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Contents of the handbook
CONTENTS
VOLUME
OF THE HANDBOOK*
I
Preface
Chapter 1 The Garne of Chess HERBERT A. SIMON and JONATHAN SCHAEFFER
Chapter 2 Games in Extensive and Strategic Forms SERGIU HART
Chapter 3 Games with Perfect Information JAN MYCIELSKI
Chapter 4 Repeated Garnes with Complete Information SYLVAIN SORIN
Chapter 5 Repeated Garnes of Incomplete Information: Zero-Sum SHMUEL ZAMIR Chapter 6
Repeated Garnes of Incomplete Information: Non-Zero-Sum FRAN(~OISE FORGES
Chapter 7 Noncooperative Models of Bargaining KEN BINMORE, MARTIN J. OSBORNE and ARIEL RUBINSTEIN
*Detailed contents of this volume (Volume I of the H a n d b o o k ) may be found on p. xvii.
viii
Chapter 8
Strategic Analysis of Auctions ROBERT WILSON
Chapter 9
Location JEAN J. G A B S Z E W I C Z and JACQUES-FRAN~OIS THISSE
Chapter i0
Strategic Models of Entry Deterrence ROBERT WILSON
Chapter 11
Patent Licensing MORTON I. KAMIEN
Chapter 12
The Core and Balancedness YAKAR KANNAI
Chapter 13
Axiomatizations of the Core B E Z A L E L PELEG
Chapter 14
The Core in Perfectly Competitive Economies ROBERT M. ANDERSON
Chapter 15
The Core in Impeffectly Competitive Economies JEAN J. GABSZEWICZ and BENYAMIN SHITOVITZ
Chapter 16
Two-Sided Matching ALVIN E. ROTH and MARILDA SOTOMAYOR
Chapter 17
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets WILLIAM F. LUCAS
Contents of the Handbook
Contents of the Handbook Chapter 18
The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus MICHAEL MASCHLER
Chapter 19
Garne and Decision Theoretic Models in Ethics JOHN C. HARSANYI
CHAPTERS PLANNED FOR VOLUMES II-III Garnes of incomplete information Two-player garnes Conceptual foundations of strategic equilibrium Strategic equilibrium Correlated and communication equilibria Stochastic games Non-cooperative games with many players Differential garnes Economic applications of differential garnes Bargaining with incomplete information Oligopoly Implementation Principal-agent models Signalling Search Biological games International conflict Taxonomy of cooperative garnes Cooperative models of bargaining The Shapley value Variations on the Shapley value Values of large garnes Values of non-transferable utility garnes Values of perfectly competitive economies Other economic applications of value theory Power and stability in politics Coalition structures Cost allocation
ix
Con~n~of~eHandbook
History of game theory Utility and subjective probability Statistics Common knowledge Experimentation Psychology Social choice Public economics Voting methods Law Computer science
VOLUME
OF THE HANDBOOK*
I
Preface
Chapter 1 The Garne of Chess HERBERT A. SIMON and JONATHAN SCHAEFFER
Chapter 2 Games in Extensive and Strategic Forms SERGIU HART
Chapter 3 Games with Perfect Information JAN MYCIELSKI
Chapter 4 Repeated Garnes with Complete Information SYLVAIN SORIN
Chapter 5 Repeated Garnes of Incomplete Information: Zero-Sum SHMUEL ZAMIR Chapter 6
Repeated Garnes of Incomplete Information: Non-Zero-Sum FRAN(~OISE FORGES
Chapter 7 Noncooperative Models of Bargaining KEN BINMORE, MARTIN J. OSBORNE and ARIEL RUBINSTEIN
*Detailed contents of this volume (Volume I of the H a n d b o o k ) may be found on p. xvii.
viii
Chapter 8
Strategic Analysis of Auctions ROBERT WILSON
Chapter 9
Location JEAN J. G A B S Z E W I C Z and JACQUES-FRAN~OIS THISSE
Chapter i0
Strategic Models of Entry Deterrence ROBERT WILSON
Chapter 11
Patent Licensing MORTON I. KAMIEN
Chapter 12
The Core and Balancedness YAKAR KANNAI
Chapter 13
Axiomatizations of the Core B E Z A L E L PELEG
Chapter 14
The Core in Perfectly Competitive Economies ROBERT M. ANDERSON
Chapter 15
The Core in Impeffectly Competitive Economies JEAN J. GABSZEWICZ and BENYAMIN SHITOVITZ
Chapter 16
Two-Sided Matching ALVIN E. ROTH and MARILDA SOTOMAYOR
Chapter 17
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets WILLIAM F. LUCAS
Contents of the Handbook
Contents of the Handbook Chapter 18
The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus MICHAEL MASCHLER
Chapter 19
Garne and Decision Theoretic Models in Ethics JOHN C. HARSANYI
CHAPTERS PLANNED FOR VOLUMES II-III Garnes of incomplete information Two-player garnes Conceptual foundations of strategic equilibrium Strategic equilibrium Correlated and communication equilibria Stochastic games Non-cooperative games with many players Differential garnes Economic applications of differential garnes Bargaining with incomplete information Oligopoly Implementation Principal-agent models Signalling Search Biological games International conflict Taxonomy of cooperative garnes Cooperative models of bargaining The Shapley value Variations on the Shapley value Values of large garnes Values of non-transferable utility garnes Values of perfectly competitive economies Other economic applications of value theory Power and stability in politics Coalition structures Cost allocation
ix
Con~n~of~eHandbook
History of game theory Utility and subjective probability Statistics Common knowledge Experimentation Psychology Social choice Public economics Voting methods Law Computer science