- Email: [email protected]
Conservatism as motivated avoidance of affect: Need for affect scales predict conservatism measures
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762 www.elsevier.com/locate/jrp
Brief Report
Conservatism as motivated avoidance of affect: Need for affect scales predict conservatism measures Luigi Leone a b
a,*
, Antonio Chirumbolo
b
Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, University of Rome ‘‘Sapienza’’, Italy Faculty of Psychology, University of Chieti-Pescara, Via dei Vestini, 31, 66013 Chieti, Italy Available online 16 August 2007
Abstract We propose that individual differences in the motivation to avoid emotions are related to political conservatism. We argue that because conservatism is concerned with managing uncertainty and emphasizes ego-control, conservative ideologies match with the motivational concerns of those individuals who find emotions to be uncertainty-enhancing and dysfunctional. In a group of 267 participants, positive associations were found between emotion avoidance and right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and support for conservative policies. Negative associations were found between emotion approach and conservatism measures. Ó 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Conservatism; Need for affect; Motivation; Motivated social cognition
1. Introduction Recent theorizing interprets adoption of ideologies, such as conservatism and liberalism, as a form of ‘‘motivated social cognition’’ (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). This line of research proposes that a set of dispositional factors represents the motivational underpinnings of ideological preferences. Meta-analytical studies (Jost et al., 2003) have found reliable associations between conservatism and such epistemic motives as need for order, structure and closure, uncertainty avoidance, and openness to * Corresponding author. Address: Department of Psychology of Socialization and Developmental Processes, Via dei Marsi, 78, 00185 Rome, Italy. Fax: +39 0649917652. E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Leone).
0092-6566/$ - see front matter Ó 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2007.08.001
756
L. Leone, A. Chirumbolo / Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762
experience. Also, such existential motives as death anxiety, fear of threat and loss, and selfesteem concerns were correlated with ideological conservatism. We propose here that individual differences in the motivation to approach and avoid emotions should be added to the list of dispositional variables associated with conservatism. 1.1. Matching between individual concerns and ideology beliefs The motives associated with conservatism (need for closure, uncertainty avoidance, death anxiety, fear of loss) highlight the individual’s needs for stability, predictability, and reduction of uncertainty. Theoretically, it has been proposed that the adoption of conservatism, as an ideology supporting tradition and stability over innovation and change, may represent a satisfactory ideological choice that matches the individuals’ concerns for predictability and uncertainty reduction. Differently stated, individuals prefer ideological belief systems that best fit their psychological needs (Jost, 2006). As an example of this matching process, consider the case of need for closure. Need for closure is defined as a desire for any firm belief on a given issue, as opposed to ambiguity and uncertainty. Persons high in need for closure seek definite and quick answers when facing ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Individuals who are concerned about stability, clarity, and order should perceive a match between their motives and the core tenets of conservatism which advocate stability, order, tradition, and opposition to change. Symmetrically, such persons should perceive a miss-match between their needs and claims for change and diversity which are associated with liberal ideologies. A similar argument could explain associations of existential motives with conservatism. Mortality salience and death anxiety make individuals turn to traditional values and religious views to transcend death, and to reduce anxiety (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997). Because religious beliefs and traditional values often define the core of conservative ideologies, conservatism fits nicely with the individuals’ need to reduce death anxiety (Jost et al., 2003). In a similar vein, we propose that individuals motivated to avoid emotions should fit better within a conservative worldview, whereas individuals motivated to approach emotional experiences should perceive a miss-match between their need and conservatism. These hypotheses can be tested with recently developed measures of the need to approach and avoid emotions (Maio & Esses, 2001). 1.2. Need for affect and conservatism Unlike constructs of emotional ability (such as alexithymia) and emotional tone (such as positive and negative affect), the need for affect scales (NAS, Maio & Esses, 2001) are not concerned with how emotions are experienced or expressed, nor with emotional valence. Rather, these scales measure the motivation to approach and avoid intense emotions and emotional-eliciting situations. Items from the NAS measure (1) evaluations of individuals’ comfort with emotional experiences (e.g., Avoidance: ‘‘I find strong emotions overwhelming and therefore try to avoid them’’; Approach: ‘‘I think it is important to explore my feelings’’), (2) beliefs about the problem-solving value of emotional experiences (e.g., Avoidance: ‘‘I would love to be like ‘‘Mr. Spock’’, who is totally logical and experiences little emotion’’; Approach: ‘‘Emotions help people getting along in life’’), and (3) beliefs about the role of emotional experiences (e.g., Avoidance: ‘‘People can function most effectively when they are not experiencing strong emotions’’; Approach: ‘‘The expe-
