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COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan
COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan by Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon Theo Farrell is Professor of War in the Modern World in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Stuart Gordon is a Senior Lecturer in Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.
Abstract: This article assesses the British military effort in Afghanistan looking at three key elements in the campaign: strategy, military operations, and the interagency ‘‘Comprehensive Approach.’’ We start by recognising the scale of the challenge that has faced the British: of all the provinces in Afghanistan, Helmand is the toughest to stabilize and secure. We then examine the evolution of all three elements above and find significant improvements in each: a flawed strategy has been corrected; the military have received more resources and become significantly better at COIN; and there is significant progress in the development of the inter-agency approach. In short, what the Americans will find in Helmand is a British COIN machine; a little creaky perhaps, but one that is fit for purpose and getting the job done. We briefly conclude on the prospects and the key to success: namely the development of a more coherent international strategy that accommodates the challenges posed by both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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here is a growing consensus that the British are no longer effective at counterinsurgency (COIN). The irony is that just a few years ago senior British officers felt able to lecture the Americans (much to their annoyance), often contrasting U.S. problems in Iraq with Britain’s record of successful COIN campaigns from the end of empire.1 Now the roles appear reversed.2 This is an expanded version of an article published in the RUSI Journal (June 2009). The authors thank Taylor and Francis for permission to publish it in Orbis. Theo Farrell also gratefully acknowledges financial support from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (Grant RES-971-027-0069). Finally, we thank the many British officers and officials who gave us feedback on drafts of this paper. 1 Nigel Alywin-Foster, ‘‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,’’ Military Review, November-December 2005. 2 Paul Cornish, ‘‘The United States and Counterinsurgency,’’ International Affairs, vol. 81, no. 5 (2009), pp. 62-3. Cf. David Betz and Anthony Cormack, ‘‘Wars Amongst the People: Iraq, Afghanistan, and British Strategy,’’ Orbis, Spring 2009. # 2009 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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The U.S. Army and Marine Corps produced a new COIN manual (FM 3-24) in December 2006 that is now in use by militaries the world over.3 Informing this manual are new COIN tactics and capabilities that were developed and roadtested by U.S. battalions in Iraq in 2005-2006.4 Around this time, the British were beginning to lose their hold over Basra. British failure in Iraq was complete when it was left to the Iraqi Army, supported by the U.S. military, to wrestle back control of Basra city from Shi’ite militia in March 2008.5 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that The Economist should note ‘‘a new mood of self-doubt’’ in the British military, citing one British general as declaring that ‘‘we have lost our way’’ when it comes to small wars.6 To be sure, much of the criticism has focused on the lack of a national strategy and political will in Iraq. Britain played its traditional role as the United States’ most steadfast ally in committing a massive 46,000-strong force to support the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. But Britain had no strategy of its own for victory in Iraq. Moreover, British political and military commitment to the Iraq campaign began to wane in the face of growing public anger over the circumstances of Britain’s entry into the war. By mid 2004 the British force had been drawn down to around 8,500. Three years on, the force was down to 5,700—nowhere near enough to assert British authority over Basra. The failure of Iraq casts a long shadow over British campaign in Afghanistan.7 Critics routinely pair the two campaigns in concluding that both demonstrate that ‘‘we lack the troops, wealth and stomach for anything more than the briefest conflict.’’8 And just as the lack of political will, resources, and strategy undercut military operations in Iraq, so it is held that the same dysfunctional dynamic is at play in Afghanistan.9 Hence, it is argued the British are reliant on airpower ‘‘to blunt Taliban offensives’’ and that, due to the lack of commitment by non-military Whitehall agencies, efforts to 3
Subsequently published as a best-selling book, US Army/Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007). For a British assessment, see Alexander Alderson, ‘‘Leaning, Adapting, Applying: US Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and Practice,’’ RUSI Journal, vol. 152, no. 6 (2007), pp. 12-19. 4 James Russell, ‘‘Innovation in the Crucible of War: The American Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq, 2005-2006,’’ Ph.D. thesis, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, 2009. 5 Warren Chin, ‘‘Why Did It All Go Wrong? Reassessing British Counterinsurgency in Iraq,’’ Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2008, pp. 119-35. 6 ‘‘Britain’s Armed Forces: Losing Their Way,’’ The Economist, Jan. 29, 2009. 7 The then British Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, recently noted ‘‘that our national and military reputation and credibility, unfairly or not, has been called into question at several levels in the eyes of our most important ally as a result of some aspects of the Iraq campaign,’’ CGS Speech to the Chatham House, ‘‘A Perspective on the Nature of Future Conflict,’’ London, May 15, 2009. 8 Michael Portillo, ‘‘Britain has Lost the Stomach for a Fight,’’ Sunday Times, Dec. 21, 2008. 9 Sarah Baxter and Nicola Smith, ‘‘US Opens Fire on Brown’s ‘War Fatigue,’’’ Sunday Times, Dec. 21, 2008.
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COIN in Afghanistan develop an integrated civil-military Comprehensive Approach have been ‘‘largely still-born.’’10 These criticisms have significant implications for the British campaign in Afghanistan at a time when the United States is surging an additional 20,000 troops into the South. Of these, 8,000 Marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) will deploy into what has been, until now, Britishcontrolled Helmand province. If the critics are to be believed, then the Americans should expect little from the British. To be sure, American expectations are low.11 U.S. commanders and commentators tend to lump all the Europeans together, in contrasting the American war-fighting effort with the more effete European peacekeeping contribution.12 Such a comparison ignores the sacrifice of the British, Danes, Dutch and Canadians, who have been involved in heavy fighting in the South for almost three years. Helmand – A Tough Nut to Crack Comparisons between British performance in Helmand and that of the United States in the East have tended to ignore the different scale of challenge in each region—making meaningful comparisons between performances very difficult. Simply put, Helmand is a far tougher nut to crack. Admittedly some of the challenges are common to both regions, deriving from a combination of the scale of international ambition for reform and the resistance to this from elements of Pashtun society. The scale of international ambition has been staggering. It approximates the equivalent of the Enlightenment and the Marshall Plan in the context of Europe’s one hundred years war. At the very least the ambition is to effect a rapid ‘‘triple transition’’ in the security, political and socio-economic spheres13 but in the context of the absence of an effective ‘‘importing elite,’’ a vast and unforgiving terrain, a paucity of established infrastructure and a tribally fragmented population with little experience of central government and who are xenophobic, conservative and largely predisposed to resist foreigners. Furthermore, the idea of a strong central state is contested and lacks legitimacy, particularly in the southern part of the Pashtun belt, and development has the potential to be portrayed as a western plot. These challenges have been compounded by significant military difficulties: an inability to deny the home base of the insurgents; an almost inexhaustible 10
Betz and Cormack, ‘‘Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy,’’ Orbis, Spring 2009, pp. 326,
329. 11
See comments by Gen. Dan McNeill (rtd) and Lt. Col. John Nagl (rtd) in Dispatches – Afghanistan: Mission Impossible?, Channel 4, Apr. 6, 2009. 12 See, e.g., Joseph J. Collins, ‘‘Transition Strategy: Regaining the Initiative in Afghanistan: Faltered but not Fallen,’’ Armed Forces Journal, posted January 7, 2009, at http://www. armedforcesjournal.com/2009/01/3846067. 13 James K Boyce, ‘‘Unpacking Aid,’’ Development and Change, vol. 33, no. 2, 2002, pp. 239-46.
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supply of foreign jihadists and a largely ineffective and corrupt Afghan state that cannot easily address grievances.14 While common to both the south and east, in Helmand the challenges are accentuated. The Helmandi economy is mobilized to a far greater degree around criminality, corruption, and networks of narcotics traffickers. The paucity of education, the lack of human capacity, and the acute deficit of governance, justice, and economic opportunities provide opportunities for exploitation by criminals, narcotics dealers, and insurgents. All the while significant elements of the provincial leadership and institutions are so enmeshed with criminal and insurgent interests that it is difficult to draw distinctions between legal and criminal structures. This is a particularly challenging situation in the context of a counterinsurgency campaign where perceptions of the state’s responsiveness and legitimacy are critical to the extension of its moral and political authority.15 In Helmand the state is largely absent, providing little security, infrastructure, or public services. Until the appointment of Governor Gulab Mangal in 2008, the Province was administered by an ineffective and obstructive Governor, Asadullah Waffa, who resisted Kabul’s reforms, had limited understanding of or interest in Afghan government budgetary processes, and suppressed the directors of line ministries who themselves possessed little or no ability to draw funding from Kabul or manage public service or capital investment programs.16 In contrast, the east benefited from more active gubernatorial leadership and national line ministries. In addition, the political engagement between the eastern population and provincial authorities was more vigorous as several of the eastern governors actively reached out to the more marginal communities and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) played a more active political role, despite its limited capacity.17 The situation in the east is characterized by other advantages as well. In several areas, Ghazni for example, the population was generally wealthier and better educated than Helmandis while the province had a large pro-government pocket of Hazaras that provided a large area of permissiveness.18 Khost, often trumpeted as one of the most improved areas, is geographically compact, has comparatively good roads and levels of education and a reasonable infrastructure. 14 Gilbert Greenal, Evidence to the House of Commons Sub Committee etc Ev 92 para 3.6.2 Also, private discussions with Gilbert Greenal. 15 Interviews with David Slinn and Micheal Rider (former and successive heads of the UK Provincial Reconstruction Team), October 2007 and February 2008, Helmand, Afghanistan. 16 These conclusions were drawn following interviews (conducted on the basis of anonymity) with senior staff from the majority of the major national line ministries present in Helmand’s Provincial Capital, Lashkar Gah as well as Governor Assadullah Waffa himself, February 2008. 17 Conclusions drawn following anonymous interviews with several U.S. Foreign Service, USAID and PRT staff in eastern and southern Afghanistan, February 2008. 18 The districts of Malistan, Jaghuri, Nawur, parts of Qarabagh, Dih Yak, and Jaghatu are part of the Hazara area known as the Hazarajat.
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COIN in Afghanistan The eastern insurgency itself was also more fragmented (split between as many as 14 groups including the Taliban, ‘‘foreign fighter’’ groups loosely linked to al Qaeda and the Sarajuddin Haqanni network) and enjoyed less popular legitimacy.19 In contrast, the Helmandi population was more sincerely supportive of the Taliban ideology and its tribal networks were more fragmented and penetrated to a far greater degree by narcotics interests and corruption. The east’s traditional community structures (tribal elders, Shuras and other community groups) were in much better shape and more capable to resist Taliban pressure and assert their own interests. Furthermore, throughout much of 2007 and some of 2008 the Pakistani Army’s offensives in the tribal areas diverted many of the fighters who would otherwise have engaged U.S. forces in the east of Afghanistan, adding to the sense that progress was being made more rapidly in the east of Afghanistan. Finally, a private sector-led economic recovery in the east (centered around Jalalabad) had begun earlier and was less fragile than that in the south. There was also a perception among some U.S. officials that the eastern Pashtun population had considerable confidence in the sustainability of the recovery— further building confidence in the licit economy. Domestically generated economic growth (as opposed to externally generated reconstruction) appeared to provide communities with a stake in both government and stability, and weakened the attraction of the Taliban’s essentially negative message. This also provided incentives for cooperation, at several levels and with both the Afghan government and its allies. None of these advantages existed in Helmand, as the U.S. military will discover. British Strategy – Creating a Road Map for Success The evolution of the UK strategy in Helmand has proceeded in two principal stages. The first was a period (from 2006 until late 2007) of adjusting an initial ‘‘peacekeeping strategy’’ to the realities of Helmand. The second, beginning in early 2008, was one of consolidating activity around the ‘‘Helmand Road Map.’’ The UK deployed troops into the south of Afghanistan in mid 2006, in support of the plan to extend NATO’s footprint from the north. In October 2005 the Cabinet Office commissioned the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) to lead interdepartmental planning for a strategic framework encompassing both civilian and military activity in Helmand—resulting in the UK Joint Plan for Helmand. This new plan claimed consistency with the Afghanistan Compact, the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy, the Government of Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy, the UK 19
The insurgency in the east comprises the Taliban, the Hakkanni network, AQ, HIG, bandit groups and pockets of professional fighters paid by the Taliban. It is both mixed and significantly more fragmented than the southern insurgency.
