Community participation in third world housing

Community participation in Third World housing Potential and constraints

Reinhard J. Skinner

The term ‘community participation’ is almost unavoidable in discussions of low-income housing. Rarely, however, is the meaning of the expression considered, and, kfortunaiely, even less commonly is it seen in bractice. The author presents an analysis of its usefulness, its various forms, and the problems of implementation. He then- sets out recommendations for ways in which these problems - and the field of community participation itself - might best be handled in future.

I’crceptions

particlpatlon;

Hous-

wh:lt

(‘onfcrcnce elcv:ltcd reality.

ol

Settlements

to the

status

a

hc hoth

to the local

popirl:ition.

residents.

it C:iii

choice

incur

for

whichever to

nloi-c’

lx

l>rccisclv

\vh:lt

these

labour

identification

with

This

project

;I

acccpl;lhlc

and

01‘ their

reduction

ii nroicct. I .I

benefits

in into

means

cheapcf-.

lzor

cn\ irorimcnt,

in the

Ihcn.

co\t\

it seems

lxirticip;ltion.

might

hc,

ttlcq

thcrc

;It-C

‘1‘0 under\t;incl

howc\cr.

‘commiinit~

(digging

neecl\

one

can

pxticipation’

trench An

one’s for

to

IIIC;III.

~omn~~rni~y.

not the individual, pirrts

ot

the

collective

discussions

residents

by the project

to suit

the

house)

pipes),

interpretation

which

of the

them.

Cl’ or

of

rather

This

as

plans

intcndcd

0264.27511841060564-11$03.00

apply.

the

,, 1984 Butterworth

a11

of

activity

participate

for to

of

;I

;I

sccs the on!y

cxampIc.

as

(0

settlcnient’\

in modification

beneficiaries

it is

of individuals

is that which

prcscnted

resulted

worst.

xtivity

number

than

would

which

At

user which

budget.

the

as ;I

goes l’urthcr

of development

wihhcs

an identification

as actor - individuals

whole.

ugcnq

-

inclusion

to secure

in the project

interprets

own

constituent

costs

the mere

as

is expected

to maintain

labour

water

this

works

willingness

:I

conceived

At best.

howcvcr,

(building ;I

is often

communal

reducing

of

conception,

community.

(CP)

project.

;I

certain

translated a

individual

plans

;I

;I

;~ncl

lx)wc~-

and conceptions participation

as

and

In

ot the IX)O~-. ‘1‘0

cseculc

to

communit>

than this :I( wh:it

(‘ommunity

hc

making

of

houxin~~.

Foi- the nation:ll

to eyt:rblishecl

development

options.

from

of residents‘

may

way

it smoother

\vhcn it \v;14

low-inconic’

to the oroblcms

side 011~’ considers gkiinutl

more closely

seen

;I

in 1970.

It

N:rtion\

I,rojcct.

hencfit\

look

bc

lary.

United

different.

threat

al>fxo:lch ..

ii say in ttic

of improvement

the

at the

for very

potential

leaving

iiicaii

IXI~;ICC~I

something

of presenting - ;I popuI;Ir . impknicnting agcncics. it may

p;lrticilxition

accolade

in Vancouver ;I

of

it can mean

it GIII

community

its grcatu4t

inc’;iii\

Models

564

useluIncs4

on tIuni;in

hovx\,cr.

From The author is with the Institute for Housing Studies. Weena 718. PO Box 20718. 3001 JA Rotterdam. The Netherlands.

the

W;I\ probably

:rlmoat

govcrnmcnt

the Keywords: Community ina: LDCs

or

rcccived

(Figure

of the I).

& Co (Publishers)

The

Ltd

Figure 1. Lusaka, Zambia. Chawama upgrading - resident participation led to new road bending to avoid grocery store and bar.

principle underlying this approach is that if people agree to a plan they will not hinder its implementation and may well assist voluntarily in its introduction and maintenance. This pragmatic incentive of successful project completion is the real motivation behind such participation policies, despite the more grandiose references by project agencies and governments to the right of people to determine their own futures. A third conception of CP goes one step further. This places final decision making power in the hands of residents - preferably in the form of elected neighbourhood organizations. Agencies and technicians thus acquire an advisory role: their task is to facilitate the technical formulation of the community’s wishes. Although technical team and residents should work together. the residents, as beneficiaries. are the rightful ‘leaders’ of the project. Of course, it is this model of CP which is least acceptable to agencies and national governments: although it represents CP in its most complete form, it poses a challenge to the professional control of the technical experts of the agency and a potential threat. as organized popular power, to national government.

