and cognitions had been biased by exposure to the bogus feedback and thus attempted to iprow their previous thoughts when making their estimates of likely performance and ability; or whether they were more likely to engage in a re-eduation of their previous thoughts by. for example, considering evidence and explanations about how they could have succeeded 01’ failed at the task. A more motivational explanation for the role of cognitive style in belief persistence could be advanced from a consideration of cognitive-style differences in psychological defence mechanisms, as follows. The discrediting manipulation reveals to Ss that the effort and energy they expended in the suicide-note discrimination task was to some extent wasted. This dissonant (Festinger, 1957) state of affairs could be resolved by repressing or ignoring the discrediting information. Field dependents might then show greater belief persistence because they are more susceptible to dissonance-arousal or because they are more prone to adopt repression/denial as a means of reducing dissonance. Support for this latter idea comes from the literature on cognitive style (Witkin and Goddenough, 1981) showing that field dependents tend to use psychological defences such as repression and primitive denial because they are less able to keep feelings separate from cognitions (ideation), whilst field independents maintain the discreteness of feelings and ideas. and through specialized defences such as intellectualization or isolation, are able to exclude affective influences. However. a number of factors militate against this motivational type of explanation. Firstly, it is not certain that the debriefing paradigm used in the present study arouses strong feelings about oneself and one’s behaviour such as might be involved in cognitive dissonance. For example, the experimental procedure did not directly engage important personal values or result in strong threats to self-esteem (cf. Aronson, 1969; Steele and Liu, 1983). Neither is it the case that Ss’ behaviour had important consequences for others (cf. Collins and Hoyt, 1972). Secondly, under a motivational explanation. it would be expected that the degree of belief persistence would have been affected by the outcome manipulation since any feelings of dissonance occasioned by the receipt of the discrediting information would be modified by feelings of satisfaction (dissatisfaction) induced by success (failure). Yet the results did not indicate differences in belief persistence between the success and failure conditions. Moreover, the post-discrediting ratings of discomfort (dissonance?) did not show significant differences either as a function of feedback condition or cognitive style. The possibility that Ss did not believe the veracity of the discrediting information presents itself as an explanation of the results in terms of experimental artifact. However, two points argue against it. Firstly. the post-experimental debriefing did not reveal any indications that Ss disbelieved the discrediting. It is possible that Ss may have concealed their real feelings and beliefs or that the debriefing was not sensitive enough to detect Ss’ suspicions. However. recall that Ss were shown the experimenter’s predetermined feedback schedule and that they were given a plausible justification for the false-feedback manipulation. Secondly. in order to account for the difference between field dependents and field independents in degree of belief persistence. it would have to be supposed that field dependents were more likely to disbelieve the discrediting information. Apart from there being no evidence from the post-experimental debriefing that this was so. there appears to be no evidence for this supposition in the literature on field dependence. Although research on cognitive styles has been in progress for 40 years (cf. Thurstone. 1944). individual differences in the cognitive processes and strategies involved in intuitive judgement have not been extensively investigated. in part because this is a domain of relatively recent interest (Tversky and Kahneman. 1974). Given that many of our everyday judgements are based on heuristic and intuitive cognitive processes. there should be a wide scope for examining the role of cognitive styles. Within the realm of belief persistence phenomena, the Ross et al. (1975) debriefing paradigm is only one particular instance. Therefore. the role of cognitive style needs to be investigated further with respect to other manifestations of belief persistence as well as with reference to phenomena unrelated to belief persistence. For example. the debriefing paradigm is concerned with persistence of beliefs about the self: would the present findings apply to
