Competence feedback, task feedback, and intrinsic interest: An examination of process and context

iOURNAL

OF EXPERIMENTAL

SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY

25, 343-361 (1989)

Competence Feedback, Task Feedback, and Intrinsic Interest: An Examination of Process and Context CAROL SANSONE University

of Utah

Received June 27, 1988 The process by which competence feedback affects intrinsic motivation has not typically been examined in conjunction with effects of other information that may be conveyed in feedback. As such, it is difficult to determine the degree to which the proposed mechanisms are tied to the competence information in feedback. When Sansone (1986, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, S&918-931) separated feedback into components satisfying curiosity (task feedback) or signifying competence (positive normative feedback), each enhanced subsequent. interest in the task. The present study investigated two possible explanations: whether an insufficiently autonomy-supportive context prevented a stronger relationship between perceived competence and interest and. secondly, whether competence feedback more strongly affected previously identified processes (perceived competence, competence valuation, performance pressure, and perceived autonomy) which have both positive and negative implications for interest. Although positive normative feedback enhanced perceived competence, perceived competence was not related to interest, and this relationship did not change as the degree of autonomy support varied. Furthermore, the results suggest that competence information can affect interest through several processes simultaneously, such that when perceived competence is not relevant, other processes (i.e., competence valuation and perceived autonomy) are. In addition, there may be unique contributions of other kinds of information present in feedback (e.g., task feedback). The implications for process models of intrinsic motivation are discussed. 0 1989 Academic

Press, Inc.

For most activities in which we engage, we receive some kind of feedback. This feedback typically contains a wealth of information, inPortions of this research were supported by grants from the Biomedical Research Supper: Grant Program, Division of Research Resources, National Institutes of Health (BRSG SO7 RR07092), and from the Spencer Foundation. The author thanks Judith Harackiewicz. Timothy W. Smith, Carol Werner, Brenda Voisard, and Charlene Weir for helpful cornments on earlier versions of this manuscript and Charles L. Gruder for his astute editorial advice. Address correspondence and reprint requests to the author at the Department of Psychology, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112. 343 OO22-1031189 $3. Copyright D 1989 by Academic Press, inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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eluding but not limited to information concerning individual performance level. For example, when receiving feedback about an exam, a student usually finds out how much of the material was answered correctly (raw score), the competence evaluation (usually how the student did compared to other students), and the correct answers. According to many theories of intrinsic motivation (Bandura, 1982; Deci & Ryan, 1980, 1985), the information regarding individual competence is presumed to affect subsequent intrinsic motivation for that activity. In particular, these theoretical perspectives propose that feeling responsible for successfully manipulating the environment should result in feelings of efficacy and satisfaction and lead to greater subsequent motivation (White, 1959). Research has therefore typically focused on competence feedback, examining issues such as its presence or absence (e.g., Harackiewicz, 1979; Ryan, Mims, & Koestner, 1983), its valence (e.g., Boggiano & Ruble, 1979; Pretty & Seligman, 1984), or the manner in which it is conveyed (e.g., Pittman, Davey, Alafat, Wetherill, & Kramer, 1980; Ryan, 1982). The process by which competence feedback affects intrinsic motivation has not been examined in conjunction with effects of other information that may be conveyed in feedback. As such, it is difficult to determine the degree to which the mechanisms proposed to explain competence feedback effects are tied to the competence information in feedback. To begin to examine this question, Sansone (1986) compared the effect of receiving information regarding individual competence with the effect of receiving information less competence-relevant, but still relevant to the individual’s experience. Using a trivia game which aroused curiosity about the answers as well as uncertainty regarding performance, she compared the effects of receiving positive normative feedback and feedback satisfying curiosity (task feedback) (Berlyne, 1960). Each type of feedback significantly enhanced interest relative to no feedback, and there was a trend indicating that each enhanced interest relative to raw score feedback only. Positive normative feedback did result in greater perceived competence, but perceived competence was related to interest only when individuals’ skills and abilities were made explicitly relevant to performance. The present study attempts to further investigate how these effects occur. In particular, we examine whether the apparent equivalent effects for task and competence feedback are driven by factors associated with competence information. For example, Deci and Ryan (1985) suggest that positive competence feedback enhances interest only when the individual feels some self-determination or autonomy with respect to the activity, i.e., when he or she can also feel responsible for his or her level of performance. Deci and Ryan (1987) further propose that contexts differ in the degree to which they function to support an individual’s autonomy (i.e., in the degree to which they “encourage individuals to