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Strategic Plan for Afghanistan, NATO’s ISAF strategy and the emerging Afghan Development Zone concept. It also provided a vehicle to improve the coherence of the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth office (FCO), the Afghan Drugs Interdepartmental Unit (ADIDU) and Ministry of Defence (MOD) planning. Indeed, it was one of the first occasions in which three very different departments of state were able to establish an interdepartmental compact—arguably providing a greater range of strategic options and a means for developing synergies.20 The UK plan, echoing the Malayan ‘‘ink spot’’ strategy, focused on Lashkar Gar, Helmand’s provincial capital. It envisaged British and Afghan troops providing a framework of security sufficient for development work to slowly transform the political, social and economic fabric of the town and generate ‘‘effects’’ that would spill over beyond the town itself. The transformation was to be funded with some £6 million of UK money allocated to small scale quick impact projects in 2006-2007 and DFID providing an additional £30 million through a multiyear rural livelihoods program.21 The DFID money was to be channelled through the Afghan Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development. However, the initial plan contained serious weaknesses. Planning developed without sufficient knowledge and understanding of the Afghanistan situation. This problem was compounded by two factors. First was Karzai’s removal of the Helmandi Governor, Sher Mohammed Akhundzadha (or SMA), an individual who would otherwise have been expected to have been a major interlocutor and source of information.22 The second factor was Whitehall’s focus on Iraq and the resultant diversion of critical assets. This further reduced access to local actors and the information that was necessary to develop more detailed implementation planning. Furthermore, the plan did not provide a clear cross governmental blueprint for a COIN campaign, an effective means of reconciling the COIN strategy with the counter narcotics approach, nor did it adequately reflect the military distortions introduced by the U.S. led Kajaki Dam project.23 As with most of the international community, the UK’s national planning also reflected many of the assumptions of the post Bonn period; envisaging a largely top-down, technocratic and ‘‘apolitical’’ approach to state-building and neglecting the subnational state-building agenda. The post Bonn process also implied a logic of cooperation between 20
Interviews with Stabilization Unit Staff (Lou Ecclestone, Mina Jarvenpaa, Lou Perrotta and Debbie Palmer), 2007-2008. 21 Interview with Marshall Elliot, Head of DFID-Afghanistan, October 2008. 22 Akhundzadha was removed by President Karzai under pressure from the UK. He was heavily immersed in the Helmand drugs trade and was alleged to have been involved in serious human rights abuses. 23 Interviews with Col. Charlie Knaggs, Comd TFH 2006 (February 2007), Brig. Andrew Mackay (February 2008), Commander Task Force Helmand/52 Brigade and Col. Stuart Skeetes Deputy Commander 52 Brigade (February 2008).
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COIN in Afghanistan donors and Afghan leaders which presumed a shared understanding of, and commitment to, reversing state failure and managing reconstruction in the interests of all. Many Afghan elites, however, did not share that diagnosis of state failure and the state building objectives; seeking instead to maximise the potential benefits accruing to them from the political, financial and military resources that flowed from Kabul.24 The UK plan was derailed almost from the outset. By mid June 2006, the removal of SMA had created a power vacuum and, in northern Helmand, elements of the Taliban and narcotics barons harnessed what amounted to a popular uprising against the remnants of SMA’s regime. Governor Daoud (SMA’s replacement) and President Karzai placed considerable pressure on the UK to re-establish control—making British commanders painfully aware of Karzai’s view that he could lose the Presidency if the northern districts of Helmand were to fall. Despite having little more than a battle group available (initially around 500 infantry), the UK deployed units into the beleaguered towns of Sangin, Now Zad and Musa Qaleh, beginning what became known as the ‘‘platoon house’’ strategy. The deployment met unexpectedly fierce resistance from the Taliban, who massed conventional forces to drive out the British. The British clung on grimly, withstanding siege and near constant attack until October 2006. At that time, the task force commander, Brigadier Ed Butler, negotiated a controversial arrangement with local tribal leaders.25 In exchange for guarantees that the Taliban would be prevented from retaking the town of Musa Qaleh, the British withdrew. Predictably the Taliban retook the town in February 2007. However, the British military presence in Musa Qaleh had been untenable almost from the outset. With insufficient troops to deter Taliban attacks, British weakness encouraged both direct Taliban assaults and increased the British reliance on defensive airstrikes. Not only was the resulting collateral damage deeply unpopular with the civilian population but the Taliban portrayed the British presence as supporting an unpopular leader, SMA. The strategy had other deleterious side effects. The serious deterioration in security during the summer of 2006, contributed to a difficult debate in Whitehall over whether the UK was ‘‘on’’ plan. Assessments of the security situation grew increasingly pessimistic and the focus on the fighting in the north of Helmand combined with the Taliban’s growing use of asymmetric tactics to affect both DFID and the FCO’s willingness to send staff—both because of the inherent security threat and the sense that the environment was 24
For an excellent discussion of statebuilding issues in Afghanistan see Astri Suhrke, ‘‘A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan’’ in International Peacekeeping Vol 15, No 2 (2008), pp. 214-236. See also Astri Suhrke, ‘‘The Dangers of a Tight Embrace: Externally Assisted Statebuilding in Afghanistan’’ in R Paris and D Sisk (Eds) ‘The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations’ (Routledge: London, 2009). 25 Interview with Col. Charlie Knaggs, February 2007.
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not conducive to development work.26 This further slowed the build up of civilian capacity in the PRT and reduced the military’s capacity to translate tactical military success into more enduring results. While in theory the British approach was more ‘‘comprehensive’’ than that of the United States, at least in terms of harnessing foreign, defense and development ministries to a common plan, the first two years were characterized by considerable difficulties in making the model work. The original UK Plan approach envisioned a ‘‘top down’’ and largely ‘‘apolitical’’ state building strategy that failed to adequately take into account Helmand’s dangerous volatility; the nature of Afghan political society; the few implementing partners willing to operate in such an insecure environment, and seriously underplayed the mechanisms and resources needed as well as the imperative to integrate the relevant civilian lines of operation within a COIN plan. This resulted in nearly 18 months of strategic drift in which much of the UK’s overall effort dissipated and the assumptions underpinning the original UK plan increasingly broke down. The year 2007 saw a significant increase in British forces in Afghanistan. As discussed later, British commanders began to focus on more effectively developing the capabilities and techniques for COIN, and on aligning military and development activities. Supporting this more focused and capable military effort, was the development of a detailed operational level plan. This emerged in fall 2007, when 52 Brigade’s deployment coincided with the a team arriving from the then PCRU. The new brigade and PCRU team agreed jointly to produce the ‘‘Helmand Road Map.’’ The Road Map was fashioned around elements of 52 Brigade’s Operational Design and Operational Plan. Hence it reflected what the military wanted to achieve and the scale of UK resources, and it also built on the lessons learned by the British PRT in the preceding two years.27 This bottom-up initiative coincided with a change of Prime Minster and a renewed emphasis by Whitehall on Afghanistan—creating space for a policy refresh. It also coincided with the arrival of a charismatic and influential Ambassador, Sir Sherard Cowper Coles, who shepherded the plan through the pitfalls of Whitehall. The Road Map set out a broad range of security, counternarcotics, development and governance objectives, reflecting existing UK, NATO and Government of Afghanistan policy frameworks, and resulting in a more detailed plan than the original ‘‘UK Joint Plan for Helmand.’’ However, the legacy of the Joint Plan was clear, with the Road Map combining the former’s ‘‘top down’’ state-building approach with significant efforts to stimulate local governance structures and enhancements to their capacity to draw down both national programs and the work of line ministries. It envisaged stabilization and political advisers being deployed into the Forward Operating Bases and 26
Interviews conducted with FCO and DFID staff on the condition of anonymity. Interviews with Sekander Ali, Senior Stabilisation Adviser, and Lt. Col. Richard Wardlaw, CO 36 Engineer Regiment and SO1 J9 TFH, Helmand Province December 2007. 27
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COIN in Afghanistan working with district authorities and local communities to build their trust in government and to sponsor the growth of community based structures with which formal government could link. The underlying intent was to channel political dialogue, largely defined by the voicing of community aspirations and grievances, through political channels maintained by the Provincial authorities. This meant focusing the UK security effort on supporting the disruption and containment of the military threat posed by the Taliban and creating a space for collaboration between the Afghan authorities and the key populations of Helmand. The dialogue was to be led by the Afghan Provincial Authorities and underwritten by their timely delivery of critical but basic public services—principally security, health, education and some rural infrastructure work. This was augmented by the UK’s support to key ministries designed to create a government that was increasingly able to deliver visibly against key expectations in the major population centers. Delivery of the Road Map depended on a better resourced and more effective British military and civil-military effort. Fortunately here, too, there have been significant improvements.28 The Military Campaign – More Resources and Less Fighting29 The British military campaign in Helmand has evolved from one centered on hard military power and directed at destroying the Taliban, to one focused on generating ‘‘soft effects’’ and securing the civilian population. Here too we see two phases in the Helmand campaign: an initial phase from May 2006 to September 2007, where the main effort involved major combat operations against the Taliban, followed by a second phase since October 2007, where the main effort has involved stabilization operations to secure and develop urban centers. The military campaign started badly. Under-strength and slow to arrive (taking three months to deploy the full task force of just over 3,000) 16 Air Assault Brigade lacked the necessary momentum. The force was promptly augmented by another 1,500 troops in response to the Taliban’s fierce resistance. The British military was not alone in underestimating the Taliban response. The Danes rushed special forces into theater to support the battle group they had embedded in the British task force, and the neighboring Canadians promptly reinforced their task force with Leopard 1C2 main battle tanks. As noted, under immense pressure from Karzai and Whitehall to support Governor Daoud, the British adopted a platoon house strategy which caused considerable attrition to Taliban forces yet made little strategic progress. Much to the fury of the U.S. head of Regional Command (South), Major General Ben 28 These conclusions are drawn from extensive interviews with the British, Danish, US and Estonian (civilian and military) members of the PRT conducted in 2007 and 2008. 29 This section draws extensively on material (including post-operations reports for all the British brigades) which the authors are unable to cite directly.
