Community-supported slum-upgrading: Innovations from Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya

Habitat International 60 (2017) 1e9

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Community-supported slum-upgrading: Innovations from Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya Thomas Meredith*, Melanie MacDonald Department of Geography, McGill University, Montreal, H3A 2K6, QC, Canada

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 18 May 2016 Received in revised form 17 November 2016 Accepted 7 December 2016

Slum upgrading is accepted as a priority for sustainable development. While there are clear challenges to upgrading, local support and community engagement are seen as essential to success. Typical “topdown” approaches led by institutions with power and resources may fail to generate local engagement. Conversely, initiatives led by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs) or other self-help groups may garner good community support but may lack institutional and material resources to meet objectives. A hybrid approach that engages the community while mobilizing the resources of governments and large agencies can overcome some of these limitations, but it is not without complications. We examine the process and impact of a slum upgrading pilot project in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya, that operationalized this hybrid approach by adopting an adaptive management model to promote community engagement. The project was part of the Government of Kenya's Kenya Slum Upgrading Program and involved the Kibera Water and Sanitation Project led by UN-Habitat's Urban Basic Services Branch. The project showed significant early success in building community engagement, but it also encountered significant challenges. We assess the project's success in building community engagement by (a) analyzing documents that reflected the institutional discourse related to the project, (b) examining the record of the implementation of the project, and (c) conducting field surveys and interviews to assess community perception of the project. Survey results show that critical infrastructure in the community has improved over the course of the project and expectations for continued improvement in the future have developed. The study concludes that using an adaptive management approach and strongly promoting community involvement should be the aim of institutions delivering slum-upgrading projects and that this can result in effective, successful development outcomes. While the approach does present significant risks of creating unrealistic expectations, the benefits to project management are clear. © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Slum Upgrading Kibera Community-based Public-participation Water Sanitation Urban basic services

1. Introduction The policy adopted towards Kibera in the past has been based on the assumption that it would disappear altogether in a relatively short time. For that reason, neither water supplies, sanitation, education or other facilities have been provided … [But Kibera] will certainly exist for at least another 25 years and probably longer. … Experience abundantly shows that serious abuses and very objectionable conditions have resulted from [this] policy pursued, and it must, therefore, be reconsidered. Letter to the Town Clerk of

* Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (T. Meredith), mel.c.macdonald@ gmail.com (M. MacDonald). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2016.12.003 0197-3975/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Nairobi from Sgt. C.E. Mortimer, the Commissioner for Local Government, Lands, and Settlement (March 26, 1945). In the 1940s, the hope of colonial officials was evidently that the Kibera community in Nairobi, Kenya would simply vanish. The understanding now is that it will not. Sixty percent of the population in Nairobi is currently living in “severely disadvantaged conditions [and] the number of slum dwellers expected to double within the next 15 years” (UN-Habitat, 2011), and in Kibera, “an estimated population of 200,000 inhabitants live in 256 hectares of land” (UNHabitat, 2011). The issue of improving the lives of the urban poor continues to be a major challenge (Buckley, Kallergis, & Wainer, 2015; Farha, 2016; Sticzay & Koch, 2015), particularly in rapidly urbanizing developing countries overall, including those in Sub-

