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Comparison as a state of mind
JAMES N. ROSENAU
Comparison as a State of Mind
Let me begin by emphasizing that comparison is as much a state of mind, a predisposition, an impulse, as it is a method. What is involved is an interest in recurring patterns at rather abstract levels. If one has a comparative state of mind, instead of asking how various things converge to produce a certain set of outcomes in a given society, one asks what are the similarities and differences between this outcome and this process in this situation as against an outcome and a process in another situation. ‘The comparative impulse predisposes one to look for similarities and differences across cases. The presence of the comparative impulse is signified by the kinds of questions one considers. If one is interested in how at a moment in time, or at a place in space, things converge to produce a given outcome, one does not have a comparative state of mind. As you may know, a few of us in political science and international relations have gone off the deep end and in this regard, driven (some might say distracted) by the comparative state of mind to seeking out recurring patterns across 130 nations. Indeed, we have formed one of the more interesting organizations in which I have ever had the pleasure of participating (since it is not really an organization), the Inter-University Comparative Foreign Policy Project, otherwise known as the ICFP. It has been in existence since early 1967, has held four or five conferences, has consisted of members from ten different universities, and has somehow still managed STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
VOL.
VIII,
Nos.
1 & 2.
SPRINO/SUMMER
1975
58
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATlVE
COMMUNISM
to persist. ICFP has been the vehicle for two books and some 100 papers.’ It has yielded some 145 hypotheses for which empirical data are now available. It has even contributed to the advent of a yearbook for foreign policy studies.’ It has a history recorded through 1972 3 and has since continued to grow as a community of scholars interested in comparing foreign policy. The ICFP reminds me of Kuhn’s description of a normal science in that this group of scholars spend their time elaborating upon and refuting each others’ hypotheses and findings concerning foreign policy behavior across a number of systems. At its heart is a commitment to tough, hard empirical data, especially those types of data which have come to be called events data. Several events data sets relevant to the comparative study of foreign policy have been created, one at Ohio State, another at USC., another at North Carolina, and still another at Syracuse. All of them involve a reconstruction, on a day-by-day basis, of what nations do with respect to other nations, based upon global sources like The New York Times or The Times (London) as well as several regional sources. I am not sure whether those of you who are specialists in Communist systems are aware of these data sets, but if you are not, I commend them to your attention for your own possible use. You will find that all of them contain data on the daily international behavior of a number of Communist countries. Let me say with respect to the ICFP that I do not think that it is an empire-building group. Its members do not want to convert people. They long ago came to appreciate that conversion is neither desirable nor possible. They are interested only in unraveling the mysteries of foreign policy and building on each others’ studies. There is, however, some annoyance at the progress which the ICFP has enjoyed, I think; and the differences between the Rubinstein and Triska papers are reflective of this annoyance, of the regretable tendency toward intellectual conflict between those who tend to be specialists in an area and those who are impelled by a comparative state of mind. To be sure, some specialists are also comparativists, I. I am the editor of both books, which together contain 32 papers by ICFP members written expressly for meetings of the ICFP. The two books are Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods (New York : Wiley, 1974) and In Search of Global Palferns (New York: Free Press, forthcoming). 2. Patrick J. McGowan (ed.), Sage Yearbook of Foreigrz Policy Studies (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Vol. I, 1973; Vol. II, 1974). 3. James N. Rosenau. Philip M. Burgess, and Charles F. Hermann, “The .4daptation of Foreign Policy Research: A Case Study of an Anti-Case Study Project,” Iufernational Smdies Quarterly, Vol. 17 (March 1973), pp. t 19-144.