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345

make their own choices,” p. 1025). The more autonomy-supportive, the more it facilitates endorsement by the “whole self” and is experienced as action for which one is responsible. As an explanation for Sansone’s results, their model would suggest that the context in which the ~~v~d~~s performed the task was not sufficiently supportive of autonomy for competence feedback to enhance interest relative to task feedback. This possibility cannot be addressed by Sansone’s (1986) data. In addition to the possibility of a contextual factor preventing a stronger relationship between perceived competence and interest, it is also possible that, when activities are not explicitly hnked to competence attainment, perceived competence is not the primary process through which positive normative feedback enhances interest. This conclusion is consistent with other findings which suggest that perceived competence is a more powerful mediator for some individuals (e.g., Harackiewicz, Sansone, & Manderlink, 1985) and for certain situations (e.g., Harackiewicz & Larson, 1986; Manderlink & Harackiewicz, 1984). One implication is that there are other processes which can affect intrinsic motivation when percei competence does not, and it may be that competeme feedback affe these processes differentially. Alternative processes which might be responsible are presented in a model proposed by Harackiewicz, Manderhnk, and Sansone (1989) to explain the motivational effects of competence cues. These processes reflect cognitive and affective reactions to having one’s performance evaluated and have been identified or suggested from previous literature, T although no study has examined all four processes simultaneously. addition to (1) perceiving performance quality (perceived competence), there is (2) caring about competence at the activity at the present moment (competence valuation) (Harackiewicz & Manderlii, 1984; Harackiewicz et al., 1985), (3) feeling pressured to perform well (performance pressure or anxiety) (Kanouse, Gumpert, & Canavan-Gumpert, 1981; Ryan, 1982), and (4) perceiving that actions associated with initiating or continuing performance of the activity emanate from oneself (perceived autonomy) (decharms, 1968; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lepper, 1980). This process approach (see Fig. 1) allows the receipt of feedback to affect motivation at two points in the temporal process: first, by feedback’s effect on the hypothesized mediating processes (a in Fig. I), and second, by the relation between these processes and intrinsic motivation (b in Fig. %). Normative feedback would be expected to have a stronger effect than task feedback on the three processes that are most directly related to individual performance: perceived competence (Sansone, 1984), competence valuation (Harackiewicz & Manderlink, 1984; Harackiewicz et al., 1985), and performance pressure (Butler &. Nisan, 1986; Ryan, 1982). Perhaps it is the combination of the stronger effects on these other processes (processes which have both positive and negative implications

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CAROL SANSONE

/ I/ I I

/ /---CONTEXT---., I i

\

\

\ I I

Hypothesized Mediators Perceived Competence --a--+

Competence Valuation Performance Pressure

Orientation FIG. 1. Adaptation of process model of intrinsic motivation (1989). Dotted lines indicate paths added to the earlier model.

in Harackiewicz,

et al.

for interest) that gives the appearance of competence and task feedback being equally relevant to individual interest. Harackiewicz et al. (1989) also suggest that individual differences in achievement orientation may moderate the effects involving processes related to individual competence, because it is in response to this element of the situation that high and low achievers systematically differ. Thus, we would expect high achievers characteristically to value competence to a greater degree, and we would expect low achievers characteristically to feel more concerned about performance (Atkinson, 1964). However, we would not necessarily expect to see achievement orientation differences for perceived autonomy, because this process is not explicitly tied to individual competence. THE PRESENT STUDY Both of the above explanations (i.e., lack of a sufficiently autonomysupportive context, and stronger effects of competence feedback on multiple processes) were examined in the present study. Although Deci and Ryan provide a framework for examining self-determination or autonomy, their theory does not allow us to specify a priori what level of autonomy support in the environment would be sufficient to permit perceived competence to enhance interest. Because we cannot specify an absolute level,

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347

we must examine the relative relationship between perceived competence and interest as the level of autonomy support varies. To establish relative differences in the degree of autonomy support, we varied choice over one aspect of participation. When Swann and Pittman (1977) manipulated choice, subjects were informed that they could choose which activity to play, but it was further suggested that they choose the activity in front of which they were seated. No-choice subjects were told that although up until that point children had chosen which activity to play, they themselves would not be allowed to choose. Subjects provided the illusion of choice were somewhat more intrinsic motivated than subjects denied choice; in addition, choice served as the context in which other manipulations differentially affected motivation. Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith, and Deci (1978) found that if individuals were allowed to choose the subset of several equivalent puzzles on whit they worked, they exhibited greater subsequent intrinsic motivation tba~ no-choice subjects. In the present study subjects could not choose the subset of puzzle because a particular set and sequence of puzzles were necessary, suggestin the use of Swann and Pittman’s (1977) procedure. However, we did want to allow individuals to behave more actively than individuals did in S and Pittman (1977). Borrowing a “controllability cue” from the ill of control literature (Deci and Ryan, 1985), subjects were told th could choose among several equivalent sets of puzzles and then made this choice by selecting a slip from a jar (Langer, 1983; Wortman, 1975). If the relationship between perceived competence and interest is correspondingly stronger when puzzle choice is given rather than denied (i.e., as the context becomes more autonomy-supportive), this resuh would suggest that the failure of competence feedback to be superior to task feedback can be traced to this moderating contextual feature. The puzzle choice manipulation does not address, however, the degree to which an individual feels on an absolute scale that his or her actions “‘emanate from oneself and are one’s own” (Deci & Ryan, 1987, p. 1025). The latter is defined as the subjective feeling of self-determination or autonomy. When experienced at a high level, perceived autonomy is a defining characteristic of an intrinsically motivated activity (Deci Ryan, 1987; Harackiewicz et al., 1989). Thus, we must make a d~st~~ct~~~ between two types of choice: being given choice over some aspect of performance (which is an autonomy-supportive feature of the context and functions as a moderator variable) and perceived choice over whether to initiate or continue performance of the activity (which is closer to the description of individuals’ subjective feeling of autonomy and functions as a mediating process). To examine whether the equivalent effects of competence and task feedback are due to competence feedback more strongly affecting several