L. Leone, A. Chirumbolo / Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762
757
rience of emotions promotes human survival’’). Maio and Esses (2001) reported positive correlations between the motivation to approach emotions and positive affect, need for cognition, and openness to experience, but also with measures related to anxiety, and to intensity of sad emotions, showing how emotion seekers may approach both positive and negative emotional experiences. The motivation to avoid emotions correlated positively with negative affect, need for cognitive closure, neuroticism, and anxiety measures. It is noteworthy that NAS items do not mention any political issue, nor show any ideological content. This is important, because it has been argued that associations between personality constructs and ideology may be inflated by embedded ideological content in the personality measures (Jost et al., 2003). The rationale for hypothesizing associations between the need for affect constructs and conservatism builds on early theorizing on emotions and conservatism. Classic theorizing suggests that conservatives tend to avoid intense emotions. Conservatives tend to prefer strong ego-control mechanisms and distrust intense emotionality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Such distrust of emotions matches the emphasis on selfcontrol, norm adherence, order, and social stability characteristic of conservatism. Tomkins’ ideo-affective polarity theory also emphasizes differences in the way liberals and conservatives evaluate emotions. ‘‘Leftists’’ believe humans are good, and that emotions are a way to facilitate human growth. By contrast, conservatives hold a pessimistic view of human nature, which is perceived as bad and anti-social; such pessimism leads conservatives to argue that the function of society is to set rules, reward self-control, and prevent emotion-driven behavior (e.g., Tomkins, 1995). Hence, individuals perceiving that emotions are disturbing should prefer conservative worldviews that distrust emotionality and that praise self-control (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998). As individuals high in need for closure may use conservatism as a source of stable and unambiguous beliefs and cognitions (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), ‘‘emotion avoiders’’ should embrace conservatism as the ideological match of their distrust and discomfort with emotions. By contrast, persons that need to approach affect should perceive a miss-fit with conservative worldviews, and feel more comfortable adopting liberal ideologies. Our hypotheses are consistent with previous research (Block & Block, 2006; Jost et al., 2003); however, to-date they have not been directly tested. To investigate these predictions, we focused on two components of conservatism: resistance to change, and acceptance of inequality (Jost et al., 2003). Resistance to change can be measured by the right-wing authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 1998), while acceptance of inequality may be operationalized with the social dominance orientation scale (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). The RWA and SDO measure broad ideological postures. It is interesting to examine also narrower and more attitudinal indicators of conservatism. Hence, we also measure support for a set of conservative policies. To reduce the risk of spurious associations, hypotheses were tested controlling for need for closure, because this variable is related to affect approach and avoidance (Maio & Esses, 2001), and to political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003). 2. Method 2.1. Participants and procedure We wished to investigate a less homogeneous sample than the more frequently studied college student. We decided thus to contact potential respondents outside campuses,
758
L. Leone, A. Chirumbolo / Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762
in parks and other public places during weekends, in a large Italian city. About 80% of contacted individuals agreed to fill out the questionnaire. A sample of 267 was obtained (150 females; mean age 31.78, SD = 12.09, range 18–75). Most of the participants (69.5%) were non-students. Admittedly, this is still a convenience sample, but at least more heterogeneous than typical college-student samples. Participants were debriefed upon completion of the questionnaire. The few and apparently random missing responses (about 3% of the sample failed to respond to all items) were recoded using item means. 2.2. Measures 2.2.1. Need for affect Motivations to avoid and approach affect were measured with the Italian version (Leone & Presaghi, 2007) of the need for affect scales (NAS; Maio & Esses, 2001). The NAS measures affect avoidance and affect approach with scales of 13-item each (see sample items mentioned above). Seven-point disagree–agree response scales were used. Items for each scale were averaged (alphas: .83 for approach; .88 for avoidance). 2.2.2. Right-wing authoritarianism The Italian version (Aiello, Leone, & Chirumbolo, 2004) of Altemeyer’s 30-item RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1998) was used as a measure of the ‘‘resistance to change’’ component of conservatism. (Sample item: ‘‘Authorities such as parents and our national leaders generally turn out to be right about things, and the radicals and protestors are almost always wrong’’). Disagree–agree 7-point scales were used. Items were averaged (a = .89). 