Degrees of CP In some projects, CP is seen merely as a collection of individual households constructing, or organizing the construction of their houses. This kind of activity hardly merits the term ‘community participation’ at all - it is individualized and limited in impact. This becomes clearer if we consider all projects in terms of the three stages of planning. implementation, and maintenance (although all will overlap to a certain extent). Some schemes are little more than conventional contractor-built operations. although they may be carried out in slum, squatter or sites and services areas. All works are undertaken by construction companies or public enterprises which assume that, on completion, the ‘new’ neighbourhood’s residents will participate to the extent of adding to and improving their dwellings and maintaining some of the new services delivered (such as street cleaning or clearing blocked drainage channels). Since all self-help housing projects include dwelling improvement, the special feature of this type of scheme is that it assumes maintenance will be undertaken by the population ‘served’. The failure of such schemes lies in the inability to realize that residents are unlikely to maintain that which they see as ‘officially’ provided and. therefore. as

CITIES November

1984

565

an officiA

responsibility

almost

other

all

:itxcnce

of commitment

Other

projects

virtually

be

willing

construct

to

The exclusion

guarantees

to project

stage.

maintain

of particip;ition

either

rescntmcnt

in

or the

maintcnnncc.

for participation

allow

it in the maintenance

expecting will

to m:iint:iin.

rcapects

in implemcnt;ltion ;I\ bell ;I\ While it is more likc1y that pcoplc

something

Lvhich

they

have

helped

to

(apart

from their own houses) this approach ma\ hackfire. Implementation. in the last instance. ;I> f2r ;is it at‘fects Iou-incomc populations means effort and time, and mav not alw:i);s he ;I sourc‘c ot pride in achievement since the idea will have originated from somelxd~ elx. It may hc. then. that implementation is wen hy residents purely, ;IS ;I form

of cheap

after

all.

the

labour.

agency’\.

which

they

participate: even it’ ii half-hearted whatever that maintenance tasks

to a pro,jc’ct \vhich i5.

may be resentment effort will

is made.

;~nd :I

there

he fulfilled

I-cfusal

to

i\ no guxmtcc

(Figure

2).

greatcst

degree of CP is seen in projects in which planning (decision making) is added to the implementation and maintcnanw spheres of collective activity. Scttlcment development non acquires ;I The

Figure 2. Kerege, Tanzania. Village improvement - CP demanded without consultation. Villagers abandoned work on ‘collectively built’ house for the village manager.

are donating

result

The

character

clcnied

Lvhat they with

the trained.

to ;lssi\t different

two

approache\:

pcop1c’ M ho dccidc

in the design of the project. togcthcr agency team. ‘‘ire more likely to he willing

professional

and.

to its miiintenunce. project

participate

All

other

;I part

in its implementation

commitment

Levels

it in the

Leant ;tnd play

5tagcs:

it

thereafter.

This

cannot

in one \taye if they

he

have sonic’ psvchologic:ll

4hokvs the assumed

;lrt’ excluded

interdcp’ndcnc\

from

01

rcsidcnta

that another

-will

(Figure

3).

of CP

settlements

such.

individual

needs

;I house

contain

and

individuals group

and group\

needs

and may decide

and

of

potential

to construct

it

individuals

activities. it\clf:

rcf‘usc

:ind.

as

14 t’xnilv disposal

Figure 3. La Paz, Bolivia. La Portada squatter upgrading - unskilled residents permitted by agency to make individual water connection. Such initiatives were freely incorporated into a sympathetic and non-paternalistic programme.

566

CITIES

November

1984

(when not provided by the municipality) can best be handled by groups of families; planning for future service demands can only be undertaken at the level of the whole settlement. Occasionally mobilization of low-income residents is invited into the area of national politics. such as in Peru overtly between 1968 and 1975 and in Chile, more implicitly. between 1970 and 1973 (Appendix 1). The above categories show the different levels of grouping to be considered in CP and the distinctions are vital in planning for participatory projects. This becomes even more pronounced when different levels of CP need to take place simulta~wousl~ in some project spheres (eg house improvement. refuse disposal and schoolbuilding). and cotzsecuril-,ely in others (eg payment for plot registration, constructing a playcground for a block, and maintaining standpipes). In all cases. however, a formal community organization of one kind or another is necessary if settlement development is to be coordinated between varying levels of resident grouping over different periods of time. The agency itself is unable to assume such a role unless it is attached solely to the settlement concerned for an indefinite period (and then. of course. it is a community organization itself. however unrepresentative). The above analysis of conceptions. degrees and levels of CP leads to the conclusion that maximum community participation in each is the most rational as far as CP projects are concerned. Yet few programmes in the world adopt this approach. Among those which have come closest are Peru (1968-75). Zambia. Papua New Guinea. and Nicaragua (Appendix 2). Those which clearly have not are particularly worthy of note because of their much-publicised activities or large-scale investments: the Philippines, Sri Lanka. Tanzania, Malawi. and Indonesia (Appendix 3). The obvious question is. assuming CP has its merits. to what extent are different programmes capitalizing on it? When they are not, then why are they not?