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Saharan Africa (Croese, Cirolia, & Graham, 2016; Ochieng, 2013). Despite increased global attention to expanding slums, no widely accepted sustainable and equitable solution has been identified or adopted, and innovation is called for (Andreasen & Møller-Jensen, 2016). Innovation requires records of success (Das & Takahashi, 2009). This paper seeks to contribute to such a record, specifically by researching the experience of a pilot project in Kibera. One persistent challenge relates to mechanisms for fostering effective community engagement for improving living conditions in slums (Hossain, 2007; Muraya, 2006; Pal, 2006; Rigon, 2014). However, mechanisms for achieving effective public participation are complicated, can be time consuming (Dupont, Banda, Vaidya, & Gowda, 2014; Rigon, 2014; Samad, 2006) and are often neglected (Croese et al., 2016). Instead, with profit, prestige, and simplified management in mind, large centralized projects continue to be developed, despite the fact that they may further marginalize the poor and leave them critically vulnerable (Andreasen & MøllerJensen, 2016; Buckley et al., 2015; Watson, 2013). The pilot project we study was intended to generate synergies in bottom-up and top-down collaborations. Historically, efforts to improve slums have addressed housing rather than urban basic services (Muraya, 2006). In Nairobi, projects that focused on housing failed, and left damaging legacies of mistrust and suspicion. These were large, centralized projects led by institutions with power and resources, but they did not succeed in generating community engagement. The Pumwani-Majengo Project, initiated in 1983 (National Housing Corporation, 2004) and the Kibera High Rise Project, initiated in 1990s, both displaced local residents; the Mathare 4A project, started in March 1997, failed because it alienated local people (Kamau & Ngari, 2002; Otiso, 2003). The legacy of failure shows that, while community support is essential, it is not easily attained in “top-down” approaches (Andreasen & Møller-Jensen, 2016; Croese et al., 2016; Das & Takahashi, 2009; Pal, 2006). However, while “bottom-up” initiatives led by community groups may generate local engagement, they may not have the institutional depth, material or financial resources, or longevity to achieve sustainable positive outcomes. Therefore, a hybrid approach that mobilizes the resources of large agencies (including governments) and yet successfully engages the community may be most effective for slum upgrading. This paper explores one part of an upgrading initiative in Soweto East, a village within Kibera. The Government of Kenya acknowledged new ethically-based approaches to slum upgrading enunciated at the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) in 1996. These challenged governments “to break the €nen, vicious cycle of poverty, homelessness and unemployment” (Syrja 2008). Determined to avoid the mistakes of the past, the government worked with UN-Habitatdwhose discourse addressed “Slums of Hope” (Habitat, 2003)dand developed their own progressive guidelines for the Kenya Slum Upgrading Program (KENSUP) (Government of Kenya, 2004). The Soweto East initiative was a large-scale, ambitious and controversial project that included land clearance, extensive construction of new housing, and temporary resettlement of over 5000 residents (Fernandez and Calas, 2011). It is still too early to say whether the ultimate objectives will be met, but because of its scale, the project has been widely studied and has generated criticism, resistance, legal challenges. Amnesty International became published a report intended to provide an overview of the “human rights issues raised by the Kenyan government's approach to slums and informal settlements” (Amnesty International, 2009). Critics call for further innovation (Anyiso, 2013; Fernandez & Calas, 2011; Mutisya & Yarime, 2011; Otsuki, 2016; Stenton, 2015), noting particular concerns about the balance between socio-economic needs and

basic services as opposed to new housing (Lüthi, 2016, pp. 115e124; Mutisya & Yarime, 2011; Nyabuti, 2015; Stenton, 2015), and concerns about engagement with the community (Cronin & Guthrie, 2011; Ndukui, 2013; Nyabuti, 2015; Rigon, 2014). Community engagement is a challenge partly because of the heterogeneity of communities (Anyiso, 2013; Huchzermeyer, 2008; Lüthi, 2016, pp. 115e124; Muraguri, 2011; Nyabuti, 2015) and partly due to the risks of corruption, local power imbalances, and “elite capture” (Anyiso, 2013; Charbonneau, 2016; Fernandez & Calas, 2011; Rigon, 2014). The focus of this paper is on a single aspect of the Soweto East initiativedan “entry-point” project designed to build trust in and engagement with the community in order to allow the full project agenda to advance. This entry-point project used an integrated approach to providing urban basic services that explicitly responded to community aspirations. The objective was to establish a hybrid approach that would engage the community and build mutual trust so that the resources of large institutions could be drawn upon. The entry-point project was led UN-Habitat's Urban Basic Services, selected because it had a strong records of success with small-scale water and sanitation projects within Kibera. The resulting project was referred to as K-WATSAN (For Kibera Water and Sanitation) butdbecause the project used an adaptive management approach and relied heavily on interaction with the communitydthe actual project that evolved was an integrated one addressing a broad array of urban basic services including roads, community centers, and capacity building initiatives. Therefore, to avoid confusion, in this paper the project is referred to as the Urban Basic Services (UBS) project. Because of the scale of the Soweto East KENSUP project, the strategic importance of the UBS project within it, and the importance of contributing to the record of successes in slum upgrading, we undertook to research three questions: 1) what was the discourse in the implementing institutions as the UBS project was conceived and developed, 2) what steps were taken during implementation to engage community support and address community priorities, and 3) what degree of success was achieved through implementation? 2. Methods The methods used for the first two questionsdthe institutional discourse and the steps of implementationdinvolved archival research and key informant interviews. For the archival research, records were gathered from KENSUP, UN-Habitat, and Maji na Ufanisi and were collated and reviewed to assess the discourse leading to the genesis of KENSUP and the record of implementation of the UBS project in Soweto East. Key informant interviews were held during May/June, 2012, with individuals from Government of Kenya (KENSUP), the Nairobi City Council, UN-Habitat, Maji na Ufanisi, and with representatives from the community, including members of the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC), the community-based organization Eco-Build Africa Trust, the staff of the Soweto East Resource Centre, and the community at large. Methods used for the third questiondassessing the impact of the UBS in Soweto Eastdinvolved further key-informant interviews as well as field surveys, conducted July/August 2012, of 180 people impacted by one major feature of the project, a new access road. Included in the surveys were questions about the respondent's perception of conditions in Kibera as they were before the start of the project, at the time of the interviews, or were expected to be when all phases of the full KENSUP project were completed. This was intended to gauge satisfaction levels with progress to date, to document levels of trust and optimism about continued progress, and to assess the success of the “entry-point” function of the USB project.