2.2.3. Social dominance orientation The Italian version (Aiello, Chirumbolo, Leone, & Pratto, 2005) of Pratto et al. (1994) 16-item SDO scale operazionalized the ‘‘acceptance of inequality’’ component of conservatism. (Sample item: ‘‘This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people are’’). Disagree–agree 7-point scales were used. Items were averaged (a = .88). 2.2.4. Support for conservative policies Five typical conservative policies were rated on 7-point disagree/agree scales: ‘‘Reducing government spending for retirement plans’’; ‘‘Reducing the number of public servants employed by the government’’; ‘‘Reducing government spending for public health programs’’; ‘‘Pre-emptive war against threatening regimes’’; ‘‘Use of military strikes to protect democracy’’. Ratings were averaged (a = .62). Need for cognitive closure was measured by the Italian version of the need for closure 42-item scale (Mannetti, Pierro, Kruglanski, Taris, & Bezinovic, 2002). Seven-point disagree–agree scales were used. Items were averaged (a = .85). 3. Results Correlations between measures were in the hypothesized direction (Table 1). Emotion avoidance was positively correlated with RWA, SDO, and support for conservative
L. Leone, A. Chirumbolo / Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762
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Table 1 Zero order correlations, means, and standard deviations (N = 267) 1 1. Emotion avoidance 2. Emotion approach 3. RWA 4. SDO 5 Support for conservative policies 6. NCC
1 .03 .32** .19** .40** .39**
M (SD)
3.03 (1.15)
2
3
4
5
6
1 .42 .38** .49**
1 .36** .12*
1 .19**
1
3.43 (0.81)
2.84 (1.16)
4.04 (0.87)
4.18 (0.78)
1 .19** .14* .12* .11 4.84 (0.93)
Note: RWA, right-wing authoritarianism; SDO, social dominance orientation; NCC, need for cognitive closure. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).
policies. Emotion approach correlated negatively with conservatism measures. Need for closure was positively associated with conservatism criteria (Jost et al., 2003). Need for closure correlated positively with affect avoidance, and negatively with affect approach (Maio & Esses, 2001). Hierarchical multiple regression models were used for hypothesis testing. Need for closure was entered first predicting the conservatism criteria. Controlling for this variable ensures that the effects of the NAS are non-redundant with any association between need for closure and conservatism. In the second step, emotion approach and avoidance were added as predictors. Inclusion of the need for affect motivations significantly increased explained variances (incremental Fs(2,262): 6.08 for SDO; 7.84 for RWA; 21.80 for support for conservative policies; ps < .01). As hypothesized, emotion avoidance positively predicted SDO, RWA, and support for conservative policies, whilst emotion approach negativity predicted the conservatism measures (Table 2).
Table 2 Hierarchical regression models (N = 267) Dependent variables Social dominance orientation Model 1 Need for cognitive closure R2 Model 2 Need for cognitive closure Emotion approach Emotion avoidance R2 DR2 * **
p < .05. p < .01 (two-tailed).
Right-wing authoritarianism
Support for conservative policies
.12*
.49**
.19**
.02*
.24**
.04**
.04
.41**
.03
.14* .18** .04** .02**
.15* .17** .29** .05**
.13* .39** .17** .13**
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L. Leone, A. Chirumbolo / Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762
4. Discussion Consistent with classic theories (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Tomkins, 1995), our results suggest that psychological interpretations of emotions are related with social attitudes. The results are also consistent with more recent models of political conservatism that interpret political preferences as a result of the match between an individual’s motivational concerns and ideological beliefs (Jost, 2006). Apparently, emotion avoiders ‘‘feel comfortable’’ embracing the disregard of emotions and preference for self-control advocated by conservatism. Previous research has investigated whether conservatives and liberals differ in both positive and negative emotions (Tomkins, 1995), or whether negative emotions only typify conservatives (Jost et al., 2003; Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2006). We consider our hypotheses as more general than those focusing on specific emotions. We investigated the effects of individual differences in the strength of dispositions regulating approach and avoidance of emotional experiences, regardless of emotional valence. We also argue that some evidence stemming from research on emotional differences between liberals and conservatives supports the importance of differences in general regulatory systems. For instance, de St. Aubin (1996) reported that conservatives show less frequent experience of the typical ‘‘liberal emotions’’ (joy, distress), rather than more frequent experience of such ‘‘conservative emotions’’ as anger, disgust, and excitement. Consistent with our results, such findings are suggestive of a general tendency of conservatives to avoid emotions or pursue less intense emotional experiences, rather than to prefer different specific emotions compared with liberals. Nevertheless, further inquiry in both directions is warranted. Individual differences related to ideological preferences might be traced back to early childhood (Block & Block, 2006). Motivation to avoid emotions might stem from early individual differences in the relative thresholds reinforced in the experience of positive