346
&‘hRTIS
F D.\\~cs
cognitive-style differences in the persistence of beliefs about other people or theories about the nature of social events (Anderson, Lepper and Ross, 1980: Ross. Lepper. Strack and Steinmetz. 1977)? Would cognitive style be an important factor in phenomena such as hindsight (Fischhoff. 1975) or eyewitness memory following leading questions (Loftus. 1975)‘? REFERENCES Anderson C. A.. Lepper M. R. and Ross L. (1980) Perseverance of social theortes: the role of explanatton in the perststencr of discredited information. J. Person. sot. Psvchol. 39. 1037-1049. Aronson E. (1969) The theory of cognitive dissonance: a current perspective. .4dr. e\-p. .soc. Pr~~clroi. 4. I-34. Bacon F. (1855),Yowm Organurn. Oxford Univ. Press (originally published 1621). Collins B. E. and Hoyt M. F. (1972) Personal responsibility and dissonance: an integratton and extension of the “forced compliance” literature. J. e.yp. sot. Psychol. 8, 558-593. Davis J. K. and Frank B. M. (1979) Learning and memory of field independent-dependent indivtduals. J. Res. Prrsorz. 13, 469-479. Festinger L. (1957) A T’lteory of Cognitice Dissonance. Stanford Univ. Press. Stanford. Calif. Fischhoff B. (1975) Hindsight # foresight: the effect of outcome knowledge on judgement under uncertainty. J. c’_vp. Psvchol.: Hum. Percept. Perform. 1, 288-299. Goodenough D. R. (1976) The role of individual differences in field dependence as a factor m learmng and memory. Ps~~chol. Bull. 83. 675-694. Heim A. W.. Watts K. P. and Simmonds V. (1975) AHZGroup Test q/ General Reasoning. NFER-Nelson. Windsor. Berks. Kuhn T. S. (1962) The Structure of‘Scientifc Recolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. Chicago, III. Loftus E. F. (1975) Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cog. PsychoI. 7, 560-572. Nisbett R. E. and Ross L. (1980) Human Irtference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Prenttce-Hall. Engelwood Cliffs, N.J. Ross L. and Lepper M. R. (1980) The perseverance of beliefs: emptrrcal and normative consrderattons. In :Vrn, Dwecrwns for Methodology ofBehavioral Science: Fallible Judgment in Beharioral Research (Edited by Shweder R. A. and Fiske D.). Jossey-Bass. San Francisco. Calif. Ross L., Lepper M. R. and Hubbard M. (1975) Perseverance m self-perception and social perception: biased attribution processes in the debriefing paradigm. J. Person. sot. P.yvchol. 32, 88G892. Ross L.. Lepper M. R., Strack F. and Steinmetz J. (1977) Social explanation and social expectation: effects of real and hypothetical explanations on subjective likelihood. J. Person. sot. Psvchol. 35, 8 17-829. Shneidman E. S. and Farberow N. L. (1957) Clues to Suicide. McGrawlHill, New York. Steele C. M. and Liu T. J. (1983) Dissonance processes as self-affirmation. J. Person. sot. P.wchol. 45. 5-19 Thurstone L. L. (1944) A Factorial Stud?, of Pkception. Untv. of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill: Tversky A. and Kahneman D. (1974) Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science 185. 1124-l 131. Witkin H. A. (1964) Origins of cognitrve style. in Cognrtion: Theory. Research. Promise (Edited by Sheerer C.). Harper & Row. New York. Witkin H. A. and Goodenough D. R. (1981) Cognitiw Styles: Essence and Origins. Int. Univ Press. New York. Witkin H. A.. Dyk R. B.. Faterson H. F.. Goodenough D. R. and Karp S. A. (1962) f.~~cholo,~~crl fI!/frrentiarion. Wiley, New York. Witkin H. A.. Oltman P. K.. Raskin I. and Karp S. A. (1971) A Manual for the Etnhedtletl-~,?ure.s Test. Consulting Psychologrsts Press. Palo Alto. Calif.
of Psychology.
F.
DAVIES
Goldsmiths’ College. liniversity London SE14 hNW. England
01‘ London.
New Cross.
Summary-Cognitive-style differences in belief persistence were investigated in a debriefing pdrddigm by comparing the reactions of field-dependent and held-independent persons to the total evidential discrediting of their beliefs. Ss were exposed to apparent success or failure experiences via false performance feedback on a novel discrimination task. Following a debriefing procedure which revealed the bogus nature of the feedback. Ss estimated their actual performance and ability at the task. The results showed that belief persistence after evidential discrediting was greater for field dependents than for field independents. Explanations of the findings based on dissonance-reduction mechanisms and disbelief in the discrediting were discussed. but the preferred interpretation of the results involved differences in cognitive re-structuring as a function of cognitive style.