Constraints

‘For

this

see

R. Skinner,

‘Community

Participation: its scope and organisation’,

in R. Skinner and M. Rodell, eds, People, Poverty and Shelter. Problems of SelfHelp Housing in the Third World, Methuen, London, 1983.

CITIES November

1984

on community

participation

It is impossible here to go through all the constraints on CP.’ but some of the major ones can be listed. First, many projects which aim to include a participatory element employ much the same staff as they did for non-participatory projects (eg completed new housing estates) and thus ignore the need for new skills, particularly the organizational. social skills. and those relating to communication and discussion with the ‘target’ population. Second, the nature of CP is that it is to some extent unpredictable: at times it will be slow to materialize or fail altogether: at other times a new and unexpected area of potential CP may arise. Any project which is bound by strict time schedules for completion of various components will fail to adapt itself to these realities. Third. standards can impede CP in two ways in particular. If standards of construction or infrastructure (especially social) are too high. they will exclude the possibility of relatively unskilled local labour being employed. At the dwelling level. if standards normally in force are not reduced vis-2-vis materials and type of construction. there is the danger that the poor will be unable to meet the requirements of a ‘permanent’ dwelling within a short enough period and thus \I,ill be excluded from the project (Kenya is an example of official demands for speedy attainment of ‘acceptable’ dwelling standards). Materials stan-

567

da&

pose another

problem

- production

standards

art3 too high for

materials.

then

the oligopc>lisGc

;I iicencc to print

granted

either

sIn;~ll

Fourth. planned decide

project

design

and provided for

thtmsclvcs

Pro.ject type also defines acccptecl

to so &xi&.

amenable to CP than sites possess socinl relationships time

and

and services

cooperation.

are assumed

to lack thcsc qualities

who

do

not

~istiri~ti(~ii. schcmcs

On

i\ to

or

felt

a4 argiccl

for

have heen

(‘I’.

It is

are more the

titrmcr

tcstcct over

and confidence in mutual aid area\.

on the other

hand.

they arc ~on~l3os~d of ptxq3lc

because

other.

each

the +,vholo one

cxn

accept

this

he pointed

it should

out that some sitcs and wrciccs anti-(‘P: those, for example. which arc

so inherently

are not

‘overspill’ transfer

know hut

that

resident\;

priorities

difficulty

which

wrvices

and

to

prt~,~ect~. hcc;It~sc

Icad to a certain degree of trusl

or collective

more

is for

of loug standing

nctworkx

Sites

The

maintenance.

md

setticmcnts

arid

who-will

poor

thcv can hc espectcii to l3c

an area of potential

squatter

that

the

mav he

the ~1st‘ of public spaces or the

a

more amenable to CP in implcmcntation ubovc. widely

to Cl’.

inst~~ll~~ti~~n xcctrcling

the opporfunity

neects. Given

of the

the Icss scope thcrc

on 5uch issue5

sequence of iIi~r~lstrLl~tilr~

supply

sector

driven cwt of the project (the Prty-amme suffers f~-mt this

can be ;I hinchxncc

in alvance,

to

formal

money at the expense

ilnp~~~~rishe~{ or Improvcmcnt Kampung

Where these

and price.

producers

or monopolistic

he further

Indonesi:tn problem).

source

‘informal

sites for squatter upgrading schcmcs can. to II certain extent. old relationships

to the new a~-C;I. and collective

13lots (by ernPloym~nt-b;tsctd ovcrwnw

cooperatives.

for

the ~3r~)l3l~i~i of’ lack of knowlccige

Undoubtedly.

that of political

howcvcr, control.

the

Where

greatest

hctwecn

problem

;~~~t~nomoii~

iIppliC~lti0ll

csxnplc)

[or

can sin,ilarl!; rcsidunt\.

with

respect

collective

to (‘P

~~r~anization

is is

h!; the govcrnmcnt to constitulc ii thi-eat lo national 4tahility. the cstahlished frumework of decision making (eg ‘the Part\;‘) will he maintained and local lxwer5 cont‘inetl to the ;Ircas ot’ rclativtlv pcrwivccl

in~li~i~lL1~ili~~~l. huilciin~

of

small

hoiiws

ipup. or

here arc the Philippines bc severely

568

curtailed

or

o~~i~i~ill~

maintcnmcc ;~nd ‘I‘unisia.

of

~~)iltf-~~ll~~l activities.

p-ccii

/\a ;Irgucd

;II-as.

‘I‘vpical

carlier.‘(‘I’

wch

8s

csaniplcs is certain

to

by such apprcxlchc\.