and negative emotions (Tomkins, 1995). Emotion avoidance may thus develop as an adaptive strategy to cope with lower thresholds to negative emotions (Block & Block, 2006). A lower threshold for negative emotionality could in turn become associated with the pessimistic view of human nature that is typical of conservatism (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001). Future research on emotional thresholds and coping strategies may shed light on the developmental sources of ideological preferences. We believe that our research and the motivated social cognition approach to conservatism do not imply that conservative beliefs are less valid because they are partly adopted to satisfy psychological needs (e.g., Durrheim, 1997). Indeed, the matching of psychological needs to ideological beliefs may explain adoption of liberal opinions as well. We also argue that research on such constructs as need for closure, need for affect, and other epistemic and existential motives, is largely free of ideological bias, because these constructs represent general preferences for reasoning, decision, and coping styles that do not imply hampered cognitive and affective capabilities, or mal-adjustment. Persons high in need for closure or emotion avoidance can be as smart, well-adjusted, and effective in achieving goals as emotion seekers or closure avoiders. One might also argue that in one sense the ‘‘conservative personality’’ is better suited for politics than the ‘‘liberal personality’’. In fact, such political characteristics such as goal-oriented, ordered, logical, not driven by emotions, and self-controlled, stem from a combination of high need for closure and emotion avoidance. In politics, such traits as rigidity or emotional detachment may translate into effective commitment and unwavering resolve, whilst such ‘‘liberal’’ traits as
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openness and need for affect may turn into liabilities (e.g., wavering, irrationality). The success of conservative policies and conservative values in today’s politics may in part be explained by the fine tuning of conservative ideology with public needs for decisiveness, clarity, order, stability, rationality, and policies not determined by emotional drives. The ‘‘conservative personality’’ is especially politically efficacious, and such success helps explain why conservatism is often considered a more interesting research topic than Liberalism (Jost, 2006). Some limitations in our study should be acknowledged. First, we relied on self-reported data, but behavioral indicators are badly needed in political psychology. Second, our cross-sectional design is uninformative of causal direction. Third, generalizability is limited to the extent that results were observed in a typical Western capitalistic democracy (Italy). In different cultural and political contexts different associations might be found (e.g., Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003). In former communist countries, Western conservatism may be perceived as the ‘‘revolutionary option’’ challenging the status-quo embodied by communist ideologies. Fourth, our results may be contingent on the current political climate. Emotion avoiders will endorse conservatism only as long as conservative ideology matches their psychological motives (rationality, emotional stability). This fit is partly dependent on the social and political climate (Jost et al., 2003). However, the current political climate, emphasizing security and control (still influenced strongly by the 9/11 attacks and fear of terrorism), appears to reinforce the match between emotion avoidance and conservatism. References Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper. Aiello, A., Chirumbolo, A., Leone, L., & Pratto, F. (2005). A study for the validation of the Social Dominance orientation scale. Rassegna di Psicologia, 22, 65–75. Aiello, A., Leone, L., & Chirumbolo, A. (2004). Right wing authoritarianism scale: A study of adaptation and validation to the Italian context. Rassegna di Psicologia, 21, 73–91. Altemeyer, R. A. (1998). The other ‘‘authoritarian personality’’. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.). Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 47–91). New York: Academic Press. Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Simon, L. (1997). Suppression, accessibility of deathrelated thoughts, and cultural worldview defence: Exploring the psychodynamics of worldview defence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 5–18. Block, J., & Block, J. H. (2006). Nursery school and political orientation two decades later. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 734–749. de St. Aubin, E. (1996). Personal ideology polarity: Its emotional foundations and its manifestations in individual value systems, religiosity, political orientation, and assumptions concerning human nature. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 152–165. Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 41–113. Durrheim, K. (1997). Theoretical conundrum: The politics and science of theorizing authoritarian cognition. Political Psychology, 18, 625–644. Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of end of ideology. American Psychologist, 61, 651–670. Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339–375. Kossowska, M., & Van Hiel, A. (2003). The relationship between need for closure and conservative beliefs in Western and Eastern Europe. Political Psychology, 24, 501–518. Leone, L., & Presaghi, F. (2007). Validity of the need for affect scales: Factorial structure, invariance and validity in Italy. Manuscript submitted for publication.
