Community water supply for the urban poor in developing countries: The case of Dhaka, Bangladesh

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Habitat International 31 (2007) 24–35 www.elsevier.com/locate/habitatint

Community water supply for the urban poor in developing countries: The case of Dhaka, Bangladesh H.M. Delwar Akbar, John R. Minnery, Basil van Horen, Phil Smith School of Geography, Planning and Architecture, The University of Queensland, Brisbane QLD 4072, Australia

Abstract This paper presents a model for community and institutional supply of potable water to the urban poor in the cities of developing countries, through an examination of Dhaka, Bangladesh. The model identifies ways of providing small-scale water supply systems for urban slum and squatter communities by following internationally recognised principles of potable water supply and building on existing recognised ‘good practise’. There are three main components of the proposed model: the community (the central actor), various complementary actors and potential local suppliers of finance and technology. The model sees a strong role for private sector investors. It is applicable to those cities where there is little or no problem with water availability but where the poor still do not have good access to potable water. The model does not claim to be a complete solution for the existing problem, but it will significantly aid the urban poor. It shows how the provision of basic services to the urban poor can be facilitated by the poor themselves. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Water supply; Urban poor; Community; Dhaka

Introduction Over half of the people living in the large cities of developing countries are poor and live in informal settlements that lack a potable water supply (UN-HABITAT, 2003). Household connections to a piped water supply are often available to only an elite minority of the population (Kyessi, 2005; McIntosh, 2003). The reasons for this extend beyond the physical availability of water—many cities in developing countries are in areas of high rainfall or are close to major rivers. Rather political, institutional and economic factors are responsible. This paper explores the influence of these factors, and the social and technical factors that are related to them, in trying to better understand why this is so. It develops an institutional model for the supply of potable water to the urban poor, through examination of an example of current ‘best practise’ and through the findings of case study research. A major innovation in the suggested approach is that engagement of the private sector can be utilised to empower local communities.

Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 413461360; fax: +61 7 33656899.

E-mail address: [email protected] (H.M.D. Akbar). 0197-3975/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2006.03.001

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Table 1 Water source of the poor in Dhaka City Reference

Year

Study coverage

Water source

%

Qadir (1975)

1975

Squatter settlements of Dhaka City

Tap

1

Hand pump Dug well Pond

63 2 35

Tap and hand pump

37

Dug well and pond

15

Tap

50

Hand pump

14.6

Tap

55

Hand pump Pond/canal/river Others

43.5 0.2 1.3

Tap

31.24

Hand pump Dug well Others

38.52 4.27 25.96

Tap

44.35

Hand pump Unsafe sources

43.5 12.15

Centre for Urban Studies (CUS) (1983)

Centre for Urban Studies (CUS) (1988)

Islam, Rahman, and Huq (1997b)

Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) (1999)

Hanchett, Akhter, & Khan (2003)

1983

1988

1995

1997

2001

Informal settlements of Dhaka City Informal settlements of Dhaka City Overall urban poor of Dhaka City

Slums and squatter settlements of Dhaka City

Slums and squatter settlements of Dhaka City and Chittagong City

The urban poor and water supply in Dhaka The focus of this study is Dhaka, Bangladesh. Dhaka is a city of poverty. The average per capita annual income in Dhaka City is around Taka 13,000 (US$327) (Centre for Urban Studies, 1989), which is one of the lowest in the mega-cities of the world. About 70% of the total population of Dhaka are classed as ‘absolute poor’ (Siddiqui, Ahmed, Awal, & Ahmed, 2000). The largest concentrations of the urban poor are in the informal settlements. There were at least 3007 informal settlements in Dhaka City in 1996 (Centre for Urban Studies, 1996). Physically these settlements are characterised by kutcha1 and semi-pucca2 structures of a single storey. They have residential densities of 1000–2500 persons per acre (Siddiqui et al., 2000). Recent studies estimate that between two and four million people live in these settlements; this could be nine million by 2020 (Islam and Nazem, 1997; Water Partners International (WPI), 2004). Most urban poor in Dhaka do not have access to potable water. The formal system provides only 1643 street hydrants (Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority, 2002a), so most of the poor use hand pumps. Water vending is common in the informal settlements. People also use water from dug-wells, ponds, rivers, 1

Kutcha house has a ceiling which is less than one meter height and is made of very cheap construction materials like straw, bamboo, chhan (grass), golpata (leaves), polythene sheets, old tins and gunny bags (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 1999). 2 Semi-pucca house is a structure of normal height and has walls made of bricks. The roof is made of any material other than cement and concrete (BBS, 1999).