INTRODUCTION
Research with the field-dependence construct has provided a large body of evidence linking individual differences in cognitive style with individual differences in self-functioning across a and social-interpersonal variety of domains including perception. memory, personality behaviour-see Witkin and Goodenough (1981) for a review. According to Witkin and Goodenough (198 l), field dependence-independence (also referred to as cognitive style) is a component of general psychological differentiation, specifically that part associated with degree of self-nonself segregation. Whereas field independents rely on internal frames of reference in cognitive functioning, field dependents rely more on external referents. Although conceptualized as a cognitive style, the field-dependence construct is most clearly embodied in cognitive abilities. particularly cognitive re-structuring abilities. Field dependence is typically measured by one of two tests of perceptual disembedding. either the Embedded-figures Test (EFT). which requires Ss to pick out a simple figure hidden in an organized stimulus field. or the Rod-and-frame Test (RFT). which requires that the distracting effects of a background frame be overcome in order to align a rod with true vertical. In addition to studies of perceptual re-structuring, field independence has been found to be related to more cognitive skills such as adaptive flexibility and analytical tests of intelligence (Witkin. Dyk. Faterson. Goodenough and Karp, 1962). Recently, Goodenough (1976) and Davis and Frank (1979) provided reviews of the evidence linking field dependence with learning and memory. The cognitive re-structuring ability of field independents is exhibited most clearly in those tasks that require the breaking up of an organized stimulus complex into individual elements, and/or the re-arrangement of elements to provide a new structure. Thus, field independents perform better than field dependents in concept learning tasks involving the combination of different stimulus dimensions. Related to this. Witkin (1964) cites a number of studies showing the superiority of field independents on Einstellung problems where correct solution requires breaking the set (embedding context) provided by the initial problems. Research on inferential processes and strategies in intuitive judgements (Nisbett and Ross. 1980) represents an area of cognitive functioning that has not yet been studied with reference to individual differences in cognitive style. Of particular relevance to cognitive style is the phenomenon of belief persistence. Four centuries ago. Francis Bacon (1621 ‘1855) noted that humans have a tendency to persist in their beliefs despite the presence of strong contradictory evidence. Similarly, the tendency of scientists to adhere to theories in the face of compelling contrary evidence has been
well-documented (Kuhn. 1962). Often. however. there are no clear rules for suggesting to the layperson or the scientist how much a belief. impression or theory should be rc\,issd in the light of new evidence. Except perhaps in the case where ‘new’ evidence consists of the total in\alidatinn of the original evidence for the belief. As long as there are no grounds for doubting the in\,alldation. the normatively appropriate strategy is to revise one’s belief to a neutral or baseline position. Ross and colleagues-for a review see Ross and Lepper (1980)-have investigated the estent to \\ hich people’s beliefs or theories persist after evidential discrediting. and the results show that beliefs are often remarkably resistant to logical or empirical attack. In the debriefing paradigm ( Ross. Lepper and Hubbard. 1975), Ss were presented with a novel task requiring them to discriminate bet\vsen pairs of genuine and fictitious suicide notes. Bogus performance feedback was supplied on II trial-by-trial basis such that Ss were led to believe they had done much better or much ivorse than average. After performing the discrimination task (which provided the evidential basis for a belief in ability at the task), Ss were given a debriefing that revealed the bogus nature of the feedback and its arbitrary relation to Ss’ real performance. Despite this total invalidation of their ostensible ability and performance at the task, Ss given the bogus success feedback still believed they had done much better than average and Ss given the bogus failure feedback continued to believe the> had done much worse than average. The basis of this belief persistence is that the evidence giving rise to the belief is embellished and bolstered via a number of cognitive mechanisms. For example, unexpectedly good performance on the suicide-note task might evoke recollection of successful performance on other tasks. Conversely. poor performance might lead the performer to recall those previous occasions and instances which suggested a self-assessment of C - in social sensitivity. empathy or insight. The initial belief or impression will tend to produce biased search and recollection of collateral evidence which not only buttresses the belief but can sustain it even when the original evidential base is removed. The framework of supporting cognitions may remain relatively intact after the debriefing, discrediting and thus continue to generate erroneous inferences and predictions about good or bad performance. The relevance of this to the cognitive re-structuring aspect of cognitive style is that field independents should be more likely than field dependents to overcome the influence of the background field (the supporting cognitions) in revising their estimates of task ability and performance. Upon receipt of the discrediting information, beliefs about one’s task ability need to be considered separate from the previously-generated cognitions in the light of the new evidence that the performance feedback was invalid. Field independents do better than field dependents at this sort of symbolic disembedding task (just as they do better at more perceptual disembedding tasks) and they should therefore show less belief persistence. METHOD