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Maio & Esses (2001). The need for affect: Individual differences in the motivation to approach or avoid emotions. Journal of Personality, 69, 583–615. Mannetti, L., Pierro, A., Kruglanski, A. W., Taris, T., & Bezinovic, P. (2002). A cross cultural study of the need for cognitive closure scale: Comparing its structure in Croatia, Italy, USA and The Netherlands. British Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 139–156. Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741–763. Tomkins, S. S. (1995). Ideology and affect. In E. V. Demos (Ed.), Exploring affect: The selected writings of Silvan S. Tomkins (pp. 109–167). New York: University of Cambridge Press. Van Hiel, A., & Kossowska, M. (2006). Having few positive emotions, or too many negative feelings? Emotions as moderating variables of authoritarianism effects on racism. Personality and Individual Differences, 40, 919–930. Webster, D., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 1049–1062.
Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762 www.elsevier.com/locate/jrp
Brief Report
Conservatism as motivated avoidance of affect: Need for affect scales predict conservatism measures Luigi Leone a b
a,*
, Antonio Chirumbolo
b
Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, University of Rome ‘‘Sapienza’’, Italy Faculty of Psychology, University of Chieti-Pescara, Via dei Vestini, 31, 66013 Chieti, Italy Available online 16 August 2007
Abstract We propose that individual differences in the motivation to avoid emotions are related to political conservatism. We argue that because conservatism is concerned with managing uncertainty and emphasizes ego-control, conservative ideologies match with the motivational concerns of those individuals who find emotions to be uncertainty-enhancing and dysfunctional. In a group of 267 participants, positive associations were found between emotion avoidance and right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and support for conservative policies. Negative associations were found between emotion approach and conservatism measures. Ó 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Conservatism; Need for affect; Motivation; Motivated social cognition
1. Introduction Recent theorizing interprets adoption of ideologies, such as conservatism and liberalism, as a form of ‘‘motivated social cognition’’ (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). This line of research proposes that a set of dispositional factors represents the motivational underpinnings of ideological preferences. Meta-analytical studies (Jost et al., 2003) have found reliable associations between conservatism and such epistemic motives as need for order, structure and closure, uncertainty avoidance, and openness to * Corresponding author. Address: Department of Psychology of Socialization and Developmental Processes, Via dei Marsi, 78, 00185 Rome, Italy. Fax: +39 0649917652. E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Leone).
0092-6566/$ - see front matter Ó 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2007.08.001
756
L. Leone, A. Chirumbolo / Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762
experience. Also, such existential motives as death anxiety, fear of threat and loss, and selfesteem concerns were correlated with ideological conservatism. We propose here that individual differences in the motivation to approach and avoid emotions should be added to the list of dispositional variables associated with conservatism. 1.1. Matching between individual concerns and ideology beliefs The motives associated with conservatism (need for closure, uncertainty avoidance, death anxiety, fear of loss) highlight the individual’s needs for stability, predictability, and reduction of uncertainty. Theoretically, it has been proposed that the adoption of conservatism, as an ideology supporting tradition and stability over innovation and change, may represent a satisfactory ideological choice that matches the individuals’ concerns for predictability and uncertainty reduction. Differently stated, individuals prefer ideological belief systems that best fit their psychological needs (Jost, 2006). As an example of this matching process, consider the case of need for closure. Need for closure is defined as a desire for any firm belief on a given issue, as opposed to ambiguity and uncertainty. Persons high in need for closure seek definite and quick answers when facing ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Individuals who are concerned about stability, clarity, and order should perceive a match between their motives and the core tenets of conservatism which advocate stability, order, tradition, and opposition to change. Symmetrically, such persons should perceive a miss-match between their needs and claims for change and diversity which are associated with liberal ideologies. A similar argument could explain associations of existential motives with conservatism. Mortality salience and death anxiety make individuals turn to traditional values and religious views to transcend death, and to reduce anxiety (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997). Because religious beliefs and traditional values often define the core of conservative ideologies, conservatism fits nicely with the individuals’ need to reduce death anxiety (Jost et al., 2003). In a similar vein, we propose that individuals motivated to avoid emotions should fit better within a conservative worldview, whereas individuals motivated to approach emotional experiences should perceive a miss-match between their need and conservatism. These hypotheses can be tested with recently developed measures of the need to approach and avoid emotions (Maio & Esses, 2001). 