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canals and swamps. Estimates of the use of different water sources vary. Table 1 shows estimates from a number of sources between 1975 and 2001. The table indicates that tap-water supply increased from a very low base in 1975 to between 30% and 50% in more recent times. This implies that government projects and NGOs’ endeavours have made some improvements over time. Information for the research reported here was collected through a survey of 540 households, focus group discussions and stakeholder interviews. The discussion group participants were men and women from nine slums and squatter settlements. Thirty stakeholders from different professions (public water provider, executives of international and national NGOs, urban planners and other experts, politicians and community leaders) were also interviewed (Akbar, 2005). Data collected from these sources shows that informal dwellers generally pay more per unit of water for tap-water than do other social groups in Dhaka City. On average, the informal dwellers spend Tk.1.00 for 18 l of water; while others, who are linked to the piped water system directly, receive 220 l for Tk.1.00 (see also Danida, 1997). Some poor do not pay for water, but use natural sources, neighbour’s supplies and community hand pumps, or pilfer water from Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DWASA) lines (Akbar, 2005). As is the case in many other cities in developing countries, overall water availability is not the principal reason why potable water is not available to informal settlements. Rather the main reasons are political, institutional and economic. The survey undertaken for this research showed, for example, that some public water provider’s staff do not like to provide water to the informal settlements because this would decrease their extra income through bribes. In addition, the informal dwellers have insecure tenure and are always fearful of eviction, which discourages them from spending money for water supply development. One survey showed that 5% of the informal dwellers in Dhaka City already have experienced eviction (Islam, Rahman, & Huq, 1997a). International development assistance for water supply through local or national government departments often does not reach the poor (Islam et al., 1997a, p. 241). Thus the formal water supply to the urban poor in Dhaka City is very limited. It is a mistake, however, to believe that the urban poor are not able or willing to pay for water. The research findings showed that most of the poor are already paying higher rates than middle and high income communities (Akbar, 2005). Although the poor have the ability to pay the user charge, they are not able to pay the large amount of money needed for connection fees. The existing legislation does not allow informal dwellers to be connected to the formal water supply system directly because of their insecure tenure.

Current ‘good practise’ Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) is an NGO in Dhaka, established in 1988. Its main purpose was providing health services to the informal dwellers in Dhaka City and then in 1992 it expanded its activities to include community-based water supply and sanitation. The approach it uses is known as the ‘DSK Model’. The model is based on the belief that the urban poor can manage a formal water supply, such as a community water point, if someone such as an NGO guides them in an appropriate direction (Hanchett et al., 2003; Matin, 1999). It demonstrates how the informal community can access formal utility services. A key principle of the model is to respond to the demand for water indicated by the community’s willingness to pay. When DSK started their work they installed a hand pump, but the groundwater level during the dry season became too low to make it sustainable. Then they approached DWASA for a piped water connection. In 1992, after continuous negotiations with DWASA and Dhaka City Corporation (DCC), DSK was able to gain access to the piped water system. DSK invested Taka 70,000 and introduced a water point that was community owned and managed and for which the residents were to pay the development, operation and maintenance costs. The water point uses a reservoir to store water taken from the piped water system; it is then removed from the reservoir by hand pump. DSK has gradually extended its operations. To date, about 115 community-managed water points have been established and are benefiting around 70,000 informal dwellers (DWASA, 2002b). The way the DSK model works is shown in Fig. 1. International donor agencies, national NGOs, public water providers, local governments and the informal communities are the actors in this model. NGOs are seen as the key actors. They initiate the planning for establishing community water.