CITIES

November

1984

It should not be assumed that even wifhirl countries the different actors in the low-income housing field share similar views of CP. It may be that ‘participation’ is part of official ideology but implementing agencies see it as impeding technical efficiency. Sometimes this is quite understandable: it is relatively easy for the President to make a public statement or issue a decree promoting largc-scalc CP; it is quite another matter for a ministry or project agency to reorganize its methods of operation to comply with it. This brings us to the question of how far one should try to go with CP. Since CP does not automatically guarantee success, it is unwise to advocate switching immediately from non-participatory programmcs to those in which CP is prominent. Lack of experience in such programmes brings a host of problems. Are there sufficient suitable personnel for new types of projects? Are existing organizational structures suited to two-way communication and working together with poor populations‘? Are the populations themselves - used as they are to a ‘top-down’ autocratic approach - prepared to accept the idea of CP as presented to them‘? The more such questions are problematic, the greater the chance of failure. And while initial failure is not a reason to abandon CP, it does provide ammunition for groups within national decision making structures which are opposed to CP. It is probably safer, therefore, to introduce the approach gradually, paying great attention to it in its early stages and thereby aiming at an initial success which can prepare the ground for more ambitious ventures. It is often said that if CP is to be successful it must include dialogue between the official agency and the target population. What is not so clearly stated, though it should be obvious, is that dialogue between the constituent parts of the agency itself, and any other authorities likely to be drawn into the programme, is also necessary. In Lusaka’s squatter upgrading programme, the Housing Project Unit held regular ‘briefings’ of its own staff both as a means of problem-solving and coordination of aims and efforts. At the interagency level it may sometimes be the case that policy is decided in consultation with one agency to the exclusion of another. Where this occurs planning is not only likely to be inefficient (the excluded agency will have some spheres of expertise which could be contributed at this stage) but may also lead to resentment which produces non-cooperation, or unrealistic demands being placed on the excluded agency which could have been avoided if it had been brought into the initial discussions. This kind of problem may account for the poor cooperation sometimes experienced between the municipal (servicing) authority (the BMA) and the National Housing Authority in Thailand’s upgrading programme, where the NHA has been the dominant decision maker. Of course. another way in which CP can create its own institutional problems is where there is an existing lack of coordination between agencies and departments which is compounded with the introduction of CP-type programmes. Where there is no efficient working relationship between departments responsible for service installation. payments collection. and maintenance in existing housing provision. for example, the superimposition of resident participation at its various levels and in its different degrees can only further complicate the problem of coordination. This, however, is not to say CP is undesirable. but that it presents difficulties which should be anticipated.

CITIES

November

1984

569

The question of coordination is partly ;I question of control: any multifaceted project will be coordinated by relatively few lx~plc and these. as such. exercise control. A problem hcrc is N*/I~ these should be. It remains a paradox that even in countries where CP is propounded vigorously it is controlled with minimal participation of the community. This means that CP is far from exhibiting the ‘optimal’ characteristics of level, degree and model referred to above. What tends to happen is that residents’ views and activities are channelled through go\,crnmentcontrolled bodies. such as the project agency or the hingle political party. The limits on potential for participation arc obvious. All the above points to the fact that CP. desirable as it undoubtedly is, produces problems as well as solutions and costs as well as bcncfit$. In addition to the costs referred to above. one can make rcferencc to two others which are not al~vays taken into account as IIILICII as they should be. The first is cost in terms of labour and efficiency. Rarely is self-help labour free: if it were not employed in the project it might bc LISCC~ to earn income; in any case. effort mcan5 the expenditure of calorica on the part of residents. Or it might be that collective Iabour tc:lms t;tkc several times as long as a contractor’s gang to deli\cr ;I product which is technically inferior. Secondly. some CP projects fail to include the cost of technical assistance in their accounting and tvhere this is subst;rntial. as is not unlikely in comprehenaivc schemes. the financial benefits arc greatly overstated.

Proposals for CP programmes It is clear that Cl’ is potentially potential depends, however, upon and degrees of CP stimulated. Even CP itself or the way in which it Ways of overcoming these have indirectly in the preceding sections. are reiterated here. and some not rized.

valuable. The realization of that the models adopted and the levels then difficulties arise, either out of is treated in a particular project. been suggested either directly or Some of the more important ways previously mentioned arc summa-

(1) CP should be conceived of as a process which will ultinzutel~~ rdqfi~rc relationships betlrvetz cornrmnities mtl the state. R&dents. through their own independent organizations. should be encouraged (not implementation and postforceti) to take part in the planning, implementation stages of a project with negotiation and agreement at all stages based upon ;I linking of residents’ needs and desires and the agency’s technical skills. The agency is. however. servant to the community. (3) The fulfilment of the above goal is not easy. It will often be and programmes Lvhich ITKJLYJ necessary to formulate projects toi~wds this gotrl gruiud!\~. (3) From the above it follows that CP is neither to be conceived of as an individual nor purely physical activity, though these are part of the picture. CP can take place at an individual, group and settlement level and incorporates mental as well as physical effort. Planning ‘echo dors trhar’ needs to take this into account. Whctl who does what depends on decisions taken regarding point (2). (4) However a project is formulated. following the above guidelines, it must consider the degree of htc~rdeprnclrrl(.c~of planning, impleof mentation and post-implementation stages. and the components each. if successful CP in any of them is expected.