1.2. Need for affect and conservatism Unlike constructs of emotional ability (such as alexithymia) and emotional tone (such as positive and negative affect), the need for affect scales (NAS, Maio & Esses, 2001) are not concerned with how emotions are experienced or expressed, nor with emotional valence. Rather, these scales measure the motivation to approach and avoid intense emotions and emotional-eliciting situations. Items from the NAS measure (1) evaluations of individuals’ comfort with emotional experiences (e.g., Avoidance: ‘‘I find strong emotions overwhelming and therefore try to avoid them’’; Approach: ‘‘I think it is important to explore my feelings’’), (2) beliefs about the problem-solving value of emotional experiences (e.g., Avoidance: ‘‘I would love to be like ‘‘Mr. Spock’’, who is totally logical and experiences little emotion’’; Approach: ‘‘Emotions help people getting along in life’’), and (3) beliefs about the role of emotional experiences (e.g., Avoidance: ‘‘People can function most effectively when they are not experiencing strong emotions’’; Approach: ‘‘The expe-
L. Leone, A. Chirumbolo / Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762
757
rience of emotions promotes human survival’’). Maio and Esses (2001) reported positive correlations between the motivation to approach emotions and positive affect, need for cognition, and openness to experience, but also with measures related to anxiety, and to intensity of sad emotions, showing how emotion seekers may approach both positive and negative emotional experiences. The motivation to avoid emotions correlated positively with negative affect, need for cognitive closure, neuroticism, and anxiety measures. It is noteworthy that NAS items do not mention any political issue, nor show any ideological content. This is important, because it has been argued that associations between personality constructs and ideology may be inflated by embedded ideological content in the personality measures (Jost et al., 2003). The rationale for hypothesizing associations between the need for affect constructs and conservatism builds on early theorizing on emotions and conservatism. Classic theorizing suggests that conservatives tend to avoid intense emotions. Conservatives tend to prefer strong ego-control mechanisms and distrust intense emotionality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Such distrust of emotions matches the emphasis on selfcontrol, norm adherence, order, and social stability characteristic of conservatism. Tomkins’ ideo-affective polarity theory also emphasizes differences in the way liberals and conservatives evaluate emotions. ‘‘Leftists’’ believe humans are good, and that emotions are a way to facilitate human growth. By contrast, conservatives hold a pessimistic view of human nature, which is perceived as bad and anti-social; such pessimism leads conservatives to argue that the function of society is to set rules, reward self-control, and prevent emotion-driven behavior (e.g., Tomkins, 1995). Hence, individuals perceiving that emotions are disturbing should prefer conservative worldviews that distrust emotionality and that praise self-control (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998). As individuals high in need for closure may use conservatism as a source of stable and unambiguous beliefs and cognitions (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), ‘‘emotion avoiders’’ should embrace conservatism as the ideological match of their distrust and discomfort with emotions. By contrast, persons that need to approach affect should perceive a miss-fit with conservative worldviews, and feel more comfortable adopting liberal ideologies. Our hypotheses are consistent with previous research (Block & Block, 2006; Jost et al., 2003); however, to-date they have not been directly tested. To investigate these predictions, we focused on two components of conservatism: resistance to change, and acceptance of inequality (Jost et al., 2003). Resistance to change can be measured by the right-wing authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 1998), while acceptance of inequality may be operationalized with the social dominance orientation scale (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). The RWA and SDO measure broad ideological postures. It is interesting to examine also narrower and more attitudinal indicators of conservatism. Hence, we also measure support for a set of conservative policies. To reduce the risk of spurious associations, hypotheses were tested controlling for need for closure, because this variable is related to affect approach and avoidance (Maio & Esses, 2001), and to political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003). 2. Method 2.1. Participants and procedure We wished to investigate a less homogeneous sample than the more frequently studied college student. We decided thus to contact potential respondents outside campuses,
758
L. Leone, A. Chirumbolo / Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762
in parks and other public places during weekends, in a large Italian city. About 80% of contacted individuals agreed to fill out the questionnaire. A sample of 267 was obtained (150 females; mean age 31.78, SD = 12.09, range 18–75). Most of the participants (69.5%) were non-students. Admittedly, this is still a convenience sample, but at least more heterogeneous than typical college-student samples. Participants were debriefed upon completion of the questionnaire. The few and apparently random missing responses (about 3% of the sample failed to respond to all items) were recoded using item means. 2.2. Measures 2.2.1. Need for affect Motivations to avoid and approach affect were measured with the Italian version (Leone & Presaghi, 2007) of the need for affect scales (NAS; Maio & Esses, 2001). The NAS measures affect avoidance and affect approach with scales of 13-item each (see sample items mentioned above). Seven-point disagree–agree response scales were used. Items for each scale were averaged (alphas: .83 for approach; .88 for avoidance). 