The Group Embedded-figures Test (GEFT; Witkin. Oltman. Raskin and Karp. 1971) and the AH2 Group Test of General Reasoning (Heim. Watts and Simmonds, 1975) were administered to were selected as the college students in mass-testing sessions. From this sample. 24 students field-independent group from those scoring in the top third of the distribution of GEFT scores l> 16) and 24 selected as the field-dependent group from those scoring in the bottom third of the distribution of GEFT scores (< IO), such that the two groups were matched on reasoning ability (field independents = 73.4; field dependents = 72.5). The field-independent group comprised 10 males and 14 females. The field-dependent group comprised 9 males and 15 females. (Sex of .S did not affect the pattern of results and is not mentioned further.)
Subjects were run individually on the belief persistence task. They were randomly assigned to conditions such that equal numbers in the field dependent/independent groups were given bogus success/failure feedback. Td. The experimenter explained that the experiment. was a study of physiological reactions during decision making which required the S to discriminate between pairs of genuine and
Bcl~el’ pcrslstcncc
343
simulated suicide notes. Feedback would be given on each trial so as to provide controlled conditions for assessing performance, and physiological reactions would be measured during the experiment. Electrodes were then attached to the S’s non-dominant hand and the workings of the galvanic skin response (GSR) equipment were briefly explained so as to allay any fears. It was explained that the genuine suicide notes had been obtained some years earlier in a large-scale U.S. study of suicide (Shneidman and Farberow, 1957). The simulated notes had been obtained in the same study by getting a sample of people (matched with actual suicide-victims on characteristics such as age. sex, religion and occupational status) to write a note as if they were going to commit suicide. Ss would be given 15 cards on each of which was a pair of typewritten notes. one genuine and one simulated. and the task was to decide which was the genuine one. The experimenter would give immediate feedback and Ss would note down whether their decision was right or wrong. In order to establish a baseline of performance, Ss were informed that students typically obtained 8 correct out of 15 with these particular notes. Outcome manipulation. Ss were given performance feedback according to a predetermined Ss were ‘correct’ 13 times out of 15; in the schedule. In the apparent-Success condition, apparent-Failure condition. Ss were ‘correct’ only 3 times out of 15. (Subsequent analysis of true performances did not indicate any significant differences across conditions.) At the conclusion of the 15 trials, the experimenter checked the GSR equipment briefly and then administered a short questionnaire asking Ss to rate on 1I-point scales how satisfied they were with their performance and how difficult they had found the task. These questions served as checks on the effectiveness of the success/faiiure manipulation and on the equivalence of field dependents’ and field independents’ reactions to their performance. Feedback discrediting. Ss were then informed of the bogus nature of the performance feedback. It was explained that the experiment was concerned with the effects of success and failure on physiological reactions, and that in order to produce differential perceptions of success and failure it had been necessary to give false feedback. It was emphasized that the feedback had been determined before the S had arrived such that those in the Success condition would be told they were right 13 times out of 15 while those in the Failure condition would be told they were right only 3 times out of 15 regardless of what the S’s actual responses were. The experimenter reinforced this point by showing Ss the predetermined feedback schedule. Following this debriefing/discrediting, Ss were given a second questionnaire containing the main dependent measures. On the pretext that the experimenter was interested in the relation between physiological reactions and Ss’ actual performance and perceptions, Ss estimated (a) how many of their responses had actually been correct, (b) how many the average student would get correct and (c) their ability at the task. In addition, Ss rated their feelings of confusion and discomfort in order to collect data on differential reactions of field dependents and field independents to the discrediting manipulation. Finally. Ss were thoroughly (and properly) debriefed. The experimenter mentioned that there was something more to the experiment and asked Ss what they thought it was. No S expressed doubt concerning the authenticity of the feedback discrediting.