SYMPOSIUM
ON COMMUNIST
FOREIGN POLICIES
59
but in my view a tendency toward intellectual conflict often pervades our deliberations. Triska mentions in his paper that the comparative study of foreign policy has a variety of problems, just as, he says, “. . . the field of comparative politics has in political science.” His paper does not make clear what the problems of comparative politics are. I suppose he basically means that people have been studying politics comparatively for some time and that they have little to show for it. I do not know whether comparative Communist studies are so bad off as comparative studies in general, but perhaps it is useful to note that to some extent those who study comparative foreign policy have an easier time of it. Persons who study comparative politics compare across cultures, legislatures, parties, or whatever institution or process interests them. In so doing they focus on entities that do not have final authority and that are always subject to inputs from and control by their external environment; whereas students of foreign policy have the advantage of at least focusing on entities that have, if not the final authority, close to final authority. The latter thus have the advantage of being able to hold a variety of important variables constant. Although Rubinstein says in his paper that we should not talk about it, I might point out that most area specialists are not of a comparative frame of mind. So while I agree with Rubinstein’s call for more case studies, I would argue that area specialists would probably benefit by looking at comparisons within their areas. This is a naive statement, because I do not know that they do not. It seems to me extremely important that case studies be undertaken in such a way that others can use each case as one among many. Those who write case studies in Communist affairs thus ought to try to converge upon common problems and common variables so that others, either in the area or outside it, can use the variety of case studies for comparative purposes. I regret to say that, at least in the area of foreign policy analysis, the number of studies that allow for comparison with other case studies can be counted on the fingers of one hand-and that might come down to just the thumb and Glenn Paige’s study of the Korea decision. I have asked myself what one who thinks of himself as a student of comparative foreign policy can say that might be useful to one who is a student of the Communist world. This, in turn, leads to three questions: Why compare the foreign policies of Communist societies? What variables might a student of comparative foreign policy be interested in if he is also interested in Communist systems? If a student of Communist politics has a comparative state of mind,
60
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
what variables might be of interest to him? I think the answer to all three of these questions is roughly the same. One compares the foreign policy of Communist systems because there are characteristics of such systems which can be clarified by comparing their behavior. That is, certain variables are central to Communist systems which can be better grasped through observing their operation in several such systems, and which, if this is accomplished, can serve the intellectual interests of both the student of comparative Communism and the student of comparative foreign policy. Three such variables come quickly to mind. One is ideology, since it remains static for some countries and varies for others. Another variable is one-party rule, or what might be called authoritarian or closed regimes-in which one looks for commonalities and differences across different systems that show the quality of having one-party rule. The third variable could be that of East European culture, wherein one compares the Communist states of that region with other Communist states that do not have a common geographic locale and shared historical experiences. To be sure, East European culture is extraordinarily diverse; nonetheless, a distinction can surely be drawn in terms of geography and history compared with Africa or Asia. Now I would ask those of you who are students of the Communist world (even if you do not have a comparative state of mind, but would be interested in seeing where it might lead you) what kind of variables interest you? My test for the appropriateness of a variable would be to play a mental game along the following lines: If you want to test your interest in ideology as a variable, ask yourself whether the idea of comparing, say, Bulgaria and Cuba along other dimensions excites your imagination and whets your theoretica appetite. If your answer is that this is really a dull question, then ideology is not a variable that interests you. At least to an outsider it would seem that if you are interested in the potency of ideological considerations as dynamics in the foreign policy of Communist systems, the idea of comparing Bulgaria and Cuba would be a very legitimate one. If it does not seem very central to you, but if the idea of comparing Bulgaria and Rumania does, then your interest would seem to be in cultural variables-those having to do with Eastern Europe, making Bulgaria and Rumania more worth comparing than Bulgaria and Cuba. For myself, I would want to find out the relative strengths of different variables in different systems. The advent of a Communist regime in Cuba or China is, from a comparative perspective, a great event. It allows one to see what happens when one relaxes cultural variables.
SYMPOSIUM
ON
COMMUNIST
FOREIGN
POLICIES
61
Such a mental game yields an answer to the question, asked by Kanet, whether there is more to be gained from comparing the foreign policy systems of Communist states than from comparing Communist states with non-Communist states. My impulse is that it would be preferable to start out, not by comparing Communist and non-Communist systems, but by comparing the inputs and outputs of the former on the grounds that in this way one can hold a number of important variables constant and thus develop more incisive analyses.