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Freakley, virtually the entire British task force was stuck defending towns from Taliban attack, and hence the British were unable to contribute forces to support the RC (South) scheme of manuever.30 In October 2006, 3 Commando Brigade took over from 16 Brigade with a very different concept of operations (CONOPS). The Royal Marines were determined not to be ‘‘fixed’’ by enemy action but rather to go on the offensive. To this end, 3 Commando created a number of Mobile Operations Groups (MOGs)—250 strong flying columns in 40 vehicles (a mix of Vikings and Land Rovers)—tasked with seeking out and engaging the Taliban. The idea was to disrupt and defeat the Taliban but they proved too wily to be drawn by the MOGs into prepared kill zones. Instead MOGs had to ‘‘advance to ambush’’ to engage the Taliban on their own terms.31 Moreover, as the brigade’s main effort was concentrated on military defeat of the enemy, little progress was made on stabilization and development. Greater military resources were committed to the British campaign with the deployment of 12 Mechanized Brigade in April 2007. In addition to having more troops, 12 Mechanized was far better equipped than its predecessors: it deployed with Warrior infantry fighting vehicles and the new Mastiff armoured vehicles, as well as two GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System) batteries. With 12 Brigade, there was also a return to the original UK plan. Indeed, whereas Brigadier Butler felt cut out from the drafting of the Joint Helmand Plan which he had been given to implement, the commander of 12 Brigade, Brigadier John Lorimer, had been on the PJHQ team that helped draft it. Hence, 12 Brigade’s CONOPS followed the ‘‘ink-spot strategy’’ of the original plan – namely to secure the Green Zone,32 focusing on the triangle formed by the towns of Lashkar Gah, Gereshk, and Sangin. However, 12 Brigade ended up pursuing an attrition campaign against the Taliban when it sought to secure the countryside between these towns through a series of ‘‘clearance operations.’’ These involved many pitched battles which the Taliban lost to an ever-rising body count. However, territory was not held afterwards, and so the Taliban were able to return once the British had departed. The lack of real progress led a frustrated Brigadier Lorimer to reflect that it felt rather like ‘‘mowing the lawn.’’33 The military campaign changed direction with 52 Brigade in October 2007. Borrowing from the draft FM 3-24, the brigade’s CONOPS was ‘‘clear, hold, build.’’ In contrast, 12 Brigade had done little holding and no building. Moreover, 52 Brigade’s Operational Design conceptualized the campaign center of gravity in terms of the local population instead of the enemy’s will 30
James Fergusson, A Million Bullets (Bantham Press, 2008), pp. 164-5. Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Helmand, Afghanistan (Ebury Press, 2008), pp. 77-8. 32 The Green Zone is the agricultural area that runs along the Helmand River, on which lie the main towns in Helmand. 33 Stephen Grey, Operation Snakebite (London: Penguin Viking, 2009), pp. 61-5. 31
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COIN in Afghanistan and ability to fight. Indeed, for the new task force commander, Brigadier Andrew Mackay, Taliban body count was a ‘‘corrupt measure of success.’’34 Accordingly, 52 Brigade’s campaign focused on influence operations to win the consent of the population and developed new capabilities for influence operations, including company level Non-kinetic Effects Teams, and a new methodology, the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF), to target non-kinetic activities and measure their effectiveness.35 This population-centric strategy continued under 16 Brigade on its second tour in Helmand from April to October 2008.36 This time under the command of Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, the brigade’s CONOPS was to ‘‘Go deep not broad.’’ Hence the British Task Force focused on protecting urban centres, and on developing the Afghan government’s influence and authority in those areas that realistically could be secured and held. Regarding the enemy, the focus was on undermining Taliban influence rather than fighting their forces. Like their predecessor, 16 Brigade strove to achieve an appropriate mix of kinetic and non-kinetic activities which was coordinated by a civil-military Joint Targeting Board. 16 Brigade did not continue with TCAF, but it did develop its own capabilities for soft effects—such as Radio Hewad.37 TCAF has since been readopted by the British and is currently in use by 19 Brigade in Helmand.38 It has also been adopted by the U.S. military: indeed, it was used by the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) that was embedded in the British Task Force under 52 and 16 Brigades, and it will be used by the 2nd MEB when they deploy into theater.39 Over the period 2006-2009, then, there were major improvements in the planning and conduct of the British COIN campaign in Helmand. One is tempted to find a very simple dynamic at play: that the British relearned old tricks. To be sure, the historical record supports this.40 Almost all of Britain’s 34
Commander British Forces, Op HERRICK 7, ‘‘Counterinsurgency in Helmand, Task Force Operational Design,’’ TFH/COMD/DO7, January 1, 2008, p. 2. 35 Telephone Interview with Brig. Andrew Mackay, Commander Task Force Helmand/52 Brigade, April 23, 2008. 36 Patrick Bishop, Ground Truth, 3 Para: Return to Helmand (London: Harper Press, 2009), pp. 18-20. 37 For critical account that explains why 16 Brigade abandoned TCAF, see David Wilson and Gareth E Conway ‘‘The Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework’’ RUSI Journal, vol. 154, no.1 (2009), pp 10-15. 38 Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Richard Wardlaw, CO 36 Engineer Regiment, Feb. 9, 2009. 39 For a positive account of the 24 MEU’s use of TCAF, see Rene L. Cote, ‘‘Data-Driven Stabilization: The Process of Selecting Reconstruction and Development Efforts,’’ July 13, 2009, http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/Data-Drive.Stabilization.pdf. 40 The historical record also shows that learning COIN is not easy for militaries. See John Kiszely, ‘‘Learning About Counterinsurgency,’’ Military Review, March-April 2007, pp. 5-10. Nor was it easy for the U.S. Military in Iraq. David Ucko, ‘‘Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency,’’ Orbis, Spring 2009.
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past COIN campaigns started poorly—excessive force, poor intelligence, no influence operations—and proved successful only when the British relearned and applied the principles of COIN.41 But we would suggest a more complex interaction of factors. First, the British were able to focus more on stabilization and development activities from early 2008 because the Taliban lost the will and ability to continue major combat operations in Helmand. In 2006-2007, Taliban forces suffered considerable attrition in heavy fighting with 16, 3 and 12 Brigades. British Defence Intelligence puts the number of Taliban dead in the thousands (though some British commanders have expressed doubts at such high figures). Clearly, since early 2008 the Taliban have switched from conventional to asymmetric tactics as their primary mode of warfare.42 Most casualties in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are now caused by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).43 Not only are the Taliban slower to engage in formation assaults on ISAF forces, when they do attack in numbers it is clear that there has been a decline in Taliban combat fieldcraft: the inference being that experienced fighters lost in 2006-2007 are being replaced by novices. Just as Taliban capabilities had diminished by early 2008, so Afghan National Army (ANA) capabilities were improving. The ANA grew from around 50,000 in 2007 to almost 80,000 in 2008.44 Moreover, the ANA increased its ability to conduct battalion-level operations; 30 percent of ANA battalions could do so with the support of international forces by December 2006, rising to 44 percent by December 2007 and 62 percent by December 2008.45 The situation in Helmand reflected this national trend, especially in terms of the capabilities of ANA battalions. Accordingly, the British task forces have been increasingly able to integrate ANA into their campaign. This is critical to building ANA confidence and capabilities to take over the security role and enabling the eventual withdrawal of ISAF. Thus we see a progression from using ANA to backfill areas secured by the British to, from late 2007 on, the partnering of ANA battalions with British battle groups and the ANA being given their own independent area of operations within Helmand.46 41
Victoria L. Nolan, ‘‘Command and Culture: Military leadership and the Evolution of the British Army’s Approach to Small Wars,’’ PhD thesis, King’s College London, 2009. 42 Interview with staff officer, Defence Intelligence, Ministry of Defence, London, late 2009. 43 16 Brigade reported the number of IEDs as ‘‘doubling’’ each month of their tour (April-October 2008). Notes from Collective Debrief of 16 Air Assault Brigade, December 3, 2008, Merville Barracks, Essex. US fatalities in ISAF caused by IEDs increased from 27 percent in 2006 to 54 percent in 2008, and 47 percent up to May 2009. Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variable of Reconstruction and Security in Post 9/11 Afghanistan, Brookings Institution, May 19, 2009, figure 1.3, p. 6. 44 Afghanistan Index, Figure 1.15, p. 12. 45 ISAF Metrics Brief, 2007-2008, UNCLASS // REL USA ISAF NATO, slide 8. 46 By mid 2007, there were five ANA battalions deployed in Helmand. Interview with Brig. Andrew Mackay, Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, Jan. 29, 2001.
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COIN in Afghanistan Table 1. British troop numbers in Afghanistan.50 Task force Brigade
Date
Size
16 Air Assault Bde 3 Commando Bde 12 Mechanised Bde 52 Bde 16 Air Assault Bde 3 Commando Bde
April–Oct. 2006 Oct. 2006–April 2007 April–Oct. 2007 Oct. 2007–April 2008 April–Oct. 2008 Oct. 2008–April 2009
3,150 (4,500) 5,200 6,500 7,750 8,530 8,300
Another important factor is that the campaign received more support and resources, especially as the British government shifted its strategic focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. Hence, British troops numbers more than doubled between late 2006 and late 2007, peaking in 2008 at just over 8,500 (see Table 1). Equally significant has been the better equipping of task forces from 12 Brigade on. Much of this additional kit has been acquired as Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR). The British soldier has received around 20 enhancements (new rifle sights, body armor, night-goggles, etc). One key new capability, the Mastiff armored vehicle, was originally acquired for Iraq within five months under the UOR scheme; some of these units were redirected to Afghanistan. Delivery of a larger purchase of Mastiff for Afghanistan is taking longer because of a complex refitting of the vehicle to meet campaign-specific specifications combined with limitations on industry’s ability to meet demand.47 In addition, in October the Defence Secretary announced a £500 Million ‘‘Protected Mobility Package’’ providing an additional 500 armored patrol and support vehicles for operations in Afghanistan.48 There has also been better support to brigades preparing for deployment. Whereas 16 and 3 Brigades were given poorly modified versions of the training package designed for Iraq, from 12 Brigade on the Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG) had produced a favorably received package for Afghanistan. Better training has undoubtedly contributed to the learning process, as will the new collective debrief methodology introduced by the Land Warfare Centre in 2008. The Afghanistan campaign is also finally being supported by new doctrine: the Army published its updated COIN field manual in April 2009,49 and the British are publishing a new joint doctrine on stabilisation operations (JDP 3-40). This is not to say that the British military campaign in Helmand is perfect. British commanders show a keen awareness of the damage, especially to local confidence and support, caused by air strikes. Yet the British task force 47
Interview with SO2, Directive of Joint Capability, MOD Main Building, Feb. 6, 2009. Ministry of Defence, ‘‘New Armoured Vehicles for Afghanistan,’’ October 29, 2008, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/. 49 Army Field Manual Vol. 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency, AC71876, April 2009. 50 Data from ISAF Troops Placemat archive at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/ placemat.html. 48
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has not managed to reduce the number of air strikes—which has remained at 500-540 air strikes for each brigade between April 2007 and March 2009— despite the introduction of GMLRS.51 Indeed, equally striking is that demand for GMLRS has increased over this period. However, greater use of GMLRS is still an improvement as other options would likely have been higher yield and air dropped. A second problem is the shortage of helicopters, which is a major complaint in successive post-operations reports by campaign commanders. The nature of the evolving threat on the ground, coupled with the challenging terrain, means that helicopter flying hours will always be at a premium. Since 2006 improvements, admittedly much needed from the early days, have delivered a 30 percent increase in flying hours. Furthermore, using UOR procurement technical improvements have been made to several aircraft, which lacked optimal performance for ‘‘hot and high.’’ The situation will further improve following the withdrawal of British forces from Basra, when seven Merlins are to be moved from Iraq to Afghanistan.52 Finally, the British campaign has lacked continuity of command with a new Helmand Task Force commander arriving every six months. This, as much as lessons learned, has resulted in each task force pursuing a different campaign design from its predecessor. Actually, this may have increased the agility of the British campaign in better enabling it to adapt to a dynamic strategic environment (e.g., Taliban attrition and growing ANA capability).53 Nonetheless, more continuity of command would be desirable and proposals are now being considered in MOD to achieve this (including longer tours for key staff positions). In sum, there can be no doubt that the military side of the campaign has improved substantially since 2006. The Comprehensive Approach – Modest Progress in Helmand The third improvement is in linking cross government efforts in what the MOD labels as the ‘‘comprehensive approach’’—essentially an offshoot of the ‘‘joined up government’’54 agenda introduced by Tony Blair in 1997. In practice both concepts have meant coordinating the work of a disparate flotilla 51
To be fair, ISAF as a whole is struggling with this problem. Carlotta Gall and Taimoor Shah, ‘‘Afghan Villagers Describe Chaos of U.S. Strikes,’’ New York Times, 15 May 2009. 52 Michael Evans, ‘‘British Troops in Helmand Get Extra Helicopters at Last,’’ The Times, January 31, 2009, p. 47. 53 This argument here is a counter-intuitive but important one. Organizations have a natural bias in favor of exploiting core competencies over exploring new approaches and capabilities. In organization theory, this is called ‘‘the competency trap.’’ Good corporate memory reinforces this bias and therefore makes organizations less adaptive: that is, less inclined to undertake risky and new activities. Personnel turnover reduces corporate memory and, in turn, makes organizations more inclined to try new approaches to persistent problems. Jerker Denrell and James G. March, ‘‘Adaptation as Information Restriction: The Hot Stove Effect,’’ in James G. March, ed., Explorations in Organizations (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 116-146. 54 The term was first used by Tony Blair when he launched the Social Exclusion Unit in 1997.