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For security reasons, trained field assistants from within the community conducted the surveys in either Kiswahili or English (at the respondent's choice). Possible sources of error for the survey include the fact that, given the working environment, it was not possible to fully randomize respondent selection, and because surveys had to be conducted by people from within the community, there was also a possible risk of “gatekeeper” bias. 3. Results 3.1. The discourse associated with the genesis of KENSUP The published documents leading up to the Soweto-East project suggest clear recognition of the importance in developing innovative mechanisms for effective community engagement in slum upgrading. The Government of Kenya's primary goals for KENSUP were: … to improve the livelihoods of people living and working in slums and informal settlements in the urban areas of Kenya through housing improvement, income generation, and the provision of security of tenure and physical and social infrastructure; to promote and facilitate broad-based partnerships utilising consensus building and consultation among all the stakeholders, (Candiracci €nen, 2007) pg. 15. & Syrja The ideals of inclusion are further emphasized in the assertion that “slum upgrading is a social programme requiring broader and wellcoordinated participation of all stakeholders. For this to be achieved a social scenario is desirable that offers an enhanced democratic space for citizen participation, capacity building and enabling environment for participation and engagement, sufficient and clear communication linkages and strategies”(Government of Kenya, 2004) pg.10. Of twelve guiding principles published, eight refer to community attributes; two to infrastructure. Those that focus on infrastructure address only sustainability and the provision of basic services while those that focus on the community include: inclusive participation; capacity building; partnership; communication; good governance; gender awareness; and affordable housing finance. The focus on community reflects an ostensible commitment to avoiding top-down interventions. These principles led to several institutional initiatives, including: 1) the Nairobi Situation Analysis, 2) the Participatory Urban Assessment, 3) the formation of the Settlement Executive Committee, and 4) a sequence of studies intended to improve communication within and between stakeholders. Each of these steps contributed to supporting community inclusion, and each is discussed below. 3.1.1. Nairobi Situation AnalysisdJune 2001 This review document (Syagga, Winnie, Mitullah & Gitau, 2001) described the contemporary state of slums and slum upgrading initiatives in Nairobi. The intention was to allow stakeholders to reach consensus about priority conditions and actions. It assessed the political, social, physical, economic, cultural and institutional factors impacting Kibera, and critically evaluated previous efforts by development partners (government, international agencies, NGOs, Churches, CBOs, etc.) to improve the conditions. The document notes that “elites and experts normally make the major decisions regarding what is desirable and community participation is

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normally seen as a means of legitimizing what has already been decided upon” (pg. vii). It goes on to emphasize that “Evidence shows, however, that upgrading of the living environment of low-income households can be done at substantially improved and relatively modest per capita cost through the provision of basic infrastructure. At the same time, given the right kind of encouragement, slum dwellers are capable of organising themselves and improving their standards of living” (pg. ix). 3.1.2. Participatory Urban Appraisal (PUA) - 2004 The PUA surveyed each of 12 villages in Kibera with two goals: “1. To establish the real and actual situation of the living conditions of the people living and working in Kibera; 2. To use interactive community-based research methodologies for mobilization of the people to develop their hopes, generate their interest and secure their commitment in bringing about the necessary and desired change (without raising unrealistic expectations)” (KENSUP & UN Habitat, 2004) pg. 4. In Soweto East, 153 residents participated in the PUA, with 29 contributing to a subsequent stakeholders' workshop. The report provided a wealth of information in areas including a history of the community, development goals, priority problems and needs and, lastly, recommendations for action. A historical review noted consistent patterns of dislocation, protest, and efforts at self-help. Notably, the PUA also sought input about the positive elements of the community, with the concern that “residents must not lose what they are currently enjoying” (KENSUP & UN Habitat, 2004: 3). This recognized the reality that, for many people, life in slums was a best alternative that should not jeopardized. Community members created a list of development goals, but three priority projects emerged: an improved access road, improved housing, and local schools. The road reappeared in discussions that shaped the “entry-point” UBS project while housing became the endpoint of the overall Soweto East KENSUP project. Respondents in the PUA also identified what the community could provide (manpower, leeway/space for building the road, security for building materials) and what would require outside inputs (materials, funding and technical assistance). This information provided a template for later partnerships that attempted to combine bottomup and top-down contributions. 3.1.3. The Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) As a means of linking to the community and building support, the Ministry of Lands and Housing created the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC). The Terms of Reference for the SEC noted that “the most significant and innovative aspect of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme is the enabling of the slum dwellers and other stakeholders to be fully and actively involved in improving their own livelihoods and neighbourhoods” (Ministry of Lands and Housing, 2004). The SEC was to provide the institutional link for that involvement and was to be “formed by project beneficiaries through democratic elections to represent relevant stakeholders and the community members in the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)”(Ministry of Lands and Housing, 2004: 3) The tasks the committee was responsible for were: mobilizing and facilitating community and settlement stakeholders for active participation in the decision making, planning and implementation process to ensure ownership [KENSUP and related] projects; sensitizing the community, disseminating information and soliciting views and perspectives of the community on [KENSUP] and project-related issued through holding of regular meetings and sessions with settlement representatives and residents; working with the community in determining and prioritizing the needs of the community; marshaling community support