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Fig. 1. DSK model—actors and mechanisms (modified from Matin, 1999).

The first step in the process involves initial dialogue with the community to understand their needs. The second step is to prepare and submit the proposal to the donors for funding. Detailed planning and system design start at the third stage, which includes a base line survey of existing practices, site selection and design of the water point. The fourth step is the implementation stage, which includes community mobilisation through the formation of a CBO and application submissions for permission from the public water provider and local government. The fifth step is water point management and monitoring, which includes both the community’s and the NGO’s responsibilities. The community’s responsibilities are day-to-day operation of the water point, daily revenue collection, repayment of the loan to the NGO, and community decision-making on use of surplus revenue from the site. The NGO’s responsibilities include monitoring the revenue collected by field workers, and payment of the public water provider’s bill, monitoring social disputes and, after cost recovery, the transfer of the water point to the community. DSK provides training to the CBO members for operation and maintenance of water points and hygienic practices until the capital cost recovery is complete. The NGO is the central actor in all mechanisms of this model. Key experiences and lessons The DSK model has been used with some success in Dhaka City. WaterAid Bangladesh is the main donor, providing capital to start a new water point, but their funds are very limited. They donate money on the basis of cost recovery and the programme is slowly expanding through this. However, DSK faces problems from DCC and DWASA staff who frequently ask for bribes for land and water point permission (DSK and WaterAid-Bangladesh, 1999, p. 45). Secondly DSK faced problems relating to legal access to land. Residents in government and privately owned buildings object to the construction of the water points in slums adjacent to their plots, because they see the construction as a formalisation of the ‘illegal’ community and an admission by the authorities that the slum dwellers will be staying (Singha & DSK, 2002). Where the people are served by the DSK system, illegal water use has been reduced. People feel more comfortable with this legal system. The DSK model increases social unity and community awareness, and also creates employment. The responses of many of the people interviewed as part of this research were very positive about the DSK approach: ‘‘The water point does not only meet our need for water, but also we can work there. This is a suitable system for the Basteebashee’’3 (CBO leader, Monwara Bastee, Tejgoan Thana4); ‘‘First, we pay the bills, then we spend money for repairs and maintenance; and the remainder is used as the caretaker’s salary. It is always more than Taka 500 per month’’ (CBO leader of Baunia Badh Bastee, Pallabi Thana). 3 4

Slum or squatter settlement dwellers. Sub-district.