RESULTS Manipulation
cAecks
A check on the effectiveness of the outcome manipulation revealed that Ss in the Success condition rated themselves significantly more satisfied with their performance (1 = 6.79) than Ss in the Failure condition (x’ = 3.33; F = 48.48. ?f= 1.44, P < 0.001). In addition, the task was judged more difficult after failure feedback (2 = 8.42) than after success feedback (J? = 6.63: F = 8.99. #= 1.44. P < 0.01). There were no significant main effects or interactions of the cognitive-style factor on these pre-debriefing ratings.
Table 1 she\+-s Ss’ post-discrediting beliefs in their own actual and their estimates of the av’erage student’s performance.
performance.
their task ability.
\l.\KTI\
F. Da\~ts
There was a significant main effect ofinitial feedback for both estimated own actual performance (F = 27.62. L!/‘= 1.44. P < 0.001) and rated ability (F = 17.60. t(f’= 1.34. P < 0.001) indicating that Ss’ initial beliefs in their performance persisted after feedback discrediting. Thus. estimates ofactual performance were higher for Ss in the Success condition (X = 9.54) than for Ss in the Failure condition (x = 6.00); similarly. Ss in the Success condition rated their ability higher (X = 6.33) than did Ss in the Failure condition (w = 3.88). Estimates of the performance of the average student given by Success condition Ss (_? = 8.08) were not however significantly higher (F = 2.64) than estimates given by Ss in the Failure condition (a = 7.33) indicating that the attempt to establish baseline beliefs about average performance (by supplying such information beforehand) had been successful. There was a significant interaction between feedback condition and cognitive style for belief in own actual performance (F = 7.07, CJ!~= 1,44, P < 0.02) and for rated task ability (F = 3.69. d! = 1,44, P < 0.07) but not for estimates of the average student’s performance (F = 0.52). As can be seen from Table 1, for estimated own actual performance. the difference between the Success and Failure conditions is smaller for field independents (d = 1.75) than for field dependents (d = 5.33); and similarly. for rated ability, the difference between the Success and Failure conditions is smaller for field independents (ri = 1.34) than for field dependents (n = 3.58). An index of belief persistence obtained by subtracting the estimate of the average student’s performance from the estimate of own actual performance confirms the above findings. Overall. there was a significant main effect of initial feedback on this index (F = 37.84. Q‘= 1.44. P < 0.001) such that Ss in the Success condition continued to believe they had done better than average (f 1.46). whereas Ss in the Failure condition continued to believe they had done worse than average ( - 1.33). The significant interaction between feedback condition and cognitive style on the belief persistence index (F = 10.33. I//' = I,44. P < 0.01)showed that belief persistence was lower for field independents ( +0.58) than for field dependents ( + 2.33) in the Success condition (f = 3.86. tll’= 44, P < 0.001), and similarly for field independents ( -0.75) compared with field dependents ( - 1.91) in the Failure condition (t = 2.57. rlf’= 44, P < 0.02). Finally. analysis of Ss’ feelings of confusion and discomfort after the discrediting manipulation did not reveal any significant differences as a function of feedback condition and/or cognitive style.