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for the programme and facilitating the mobilization of community and stakeholder resources for investment in the upgrading process; representing interests of the community and providing linkage between the community and the institutional partners, including facilitating smooth, efficient and adequate flow of information; and providing the Programme Secretariat with accurate and timely reports on the situation on the ground at all times. But perhaps the most significant mandate was the last: “Creating unity among slum dwellers and stakeholders and ensuring that valid and reasonable views and interest of the slum dwellers are well taken care of throughout the project phases” (Ministry of Lands and Housing, 2004). From the beginning, the SEC was critical to work in Soweto East. 3.1.4. KENSUP's focus on communication and capacity building KENSUP supported studies on how best to establish effective communication. Four documents arising from these studies are considered below. 1. Investigation of actors operating in Kiberad(January 2004). This study (Acacia Consultants Ltd. & Maji na Ufanisi, 2004) provided a “status report of the various actors operating in Kibera, their areas of focus, and their achievements” (Acacia Consultants Ltd. & Maji na Ufanisi, 2004:2). Various organizations and institutions involved in service provision were identified and the role of each was considered. The study concluded that, despite “the process of slum upgrading [causing] different emotions in different actor and residents” of Kibera, there is enough “goodwill among the slum dwellers across the whole spectrum of actors for participation in the process” (Acacia Consultants Ltd. & Maji na Ufanisi, 2004: 18). 2. Communication strategy (October 2005). This document (Acacia Consultants Ltd. & Ufanisi, 2005) noted that a communication strategy was essential for the success of KENSUP: “To empower stakeholders to meaningfully participate in the implementation of slum upgrading projects.” It identified specific objectives as: creating awareness, understanding and support for KENSUP at the community level, developing a consensus amongst stakeholders and ensuring full participation in planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The report recommended a “multi-media approach to ensure maximum effect” (Acacia Consultants Ltd. & Ufanisi, 2005: 6) and suggested that the communication channels should include “the development of a website, newsletters, radio stations, video programs, mobile cinemas, seminars and public meetings, information centres, media visits (mainstream), public meetings for the political leaders, breakfast meetings, hotline/tollfree number, and drama groups” (Acacia Consultants Ltd. & Ufanisi, 2005:7e8). After stressing the importance of a communication strategy, the report observed that nothing had yet been put in place to allow for the participation of all stakeholders (Acacia Consultants Ltd. & Ufanisi, 2005: 13). 3. Communication action plan (SeptemberdOctober 2006). As a follow up to findings from the Communication Strategy (2005), the author reported that KENSUP faced persistent challenges in establishing that this process of slum upgrading was inclusive (Handa, 2006). He noted: “a clear lack of understanding of how the project will be implemented” and that “the understanding varie[s] from those who [see] KENSUP as meant to construct improved housing for urban dwellers to those who [understand] it to be a government programme to enable slum residents to own the structures they are living in” (Handa, 2006: 7).