570

CITIES

November

1984

(5) CP implies a revision of existing practices urzd organization in low-income housing delivery. New staff skills will need to be developed, rigid time schedules cannot be universally enforced, standards of construction and materials used must be relaxed, and project design should avoid the delivering of a ‘finished product’. (6) fnternational aid agencies can play a more active role in promoting CP. This assumes that CP is envisaged as an integral part of housing programmes for the poor on a par with financial and institutional considerations, which has not been the case to date. Such support will often find sympathetic groups among the range of domestic decision makers. To adopt a ‘neutral’ position instead is, in effect, to support the status quo against CP. (7) CP programmes should be elaborated with the active participation of all agencies, who might be expected to play a part in programme implementtion. This will help reduce the frictions and problems of institutional malcoordination which often accompany CP programmes. It may even be a means of healing old wounds in this respect. (8) CP is incompatible with one-sided, stare control. While the state will. through its various agencies, assume ultimate control of certain parts of the programme, so too must the community itself (eg in determining and, to a certain extent. implementing, local priorities for development). What these spheres of control are must be agreed upon by both state and community or CP will be impossible in the real sense of the term. (9) CP produces costs as well as benefits. The costs may include efficiency and technical assistance, though neither need always be great. For financial purposes, however, these costs must be taken into account. But benefits (which may well be financial also) will include social and political components. One should take both costs and benefits into account in order to avoid the two evils of utopianism (‘CP can never do any harm’) and technocracy (‘CP is financially and technically inefficient’).

1

Appendix Peru and Chile

For the Peruvian case of overt incorporation of low-income residential mobilization into national politics, see Collier,’ and Skinner.’ Collier shows how national governments or opposition parties have, since the 193Os, attempted to create alliances with squatters. By the period of the military government of Velasco (196%75), this had become comprehensive, systematic and part of an overall strategy purported to ‘transfer power’ to the organized masses at some unspecified

CITIES November

1984

future date. In this way, low-income residents would be equal to industrial and rural workers in a ‘non-capitalist. non-communist’ society. Skinner’ refers to a specific sites and services style of settlement, Villa

El Salvador,

which epitomized

the

above policy. Established in May 1971 by the government, it was soon heralded by the authorities as exemplifying both the progress which could be achieved by state-community cooperation and the new ‘autonomy’

of settlements in determining their priorities for development. Implicit in this was an invitation to participation in national politics: although in practice this was little more than a ploy (see Skinner’). the community organization actively strove to make it a reality. For example, in January 1976, by which time it had grown to some 130000 inhabitants, it convened the First Convention of P~ehlos Jo\~r~r.s of the Southern Core of Lima (p~rehlo joven = young town; this was the

571

government’s euphemism for squatter and similar low-income fringe ncighhourhoods). The Convention WIS highly critical of government scttlement pcjlicv and of its economic strategy. and this was the start of ;I political pi-ocesz which wah to produce the National Federation of f’~rch/o., .lo\,c,r~c,.s(FEDEPJOV) with ;I similarly broad and combative perspective on development issues.

Chile Pastrami and Threlfall’ explain most clearly the WI\; in which Chilean squatters acted collectivclv to make their \,oices heard at national level. While scluatters had (like the pcasantr\) undertaken land invasions under pi’cviou\ governments. such as that of Eduardo Frei (lY6-C70). it wa’r only when Salvador Allcnde was elected president that it was felt squatting would be protected ;ib an implicit principle of the left-wing Popular un-

ty coalition. but. more squatters limits

of

Invasions then increased significantly. claima 1,)

went beyond the traditional petitioning

for

service

in-

5talLition

and embraced demands for go\~ernment intervention in the supply of c\\ential commodities and the partial takeover of pri\ate production: squatters even participated in thcsc tal;co\.er\ before official any inter\,cntions.” While the government did not officialI> welcome \uch ationx. It was often forced to accept and legitimize them ~ the alternative of i-eprcssion was politically not feasible. Vantlerxchuer-cii~ similarly recounts squatter xttwt~s although hc is more interested in identifying which segments of the squatter population were at the forefront of this participation in tit\ antI national level politics. (‘astclls” i\ another important soui-cc for the analysis of the political significance of the squatter movcmcnt at this time.