DISCUSSION
Apart from replicating the finding of Ross CI (I/. (1975). the results of the present study show that belief persistence is modifiable by cognitive style. In the debriefing paradigm. field dependents persisted in erroneous beliefs about themselves following evidential discrediting more than field independents. The preferred explanation for this is in line with current thinking on belief persistence phenomena (Ross and Lepper. I%()). Exposure to the original or initial event gives rise to a number of cognitive processes including a search for confirmatory. collateral evidence (such as evidence for one’s soci&interpersonal sensitivity or insensitivity) and constructing plausible explanations for the event. such that the event-information is bolstered by a set of supporting cognitions. Upon learning that the original evidence is completely worthless. this supporting framework nevertheless may remain intact and may come to be rclicd on in making any judgements or predictions related to the original event. The tendency of field dependents’ judgements and perceptions of a stimulus cvcnt to bc dominated by the surrounding ‘licld’ means that field dependents will rely on the
supporting cognitions more than field independents who are able to consider their judgements and perceptions independent of the embedding context. Despite the plausibility of this cognitive explanation, there was little direct evidence in the present study for such mechanisms. For example. it is not clear whether field independents were more aware than field dependents after the discrediting that their thoughts and cognitions had been biased by exposure to the bogus feedback and thus attempted to iprow their previous thoughts when making their estimates of likely performance and ability; or whether they were more likely to engage in a re-eduation of their previous thoughts by. for example, considering evidence and explanations about how they could have succeeded 01’ failed at the task. A more motivational explanation for the role of cognitive style in belief persistence could be advanced from a consideration of cognitive-style differences in psychological defence mechanisms, as follows. The discrediting manipulation reveals to Ss that the effort and energy they expended in the suicide-note discrimination task was to some extent wasted. This dissonant (Festinger, 1957) state of affairs could be resolved by repressing or ignoring the discrediting information. Field dependents might then show greater belief persistence because they are more susceptible to dissonance-arousal or because they are more prone to adopt repression/denial as a means of reducing dissonance. Support for this latter idea comes from the literature on cognitive style (Witkin and Goddenough, 1981) showing that field dependents tend to use psychological defences such as repression and primitive denial because they are less able to keep feelings separate from cognitions (ideation), whilst field independents maintain the discreteness of feelings and ideas. and through specialized defences such as intellectualization or isolation, are able to exclude affective influences. However. a number of factors militate against this motivational type of explanation. Firstly, it is not certain that the debriefing paradigm used in the present study arouses strong feelings about oneself and one’s behaviour such as might be involved in cognitive dissonance. For example, the experimental procedure did not directly engage important personal values or result in strong threats to self-esteem (cf. Aronson, 1969; Steele and Liu, 1983). Neither is it the case that Ss’ behaviour had important consequences for others (cf. Collins and Hoyt, 1972). Secondly, under a motivational explanation. it would be expected that the degree of belief persistence would have been affected by the outcome manipulation since any feelings of dissonance occasioned by the receipt of the discrediting information would be modified by feelings of satisfaction (dissatisfaction) induced by success (failure). Yet the results did not indicate differences in belief persistence between the success and failure conditions. Moreover, the post-discrediting ratings of discomfort (dissonance?) did not show significant differences either as a function of feedback condition or cognitive style. The possibility that Ss did not believe the veracity of the discrediting information presents itself as an explanation of the results in terms of experimental artifact. However, two points argue against it. Firstly. the post-experimental debriefing did not reveal any indications that Ss disbelieved the discrediting. It is possible that Ss may have concealed their real feelings and beliefs or that the debriefing was not sensitive enough to detect Ss’ suspicions. However. recall that Ss were shown the experimenter’s predetermined feedback schedule and that they were given a plausible justification for the false-feedback manipulation. Secondly. in order to account for the difference between field dependents and field independents in degree of belief persistence. it would have to be supposed that field dependents were more likely to disbelieve the discrediting information. Apart from there being no evidence from the post-experimental debriefing that this was so. there appears to be no evidence for this supposition in the literature on field dependence. Although research on cognitive styles has been in progress for 40 years (cf. Thurstone. 