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But the system is not without its problems and some informal dwellers are not happy with it. In the focus group discussions people complained about queuing during peak hours, especially in the morning. Both the group discussions and field observation showed that although the projects typically started with very good intentions, and in the first few months they were looked after regularly and provided services of a high quality, it does not take long before services deteriorate. This is not because of negligence on the part of DSK but rather because the CBOs frequently fail to operate the water points properly. Survey respondents said, for example: ‘‘It is good that we have a DSK water point. Water is distributed on a ‘first come first served’ basis. However, in the morning, people have to wait up to 1 hour to collect water and the water price is too high.— Moreover, the CBO members collect water first and they pay less than the others’’ (Respondent, Bashbari Bastee of Mohammadpur Thana); ‘‘Some committee members are working with us for their own advantage, for example, to obtain extra water and water connection privileges. Actually we had deficiency maintaining discipline with respect to water distribution’’ (CBO leader, Bangladesh Rubber Industry Bastee, Tejgoan Thana). These findings are supported by studies by DSK and WaterAid Bangladesh (1999). In some cases, social violence has increased. First, the people who were involved in the widespread illegal water business lost their business and created trouble at the water point. Sometimes, the beneficiaries and the CBO members did not trust each other or caretakers acted inappropriately. In addition some of the poorest of the poor cannot afford water provided under this model. Nevertheless, although there are problems facing the DSK model, it is now well known and is spreading to other cities such as Chittagong. The poor generally like the model. Most stakeholders interviewed knew about the DSK model and felt that it is a suitable model for the poor. Responses included: ‘‘At least we have this one achievement that our name (DSK) was mentioned in the National Safe Water Supply and Sanitation Policy 1998’’ (Executive of DSK); ‘‘DWASA did not give us permission for the water point before, but now if we ask for permission they reply: ‘How many do you need. Fill in the requisition and we will give permission’’’ (Executive of Rural-Health and Development Society). The research reported here has also shown that in the slums where DSK is active the performance of the water supply system is better (Akbar, 2005). The key lessons from the DSK experience are that community demand and willingness to pay for water supply is the starting point for planning a water system for the urban poor; social mobilisation and continuous negotiation can reduce the institutional barriers to using the formal system in informal settlements; and that NGO and CBO action can reduce the problems related to local gangsters or the community power structure. These lessons are also supported by other studies (DSK and WaterAid Bangladesh, 1999; Singha and DSK, 2002). The significant lesson learned from the DSK model is that it is possible to form a user group in a poor community that can be involved in planning, development and operation of a water point and thereby ensure sustainability of the water supply system. As far as DWASA is concerned, the DSK model offers a system for regularisation of illegal connections and a corresponding increase in revenue. The Managing Director of DWASA is now encouraging NGOs to construct such water points and provides some privileges for them, including reducing the connection fee (DWASA, 2002b). Community capacity has been strengthened through organised CBOs such as Water Point Advisory Committees. Women’s participation and leadership have been ensured through CBOs run mainly by women. By 2001, 10 water points had been handed over to communities for full management. Three training courses in management, bookkeeping and repair and maintenance are facilitated for each Water Point Management Committee before the hand over. This is also a lesson on how to hand over a system to the community. The DSK model demonstrates how informal communities can access formal utility services. But, along with other problems, it suffers seriously from difficulties of managing capital costs. There is a need for a new model that builds on the ‘good practise’ of the DSK experience but overcomes its problems. The remainder of this paper proposes such a model. A new model for water supply All ‘community involvement’ models for providing basic urban services to informal settlements are facing serious problems in managing capital costs because of a shortage of international and national funding. They

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are really temporary solutions because they are not directly connected to local resources. Although NGOs seem to be the central actors, in a deeper sense donor agencies are really the core players. Thus, the aid funds of the donor agencies do not help to develop enterprise but rather they create a system that temporarily reduces the problem. The research reported here (Akbar, 2005) observed that some informal private water providers have invested large sums of money to supply potable water to the informal dwellers and they are willing to be formal providers if government allows them to do so legally. Private providers have made a good contribution in some basic service delivery in Dhaka City such as supplying house construction materials and housing, and supplying sanitation materials. The question arises as to why the private sector and local resources are not involved with potable water supply. This question, and the mobilisation of the demonstrated capacity of the poor to manage their own water supply, is at the heart of the new model. In addition, no water supply model has yet been developed which complies with internationally recognised principles of potable water supply. The new model is named the ‘Community Mixed Water Supply’ (CMWS) model. The conceptual design of the new model is presented in Fig. 2. Its working design is shown later in Fig. 3. There are three components to it, the community, various complementary actors and local resources. The community is the beneficiary of the system, but is also the central actor. International agencies, NGOs, civil societies, national and local governments and politicians are complementary to the community. They provide support services. The third component of the model is local resources that can provide finance and technology for water supply system development. This model thus integrates community needs with local resources. The model can address both the immediate problem of inadequate potable water supply as well as the development of a long-term supply. It addresses both the demand and supply management. The model connects to international principles of potable water supply for the urban poor (Akbar, 2005) which are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Water availability and quality should be maintained for potable water supply; Political commitment should have a role in water supply; Institutional rules and regulations should be maintained and enhanced; Water supply should be managed as an economic good; Water supply should be managed as a social good; and Water supply should be operated and maintained with appropriate technical knowledge and tools and standards. The case study of Dhaka City showed how these principles could be addressed through the model.

Fig. 2. Community Mixed Water Supply (CMWS) model: actors and resources.

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Fig. 3. Community Mixed Water Supply (CMWS) model: working design.