References ‘D. Collier, Squatters and Olrgarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Chanqe in Peru, Johns Hopkins Uniiersity Press, Baltimore, MD, 1976. pp 4G54. ‘R. Skinner, Community Organization, Collective Development and Politics KJ Se/f-/-/e/p Housing: Villa N Salvador, Lima (1977-7976), unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1981, DP 37-39: R. Skinner, ‘Self-helo. communit; organization and politics: Villa El Salvador, Lima’, In P. Ward (ed), Self-Help Housing: A Critique, Mansell, London, 1982. %kinner, 1981, op cif, Ref 2. %kinner, 1982, op cif, Ref 2. ‘E. Pastrana and M. Threlfall, Pan, Techo y Poder: N Movimienfo de Pobladores en Chile 197&73, Ediciones Nueva Vision. Buenos Aires, 1974. “Ibid, pp 10&104, 112-I 13. 7F. Vanderschueren, ‘The political signiflcance of neighbourhood committees In the settlements of Santiago’, in D. Johnson (ed), The Chilean Road to Socialism, Anchor Books, New York, 1973, pp 25G 283. ‘M. Castells, The Urban Question, Edward Arnold, London, 1977.

Appendix 2 Zambia, Papua New Guinea and Nicaragua The programme of squatter upgrading in Lusaka, Zambia (1971-78) did not reach the limits of CP as discussed under the headings of ‘conceptions’. ‘degrees’ and ‘levels’; it did, however. make substantial progress in these directions. Although decision making was ultimately in the hands of the state. as represented by the Housing Project Unit (HPU). this power was avoided as much as possible. Martin.’ shows how residents’ for example, leaders were responsible for the routing of roads rather than the following of predetermined, grid-iron plans. Leaders were also involved in management.’ As for degrees of CP. not only were the leaders instrumental in planning and management. but the population as a whole was expected to participate in other aspects of implementation. Here collective self-help was seen by one evaluator as ‘low‘ level. but the same writer pointed out that projects completed included mar-

572

kets. party offices. emergency drainage 1 infill of old quarry pits, and blockmaking.’ As implied here. most decisions were in the hands of leaders rather than individuals. but it can be argued that this is an advance on state control and. in any case. there is an ‘enormous degree of delegation implicit throughout the African tradition in decision-making and politics’.’ Where the Lusaka projects can be said to have fallen down is in the sphere of CP in maintenance, but this seems to have been the case mainly when the population was not involved in implementation such as with standpipes and multipurpose community centres ~ precisely what I have argued as a feature of interdependency of project components in the ‘degrees’ section above.’

decision making and residents having the final say on issues under discussion. Similarly. communities have taken part in the planning process through the negotiation of plans themselves coupled, for example, with onthe-ground decision making by means of a ‘walkabout’ to see the propok routing of a new road.’ Implementation provided for the employment of residents without jobs in infrastructural activities such as footpath and retaining wall construction. the placing of pit-latrine slabs and clearing and levelling of spaces for community facilities.’ Thus in conception and degree CP has been quite advanced; information on ‘levels’ is less readily available to the author.’

Nicaragua PNG In Papua New Guinea upgrading has included the conception of collective

Self-help housing is an integral part of an Urban Reform Programme in Nicaragua; but. even more than this.

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November

1984

CP can he regarded as integral to the concept of revolution since organized residents who had been active in the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979 were now called upon to continue their activities in the process of reconstruction. In upgrading, this was initially envisaged as starting with decision making on overall project plans by community members in discussion with representatives of the housing ministry’s Department of ‘Social Promotion’. Settlement level organization would then be established with work brigades and subcommittees to cover savings, maintenance and ‘discipline’. The work itself would include training and study groups from leadership level down-

wards and encompassing administration and construction. House building was to be collective. Although in pratice there have been bureaucratic delays and some friction between the various actors, there is evidence to suggest that the programme sketched above, with a far-reaching ‘degree’, high ‘level’ and broad ‘conception’ of CP, has indeed been seen to operate.”

References ‘R. Martin, ‘Upgrading’, in R. Skinner and M. Rodell teds), Peopte, Poverty and Shelter: Pfobfems of Serf-yelp Housing in the Third Worid, Methuen, London, 1983. *M. Hoek-Smit, Community Parficipafion in Squatter Upgrading in Zambia, American Friends Service Committee. Philadelohia. PA, 1982, pp 70-71.

31bid, p 76. 4R. Martin, ‘The formulation of a self-help proiect in Lusaka’. in P. Ward led\. Selfkelp Housing: A Crifique, Ma&elij London, 1982, p 268. ‘Hock-Smit, op cif, Fief 2, pp 11 l-l 13. ‘Shankland Cox Partnership, Third World Urban Housing: Aspirations, Resources, Programmes, Pfojecfs, Building Research Establishment, Watford, 1977, pp 17s 180. 71bid, p 186. *See also, for the Papua New Guinean cases, H. Norwood, ‘People’s participation in urban settlement upgrading: three experiences in Papua New Guinea’, in P. Swan fed), The Practice of People’s Parficipafion: Seven Asian Experiences in ffousjng the Poor, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, 1980, pp 89-l 28. ‘1. Vance, unpublished doctoral research manuscript, School of Social Sciences. University of Sussex, Hove, UK, 1983.