Comparison as a State of Mind
Let me begin by emphasizing that comparison is as much a state of mind, a predisposition, an impulse, as it is a method. What is involved is an interest in recurring patterns at rather abstract levels. If one has a comparative state of mind, instead of asking how various things converge to produce a certain set of outcomes in a given society, one asks what are the similarities and differences between this outcome and this process in this situation as against an outcome and a process in another situation. ‘The comparative impulse predisposes one to look for similarities and differences across cases. The presence of the comparative impulse is signified by the kinds of questions one considers. If one is interested in how at a moment in time, or at a place in space, things converge to produce a given outcome, one does not have a comparative state of mind. As you may know, a few of us in political science and international relations have gone off the deep end and in this regard, driven (some might say distracted) by the comparative state of mind to seeking out recurring patterns across 130 nations. Indeed, we have formed one of the more interesting organizations in which I have ever had the pleasure of participating (since it is not really an organization), the Inter-University Comparative Foreign Policy Project, otherwise known as the ICFP. It has been in existence since early 1967, has held four or five conferences, has consisted of members from ten different universities, and has somehow still managed STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
VOL.
VIII,
Nos.
1 & 2.
SPRINO/SUMMER
1975
58
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATlVE
COMMUNISM
to persist. ICFP has been the vehicle for two books and some 100 papers.’ It has yielded some 145 hypotheses for which empirical data are now available. It has even contributed to the advent of a yearbook for foreign policy studies.’ It has a history recorded through 1972 3 and has since continued to grow as a community of scholars interested in comparing foreign policy. The ICFP reminds me of Kuhn’s description of a normal science in that this group of scholars spend their time elaborating upon and refuting each others’ hypotheses and findings concerning foreign policy behavior across a number of systems. At its heart is a commitment to tough, hard empirical data, especially those types of data which have come to be called events data. Several events data sets relevant to the comparative study of foreign policy have been created, one at Ohio State, another at USC., another at North Carolina, and still another at Syracuse. All of them involve a reconstruction, on a day-by-day basis, of what nations do with respect to other nations, based upon global sources like The New York Times or The Times (London) as well as several regional sources. I am not sure whether those of you who are specialists in Communist systems are aware of these data sets, but if you are not, I commend them to your attention for your own possible use. You will find that all of them contain data on the daily international behavior of a number of Communist countries. Let me say with respect to the ICFP that I do not think that it is an empire-building group. Its members do not want to convert people. They long ago came to appreciate that conversion is neither desirable nor possible. They are interested only in unraveling the mysteries of foreign policy and building on each others’ studies. There is, however, some annoyance at the progress which the ICFP has enjoyed, I think; and the differences between the Rubinstein and Triska papers are reflective of this annoyance, of the regretable tendency toward intellectual conflict between those who tend to be specialists in an area and those who are impelled by a comparative state of mind. To be sure, some specialists are also comparativists, I. I am the editor of both books, which together contain 32 papers by ICFP members written expressly for meetings of the ICFP. The two books are Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods (New York : Wiley, 1974) and In Search of Global Palferns (New York: Free Press, forthcoming). 2. Patrick J. McGowan (ed.), Sage Yearbook of Foreigrz Policy Studies (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Vol. I, 1973; Vol. II, 1974). 3. James N. Rosenau. Philip M. Burgess, and Charles F. Hermann, “The .4daptation of Foreign Policy Research: A Case Study of an Anti-Case Study Project,” Iufernational Smdies Quarterly, Vol. 17 (March 1973), pp. t 19-144.