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COIN in Afghanistan of agencies, departments, units and professions, and overcoming contradictory departmental imperatives. The UK experience of operationalizing this in Helmand is testimony to the difficulties involved in developing even a common sense of ‘‘mission’’ that is able to bind the activities of the departments. Nevertheless, the MOD has been particularly enthusiastic for ‘‘comprehensive’’ working—reflecting changes in the department’s understanding of the complex origins of ‘‘conflict’’; it’s experience of operations in the Balkans and subsequently the ‘‘Global War on Terror’’; and finally debates relating to the transformation of the military itself, particularly the emergence of the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). The MOD has been heavily influenced in its understanding of the complexity of conflict by the ‘‘human security’’ agenda. This shaped both its understanding of conflict causality and its appetite for harnessing the capacity of other actors to address root causes. This approach was reinforced by its experiences in the Balkans from 1991, where it discovered crises involving a complex ‘‘interplay of civilian, para-military and military groups and individuals, International Organisations (IOs) and the mass Media.’’ New doctrine on The Comprehensive Approach published in 2006 encapsulated the MOD’s rediscovery of the limits of the military instrument in transforming conflict and the significance of what has increasingly been termed ‘‘civilian effect.’’55 Largely reflecting the UK’s experiences with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR II) mission in Bosnia, the MOD’s focus on comprehensive working was initially on transforming relationships with the nongovernmental and UN humanitarian systems at the tactical level. However, NATO’s response first to the refugee crisis emanating from Kosovo in 1998-1999 and subsequently to regional stabilization reinforced the growing sense that the scale of crises made tactical level coordination, mostly shared understanding and some cooperation between like minded individuals, insufficient. In response to this, the level at which cooperation occurred was elevated to the ‘‘operational’’ level—initially with the establishment of (limited) DFID and FCO representation in the UK Defence Crisis Management Organization (DCMO) and, in particular, at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). However, subsequent experience in the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone (2000), and during the invasions of Afghanistan (November 2001) and Iraq (2003), highlighted the continuing absence of machinery at the military strategic level for planning across government.56 The principal remedy to this was the establishment of the cross–Whitehall PCRU in 2004. Reinforcing MOD enthusiasm for the comprehensive approach was the development of EBAO. This concept originated in the United States, specifically in a hugely ambitious program to transform the U.S. military. 55
The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, JDCC, Shrivenham, January 2006. 56 Interview with Lt. Col. Matthew Jackson, Commander, Joint CIMIC Group, October 2008.
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Started in 2001, this U.S. program has centered on developing next generation technologies in stealth, sensor, information processing and communications, to transform the U.S. military into a wholly networked force capable of effects based operations (EBO). With EBO, the enemy is re-conceptualized and understood as a complex, adaptive system of systems. EBO then involves identifying and concentrating action against the key nodes and links that comprise that system, causing it to collapse. Such an approach resonated strongly in the UK; offering both a means for addressing the complexity of the contemporary battlefield and for offsetting the deleterious impact of budgetary pressures on capabilities.57 Nevertheless, the agenda, as played out in the UK, was different from that in the United States. While adopting the ethos of the original U.S. ‘‘transformational’’ agenda (albeit less well resourced) there were also a range of largely British elements; embedding the changes in pursuing an ‘‘ethical foreign policy’’; a stronger preference for ‘‘softer’’ effects (leveraging diplomatic, information and development actors); and a much greater willingness to countenance less hierarchical forms of cooperation between the defence, development and foreign ministries.58 Collectively these strengthened the demand for civilian departments, principally the FCO and DFID, to support the MOD in both ‘‘transforming’’ conflict through rapidly applied ‘‘development’’ activity and the provision of a political vision that would make possible a sustainable peace and the consolidation of tactical military victories.59 While the MOD’s appetite for comprehensive working had reached a high point by 2006 there were marked differences with other departments, particularly DFID and the FCO. Neither had career incentives for working in what the MOD termed ‘‘expeditionary environments,’’ but in the case of DFID the issues ran much deeper; reflecting a department configured around a ‘‘poverty reduction’’ rather than a traditional ‘‘national interest’’ agenda. DFID’s focus on poverty reduction in supporting the UN’s millennium development goals were enshrined in legislation (the 2002 International Development Act (IDA)) and militated against the type of cooperation presumed by many within the MOD. Development best practice also warned against seeking to use money as a ‘‘weapon system’’— highlighting the potential to undermine peace and the beneficiary state, to create perverse incentives, and to reinforce the war economy.60 While there was good evidence to support the DFID position, the assumptions made by some within the MOD were voiced more powerfully, 57
Theo Farrell, ‘‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation,’’ International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4 (2008), pp. 777-808. 58 Incorporating and Extending the UK Military Effects-Based Approach, Joint Doctrine Note 7/06, DCDC, Shrivenham, September 2006. 59 Interviews with Col. Ian Westerman, Assistant Director MultiAgency Operations, MOD DCDC, October 2008. 60 Interviews with Debbie Palmer and Lou Ecclestone, Stabilisation Unit, April 2008.
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COIN in Afghanistan and in the context of wars in which UK servicemen were losing their lives, DFID found it difficult to make their arguments stick. DFID’s capacity to articulate the risks of the MOD approach was further undermined by some military officers who sensed that the organization preferred to work around conflict rather than on it. In 2002 it had largely disengaged from planning for the invasion of Iraq, reflecting a widespread opposition to the conflict within DFID and stemming from the Secretary of State, Clare Short’s attitudes, but also reflecting the culture of large parts of the department. DFID’s creation and rapid expansion in 1997 had led to heavy recruitment from the NGO sector; a community that was unlikely to favor the type of robust interventionism evident in Iraq. Furthermore, the rapid expansion of DFID’s budget since 1997 placed considerable pressure on the organization for ensuring effective program management.61 The elegant solution, and one which again reflected best practice among donor states, was to pour money through multilateral partners and national state structures, building beneficiary state capacity in more sustainable ways than the direct delivery of public services by donors. However, elements of the military labored under the assumption that development workers did rather than funded or supported capacity building strategies. Meanwhile DFID staff argued, and with considerable justification, that since 2004 they had invested in the PCRU (renamed the ‘Stabilisation Unit’ in 2007) to deliver the type of conflict stabilization work that middle ranking officers within the MOD expected.62 This became an unnecessary source of tension from 2006. The FCO also struggled with operationalizing ‘‘joined up’’ approaches in theaters such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Configured around delivering what could be termed ‘‘strategic diplomacy’’ it found it difficult to find appropriately experienced staff as well as structures and strategies that could deliver the local level diplomatic engagement necessitated by the tribal politics of both conflicts.63 There were also significant differences over precisely what the civilian role should be, particularly in relation to the setting of and supporting operational priorities in Helmand. Middle ranking military complained vocally that DFID’s activities were too long term and distant to have sufficient visibility or impact in Helmand, while more senior military frequently conceptualized the civilian role as delivering a form of development based ‘‘backfill’’ designed to enable and improve military operations. In such a model the military defined the operational priorities and objectives and civilians were expected to provide a form of reconstruction ‘‘follow on force.’’ The civilian ministries chafed against this approach, arguing that it could not be further from the 61
Anonymous interview with DFID-A staff October 2008. The Stabilization Unit website is at http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/. 63 Interview with Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, UK Ambassador to Afghanistan, Kabul, October 2008. 62
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military’s own model of a politically-led COIN campaign. DFID staff also questioned a strategy that simplistically linked the construction of Afghan infrastructure by international donors (and military) to the consolidation of an Afghan state. The largely kinetic character of the British COIN campaign in 2006-07, also gave DFID and FCO reason to question the military’s understanding of, and commitment to, broader stabilization and development operations. The UK civilians in theatre did gradually develop a capacity for ‘‘political leadership’’ at the operational level, although until 2008 the pace of change was hamstrung by difficulties in getting high quality civil servants to Helmand, and a reluctance to deploy them in the military’s Forward Operating Bases. Against this most unpromising background of clashing institutional cultures, there has been remarkable progress in the level of civilian effort and in civil-military integration within Helmand. PRT civilian staff numbers have grown from around 25 in 2007 to 80 in 2009. Moreover, in late 2008, the task force headquarters and the PRT were merged into a combined Civil-Military Mission in Helmand (CMMH) which is led by an FCO civilian ‘‘two-star.’’ Also by 2008, the PRT had stabilization advisers deployed in four Forward Operating Bases across Helmand (Gereshk, Musa Qaleh, Garmsir and Sangin), and the military had established ‘‘Military Stabilisation Support Teams’’ in the key districts to significantly extend the reach and capability of the ‘‘civil effect’’— which is now limited by the ‘‘reformability’’ of Afghan society rather than the number of deployed British civilians.64 Helmand, 2009-2010—Prospects and Challenges There is reason to be optimistic. The UK military has made significant advances in enhancing its capabilities and its approach to COIN, and of working with civilian partners to stabilize and develop Helmand. Moreover, the new Obama strategy (unveiled on March 27)65 promises increased numbers of U.S. troops and civilian advisers, more development investments, reinvigorated regional diplomacy and a more sophisticated strategy towards Pakistan. There are other significant changes: the piecemeal policies for pursuing insurgents into Pakistan appear to have given way to a more coherent and expansive program for actively stabilizing the Pakistani state. And there is a renewed emphasis on speeding the deployment of capable Afghan security forces, extending the legitimacy of the Afghan state and facilitating grass roots 64
‘‘GS (Afg) 4: Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,’’ Written Evidence submitted to Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Jan. 23, 2009, para. 18, http://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/memo/afghanistan/ucgs0402.htm. 65 White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 2009, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_ pakistan_white_paper_final.pdf.
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COIN in Afghanistan employment generation rather than mass infrastructure ‘‘reconstruction.’’ There also appears to be more focus, conditionality and coherence in the assistance promised both to Afghanistan and Pakistan and greater levels of support to an Afghan led program of political outreach to ‘‘reconcilable’’ Pashtuns. The arrival of many thousands of U.S. Marines since June 2009 has made a big difference to the ISAF campaign in the province. But there remain the perennial challenges to progress; ISAF’s lack of ‘‘unity of effort’’ and the smothering impact of Afghan national politics, the narcotics industry, corruption and the dysfunctionality of the state itself. The Obama strategy is also far from being a panacea. While we recognize that a substantial element of the U.S. troop surge is deployed to train Afghan forces—‘‘leveraging’’ Afghan capacity—and that garrisoning large numbers of foreign troops has the potential to aggravate Pashtun xenophobia, we wonder whether the increased U.S. troop numbers are enough given the challenges of stabilizing Afghanistan. The Obama strategy reflects perhaps more Vice President Joe Biden’s efforts to develop a counterterrorism mission, than the more expansive and resource heavy counterinsurgency approach. While Obama himself has endorsed the idea of ‘‘counterinsurgency’’ as at the heart of his new strategy, the military resource levels are perhaps closer to those necessary for a far more limited counterterrorism strategy.