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CAROL SANSONE

mediating processes simultaneously (processes with both positive and negative effects on interest), we measured perceived autonomy as well as the other three processes more directly related to individual performance (see Fig. 1). We examined the relative effects of competence and task feedback on each of these processes and the relationship between these processes and subsequent interest. Furthermore, we examined whether puzzle choice moderated the relationship between perceived competence and interest as might be expected from Deci and Ryan’s (1985) model and extend this examination to the relationships of the other three processes as well. METHOD Overview. One hundred twenty-three male undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of six groups in a 3 (Feedback condition) x 2 (Puzzle Choice/No Puzzle Choice) factorial design, blocking on achievement orientation. Subjects were recruited from those who had completed a group-administered questionnaire at the beginning of the quarter, in which was embedded Jackson’s (1974) achievement orientation subscale of the PRF. Procedure. Subjects played a game which involved identifying the names of specific parts of common objects (e.g., the silver triangle over the rotary dial of a phone), presented as line drawings (Sansone, 1986). The subject’s task was to pick the correct name from four alternatives (e.g., finger stop, dial block, rotary gate, or plate bar). Previous research (Sansone, 1984, 1986) found that this task aroused uncertainty and curiosity about correct answers (cf., Boykin & Harackiewicz, 1981), as well as uncertainty about individual performance. Subjects were run individually by one of three experimenters, who were blind to subjects’ feedback conditions. For each picture, subjects wrote in the name of the object (e.g., phone), circled the letter corresponding to their answer (e.g., circling “a” for finger stop), and rated their certainty on a IO-point scale. After completing the initial five practice pictures, subjects answered several questions regarding interest and enjoyment of the task. Subjects next read that the purpose of the experiment was to obtain people’s reactions to diierent sets of puzzles of the same difficulty level. Embedded in the instructions for Positive Normative Feedback subjects was the line, “For your own information, you might be interested to know that if you get more than 4 right, you’ll have done better than 80% of college students.” On a table next to where the subject was sitting were four folders (marked Set M, Set N, Set 0, and Set P) and a glass jar with four folded slips of paper clearly visible inside. The experimenter said, “While you are answering the questions on the next page, I’ll get out the set of pictures you’ll be working on. Since the different sets are similar in many ways, we usually let the subject choose which set to work on,” and pointed to the glass jar. Next, the experimenter glanced down at the subject’s folder for a code number. For Choice condition subjects, the experimenter continued with, “So, why don’t you draw from this jar, and we’ll use whatever set is written on the slip of paper.” After the subject had drawn a slip, all of which said set P, the experimenter said, “OK, I’ll get out set P.” For No Choice condition subjects, the experimenter continued instead with, “However, we’ve already had a lot of people working on the different sets, and I found out that we really need some people to do set P. So, I’ll get out set P.“’ ’ When pilot subjects were asked whether they had been able to choose the set of puzzles on which they worked (Zuckerman et al., 1978), all subjects in Choice conditions (n = 7) circled “yes,” and all subjects in No-Choice conditions (n = 8) circled “no.”