The report offered a communication strategy linking institutions with community stakeholders. It concluded that “the successful implementation of the KENSUP programme will depend, to a large extent, on the creation of a clear information channel that will allow for a smooth vertical and horizontal flow of information in the KENSUP structure” (Handa, 2006: 24e25). Most significantly, it concluded that “The situation is made worse by the politicization of the programme, leading to speculations and in some cases resistance due to misinformation and propaganda. This history of slum upgrading in Kenya only adds to the justification for such resistance. The need therefore for proper accurate, well focused and timely information is important if not crucial to the success of the KENSUP programme” (Handa, 2006: 27). 4. Capacity building assessment report and Work Plan: (November 2006eJune 2009). The final document in this series was the Work Plan (Senteu, 2006), which was a top-down intervention intended to promote bottom-up engagement. “In recognition of the need to involve all the stakeholders in slum upgrading, Swedish International Development cooperation Agency has provided funds to the Government of Kenya [for] capacity building and community components of KENSUP” (Senteu, 2006: iii). With a particular focus on improving communication, the Work Plan aimed to assess and develop the capacity building component of KENSUP. The report noted that: “The KENSUP institutional structure and arrangement, though capturing the spirit of the vision, mission and goals, have not adequately captured the core of the programme e the community” (Senteu, 2006: 7). Acknowledging past failures in slum upgrading (i.e. land tenure, exclusion and other root causes the report lists), the report cautions that “the same could be repeated by KENSUP if deliberate efforts are not made by the government to involve all the stakeholders (and specifically the community) directly in the process. ” (Senteu, 2006: 7). These four documents stress the essential role of effective engagement. They also note that the root problem is not a failure to understand the need, but a lack of information about “best practices” to draw from. The KENSUP project in Soweto East was intended as a pilot project where best practices would be developed and documented. The UBS project was conceived within this framework to explore effective strategies within Kibera. Success with the UBS project could facilitate advances with the large-scale housing objectives of the Soweto East project. It could also provide an inventory of best practices for future initiatives. The following section addresses the implementation of UBS. 3.2. The integrated Urban Basic Services (UBS) project as an entrypoint for KENSUP The Water and Sanitation Branch of UN-Habitat had an established presence and a record of success in Kibera, and was therefore a logical choice as a lead agency for the entry-point project. But to build trust, they had to address community priorities beyond water and sanitation. Based on the Participatory Urban Assessment and subsequent meetings, the components of the UBS project were defined (Table 1). It was intended to begin in November, 2005 with a budget US$ 318,000. This was later increased to US$ 579,684, and the start date revised to January 2006 (with completion expected in 2008). Maji na Ufanisi was selected as the implementing partner because Maji operatives were known and trusted in the community. A sensitization workshop was held in February, 2006, to build awareness among stakeholders, to identify roles/responsibilities and contributions of the various stakeholders, and to agree on a

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Table 1 UBS Core Themes Abridged from (Maji na Ufanisi, 2006). 1 Support the community to improve accessibility to water and sanitation in Soweto East, 2 Establish and strengthen governance frameworks to regulate distribution and accessibility to water and for the upgrading of demonstrations, 3 Support community organization through the formation of Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) management committees as a vehicle for promoting small scale waste management enterprises, increased access to water and sanitation services and access for credit to facilitate improvement of housing sector, 4 Support the community to improve the drainage system in Soweto East, 5 Initiate small scale door to door waste collection and recycling initiatives based on the cooperative approach. 6 To enable the Soweto East community gain basic knowledge about computers, software and internet and supply the opportunity to participate in online discussions, send emails, search for information etc. 7 To popularise within the community a non-motorised transport system (improved bicycle transporter) for the improvement of livelihoods within the urban poor.a a

The non-motorized transport component was to be handled through a parallel agreement and is not discussed. Further in this paper.

final action plan. Stakeholders included the KENSUP Secretariat, Settlement Executive Committee (SEC), Nairobi City Council Settlement Project Implementation Unit (SPIU), Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company (NAWASCO), Athi Water Services Board, Ministry of Cooperative and UN-Habitat. This group represented the “top-down” actors, with the SEC representing the community. The meeting concluded by listing the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders, and set capacity building objectives. The workshop identified improved physical access to the community as a top priority. Consequently, construction of the Soweto East Access Road was added to the list of goals and it became the most conspicuous and ambitious aspect of the UBS project. Several meetings of the stakeholders led to the agreement that the building of the road would seek local manual labor “in order to ensure the involvement of the community; create income opportunities; develop labor skills; and increase a sense of ownership” (Maji na Ufanisi, 2008). It was further agreed that a road committee would be established, comprising up to seven people living on the designated road allowance. Inclusion of the road demonstrated the adaptive management approach. However, it also resulted in a further extension of the timeline to May 30, 2010, and an increase in the budget to USD $1,057,058.95. 3.3. What UBS accomplished: Key informant interviews and focus group responses Key informant interviews with agency representatives and community members were wide ranging, and only key points related to the entry-point UBS project are treated here. To respect confidentiality obligations, respondents are not identified, except as being from agencies or from the community. All interviews took place in between May and August, 2012. Main themes addressed by agency stakeholders were the importance of personal commitment to community engagement, recognition of the time and complexity of ensuring engagement, and satisfaction with evidence of the effectiveness of the engagement process. The themes are reflected in the following comments: “The challenge of consultation is that is takes a very long time.” “The main problem with the programme is communication.” But given these challenges … “the Settlement Executive Committee is the bridge between the project managers at the city level and the community.” Overall, KENSUP “has been top-down, but, on the ground, it has been very democratic, especially the SECdit has been conceptually unique.” Assessing elements of the integrated UBS: “both social and physical infrastructure is needed.” “People can hardly believe the impact of the road … it is the best entry-point to achieve real improvements.” Key informant interviews conducted in the community indicated how forums were organized through community Chiefs and the SEC, and how awareness of the project was built. It was “… an important process because the community (Kibera) has been promised so many things, so many times.” “People participated and were deeply invested … Community members were the ones to demolish the houses