2.2.2. Right-wing authoritarianism The Italian version (Aiello, Leone, & Chirumbolo, 2004) of Altemeyer’s 30-item RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1998) was used as a measure of the ‘‘resistance to change’’ component of conservatism. (Sample item: ‘‘Authorities such as parents and our national leaders generally turn out to be right about things, and the radicals and protestors are almost always wrong’’). Disagree–agree 7-point scales were used. Items were averaged (a = .89). 2.2.3. Social dominance orientation The Italian version (Aiello, Chirumbolo, Leone, & Pratto, 2005) of Pratto et al. (1994) 16-item SDO scale operazionalized the ‘‘acceptance of inequality’’ component of conservatism. (Sample item: ‘‘This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people are’’). Disagree–agree 7-point scales were used. Items were averaged (a = .88). 2.2.4. Support for conservative policies Five typical conservative policies were rated on 7-point disagree/agree scales: ‘‘Reducing government spending for retirement plans’’; ‘‘Reducing the number of public servants employed by the government’’; ‘‘Reducing government spending for public health programs’’; ‘‘Pre-emptive war against threatening regimes’’; ‘‘Use of military strikes to protect democracy’’. Ratings were averaged (a = .62). Need for cognitive closure was measured by the Italian version of the need for closure 42-item scale (Mannetti, Pierro, Kruglanski, Taris, & Bezinovic, 2002). Seven-point disagree–agree scales were used. Items were averaged (a = .85). 3. Results Correlations between measures were in the hypothesized direction (Table 1). Emotion avoidance was positively correlated with RWA, SDO, and support for conservative
L. Leone, A. Chirumbolo / Journal of Research in Personality 42 (2008) 755–762
759
Table 1 Zero order correlations, means, and standard deviations (N = 267) 1 1. Emotion avoidance 2. Emotion approach 3. RWA 4. SDO 5 Support for conservative policies 6. NCC
1 .03 .32** .19** .40** .39**
M (SD)
3.03 (1.15)
2
3
4
5
6
1 .42 .38** .49**
1 .36** .12*
1 .19**
1
3.43 (0.81)
2.84 (1.16)
4.04 (0.87)
4.18 (0.78)
1 .19** .14* .12* .11 4.84 (0.93)
Note: RWA, right-wing authoritarianism; SDO, social dominance orientation; NCC, need for cognitive closure. * p < .05. ** p < .01 (two-tailed).
policies. Emotion approach correlated negatively with conservatism measures. Need for closure was positively associated with conservatism criteria (Jost et al., 2003). Need for closure correlated positively with affect avoidance, and negatively with affect approach (Maio & Esses, 2001). Hierarchical multiple regression models were used for hypothesis testing. Need for closure was entered first predicting the conservatism criteria. Controlling for this variable ensures that the effects of the NAS are non-redundant with any association between need for closure and conservatism. In the second step, emotion approach and avoidance were added as predictors. Inclusion of the need for affect motivations significantly increased explained variances (incremental Fs(2,262): 6.08 for SDO; 7.84 for RWA; 21.80 for support for conservative policies; ps < .01). As hypothesized, emotion avoidance positively predicted SDO, RWA, and support for conservative policies, whilst emotion approach negativity predicted the conservatism measures (Table 2).
Table 2 Hierarchical regression models (N = 267) Dependent variables Social dominance orientation Model 1 Need for cognitive closure R2 Model 2 Need for cognitive closure Emotion approach Emotion avoidance R2 DR2 * **
p < .05. p < .01 (two-tailed).
Right-wing authoritarianism
Support for conservative policies
.12*
.49**
.19**
.02*
.24**
.04**
.04
.41**
.03
.14* .18** .04** .02**
.15* .17** .29** .05**
.13* .39** .17** .13**
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4. Discussion Consistent with classic theories (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Tomkins, 1995), our results suggest that psychological interpretations of emotions are related with social attitudes. The results are also consistent with more recent models of political conservatism that interpret political preferences as a result of the match between an individual’s motivational concerns and ideological beliefs (Jost, 2006). Apparently, emotion avoiders ‘‘feel comfortable’’ embracing the disregard of emotions and preference for self-control advocated by conservatism. Previous research has investigated whether conservatives and liberals differ in both positive and negative emotions (Tomkins, 1995), or whether negative emotions only typify conservatives (Jost et al., 2003; Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2006). We consider our hypotheses as more general than those focusing on specific emotions. We investigated the effects of individual differences in the strength of dispositions regulating approach and avoidance of emotional experiences, regardless of emotional valence. We also argue that some evidence stemming from research on emotional differences between liberals and conservatives supports the importance of differences in general regulatory systems. For instance, de St. Aubin (1996) reported that conservatives show less frequent experience of the typical ‘‘liberal emotions’’ (joy, distress), rather than more frequent experience of such ‘‘conservative emotions’’ as anger, disgust, and excitement. Consistent with our results, such findings are suggestive of a general tendency of conservatives to avoid emotions or pursue less intense emotional experiences, rather than to prefer different specific emotions compared with liberals. Nevertheless, further inquiry in both directions is warranted. Individual differences related to ideological preferences might be traced back to early childhood (Block & Block, 