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Availability and quality of potable water supply Surface and groundwater sources are available in and around Dhaka City, except that groundwater is not available during the dry season in the central and southern areas. Most informal settlements are located near DWASA pipelines; some are also near natural sources. Ground water is not at contaminated levels. Most stakeholders claim that the potable water quality of the formal system is poor, though the urban poor interviewed were satisfied with the standard. In fact, the quality of water from some informal systems, such as hand pumps and deep tube wells (DTW), is good but the indigenous water supply system such as rainwater collection and water from dug-wells is poor. Dug-well water with careful collection and filtration is drinkable. Based on these sources of water supply, the model can develop small-scale water supply systems at community level either using water from natural sources such as ground water, or by using a secondary source such as DWASA’s mains. Supporting policy and political participation Political commitment and participation are rarely found in water supply development in the informal settlements of Dhaka City, because even under the democratic political system in Bangladesh, political norms and processes do not ensure the accountability of the politicians to the people. Yet some local political leaders of Dhaka City do want to help the urban poor, although the central government and bureaucrats try to keep local politicians away from development work. However, in some instances, the case study found that social mobilisation effectively ensured local political participation. There is mention in the National Safe Water Supply and Sanitation Policy 1998 of the supply of potable water to the informal settlements in Dhaka City by the NGOs, but the policy is difficult to implement as there is no legislation supporting it. The policy does not recognise public and private sector participation in water supply. However, the important message is that this policy was put in place as a result of overwhelming pressure from the NGOs and their success in improving the water supply situation. More pressure from the international agencies, NGOs and civil society could help cause the policy to be revised to enable multiple providers of adequate potable water. Maintaining and enhancing institutional rules and regulations There are no institutional regulations for multi-provider involvement in water supply to informal settlements. A few NGOs are providing formal water supply to the informal settlements as financial mediators because of the liberalised attitude of the high officials of DWASA and DCC. But this system is tainted by the hostility of the field level staff of DWASA. At present, only nine NGOs are working under this liberalised system of water supply, but it is anticipated that if the system was allowed through institutional regulation then many NGOs will invest in it. Like NGOs, the private sector could work under the present policy, but the private sector is deterred by DWASA’s trade unions and officers’ union. The NGOs also do not welcome the involvement of the unions. Informal private companies, however, are working very well and some of them have invested as much as Taka 400,000, which is equal to or greater than NGO investment. Some formal private companies such as bottled water and beverage companies are interested in building smallscale potable water supply systems in the informal settlements but they are looking for government regulation and support. Government also thinks that the involvement of the private sector may lead to clashes with the trade unions of DWASA, and they also suspect the profit motive of the private sector could lead to exploitation. However, some senior politicians and ministers are in favour of privatisation of DWASA so the institutional environment is becoming conducive to private sector involvement. Difficulties with property rights are a serious hindrance to public or private sector involvement in informal settlements. This problem can be resolved only by government but international, national and community pressure is necessary before action will be taken.