SYMPOSIUM
ON COMMUNIST
FOREIGN POLICIES
59
but in my view a tendency toward intellectual conflict often pervades our deliberations. Triska mentions in his paper that the comparative study of foreign policy has a variety of problems, just as, he says, “. . . the field of comparative politics has in political science.” His paper does not make clear what the problems of comparative politics are. I suppose he basically means that people have been studying politics comparatively for some time and that they have little to show for it. I do not know whether comparative Communist studies are so bad off as comparative studies in general, but perhaps it is useful to note that to some extent those who study comparative foreign policy have an easier time of it. Persons who study comparative politics compare across cultures, legislatures, parties, or whatever institution or process interests them. In so doing they focus on entities that do not have final authority and that are always subject to inputs from and control by their external environment; whereas students of foreign policy have the advantage of at least focusing on entities that have, if not the final authority, close to final authority. The latter thus have the advantage of being able to hold a variety of important variables constant. Although Rubinstein says in his paper that we should not talk about it, I might point out that most area specialists are not of a comparative frame of mind. So while I agree with Rubinstein’s call for more case studies, I would argue that area specialists would probably benefit by looking at comparisons within their areas. This is a naive statement, because I do not know that they do not. It seems to me extremely important that case studies be undertaken in such a way that others can use each case as one among many. Those who write case studies in Communist affairs thus ought to try to converge upon common problems and common variables so that others, either in the area or outside it, can use the variety of case studies for comparative purposes. I regret to say that, at least in the area of foreign policy analysis, the number of studies that allow for comparison with other case studies can be counted on the fingers of one hand-and that might come down to just the thumb and Glenn Paige’s study of the Korea decision. I have asked myself what one who thinks of himself as a student of comparative foreign policy can say that might be useful to one who is a student of the Communist world. This, in turn, leads to three questions: Why compare the foreign policies of Communist societies? What variables might a student of comparative foreign policy be interested in if he is also interested in Communist systems? If a student of Communist politics has a comparative state of mind,
60
STUDIES
IN
COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
what variables might be of interest to him? I think the answer to all three of these questions is roughly the same. One compares the foreign policy of Communist systems because there are characteristics of such systems which can be clarified by comparing their behavior. That is, certain variables are central to Communist systems which can be better grasped through observing their operation in several such systems, and which, if this is accomplished, can serve the intellectual interests of both the student of comparative Communism and the student of comparative foreign policy. Three such variables come quickly to mind. One is ideology, since it remains static for some countries and varies for others. Another variable is one-party rule, or what might be called authoritarian or closed regimes-in which one looks for commonalities and differences across different systems that show the quality of having one-party rule. The third variable could be that of East European culture, wherein one compares the Communist states of that region with other Communist states that do not have a common geographic locale and shared historical experiences. To be sure, East European culture is extraordinarily diverse; nonetheless, a distinction can surely be drawn in terms of geography and history compared with Africa or Asia. Now I would ask those of you who are students of the Communist world (even if you do not have a comparative state of mind, but would be interested in seeing where it might lead you) what kind of variables interest you? My test for the appropriateness of a variable would be to play a mental game along the following lines: If you want to test your interest in ideology as a variable, ask yourself whether the idea of comparing, say, Bulgaria and Cuba along other dimensions excites your imagination and whets your theoretica appetite. If your answer is that this is really a dull question, then ideology is not a variable that interests you. At least to an outsider it would seem that if you are interested in the potency of ideological considerations as dynamics in the foreign policy of Communist systems, the idea of comparing Bulgaria and Cuba would be a very legitimate one. If it does not seem very central to you, but if the idea of comparing Bulgaria and Rumania does, then your interest would seem to be in cultural variables-those having to do with Eastern Europe, making Bulgaria and Rumania more worth comparing than Bulgaria and Cuba. For myself, I would want to find out the relative strengths of different variables in different systems. The advent of a Communist regime in Cuba or China is, from a comparative perspective, a great event. It allows one to see what happens when one relaxes cultural variables.
SYMPOSIUM
ON
COMMUNIST
FOREIGN
POLICIES
61
Such a mental game yields an answer to the question, asked by Kanet, whether there is more to be gained from comparing the foreign policy systems of Communist states than from comparing Communist states with non-Communist states. My impulse is that it would be preferable to start out, not by comparing Communist and non-Communist systems, but by comparing the inputs and outputs of the former on the grounds that in this way one can hold a number of important variables constant and thus develop more incisive analyses.