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Comment on Social Marketing: Are We Fiddling While Rome Burns?
JOURNAL OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY, 6(2),197-201 Copyright O 1997, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Comment on Social Marketing: Are We Fiddling While Rome Bums? William D. Wells School of Journalism and Mass Communication University of Minnesota
In "Social Marketing: Are We Fiddling While Rome Burns?' Goldberg urged university-based consumer psychologists to "take on some of the many social marketing issues that lie awaiting" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 367). He also urged us to focus on "upstream" rather than "downstream" issues (pp. 357-366), employ "micro-lab experimentation" (pp. 356-357), and enter the political arena to advance the implications of our work (pp. 366-367). It easy to agree that we should address social issues. Many do that now. It is not so easy to agree that we should focus on upstream rather than downstream issues or that micro-lab experimentation is the method of choice. It is very difficult to agree that we should enter the political arena where, as Goldberg acknowledged, "the adversaries are contending for power, not truth" (p. 366).
UPSTREAM MICRO-LAB EXPERIMENTATION Upstream micro-lab experimentation presents formidable problems. As Goldberg (1995) noted, upstream issues involve "altering the institutions that form the social system" (p. 365). As he also noted, micro-lab experiments are "insensitive to the complexities of context and embeddedness and fail to assess the manner in which the treatment of interest interacts with the inevitably complex array of significant factors in the broader social system" (p. 352). In other words, it's very hard to bring important social issues into the lab. Consider, for example, the way micro-lab experimenters manage independent variables. To induce "significant" effects, they employ contrasts that cannot be accomplished in the real world. Or, consider the way they manage confounding Rquests for reprints should be sent to William D. Wells, 198 East 6th Street #701, St. Paul, MN 55101.
variables. To maximize effects, they "control"-that is, eliminate-all factors that might overcome the independent variable. Outside the laboratory, those factors all come back in. These tactics would not be so ominous if micro-lab experimenters always focused on the most important influences. Unhappily, the most important influences are the hardest to manipulate realistically, so micro-lab experimenters focus on the most locally manageable influences and shut the others out. As a consequence, treatments that have large effects in micro-laboratories are dampened, even canceled, when they meet the competitive complexities of outside events. Finally, consider the way micro-lab experimenters handle dependent variables. Instead of measuring in-context behavior, they measure surrogates-memories, attitudes, intentions, make-believe decisions, and so on. As everyone knows, the road from surrogate to action is long and tortuous. It's not surprising, then, that treatments that have major impact on surrogates have minor impact on real behavior in real life. For all these reasons, extrapolations from micro-lab experiments to real-world environments are extremely hazardous. When micro-lab experimenters model upstream social policies, the hazards all become much worse. These hazards can be seen in an experiment Goldberg offered as a model of the micro-lab at work (Gorn & Goldberg, 1982). In this experiment, low-income children at a summer camp in Quebec, Canada, viewed half-hour cartoon programs every day for 2 weeks. The programs included TV commercials for fruit, orange juice, and yogurt in one condition and commercials for candy, Crackerjacks, and Kool-Aid in another. When the children chose snacks, "their choices tended to reflect their viewing experience. In particular, there was a 20% difference between the groups viewing Kool-Aid or orange juice commercials and the drinks they selected" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 361). Now imagine this experiment extended to real life. Exposure and attention to orangejuice commercials would need to match exposure and attention to Kool-Aid commercials. Without massive changes in the marketing environment-which would surely produce a long list of not necessarily desirable side effects-this condition could not be met. Moreover, to duplicate the impact of the summer camp experiment, every child would need to watch one preselected TV program every day and not watch anything else. Exactly how would one do that? It would be necessary to control confounding variables. In the experiment, orange juice and Kool-Aid were equally available. In the real world, orange juice is more expensive and less convenient than Kool-Aid. Absent massive interference with the marketing system, and absent supervision over what goes on in every kitchen, availability could not be that well matched. In the experiment, the dependent variable was children's choices. In the real world, purchases by caregivers-a factor not considered in the experiment-would be a necessary antecedent. While TV advertisements (among other factors) might
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influence children's preferences and children's preferences (among other factors) might influence caregivers' purchases, the relationships would not be perfect. Thus, a treatment that had a large effect in this experiment might well have a small effect-and maybe even no effect-on what ordinary children really drink. In his advocacy of microexperimentation, Goldberg expressed dissatisfaction with four "macroexperiments" that showed "generally small" effects (p. 353). He then cited the 20% difference between orange juice and Kool-Aid as a demonstration of the power of the micro-lab approach. It is legitimate to wonder, however, how much of that 20% difference would survive authentic application to real events. Combining upstream social issues and micro-lab experimentation presents still another problem. Like the rest of us, researchers who conduct microexperiments want to be useful. Therefore, having recited all of the experiment's "limitations," they move on to "managerial implications." In the implications, they generalize to all messages, all media, all circumstances, and all consumers. When real-world decision makers notice these departures, they decide that the experimenters could not have been serious. This gives the discipline a bad name. Even worse, when social advocatesfind outcomes that fit their preconceptions, they embrace the "implications" and suppress the rest. Where the report says-note the accurateand modest claim- the results suggest that children's choices tended to reflect their viewing experience" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 361), the advocate's press release says, "Research shows that TV advertisementsfor orangejuice increase consumption 20%!" This common sequence puts a larger burden on the micro-laboratory than this experiment--or any combination of microexperiments-can support. For all these reasons, it is not easy to agree that we should focus on upstream rather than downstream social issues or that micro-lab experimentation is the method of choice.