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Abstract: This article assesses the British military effort in Afghanistan looking at three key elements in the campaign: strategy, military operations, and the interagency ‘‘Comprehensive Approach.’’ We start by recognising the scale of the challenge that has faced the British: of all the provinces in Afghanistan, Helmand is the toughest to stabilize and secure. We then examine the evolution of all three elements above and find significant improvements in each: a flawed strategy has been corrected; the military have received more resources and become significantly better at COIN; and there is significant progress in the development of the inter-agency approach. In short, what the Americans will find in Helmand is a British COIN machine; a little creaky perhaps, but one that is fit for purpose and getting the job done. We briefly conclude on the prospects and the key to success: namely the development of a more coherent international strategy that accommodates the challenges posed by both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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here is a growing consensus that the British are no longer effective at counterinsurgency (COIN). The irony is that just a few years ago senior British officers felt able to lecture the Americans (much to their annoyance), often contrasting U.S. problems in Iraq with Britain’s record of successful COIN campaigns from the end of empire.1 Now the roles appear reversed.2 This is an expanded version of an article published in the RUSI Journal (June 2009). The authors thank Taylor and Francis for permission to publish it in Orbis. Theo Farrell also gratefully acknowledges financial support from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (Grant RES-971-027-0069). Finally, we thank the many British officers and officials who gave us feedback on drafts of this paper. 1 Nigel Alywin-Foster, ‘‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,’’ Military Review, November-December 2005. 2 Paul Cornish, ‘‘The United States and Counterinsurgency,’’ International Affairs, vol. 81, no. 5 (2009), pp. 62-3. Cf. David Betz and Anthony Cormack, ‘‘Wars Amongst the People: Iraq, Afghanistan, and British Strategy,’’ Orbis, Spring 2009. # 2009 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.
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The U.S. Army and Marine Corps produced a new COIN manual (FM 3-24) in December 2006 that is now in use by militaries the world over.3 Informing this manual are new COIN tactics and capabilities that were developed and roadtested by U.S. battalions in Iraq in 2005-2006.4 Around this time, the British were beginning to lose their hold over Basra. British failure in Iraq was complete when it was left to the Iraqi Army, supported by the U.S. military, to wrestle back control of Basra city from Shi’ite militia in March 2008.5 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that The Economist should note ‘‘a new mood of self-doubt’’ in the British military, citing one British general as declaring that ‘‘we have lost our way’’ when it comes to small wars.6 To be sure, much of the criticism has focused on the lack of a national strategy and political will in Iraq. Britain played its traditional role as the United States’ most steadfast ally in committing a massive 46,000-strong force to support the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. But Britain had no strategy of its own for victory in Iraq. Moreover, British political and military commitment to the Iraq campaign began to wane in the face of growing public anger over the circumstances of Britain’s entry into the war. By mid 2004 the British force had been drawn down to around 8,500. Three years on, the force was down to 5,700—nowhere near enough to assert British authority over Basra. The failure of Iraq casts a long shadow over British campaign in Afghanistan.7 Critics routinely pair the two campaigns in concluding that both demonstrate that ‘‘we lack the troops, wealth and stomach for anything more than the briefest conflict.’’8 And just as the lack of political will, resources, and strategy undercut military operations in Iraq, so it is held that the same dysfunctional dynamic is at play in Afghanistan.9 Hence, it is argued the British are reliant on airpower ‘‘to blunt Taliban offensives’’ and that, due to the lack of commitment by non-military Whitehall agencies, efforts to 3
Subsequently published as a best-selling book, US Army/Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007). For a British assessment, see Alexander Alderson, ‘‘Leaning, Adapting, Applying: US Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and Practice,’’ RUSI Journal, vol. 152, no. 6 (2007), pp. 12-19. 4 James Russell, ‘‘Innovation in the Crucible of War: The American Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq, 2005-2006,’’ Ph.D. thesis, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, 2009. 5 Warren Chin, ‘‘Why Did It All Go Wrong? Reassessing British Counterinsurgency in Iraq,’’ Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2008, pp. 119-35. 6 ‘‘Britain’s Armed Forces: Losing Their Way,’’ The Economist, Jan. 29, 2009. 7 The then British Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, recently noted ‘‘that our national and military reputation and credibility, unfairly or not, has been called into question at several levels in the eyes of our most important ally as a result of some aspects of the Iraq campaign,’’ CGS Speech to the Chatham House, ‘‘A Perspective on the Nature of Future Conflict,’’ London, May 15, 2009. 8 Michael Portillo, ‘‘Britain has Lost the Stomach for a Fight,’’ Sunday Times, Dec. 21, 2008. 9 Sarah Baxter and Nicola Smith, ‘‘US Opens Fire on Brown’s ‘War Fatigue,’’’ Sunday Times, Dec. 21, 2008.
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COIN in Afghanistan develop an integrated civil-military Comprehensive Approach have been ‘‘largely still-born.’’10 These criticisms have significant implications for the British campaign in Afghanistan at a time when the United States is surging an additional 20,000 troops into the South. Of these, 8,000 Marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) will deploy into what has been, until now, Britishcontrolled Helmand province. If the critics are to be believed, then the Americans should expect little from the British. To be sure, American expectations are low.11 U.S. commanders and commentators tend to lump all the Europeans together, in contrasting the American war-fighting effort with the more effete European peacekeeping contribution.12 Such a comparison ignores the sacrifice of the British, Danes, Dutch and Canadians, who have been involved in heavy fighting in the South for almost three years. Helmand – A Tough Nut to Crack Comparisons between British performance in Helmand and that of the United States in the East have tended to ignore the different scale of challenge in each region—making meaningful comparisons between performances very difficult. Simply put, Helmand is a far tougher nut to crack. Admittedly some of the challenges are common to both regions, deriving from a combination of the scale of international ambition for reform and the resistance to this from elements of Pashtun society. The scale of international ambition has been staggering. It approximates the equivalent of the Enlightenment and the Marshall Plan in the context of Europe’s one hundred years war. At the very least the ambition is to effect a rapid ‘‘triple transition’’ in the security, political and socio-economic spheres13 but in the context of the absence of an effective ‘‘importing elite,’’ a vast and unforgiving terrain, a paucity of established infrastructure and a tribally fragmented population with little experience of central government and who are xenophobic, conservative and largely predisposed to resist foreigners. Furthermore, the idea of a strong central state is contested and lacks legitimacy, particularly in the southern part of the Pashtun belt, and development has the potential to be portrayed as a western plot. These challenges have been compounded by significant military difficulties: an inability to deny the home base of the insurgents; an almost inexhaustible 10
Betz and Cormack, ‘‘Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy,’’ Orbis, Spring 2009, pp. 326,
329. 11
See comments by Gen. Dan McNeill (rtd) and Lt. Col. John Nagl (rtd) in Dispatches – Afghanistan: Mission Impossible?, Channel 4, Apr. 6, 2009. 12 See, e.g., Joseph J. Collins, ‘‘Transition Strategy: Regaining the Initiative in Afghanistan: Faltered but not Fallen,’’ Armed Forces Journal, posted January 7, 2009, at http://www. armedforcesjournal.com/2009/01/3846067. 13 James K Boyce, ‘‘Unpacking Aid,’’ Development and Change, vol. 33, no. 2, 2002, pp. 239-46.
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supply of foreign jihadists and a largely ineffective and corrupt Afghan state that cannot easily address grievances.14 While common to both the south and east, in Helmand the challenges are accentuated. The Helmandi economy is mobilized to a far greater degree around criminality, corruption, and networks of narcotics traffickers. The paucity of education, the lack of human capacity, and the acute deficit of governance, justice, and economic opportunities provide opportunities for exploitation by criminals, narcotics dealers, and insurgents. All the while significant elements of the provincial leadership and institutions are so enmeshed with criminal and insurgent interests that it is difficult to draw distinctions between legal and criminal structures. This is a particularly challenging situation in the context of a counterinsurgency campaign where perceptions of the state’s responsiveness and legitimacy are critical to the extension of its moral and political authority.15 In Helmand the state is largely absent, providing little security, infrastructure, or public services. Until the appointment of Governor Gulab Mangal in 2008, the Province was administered by an ineffective and obstructive Governor, Asadullah Waffa, who resisted Kabul’s reforms, had limited understanding of or interest in Afghan government budgetary processes, and suppressed the directors of line ministries who themselves possessed little or no ability to draw funding from Kabul or manage public service or capital investment programs.16 In contrast, the east benefited from more active gubernatorial leadership and national line ministries. In addition, the political engagement between the eastern population and provincial authorities was more vigorous as several of the eastern governors actively reached out to the more marginal communities and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) played a more active political role, despite its limited capacity.17 The situation in the east is characterized by other advantages as well. In several areas, Ghazni for example, the population was generally wealthier and better educated than Helmandis while the province had a large pro-government pocket of Hazaras that provided a large area of permissiveness.18 Khost, often trumpeted as one of the most improved areas, is geographically compact, has comparatively good roads and levels of education and a reasonable infrastructure. 14 Gilbert Greenal, Evidence to the House of Commons Sub Committee etc Ev 92 para 3.6.2 Also, private discussions with Gilbert Greenal. 15 Interviews with David Slinn and Micheal Rider (former and successive heads of the UK Provincial Reconstruction Team), October 2007 and February 2008, Helmand, Afghanistan. 16 These conclusions were drawn following interviews (conducted on the basis of anonymity) with senior staff from the majority of the major national line ministries present in Helmand’s Provincial Capital, Lashkar Gah as well as Governor Assadullah Waffa himself, February 2008. 17 Conclusions drawn following anonymous interviews with several U.S. Foreign Service, USAID and PRT staff in eastern and southern Afghanistan, February 2008. 18 The districts of Malistan, Jaghuri, Nawur, parts of Qarabagh, Dih Yak, and Jaghatu are part of the Hazara area known as the Hazarajat.
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COIN in Afghanistan The eastern insurgency itself was also more fragmented (split between as many as 14 groups including the Taliban, ‘‘foreign fighter’’ groups loosely linked to al Qaeda and the Sarajuddin Haqanni network) and enjoyed less popular legitimacy.19 In contrast, the Helmandi population was more sincerely supportive of the Taliban ideology and its tribal networks were more fragmented and penetrated to a far greater degree by narcotics interests and corruption. The east’s traditional community structures (tribal elders, Shuras and other community groups) were in much better shape and more capable to resist Taliban pressure and assert their own interests. Furthermore, throughout much of 2007 and some of 2008 the Pakistani Army’s offensives in the tribal areas diverted many of the fighters who would otherwise have engaged U.S. forces in the east of Afghanistan, adding to the sense that progress was being made more rapidly in the east of Afghanistan. Finally, a private sector-led economic recovery in the east (centered around Jalalabad) had begun earlier and was less fragile than that in the south. There was also a perception among some U.S. officials that the eastern Pashtun population had considerable confidence in the sustainability of the recovery— further building confidence in the licit economy. Domestically generated economic growth (as opposed to externally generated reconstruction) appeared to provide communities with a stake in both government and stability, and weakened the attraction of the Taliban’s essentially negative message. This also provided incentives for cooperation, at several levels and with both the Afghan government and its allies. None of these advantages existed in Helmand, as the U.S. military will discover. British Strategy – Creating a Road Map for Success The evolution of the UK strategy in Helmand has proceeded in two principal stages. The first was a period (from 2006 until late 2007) of adjusting an initial ‘‘peacekeeping strategy’’ to the realities of Helmand. The second, beginning in early 2008, was one of consolidating activity around the ‘‘Helmand Road Map.’’ The UK deployed troops into the south of Afghanistan in mid 2006, in support of the plan to extend NATO’s footprint from the north. In October 2005 the Cabinet Office commissioned the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) to lead interdepartmental planning for a strategic framework encompassing both civilian and military activity in Helmand—resulting in the UK Joint Plan for Helmand. This new plan claimed consistency with the Afghanistan Compact, the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy, the Government of Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy, the UK 19
The insurgency in the east comprises the Taliban, the Hakkanni network, AQ, HIG, bandit groups and pockets of professional fighters paid by the Taliban. It is both mixed and significantly more fragmented than the southern insurgency.