PROCESS AND CONTEXT All subjects then answered questions concerning their understanding of the instructions. The experimenter selected the folder marked Set P from the table, removed 13 pictures, and gave the first six to the subject. Upon completion, the experimenter drew “answer” cards from a specific section of a card box according to a second code on the subject’s folder. The answer cards displayed each of the six drawings again but without the four possible answers. That was all No Feedback subjects saw. For the other groups, each card also showed the “correct” answer, in one of two ways. For Positive Normative Feedback subjects, the card showed the letter of the correct alternative (e.g., “a”j. For Task Feedback subjects, the card listed the correct name next to the letter (e.g., “a. finger stop”). When summed, the letters of the correct alternatives compared to the subject’s circled answers provided the total number of correct solutions. The cards with the correct name next to the letter supplied Task Feedback. All subjects got the same three out of the first six pictures ostensibly correct (Trials No. 3,5,6). For these, the experimenter selected the answer card that matched the subject’s answer on his answer sheet. For the three “incorrect” items, the experimenter selected the card that differed from the subject’s response. No subject reported suspicion about the “correct” answers at this point or when specifically questioned at the end of the experiment. Subjects went through the answer cards themselves, with all but the No Feedback subjects able to check the “correct” answer against the letter they had circled as correct. All subjects then rated which pictures they thought the most and the least interesting; this served as the rationale for No Feedback subjects to see the pictures again. Subjects next completed a midpoint questionnaire and then worked on the last 7 pictures. Upon completion, the experimenter again selected answer cards such that the subject got 3 out of the 7 “correct” (Trials No. 9, 12, 13). By the end of the session, therefore, all but No Feedback subjects learned they had 6 out of I3 correct. For subjects who bad also received a norm, this performance level meant they had scored 2 points above the 80th percentile score. At this point, subjects completed the postperformance questionnaire. Preliminary analyses indicated that subjects were uncertain about the correct answers for the problems prior to receiving feedback, knew how many of the pictures they got correct when given the opportunity to check their answers, and were aware of 80th percentile performance, when provided with that information. Process measures. In Sansone (1986), all feedback was given at task completion; as a consequence, feedback could not have affected subjects’ experiences while task engaged. In the present study we provided feedback halfway through the set of puzzles and obtained the process measures at this midpoint. Subjects rated on 7-point scales how well they felt .they were doing on the game (perceived competence), the degree to which they felt doing well on the game was important to them (competence valuation), how relaxed they felt while playing (tension), and, given that they were expected to resume playing, how much continuing was what they wished to do (perceived’autonomy). OuiScome measure. Six items on the postperformance questionnaire (enjoyment of game, fun, not boring, interest in game, enjoyable, and interesting) were combined to form an Although the No-Choice condition was identical to the No-Choice condition in Swann and Pittman (1977), it is possible that any effects involving the choice manipulation could be caused by decrements when choice was denied, rather than increments when choice was given. Rowever, only one effect involving the choice manipulation indicated a decrement when choice was denied, and this decrement was accompanied by an enhancement elfefect in Choice conditions, suggesting that there was something positive about having choice. In addition, items obtained immediately after the choice manipulation indicated that individuals in Choice and No-Choice conditions did not differentially assess the difficulty of their respective puzzle sets.

350

CAROL SANSONE

Enjoyment scale (a. = .96), the principal dependent measure of intrinsic motivation. Previous studies (Harackiewicz, 1979; Harackiewicz, Manderlink, & Sansone, 1984; Ryan et al., 1983) have found similar measures to be correlated with behavioral measures of interest, with the pattern of results paralleling behavioral measures.’ In the present study, whether individuals wanted to take extra puzzles with them was significantly correlated with enjoyment (r(121) = .40, p < .0.5), with subjects who said “Yes” (n = 54) having significantly higher enjoyment scores than subjects who said “No” (n = 69) (Yes, M = 29.85; No, M = 23.45; t(121) = 4.81, p < .Ol). Ratings of interest and enjoyment obtained upon completion of the practice set were combined to form a pretest measure of interest, which was used as a covariate in subsequent analyses.

RESULTS Overview Multiple regression analyses were used to test whether the relative effects of positive normative and task feedback on interest could be explained by the mediation process presented in Fig. 1. In order for a path mediation model to be supported, three conditions must be met (Judd and Kenny, 1981a, 198lb). First, the treatment variables (in this case, feedback condition) must significantly affect the outcome measure, Enjoyment. Secondly, these independent variables must significantly affect the proposed mediators: Perceived Competence, Competence Valuation, Perceived Autonomy, and Tension. And finally, the mediators must affect Enjoyment, controlling for the independent variables. Because the puzzle choice manipulation was expected to moderate the relationships between the mediating processes and enjoyment, we tested an interactional mediation model (which includes direct effects of the mediating process). Regression Model Orthogonal contrast coding was used to test two specific comparisons concerning feedback condition: (I) Feedback Type contrast (Positive, + 1; Task, - 1; No Feedback, 0) and (2) Any Feedback contrast (Positive, + 1; Task, + 1; No Feedback, -2) (Cohen & Cohen, 1975). In the first independent variables model, there were four main effect terms plus Pretest Enjoyment (included as a covariate): Feedback Type contrast, Any Feedback contrast, Puzzle Choice (No Choice, - 1; Choice, + l), and Achievement Orientation. The mean was subtracted from the two continuous variables (Achievement and Pretest Enjoyment), as well as ’ In previous research using the same game and feedback manipulations (Sansone, 1984, 1986), it was discovered that despite numerous procedural changes, the number of trials (11-13 trials vs 2-3 trials in most studies) resulted in temporary satiation and fatigue by the end of the game, thereby precluding the success of a free-choice measure of interest. The number of trials could not be reduced because the normative and task feedback conditions differ only if subjects do not remember the alternatives for each picture, and pilot testing indicated that to,accomplish this goal this greater number of trials was needed. Therefore, the questionnaire measure became the principal measure of intrinsic interest.