POWER, NOT TRUTH It is hardest of all to agree that university-based consumer psychologists should forsake the "conservative" limits of "structural-functionalism" (Goldberg, 1995, pp. 365-367) and become political activists. Goldberg recommended that we embrace "critical theory," which, as he said, calls for (a) "gaining an understanding of the perspectives of the individuals in a social system," (b) "describing the nature of institutions and the constraints they impose on individuals," (c) "identifying and assessing the effects of any discrepancies between the individual's perspective and observed constraints," (d) using "the conclusions drawn at step three ... to politicize relevant individuals or groups," and (e) constructing and conducting "a political program of action" to put upstream social strategies into effect (pp. 364-367). I agree that university-based consumer psychologists might be good at learning how consumers view the social system-although surveys and depth interviews
200
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seem better suited than microexperiments to that task. I also agree that universitybased consumer psychologists might be good at assessing gaps between real constraints and perceived constraints-although our academic training does not show us how to do that. However, I flatly disagree with the recommendation that, having assessed those gaps (or anything else that implies altering the social system) we should step into the political arena to contend for power, not truth. In my view, that recommendation contradicts our very reason for being. Throughout their histories, universities have focused on knowledge-knowledge preserved in libraries and museums, transmitted through thoughtful instruction, and discovered through impartial scholarly research. Devotion to knowledge is the sole valid argument for academic freedom (and tenure), and it is always compromised when university-based researchers enter the political arena to advance the implications of their work. This is not to say that researchers are not citizens. Like all members of all democracies, we are privileged to enter politics in any way we see fit. It is only to assert that the role of knowledge-seeker and the role of political contender are fundamentally antithetical and that no participant-however iron-willed--can play both parts in the same conflict to full effect. Two close parallels come to mind. When members of advertising agencies' research departments conduct "tests" of their agencies' creative products, they are always suspected (often correctly) of having selected methods and filtered findings so as to make the numbers come out right. The instant they do that, they become superfluous. The agencies have plenty of willing advocates in the creative and account groups. When university-based consumer psychologists become expert witnesses in litigation, they are always suspected (often correctly) of having selected methods and filtered findings so as to support the side they happen to be on. When that happens, the court is treated to the sorry spectacle of equally qualified, highly respected, university-based experts, sworn to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," adamantly advocating conflicting conclusions. This does little to maintain confidence in social science. If university-based consumer psychologists use their research findings to politicize relevant individuals or groups or to construct and conduct political programs of action, they will be suspected (often correctly) of having selected methods and filtered findings to support apredetermined cause. This will endanger the university because propaganda can be had elsewhere at lower cost. So in place of Goldberg's recommendations, I would advocate a much more conservative approach. On the assumption that knowledge is more useful than opinion, I would recommend that university-based consumer psychologists focus on producing and publishing ecologically valid findings and then step back. Trustworthy newspapers build fire walls between hard news and editorial. For exactly the same reasons, we should do nothing less.
SOCIAL MARKETING
201
Goldberg feared that, in the absence of a "more upstream critical theory approach," important findings will "languish (Goldberg, 1995, p. 366). I argue that the surest way to be socially useful is to produce valid conclusions, and the surest way to lose credibility is to contend for power, not truth.
REFERENCES Goldberg, M. E. (1995). Social marketing: Are we fiddling while Rome bums? Journal of Consumer Psychology, 4, 347-370. Gorn, G. J., & Goldberg, M. E. (1982). Behavioral evidence of the effects of televised food messages on children. Journal o f Consumer Research, 9, 2MT205.
