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Communism in North Vietnam
BOOK REV/EM c ommunism (;OMMUNISM IN NORTH VIETNAM by P. J. Honey (Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963, 207 pp.). Price: S+g,j. The current crisis in Amc~rican foreign policy on the Vietnam sector is characlerizecl b\v such headlines as “Vietnam Dilemma Gets Top Priority;” “Mansfield Undercuts Asian Policy, ” “North Vietnam Warned It fi\Iay Be AtLacked,” “.Johnson Faces Vietnam Crisis Similar LO Kennedy’s in Cuba.” And French President (3arles de Gaulle‘s proposal fur the “neutralization” of all of Southern Asia sou~~cls like the siren song that has lured many a mariner lo steer his ship of stale into the maelstrom of disaster. The Soviet press argues (for example, Zzlvs!iia, Jan. 30. in the feuilleton “A Senseless Policy” by its observer V. Kudryavtsev) that the United States is fighting “auainst the people” in South Vietnam, “and in our time i: is manifestly senseless and hopeless to .fight against Ihe people.” He also points out that “U.S.A. aggression in South Vietnam” sharpens “imperialist rivalry in that area” between “U.S.A. and France, \vhich would not mind to restore its former influence in the countries of Indio-China.” This book by Patrick J. Honey continues the star! of a 1962 volume edited by the same author, North Vietnnm Today: Profile of a Communist Satellite. The new book gives an up-to-date estimate of the viability of Ho Chi Minh’s domain, its vulnerabilities and its precarious position as a neighbor of Red China. P. J. Honey, a Lecturer in Vietnamese Studies in the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London7 is one of the best informed westerners on [his area. He is also the author of A Modern History of Vietnam (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, lgG3). Yet even an expert like Mr. Honey can stub his toe and trip when, in a postscript to the main body of his book, he leaves his bailiwick to speculate on Soviet relations with North Vietnam. In his postscript, the author avers that the refusal of the North Vietnamese government to sign the Moscow Treaty limiting nuclear tests was “so grievous an affront to the Soviet Union that it is questionable whether she can ever again restore her former relationship with that country.” Mr. Honey’s misgivings were ill-founded. Between Jan. 31 and Feb. IO, 1964 the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party entertained in Moscow a high-level delegation from the North Vietnamese Lao Dong [Communist] Party. Thus, the main part of the book-in which Mr. Honey develops the thesis that Ho Chi Minh steadfastly pursues a policy that amounts to a balancing act between neighboring but impoverished China and the distant yet far more prosperous Soviet Union-continues to be valid. This book documents the basic facts about the position of communism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DVR) . It gives succinctly a clear picture of the basic geographic factor, the proximity of Chinaa traditional menace become doubly menacing in its Communist transformation, the fraternal ties of com-
in North
Vietnam
radeship and proletarian internationalism notwithstanding. This position is aggravated bv the permanent economic crisis in North Vietnam, w&h cannot feed itself, looks longingly at the rice-paddies of South Vietnam and has not yet managed to become adequately industrialized. The policies of the Head of State of the DVR and Chairman of the Lao Dong Party, Ho Chi Minh, who is now in his middle seventies, continue to be the poIities of both the government and the ruling party, according to Mr. Honey. While the members of the Politburo tend to be either pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet below the top-level occupied by Ho Chi Minh alone, the “grand old man” of Indochinese communism is concerned first and foremost with his own interests as he pursues the perilous path of balancing between the two Communist super-powers. Mr. Honey gives a blow-by-blow account of Ho’s balancing-act policy in recent years. Basing his opinion on a top-secret document of Nov. I, 1951, which outlined the long-term objectives of Indochinese Communism and more specifically of the Vietnamese Communists-a document captured by the French Expeditionary Force in North Vietnam in 1g52--the author concludes that these objectives are as valid today as they were 13 years ago. What are these basic objectives? (I) To install Communist regimes throughout Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. (2) Once this is accomplished, “the three revolutionary parties of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will be reunited to form a single party,” to quote the