PROCESS

AND

CONTEXT

35

from the five first-order interaction terms that were computed for each subject. A total of 10 terms (one covariate, four main effects, and five interaction terms) was therefore computed for each subject to be entered simultaneously in the regression analyses. The regression of Enjoyment on the independent variabfes model was significant overall, F(l0, 112) = 20.08, p < .05 (R2 = .64). A main effect of Pretest Enjoyment (F(1, 112) = 174.08, p < .05 (p = -77)) indicate that individuals who enjoyed the trivia game more in the pretest session also enjoyed the game more during the experimental session. There was also a significant main effect of the Any Feedback contrast, F(1, 112) = 11.22, p < .05 (/3 = .19), indicating that receiving either kind of feedback enhanced enjoyment relative to receiving no feedback. The Feedback Type contrast was not significant, replicating Sansone’s (1986) finding that positive competence and task feedback equivalently enhance interest relative to no feedback. These predicted effects of feedbac condition satisfy the first requirement of Judd and Kenny (198la, 198lb) that there be treatment effects to be mediated. Separate regression models were next generated to examine whether the independent variables significantly affected the proposed mediators. In these regressions, interaction terms that were not significant in any of the models were trimmed from them all (Judd & Kenny, 1981a). The resultant basic model for independent variables (seven terms) reported below included the four independent variable main effects, the covariate (pretest enjoyment), and two interactions: Feedback Type contrast by Achievement, and Feedback Type contrast by Puzzle Choice. The basic model did not significantly aB?ect how relaxed individuals felt, and therefore Tension could not serve as a mediator of the feedback effects. In remaining three models, Pretest Enjoyment was associated with gre Competence Valuation {F(l, 115) = 23.93, p < .05 tJ3 = .41)), and Perceived Autonomy (F( 1, 115) = 68.06, p < .05 (p = .59)), but not with Perceived Competence. In order to interpret significant interaction effects from these analyses, predicted values for the reIevant groups were generated from the regression equations using the unstandardized b coefficients. Values r~prese~ti~~ Achievement Orientation scores 1 standard deviation above or below the mean were used to generate predictions for typical high and low scorers. Determinants

of the Process Variables

Perceived competence. In the Perceived Competence regression, the overall model was significant, F(7, 115) = 2.73, p < .05 (R2 = .14). A Puzzle Choice main effect (F(1, 115) = 4.67, p < -05 (p = .19)) showed that exercising even minimal choice over one aspect of participation made individuals feel more competent, white an Achievement main effe (F(1, 115) = 4.19, p < .05 (/3 = . 18)) indicated that achievement-o~e~t~

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SANSONE

individuals felt more competent overall than did individuals low in Achievement Orientation. As expected, a significant effect of the Any Feedback contrast (F(1, 115) = 5.43, p < .05 (/3 = .20)) showed that receiving either kind of feedback made individuals feel more competent than did receiving no feedback. In addition, a marginally significant effect of the Feedback Type contrast (1;(1, 115) = 2.97, p < .lO (p = .15)) showed that receiving positive normative feedback tended to result in greater feelings of competence than did receiving task feedback. Competence valuation. When Competence Valuation was the dependent variable, the basic model was significant overall (F(7, 11.5) = 5.15, p < .05, (R2 = .24)). A main effect of the Feedback Type contrast @‘(I, 115) = 5.92, p < .05 (p = .20)) showed that, relative to task feedback, receiving positive normative feedback made individuals value competence more. A marginally significant interaction between the Feedback Type contrast and Achievement (F(1, 115) = 3.73, p < .I0 (fi .= - .16)) suggested that the effect of the Feedback Type contrast was primarily true for low achievers (Low Achievers: task feedback, Y = -2.19, positive normative feedback, Y = .82; High Achievers: task feedback, Y = 1.46, positive normative feedback, Y = - .OS). In other words, the receipt of positive normative feedback tended to attenuate the difference in how much high and low achievement-oriented individuals valued competence. Perceived autonomy. The overall model was significant (F(7, 115) = 12.94, p < .05 (R2 = .44)). A main effect of the Any Feedback contrast (F(1, 115) = 5.07, p < .05 (p = .16)) indicated that individuals felt more autonomous when they received either type of feedback relative to no feedback, and a main effect of the Feedback Type contrast (F(l) 115) = 7.61, p < .05 (p = .19)) showed that positive normative feedback made individuals feel more autonomous than did task feedback. From the Process Variables