to make way for the new toilet facilities and the road, for example. SEC was the most important aspect of the process.” Assessment of the project was that “community cohesion, services have increased, the road has had a great impact on businesses, and the number of flying toilets has decreased, which has reduced the incidents of disease.” Another said, “this project was created because we wanted and needed a systematic strategy to address the fact that there has been no change in our slums over the last 40 years … We need remarkable change.” Not all responses were positive. During a focus group interview with community members, both positive and negative assessments were made. When asked directly about the positive impacts of the project, members collectively agreed that there were clear improvements: “We've learned how to do advocacy work, women are involved, flying toilets are finished, there is a road and we've received training.” “We're happy that slums are being reduced and, despite there still being concerns, we know our rights now.” However, there were also grievances, primarily related to the role and structure of the SEC. “The committee was very useful in the relocation process, specifically. However, a constitution for it needs to be public and the seats on the committee should be rotational.” “It wasn't an election, it was a selection. And they represent the government.” “They've sold us out. They own vehicles and have bought land outside Kibera. They were supposed to help us but they are corrupt.” The focus group did include structure owners, who appeared to be most concerned about how they would be compensated directly for their lost property. “Raila Odinga said the landlords would be properly compensated.” “We can't sell the houses that are being built because it's a communal title, so why should we cooperate?” Key points emerging from the interviews suggest the importance of effective communication, the critical role played by the SEC, and the reality that effective public participation can be complicated. The interviews also suggests that no single outcome can meet all expectations. 3.4. What UBS accomplished: measuring the community impact The surveys to determine the impact of the UBS project were conducted when follow-up activities (relocation and demolition) were well underway. Respondents' perceptions must therefore be viewed as being influenced by the combined impacts. 3.4.1. Who was surveyed The survey included 180 males and females between the ages of 18 and 57 (Fig. 1), and with main activities aggregated into four categories (Fig. 2). 3.4.2. Community assessments of the new access road as part of the UBS project The impact of the road on “living conditions in Kibera” is reported by over 75% to have been positive (Fig. 3), with only 15% saying it made conditions worse. Likewise, 75% reported that it

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Fig. 1. The age and gender distribution.

Fig. 4. Impact of the road on safety.

Fig. 2. Main activity of respondents.

and KENSUP projects were accomplishing the intended main objectives: there were reported increases in quality of life and safety as a result of the road intervention, a marked reported improvement in all of the impact variables, and a high degree of optimism for continued improvements with the overall KENSUP project. . Narrative responses noted both the best things about the road (i.e. “boosted business” and “better access to/for goods and services within Kibera”) and worst things (i.e. “increased occurrence of accidents” and “poor drainage”). Respondents were asked what might have improved the projects and explicit responses were specific, such as: speed bumps, road lights, better drainage, footpaths, and better road signs/markings. These suggested that some negative assessments of the road concerned engineering attributes rather than the presence of the road itself. However, there were also concerns about unintended negative consequences of the road on community security and commerce. Four respondents noted that the road resulted in an “opening up” and “exposure” to strangers that had effectively altered the systems in place for ensuring community safety. Violent incidents took place during field research that were attributed by some respondents as being directly connected to the new road. In one incident, three people were shot dead by undercover police, and, in another, a community resident attempting to alert police was shot by the group of robbers. According to some respondents, these incidents are explained as being a result of having an open road allowing access through a congested settlement. Increased traffic along the road would mean increased commerce for shops and kiosksda positive outcomedbut there was concern that opportunities would be taken by powerful merchants and that local informal sector entrepreneurs would be displaced.

4. Conclusions Fig. 3. Impact of the road on living conditions.

made conditions safer, while only 10% said less safe (Fig. 4). Going beyond the focus on the road, and taking the overall impact of the project on general aspects of community life (listed in Fig. 5-A,B, and C), there are consistent reported improvements to the date of the survey, and overwhelming optimism about future outcomes.