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Potable water supply as an economic good Most informal dwellers cannot pay the capital cost of a connection fee or establishment cost by one-off payment, but they have the ability to pay it through instalments as a service charge, with the user charge, and they are also ready to pay some upfront development fees for the construction of the water points. The public sector and the NGOs suffer from a serious lack of financial resources for system development. This model strongly argues the involvement of the private sector in investment, and also to collect upfront development fees (up to 5–10% of the capital cost) for the initial system development, but guarantees are needed. Informal dwellers are used to paying more than the formal price for water, so full-cost pricing including a marginal profit would not be a problem in developing small-scale water supply systems at the community level, but government involvement is needed as well as the adoption of minimum and maximum price caps. Potable water supply as a social good The informal communities have the capacity to operate and maintain small-scale water supply systems. They co-operate with DSK and other NGOs for the development of water points, and they are also willing to help the water providers in system development. Experience has shown that social motivation often unites the communities to develop the water supply systems and to express their demands to politicians and the government. The informal community has shown its willingness to manage the local gangsters for the security of the system and they are also very aware of water pilfering. If the people get a reliable formal water supply, then they will not want to be connected to the illegal system. This suggests that the community can provide enough social security to investors for the system operation and maintenance. Thus, the system needs joint operation between the community and the investor. Some of the poorest of the poor do not have the ability to pay even the user charge. In such cases under the DSK approach they are provided with water in exchange for cleaning the water point or doing other physical work, or the water is completely free. The new model suggests providing community subsidy vouchers for the poorest of the poor or disabled persons. The community and/or the water provider will decide who will get these subsidy vouchers. This voucher should be subsidised by the local/national government, by the provider itself, or by the donor agencies and individual donors under an institutional framework. Women’s participation is an important social issue for the development of small-scale water supply systems. This study found that women’s participation is very effective in the operation and maintenance of communitybased water point. Moreover, women are more involved in household water supply management. This model strongly suggests involving the women in the design, operation and maintenance of the small-scale water supply system. Appropriate knowledge, tools and standards to build, operate and maintain water supply systems There are no official plans for providing potable water to the urban poor. Some government projects (mainly financed by UN Agencies) are providing water to a very few informal settlements in Dhaka City but these are inadequate. Government agencies implemented these projects through local contractors. In most cases, the system has broken down after a few months because of poor construction standards applied by the contractors and approved by the project managers. This suggests that these funds could be better used by NGOs or by established CBOs under government supervision. The case study found that the informal dwellers used formal, informal and indigenous sources for potable water. It also found that the informal water supply system is more reliable than the formal system. People like the DSK water points more than household tap connections, because, so long as water is in the reservoir, there is enough water pressure and most have sufficient duration of water supply, which is what most informal dwellers expect. Tap water connections in Dhaka can be unreliable, with low water pressure and water available only for a few hours a day. So the provider could use the lessons from the DSK experience and other informal systems for system design and maintenance standards. In addition, although the repair and

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maintenance systems are user-friendly, some informal dwellers are careless about hygienic water use and water conservation. Promotion of, and education about, water use can improve this situation. Safe modes of small-scale water supply The case study found four safe sources of water: Tara pump or Tara pump with a motor, deep tube well with a water kiosk, a water kiosk connected to the DWASA pipeline, or mobile water vending with the permission of DWASA. These are the primary local resources from which the community and investors can choose the appropriate mode of supply based on the size of the community, the investor’s capacity and location of the settlements. Tara pump kiosks and kiosks connected to DWASA pipelines are advisable, because these are least-cost investments and so it can take less than 3 years for cost recovery. Household tap connection is not physically and economically feasible, because the houses are so congested there is not enough room to fit pipelines and fix the taps, and the poor cannot afford the connection charge. So this model is flexible enough to meet local need with local resources, is adaptable to changes, and has a short period for cost recovery. The working mechanisms adopted in the model are flexible and would be effective over time. Mechanisms of the model The overall mechanism of the model is shown in Fig. 3, indicating a working model for the present situation of Dhaka City, but this working model could change over time and place by applying the concepts of the model as given in Fig. 2. This is a ‘mixed’ model, so it starts with the formation of a community water supply group (CWSG) through the interaction of the community, investors and other stakeholders. As many of the members as possible should be women. Who would initiate such a group? International agencies, NGOs and civil societies can help. Preferably, civil societies (e.g., professional groups, media and social organisations) and NGOs would come to the fore to accomplish such a task. International donor agencies can make provision for community mobilisation as part of loan or grant disbursement. Social mobilisation takes time but can be accomplished. Throughout the community mobilisation and formation of the CWSG, the community and investors have to understand the existing policies and legislation in order to develop a future strategy. The community and civil society will need to keep pressure on the government to adopt multi-provider legislation under the existing policy guidelines. Investors also need to have baseline information to anticipate what mode of water supply the community wants and the type of capital investment necessary in terms of cost recovery and profit. Baseline information could be related to the six principles of potable water supply described above. Investors could choose the amount of investment needed and with the community, choose the water supply system that needs to be developed. After implementation, the system should be monitored and evaluated. This will enhance sustainability of both the investment and the system’s performance. The question arises as to who would, in practise, be involved in the capital investment. It is envisaged that it would start with international donors, NGOs and CBOs, as already exist. After completion of a few smallscale water supply systems at community level, NGOs and CBOs can offer the development to the private sector as entrepreneurs or loan providers. However, after a period of successful examples, private investment should become more common. Private investors may even start investment now if the NGOs and CBOs can demonstrate the prospects of a return on investment properly and help investors to be involved with DWASA and DCC. Assumptions of the model The model makes five assumptions for speedy implementation in the informal settlements of Dhaka City. First, the community will decide what modes of potable water supply they want to be developed. Second, community initiatives can help overcome legislative barriers to formal water supply to informal settlements. Third, NGOs, CBOs and the private sector will work as mediators and/or investors independently under minimum and maximum price caps. At the initial stage, the maximum price cap would not exceed a profit of