Appendix 3 Philippines,

Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Malawi and Indonesia

In the Philippines the most publicised and best known ‘participatory’ project is that of upgrading the Tondo Foreshore in Manila. The official commitment to popular wishes can be gauged by the fact that Tondo’s upgrading was started by the National Housing Authority in 1977 only after pressure from the World Bank which supported residents’ protests against eradication and relocation. With a population of over 2~~~,’ Tondo became a showpiece for the Philippines government and featured prominently in its exhibitions at the 1976 Vancouver Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat). The veracity of claims to be promoting CP can be questioned on numerous points: for example, the most active Tondo residents’ organization (ZOTO) had its leaders imprisoned for the duration of the Vancouver conference to prevent their presenting their views on the programme. Second, when alternative plans were presented to the residents’ groupings regarding upgrading, residents tended to select those plans requiring most relocation (NHA, internal survey) - a choice untypical of most squatter com-

ClTlES

November

1984

munities and smacking strongly of misinformation on the part of the planners ‘discussing’ options with the community. It also appears that very little organization for improvement. or even assistance in relocation, exists beyond the family unit. Finally, and in conjunction wifh the above, decisions in general have been made from the planning to maintenance stages by the NHA and/or World Bank whether or not they are then submitted for community ‘approval’. Families are only further involved in their house improvement and are expected to keep streets clean (personal observations).

Sri Lanka Self-help housing in Sri Lanka is a recent development: it was not until 1978 that ‘Slum and Shanty Improvement’ became a feature of policy statements.’ Despite good intentions on the part of some members of the Urban Development Authority’s Slum and Shanty Division what emerged was a very top-down approach which overlapped with earlier policies. Here one can compare the settlements of

Summitpura and Hennamulla, both in Colombo, with the former being of the ‘pre-self help’ era and the latter straddling this and the new ‘CP period’. Summitpura was a relocation scheme in which residents were allocated plots, and from then no participation in decision making was ever invited (the area became poorly maintained, refuse widely scattered, and houses located in flood zones). Hennamulla, on the other hand, was initially an upgrading scheme planned solely by central authorities but after the 1978 policy statement, incorporated the idea that residents ought to be ‘involved’. Unfortunately, this amounted to little more than abandoning government-built row houses in favour of shell and core structures. My own investigations, together with a Sri Lankan colleague in 19X2, found that virtually no decisions were made locally: there were contractors offering dwelling units for often unofficial modification, common facilities such as washrooms and toilets were inadequate, inconveniently located and in disrepair. and finally, post-implementation

upkeep

intended

573

for

residents

rather off

was

‘dumped

public

negotiated

in to

daytime.

public

involvement

such

found.

Finally.

in

residents’

priorities

better

standpipc

facilities instead

new

most

and

iramme

is its apparent

formal

structure

cipation the

grouping

households

quarter

w:i\

~Iccommod~rtetI

indi-

were

for

which

they

of

approxiniatcly

of popular

party

;I\ well

is

exi4t5.

there-is

quite

tasks

and receive

organi7;ltion; making

has

I.;ind\.

and

party

organs block

of

therefore,

interests their

house

oi- scllng

groups

them

~ and

more

than

evidence

making

;I passive

beyond

i5 conccntratcd Ministry) colverl

from

stages

(pcr\onal

574

first

priority

exprascd

and tor

facilitks,

refuse communitv

found

with

that

with

plot

little

applic;lnts,

oi

which

toilets total

and

Imigct.

I0

is

residents‘

public These

in

of

the

IS%

niaintt‘nance

considered

by tit!

to be the responsihilit\z organizations

do not

wit\ water

electricity

centres. than

of

as ;I

iiced

buildings.

Infrastructure

roads)

survey (70%

drinking

disposal.

less

for

Jakarta

or bridges

a strong

health

claimed

for

than

better

supply,

areas.

particip:lte

the responsibility government

while in this as that

the ;irc;i,

of the

as it is in other

city

”

References

cii-

a140 suggests

changes

choice

could

wcrc

popular

residents

decision

nianageni~nt

such

arrears

that

in

he i-educed if more

offered

arc nior6

and

actively

after

propost involved

in

allocation.

of

Indonesia The

Kampun~

ramme

sia in IYhY.

(‘Kampungs’

What.

ing

indi-

KIP

rcntins

to

them

the

;irc‘;i\

million

party

is little

however.

is

decision

and cant

(‘P

(cg the

appear

to

Malalvi

of Jakarta

Its

and

in

implementation.

without

beyond

that

KIP

hierarchical any

signifi-

individual ;ilthough

effort\.