3.4.3. Implications These data demonstrate that, at the time of the survey, the UBS

4.1. The emergence of top-down/bottom-up community alliances Given the need for new approaches in slum upgrading (Andreasen & Møller-Jensen, 2016; Das & Takahashi, 2009), and particularly in building community engagement (Hossain, 2007; Muraya, 2006; Pal, 2006; Rigon, 2014) this study undertook to research three questions about the efforts of the UBS project in Soweto East to find synergies in bottom-up and top-down collaboration. The first was about the institutional context in which the initiative was developed, the second about steps taken to engage community support, and the third about apparent successes.

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Fig. 5. A. Perspective on living conditions before KENSUP began. B. Perspective on living conditions at the time of the survey. C. Perspective on living conditions likely when KENSUP is completed.

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Taking the last question first, our data show that survey respondents were overwhelmingly positive about the impacts UBS had in Soweto East, which suggests that UBS, and by extension KENSUP, were successful in winning community support through the “entry-point” project. The strategy was clearly effective. Assessments of the first two questions help explain the success. It was partially due to the cautious and attentive steps taken during project implementation, as outlined in Section 3.2, even though these steps added costs and caused delays. And these cautious and attentive steps were fully consistent with the institutional commitments implied in discourse of key institutional players, as outlined in Section 3.1. The literature clearly shows that the mechanisms for achieving effective public participation can be complicated and time consuming (Dupont et al., 2014; Rigon, 2014; Samad, 2006). Key informants from the agencies confirmed this, but the institutional commitment to adaptive management and the toleration of practical delays that added costs in implementationdfor example, in the building of the roaddshowed an active willingness to respond to community input. Some strategic characteristics of the UBS project can be enumerated and may be transferrable to other cases where top-down/bottom-up collaboration is necessary. 1. The value of using known agents to engage a skeptical or suspicious community. Maji Ufanisi and the UN-Habitat Water and Sanitation Branch (of Basic Urban Services) had established records within Kibera. Extending their work with urban basic services accomplished three outcomes: it improved living conditions; it extended trust and confidence; and as comments in the interviews showed, it helped with capacity building for partnership in upgrading activities. 2. The value of continuity in relationships of trust. Key informants and project operatives reported and demonstrated a sincere personal commitment to being available, working in the community, and being willing to engage in dialogue. That accessibility was clearly a catalyst to the trust that developed. 3. The importance of an inclusive and respectful approach to public engagement. It was clear from the documents, actions and interviews that there was a genuine investment in effective consultation and dialogue. It generated very high levels of trust and engagement, even though, as key informants noted, it was time-consuming. 4. The benefit of adaptive management. Adapting the project design to community input from the community built trust, but also allowed the project to include components that would have the biggest transformative impact, as inclusion of the road indicated. 5. The value of urban basic services as a cost-effective way of improving many lives quickly. The UBS initiative was envisioned as an entry-point project for KENSUP's large-scale housing project, however it generated marked improvements in quality of life for those who were not part of the relocation. It did so by providing basic service (water, sewage, lighting, access, security, employment and capacity building) to large number of residents. The costs per capita for these improvements will be significantly lower than what critics note as high and perhaps unsustainable costs of the new housing initiative (Fernandez & Calas, 2011). The UBS could therefore be more readily replicated. 6. The value of a multifaceted, integrated approach. The UBS project addressed several complementary goals simultaneously (from water and sanitation to non-motorized transport and a community resource center). These were defined by the community and had synergistic effects; no single initiative would have progressed as well without the others, nor would

the final benefit of any have been as great. Most obviously, as the survey revealed, providing an access road facilitated all other components requiring infrastructure development. 7. The value of engagement through formal entities such as the Settlement Executive Committee. The evidence shows that by creating a formal institutional arrangement to give voice to a communitydas the SEC in Soweto East diddand treating that entity as a full partner, it was possible to ensure consistent, sustainable and effective links with the community, even despite some of the cited community concerns about the SEC. 8. Win/win solutions may be a fantasy - there may always be some who are disaffected. Even when an intervention will benefit a majority, there may be those who are negatively affected, in some cases by the very fact that the majority has become less vulnerable or dependent. For example, those who sell water at an inflated price to a captive market will not benefit from a better water supply, structure-owners who lose control over profitable rental holdings will not benefit from equitable tenure arrangement, less competitive kiosk owners may lose profit as more traffic attracts bigger vendors. Concessions to those who profit from unacceptable conditions cannot be used to win their support, so winning wide community engagement may be the only answer. The broad base of consultation before the project, and wide involvement during the project, maintained viable working conditions throughout the UBS project. 9. Success may bring volatility. The high levels of optimism within the community arising from the UBS engagement may create a volatile situation if trust and expectations are not fulfilled by the overall KENSUP project. Expectations may be unrealistically high or may be varied within the community, such that no single outcome would meet all expectations. As noted, critical assessments of KENSUP in Soweto East suggest that final outcomes may not meet standards for sustainable and equitable upgrading (Anyiso, 2013; Fernandez & Calas, 2011; Stenton, 2015). If this project contributes to the legacy of other failed, large-scale slum developments, the trust built by the USB project will be lost, and may be harder to replicate in any future setting.