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10% of the capital investment until effective competition is established among the private companies and others. Alternatively, the government can give a tax holiday period to the private companies for such investment with a maximum price cap for the water. This maximum price cap will act to prevent the private sector developing a monopoly in the system and also to maintain the interest of the community. A minimum price cap is needed so that NGOs will not provide subsidised or free water, except through subsidy vouchers to the poorest of the poor. Maximum and minimum price caps must be determined by the local or national government through consultation with the CBOs. The fourth assumption is that establishment or connection fees will be repaid by easy instalments, charged with the user charge. The investor must not expect capital cost recovery in less than 3 years. This time frame was confirmed by the DSK model. The fifth assumption is that the mechanisms of the model (as shown in Fig. 3) would change over time and place, but the basic concept (as shown by Fig. 2) should remain. Implications of the model The most important implication of the model is that it is flexible enough to be adapted by urban poor communities and that it will lead to less financial dependency on donor agencies. A critical and innovative feature of the model is that it offers a way to engage the private sector and its resources. Because of this it gives serious consideration to overall financial feasibility and on-going monetary implications. The model can work under different organisational arrangements with different levels of involvement of private companies, NGOs and CBOs, and the public sector. It provides a suitable water price to the urban poor on the one hand, but one that is also suitable for the small-scale investor on the other. Thus the use of the model could spread very quickly. This model unites the urban poor, empowers the people, and empowers women. In addition, it creates employment opportunities for the poor. It acts as a small-scale enterprise rather than a voluntary service delivery system. It could also be applied to other basic service delivery systems which have user charges, such as sanitation, garbage disposal and electricity. Thus, the model can hopefully reduce urban poverty. It will also reduce the burden on the government, and reduce the likelihood of illegal connections. In the context of the mega-cities in developing countries, it would be a milestone in the management of water supply for the urban poor and the reduction of the system loss for the public water supply providers. It also successfully articulates the components of strategic planning and the components of urban governance (i.e., community, market and state) (Minnery, 2004; van Horen, 2002), which are theoretically and practically adaptable to the rapid changes in the mega-cities of developing countries. Conclusion The CMWS model is based on internationally recognised principles of potable water supply, the lessons from a case study and the DSK model. It is able to provide an adequate potable water supply to informal urban dwellers and thus improve the health and economic conditions of the urban poor. At present, institutional and political factors are the main barriers to implementing this model, but it is certainly possible to overcome these barriers through the mobilisation of communities by international agencies, national and local NGOs, and civil societies. The model sees a strong role for private sector investors. It is applicable to those cities where there is little or no problem with water availability but where, even then, the poor do not have access to potable water supply. The model does not claim to be a complete solution for the existing problem, but it will significantly reduce the existing potable water supply problem in informal settlements. References Akbar, H.M.D. (2005). Accessibility of urban water supply to the poor in developing countries—The Case of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Ph.D. thesis, School of Geography, Planning and Architecture, The University of Queensland, Brisbane. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (1999). Census of slum areas and floating population, 1997. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka. Centre for Urban Studies. (1983). Slums in Dhaka City. Dhaka: Centre for Urban Studies.

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