The

absence

house it

has been popular of

participation

in two major

and maintenance. yeai-\.

The

(10’%, of

does with

r&dents.” eniplificd

observations).

over

has hccn very

paternalistic

building

arc uniii-

arca

hous-

cities).

at upgrading

pa~plr.~

p0wc1

planning

arts the infor-

low-income

Indonesian

urbanized

Prog-

in Indone-

that city alone had by IY78 reached 7.3

income There

of

aimed

hiphcr

centi-e

was started

is that

labour

in any

Improvement

(KIP).

mal and unplanned

their

residents

tifteen

roads

in all respects

is undertahcn

has supposedly than

placed

local

plot

Malawi F-orniorc

residents

of

Crooks

the indi\ idual. the

lY7-1 a lY73

fewer

~~dministr~ltors

representing

entitv.

of (‘P in

and

niaintcnance

local

the

scant

to

and

that

improvement.

an

any.

hiring

lY6Y

budget

indicated

to

bridges

accounted

KIP

is low

the

Ministry

to

to

I .5

between

roads.

channels

of the

is deli-

corrrspond

while

house

C’rooke’

no consultation

picture.

families.’

~ from

(‘P

example,

for such

in pi-actice

act according

improve out

ten

happens

residents vidual

those

Hut

individual

projects

;ll’l”.“xirn~ltel);

by powcr4

defunct)

than

million.” except

these

gov-

drainage

Evidence

what

alwavs

wishes:

X6.6’%

(except

1lousing ;ind Llrhan Develop, at ;I political Icvel. higher

ment

for

to

British

party

bodies

by higher-level

(rcccntly

alone

amounted

IYXI

howc\-

if

nullified

aid

to

the

the

promote

been

IJp

Lilongwe.

and

not

that

;I system

grass-roots

exercised

and

pur-

producing

little.

to

repre-

sphere.

arc‘ not trained

couragenient

were

areas.

seeing

;I diffcrcnt

officials

people

in these

for

In practice.

Party

million

raidcnts’

latter

in

such

and

a

ten

procesx

inbuilt

niachinrrv

the

that

about

package.

however.

does

;I gi-ass-

member

ways for

lYX1

improvement

vered

Housing

and 51’!4, of the two main

resptzctivelv.’

;illocation

suggests.

unit

I>!

participatory

concept

as the

ten-cell

mobilization

It would appear

By

Blaltyre

ernment

own

parti-

as the political

is ideal in many organked

of ;I

37%

cities.

‘Traditional

;I

sites loca-

of providing

in pcri-urban

THAs).

of

senting

For

prop-

integration

represented

elected

cr.

upgrading

the

roots

phyGcal

of l‘antania’s

on

post‘s

~

that

of community

hased

(called

had

aspect

sites and services

tions.

means

house.’

notable

plots

Areas’

Tanzania The

a policy

The

and home

of

haa followed and 4ervices

taps).

survey

cated

received

having

upkeep

an internal

improvement

but

(eg switching

Iack of discussion

earlier ii0

lights

made

repairs

not

on them

each kanipung

areas:

is cxpl~inninp

In the former been about

negotiation the nature

ther: in ot its

‘W. Keyes, ‘Case study: Metro-Manila, Philippines’, in M. Sarin (ed), Policies Towards Urban Slums: Slum and Squatter Settlements in the ESCAP Regron, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 1980, p 50. ‘M. Fiodell. ‘Case study: Colombo, Sn Lanka’, Ibid, p 35. 3Personal communication, Mr L. William, Urban Development Authority. “B. Nnunduma, Policies of Low-income Shelter in Tanzania: Some Reflections from Manzese Squatter Upgrading and S/nza-Kijifonyama Sites and Services Prolecfs, Institute for Housing Studies, Rotterdam, Report No 1064, May 1984. “P. Crooke, ‘Popular housing supports and the urban housing market’, in R. Skinner and M. Rodell (eds), People, Poverty and Shelter: Problems of Se/f-He/p Housing m the Th/rd World, Methuen. London, 1983, p 183. 6P. Crooke, Low-Income Housrng in Malawi: an Evaluation of British-Aided Programmes, Overseas Development Administration, London, 1981, p 11. 71bid, pp 52-53. “L. Erni and Bianpoen, ‘Case study: Jakarta, Indonesia’, in Sarin, op cif, Ref 1, p 69. 9N. Devas, Indonesia’s Kampung Improvement Programme: An Evaluative Case Study, Development Administration Group, Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, 1980. Occasional Paper 10. “Ernie and Bianpoen, op tit, Ref 8, p 71. “Devas, op cit. Ref 9, p 48.

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1984