4.2. Top-down/bottom-up approaches: can they work? By taking local engagement as a prerequisite for successful slum upgrading, as in the case of the UBS project, appreciable success was achieved despite initial suspicion, despite complications that caused delays and cost over-runs, and despite failure to satisfy all survey respondents. That said, while the financial resources and professional expertise of the large institutions were essential to the vision and to the implementation of the project, it was the degree of acceptance and support from the community that made successes possible. The objective of this research was to determine whether, in this case, outside actors could win community support to establish a collaborative upgrading program. Clearly they did. The USB project created synergies between large, well-endowed, topdown organizations and bottom-up community interests. When, in 1945, the then Commissioner for Local Government, Lands, and Settlement, recognized that “serious abuses and very objectionable conditions have resulted from the policy pursued,” he argued for changed policies. The evidence from the UBS project in Soweto East suggests that the rhetoric and underlying values have changed, that project management strategies have evolved, and that the need for community engagement has been recognized and embedded. The implementation and outcome indicate a viable hybrid approach that supports bottom-up input and local engagement, while also

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mobilizing the resources of large institutions. The introduction outlined the challenges of sustainable and equitable transformation of slums as outlined scholarly literature, and the aspirations UN and Government agencies as cited in policy documents. Given these challenges and aspirations, the hybrid approach developed in the USB project may prove to be an effective way of improving living conditions for the urban poor. Acknowledgements The authors are grateful for the cooperation of all those who contributed to the study by allowing access to documents, providing introductions to key actors, or participating in interviews. Given the nature of the research, the list of such people is long, but the study could not have been done without the support of those associated with the Ministry of Lands and Housing KENSUP office in Kibera, UN-Habitat Water and Sanitation Division, Maji na Ufanisi, and the Settlement Executive Committee. Dr. Graham Alabaster and Harrison Kwach, of UN-Habitat, were generous, constant and effective in providing guidance and contacts. UNHabitat contributed financial and logistic support for part of this study. We also thank the reviewers of the early draft for their constructive comments. All are gratefully acknowledged. References Acacia Consultants Ltd., & Maji na Ufanisi. (2004). Investigation of actors operating in Kibera e Volume I. Analytical Report. Acacia Consultants Ltd., & Ufanisi, M. n. (2005). Communication strategy (for KWATSAN in Soweto East). Amnesty International. (2009). The unseen Majority: Nairobi's 2 million slum dwellers. Andreasen, M. H., & Møller-Jensen, L. (2016). Beyond the networks: Self-help services and post-settlement network extensions in the periphery of Dar es Salaam. Habitat International, 53, 39e47. Anyiso, J. (2013). Factors influencing sustainability of slum upgrading programs, kibera-soweto east upgrading program. Langata County, Nairobi, Kenya: University of Nairobi. Buckley, R., Kallergis, A., & Wainer, L. (2015). The housing challenge: Avoiding the ozymandias syndrome. Rockefeller Foundation and New School. €nen, R. (2007). UN-Habitat and the Kenya slum upgrading Candiracci, S., & Syrja programme. Charbonneau, A. (2016). Managing conflicts in slums within a relocation project. Case Study of Soweto East, Kibira, Nairobi). Croese, S., Cirolia, L. R., & Graham, N. (2016). Towards Habitat III: Confronting the disjuncture between global policy and local practice on Africa's ‘challenge of slums’. Habitat International, 53, 237e242. Cronin, V., & Guthrie, P. (2011). Alternative approaches to slum upgrading in Kibera, Nairobi. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers-Urban Design and Planning, 164(2), 129e139. Das, A. K., & Takahashi, L. M. (2009). Evolving institutional arrangements, scaling up, and sustainability emerging issues in participatory slum upgrading in Ahmedabad, India. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 29(2), 213e232. Dupont, V., Banda, S., Vaidya, Y., & Gowda, M. S. (2014). Unpacking participation in Kathputli Colony. Economic & Political Weekly, 49(24), 39. Farha, L. (2016). Homelessness is not just about housing d it's a human rights failure. Retrieved from http://citiscope.org/habitatIII/commentary/2016/02/ homelessness-not-just-about-housing-its-human-rights-failure. Fernandez, R. F., & Calas, B. (2011). The Kibera Soweto East project in Nairobi, Kenya. Les cahiers d'Afrique de l'Est, 44, 129e146.

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