2006). Motivation to avoid emotions might stem from early individual differences in the relative thresholds reinforced in the experience of positive and negative emotions (Tomkins, 1995). Emotion avoidance may thus develop as an adaptive strategy to cope with lower thresholds to negative emotions (Block & Block, 2006). A lower threshold for negative emotionality could in turn become associated with the pessimistic view of human nature that is typical of conservatism (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001). Future research on emotional thresholds and coping strategies may shed light on the developmental sources of ideological preferences. We believe that our research and the motivated social cognition approach to conservatism do not imply that conservative beliefs are less valid because they are partly adopted to satisfy psychological needs (e.g., Durrheim, 1997). Indeed, the matching of psychological needs to ideological beliefs may explain adoption of liberal opinions as well. We also argue that research on such constructs as need for closure, need for affect, and other epistemic and existential motives, is largely free of ideological bias, because these constructs represent general preferences for reasoning, decision, and coping styles that do not imply hampered cognitive and affective capabilities, or mal-adjustment. Persons high in need for closure or emotion avoidance can be as smart, well-adjusted, and effective in achieving goals as emotion seekers or closure avoiders. One might also argue that in one sense the ‘‘conservative personality’’ is better suited for politics than the ‘‘liberal personality’’. In fact, such political characteristics such as goal-oriented, ordered, logical, not driven by emotions, and self-controlled, stem from a combination of high need for closure and emotion avoidance. In politics, such traits as rigidity or emotional detachment may translate into effective commitment and unwavering resolve, whilst such ‘‘liberal’’ traits as
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openness and need for affect may turn into liabilities (e.g., wavering, irrationality). The success of conservative policies and conservative values in today’s politics may in part be explained by the fine tuning of conservative ideology with public needs for decisiveness, clarity, order, stability, rationality, and policies not determined by emotional drives. The ‘‘conservative personality’’ is especially politically efficacious, and such success helps explain why conservatism is often considered a more interesting research topic than Liberalism (Jost, 2006). Some limitations in our study should be acknowledged. First, we relied on self-reported data, but behavioral indicators are badly needed in political psychology. Second, our cross-sectional design is uninformative of causal direction. Third, generalizability is limited to the extent that results were observed in a typical Western capitalistic democracy (Italy). In different cultural and political contexts different associations might be found (e.g., Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003). In former communist countries, Western conservatism may be perceived as the ‘‘revolutionary option’’ challenging the status-quo embodied by communist ideologies. Fourth, our results may be contingent on the current political climate. Emotion avoiders will endorse conservatism only as long as conservative ideology matches their psychological motives (rationality, emotional stability). This fit is partly dependent on the social and political climate (Jost et al., 2003). However, the current political climate, emphasizing security and control (still influenced strongly by the 9/11 attacks and fear of terrorism), appears to reinforce the match between emotion avoidance and conservatism. References Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper. Aiello, A., Chirumbolo, A., Leone, L., & Pratto, F. (2005). A study for the validation of the Social Dominance orientation scale. Rassegna di Psicologia, 22, 65–75. Aiello, A., Leone, L., & Chirumbolo, A. (2004). Right wing authoritarianism scale: A study of adaptation and validation to the Italian context. Rassegna di Psicologia, 21, 73–91. Altemeyer, R. A. (1998). The other ‘‘authoritarian personality’’. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.). Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 47–91). New York: Academic Press. Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Simon, L. (1997). Suppression, accessibility of deathrelated thoughts, and cultural worldview defence: Exploring the psychodynamics of worldview defence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 5–18. Block, J., & Block, J. H. (2006). Nursery school and political orientation two decades later. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 734–749. de St. Aubin, E. (1996). Personal ideology polarity: Its emotional foundations and its manifestations in individual value systems, religiosity, political orientation, and assumptions concerning human nature. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 152–165. Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 41–113. Durrheim, K. (1997). Theoretical conundrum: The politics and science of theorizing authoritarian cognition. Political Psychology, 18, 625–644. Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of end of ideology. American Psychologist, 61, 651–670. Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339–375. Kossowska, M., & Van Hiel, A. (2003). The relationship between need for closure and conservative beliefs in Western and Eastern Europe. Political Psychology, 24, 501–518. Leone, L., & Presaghi, F. (2007). Validity of the need for affect scales: Factorial structure, invariance and validity in Italy. Manuscript submitted for publication.
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