Accepted by Dipankar Chakravarti.
Comment on Social Marketing: Are We Fiddling While Rome Bums? William D. Wells School of Journalism and Mass Communication University of Minnesota
In "Social Marketing: Are We Fiddling While Rome Burns?' Goldberg urged university-based consumer psychologists to "take on some of the many social marketing issues that lie awaiting" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 367). He also urged us to focus on "upstream" rather than "downstream" issues (pp. 357-366), employ "micro-lab experimentation" (pp. 356-357), and enter the political arena to advance the implications of our work (pp. 366-367). It easy to agree that we should address social issues. Many do that now. It is not so easy to agree that we should focus on upstream rather than downstream issues or that micro-lab experimentation is the method of choice. It is very difficult to agree that we should enter the political arena where, as Goldberg acknowledged, "the adversaries are contending for power, not truth" (p. 366).
UPSTREAM MICRO-LAB EXPERIMENTATION Upstream micro-lab experimentation presents formidable problems. As Goldberg (1995) noted, upstream issues involve "altering the institutions that form the social system" (p. 365). As he also noted, micro-lab experiments are "insensitive to the complexities of context and embeddedness and fail to assess the manner in which the treatment of interest interacts with the inevitably complex array of significant factors in the broader social system" (p. 352). In other words, it's very hard to bring important social issues into the lab. Consider, for example, the way micro-lab experimenters manage independent variables. To induce "significant" effects, they employ contrasts that cannot be accomplished in the real world. Or, consider the way they manage confounding Rquests for reprints should be sent to William D. Wells, 198 East 6th Street #701, St. Paul, MN 55101.
variables. To maximize effects, they "control"-that is, eliminate-all factors that might overcome the independent variable. Outside the laboratory, those factors all come back in. These tactics would not be so ominous if micro-lab experimenters always focused on the most important influences. Unhappily, the most important influences are the hardest to manipulate realistically, so micro-lab experimenters focus on the most locally manageable influences and shut the others out. As a consequence, treatments that have large effects in micro-laboratories are dampened, even canceled, when they meet the competitive complexities of outside events. Finally, consider the way micro-lab experimenters handle dependent variables. Instead of measuring in-context behavior, they measure surrogates-memories, attitudes, intentions, make-believe decisions, and so on. As everyone knows, the road from surrogate to action is long and tortuous. It's not surprising, then, that treatments that have major impact on surrogates have minor impact on real behavior in real life. For all these reasons, extrapolations from micro-lab experiments to real-world environments are extremely hazardous. When micro-lab experimenters model upstream social policies, the hazards all become much worse. These hazards can be seen in an experiment Goldberg offered as a model of the micro-lab at work (Gorn & Goldberg, 1982). In this experiment, low-income children at a summer camp in Quebec, Canada, viewed half-hour cartoon programs every day for 2 weeks. The programs included TV commercials for fruit, orange juice, and yogurt in one condition and commercials for candy, Crackerjacks, and Kool-Aid in another. When the children chose snacks, "their choices tended to reflect their viewing experience. In particular, there was a 20% difference between the groups viewing Kool-Aid or orange juice commercials and the drinks they selected" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 361). Now imagine this experiment extended to real life. Exposure and attention to orangejuice commercials would need to match exposure and attention to Kool-Aid commercials. Without massive changes in the marketing environment-which would surely produce a long list of not necessarily desirable side effects-this condition could not be met. Moreover, to duplicate the impact of the summer camp experiment, every child would need to watch one preselected TV program every day and not watch anything else. Exactly how would one do that? It would be necessary to control confounding variables. In the experiment, orange juice and Kool-Aid were equally available. In the real world, orange juice is more expensive and less convenient than Kool-Aid. Absent massive interference with the marketing system, and absent supervision over what goes on in every kitchen, availability could not be that well matched. In the experiment, the dependent variable was children's choices. In the real world, purchases by caregivers-a factor not considered in the experiment-would be a necessary antecedent. While TV advertisements (among other factors) might
SOCIAL MARKETING
199
influence children's preferences and children's preferences (among other factors) might influence caregivers' purchases, the relationships would not be perfect. Thus, a treatment that had a large effect in this experiment might well have a small effect-and maybe even no effect-on what ordinary children really drink. In his advocacy of microexperimentation, Goldberg expressed dissatisfaction with four "macroexperiments" that showed "generally small" effects (p. 353). He then cited the 20% difference between orange juice and Kool-Aid as a demonstration of the power of the micro-lab approach. It is legitimate to wonder, however, how much of that 20% difference would survive authentic application to real events. Combining upstream social issues and micro-lab experimentation presents still another problem. Like the rest of us, researchers who conduct microexperiments want to be useful. Therefore, having recited all of the experiment's "limitations," they move on to "managerial implications." In the implications, they generalize to all messages, all media, all circumstances, and all consumers. When real-world decision makers notice these departures, they decide that the experimenters could not have been serious. This gives the discipline a bad name. Even worse, when social advocatesfind outcomes that fit their preconceptions, they embrace the "implications" and suppress the rest. Where the report says-note the accurateand modest claim- the results suggest that children's choices tended to reflect their viewing experience" (Goldberg, 1995, p. 361), the advocate's press release says, "Research shows that TV advertisementsfor orangejuice increase consumption 20%!" This common sequence puts a larger burden on the micro-laboratory than this experiment--or any combination of microexperiments-can support. For all these reasons, it is not easy to agree that we should focus on upstream rather than downstream social issues or that micro-lab experimentation is the method of choice.
