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Comment on “Can we live without a dog? Consumption life cycles in dog–owner relationships”
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Journal of Business Research 61 (2008) 579 – 580
Comment on “Can we live without a dog? Consumption life cycles in dog–owner relationships” John O'Shaughnessy 1801 Cavazos Court, The Villages, FL 32162, USA
Abstract The intention in this commentary is to anchor the paper to concepts from the consumer behavior literature and highlight departures from what we might expect. © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.
These comments focus on the study itself. Toward the end of the paper, the author discusses “theoretical implications about relationships.” My comments will not repeat what he says there but, rather, will try to see what sensitizing concepts the behavioral literature might offer and will inquire about what is different from what we claim applies to other forms of buying. Thought alone can generate emotion. As Kagan (2006) points out, this generative process starts early in that children experience strong feelings when certain thoughts enter consciousness. In this way, the author's desire for a dog emerged from thinking about the stories of Podger, a dog that belonged to his wife's family. The stories provided a symbolic representation of what it would be like (would really be like) to have a dog in the family. Interestingly, the first dog had to be returned to the rescue home because of its behavior. Yet the author gives no indication that he viewed the acquisition of another dog as risky. However, beliefs generally reflect experience, and the author had previously experienced a bad outcome. Thus, regret theory would have predicted his taking account of future regret (Bell 1982, 1985). It was the family's first dog — Zeb, a golden retriever — who introduced the author to the pluses and minuses of owning a dog. Experiences with products always involve learning opportunities, and one lesson for this dog owner was that that the declarative knowledge in a text on dog training differed
E-mail address: [email protected]. 0148-2963/$ - see front matter © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.07.012
from procedural knowledge insofar as “knowing that” (a cognition) is not the same thing as “knowing how” (a skill). More learning resulted from the experience of participating in the dog's whole life cycle. The enjoyment of another entails a penalty in that we experience sorrow at their decline and death. Inanimate products can be tokens of each other, but living creatures such as dogs never are. If we followed rational choice theory (RCT), we would take account of such long-term “costs” but, in the case of animal companions, this does not happen. Especially in the case of pets, new acquisitions are not necessarily purchased. For example, consider the semi-feral cat that was just inherited with the house, as well as the rabbits and sheep. These creatures served as symbolic icons of a rural lifestyle and as a sort of fantasy based on living the simple life, close to nature. Interestingly, however, we hear nothing about either decision strategies (such as compensatory decision-making heuristics) or decision processes (such as the rational progression of want recognition followed by the search for alternatives and the acquisition of information leading to an awareness set, a reduced consideration set of options, and so on in the manner described by virtually all the marketing texts). The reason I suspect is little rational decision making as we know it actually occurred. Of course, plausible reasons are given for buying a dog — the function of guarding the house; the enjoyment of the creature's company; the image projected by pet ownership; children's education; and, finally, fun. But, as noted by Velleman (1989), many such reasons are simply rationalizations to justify the emergence of an implicit favorite. Here, I would suspect, the simple desire for a dog led to buying that mainly
580
J. O'Shaughnessy / Journal of Business Research 61 (2008) 579–580
followed the likeability heuristic — that is, choosing on the basis of liking. The fact that, as noted later, the children participated in the decision supports this role of likeability. Ah!, but not quite, insofar as both husband and wife recognized the need to feed and look after any dog bought. Nonetheless, we find no sign of this recognition having led to any sort of conjunctive rule. If decisions were simply a matter of calculating costs versus benefits (economic value to the customer), the problems of living with a dog and the responsibilities of ensuring its safety and health would have risen to the fore. Yet these considerations did not seem to enter into the decision to acquire a dog. Thus, if rationality depends on the consideration of both short- and longterm consequences, we might question the rationality of the dog-acquisition commitment. People are usually shamed into cleaning up a dog's mess. Shame arises from violating social norms. But if such norms require the supplementary reinforcement of laws and legal penalties, we might infer that shame no longer serves as the deterrent of old. Charles Taylor (1987) contrasts instrumental reasons with expressive reasons for doing something. Expressive behaviors reflect feelings and values. Rather than serving as instrumental means, they constitute ends in themselves. In this spirit, if a dog is actually bought because it symbolizes an idealized lifestyle, would this purchase not qualify as a form of expressive behavior? The author asks, “Can we live without a dog?” A negative answer would put having a dog on the same level as the
need to have food and drink — obviously, a ridiculous suggestion. Instead, the question should be, “Would we ever want to live without a dog?” Probably not, it seems, because — in owning one dog after another — a dog becomes an informational anchor to reassure the dog owner that some things are the same, even in an ever-changing world. As the author says, a dog offers affection and “rapport.” In prospect theory, one implication of loss aversion is the endowment effect in which the value of something increases when a person already possesses it. Certainly, the value of a dog to the dog owner increases as time goes on, though I am not sure that this would be viewed as an exemplar of the endowment effect. After all, a mere coffee cup or other such endowment exemplar does not lick your face or fetch your pipe and slippers. References Bell DE. Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Oper Res 1982;30:961–81. Bell DE. Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty. Oper Res 1985;33:1–27. Kagan Jerome. An argument for mind. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 2006. Taylor Charles. “Language and Human Nature,”. In: Gibbons Michael T, editor. Interpreting Politics. New York, NY: New York University Press; 1987. p. 101–32. Velleman David J. Practical Reflection. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press; 1989.