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Strategic Plan for Afghanistan, NATO’s ISAF strategy and the emerging Afghan Development Zone concept. It also provided a vehicle to improve the coherence of the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth office (FCO), the Afghan Drugs Interdepartmental Unit (ADIDU) and Ministry of Defence (MOD) planning. Indeed, it was one of the first occasions in which three very different departments of state were able to establish an interdepartmental compact—arguably providing a greater range of strategic options and a means for developing synergies.20 The UK plan, echoing the Malayan ‘‘ink spot’’ strategy, focused on Lashkar Gar, Helmand’s provincial capital. It envisaged British and Afghan troops providing a framework of security sufficient for development work to slowly transform the political, social and economic fabric of the town and generate ‘‘effects’’ that would spill over beyond the town itself. The transformation was to be funded with some £6 million of UK money allocated to small scale quick impact projects in 2006-2007 and DFID providing an additional £30 million through a multiyear rural livelihoods program.21 The DFID money was to be channelled through the Afghan Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development. However, the initial plan contained serious weaknesses. Planning developed without sufficient knowledge and understanding of the Afghanistan situation. This problem was compounded by two factors. First was Karzai’s removal of the Helmandi Governor, Sher Mohammed Akhundzadha (or SMA), an individual who would otherwise have been expected to have been a major interlocutor and source of information.22 The second factor was Whitehall’s focus on Iraq and the resultant diversion of critical assets. This further reduced access to local actors and the information that was necessary to develop more detailed implementation planning. Furthermore, the plan did not provide a clear cross governmental blueprint for a COIN campaign, an effective means of reconciling the COIN strategy with the counter narcotics approach, nor did it adequately reflect the military distortions introduced by the U.S. led Kajaki Dam project.23 As with most of the international community, the UK’s national planning also reflected many of the assumptions of the post Bonn period; envisaging a largely top-down, technocratic and ‘‘apolitical’’ approach to state-building and neglecting the subnational state-building agenda. The post Bonn process also implied a logic of cooperation between 20
Interviews with Stabilization Unit Staff (Lou Ecclestone, Mina Jarvenpaa, Lou Perrotta and Debbie Palmer), 2007-2008. 21 Interview with Marshall Elliot, Head of DFID-Afghanistan, October 2008. 22 Akhundzadha was removed by President Karzai under pressure from the UK. He was heavily immersed in the Helmand drugs trade and was alleged to have been involved in serious human rights abuses. 23 Interviews with Col. Charlie Knaggs, Comd TFH 2006 (February 2007), Brig. Andrew Mackay (February 2008), Commander Task Force Helmand/52 Brigade and Col. Stuart Skeetes Deputy Commander 52 Brigade (February 2008).
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COIN in Afghanistan donors and Afghan leaders which presumed a shared understanding of, and commitment to, reversing state failure and managing reconstruction in the interests of all. Many Afghan elites, however, did not share that diagnosis of state failure and the state building objectives; seeking instead to maximise the potential benefits accruing to them from the political, financial and military resources that flowed from Kabul.24 The UK plan was derailed almost from the outset. By mid June 2006, the removal of SMA had created a power vacuum and, in northern Helmand, elements of the Taliban and narcotics barons harnessed what amounted to a popular uprising against the remnants of SMA’s regime. Governor Daoud (SMA’s replacement) and President Karzai placed considerable pressure on the UK to re-establish control—making British commanders painfully aware of Karzai’s view that he could lose the Presidency if the northern districts of Helmand were to fall. Despite having little more than a battle group available (initially around 500 infantry), the UK deployed units into the beleaguered towns of Sangin, Now Zad and Musa Qaleh, beginning what became known as the ‘‘platoon house’’ strategy. The deployment met unexpectedly fierce resistance from the Taliban, who massed conventional forces to drive out the British. The British clung on grimly, withstanding siege and near constant attack until October 2006. At that time, the task force commander, Brigadier Ed Butler, negotiated a controversial arrangement with local tribal leaders.25 In exchange for guarantees that the Taliban would be prevented from retaking the town of Musa Qaleh, the British withdrew. Predictably the Taliban retook the town in February 2007. However, the British military presence in Musa Qaleh had been untenable almost from the outset. With insufficient troops to deter Taliban attacks, British weakness encouraged both direct Taliban assaults and increased the British reliance on defensive airstrikes. Not only was the resulting collateral damage deeply unpopular with the civilian population but the Taliban portrayed the British presence as supporting an unpopular leader, SMA. The strategy had other deleterious side effects. The serious deterioration in security during the summer of 2006, contributed to a difficult debate in Whitehall over whether the UK was ‘‘on’’ plan. Assessments of the security situation grew increasingly pessimistic and the focus on the fighting in the north of Helmand combined with the Taliban’s growing use of asymmetric tactics to affect both DFID and the FCO’s willingness to send staff—both because of the inherent security threat and the sense that the environment was 24
For an excellent discussion of statebuilding issues in Afghanistan see Astri Suhrke, ‘‘A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan’’ in International Peacekeeping Vol 15, No 2 (2008), pp. 214-236. See also Astri Suhrke, ‘‘The Dangers of a Tight Embrace: Externally Assisted Statebuilding in Afghanistan’’ in R Paris and D Sisk (Eds) ‘The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations’ (Routledge: London, 2009). 25 Interview with Col. Charlie Knaggs, February 2007.
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not conducive to development work.26 This further slowed the build up of civilian capacity in the PRT and reduced the military’s capacity to translate tactical military success into more enduring results. While in theory the British approach was more ‘‘comprehensive’’ than that of the United States, at least in terms of harnessing foreign, defense and development ministries to a common plan, the first two years were characterized by considerable difficulties in making the model work. The original UK Plan approach envisioned a ‘‘top down’’ and largely ‘‘apolitical’’ state building strategy that failed to adequately take into account Helmand’s dangerous volatility; the nature of Afghan political society; the few implementing partners willing to operate in such an insecure environment, and seriously underplayed the mechanisms and resources needed as well as the imperative to integrate the relevant civilian lines of operation within a COIN plan. This resulted in nearly 18 months of strategic drift in which much of the UK’s overall effort dissipated and the assumptions underpinning the original UK plan increasingly broke down. The year 2007 saw a significant increase in British forces in Afghanistan. As discussed later, British commanders began to focus on more effectively developing the capabilities and techniques for COIN, and on aligning military and development activities. Supporting this more focused and capable military effort, was the development of a detailed operational level plan. This emerged in fall 2007, when 52 Brigade’s deployment coincided with the a team arriving from the then PCRU. The new brigade and PCRU team agreed jointly to produce the ‘‘Helmand Road Map.’’ The Road Map was fashioned around elements of 52 Brigade’s Operational Design and Operational Plan. Hence it reflected what the military wanted to achieve and the scale of UK resources, and it also built on the lessons learned by the British PRT in the preceding two years.27 This bottom-up initiative coincided with a change of Prime Minster and a renewed emphasis by Whitehall on Afghanistan—creating space for a policy refresh. It also coincided with the arrival of a charismatic and influential Ambassador, Sir Sherard Cowper Coles, who shepherded the plan through the pitfalls of Whitehall. The Road Map set out a broad range of security, counternarcotics, development and governance objectives, reflecting existing UK, NATO and Government of Afghanistan policy frameworks, and resulting in a more detailed plan than the original ‘‘UK Joint Plan for Helmand.’’ However, the legacy of the Joint Plan was clear, with the Road Map combining the former’s ‘‘top down’’ state-building approach with significant efforts to stimulate local governance structures and enhancements to their capacity to draw down both national programs and the work of line ministries. It envisaged stabilization and political advisers being deployed into the Forward Operating Bases and 26
Interviews conducted with FCO and DFID staff on the condition of anonymity. Interviews with Sekander Ali, Senior Stabilisation Adviser, and Lt. Col. Richard Wardlaw, CO 36 Engineer Regiment and SO1 J9 TFH, Helmand Province December 2007. 27
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COIN in Afghanistan working with district authorities and local communities to build their trust in government and to sponsor the growth of community based structures with which formal government could link. The underlying intent was to channel political dialogue, largely defined by the voicing of community aspirations and grievances, through political channels maintained by the Provincial authorities. This meant focusing the UK security effort on supporting the disruption and containment of the military threat posed by the Taliban and creating a space for collaboration between the Afghan authorities and the key populations of Helmand. The dialogue was to be led by the Afghan Provincial Authorities and underwritten by their timely delivery of critical but basic public services—principally security, health, education and some rural infrastructure work. This was augmented by the UK’s support to key ministries designed to create a government that was increasingly able to deliver visibly against key expectations in the major population centers. Delivery of the Road Map depended on a better resourced and more effective British military and civil-military effort. Fortunately here, too, there have been significant improvements.28 The Military Campaign – More Resources and Less Fighting29 The British military campaign in Helmand has evolved from one centered on hard military power and directed at destroying the Taliban, to one focused on generating ‘‘soft effects’’ and securing the civilian population. Here too we see two phases in the Helmand campaign: an initial phase from May 2006 to September 2007, where the main effort involved major combat operations against the Taliban, followed by a second phase since October 2007, where the main effort has involved stabilization operations to secure and develop urban centers. The military campaign started badly. Under-strength and slow to arrive (taking three months to deploy the full task force of just over 3,000) 16 Air Assault Brigade lacked the necessary momentum. The force was promptly augmented by another 1,500 troops in response to the Taliban’s fierce resistance. The British military was not alone in underestimating the Taliban response. The Danes rushed special forces into theater to support the battle group they had embedded in the British task force, and the neighboring Canadians promptly reinforced their task force with Leopard 1C2 main battle tanks. As noted, under immense pressure from Karzai and Whitehall to support Governor Daoud, the British adopted a platoon house strategy which caused considerable attrition to Taliban forces yet made little strategic progress. Much to the fury of the U.S. head of Regional Command (South), Major General Ben 28 These conclusions are drawn from extensive interviews with the British, Danish, US and Estonian (civilian and military) members of the PRT conducted in 2007 and 2008. 29 This section draws extensively on material (including post-operations reports for all the British brigades) which the authors are unable to cite directly.