to Enjoyment

As can be seen in Table 1, positive normative feedback had an impact stronger than that of task feedback on each of three process variables. The relationships between these process variables and Enjoyment were next examined. To test for interactional mediation, Perceived Competence, Competence Valuation, Perceived Autonomy, and 12 two-way interaction terms (each of the four independent variable terms multiplied separately by Perceived Competence, Competence Valuation, and Perceived Autonomy) were entered into the Enjoyment regression. Nonsignificant terms were then trimmed from the model. Perceived Competence did not significantly atfect Enjoyment either directly or in interaction with any of the independent variables, including the Puzzle Choice manipulation; it was therefore

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TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANTEFFECTSON THE PR~~ZESSES Perceived Competence Normative Any Puzzle Choice High

> > > >

Task Feedback No Feedback No Puzzle Choice Low Achievement Orientation

Competence Valuation > Normative Task Feedback (especially for individuals who are not achievement orientedj Perceived Autonomy Normative Any

> >

Task Feedback No Feedback

eliminated as a possible mediator of the effects on Enjoyment3 The final model consisted of 10 terms entered simultaneously. These included the 7 terms of the basic model, main effects of Competence Valuation Perceived Autonomy, and 1 new interaction term: Puzzle Choice Competence Valuation. This model was highly significant overall ( 112) = 35.94, p < .05 (R2 = .76) and accounted for significantly more variance than did the basic model (R2 difference = .13, F(3, 112) = 19.99, p < .Q5).4 Mediated effects on enjoyment. Perceived Autonomy directly mediate Enjoyment effects (F(1, 112) = 50.56, p < .05 (,8 = .46)) such that, regardless of context, the more one felt one was doing what one wanted 3 Because Perceived Competence was correlated with Competence Valuation and Perceived Autonomy (35 and .18, respectively), we examined the partial correlations between each of the processes and Enjoyment, controlling for Perceived Competence. Competence Valuation was correlated 44 with Enjoyment; when Perceived Competence was controlled, the correlation was .41. Similarly, Perceived Autonomy was correlated with Enjoyment .75: when Perceived Competence was controlled, the correlation was .74. In contrast, Perceived Competence was correlated only .15 with Enjoyment; when Perceived Autonomy was controlled, the correlation was .02; when Competence Valuation was controlled, it was .OO. This pattern of results suggests that multicollinearity does not account for the lack of effect for Perceived Competence. 4 Pretest interest is of theoretical importance in the present study because much of what we know about intrinsic motivation processes is applicable only to those activities which are initially intrinsically interesting (see, e.g., Lepper et al., 1973; Manderlink gL IIarackiewicz, 1984). A preliminary 3 (Feedback condition) x 2 (Choice/No Choice) x 2 (high/low Pretest Enjoyment) ANOVA on the outcome measure of enjoyment indicated only a main effect for Pretest Enjoyment; therefore it was included as a covariate in subsequent analyses Nevertheless, when Pretest Enjoyment is omitted from the final model discussecl, the overall model is still significant (F(9, 113) = 22.3, p < .OS, R’ = .64) although weaker (R' difference = - .12), and the same mediational effects are found.

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TABLE

2

PUZZLE CHOICE x COMPETENCE VALUATION: PREDI~ED VALUES MR ENJOYMENT

Competence Valuation level Choice condition

Low

High

No Choice Choice

28.84 22.62

24.52 28.94

to do, the greater the subsequent interest. In contrast, the significant interaction between Competence Valuation and Puzzle Choice (F(1, 112) = 6.14, p < .05 (/3 = .12)) indicated a relationship similar to what Deci and Ryan (1985, 1987) propose for Perceived Competence; i.e., valuing competence on this game enhanced subsequent interest only when the context was relatively more supportive of autonomy, In fact, it also appeared that caring about doing well when denied choice may actually decrease interest. Predicted values for this interaction appear in Table 2. Direct effects on enjoyment. In this final model, Pretest Enjoyment was associated with greater subsequent Enjoyment (F(l) 112) = 57.48, p < .05 (~3 = .46)). In addition, the Any Feedback contrast continued to exert a direct effect, although the magnitude of the effect was weakened (F(1, 112) = 5.90, p < .05 (/? = .12)). Interestingly, two additional direct effects emerged. There was a marginally significant main effect of the Feedback Type Contrast, F(1, 112) = 3.90, p = .052 @ = - .lO), such that receiving task feedback resulted in greater subsequent interest than did receiving positive normative feedback. This main effect was qualified by the interaction of the feedback Type contrast with Puzzle Choice, F(1, 112) = 4.52, p < .05 (fi = - .lO), which indicated that the relative difference in interest was true primarily when subjects chose the pictures on which to work. In the context of No Puzzle Choice, positive normative and task feedback did not differentially affect interest. Predicted values for this interaction appear in Table 3. TABLE PUZZLE