1944). individual differences in the cognitive processes and strategies involved in intuitive judgement have not been extensively investigated. in part because this is a domain of relatively recent interest (Tversky and Kahneman. 1974). Given that many of our everyday judgements are based on heuristic and intuitive cognitive processes. there should be a wide scope for examining the role of cognitive styles. Within the realm of belief persistence phenomena, the Ross et al. (1975) debriefing paradigm is only one particular instance. Therefore. the role of cognitive style needs to be investigated further with respect to other manifestations of belief persistence as well as with reference to phenomena unrelated to belief persistence. For example. the debriefing paradigm is concerned with persistence of beliefs about the self: would the present findings apply to
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F D.\\~cs
cognitive-style differences in the persistence of beliefs about other people or theories about the nature of social events (Anderson, Lepper and Ross, 1980: Ross. Lepper. Strack and Steinmetz. 1977)? Would cognitive style be an important factor in phenomena such as hindsight (Fischhoff. 1975) or eyewitness memory following leading questions (Loftus. 1975)‘? REFERENCES Anderson C. A.. Lepper M. R. and Ross L. (1980) Perseverance of social theortes: the role of explanatton in the perststencr of discredited information. J. Person. sot. Psvchol. 39. 1037-1049. Aronson E. (1969) The theory of cognitive dissonance: a current perspective. .4dr. e\-p. .soc. Pr~~clroi. 4. I-34. Bacon F. (1855),Yowm Organurn. Oxford Univ. Press (originally published 1621). Collins B. E. and Hoyt M. F. (1972) Personal responsibility and dissonance: an integratton and extension of the “forced compliance” literature. J. e.yp. sot. Psychol. 8, 558-593. Davis J. K. and Frank B. M. (1979) Learning and memory of field independent-dependent indivtduals. J. Res. Prrsorz. 13, 469-479. Festinger L. (1957) A T’lteory of Cognitice Dissonance. Stanford Univ. Press. Stanford. Calif. Fischhoff B. (1975) Hindsight # foresight: the effect of outcome knowledge on judgement under uncertainty. J. c’_vp. Psvchol.: Hum. Percept. Perform. 1, 288-299. Goodenough D. R. (1976) The role of individual differences in field dependence as a factor m learmng and memory. Ps~~chol. Bull. 83. 675-694. Heim A. W.. Watts K. P. and Simmonds V. (1975) AHZGroup Test q/ General Reasoning. NFER-Nelson. Windsor. Berks. Kuhn T. S. (1962) The Structure of‘Scientifc Recolutions. Univ. of Chicago Press. Chicago, III. Loftus E. F. (1975) Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cog. PsychoI. 7, 560-572. Nisbett R. E. and Ross L. (1980) Human Irtference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Prenttce-Hall. Engelwood Cliffs, N.J. Ross L. and Lepper M. R. (1980) The perseverance of beliefs: emptrrcal and normative consrderattons. In :Vrn, Dwecrwns for Methodology ofBehavioral Science: Fallible Judgment in Beharioral Research (Edited by Shweder R. A. and Fiske D.). Jossey-Bass. San Francisco. Calif. Ross L., Lepper M. R. and Hubbard M. (1975) Perseverance m self-perception and social perception: biased attribution processes in the debriefing paradigm. J. Person. sot. P.yvchol. 32, 88G892. Ross L.. Lepper M. R., Strack F. and Steinmetz J. (1977) Social explanation and social expectation: effects of real and hypothetical explanations on subjective likelihood. J. Person. sot. Psvchol. 35, 8 17-829. Shneidman E. S. and Farberow N. L. (1957) Clues to Suicide. McGrawlHill, New York. Steele C. M. and Liu T. J. (1983) Dissonance processes as self-affirmation. J. Person. sot. P.wchol. 45. 5-19 Thurstone L. L. (1944) A Factorial Stud?, of Pkception. Untv. of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill: Tversky A. and Kahneman D. (1974) Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science 185. 1124-l 131. Witkin H. A. (1964) Origins of cognitrve style. in Cognrtion: Theory. Research. Promise (Edited by Sheerer C.). Harper & Row. New York. Witkin H. A. and Goodenough D. R. (1981) Cognitiw Styles: Essence and Origins. Int. Univ Press. New York. Witkin H. A.. Dyk R. B.. Faterson H. F.. Goodenough D. R. and Karp S. A. (1962) f.~~cholo,~~crl fI!/frrentiarion. Wiley, New York. Witkin H. A.. Oltman P. K.. Raskin I. and Karp S. A. (1971) A Manual for the Etnhedtletl-~,?ure.s Test. Consulting Psychologrsts Press. Palo Alto. Calif.