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Freakley, virtually the entire British task force was stuck defending towns from Taliban attack, and hence the British were unable to contribute forces to support the RC (South) scheme of manuever.30 In October 2006, 3 Commando Brigade took over from 16 Brigade with a very different concept of operations (CONOPS). The Royal Marines were determined not to be ‘‘fixed’’ by enemy action but rather to go on the offensive. To this end, 3 Commando created a number of Mobile Operations Groups (MOGs)—250 strong flying columns in 40 vehicles (a mix of Vikings and Land Rovers)—tasked with seeking out and engaging the Taliban. The idea was to disrupt and defeat the Taliban but they proved too wily to be drawn by the MOGs into prepared kill zones. Instead MOGs had to ‘‘advance to ambush’’ to engage the Taliban on their own terms.31 Moreover, as the brigade’s main effort was concentrated on military defeat of the enemy, little progress was made on stabilization and development. Greater military resources were committed to the British campaign with the deployment of 12 Mechanized Brigade in April 2007. In addition to having more troops, 12 Mechanized was far better equipped than its predecessors: it deployed with Warrior infantry fighting vehicles and the new Mastiff armoured vehicles, as well as two GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System) batteries. With 12 Brigade, there was also a return to the original UK plan. Indeed, whereas Brigadier Butler felt cut out from the drafting of the Joint Helmand Plan which he had been given to implement, the commander of 12 Brigade, Brigadier John Lorimer, had been on the PJHQ team that helped draft it. Hence, 12 Brigade’s CONOPS followed the ‘‘ink-spot strategy’’ of the original plan – namely to secure the Green Zone,32 focusing on the triangle formed by the towns of Lashkar Gah, Gereshk, and Sangin. However, 12 Brigade ended up pursuing an attrition campaign against the Taliban when it sought to secure the countryside between these towns through a series of ‘‘clearance operations.’’ These involved many pitched battles which the Taliban lost to an ever-rising body count. However, territory was not held afterwards, and so the Taliban were able to return once the British had departed. The lack of real progress led a frustrated Brigadier Lorimer to reflect that it felt rather like ‘‘mowing the lawn.’’33 The military campaign changed direction with 52 Brigade in October 2007. Borrowing from the draft FM 3-24, the brigade’s CONOPS was ‘‘clear, hold, build.’’ In contrast, 12 Brigade had done little holding and no building. Moreover, 52 Brigade’s Operational Design conceptualized the campaign center of gravity in terms of the local population instead of the enemy’s will 30
James Fergusson, A Million Bullets (Bantham Press, 2008), pp. 164-5. Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Helmand, Afghanistan (Ebury Press, 2008), pp. 77-8. 32 The Green Zone is the agricultural area that runs along the Helmand River, on which lie the main towns in Helmand. 33 Stephen Grey, Operation Snakebite (London: Penguin Viking, 2009), pp. 61-5. 31
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COIN in Afghanistan and ability to fight. Indeed, for the new task force commander, Brigadier Andrew Mackay, Taliban body count was a ‘‘corrupt measure of success.’’34 Accordingly, 52 Brigade’s campaign focused on influence operations to win the consent of the population and developed new capabilities for influence operations, including company level Non-kinetic Effects Teams, and a new methodology, the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF), to target non-kinetic activities and measure their effectiveness.35 This population-centric strategy continued under 16 Brigade on its second tour in Helmand from April to October 2008.36 This time under the command of Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, the brigade’s CONOPS was to ‘‘Go deep not broad.’’ Hence the British Task Force focused on protecting urban centres, and on developing the Afghan government’s influence and authority in those areas that realistically could be secured and held. Regarding the enemy, the focus was on undermining Taliban influence rather than fighting their forces. Like their predecessor, 16 Brigade strove to achieve an appropriate mix of kinetic and non-kinetic activities which was coordinated by a civil-military Joint Targeting Board. 16 Brigade did not continue with TCAF, but it did develop its own capabilities for soft effects—such as Radio Hewad.37 TCAF has since been readopted by the British and is currently in use by 19 Brigade in Helmand.38 It has also been adopted by the U.S. military: indeed, it was used by the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) that was embedded in the British Task Force under 52 and 16 Brigades, and it will be used by the 2nd MEB when they deploy into theater.39 Over the period 2006-2009, then, there were major improvements in the planning and conduct of the British COIN campaign in Helmand. One is tempted to find a very simple dynamic at play: that the British relearned old tricks. To be sure, the historical record supports this.40 Almost all of Britain’s 34
Commander British Forces, Op HERRICK 7, ‘‘Counterinsurgency in Helmand, Task Force Operational Design,’’ TFH/COMD/DO7, January 1, 2008, p. 2. 35 Telephone Interview with Brig. Andrew Mackay, Commander Task Force Helmand/52 Brigade, April 23, 2008. 36 Patrick Bishop, Ground Truth, 3 Para: Return to Helmand (London: Harper Press, 2009), pp. 18-20. 37 For critical account that explains why 16 Brigade abandoned TCAF, see David Wilson and Gareth E Conway ‘‘The Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework’’ RUSI Journal, vol. 154, no.1 (2009), pp 10-15. 38 Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Richard Wardlaw, CO 36 Engineer Regiment, Feb. 9, 2009. 39 For a positive account of the 24 MEU’s use of TCAF, see Rene L. Cote, ‘‘Data-Driven Stabilization: The Process of Selecting Reconstruction and Development Efforts,’’ July 13, 2009, http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/Data-Drive.Stabilization.pdf. 40 The historical record also shows that learning COIN is not easy for militaries. See John Kiszely, ‘‘Learning About Counterinsurgency,’’ Military Review, March-April 2007, pp. 5-10. Nor was it easy for the U.S. Military in Iraq. David Ucko, ‘‘Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency,’’ Orbis, Spring 2009.
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past COIN campaigns started poorly—excessive force, poor intelligence, no influence operations—and proved successful only when the British relearned and applied the principles of COIN.41 But we would suggest a more complex interaction of factors. First, the British were able to focus more on stabilization and development activities from early 2008 because the Taliban lost the will and ability to continue major combat operations in Helmand. In 2006-2007, Taliban forces suffered considerable attrition in heavy fighting with 16, 3 and 12 Brigades. British Defence Intelligence puts the number of Taliban dead in the thousands (though some British commanders have expressed doubts at such high figures). Clearly, since early 2008 the Taliban have switched from conventional to asymmetric tactics as their primary mode of warfare.42 Most casualties in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are now caused by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).43 Not only are the Taliban slower to engage in formation assaults on ISAF forces, when they do attack in numbers it is clear that there has been a decline in Taliban combat fieldcraft: the inference being that experienced fighters lost in 2006-2007 are being replaced by novices. Just as Taliban capabilities had diminished by early 2008, so Afghan National Army (ANA) capabilities were improving. The ANA grew from around 50,000 in 2007 to almost 80,000 in 2008.44 Moreover, the ANA increased its ability to conduct battalion-level operations; 30 percent of ANA battalions could do so with the support of international forces by December 2006, rising to 44 percent by December 2007 and 62 percent by December 2008.45 The situation in Helmand reflected this national trend, especially in terms of the capabilities of ANA battalions. Accordingly, the British task forces have been increasingly able to integrate ANA into their campaign. This is critical to building ANA confidence and capabilities to take over the security role and enabling the eventual withdrawal of ISAF. Thus we see a progression from using ANA to backfill areas secured by the British to, from late 2007 on, the partnering of ANA battalions with British battle groups and the ANA being given their own independent area of operations within Helmand.46 41
Victoria L. Nolan, ‘‘Command and Culture: Military leadership and the Evolution of the British Army’s Approach to Small Wars,’’ PhD thesis, King’s College London, 2009. 42 Interview with staff officer, Defence Intelligence, Ministry of Defence, London, late 2009. 43 16 Brigade reported the number of IEDs as ‘‘doubling’’ each month of their tour (April-October 2008). Notes from Collective Debrief of 16 Air Assault Brigade, December 3, 2008, Merville Barracks, Essex. US fatalities in ISAF caused by IEDs increased from 27 percent in 2006 to 54 percent in 2008, and 47 percent up to May 2009. Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variable of Reconstruction and Security in Post 9/11 Afghanistan, Brookings Institution, May 19, 2009, figure 1.3, p. 6. 44 Afghanistan Index, Figure 1.15, p. 12. 45 ISAF Metrics Brief, 2007-2008, UNCLASS // REL USA ISAF NATO, slide 8. 46 By mid 2007, there were five ANA battalions deployed in Helmand. Interview with Brig. Andrew Mackay, Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, Jan. 29, 2001.
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COIN in Afghanistan Table 1. British troop numbers in Afghanistan.50 Task force Brigade
Date
Size
16 Air Assault Bde 3 Commando Bde 12 Mechanised Bde 52 Bde 16 Air Assault Bde 3 Commando Bde
April–Oct. 2006 Oct. 2006–April 2007 April–Oct. 2007 Oct. 2007–April 2008 April–Oct. 2008 Oct. 2008–April 2009
3,150 (4,500) 5,200 6,500 7,750 8,530 8,300
Another important factor is that the campaign received more support and resources, especially as the British government shifted its strategic focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. Hence, British troops numbers more than doubled between late 2006 and late 2007, peaking in 2008 at just over 8,500 (see Table 1). Equally significant has been the better equipping of task forces from 12 Brigade on. Much of this additional kit has been acquired as Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR). The British soldier has received around 20 enhancements (new rifle sights, body armor, night-goggles, etc). One key new capability, the Mastiff armored vehicle, was originally acquired for Iraq within five months under the UOR scheme; some of these units were redirected to Afghanistan. Delivery of a larger purchase of Mastiff for Afghanistan is taking longer because of a complex refitting of the vehicle to meet campaign-specific specifications combined with limitations on industry’s ability to meet demand.47 In addition, in October the Defence Secretary announced a £500 Million ‘‘Protected Mobility Package’’ providing an additional 500 armored patrol and support vehicles for operations in Afghanistan.48 There has also been better support to brigades preparing for deployment. Whereas 16 and 3 Brigades were given poorly modified versions of the training package designed for Iraq, from 12 Brigade on the Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG) had produced a favorably received package for Afghanistan. Better training has undoubtedly contributed to the learning process, as will the new collective debrief methodology introduced by the Land Warfare Centre in 2008. The Afghanistan campaign is also finally being supported by new doctrine: the Army published its updated COIN field manual in April 2009,49 and the British are publishing a new joint doctrine on stabilisation operations (JDP 3-40). This is not to say that the British military campaign in Helmand is perfect. British commanders show a keen awareness of the damage, especially to local confidence and support, caused by air strikes. Yet the British task force 47
Interview with SO2, Directive of Joint Capability, MOD Main Building, Feb. 6, 2009. Ministry of Defence, ‘‘New Armoured Vehicles for Afghanistan,’’ October 29, 2008, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/. 49 Army Field Manual Vol. 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency, AC71876, April 2009. 50 Data from ISAF Troops Placemat archive at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/ placemat.html. 48
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has not managed to reduce the number of air strikes—which has remained at 500-540 air strikes for each brigade between April 2007 and March 2009— despite the introduction of GMLRS.51 Indeed, equally striking is that demand for GMLRS has increased over this period. However, greater use of GMLRS is still an improvement as other options would likely have been higher yield and air dropped. A second problem is the shortage of helicopters, which is a major complaint in successive post-operations reports by campaign commanders. The nature of the evolving threat on the ground, coupled with the challenging terrain, means that helicopter flying hours will always be at a premium. Since 2006 improvements, admittedly much needed from the early days, have delivered a 30 percent increase in flying hours. Furthermore, using UOR procurement technical improvements have been made to several aircraft, which lacked optimal performance for ‘‘hot and high.’’ The situation will further improve following the withdrawal of British forces from Basra, when seven Merlins are to be moved from Iraq to Afghanistan.52 Finally, the British campaign has lacked continuity of command with a new Helmand Task Force commander arriving every six months. This, as much as lessons learned, has resulted in each task force pursuing a different campaign design from its predecessor. Actually, this may have increased the agility of the British campaign in better enabling it to adapt to a dynamic strategic environment (e.g., Taliban attrition and growing ANA capability).53 Nonetheless, more continuity of command would be desirable and proposals are now being considered in MOD to achieve this (including longer tours for key staff positions). In sum, there can be no doubt that the military side of the campaign has improved substantially since 2006. The Comprehensive Approach – Modest Progress in Helmand The third improvement is in linking cross government efforts in what the MOD labels as the ‘‘comprehensive approach’’—essentially an offshoot of the ‘‘joined up government’’54 agenda introduced by Tony Blair in 1997. In practice both concepts have meant coordinating the work of a disparate flotilla 51
To be fair, ISAF as a whole is struggling with this problem. Carlotta Gall and Taimoor Shah, ‘‘Afghan Villagers Describe Chaos of U.S. Strikes,’’ New York Times, 15 May 2009. 52 Michael Evans, ‘‘British Troops in Helmand Get Extra Helicopters at Last,’’ The Times, January 31, 2009, p. 47. 53 This argument here is a counter-intuitive but important one. Organizations have a natural bias in favor of exploiting core competencies over exploring new approaches and capabilities. In organization theory, this is called ‘‘the competency trap.’’ Good corporate memory reinforces this bias and therefore makes organizations less adaptive: that is, less inclined to undertake risky and new activities. Personnel turnover reduces corporate memory and, in turn, makes organizations more inclined to try new approaches to persistent problems. Jerker Denrell and James G. March, ‘‘Adaptation as Information Restriction: The Hot Stove Effect,’’ in James G. March, ed., Explorations in Organizations (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 116-146. 54 The term was first used by Tony Blair when he launched the Social Exclusion Unit in 1997.