3

CHOICE x FEEDBACK TWE: VALUES FOR ENJOYMENT

Choice condition No Choice Choice

PREDICTED

Task feedback

Positive normative feedback

26.64 27.70

26.72 23.87

PROCESS AND CONTEXT

3.55

Path model. The final path model appears in Figure 2. Only significant

paths are shown; path coefficients are the /3 weights derived in the fir& regression equations. The path from the Feedback Type contrast to Competence Valuation differed by Achievement Orientation; this pat is starred in the model, and the path coefficients are also presented separately in the caption for low (p = .36) and high (/3 = .04) achievers. In addition, the paths from the Feedback Type contrast and Competence Valuation to Enjoyment differed by Puzzle Choice condition (indicated by boldface lines). The first path coefficient presented on each line represents the path in No Choice conditions; the second path coefficient shows this same path in Choice conditions. As indicated in Fig. 2, choice provided the setting in which valuing competence enhanced interest, and receiving positive normative feedback decreased interest, at least relative to task feedback.

’ .87 I

Valuation

Feedback

Type

contrast

Perceived

I .75

FIG. 2. Path mediation model. Boldface lines indicate significant interactions with choice; the first coefficient presented on each line is the path in No Choice conditions; the second is the path in Choice conditions. All other lines indicate significant paths; the starred path indicates a two-way interaction with achievement (Feedback Type contrast to Competence Valuation: Low Achievers, p = .36; High Achievers, p = .04).

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CAROL

SANSONE

DISCUSSION In order to examine the process by which competence information affects intrinsic interest, we examined the effects of receiving competence information in conjunction with effects of noncompetence information. In particular, we separated feedback into a component that satisfies curiosity (task feedback) and a component that signifies competent performance (positive normative feedback). Both types of feedback enhanced subsequent interest in the task, replicating Sansone (1986). We further examined whether the equivalent enhancement was due to two factors associated with competence information: whether the context was not sufficiently supportive of autonomy to allow perceptions of competence to enhance interest, and whether competence information more strongly affected several mediating processes that had both positive and negative implications for interest. Although positive normative feedback did enhance perceptions of competence relative to task feedback, Perceived Competence was not associated with greater interest, and the relationship did not change as the context became more or less supportive of autonomy (i.e., across contexts where puzzle choice was given or denied). This change in the degree of autonomy support did affect other relationships, suggesting that individuals were sensitive to this contextual factor. Thus it appears that the lack of relationship between perceived competence and interest was not due solely to insufficient autonomy support, at least within the range of contextual differences in the present study. That perceived competence still did not affect interest suggests that competence information was affecting interest through other processes. One of these additional processes was how much an individual valued competence at the trivia game. Doing well became more important when individuals received normative feedback. This greater valuation was subsequently associated with greater interest when individuals chose the puzzles on which to work and with less interest when choice was denied. Positive normative feedback also affected interest through Perceived Autonomy. In particular, positive normative feedback enhanced Perceived Autonomy relative to task feedback, and Perceived Autonomy enhanced subsequent interest. The effects for Competence Valuation in the present study taken with previous research on Perceived Competence support Deci and Ryan’s (198.5, 1987) assertion concerning the importance of a context that supports autonomy. The results expand on previous findings by showing that while an autonomy-supportive context may be necessary for Perceived Competence to enhance interest (e.g., Ryan, 1982), it is not sufficient. Moreover, the results demonstrate the importance of an autonomy-supportive context for other motivational processes in addition to Perceived Competence.

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3.57

Competence information appears to be important to interest, but the impact of this information goes beyond the simple perception of competence or incompetence. Rather, its impact appears to be connected to a network of affective and cognitive processes associated with competence at an activity. These potential multiple effects can work simultaneously to decrease and enhance subsequent interest. For example, it appeared that under autonomy-supportive conditions, positive normative feedback may have directly suppressed enjoyment relative to task feedback. At the same time, it indirectly enhanced Enjoyment through its effect on Competence Valuation. Because a specific context can affect the relationshi between a particular process (e.g., Competence Valuation) and subsequent interest, recognizing the multiple effects competence information can have seems to be critical to predicting and explaining results in different settings. The results also suggest that the mechanisms by which feedback may enhance interest are not all directly tied to the competence information feedback may contain. In particular, when all the previously identified (primarily competence-related) processes were controlled, feedback satisfying curiosity continued to enhance interest. The activity used in the present study was purposely created to arouse curiosity as well as uncertainty about individual performance (Sansone, 1984, 1986). this activity, therefore, information that satisfies curiosity may be e PO contribute to continued involvement in a way that competence information alone does not; i.e., it satisfies that curiosity. In examining the process by which competence feedback affects interest in juxtaposition to task feedback, we see that competence feedback can affect interest through several processes simultaneously, such that even when Perceived Competence is not relevant, other processes may be. Furthermore, we can see that, in addition to the ways in which competence information contributes to our subsequent interest, there may be unique contributions of other kinds of information conveyed in feedback, depending on the activity and the situation (e.g., Harackiewicz, Abrahams, & Wageman, 1987). The Role of Individual