directive, with the implication that this single united party will be under the control of the Vietnamese comrades, as the Indochinese Communist Party had been. (3) “Not only is it our duty to aid the revolutionaries in Cambodia and Laos,” states Section 5, Part C of this directive, “but we must also aid the revolutionary movements in the other countries of Southeast Asia, countries such as Malaya, Indonesia, Burma.” Working toward these objectives was made more dificult when U.S. aid saved South Vietnam from collapse -that is, when South Vietnam began to prosper due to its sound agricultural base, the U.S. aid and the administration of Ngo Dinh Diem. The impetus given to the South Vietnamese Army by American military advisers and armament aid frustrated the success of the armed insurrection in South Vietnam, directed from the North. The economic crises in North Vietnam, aggravated by the diminished prospects of a quick military victory, brought about a change in Ho Chi Minh’s policy line. Ho, directly and indirectly, through French residents and diplomats among others, began to call for neutralization of South Vietnam. Feelers to that effect were sent out to the government of Diem and to the junta that overthrew him. The major obstacle to a policy of “neutrality,” which for Ho means eventual take-over by the Communists, has been his insistence that neutral status applies only to the South. The renewed campaign of Vietcong raids and the initiation of terrorism against American personnel is aimed at forcing acceptance of neutrality on Ho’s terms.-C.M.
in North
Vietnam
radeship and proletarian internationalism notwithstanding. This position is aggravated bv the permanent economic crisis in North Vietnam, w&h cannot feed itself, looks longingly at the rice-paddies of South Vietnam and has not yet managed to become adequately industrialized. The policies of the Head of State of the DVR and Chairman of the Lao Dong Party, Ho Chi Minh, who is now in his middle seventies, continue to be the poIities of both the government and the ruling party, according to Mr. Honey. While the members of the Politburo tend to be either pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet below the top-level occupied by Ho Chi Minh alone, the “grand old man” of Indochinese communism is concerned first and foremost with his own interests as he pursues the perilous path of balancing between the two Communist super-powers. Mr. Honey gives a blow-by-blow account of Ho’s balancing-act policy in recent years. Basing his opinion on a top-secret document of Nov. I, 1951, which outlined the long-term objectives of Indochinese Communism and more specifically of the Vietnamese Communists-a document captured by the French Expeditionary Force in North Vietnam in 1g52--the author concludes that these objectives are as valid today as they were 13 years ago. What are these basic objectives? (I) To install Communist regimes throughout Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. (2) Once this is accomplished, “the three revolutionary parties of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will be reunited to form a single party,” to quote the directive, with the implication that this single united party will be under the control of the Vietnamese comrades, as the Indochinese Communist Party had been. (3) “Not only is it our duty to aid the revolutionaries in Cambodia and Laos,” states Section 5, Part C of this directive, “but we must also aid the revolutionary movements in the other countries of Southeast Asia, countries such as Malaya, Indonesia, Burma.” Working toward these objectives was made more dificult when U.S. aid saved South Vietnam from collapse -that is, when South Vietnam began to prosper due to its sound agricultural base, the U.S. aid and the administration of Ngo Dinh Diem. The impetus given to the South Vietnamese Army by American military advisers and armament aid frustrated the success of the armed insurrection in South Vietnam, directed from the North. The economic crises in North Vietnam, aggravated by the diminished prospects of a quick military victory, brought about a change in Ho Chi Minh’s policy line. Ho, directly and indirectly, through French residents and diplomats among others, began to call for neutralization of South Vietnam. Feelers to that effect were sent out to the government of Diem and to the junta that overthrew him. The major obstacle to a policy of “neutrality,” which for Ho means eventual take-over by the Communists, has been his insistence that neutral status applies only to the South. The renewed campaign of Vietcong raids and the initiation of terrorism against American personnel is aimed at forcing acceptance of neutrality on Ho’s terms.-C.M.