Journal of Business Research 61 (2008) 579 – 580
Comment on “Can we live without a dog? Consumption life cycles in dog–owner relationships” John O'Shaughnessy 1801 Cavazos Court, The Villages, FL 32162, USA
Abstract The intention in this commentary is to anchor the paper to concepts from the consumer behavior literature and highlight departures from what we might expect. © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.
These comments focus on the study itself. Toward the end of the paper, the author discusses “theoretical implications about relationships.” My comments will not repeat what he says there but, rather, will try to see what sensitizing concepts the behavioral literature might offer and will inquire about what is different from what we claim applies to other forms of buying. Thought alone can generate emotion. As Kagan (2006) points out, this generative process starts early in that children experience strong feelings when certain thoughts enter consciousness. In this way, the author's desire for a dog emerged from thinking about the stories of Podger, a dog that belonged to his wife's family. The stories provided a symbolic representation of what it would be like (would really be like) to have a dog in the family. Interestingly, the first dog had to be returned to the rescue home because of its behavior. Yet the author gives no indication that he viewed the acquisition of another dog as risky. However, beliefs generally reflect experience, and the author had previously experienced a bad outcome. Thus, regret theory would have predicted his taking account of future regret (Bell 1982, 1985). It was the family's first dog — Zeb, a golden retriever — who introduced the author to the pluses and minuses of owning a dog. Experiences with products always involve learning opportunities, and one lesson for this dog owner was that that the declarative knowledge in a text on dog training differed
E-mail address: [email protected]. 0148-2963/$ - see front matter © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.07.012
from procedural knowledge insofar as “knowing that” (a cognition) is not the same thing as “knowing how” (a skill). More learning resulted from the experience of participating in the dog's whole life cycle. The enjoyment of another entails a penalty in that we experience sorrow at their decline and death. Inanimate products can be tokens of each other, but living creatures such as dogs never are. If we followed rational choice theory (RCT), we would take account of such long-term “costs” but, in the case of animal companions, this does not happen. Especially in the case of pets, new acquisitions are not necessarily purchased. For example, consider the semi-feral cat that was just inherited with the house, as well as the rabbits and sheep. These creatures served as symbolic icons of a rural lifestyle and as a sort of fantasy based on living the simple life, close to nature. Interestingly, however, we hear nothing about either decision strategies (such as compensatory decision-making heuristics) or decision processes (such as the rational progression of want recognition followed by the search for alternatives and the acquisition of information leading to an awareness set, a reduced consideration set of options, and so on in the manner described by virtually all the marketing texts). The reason I suspect is little rational decision making as we know it actually occurred. Of course, plausible reasons are given for buying a dog — the function of guarding the house; the enjoyment of the creature's company; the image projected by pet ownership; children's education; and, finally, fun. But, as noted by Velleman (1989), many such reasons are simply rationalizations to justify the emergence of an implicit favorite. Here, I would suspect, the simple desire for a dog led to buying that mainly
580
J. O'Shaughnessy / Journal of Business Research 61 (2008) 579–580
followed the likeability heuristic — that is, choosing on the basis of liking. The fact that, as noted later, the children participated in the decision supports this role of likeability. Ah!, but not quite, insofar as both husband and wife recognized the need to feed and look after any dog bought. Nonetheless, we find no sign of this recognition having led to any sort of conjunctive rule. If decisions were simply a matter of calculating costs versus benefits (economic value to the customer), the problems of living with a dog and the responsibilities of ensuring its safety and health would have risen to the fore. Yet these considerations did not seem to enter into the decision to acquire a dog. Thus, if rationality depends on the consideration of both short- and longterm consequences, we might question the rationality of the dog-acquisition commitment. People are usually shamed into cleaning up a dog's mess. Shame arises from violating social norms. But if such norms require the supplementary reinforcement of laws and legal penalties, we might infer that shame no longer serves as the deterrent of old. Charles Taylor (1987) contrasts instrumental reasons with expressive reasons for doing something. Expressive behaviors reflect feelings and values. Rather than serving as instrumental means, they constitute ends in themselves. In this spirit, if a dog is actually bought because it symbolizes an idealized lifestyle, would this purchase not qualify as a form of expressive behavior? The author asks, “Can we live without a dog?” A negative answer would put having a dog on the same level as the
need to have food and drink — obviously, a ridiculous suggestion. Instead, the question should be, “Would we ever want to live without a dog?” Probably not, it seems, because — in owning one dog after another — a dog becomes an informational anchor to reassure the dog owner that some things are the same, even in an ever-changing world. As the author says, a dog offers affection and “rapport.” In prospect theory, one implication of loss aversion is the endowment effect in which the value of something increases when a person already possesses it. Certainly, the value of a dog to the dog owner increases as time goes on, though I am not sure that this would be viewed as an exemplar of the endowment effect. After all, a mere coffee cup or other such endowment exemplar does not lick your face or fetch your pipe and slippers. References Bell DE. Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Oper Res 1982;30:961–81. Bell DE. Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty. Oper Res 1985;33:1–27. Kagan Jerome. An argument for mind. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 2006. Taylor Charles. “Language and Human Nature,”. In: Gibbons Michael T, editor. Interpreting Politics. New York, NY: New York University Press; 1987. p. 101–32. Velleman David J. Practical Reflection. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press; 1989.