Differences

As has been found in previous studies (Harackiewicz, 1979; Harackiewicz et al., 1985; Manderlink, 1984; Sansone, 1986), achievement-oriented individuals had greater Perceived Competence than did individuals low in Achievement Orientation, although performance feedback would have indicated identical performance levels. One reason why individuals Bow in Achievement Orientation do not seek out opportunities to evaluate competence may be that, given the same objective feedback, they are less likely to see the feedback as indicating competent performance.

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Perhaps more interesting is the suggestion that the main effect of feedback type on Competence Valuation was moderated by individual differences in Achievement Orientation. In particular, the finding that positive normative feedback enhanced Competence Valuation relative to task feedback appeared to be primarily true for individuals who do not in general value competence. Although the difference in how much high and low achievement-oriented individuals valued competence was quite clear in task feedback conditions, this difference was attenuated when individuals received positive normative feedback. The interaction between Achievement Orientation and feedback type on Competence Valuation indicates that non-achievement-oriented individuals can value performing well. Harackiewicz et al. (1989) suggested that this may occur for nonachievement-oriented individuals if their concerns about performing satisfactorily can be addressed. One of the conditions under which this occurs is when low achievers can use objective information to assess their own ongoing performance (Harackiewicz et al., 1985), and the normative feedback in the present study would have allowed this possibility. Individual differences in initial interest also appear to be important to our understanding of the processes involved. Although pretest interest did not interact with feedback type or choice to affect interest, it did exert strong effects on the hypothesized processes as well as on the outcome measure of enjoyment. Some results suggest that interest generated initially by task characteristics continues to be important throughout the process. We should note however that it is probable that the strength of these relationships may be due partially to potential redundancies in several measures. Deci and Ryan (1987) assert that intrinsically motivated behavior is the “paradigmatic case of self-determination,” but that “it is not the only case of self-determined activity” (p. 1033). However, in attempts to measure or manipulate what are proposed to be two distinct (although related) constructs, this distinction may become blurred. For example, intrinsic motivation is often operationally defined as those behaviors which occur in the absence of external constraints (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1980), while self-determination or autonomy is often defined in terms of freely engaging in an activity (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1987). In the present study, the timing of the perceived autonomy measure is critical to its interpretation. Intrinsic motivation must be inferred by whether individuals intend to (or actually do) resume the activity when the need to do so as part of the experiment has ostensibly ended (e.g., Lepper et al., 1973). The perceived autonomy measure, in contrast, was obtained at the midpoint of engagement, where individuals knew that they would be continuing as part of the experiment. In that context, the measure asked subjects the extent to which they felt that continuing (which subjects were essentially constrained to do) was something they wanted to do.

PROCESS AND CONTEXT

In this context this measure could not serve as a true motivation. However, it is reasonable to assume that individuals enjoy the activity would be an important reaction, perhaps independently of the factors we vary

359 measure of intrinsic the degree to which determinant of this in the environment.

CONCLUSION The results from the present study indicate that positive normative and task feedback may each enhance subsequent interest. This apparently equivalent impact on interest does not appear to be due solely to factors associated with the competence information present in feedback, but rather is due at least partially to factors associated with information that satisfies curiosity. In addition, the relationships between the potential mediating processes and interest appear to depend in part on contextual factors, such that certain relationships become stronger as autonomy support increases or as their import is emphasized by cues in the environment (cf., Sansone, 1986). In sum, we have demonstrated the utility of employing a process approach when examining feedback effects an found partial support for our previous model. By examining normative feedback in conjunction with other kinds of feedback, however, we have also found that the model should be modified to include the effects of different kinds of information, as well as to ground the overall motivations process within a specific context (as we have shown in Fig. I). REFERENCES Atkinson. J. W. (1964). An introduction to motivation. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. Bandura, A. (1982). Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. American Psychologist, 37, 122-147. Berlyne, D. E. (1960). ConJlict, arousal and curiosity. New York: McGraw-Hill. Soggiano, A. K., & Ruble, D. N. (1979). Competence and the overjustification effect: A developmental study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1462-1468. Boykin, A. W., & Harackiewicz, J. (1981). Epistemic curiosity and incidental recognition in relation to degree of uncertainty: Some general trends and intersubject differences. British

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