POWER, NOT TRUTH It is hardest of all to agree that university-based consumer psychologists should forsake the "conservative" limits of "structural-functionalism" (Goldberg, 1995, pp. 365-367) and become political activists. Goldberg recommended that we embrace "critical theory," which, as he said, calls for (a) "gaining an understanding of the perspectives of the individuals in a social system," (b) "describing the nature of institutions and the constraints they impose on individuals," (c) "identifying and assessing the effects of any discrepancies between the individual's perspective and observed constraints," (d) using "the conclusions drawn at step three ... to politicize relevant individuals or groups," and (e) constructing and conducting "a political program of action" to put upstream social strategies into effect (pp. 364-367). I agree that university-based consumer psychologists might be good at learning how consumers view the social system-although surveys and depth interviews
200
WELLS
seem better suited than microexperiments to that task. I also agree that universitybased consumer psychologists might be good at assessing gaps between real constraints and perceived constraints-although our academic training does not show us how to do that. However, I flatly disagree with the recommendation that, having assessed those gaps (or anything else that implies altering the social system) we should step into the political arena to contend for power, not truth. In my view, that recommendation contradicts our very reason for being. Throughout their histories, universities have focused on knowledge-knowledge preserved in libraries and museums, transmitted through thoughtful instruction, and discovered through impartial scholarly research. Devotion to knowledge is the sole valid argument for academic freedom (and tenure), and it is always compromised when university-based researchers enter the political arena to advance the implications of their work. This is not to say that researchers are not citizens. Like all members of all democracies, we are privileged to enter politics in any way we see fit. It is only to assert that the role of knowledge-seeker and the role of political contender are fundamentally antithetical and that no participant-however iron-willed--can play both parts in the same conflict to full effect. Two close parallels come to mind. When members of advertising agencies' research departments conduct "tests" of their agencies' creative products, they are always suspected (often correctly) of having selected methods and filtered findings so as to make the numbers come out right. The instant they do that, they become superfluous. The agencies have plenty of willing advocates in the creative and account groups. When university-based consumer psychologists become expert witnesses in litigation, they are always suspected (often correctly) of having selected methods and filtered findings so as to support the side they happen to be on. When that happens, the court is treated to the sorry spectacle of equally qualified, highly respected, university-based experts, sworn to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," adamantly advocating conflicting conclusions. This does little to maintain confidence in social science. If university-based consumer psychologists use their research findings to politicize relevant individuals or groups or to construct and conduct political programs of action, they will be suspected (often correctly) of having selected methods and filtered findings to support apredetermined cause. This will endanger the university because propaganda can be had elsewhere at lower cost. So in place of Goldberg's recommendations, I would advocate a much more conservative approach. On the assumption that knowledge is more useful than opinion, I would recommend that university-based consumer psychologists focus on producing and publishing ecologically valid findings and then step back. Trustworthy newspapers build fire walls between hard news and editorial. For exactly the same reasons, we should do nothing less.
SOCIAL MARKETING
201
Goldberg feared that, in the absence of a "more upstream critical theory approach," important findings will "languish (Goldberg, 1995, p. 366). I argue that the surest way to be socially useful is to produce valid conclusions, and the surest way to lose credibility is to contend for power, not truth.
REFERENCES Goldberg, M. E. (1995). Social marketing: Are we fiddling while Rome bums? Journal of Consumer Psychology, 4, 347-370. Gorn, G. J., & Goldberg, M. E. (1982). Behavioral evidence of the effects of televised food messages on children. Journal o f Consumer Research, 9, 2MT205.
Accepted by Dipankar Chakravarti.