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COIN in Afghanistan of agencies, departments, units and professions, and overcoming contradictory departmental imperatives. The UK experience of operationalizing this in Helmand is testimony to the difficulties involved in developing even a common sense of ‘‘mission’’ that is able to bind the activities of the departments. Nevertheless, the MOD has been particularly enthusiastic for ‘‘comprehensive’’ working—reflecting changes in the department’s understanding of the complex origins of ‘‘conflict’’; it’s experience of operations in the Balkans and subsequently the ‘‘Global War on Terror’’; and finally debates relating to the transformation of the military itself, particularly the emergence of the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). The MOD has been heavily influenced in its understanding of the complexity of conflict by the ‘‘human security’’ agenda. This shaped both its understanding of conflict causality and its appetite for harnessing the capacity of other actors to address root causes. This approach was reinforced by its experiences in the Balkans from 1991, where it discovered crises involving a complex ‘‘interplay of civilian, para-military and military groups and individuals, International Organisations (IOs) and the mass Media.’’ New doctrine on The Comprehensive Approach published in 2006 encapsulated the MOD’s rediscovery of the limits of the military instrument in transforming conflict and the significance of what has increasingly been termed ‘‘civilian effect.’’55 Largely reflecting the UK’s experiences with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR II) mission in Bosnia, the MOD’s focus on comprehensive working was initially on transforming relationships with the nongovernmental and UN humanitarian systems at the tactical level. However, NATO’s response first to the refugee crisis emanating from Kosovo in 1998-1999 and subsequently to regional stabilization reinforced the growing sense that the scale of crises made tactical level coordination, mostly shared understanding and some cooperation between like minded individuals, insufficient. In response to this, the level at which cooperation occurred was elevated to the ‘‘operational’’ level—initially with the establishment of (limited) DFID and FCO representation in the UK Defence Crisis Management Organization (DCMO) and, in particular, at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). However, subsequent experience in the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone (2000), and during the invasions of Afghanistan (November 2001) and Iraq (2003), highlighted the continuing absence of machinery at the military strategic level for planning across government.56 The principal remedy to this was the establishment of the cross–Whitehall PCRU in 2004. Reinforcing MOD enthusiasm for the comprehensive approach was the development of EBAO. This concept originated in the United States, specifically in a hugely ambitious program to transform the U.S. military. 55
The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, JDCC, Shrivenham, January 2006. 56 Interview with Lt. Col. Matthew Jackson, Commander, Joint CIMIC Group, October 2008.
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Started in 2001, this U.S. program has centered on developing next generation technologies in stealth, sensor, information processing and communications, to transform the U.S. military into a wholly networked force capable of effects based operations (EBO). With EBO, the enemy is re-conceptualized and understood as a complex, adaptive system of systems. EBO then involves identifying and concentrating action against the key nodes and links that comprise that system, causing it to collapse. Such an approach resonated strongly in the UK; offering both a means for addressing the complexity of the contemporary battlefield and for offsetting the deleterious impact of budgetary pressures on capabilities.57 Nevertheless, the agenda, as played out in the UK, was different from that in the United States. While adopting the ethos of the original U.S. ‘‘transformational’’ agenda (albeit less well resourced) there were also a range of largely British elements; embedding the changes in pursuing an ‘‘ethical foreign policy’’; a stronger preference for ‘‘softer’’ effects (leveraging diplomatic, information and development actors); and a much greater willingness to countenance less hierarchical forms of cooperation between the defence, development and foreign ministries.58 Collectively these strengthened the demand for civilian departments, principally the FCO and DFID, to support the MOD in both ‘‘transforming’’ conflict through rapidly applied ‘‘development’’ activity and the provision of a political vision that would make possible a sustainable peace and the consolidation of tactical military victories.59 While the MOD’s appetite for comprehensive working had reached a high point by 2006 there were marked differences with other departments, particularly DFID and the FCO. Neither had career incentives for working in what the MOD termed ‘‘expeditionary environments,’’ but in the case of DFID the issues ran much deeper; reflecting a department configured around a ‘‘poverty reduction’’ rather than a traditional ‘‘national interest’’ agenda. DFID’s focus on poverty reduction in supporting the UN’s millennium development goals were enshrined in legislation (the 2002 International Development Act (IDA)) and militated against the type of cooperation presumed by many within the MOD. Development best practice also warned against seeking to use money as a ‘‘weapon system’’— highlighting the potential to undermine peace and the beneficiary state, to create perverse incentives, and to reinforce the war economy.60 While there was good evidence to support the DFID position, the assumptions made by some within the MOD were voiced more powerfully, 57
Theo Farrell, ‘‘The Dynamics of British Military Transformation,’’ International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4 (2008), pp. 777-808. 58 Incorporating and Extending the UK Military Effects-Based Approach, Joint Doctrine Note 7/06, DCDC, Shrivenham, September 2006. 59 Interviews with Col. Ian Westerman, Assistant Director MultiAgency Operations, MOD DCDC, October 2008. 60 Interviews with Debbie Palmer and Lou Ecclestone, Stabilisation Unit, April 2008.
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COIN in Afghanistan and in the context of wars in which UK servicemen were losing their lives, DFID found it difficult to make their arguments stick. DFID’s capacity to articulate the risks of the MOD approach was further undermined by some military officers who sensed that the organization preferred to work around conflict rather than on it. In 2002 it had largely disengaged from planning for the invasion of Iraq, reflecting a widespread opposition to the conflict within DFID and stemming from the Secretary of State, Clare Short’s attitudes, but also reflecting the culture of large parts of the department. DFID’s creation and rapid expansion in 1997 had led to heavy recruitment from the NGO sector; a community that was unlikely to favor the type of robust interventionism evident in Iraq. Furthermore, the rapid expansion of DFID’s budget since 1997 placed considerable pressure on the organization for ensuring effective program management.61 The elegant solution, and one which again reflected best practice among donor states, was to pour money through multilateral partners and national state structures, building beneficiary state capacity in more sustainable ways than the direct delivery of public services by donors. However, elements of the military labored under the assumption that development workers did rather than funded or supported capacity building strategies. Meanwhile DFID staff argued, and with considerable justification, that since 2004 they had invested in the PCRU (renamed the ‘Stabilisation Unit’ in 2007) to deliver the type of conflict stabilization work that middle ranking officers within the MOD expected.62 This became an unnecessary source of tension from 2006. The FCO also struggled with operationalizing ‘‘joined up’’ approaches in theaters such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Configured around delivering what could be termed ‘‘strategic diplomacy’’ it found it difficult to find appropriately experienced staff as well as structures and strategies that could deliver the local level diplomatic engagement necessitated by the tribal politics of both conflicts.63 There were also significant differences over precisely what the civilian role should be, particularly in relation to the setting of and supporting operational priorities in Helmand. Middle ranking military complained vocally that DFID’s activities were too long term and distant to have sufficient visibility or impact in Helmand, while more senior military frequently conceptualized the civilian role as delivering a form of development based ‘‘backfill’’ designed to enable and improve military operations. In such a model the military defined the operational priorities and objectives and civilians were expected to provide a form of reconstruction ‘‘follow on force.’’ The civilian ministries chafed against this approach, arguing that it could not be further from the 61
Anonymous interview with DFID-A staff October 2008. The Stabilization Unit website is at http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/. 63 Interview with Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, UK Ambassador to Afghanistan, Kabul, October 2008. 62
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military’s own model of a politically-led COIN campaign. DFID staff also questioned a strategy that simplistically linked the construction of Afghan infrastructure by international donors (and military) to the consolidation of an Afghan state. The largely kinetic character of the British COIN campaign in 2006-07, also gave DFID and FCO reason to question the military’s understanding of, and commitment to, broader stabilization and development operations. The UK civilians in theatre did gradually develop a capacity for ‘‘political leadership’’ at the operational level, although until 2008 the pace of change was hamstrung by difficulties in getting high quality civil servants to Helmand, and a reluctance to deploy them in the military’s Forward Operating Bases. Against this most unpromising background of clashing institutional cultures, there has been remarkable progress in the level of civilian effort and in civil-military integration within Helmand. PRT civilian staff numbers have grown from around 25 in 2007 to 80 in 2009. Moreover, in late 2008, the task force headquarters and the PRT were merged into a combined Civil-Military Mission in Helmand (CMMH) which is led by an FCO civilian ‘‘two-star.’’ Also by 2008, the PRT had stabilization advisers deployed in four Forward Operating Bases across Helmand (Gereshk, Musa Qaleh, Garmsir and Sangin), and the military had established ‘‘Military Stabilisation Support Teams’’ in the key districts to significantly extend the reach and capability of the ‘‘civil effect’’— which is now limited by the ‘‘reformability’’ of Afghan society rather than the number of deployed British civilians.64 Helmand, 2009-2010—Prospects and Challenges There is reason to be optimistic. The UK military has made significant advances in enhancing its capabilities and its approach to COIN, and of working with civilian partners to stabilize and develop Helmand. Moreover, the new Obama strategy (unveiled on March 27)65 promises increased numbers of U.S. troops and civilian advisers, more development investments, reinvigorated regional diplomacy and a more sophisticated strategy towards Pakistan. There are other significant changes: the piecemeal policies for pursuing insurgents into Pakistan appear to have given way to a more coherent and expansive program for actively stabilizing the Pakistani state. And there is a renewed emphasis on speeding the deployment of capable Afghan security forces, extending the legitimacy of the Afghan state and facilitating grass roots 64
‘‘GS (Afg) 4: Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,’’ Written Evidence submitted to Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Jan. 23, 2009, para. 18, http://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/memo/afghanistan/ucgs0402.htm. 65 White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 2009, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_ pakistan_white_paper_final.pdf.
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COIN in Afghanistan employment generation rather than mass infrastructure ‘‘reconstruction.’’ There also appears to be more focus, conditionality and coherence in the assistance promised both to Afghanistan and Pakistan and greater levels of support to an Afghan led program of political outreach to ‘‘reconcilable’’ Pashtuns. The arrival of many thousands of U.S. Marines since June 2009 has made a big difference to the ISAF campaign in the province. But there remain the perennial challenges to progress; ISAF’s lack of ‘‘unity of effort’’ and the smothering impact of Afghan national politics, the narcotics industry, corruption and the dysfunctionality of the state itself. The Obama strategy is also far from being a panacea. While we recognize that a substantial element of the U.S. troop surge is deployed to train Afghan forces—‘‘leveraging’’ Afghan capacity—and that garrisoning large numbers of foreign troops has the potential to aggravate Pashtun xenophobia, we wonder whether the increased U.S. troop numbers are enough given the challenges of stabilizing Afghanistan. The Obama strategy reflects perhaps more Vice President Joe Biden’s efforts to develop a counterterrorism mission, than the more expansive and resource heavy counterinsurgency approach. While Obama himself has endorsed the idea of ‘‘counterinsurgency’’ as at the heart of his new strategy, the military resource levels are perhaps closer to those necessary for a far more limited counterterrorism strategy.
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